Liberty Media Turns Formula 1 Into $25 Billion B2B Corporate Sport

自由媒体将F1打造为250亿美元的B2B商业体育帝国 F1之所以实现250亿美元的企业价值，是因为自由媒体通过成本上限和全球媒体策略推动了该赛事的专业化运作，使其从一场混乱的工程技术展示，转变为高利润且资产稀缺的企业游乐场。 本期内容记录了F1赛车的商业演变历程，从二战后的起源与安全危机，到蜕变成为价值数十亿美元的商业巨擘。内容着重介绍了伯尼·埃克莱斯顿如何通过《协和协议》集中掌控电视转播权与车队参赛权，以及随后在CVC Capital Partners主导下的结构变革与私募股权运作。最后，回顾重点落在了自由媒体2017年的收购上：该举措推动了赛事的现代化改革，引入了支出成本上限，通过Netflix的《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）拓展了美国市场，并确立了精英级B2B企业赞助模式，将车队的平均估值提升至36亿美元。 Formula 1 本质上融合了三场核心竞赛：时速超过 200 英里的顶尖车手对决、千人团队完全从零造车的“工程世界杯”，以及围绕围场政治与亿万富翁博弈的现实秀，如今已成为年观众超 8.27 亿的全球顶级赛事。 (2:08) 二战后英国废弃军用机场与空军机械人才的大量涌入奠定了现代 F1 的工程集群中心，而莲花车队（Lotus）创始人 Colin Chapman 推动的轻量化底盘设计与企业烟草赞助模式，从根本上重塑了该运动的技术与商业底层。 (12:04) 摩纳哥大奖赛凭借名流效应为这项运动注入了不可替代的奢华调性，而自 1950 年创办以来全勤参赛的法拉利（Ferrari），则构成了 Formula 1 锦标赛最核心的品牌与赛事合法性基石。 (21:21) 伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）打破了车队分别与赛道谈判出场费的低效模式，通过集中代理权将单队单场出场收入暴增数十倍，并在幕后抽取约 8% 的分成作为掌控商业版图的开端。 (43:49) 1981 年《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）将技术监管权赋予 FIA，同时将商业与转播权划归埃克莱斯顿，使他得以通过极低价格向全欧 92 家公共电视台大范围分销完整赛历转播，从而在早期积累了极其庞大的忠诚观众池。 (47:29)

Acquired hosts Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal argue that Formula 1 transformed from a financially unstable pastime for wealthy hobbyists into a highly defensible, $70 billion corporate ecosystem by pioneering a centralized 'fat league' media structure, turning racing teams into B2B enterprise marketing platforms, and leveraging digital storytelling to capture the American market. Media Centralization and the 'Fat League' Model (41:12) Gilbert and Rosenthal contrast Formula 1 with North American leagues like the NFL and NBA, which operate as 'thin leagues'—pass-through entities that distribute collective media earnings evenly among franchise owners. In contrast, Bernie Ecclestone structured F1 as an explicitly self-serving 'fat league.' Under the foundational 1981 Concorde Agreement, Ecclestone split authority with the FIA, leaving technical regulations to the governing body while centralizing broadcast and promoter revenues under his private entity, FOPA. He personally financed centralized broadcast production and negotiated guaranteed promoter fees, eventually buying out the FIA's volatile 30% revenue share for a flat annual fee escalating from $5 million to $9 million. When Liberty Media bought Formula 1 for $8 billion in 2017 ($4.4 billion in equity) and ousted Ecclestone, they modernized this equity model. By 2026, the Formula 1 Group reached an enterprise value of $25 billion and a $22 billion market capitalization, delivering a 22% compound annual growth rate for Liberty. Combining the league's valuation with the ten teams' collective $36 billion worth and a $500 million proxy value per Grand Prix circuit, the hosts estimate the sport's total enterprise value at roughly $70 billion, even as the teams' share of central management revenue dropped from 50% in 2018 to 37%. Team Turnaround and B2B Sponsorship Economics (222:40) Historically, F1 constructors operated as chronic loss leaders; over 100 teams collapsed into bankruptcy, and franchises frequently traded hands for nominal sums, such as Ford selling Jaguar Racing to Red Bull in 2004 for £1, and Honda transferring its outfit to Ross Brawn for £1 in 2008. Today, cost regulations and surging commercial demand have transformed teams into self-sustaining, profitable assets. A recent minority investment valued Mercedes F1 at $6 billion, with the team generating $200 million in operating profit at a 25% margin, alongside an estimated $1 billion in annual brand exposure. Ferrari and McLaren generate operating profits of $80 million and $70 million on revenues near $670 million, while Red Bull intentionally reinvests surplus cash to run near a 1% margin. Because broadcast cameras track moving cars rather than static trackside banners, constructors control the sport's most valuable commercial real estate, including $6 million to $7 million micro-placements on engine airboxes. Replacing historic tobacco liveries, teams now operate as enterprise B2B marketing platforms. Technology firms increasingly treat the Paddock Club as mobile executive briefing centers to demonstrate mission-critical software under high-stakes conditions, underpinning partnerships like Oracle's reported $500 million Red Bull title deal, ServiceNow's integration with Aston Martin, and LVMH's $100 million annual presence. Audience Expansion and U.S. Market Monetization Under Ecclestone, F1 suppressed digital media and sent cease-and-desist notices to drivers like Lewis Hamilton for publishing race footage on Instagram. Liberty reversed this policy by embracing open social distribution, esports partnerships with Electronic Arts, and narrative storytelling. The primary catalyst was Netflix's docuseries Drive to Survive, which premiered ahead of the COVID-19 pandemic and humanized drivers for locked-down viewers, adding 73 million global fans between 2020 and 2021 while substantially broadening female viewership. This media strategy unlocked the historically resistant U.S. market. Liberty initially licensed U.S. broadcast rights to ESPN for zero dollars to build reach across standard cable packages, eventually parlaying surging viewership—including a record 3.1 million American viewers for the Miami Grand Prix—into an ESPN renewal estimated at $80 million to $90 million annually through 2025. Crucially, the hosts observe that F1 has cultivated a unique dynamic where millions of self-identified fans buy merchandise and follow paddock personalities without regularly tuning in to live race broadcasts. The Engineering Arms Race and Regulatory Tensions (85:30) F1 engineering mirrors the semiconductor industry's capital-intensive frontier: with low-hanging technical gains exhausted, constructors spend upwards of $50 million chasing marginal aerodynamic advantages. Competitors operate in a relentless cycle of exploiting regulatory loopholes, decoding rival engineering breakthroughs, and replicating them across the grid within a few races. However, this technical sophistication introduces friction between pure entertainment and engineering dogma. Drivers including Max Verstappen have criticized modern hybrid power units as overly synthetic 'souped-up Formula E' cars, while purists lament the lost auditory violence of V10 engines. Furthermore, the hosts argue that corporate sustainability rhetoric is mathematically paradoxical: while on-track fuel consumption is negligible, moving the global series requires seven Boeing 777 cargo aircraft and 300-truck ground convoys. Long-term risks also include racing becoming processional parades constrained by heavy cars and tire conservation, though high switching costs and network scale protect the series against rival breakaway leagues. The hosts conclude that while Liberty Media successfully extracted the sport's low-hanging commercial opportunities by professionalizing digital media and penetrating the United States, future appreciation will require a slower, multi-decade operational slog. Formula 1's ongoing enterprise health depends on resolving the tension between technical complexity and exciting on-track racing while preserving its unique blend of global celebrity, engineering innovation, and corporate enterprise hospitality.

Acquired 节目主播 Ben Gilbert 与 David Rosenthal 指出，Formula 1（F1）已从历史上由欧洲富豪烧钱驱动的高危赛车运动，转型为由集中化商业运作、超级叙事与企业级软件赞助支撑的超级盈利机器。在 Liberty Media 主导下，F1 凭借独特的“肥联盟”（fat league）商业结构与美国市场开拓，蜕变为兼具极高技术护城河与百亿美元级估值的全球体育帝国。 集权控制与转播权变现模式 (47:29) 早期的格兰披治大奖赛各自独立，直到 1950 年 FIA 设立首届世界锦标赛。不同于北美 NFL 联盟专员 Pete Rozelle 奉行的“联盟优先、均分利益”模式，Bernie Ecclestone 采取了鲜明的“个人优先”集权策略。他察觉到车队老板们普遍沉迷造车而缺乏商业头脑，便通过自建公司垄断了赛道与赛事的独家商业谈判权。1981 年首份《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）确立了 FIA 管辖规则、车队必须按时参赛、赛事收益与转播权集中经由 Ecclestone 运作的格局。 随后，Ecclestone 创办 FOPA 独家整合转播制作，自费打造由英国统一向全球分发的单一主信号，彻底改写了赛车媒体经济。在转播权从最初的 30% 分成演化为用 500 万至 900 万美元固定年费买断 FIA 权益后，Ecclestone 赚取了巨额个人利润。同时，他利用阿布扎比（总投入 10 亿美元）、俄罗斯索契等主权级资金与高额承办费，重塑了 F1 的全球版图与盈利底座。 车队财务逆转与现代盈利神话 (151:46) 历史上曾有 100 多支 F1 车队因巨额亏损而破产退出。早年 Enzo Ferrari 仅将民用车销售视为资助赛车执念的工具，而莲花车队创始人 Colin Chapman 在 20 世纪 60 年代率先将 Gold Leaf 烟草广告涂满车身，开启了赞助商主导车队涂装的先河。全球金融危机期间，车队资产曾跌至谷底：Red Bull 以 1 英镑象征性收购捷豹车队；Ross Brawn 同样以 1 英镑管理层收购本田车队创立 Brawn GP，并在夺得双料世界冠军后，于休赛期以 2 亿美元向 Mercedes 出售 75% 股权。 在现代管理架构与预算帽等机制重塑下，当代车队已成为高产出现金流的成熟企业。节目披露的数据显示，Ferrari 年营收约 6.7 亿美元（营利 8000 万美元），McLaren 营收在 6.5 亿至 7 亿美元区间（营利约 7000 万美元），Red Bull 年营收约 4.2 亿美元并保持极低利润再投资。最具代表性的是 Mercedes 车队，在 6 亿美元总支出下实现了约 2 亿美元的营业利润，营业利润率达 25%，近期少数股权交易更对其给出了 60 亿美元估值，Toto Wolff 估算其每年还能产生 10 亿美元的“广告等价价值”。 企业级软件赞助与围场商业生态 (222:40) F1 拥有异于传统体育赛事的收入结构：最高价值的广告资源直接附着在赛车和车手身上，而非静态的赛道围栏。赛车进气箱的微型广告位年租金可达 600 万至 700 万美元，车手胸前布标亦达 150 万美元。现代 F1 已经演化为科技与企业级 B2B 软件的顶级社交主场。例如 Atlassian 首席执行官 Mike Cannon-Brookes 将赞助威廉姆斯车队定义为“移动高管简报中心”，高科技企业借助围场俱乐部（Paddock Club）向全球大客户现场展示其软件系统在极端高压场景下的实时运算能力。 这种 B2B 生态撬动了极其丰厚的资金池，如 ServiceNow 深度嵌入 Aston Martin 的工作流程，Oracle 与 Red Bull Racing 达成了据传 5 年 5 亿美元的冠名合作，LVMH 也签署了每年 1 亿美元的赞助大单。从 F1 母公司集团的 34 亿美元收入结构来看，转播权占 33%，赛事承办费占 29%，广告赞助占 19%，门票款待与周边授权占 19%，车队与联盟共同实现了商业价值的几何级倍增。 肥联盟架构与受众破圈的护城河 (231:03) 与北美 NFL、NBA 等仅作为资金穿透分发实体的“瘦联盟”（thin leagues）截然不同，F1 是一家自身截留巨额利润并享有资本市场估值的“肥联盟”（fat league）。2017 年 Liberty Media 以 80 亿美元（股权价值 44 亿美元）入主，到 2026 年 F1 集团市值达 220 亿美元、企业价值达 250 亿美元，录得 22% 的复合年增长率；结合 10 支车队约 360 亿美元的估值及分站赛事资产，全生态体系价值约达 700 亿美元。尽管车队在 F1 管理收入中的分成比例从 2018 年的 50% 下滑至约 37%，但不断做大的蛋糕使车队整体资产大幅增值。 Liberty 彻底废弃了 Ecclestone 时代对数字媒体与社交网络的严苛封锁，借助 Netflix 纪录片《疾速争胜》（Drive to Survive）引爆了全球特别是美国大众市场。美国平均观赛人数从 50 万翻倍突破百万，迈阿密站更创下 310 万收视纪录。依托 Hamilton Helmer 的“7 Powers”竞争框架，F1 凭借庞大的跨国运营规模经济、全球化赛道网络效应以及高达数十亿美元的替换成本，建立起了任何潜在竞争联盟都难以撼动的垄断壁垒。 主播在总结中指出，F1 的奇特之处在于其建立起了一大批狂热跟踪车手八卦、购买周边和关注科技赞助，却极少收看周末正赛直播的年轻化与女性化受众群体。但该商业模型并非毫无隐忧：一方面，Liberty 收购后的低垂红利已基本被摘取完毕，未来需面对多方转播权竞价与赛历协调的硬仗；另一方面，赛车为安全与混合动力妥协导致车身过重，复杂的电池能量管理和缺乏声浪让正赛日益沦为“巡游”，且庞大的全球洲际航运物流也让所谓的碳中和叙事显得极为脆弱。

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=0s) 序曲与节目开场：F1 的多重魅力 节目在欢快的闲聊中拉开帷幕。Ben Gilbert 和 David Rosenthal 兴奋地分享他们在录音前正在单曲循环 F1 的标志性主题曲来提振情绪。Ben 特意提到，Acquired 北部总部刚刚换上了根据 Acquired Slack 社区听友推荐购入的新音响，低音震撼无比。伴随着经典片头曲的节奏，两位主播正式宣布进入 2026 年春季档，并揭晓本期主角——世界上最顶级的赛车运动系列赛：世界一级方程式锦标赛（Formula 1）。 这项运动最早可以追溯到 20 世纪 30 年代，始于一群人对赛车极致纯粹、却也极度致命的热爱。二战结束后，大批退役的英国皇家空军人员和机械工程师涌入这项赛事，不断挑战技术与物理极限。随后几十年间，它逐渐演变成欧洲富豪们的烧钱游乐场：无数有钱人为了在欧洲大陆巡回竞逐而组建车队，却在过程中亏损了天文数字的财富。自这项运动诞生以来，已有超过 100 支独立车队登场并黯然离场，其中绝大多数都以破产告终。 然而在当下，这项一度被认为管理极其落后、靠“生拉硬拽”才步入现代管理轨道的赛事，已经被美国上市公司自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）收购——这家旗下曾囊括亚特兰大勇士队、SiriusXM、Live Nation 乃至互联网泡沫时期的 Excite@Home 的传媒巨头，顶住外界的所有质疑，终于将这项赛事、各个参赛车队以及明星车手们重塑为真正具备持续盈利能力的成熟商业实体。 --- ### [02:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=129s) 什么是 F1：工程世界杯、围场政治与天价马戏团 在两位主播眼中，F1 绝非单纯的赛车，而是一场“三位一体”的宏大竞技。首先，它是全球顶尖赛车手展现超凡车技的舞台；其次，它实质上是一场“工程世界杯”。在现代 F1 比赛中，每辆赛车的最终战力在很大程度上取决于幕后千人工程团队的研发实力，其决定性甚至超过了车手本身的临场发挥。F1 也是全球唯一要求参赛车队必须从零开始完全自主设计并制造赛车的赛车运动，进入门槛高得匪夷所思。最后，正如一位听众的精妙总结，F1 是一场“办公室政治的世界杯”，或者说是“车库里的真正主妇（Real Housewives of the Garage）”——那种顶级富豪之间的心机博弈、权力倾轧与肥皂剧般的抓马剧情，几乎天然就是绝佳的流媒体真人秀素材。 这项赛事的物理规格与物流开销同样令人咋舌： - **速度与耐力**：20 位车手驾驶赛车在超过 200 英里/小时（约 320 公里/小时）的时速下，完成全程长达 190 英里的高速对抗。 - **全球巡回物流**：被称为“飞行马戏团”的全部家当——包括价值连城的赛车、技术装备与移动围场接待中心，在每站比赛间隙被塞进整整 7 架波音货机，穿梭于摩纳哥、巴林、澳大利亚墨尔本等全球 24 座城市。 - **高科技造价**：单台赛车建造成本高达 2,000 万美元，前期研发费用更数以亿计，全车搭载多达 300 到 600 个精密传感器。 - **全球影响力**：尽管许多美国本土观众直到近年才通过 Netflix 纪录片有所耳闻，但 F1 实质上是全球收视规模最大的年度体育系列赛，观众群体超过 8.27 亿人（相比之下，奥运会和世界杯均为两到四年一届，并不属于常态年度赛事）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 的三重竞技属性 accDescr: 展示 F1 结合顶级车手对决、极限工程研发与车房政治大戏的三重特征。 subgraph Triangle["F1: 三位一体的全球顶级赛事"] A["顶尖车手对决<br/>20 位车手 / 200+ mph / 190 英里赛程"] B["工程世界杯<br/>1000+ 人团队 / 2000 万美元单车 / 零自研底盘"] C["围场政治剧<br/>车队领队博弈 / 亿万富豪冲突 / '车房娇妻'"] end A --- B B --- C C --- A ``` --- ### [03:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=233s) 商业视角下的 F1 与新赛季前瞻 Ben 和 David 强调，这期节目恰逢其时：距离新赛季打响仅剩 5 天时间，而这项运动即将迎来数十年未见的颠覆性巨变。不仅全面推行全新技术规则，导致赛车设计全盘洗牌，还将迎来第 11 支新车队凯迪拉克（Cadillac）的加入，奥迪（Audi）和福特（Ford）等巨头厂商也正在强势杀入围场，同时美国地区的流媒体转播权也正式花落 Apple TV。尽管整个运动体系走向了严密的高度职业化，但其背后依然由一群热爱赛车的顶级富豪所掌控——唯一的区别在于，如今的这群富豪“不再是赔钱赚吆喝的富豪了”。 两位主播同时重申了节目的核心定位：与此前制作过的 NFL、NBA 以及 IPL（印度板球超级联赛）类似，本期 Acquired 专注于剖析 F1 的底层商业逻辑，而非逐个盘点发烧友津津乐道的具体车手恩怨、规则细节或经典 V10 引擎的排气声浪。他们向本期特约赞助商 J.P. Morgan Payments 致谢，并宣布感谢华尔街日报体育编辑 Joshua Robinson 与 Jonathan Clegg，两位作者撰写的《The Formula》一书为本次节目提供了极具价值的商业历史史料与直接研究支持。 --- ### [05:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=352s) 赛车运动的诞生：“大奖赛”与国际汽联的规则之书 探讨 F1 的起源，David 指出它不同于普通商业公司或典型的北美职业联盟，并没有一个孤立的、清晰的“创立时刻”，而是与整个现代汽车工业的诞生相伴而生。在 19 世纪末德国人卡尔·本茨（Carl Benz）发明现代汽车后不久，人类本能的竞技欲望便迅速从赛马蔓延到了赛车。 进入 20 世纪最初的几十年，欧洲各地纷纷自发成立汽车俱乐部并举办有奖竞速赛。为了筹集奖金，组织方开始售卖门票与广告位，吸引全球各地的早期车手与汽车制造商参赛。1906 年，当时欧洲最具影响力的法国汽车俱乐部（Automobile Club de France）在巴黎西南郊的勒芒（Le Mans）举办了一场开创性的赛事。为了招揽观众，主办方取了一个极其直白的名字——“勒芒大奖赛”（Grand Prix de Le Mans，字面直译即为“大奖”）。 这一命名方式在赛车史上被永远定格。随着勒芒大奖赛名声大噪，整个 10 年代和 20 年代，欧洲各地相继效仿法国汽车俱乐部的规则标准举办同类竞速，意大利蒙扎（Monza）、摩纳哥蒙特卡洛（Monte Carlo）、德国纽博格林（Nürburgring）等传奇赛道相继涌现。20 世纪 20 年代，各大汽车俱乐部齐聚巴黎，商议设立一个常设跨国机构以统一监管这套竞赛规则（Formula），该机构几经更名后演变为如今的国际汽车联合会（FIA，Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile）。正如《The Formula》一书所指出的，这项运动之所以叫“Formula 1”，是因为它字面上就是以其背后的“规则手册（Formula）”命名的；围场内外无休止的规则争执与违规仲裁，正是其基因中不可分割的底色。 --- ### [08:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=522s) 1950 年银石启航：F1 的三大基石与英国赛车核心 尽管战前已经拥有了众多闻名遐迩的赛道与统一的 FIA 规则，但当时的各项大奖赛仍然属于互不相干的独立单场赛事，缺乏跨赛事的积分榜与年度锦标机制。虽然二战前曾有建立统一锦标赛的构想，但由于缺乏体系并随即被世界大战无情打断。 战后，建立真正意义上的全球车手总冠军赛的愿望空前强烈。1949 年，FIA 正式宣布创立首届“一级方程式世界车手锦标赛（World Championship of Drivers）”，精选了 7 场欧洲最负盛名的大奖赛组成首个赛季。1950 年 5 月 13 日，首场官方正式比赛在英格兰的银石赛道（Silverstone Circuit）轰鸣开跑，拉开了现代 F1 的历史帷幕。 David 指出，支撑起 F1 早期格局并奠定其后数十年基因的，是三大核心地理支柱： 1. **英国（United Kingdom）**：工业革命的发源地与战后航空航天技术的熔炉，从一开始就是、且至今仍是 F1 的技术神经中枢。即使到了今天，围场内仍有 70% 的车队总部与研发基地扎根英国（即著名的“赛车谷”Motorsport Valley）。 2. **摩纳哥（Monaco）**：代表着无可匹敌的财富、上流社交圈层与极致的奢华名望。 3. **意大利（Italy）**：代表着激昂的造车激情与赛车图腾，其中最无可替代的核心代表便是法拉利（Ferrari）——这也是围场内唯一未将研发大本营设在英国的老牌豪门。 ### [10:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=619s) 英国中部：F1 赛车圣地的诞生与正向循环 F1 车队之间虽然有着天差地别的文化、观念以及极其激烈的竞争，但令人惊奇的是，几乎所有车队的技术员工都集中在英格兰中部地区（English Midlands）方圆几十英里的极小范围内。表面上看，这显得非常随机：如果按照早期大奖赛的萌芽历史来推断，这项运动的自然温床理应是法国或德国，为何偏偏落在了英国乡村？ 二战后的英国恰好具备了一切天时地利的极端条件。首先，与战败的德国不同，英国虽是战胜国，但战后国内经济百废待兴、一片萧条，极度渴望重建与精神娱乐；其次，与法国不同，英国在战后遗留了大量空置的军用机场，并且伴随着数以万计刚从皇家空军退役、面临失业的战斗机飞行员与顶尖机械师。将这些闲置的机场跑道改造成赛道，让技艺高超的机械师和胆大包天的飞行员投入赛车运动，成了当时振兴英国乡村基础设施最完美的方式。 这就如同洛克希德·马丁（Lockheed Martin）与硅谷的早期发展一样，形成了一个强大的正向生态反馈循环：顶尖人才在此聚集，周边大学纷纷设立专门研究空气动力学、发动机设计和机械工程的学科与实验室，从而让这里成为全球招募 F1 技术人才最核心的基地。时至今日，即便车队名义上归属于其他国家并在当地注册，其绝大部分真正的工程与运营研发中心依然顽固地扎根在英国中部乡村。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 英国中部赛车产业集群生态演进 accDescr: 展示二战后英国凭借资源条件与正向循环打造现代 F1 核心工程基地的过程 subgraph PostWar["战后资源条件"] A["大量退役 RAF 飞行员与机械师"] B["广阔空置的军用废弃机场"] C["战后经济急需娱乐与重建"] end subgraph IndustryLoop["产业集群与正向循环"] D["早期车队成立与机场赛道改装"] E["高校设立空气动力学与发动机专业"] F["顶尖工程研发人才高密度聚集"] end subgraph ModernStatus["现代 F1 产业地位"] G["全球车队运营中心扎根英国乡村"] end A --> D B --> D C --> D D --> E E --> F F --> D F --> G ``` --- ### [12:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=724s) 柯林·查普曼、莲花车队与工程减重革命 在这些刚退役的皇家空军飞行员中，有一位不仅会开飞机，还是科班出身的机械工程师——柯林·查普曼（Colin Chapman）。他和法拉利的创始人恩佐·法拉利（Enzo Ferrari）一起，可以说是塑造 F1 第一个黄金时代最关键的两个人。1952 年，查普曼仅凭借 25 英镑的初始创业资金，在伦敦北部的一个废弃马厩里创办了莲花车队（Team Lotus）。因为 25 英镑连造半台赛车都不够，查普曼同期创立了莲花公路车业务来赚钱输血，后来该业务相当成功（特斯拉的第一代 Roadster 跑车底盘正是基于 Lotus Elise 打造）。 1958 年，查普曼终于凑齐资本造出了自己的赛车并正式进军一级方程式。彼时的 F1 还停留在草创期的“牛仔时代”，极像早期的 NFL：车队没有任何成规模的现代化后勤团队，往往由一两个人包揽了车队老板、经理、总工程师乃至当家车手的多重角色。事实上，在 1958 年之前根本就没有所谓的“车队年度总冠军”（Constructors' Championship），只有车手个人总冠军，因为车手与造车者往往就是同一批人。直到 1958 年引入车队冠军机制，要求每支车队必须自行设计制造底盘，并且必须派两辆赛车、两名车手出赛。 查普曼彻底颠覆了当时这项运动的认知逻辑。在此之前，以恩佐·法拉利为代表的主流观点认为赛车的核心就是大马力发动机，力大砖飞；而查普曼则指出，赛车不能像纳斯卡（NASCAR）那样只绕着椭圆圈跑，面对急弯、发卡弯、减速弯与双弯心，敏捷度和操控性至关重要。他留下一句名言："Adding power makes you faster on the straights. Subtracting weight makes you faster everywhere."（增加马力让你在直道更快，减轻重量让你在全场更快。）查普曼带领的轻量化与悬挂设计革命，直接将赛车工程推入了精细化操控的新纪元。 - **早年赛车形态**：20 世纪 50 至 60 年代的 F1 赛车完全没有如今巨大的前后扰流板或尾翼，外观就像极简的“皂飞车（Soapbox derby car）”或飞行的金属子弹。 --- ### [14:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=892s) 商业化突破：香烟赞助与疯狂的牛仔时代收场 查普曼带给 F1 的另一项决定性创举是车身赞助商广告涂装。在查普曼打破规矩之前，所有 F1 赛车只能涂刷国际汽联（FIA）按国家分配的传统颜色： - **英国**：英国赛车绿（British Racing Green） - **意大利**：法拉利红（Ferrari Red） - **德国**：梅赛德斯银（Silver Arrows） 到了 20 世纪 60 年代，为了给研发活动筹措巨资，查普曼拉来了金叶烟草公司（Gold Leaf Tobacco），将莲花赛车喷涂成赞助商标志性的红白相间条纹。这开启了 F1 历史上最深远、也是最赚钱的联姻——“极速赛车与烟草巨头”。尽管 FIA 起初极力反对并一度明令禁止车身广告，但面对各车队接二连三濒临破产的惨淡现实，官方很快妥协，意识到唯有赞助费才能挽救这项昂贵的运动。由此，万宝路（Marlboro）、约翰·球员特别版（John Player Special）等烟草品牌几乎完全主导了长达数十年的车身涂装，以至于赛车在赛道飞驰时就像一盒盒移动的烟盒，连塞纳（Ayrton Senna）、迈克尔·舒马赫（Michael Schumacher）和阿兰·普罗斯特（Alain Prost）这些传奇巨星的比赛服与头盔也全被烟草商标覆盖，直到 2000 年代初欧盟立法全面禁止烟草广告才告一段落。 查普曼传奇的一生却以极其荒诞和戏剧性的方式收场。70 年代末至 80 年代初，他卷入了与传奇汽车人物约翰·德罗宁（John DeLorean）的惊天丑闻中。查普曼当时为《回到未来》中的经典跑车 DMC-12 设计底盘，随后德罗宁公司轰然破产。英国检方指控德罗宁与查普曼合谋侵吞了原本用于在北爱尔兰建厂的 800 万英镑英国政府补贴。在这桩挪用公款丑闻东窗事发之际，查普曼于 54 岁突发心脏病猝死；而德罗宁随后在洛杉矶的一场 FBI 钓鱼执法行动中落网——他当时试图通过走私 220 磅可卡因来偿还汽车公司的债务。 这种充满野心、独立怪才、个人英雄主义、烟草黑金，甚至带着或多或少诈骗色彩的荒诞故事，正是早期欧洲 F1“狂野西部”时代的生动写照。 --- ### [18:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1086s) 摩纳哥大奖赛：好莱坞名流与奢华名利场的碰撞 如果 F1 的发展仅仅停留在英国中部那些工程师和机械狂人的狂野作坊里，它绝不可能成长为今天全球顶级的商业帝国。就在莲花车队崛起的同一时期，这项运动确立了第二大基石——摩纳哥。 1956 年，摩纳哥元首兰尼埃三世（Prince Rainier III）迎娶了好莱坞巨星格蕾丝·凯利（Grace Kelly）。这场世纪婚礼将旧大陆欧洲王室的悠久传承、贵族地位与合法性，同新大陆好莱坞的耀眼星光与奢华名气完美交融，犹如“20 世纪的特拉维斯·凯尔西与泰勒·斯威夫特（Travis Kelce & Taylor Swift）跨界大狂欢”。 虽然在二战之前，摩纳哥狭窄起伏的街道上就已经举行过具有相当声望的街道大奖赛，但当格蕾丝王妃入主摩纳哥王宫后，一切被推向了全新的高度： - **名流汇聚**：格蕾丝王妃的好莱坞名流圈层开始蜂拥而至； - **赛历天作之合**：摩纳哥大奖赛在赛历上恰好与近在咫尺的戛纳电影节（Cannes Film Festival）时间重叠； - **巨星打卡**：弗兰克·辛纳屈（Frank Sinatra）、披头士乐队（The Beatles）、滚石乐队（The Rolling Stones）等顶级巨星相继成为维修区与游艇上的常客。 自此，车手们不仅是机械竞技者，也成为了名流社交界的主角。随着时间推移，包括刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）、马克斯·维斯塔潘（Max Verstappen）、夏尔·勒克莱尔（Charles Leclerc）和兰多·诺里斯（Lando Norris）在内的大批现役顶尖车手，不仅贪恋蔚蓝海岸的奢靡社交与避税天堂属性，更让摩纳哥彻底成为了 F1 奢华、名声与极速交织的精神图腾。 ### [20:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1237s) 摩纳哥大奖赛的不可替代性与奢华基因 摩纳哥赛道依悬崖而建，街道狭窄、古老且蜿蜒曲折。在 1950 年代初，用当时那种小巧纤细的赛车在这样的街道上飞驰还算合情合理；但放到今天，现代 F1 赛车庞大厚重的体型早已让这条赛道显得格格不入。如果以当今的标准去规划赛历，赛事组织者绝无可能把摩纳哥列入大奖赛版图。然而与此同时，F1 也绝无可能放弃摩纳哥——正是摩纳哥将纯粹的奢华基因注入了这项运动。放眼当今的职业体育联盟商业运作（正如在印度板球超级联赛 IPL 专题中讨论的那样），奢华与高规格包装已是常规操作，但在 1950 年代，这种误打误撞的结合不仅超前于时代，更在无意间确立了 F1 的高端调性。 这种赛事体系与普通体育联盟截然不同：F1 本质上是车队（Teams）与赛道（Racetracks）这两个独立实体的联姻。在常规体育中，一支球队通常与固定的主场球馆绑定，比如西雅图海鹰队（Seattle Seahawks）与他们的流明球场（Lumen Field）；而 F1 却是由管理机构把一群没有固定主场的车队与散落世界各地的大奖赛赛道撮合在一起。在最初的年月里，这种合作极为松散随意，每场大奖赛的车队与车手阵容都不尽相同，主办方完全是各凭本事、东拼西凑地招募车队前来参赛。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 双轨组织架构关系图 accDescr: 展示 F1 联盟如何撮合独立的参赛车队与独立的大奖赛赛道承办方 subgraph Core ["Formula 1 赛事平台组织者"] F1["F1 联盟组织方<br/>(撮合赛事日程与商业权益)"] end subgraph Teams ["流动的参赛实体"] T1["法拉利 (Ferrari)"] T2["莲花 (Lotus) 等英系车队"] T3["各独立私人车队"] end subgraph Circuits ["独立的分站赛道"] C1["摩纳哥街道赛 (蒙特卡洛)"] C2["银石赛道 (英国)"] C3["蒙扎赛道 (意大利)"] end Teams -->|"奔赴全球各站参赛"| F1 Circuits -->|"承办大奖赛分站"| F1 F1 -->|"构建全球巡回赛季"| Output["F1 世界一级方程式锦标赛"] ``` --- ### [21:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1281s) 法拉利与恩佐：F1 的终极基石与神话源泉 摩纳哥奠定了奢华，而这项运动早期不可动摇的意大利核心柱石则是法拉利（Ferrari）及其灵魂人物恩佐·法拉利（Enzo Ferrari）。在二战前，恩佐创立公司的初衷完全是为了赛车，代表阿尔法·罗密欧（Alfa Romeo）出征各大赛事，这也正是法拉利继承意大利标志性赛车红的原因。直到二战结束后，法拉利才真正开始自行制造汽车。1950 年首届 F1 世界锦标赛开打时，渴望在赛车之巅证明自己的恩佐必然选择加入；自此，法拉利成为自 1950 年首届锦标赛起唯一参加了每一届 F1 赛季的车队。 普通大众往往认为，是成熟的顶级赛事为汽车制造商带来声誉背书，但法拉利与 F1 的关系恰恰完全相反——是法拉利的存在赋予了 F1 合法性与权威感。如果哪天法拉利宣布退出 F1，全球观众的第一反应会是怀疑这项赛事的价值，甚至会发问：“如果法拉利不在，这还能算顶级赛车吗？”不同于柯林·查普曼（Colin Chapman）这类专注机械极限的英国工程怪才，恩佐·法拉利拥有敏锐的商业嗅觉。他率先洞察到一个前所未有的商业契机：将极速狂飙的赛车、无与伦比的竞技底蕴，与摩纳哥代表的名流社交、泼天财富以及好莱坞星光无缝结合，并把这种极致性能车兜售给全球名流与皇室贵胄。 在二战后极短的时间内，法拉利便确立了顶级奢侈品牌的地位，甚至可以被视为 20 世纪下半叶唯一真正白手起家并站稳脚跟的超级奢侈品牌。正如马术渊源构成了爱马仕（Hermès）的灵魂基石，F1 赛车运动正是法拉利的合法性灵魂所在。当其他许多车队仅仅打造两三辆纯赛车比完就了事时，恩佐正在为欧洲皇室和好莱坞明星手工打造限量跑车。普通车迷或许一辈子买不起法拉利，但每个孩子卧室墙上挂着的红色跑车海报或案头模型，成功将赛道上的残酷竞速转化为了大众心中触手可及的造车传奇。 - **全勤纪录**：法拉利是自 1950 年成立以来唯一一支从未缺席过任何单一赛季的 F1 车队。 - **奢侈品对比**：爱马仕依托顶级马术奠定品牌神性，法拉利则依托 1950 至 1960 年代与 F1 的共生发展树立了超级跑车的神话。 --- ### [25:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1542s) 早期赛车的致命危险与奔驰的勒芒灾难 在英格兰与意大利主导早期赛车时，德国车厂并非没有存在感。梅赛德斯（Mercedes）在 1950 年代初曾是 F1 与赛车界的主导力量。然而 1955 年勒芒 24 小时耐力赛上发生了赛车史惨绝人寰的一幕：梅赛德斯赛车发生严重撞车事故冲入看台，造成 82 名观众丧生。这场毁灭性灾难直接导致当年剩余的四场 F1 大奖赛被取消，梅赛德斯更宣布退出几乎全部赛车运动，就此阔别 F1 赛场长达 40 年之久。 在那个年代，赛车运动伴随着可怕的致命死亡率，但这种“向死而生”的角斗士色彩反倒成了吸引受众的核心魅力之一。车手每次坐进座舱都是在拿生命下注，其残酷的伤亡数据令人触目惊心： - **1950 年代**：F1 发生 14 起车手丧生事故，平均每年夺去 1.4 名车手的生命。 - **1960 年代**：同样夺走了 14 名车手的生命；在 1961 年意大利蒙扎大奖赛上，一起事故除车手遇难外，更连带造成 15 名现场观众死亡。 - **1970 年代**：又有 12 位车手在比赛中殒命；直到 1980 年代后安全规程才逐步完善。 在 F1 前三十年的岁月里，每年都有 5% 到 10% 的现役车手因意外身亡，重伤更是不计其数。最传奇的案例当属尼基·劳达（Niki Lauda），他的赛车起火导致头部严重烧伤毁容，然而在被大火灼伤短短数周后，他便头戴绷带重返赛道，这种不可思议的硬汉精神在现代人看来简直难以想象。 --- ### [27:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1650s) 伯尼·埃克莱斯顿登场与时代变局 在整个 1970 年代之前，唯有恩佐·法拉利参透了如何借由公路跑车将整个赛车体系变现为庞大商业帝国。当时赛道围场里流传着一句竞争车队老板的名言：“Formula 1 is Ferrari and Ferrari is Formula 1. It's that simple.”（F1 就是法拉利，法拉利就是 F1，事情就是这么简单。） 说出这句名言的竞争对手不是别人，正是日后从某种意义上在商界“取代”了恩佐地位的教父级人物——伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）。正如《方程式》（*The Formula*）一书作者约书亚·罗宾逊（Joshua Robinson）与乔纳森·克莱格（Jonathan Clegg）所评价的那样：“事实证明，谁也没能比伯尼从法拉利的神话光环中榨取更多财富，尽管他从未在马拉内罗（Maranello）领过哪怕一分钱薪水。”伯尼成为了掌控整项赛事的至高霸主。 在讲述伯尼的发迹史前，节目插播了主赞助商摩根大通支付（J.P. Morgan Payments）的介绍：现代体育消费涵盖门票、餐饮到周边商品，摩根大通在生物识别面部支付（Pay-by-Face）等前沿技术上大力投入，此前在 Chase Center 现场秀中就应用了面部识别结账系统，通过全渠道支付 API 与硬件方案优化用户体验。 广告结束后，故事正式切入伯尼·埃克莱斯顿的人生起点。伯尼出生于 1930 年，成长于伦敦东北部萨福克郡（Suffolk）的一个清贫家庭。他的父亲是一名商业渔民，母亲则是操持家务的家庭主妇。这个身材矮小的工薪阶层青年，即将在这项充斥着贵族与危险的赛车运动中掀起一场天翻地覆的商业风暴。 ### [31:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=1862s) 从二手车贩到伦敦名流的“车贩子” 二战结束后，伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）在伦敦涉足退役军用摩托车和二手剩余汽车的倒买倒卖生意。不久后，他在伦敦市郊开办了自己的汽车展厅，开始专注于向战后新兴的富豪与名流兜售豪华座驾。在 20 世纪 60 年代的伦敦名流圈，正如每个人都会有自己专属的珠宝商、裁缝甚至是违禁药品贩子一样，伯尼成了名副其实的“豪车掮客”（the car guy）。 大众往往将伯尼戏称为“前二手车贩”，但这种标签并不公允——这好比把别人收藏的拼图表盘劳力士（puzzle dial Rolex）贬低为“二手表”一样。当时的伯尼做的是高端稀缺资源生意：客人想要法拉利（Ferrari）还是布加迪（Bugatti），只要一通电话，他就能调配资源搞定。坊间长期流传着他参与过地下黑产的传言，伯尼本人甚至乐于顺水推舟强化这种狠人形象。最著名的传闻莫过于他被怀疑是 1963 年英国“火车大劫案”（Great Train Robbery，劫匪从英国皇家邮政列车抢走 260 万英镑现金）的幕后黑手。直到 2005 年伯尼 75 岁时接受媒体采访，被问及此事，他才轻描淡写地回应：“那趟火车上的钱根本不值得我出手，要干我也干一票更大的。” 除了倒卖豪车，精明的伯尼还盯上了汽车金融。他不仅赚取高额的车辆溢价，更把富豪客户们引导到汽车贷款与金融方案中。当豪车总价极其昂贵时，伴随的金融服务费和利息是一笔巨额收入，这为伯尼积累了人生第一笔真正意义上的原始财富。 - 1963 年英国皇家邮政列车大劫案失窃金额达 260 万英镑，当时被誉为史上最著名的劫案之一。 - 伯尼依靠豪车销售溢价与高额汽车金融贷款服务，完成了早期的资本积累。 --- ### [33:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=2026s) 结缘约亨·林特与入主布拉汉姆车队 深入豪华车圈后，伯尼获得了与恩佐·法拉利（Enzo Ferrari）几十年前完全相同的商业顿悟：赛车运动（Motorsport）是所有豪华超跑最核心、最无可替代的品牌合法性背书。为了让自己的汽车展厅和品牌与顶级赛车挂钩，伯尼在 60 年代中期开始频繁出没于 F1 车手圈。凭借高超的谈判和交易撮合能力，他迅速当上了几位哥们儿车手的经纪人，通过向车队争取更高的车手薪水来抽取佣金。 在此期间，伯尼与莲花车队（Team Lotus，由科林·查普曼执掌）的头牌车手约亨·林特（Jochen Rindt）成为了挚友与合伙人。两人密谋由林特离开莲花车队，与伯尼联手买下一支属于他们自己的 F1 车队，让林特从纯粹的车手晋升为车队老板。在 1970 赛季，状态如日中天的林特凭借压倒性优势领跑积分榜。然而，在当年倒数第 4 场大奖赛的练习赛中，一直对莲花赛车安全性抱有疑虑的林特不幸遭遇严重车祸身亡。即便在身故后剩余的所有分站中一分未得，林特此前积累的巨大积分优势依然让他获得了 1970 年 F1 年度车手世界冠军，成为这项运动历史上唯一一位被死后追授世界冠军的车手。 林特的猝然离世让伯尼悲痛万分。为了兑现二人共同的遗愿，伯尼在 1972 年出资 10 万英镑（约合如今的 230 万英镑）买下了布拉汉姆车队（Brabham）。尽管伯尼几年后仅以 500 万英镑的价格转手了布拉汉姆，但这笔收购彻底为他打开了通往 F1 权力核心的大门。 - 约亨·林特（Jochen Rindt）是 F1 历史上唯一一位在身故后被追授世界冠军的车手。 - 伯尼在 1972 年以 10 万英镑收购布拉汉姆车队，而在如今的现代 F1 中，单支车队的估值底线已经飙升至 15 亿美元。 --- ### [36:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=2193s) F1 制造商协会与荒唐的散装运营模式 买下布拉汉姆车队的同时，伯尼顺理成章地拿到了“一级方程式制造商协会”（FOCA，Formula One Constructors Association）的入场席位。这个所谓的协会在当时极为松散，由科林·查普曼（Colin Chapman）于 1963 年牵头成立，最初的目的极其朴素：车队老板们为了节约成本，联合协调把赛车和设备运送到世界各地的后勤包机与陆运物流。赛道上彼此拼得你死我活的宿敌，在场下为了省钱只能“拼车搭伙”。 深入其中后，伯尼敏锐地洞察到了赛场背后的两个残酷真相： 1. **绝大多数车队毫无商业头脑**：除恩佐·法拉利外，其余车队老板唯一的执念就是打造更快的车、赢得比赛，手头无论有多少资金都会被无节制地挥霍进赛车改装的无底洞。 2. **大部分车队极度缺钱且缺乏造血能力**：除了法拉利（当时已将一半股权出售给菲亚特集团，背靠巨额产业资本）之外，其他独立车队朝不保夕。例如莲花车队的查普曼不久后甚至卷入了 DeLorean 800 万美元的挪用公款丑闻。在整个 F1 历史上，车队的平均寿命只有短短 6 年左右。1972 年围场内的 9 支车队中，只有法拉利和迈凯伦延续至今，而当时真正算得上可持续商业实体的唯有法拉利一家。 更荒唐的是当时的商业化与赛事运作模式。在伯尼接管前，全联盟不存在任何中心化的商业开发。各大车队需要分别与全球各个分站的赛道推广方（Promoters）单独谈判出场费（appearance fees）。如果一个赛季有 15 站大奖赛、9 支车队，围场内就会诞生多达 135 份各自为政、价格参差不齐的独立协议。这种模式不仅让车队在面对赛道方时完全丧失谈判议价权，更对赛事本身构成了毁灭性打击：车迷买票入场前，根本无法获知法拉利或迈凯伦会不会参赛，车队随时可能因为出场费谈不拢而直接罢赛。 与此同时，电视转播在当时的 F1 几乎是一片荒原，没有任何全球转播权架构。相比之下，大洋彼岸的美国 NFL 早在 1961 年就签署了全美统一转播协议，并在 1970 年开创了《周一橄榄球之夜》（Monday Night Football），单年全美转播收入已突破 5000 万美元大关。在商业逻辑四分五裂、电视转播完全空白的权力真空中，伯尼看到了彻底重构整个这项运动商业格局的绝佳契机。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1970年代初F1分散商业模式与转播真空 accDescr: 展示1972年伯尼入局前F1各自为政的谈判架构与商业缺陷 subgraph IndependentTeams["各独立车队（9支车队）"] T1["法拉利 (Ferrari)"] T2["莲花 / 迈凯伦 / 布拉汉姆等"] end subgraph TrackPromoters["各分站赛道推广方（约15站）"] P1["摩纳哥大奖赛"] P2["银石大奖赛"] P3["蒙扎大奖赛等"] end IndependentTeams <-- "多达135份各自独立的<br/>出场费谈判协议" --> TrackPromoters subgraph MarketFailure["机制缺陷与市场真空"] F1["谈判杠杆完全分散<br/>出场收益极低"] F2["车队随时缺席<br/>车迷无法预知阵容"] F3["电视转播权完全空白<br/>落后于NFL等成熟联盟"] end IndependentTeams -.-> MarketFailure TrackPromoters -.-> MarketFailure ``` - 1972 年伯尼入局时的 9 支车队分别为：莲花（Lotus）、泰瑞尔（Tyrrell）、迈凯伦（McLaren）、法拉利（Ferrari）、瑟蒂斯（Surtees）、马驰（March）、BRM、马特拉（Matra）以及布拉汉姆（Brabham）。 - 当时 9 支车队与 15 个分站赛道推广方单独谈判，赛季内形成至少 135 份独立出场费合约。 - 美国国家美式橄榄球联盟（NFL）早在 1961 年便推出了全美集中转播协议，到 1970 年代中期年均转播收入已超过 5000 万美元，而同期的 F1 仍在电视版权上处于零起点状态。 ### [41:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=2500s) 伯尼 vs 皮特·罗泽尔：“我优先”与“联盟优先”的商业哲学碰撞 在当时的体育商业格局中，F1 的知名度完全不亚于任何主流联赛，它是一项拥有绝佳受众画像的全球化运动，但在媒体版权收入上却几乎为零。伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）踏入这个赛场时，虽然算不上专业媒体人，但他敏锐地看到了两个巨大的商业杠杆：短期内将各赛道的承办谈判权集中收拢，压榨出最大利益并从中抽成；长远来看，则潜藏着电视转播权这笔尚未被发掘的惊人资产。 主播们在这里将伯尼与同时期掌舵 NFL 的传奇总裁皮特·罗泽尔（Pete Rozelle）进行了精彩对比，戏称伯尼是“反向罗泽尔”（anti-Pete Rozelle）。罗泽尔是来自洛杉矶、精明老练的公关与媒体专家，他是被 32 支球队老板雇佣的职业经理人，代表所有球队的共同利益。罗泽尔的核心哲学是“共产主义资本主义”（communist capitalism）——联盟利益至上，大家同舟共济，集中打包版权并均分收益，共同做大蛋糕。 然而伯尼的行动信条绝非“联盟第一”，而是彻底的“我优先”（me first）。伯尼推行的集权化，绝不是让所有车队平分 F1 的所有权；他的逻辑是自己成立一家独立公司，由这家公司出面与全球赛道签订协议，然后要求所有车队回过头来与他做生意，由他来决定每支车队参赛的利益分配。 ### [43:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=2629s) 8%提成与拯救车队：从一万美元到二十万美元的质变 伯尼向一众制造商业余车队老板抛出了极具诱惑力却又暗藏杀机的提议：车队老板们显然缺乏商业谈判的精力和意愿，既然如此，不如将车队出赛权全部打包授权给他。由他亲自出面去对付那些在当时颇具“黑帮做派”的赛道推广方，为大家争取最优的集体报价。为了彻底打消顾虑，伯尼甚至独自承担全部风险，提前向车队白纸黑字担保他们拿到的钱绝不低于现状。作为交换，车队必须放弃过去“想去就去、不想去就鸽”的散漫习惯，签署具有法律约束力的强制出赛条款。 在收益分配上，坊间传闻伯尼当年在车队协会（FOCA）会议上面头承诺，自己只会在总赛事出场费中提取极其微薄的“2%”作为服务酬劳。但伯尼行事从不立字据。数十年后因一系列官司让账目公之于众，人们才赫然发现，他实际从总流水中硬生生抽走了 8% 的顶级提成。此外，他自己还拥有一支车队（布拉汉姆车队），因此还能分走一份参赛分成。但客观评价，这 8% 的提成车队掏得心服口服——如果没有伯尼，除了财大气粗的法拉利以外，其他纯粹靠比赛糊口的小车队几乎都会走向破产。 在伯尼接盘之前，各分站大奖赛支付给车队的平均奖金与出场费仅有可怜的 1 万美元左右。伯尼掌舵的第一年，就把车队平均单场分红拉升至 4 万美元（暴涨 4 倍）；到了 1970 年代中期，这一数字跃升至 15 万美元；而在 70 年代末期，单场出赛费更是突破了 20 万美元大关。单场 20 万美元的保底收入，让车队终于有了稳定的现金流来支撑工厂研发与赛事运营。此外，伯尼还凭借聚合采购的议价权，为各车队拿下了极其优惠的跨国货运与差旅物流折扣。这正如一位主播导师当年的生动总结：“他或许是个恶霸，但至少他是站在我们这边的恶霸”（"He may be a thug, but at least he's our thug."）。 - **车队收益飞跃**：单场奖金/出场费从伯尼接手前的平均 1 万美元，飙升至首年 4 万美元、70 年代中期 15 万美元，最终在 70 年代末达到 20 万美元。 - **物流集约化**：将车队协会最初协调差旅费用的初衷彻底落实，通过大宗谈判大幅削减了跨国海空运成本。 - **治理性质**：国际汽联（FIA）作为行业非政府组织（NGO）依然把控赛车技术规则与大奖赛命名认可权，伯尼则接管了整项赛事的商业运转中枢。 ### [47:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=2849s) 协和协定横空出世：巴黎协和广场的权力分立 伯尼这种强行聚合权力、将全球赛道推广方逼入墙角的行径，立刻引来了推广商们的强烈反弹。各大赛道老板根本无法容忍这个来自英国的矮个子骑在自己头上予取予求，于是纷纷找上国际汽联告状，抗议伯尼妄图独揽 F1 大权。这随即引发了伯尼率领的车队协会（FOCA）与国际汽联（FIA）之间漫长而激烈的权力拉锯战，最终双方在 1981 年达成妥协，签署了奠定现代 F1 权力基石的历史性文件——《第一份协和协定》（First Concorde Agreement）。 协定之所以被冠以“协和”（Concorde）之名，正因为谈判是在国际汽联位于巴黎协和广场（Place de la Concorde）的总部内闭门敲定的。当时的国际汽联是由欧洲各国汽车俱乐部联合组成的非政府标准组织，掌管着拉力赛、耐力赛等各类汽车运动，充斥着一群自命不凡的传统官僚。在这份开启 F1 现代化篇章的协定中，双方敲定了四项核心条款： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1981年第一份协和协定权力与商业利益划分 accDescr: 展示FIA、车队协会与伯尼在竞技规则、参赛义务、赛事承办费与电视转播权上的分工 subgraph S1["国际汽联 (FIA) 权力范围"] A["技术与竞赛规则制定权"] --> A1["全权掌管，排他性管辖，车队无权干涉"] end subgraph S2["车队协会 (FOCA) 义务"] B["车队出赛承诺"] --> B1["严格保证参加每一个官方大奖赛分站"] end subgraph S3["商业利益归属 (伯尼与FOCA)"] C["赛道承办费与奖金分配"] --> C1["赛道方必须全额统一支付给伯尼与车队协会"] D["电视媒体转播权"] --> D1["未来5个赛季所有转播权益与收益100%归伯尼与FOCA所有"] end ``` ### [50:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3033s) 被视作“烫手山芋”的电视转播权：时代的致命盲区 回看这份协定中最不可思议的一笔交易，莫过于赛道方和 FIA 竟然拱手让出了未来五个赛季所有的电视转播权与相关收入，一分钱都没给自己留，任由其全部流向伯尼与车队协会手中。在今天看来，电视转播权早已是整项运动体量最大、最赚钱的印钞机，但在 1981 年，双方在签字时居然都觉得自己占尽了便宜。 造成这一历史性误判的核心原因在于，当时的赛道推广方和官僚们认为电视版权根本一文不值： 1. **转播生态滞后**：当时的欧洲和英国电视媒体高度由国家公权力垄断（如 BBC 及其欧洲各国同行），性质类似于美国的公共广播电视台（PBS），缺乏像美国三大商业电视网那样成熟、激烈的商业赞助和竞价变现机制。 2. **转播技术门槛极高**：在当时的转播技术条件下，要想在一座包含十几个复杂弯角、单圈数公里的赛道上捕捉以极速掠过的赛车，简直是拍摄调度上的噩梦。 3. **官僚沟通成本巨大**：制作成本奇高不说，还要去求着各国的国有电视台排期播放，所有人都觉得这是个注定赔本且吃力不讨好的差事（"boondoggle"）。 赛道方和 FIA 当时的态度就像是把一块烫手山芋扔给了伯尼，甚至心想“祝你好运，有本事你就去折腾吧”。而善于在灰色地带中游刃有余的伯尼，正是在所有人认知盲区的废墟之上，悄然开启了他对全球电视体育帝国的终极布局。 ### [52:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3160s) 伯尼的远见：低价绑定转播商与单一公共信号的诞生 伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）在掌控转播权之后，展现出了极致的商业操盘能力。他没有急于榨取当期利润，而是直接找到了欧洲广播联盟（European Broadcasting Union，简称 EBU）。这个组织代表了包括英国 BBC 在内的 92 个国家的公共广播电视台。伯尼向他们提出了一笔极其划算的交易：每年仅需支付几百万美元的象征性费用，就能打包拿走 F1 在全部 92 个国家的转播权。分摊到每一家国家电视台头上，成本几乎可以忽略不计。但伯尼开出了一个核心先决条件：转播机构必须承诺直播赛历上的“每一场分站赛”，而绝不仅限于他们本国的主场比赛。 彼时的伯尼完全处于“培育市场”模式，而非急于“变现收割”。他深知通过各大国家级公共广播电台将赛事推向千家万户，能以极低成本迅速在大众层面建立起 F1 的品牌与观赛习惯。然而，这 92 家公共电视台很快暴露了一个现实难题：它们既没有技术经验，也没有动力去专门研究如何转播一场极其复杂的赛车比赛。时至今日，全球各地的电视台在转播 F1 时，绝大部分也依然直接接收一条官方制作的主信号，再在此基础上添加本国解说与附加内容。 面对制作难题，伯尼主动承担了前期资金与技术风险。他自掏腰包投入重金，决定由自己在英国集中制作每场比赛的单一标准化公共电视信号（central television feed），再统一下发给欧洲各国的电视台。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 伯尼整合电视转播生态示意图 accDescr: 展示伯尼如何通过公共信号与分销网络掌控全球F1转播 subgraph Core ["信号制作与集权中心"] Bernie["伯尼 / FOPA<br/>统筹制作统一公共信号"] end subgraph Distribution ["分销网络"] EBU["欧洲广播联盟 EBU<br/>涵盖92国公共电视台"] PayTV["新兴欧洲付费电视生态<br/>后期竞标变现"] end subgraph Terminal ["终端与收益"] Audiences["欧洲及全球泛受众<br/>观赛基数爆炸性扩张"] Commercial["车队赛车赞助价值暴增<br/>赛道方仅剩门票收入"] end Bernie -->|"超低价授权全季转播"| EBU Bernie -->|"成熟期高价拍卖"| PayTV EBU --> Audiences PayTV --> Audiences Audiences --> Commercial ``` --- ### [54:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3258s) 创立 FOPA：不做厚合同的握手生意与欧洲付费电视浪潮 为了运作电视信号的制作与分销，伯尼成立了一家名为“一级方程式推广与管理公司”（Formula One Promotions and Administration，简称 FOPA）的新公司。这不仅与代表车队利益的 FOCA（一级方程式制造商协会）划清了界限，更是让电视转播业务完全独立归属于伯尼个人控制的名下。伯尼在商业世界中素以特立独行闻名，他极度厌恶繁琐的法律文书，曾公开表示： > “我做生意的方式很不寻常。我不喜欢合同。我喜欢能够看着对方的眼睛，然后和他们握手，而不是像美国人那样搞一份 92 页厚、根本没人看也没人懂的合同。如果我说我会做某事，我就会去做；如果我说不做，我就不会做。” 伯尼不断复用他的经典商业打法：先在一个原本分散的环节中建立起集中化的服务，让自己成为整个生态系统中唯一的“咽喉要道”，从而掌握绝对的博弈筹码。让各大公共广播机构以白菜价为他培养并教育市场后，一旦合约期满，受众胃口已被完全吊起，他就能够以垄断供给者的身份重新开价。 与此同时，时代也给予了伯尼极大的助力。美国之所以能更早开发体育电视市场，是因为其有线电视和付费电视（Pay TV）体系成形较早，内容买家竞争激烈；而就在伯尼推进 F1 电视化的这几年，欧洲的付费电视产业也迎来了全面爆发。此外，伯尼在协议中还悄然植入了一条关键条款：各分站赛事的承办方必须将赛道广告（trackside advertising）和企业贵宾款待区（corporate hospitality）的权益全额上缴给 F1 旗下的实体。自此，赛道所有者的商业模式被硬生生压缩到了只剩门票销售。 --- ### [57:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3454s) 瓜分转播权利益：《协和协议》谈判与 FIA 的股权出局 随着转播权价值呈指数级上升，最初签署的 1981 年《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）即将到期。原本的协议中根本没有提及 FOPA，也没有界定电视转播权归属。各大车队与监管机构国际汽联（FIA）纷纷意识到转播将是一座金矿，并要求参与分成：“没有车队、赛道和比赛，哪来的转播？我们必须分一杯羹。” 在协商第二份《协和协议》时，伯尼最初提议由 FOCA、FIA 和 FOPA 三方平分各占三分之一。在几经拉扯后，最终达成的分成方案为：车队阵营（FOCA）获得 47%，FIA 获得 30%，而伯尼全资拥有的 FOPA 拿走了 23%。在协议敲定后，为了不让过多的资金过早流入合作方口袋，伯尼并没有立即在全球开启转播权公开竞价，而是将 EBU 的低价协议又延续了三年，继续巩固观众基础。 到了 1992 年第三份《协和协议》谈判时，伯尼精准抓住了 FIA 作为国际官僚监管组织的痛点。他对 FIA 表示，转播业务极其复杂，且分成模式伴随市场波动与风险，不如由他来提供“确定性”。伯尼提出用固定保底年费买断 FIA 手中 30% 的转播分成权：起薪每年 500 万美元，之后每年递增 100 万美元，直至协议末期的每年 900 万美元。FIA 欣然同意了这种零风险方案。由此，伯尼手中握有的转播分成从 23% 激增到了 53%，随后他迅速在全球各大市场启动转播权竞标拍卖，F1 转播年收入瞬间从几百万美元暴冲到 4,000 万至 5,000 万美元，仅流入伯尼个人公司的现金流就超过了 2,500 万美元。 - **1987 年转播分成重组**：车队（FOCA）占 47%，FIA 占 30%，伯尼私人公司（FOPA）独占 23%。 - **1992 年 FIA 权益买断**：伯尼以 500 万至 900 万美元梯级固定年费买断 FIA 的 30% 份额。 - **伯尼控制权跃升**：伯尼直接控制的转播权收益比例达到 53%，实现绝对多数控股与利润攫取。 --- ### [01:01:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3691s) 车队的反响与赞助风暴：从肯·泰瑞尔的指责到烟草巨头涌入 面对伯尼从这项赛事的电视转播中一人抽走过半收益的现状，车队阵营的态度并非铁板一块。部分元老级车队老板对此怒不可遏，泰瑞尔车队（Tyrrell，即当今梅赛德斯奔驰 F1 车队的前身）创始人肯·泰瑞尔（Ken Tyrrell）便曾公开抨击伯尼是在“从车队手中偷窃 F1”。然而，这种愤怒在当时仅属于少数派的声音，绝大部分车队老板依然对伯尼心存感激，因为正是电视转播彻底引爆了车队自身的商业价值。 在 F1 未普及电视转播的年代，赞助商把商标贴在赛车上，只能被现场观众看到，甚至只有位置靠前、角度极佳的观众才能在赛车呼啸而过时看清车体上的品牌。那时最昂贵的广告位是赛道护墙广告。但电视镜头彻底改变了广告逻辑：机位始终牢牢锁定在赛车本身与车手身上，疾驰的赛车成为了全球数亿观众瞩目的焦点，赛车车体涂装一跃成为全球体育界最顶级的广告资产。 伴随着巨大的电视曝光效应，巨额跨国企业赞助开始排山倒海般涌入 F1，尤其是现金极其充沛的烟草巨头们。电视转播直接推动 F1 步入了黄金赞助时代，在欧盟于 2006 年全面出台禁令之前，各烟草跨国公司累计向这项运动疯狂倾注了高达 45 亿美元的赞助赞助资金，彻底改写了整个围场的经济版图。 ### [01:03:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3829s) 烟草赞助的黄金漏洞与车队的无限预算军备竞赛 烟草品牌在早年向 F1 车队注入了天量赞助资金，这甚至只是赞助资金来源的其中一个分类。烟草巨头之所以对 F1 如此痴迷，根源在于当时的一个精妙营销漏洞：随着各国政府在电视、广播、路边广告牌和报纸上全面下达香烟广告禁令，直接买电视广告走不通了；但如果把香烟品牌的标志喷在赛车涂装上，而赛车恰好在电视转播画面中疾驰而过——这就属于车队赞助，而非传统意义上的电视广告。 烟草商借此成功留在电视屏幕中央，并将其产品与 F1 塑造的奢华、极致速度与冒险精神深度绑定。他们包揽了整台赛车的涂装，实际上就是长时间占领电视全屏的巨型流动广告。随着烟草资金、电视转播权收益的大量流入以及 Bernie 的商业运作，F1 车队手头积累了前所未有的充沛资金，以支撑日益昂贵的研发与运营。然而，各车队的终极目标只有一个：在赛道上打败所有对手。在没有预算上限的时代，各队开始近乎无底线地疯狂烧钱，通过各种天马行空的工程手段压榨性能，让赛车在发车格上快上哪怕十分之一秒。 - 烟草赞助完美规避了全球主流媒体对香烟广告的直接禁令，成为 F1 史上最大规模的商业赞助来源之一。 - 赛车全车身涂装（livery）被当作全屏流动的电视广告，既合法规避了监管，又强化了香烟品牌“速度、危险、奢华”的品牌形象。 - 资金充裕的车队进入了无限扩张研发支出的“军备竞赛”循环。 --- ### [01:05:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=3908s) 赞助商插播：访谈 ServiceNow 首席营销官 Colin Fleming 在深入拆解技术革新之前，主播们连线了节目赞助商 ServiceNow 的 CMO 兼执行副总裁 Colin Fleming。Colin 拥有非同寻常的背景——他曾是红牛车队的测试车手。主播们回忆起与他一同在拉斯维加斯大奖赛（Las Vegas GP）Paddock Club 交流的经历，并邀请他分享大众认知以外的 F1 内幕。 Colin 强调，外界往往过度关注顶尖技术和纯粹速度，却忽视了 F1 最严苛的一环：车手所承受的极致人体生理与认知极限。在 90 分钟不间断的比赛中，车手需要承受高达 6G 的横向过载（相当于脖子要支撑重达 80 磅的头部），心率持续维持在 180 次/分以上，单场比赛甚至会脱水流失 5% 的体重。在没有暂停、没有商业广告间隙的高压环境下，车手在极速行驶中要做成千上万个微秒级决策，认知负荷堪比战斗机飞行员。当被问及 F1 历史上最具颠覆性的技术变革时，Colin 认为是 2014 年引入的混合动力单元（Hybrid Era）：这直接将运动逻辑从“纯马力竞争”重塑为“能量管理”，车手不仅要操控赛车，还要实时调度电池输出、动能回收模式和引擎点火图谱，梅赛德斯（Mercedes）因率先吃透这一技术而斩获了前所未有的车队八连冠。谈到 ServiceNow 为何选择赞助阿斯顿·马丁（Aston Martin）车队，Colin 表示并非单纯贴牌，而是将平台技术深度嵌入车队运营以挖掘毫秒级性能，并借助顶级接待和赛事平台打动同样面临数字化治理难题的企业级客户。 - **车手生理极限指标**：承受 6G 压力（头部感受重约 80 磅）、心率 180+ bpm、流失 5% 体重、90 分钟无间断高负荷决策。 - **混合动力革命（2014年）**：比赛核心由纯发动机马力跃迁至电能回收与电池策略管理，奠定了梅赛德斯八连冠王朝。 - **B2B 商业合作逻辑**：ServiceNow 将其 AI 与编排技术嵌入车队后勤以提升确定性控制，同时利用围场高端社交资源（Hospitality）讲好企业故事。 --- ### [01:08:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4088s) 空气动力学启蒙：从外挂尾翼到下压力与阻力的矛盾 话题回到 20 世纪六七十年代车队挥霍资金搞技术的开端。1968 年，莲花车队（Lotus）的传奇掌舵人 Colin Chapman 坚信，要想让赛车在弯道中跑得更快，必须增加“下压力（Downforce）”，使轮胎获得更强的抓地力。于是莲花率先在赛车上安装了扰流翼片（Airfoils/Wings）。1968 年最初尝试的翼片非常小，赛车外观仍保留着早期雪茄烟斗状细长车身的形态，只是点缀着现代 F1 的雏形。随后车队们开始疯狂尝试各种巨大的高架翼片，直到 FIA（国际汽联）出于安全考虑出台规则将其取缔。 主播在这里为听众做了一堂生动的空气动力学物理科普：传统直觉认为赛车越轻越快，为什么反而要加装尾翼把车硬生生“往下压”？关键在于必须把“下压力”与“车身物理自重”区分开来。增加下压力能在不增加赛车总质量（不引入多余惯性）的前提下让轮胎死死贴住路面，从而提升过弯极限。然而，单纯依靠高耸的尾翼会带来致命副作用——空气阻力（Drag）。阻力会严重拖慢赛车在长直道上的极速表现。因此，空气动力学设计的核心永恒博弈就是：**“下压力多多益善，空气阻力越小越好”**（Downforce good, drag bad）。 - 1968 年 Colin Chapman 与莲花车队开启 F1 扰流翼时代，初期的微型翼片逐渐演化为极端的高耸机械翼。 - **核心物理悖论**：单纯追求过弯下压力会导致巨大风阻，使赛车在直道失速；车队必须找到一种既能制造极低下压力又不会产生巨大阻力的方法。 --- ### [01:10:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4230s) 文丘里效应与地面效应：莲花 78/79 的神话诞生 到了 20 世纪 70 年代末，莲花车队依然在死磕“高下压力、低风阻”的世纪难题。随之诞生的 Lotus 78 和 Lotus 79 在赛车工程史中被车迷奉为“神车”。工程团队跳出了在车身外表面外挂翼片的传统思维，迎来了两项颠覆性的技术飞跃： 第一项突破是将整个赛车车身融合成一个巨型机翼。车体不再是普通的座舱外壳加装扰流板，而是将车侧的侧箱整体塑造成翼面造型，让赛车本身直接化作机翼。第二项突破则直接借鉴了流体力学中的经典反向设计。普通飞机机翼利用上方弯曲、下方平直的截面构造，产生下高上低的压差从而获得向上的“升力”；莲花团队则反其道而行之，将赛车底盘做成了“倒置的机翼剖面”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 地面效应文丘里气流示意图 accDescr: 展示气流通过车底文丘里通道加速并配合侧裙密封产生极低气压以吸附地面的物理过程 subgraph Venturi_Action ["底盘文丘里效应 (Venturi Effect)"] AirIn["高速气流吸入车底前端"] --> Squeeze["侧裙密封 + 底板收窄气道 (文丘里通道)"] Squeeze --> SpeedUp["气流急剧加速 / 局部形成极度低压区"] SpeedUp --> Diffuser["尾部扩散器 (Diffuser) 平缓向上扩压排出"] end subgraph Pressure_Force ["空气动力学结果"] LowBottom["车底极低气压区"] HighTop["车顶相对高气压"] LowBottom & HighTop --> Suction["将赛车紧紧吸附在赛道地面 (Ground Effect)"] end ``` 车队在赛车底部两侧加装了活动的侧裙（Skirts），贴地阻隔外界空气侧向渗入；将底盘下方空间收拢形成狭小的通道，迫使气流在底盘与地面之间以极高的速度掠过，依据伯努利原理形成巨大的低压真空区；最后，底盘尾部配合平缓上扬的扩散器（Diffuser）让气流稳定排出。车底处于极低气压状态，而车体上方保持较高气压，两者的巨大压差产生了一股强大的向下拉力，如同一只无形的真空吸盘将赛车牢牢“吸”在地面上。这在物理学上被称为文丘里效应（Venturi effect），车底的通道也被称作文丘里通道，这一划时代的理念由此奠定了 F1 传奇的“地面效应”（Ground Effect）时代。 - **颠覆性构想**：不再外挂尾翼，而是把整个车身底盘当成倒置的飞机机翼。 - **文丘里效应应用**：利用密封侧裙、文丘里通道与尾部扩散器，车底高速气流造就了超低压吸力，在几乎不增加直道阻力的情况下，为过弯提供了恐怖的下压力。 ### [01:12:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4354s) 地面效应的诞生、禁止与回归 F1 赛车常被形容为“贴地飞行的战斗机”，更准确地说，它们是一架架倒置的战斗机。1978 年，路特斯车队（Lotus）将地面效应（ground effects）引入 F1 并大获成功。马里奥·安德雷蒂（Mario Andretti）在驾驶那台开创性的赛车后曾惊叹：赛车过弯时牢牢吸在地上，"犹如被直接漆在了路面上一样"。凭借这一利器，安德雷蒂夺得 1978 年车手总冠军，路特斯也锁定了车队总冠军。 然而到了 1980 年代初，地面效应产生的下压力已经极端到让车手能以超乎想象的高速过弯，反而带来了巨大的安全隐患。一旦赛车压上路肩导致侧裙密封失效，瞬间失去地面吸附力的高速赛车就会彻底失控。因此，国际汽联在 1983 年修改规则，全面禁止地面效应，并强制要求所有赛车必须使用平整底盘。 这项空气动力学奇迹在 2022 至 2025 年的新规中重返 F1。两位主持人聊到他们在拉斯维加斯大奖赛现场的震撼体验：新规下赛车高达 70% 的下压力都来自地面效应的底盘“抽吸”，而非仅靠尾翼下压。这导致排位赛时，街道赛道上积聚的沙土和细尘被强力吸起，在车尾卷起遮天蔽日的尘雾；而在雨战排位中，赛车更是将积水高高扬起，甩出极为夸张的“公鸡尾（rooster tails）”水雾。地面效应吸力之恐怖，甚至在比赛两年前的拉斯维加斯发生过意外：一台赛车底盘将焊死的下水道井盖直接连根拔起吸飞，瞬间将赛车砸得粉碎。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 地面效应的发展与沿革 accDescr: 展示F1赛车地面效应从1978年引入、1983年被禁到2022年重返的发展历程 subgraph Phase1["1970-1980年代：崛起与初次封禁"] A["1978 路特斯引入地面效应<br/>下压力剧增，路特斯与安德雷蒂夺冠"] --> B["过弯速度过快 & 侧裙失效失控风险"] B --> C["1983 规则禁止地面效应<br/>强制执行平整底盘"] end subgraph Phase2["2022年之后：重获新生"] D["2022 规则恢复地面效应<br/>下压力约70%来自底盘吸力"] --> E["极高下压力引发连锁反应<br/>漫天沙尘 / 井盖吸脱险情"] end C -.->|"2022年规管变动"| D ``` ### [01:14:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4476s) 动力跃迁：燃油效率、千匹马力与涡轮技术 除了空气动力学，动力单元也迎来了技术飞跃。现代 F1 引擎的热效率极为惊人，仅有约 50% 的能量以热量形式损耗；相比之下，普通民用乘用车的热量损失高达 70% 到 80%。这种极致效率对 F1 来说至关重要：引擎越省油，赛车起步时需要搭载的燃料就越少，车身更轻，圈速也就越快。 与此同时，马力输出经历了数倍跃升。1950 年代初期的 F1 引擎输出仅有 300 匹马力左右，如今已攀升至近 1000 匹马力。将近千匹马力塞进一台整备质量仅为普通民用车二分之一甚至三分之一、全碳纤维打造、轻如鸿毛的赛车中，其推重比令人咋舌。 涡轮增压器（turbocharger）的技术应用同样极具革命性。它通过回收废气中本会浪费掉的能量去驱动涡轮，从而压缩进入气缸的空气，显著增加单个冲程内的氧气含量，引发更为剧烈强大的燃烧，带来暴涨的动力输出。尽管车队乃至背后的汽车厂商最初绝非出于改善民用车的崇高目标才进行这些研发，但客观上，F1 赛场成为了新技术的试验场，为车企投入巨额研发资金提供了完美的“掩护”。从换挡拨片、碳纤维材料，到现今绝大多数民用车型标配的涡轮增压技术，都在 F1 的极限竞争中被不断迭代、验证并趋于完善。 - 引擎热损失：现代 F1 仅损耗约 50%，民用车损耗通常达 70%-80%。 - 马力增长：从 1950 年代的 300 匹左右提升到现代的约 1000 匹马力。 - 研发外溢：涡轮增压、换挡拨片与先进轻量化材料均在 F1 的技术内卷中走向成熟并反哺量产车。 ### [01:17:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4628s) 威廉姆斯的“黑科技”与电子时代的禁令 进入 1990 年代初，F1 迎来了空气动力与引擎之外的第三大技术革命：电子自动化。在此之前，F1 赛车是纯粹机械化、人工操控的模拟机器。但在前互联网时代的 1990 年代初，威廉姆斯车队（Williams）敏锐意识到电子技术已经成熟，足以实现全车多系统的实时自动化协同控制。 威廉姆斯拿出了令人瞠目的全套前沿技术：牵引力控制系统（traction control）、防抱死刹车（ABS）、半自动变速箱，以及最具统治力的主动悬挂系统（active suspension）。主动悬挂能依据不同赛道、甚至每个弯道的具体特征，实时自动调节车身底盘高度。整套电子系统协同运转，使得威廉姆斯 FW14B 和 FW15C 拥有了无懈可击的弯道极限。对手们对此暴跳如雷，甚至愤怒指责威廉姆斯造出了一台“会自动驾驶的赛车”。 然而，这套系统在当时完全合规。凭借这一巨大的代差优势，奈杰尔·曼塞尔（Nigel Mansell）与阿兰·普罗斯特（Alain Prost）分别在 1992 和 1993 年毫无悬念地包揽了车手与车队双料世界冠军。该车的无敌表现甚至吸引了普罗斯特的宿敌、三届世界冠军埃尔顿·塞纳（Ayrton Senna）。随着普罗斯特在 1993 赛季结束后退役，塞纳毫不犹豫地离开迈凯伦，转投心仪已久的威廉姆斯车队，准备在 1994 赛季大展拳脚。 但戏剧性的是，国际汽联（FIA）在塞纳刚加盟时突然修改规则，全面封杀了所有电子辅助驾驶系统。FIA 认为这些黑科技大幅削弱了车手个人驾驶技术的比重，让比赛变了质。当被迫剥离全部电子创新后，威廉姆斯的优势荡然无存，赛车极其不稳定，水平瞬间跌落到与围场其他赛车持平甚至更落后的境地。塞纳被迫去驾驭一台难以驯服的赛车，而赛车界也即将迎来其历史上最黑暗、最痛心的一幕。 ### [01:19:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4773s) 塞纳之死与 F1 安全革命的开端 1994 年伊莫拉大奖赛的致命撞车事故中，埃尔顿·塞纳不幸丧生，引发了全球范围内的巨大震动。直到今天，塞纳在巴西举行的国葬依然被认为是人类历史上规模最大的公共葬礼之一，多达 300 万民众走上街头为这位旷世奇才送行。 塞纳从冉冉升起的天才成长为公认的世界最佳车手，其罹难在现代电视转播时代第一次将聚光灯以无比残酷的方式打在 F1 身上，彻底暴露了这项运动在辉煌表象下依然残酷、脆弱且极度不安全的本质。 事实上，在塞纳事故之前，赛车的伤亡数字已经在逐年改善： - 1950 年代：14 名车手遇难； - 1960 年代：14 名车手遇难； - 1970 年代：12 名车手遇难（整个时期平均每个赛季不止夺走一条人命）； - 1980 年代：死亡人数显著降至 4 人。 在 1970 年代，FIA 逐步建立并落实了许多如今看来理所当然的基础安全防线：每站赛前必须对赛道进行强制安全验收，彻底取缔原本用作缓冲防护的稻草垛（straw bales），换装双层加固钢护栏；维修区增加与主赛道的安全隔离；全面强制推广防火赛车服、安全防爆油箱、强制佩戴多点式安全带等。让人难以置信的是，在此之前车手们长期拒绝系安全带——因为在那个赛车撞车后极易起火爆炸的年代，车手们宁愿在撞击瞬间被甩出座舱，也不想被安全带困在熊熊燃烧的残骸中坐以待毙。 到了 1990 年代，大家一度天真地以为致命伤亡已被攻克。然而，1994 年伊莫拉那个受诅咒的周末打破了一切幻象——罗兰德·拉岑伯格（Roland Ratzenberger）与埃尔顿·塞纳在同一个周末接连殒命。世界突然惊醒，安全之路还远未走到尽头。塞纳的牺牲直接促成了 F1 现代历史上最彻底的安全大变革，而改革的第一步，就是不惜一切代价先将赛车速度降下来。 ### [01:22:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=4933s) 塞纳之死后的安全革命与光环系统（Halo） 大众往往直觉地认为，F1 赛车经历了数十年的极限研发、高科技抓地力与空气动力学迭代，速度一定会比半个多世纪前快上两三倍。然而事实令人大吃一惊：如今的 F1 赛车极速其实只比 1950 年代快了大约 40 英里/小时（约 64 公里/小时）。原因在于，赛车抓地力越强、过弯速度越恐怖，发生碰撞时的致命危险就呈指数级上升。在埃尔顿·塞纳（Ayrton Senna）于 1994 年圣马力诺伊莫拉赛道不幸丧生后，国际汽联（FIA）立刻对赛车的空气动力学套件进行了严格限制，不仅缩小了前后翼的尺寸，还大幅限制了车底扩散器的规格。1998 年，FIA 更进一步强制引入开槽花纹胎（grooved tires）以减少机械抓地力并降低弯道速度，赛车轮番褪去了光头胎（slicks）的纯粹模样，反而变得有些像民用车轮胎。此外，赛车结构也迎来了全面升级：引入可变形吸能防撞结构、强化碳纤维生存座舱、严格的前向碰撞测试，并大幅垫高座舱两侧以保护车手头部，各大赛道也纷纷扩建缓冲区并升级吸能护栏。 然而到了 2010 年代，赛场上再度出现了致命事故（如朱尔斯·比安奇在 2014 年日本大奖赛上的重创）。面对悲剧，FIA 终于下定决心，在 2018 年强制推行了一项最具标志性但也饱受争议的被动安全装置——Halo（光环系统）。这个安装在座舱正上方、由钛合金制成的超坚固重型三叉保护架，正前方正对着驾驶员视线中央竖立着一根粗壮的立柱。起初这项妥协设计遭遇了无数关于视野和美观度的吐槽，但在实战中，它能在赛车翻滚、底朝天滑行以及遭受重物砸击时为车手筑起绝对的生存空间，至今至少挽救了三位现役顶级车手的性命。正是这一连串强制性的严苛安全创新，让 F1 创造了自 2014 年以来零死亡事故的奇迹，写下了这项运动 70 多年历史中最长的一段无致命事故纪录。 - **空气动力学与机械抓地力双重降速**：塞纳遇难后立即限制翼片与扩散器尺寸；1998 年引入四道纵向凹槽的花纹胎以遏制过弯极速。 - **被动安全与结构规范**：生存座舱（survival cell）防撞击认证、侧翼加高保护颈部与颅骨、缓冲区由碎石区扩建并换装高科技安全防护墙。 - **Halo 系统的救命里程碑**：2018 年成为全系强制标准，即便颠覆并倒扣滑行也能承受数吨冲击力，奠定了 2014 年后 F1 的零死亡安全神话。 --- ### [01:24:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5063s) 规则锁死催生“军备竞赛”与半导体摩尔定律式的研发内卷 将视角切回到商业与工程博弈，这项出于安全考虑而强行放慢车速的正确决策，却戏剧性地引发了一场 teams（车队）之间的“军备竞赛”恶性循环。在赛车运动萌芽的蛮荒时代，到处都是唾手可得的性能红利（low-hanging fruit），工程师们可以大开脑洞肆意挥洒，比如装在两根通天高柱上的巨大尾翼，乃至 1970 年代轰动一时的 Tyrrell P34 六轮赛车——因为当时的规则手册压根没写赛车“必须只有四个轮子”。然而，随着安全与技术规范编织得越来越密不透风，车队想要脱颖而出，核心竞争力便从“造一台马力更狂暴的引擎”彻底转向了“如何在合规字缝里找漏洞（exploit the rules）”。 工程师们耗费海量精力去推敲规则条文中写了什么、没写什么，寻找起草者的真实意图与字面漏洞之间的微小缝隙，从而豪掷数千万美元的研发预算，只为在某个模棱两可的灰色地带榨取 0.1 秒的优势。这种竞争格局与现代半导体产业惊人地相似：台积电（TSMC）与阿斯麦（ASML）面对的是不可逾越的物理学定律，而车队工程师面对的是 FIA 的规则文本。当所有简单的红利都被吃尽后，企业为了向前推进哪怕一纳米或千分之一秒，每年都必须投入呈指数级暴涨的资本开支与 R&D，手段也变得愈发极端和异想天开。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 规则收紧引发的技术研发与资本内卷 accDescr: 展现从早期宽泛规则到安全限制，最终导致车队钻空子并陷入半导体式高额研发内卷的过程。 subgraph EarlyStage["早期拓荒时代（红利期）"] A["规则极度宽松\n（允许六轮车、异形尾翼）"] --> B["低成本大幅提升性能\n引擎与基础气动红利充足"] end subgraph Regulation["规则密集收敛（安全导向）"] C["塞纳事故与安全改革\n限制翼片/花纹胎/Halo"] end subgraph EndlessSpiral["现代军备竞赛（内卷期）"] D["常规红利耗尽\n寻找规则条文漏洞与灰色地带"] E["半导体式的极端研发内卷\n投入数千万美元榨取零点几秒"] end B --> C C --> D D --> E ``` --- ### [01:26:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5182s) 伯尼的独裁王国与伦敦连体别墅里的“一人联盟” 当各大车队为了毫厘之争在没有尽头的研发内卷中将自己烧向亏损深渊时，伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）却在个人财富的巅峰上高歌猛进。早在 1993 年，伯尼便凭借 4450 万美元的税前现金薪酬，一跃成为全英国薪酬最高的企业高管——而这还仅仅是他当年向英国皇家税务海关总署公开申报的冰山一角。彼时已年近七旬的伯尼迎来了第二段婚姻，并与超模妻子斯拉维卡（Slavica）育有两个幼女。步入晚年的他开始紧迫地考虑家族资产规划与巨额遗产传承变现，但他随后的一系列资本财技，几乎让整个 F1 商业帝国彻底分崩离析。 尽管头顶全英最高薪 CEO 的光环，伯尼经营 F1 的方式却原始得骇人听闻。他完全将估值数十亿的庞大赛车帝国当作一家私营“个体工商户”来操盘。整套管理机构就设在他在伦敦拥有一整栋的多层排屋里：底层四层是 F1 的日常办公地点，上面几层则是他的私人住宅。据传他把所有办公室都装满了监听窃听设备，以便随时掌握员工的一举一动；每天傍晚六点整，伯尼更会准时下逐客令：“好了，全都滚出我家，你们该滚回自己家了！”在这个庞大的商业帝国里，除了伯尼自己，没有真正意义上的市场营销部、没有受众数据分析部，甚至连销售部都不复存在。除了一小撮听话的律师和财务人员处理账目，伯尼拒绝保留正式会议记录，极力将需要签字的纸质合同压至最少，全凭一己之力在全世界近百个国家之间周旋谈判电视台转播权益。 - **1993 年全英打工皇帝**：伯尼凭借 4450 万美元账面现金报酬位列英国企业高管收入榜首，私下资本运作规模更为庞大。 - **客厅楼下的企业总部**：伦敦联排别墅楼下办公、楼上居住，办公室布满窃听器，每晚 6 点强制清场赶人，这种作风一直延续至 2017 年自由媒体集团接盘。 - **极度扁平的草台班子**：长期缺失现代企业必备的市场营销、数字资产运营与数据分析中枢，核心商业事务全由伯尼一人手提包式处理。 --- ### [01:28:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5324s) 极致利益冲突：兼并四重身份与“从未拥有却转卖四次”的神话 伯尼在这场独裁统治中并非完全单打独斗，他有一个不可或缺的黄金搭档——前 F2 车手、March 车队联合创始人兼职业律师马克斯·莫斯利（Max Mosley）。在两人初次共事时，伯尼曾敲打莫斯利：“马克斯，你最大的毛病就是总想把每件事都弄得清清楚楚，但在这个圈子里，很多事情保持模糊反而是天大的好事。”深谙潜规则的莫斯利迅速与伯尼形影不离。1993 年，在伯尼成为英国最高薪高管的同一年，他通过精巧的幕后黑箱操作，扶植莫斯利成功坐上了 FIA 国际汽联主席的铁王座；而伯尼自己也早已巧妙地捞到了 FIA 负责推广事务的副主席头衔。 更令人瞠目结舌的是，在利益冲突的灰色丛林里，伯尼还曾直接兼任比利时斯帕大奖赛的赛事承办推广商（Promoter）——这意味着他甚至可以自己代表 F1 官方给自己所办的分站开出发票收取承办费。在几十年的漫长岁月里，伯尼把“没有利益冲突就制造利益冲突”的流氓商业哲学发挥到了极致，他常常在四大核心利益方之间随意切换并同时身兼数职：车队老板、分站赛推广商、FIA 官方最高层，以及掌握全球商业运营权的 FOPA/FOA 首席执行官。 | 核心角色类别 | 伯尼·埃克莱斯顿代表的具体实体 | 掌握的商业权力与利益纠葛 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **车队所有者** | Brabham 车队老板（早期） | 代表车队向组织方索要参赛分红与话语权 | | **赛道与分站推广方** | 比利时斯帕大奖赛推广商 | 自行洽谈分站承办费，自己向自己付账签约 | | **规则与监管机构** | FIA 推广事务副主席 / 盟友莫斯利出任 FIA 主席 | 掌控赛事实体规则解释权、仲裁权及商业特许经营权发放 | | **商业权益运营方** | FOCA / FOPA / FOA 控股股东兼 CEO | 垄断全球电视转播权、赛道广告权益及各分站承办收费分成 | 正如传奇车队老板埃迪·乔丹（Eddie Jordan）那句广为流传的名言所精辟总结的：“伯尼·埃克莱斯顿这个人，把一级方程式赛车倒手卖了整整四次，却从未花钱买回过它，从未丧失过对它的绝对控制权，直到今天依然掌控着它。而这其中最神绝的是——他从一开始就他妈的从来没有真正拥有过它！”这段堪称资本神迹的空手套白狼故事，正是伯尼即将展开的离奇流动性大戏的序幕。 --- ### [01:31:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5478s) 赞助商插播：Vercel 与 AI Agent 时代的性能隐喻 在揭秘伯尼如何在没有资产所有权的前提下转卖 F1 四次之前，主播们插播了赞助商 Vercel 的最新动向。在拉斯维加斯大奖赛维修区通道中，主播偶遇了 Vercel 创始人兼首席执行官吉列尔莫·劳赫（Guillermo Rauch）。作为以极致加载速度与超高迭代效率闻名的开发者平台，Vercel 与追求极限速度的 F1 赛车运动有着极佳的契合度。 讨论指出，行业正全面迈入以自主 AI Agent 为核心的落地阶段。构建单个 Agent 的原型十分简单，但要在企业级生产环境中大规模调度和运行整个 Agent 集群，同时兼顾系统治理、环境隔离与安全策略合规，则极具挑战，而这正是 Vercel 所构建的底层基础设施赋能的核心所在。 ### [01:32:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5535s) 赞助商插播：Vercel 与现代网络基础设施 在进入正题前，主持人谈及节目赞助商 Vercel。从 Notion、DoorDash 到 Stripe，现代网络很多核心应用的基础管道均由 Vercel 驱动。随着 AI 与智能体网络（agentic web）的兴起，Vercel 凭借其 AI Gateway、沙盒环境（Sandbox）以及每周下载量达 700 万次的 AI SDK，已成为从个人开发者到跨国企业构建 AI 产品的通用底座。近期他们还推出了“Vercel Agent”智能体套件，致力于打造构建、部署和运维 AI Agent 的自动化基础设施。 --- ### [01:33:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=5599s) 伯尼的套现大计与受挫的 40 亿美元 IPO 时间来到 20 世纪 90 年代中期，接近 70 岁的伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）开始考虑个人资产的流动性变现。当时他的核心诉求是建立一套离岸信托架构，以规避英国高达 40% 的高额遗产税。如果他不提前规避，一旦发生不测，他的家族根本无法保留对 F1 的控制权，整个赛事将被迫拆分出售以缴纳巨额税款。对于车队和赛事推广商而言，伯尼的健康与寿命直接成了整个运动的生存级系统性风险（尽管当时谁也没想到他 2026 年依然健在）。 恰逢 90 年代末互联网泡沫高潮，伯尼萌生了让 F1 挂牌上市（IPO）的狂野想法。当时伯尼旗下各个 F1 相关实体的年收入总额约为 2.5 亿英镑，且息税折旧摊销前利润（EBITDA）利润率高达 50% 以上。考虑到当时英镑兑美元汇率有着 60% 至 70% 的高溢价，从账面指标来看，这无疑是一个完美的上市标的。 伯尼找来所罗门兄弟（Salomon Brothers）的投行家，计划将名下错综复杂的 F1 资产打包整合为一家名为 SLEC Holdings 的控股公司（SLEC 取自其当时的第二任妻子斯拉维察·埃克莱斯顿 Slavica Ecclestone 的名字缩写，股权也转移至其名下用于税务隔离），准备在英美两地双重上市，目标估值高达 40 亿美元。 然而，投行在尽职调查时发现了一个致命问题：伯尼名下虽然握有极其赚钱的转播权收入、分量惊人的分站赛承办费（Promoter Fees，赛道或地方政府为了办赛向伯尼支付的巨额特许费）、庞大的物流运输网络以及利润丰厚的围场俱乐部（Paddock Club），但在法律层面上，伯尼手中根本没有一张正式的、长期有效的独占授权文件能证明这些权益合法属于他。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bernie Ecclestone IPO Attempt and Pivot to Bernie Bonds accDescr: 展现伯尼试图通过 SLEC 整合资产上市，但因欧盟反垄断调查而转为发行 14 亿美元伯尼债券套现的流程。 subgraph Phase1["IPO 规划与权力洗牌"] A["伯尼名下资产年收入 2.5 亿英镑<br>EBITDA 利润率 50%+"] --> B["成立 SLEC Holdings<br>资产挂在妻子 Slavica 名下"] B --> C["第四份《协和协议》<br>将原 FOCA 权利转移给新壳公司 FOCAL"] end subgraph Phase2["遭遇阻碍与紧急转向"] C --> D{"计划被媒体泄露<br>欧盟反垄断调查介入"} D -->|撤回上市并辞任 FIA 副总裁| E["放弃 IPO 方案"] E --> F["转向摩根士丹利<br>以未来电视转播权为抵押发债"] end subgraph Phase3["伯尼债券与心脏手术"] F --> G["发行 14 亿美元伯尼债券 (Bernie Bonds)"] G --> H["14 亿美元特别股息转入离岸账户"] H --> I["交易完成 3 天后<br>伯尼进行心脏三重搭桥手术"] end ``` 为了弥补这一法律缺陷，恰逢第四份《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）谈判节点，伯尼暗度陈仓：他新注册了一家完全由自己掌控的公司 FOCAL（Formula One Constructors Association Administration Limited），用它替换掉原本属于各车队共同利益的 FOCA。在刚刚当选国际汽联（FIA）主席的老盟友马克斯·莫斯利（Max Mosley）的默许下，伯尼通过新协议将所有商业权利一网打尽并确权。 正当通往 IPO 的大门完全铺平之际，这桩暗箱操作和权力整合被媒体公之于众，直接引来了欧盟反垄断机构的严厉调查。伯尼深知自己经不起深挖，只得立刻搁置 IPO 计划，并辞去 FIA 副总裁的官方职务，才勉强平息了监管部门的怒火。 - 注：围绕这套繁复的离岸避税结构，伯尼在 2023 年最终承认犯下税务欺诈罪，向前述英国税务海关总署（HMRC）补缴了 6.53 亿英镑的税款及罚金，并被判处 17 个月缓刑（很大程度上由于他年事已高）。这或许也解释了他此前多次婉拒英国爵士爵位（Knighthood）的原因。 --- ### [01:40:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6001s) “伯尼债券”套现 14 亿与惊魂心脏手术 上市之路被堵死后，伯尼的套现诉求并没有消失。他迅速更换投行合作方，转而找上摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley），提出了一套更为大胆的杠杆方案：以 F1 未来的电视转播权收入流作为抵押发行债券，再将发债筹集的现金以巨额“特别股息”的形式一次性派发给他自己和离岸信托实体。 这批后来被称为“伯尼债券”（Bernie Bonds）的高风险债券原本计划发行 20 亿美元，但市场上愿意买单的投资者并不充裕，摩根士丹利最终只拼凑认购了 14 亿美元。 整个交易于一个周五顺利交割：债券全部售出，14 亿美元特别股息被准时划入伯尼名下的离岸账户。然而到了紧接着的周一清晨，伯尼给摩根士丹利的女投行主管打去一通电话，漫不经心地说道：“顺便说一句，有件事之前没告诉你——我今天要做心脏三重搭桥手术。” 整个承销团队顿时陷入恐慌：这笔 14 亿美元的庞大债务完全是建立在未来赛事经营收益上的，而整个 F1 的商业机器几乎百分之百依赖伯尼个人的手腕与人脉维系。所幸手术成功，伯尼从病房中幽默地向媒体传话：“让这么多人失望了，真不好意思。”（“I have disappointed so many people.”）那位几乎被吓出心脏病的银行家后来回忆，她当时心里的第一反应是：“只要你能活着从手术室出来，老娘就亲自去病房宰了你。” --- ### [01:42:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6125s) 私募巨头入局：Hellman & Friedman 的收购狂潮 熬过手术后的伯尼彻底开启了出售 F1 股权的闸门。从 1999 年末到 2000 年初，伯尼与其妻子斯拉维察开始分批将 SLEC Holdings 的股权套现给各家私募股权机构（PE）。 2000 年 2 月，旧金山知名私募股权巨头 Hellman & Friedman（H&F）斥巨资收购了 F1 37% 的股权。随后，H&F 动作不断，通过买断斯拉维察与伯尼此前兜售给其他少数股东的股份，一举将手中持股比例提高到了 50%，一跃成为 F1 的绝对控股股东。紧接着，他们更进一步，与伯尼夫妇达成新协议：获得了以 6 亿美元的固定价格再买入 25% 股权的期权，从而开启了全球金融资本轮番洗牌 F1 控股权的混乱大戏。 ### [01:43:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6185s) 互联网泡沫狂潮：EM.TV 的疯狂接盘与闪电崩盘 2000 年 3 月，正值互联网泡沫破裂的前夕，旧金山知名私募股权机构 Hellman & Friedman（H&F）刚刚落实了获得一级方程式赛车（F1）75% 控股权的期权文件。然而，就在泡沫达到最疯狂顶点的当口，一家名为 EM.TV 的德国新媒体公司突然半路杀出，开出了一个令人无法拒绝的巨额天价，提出要一口气全盘接盘 H&F 手中的所有 F1 股权。当时 EM.TV 刚刚收购了制作《布偶大电影》（The Muppets）的吉姆·汉森公司（Jim Henson Company），正沉醉于将全球头部娱乐与媒体资产打包推进所谓“数字化新纪元”的互联网狂热大梦中。面对如此暴利的收购要约，H&F 毫不犹豫地选择套现离场。 这笔闪电交易创下了私募投资史上的奇观：H&F 仅持有 F1 股权区区一个月时间，动用约 11 亿至 12 亿美元本金，就净赚了 2.41 亿英镑利润，单月投资回报率超 20%。但接盘的 EM.TV 很快就陷入了流动性危机。拿下 50% 股权后，EM.TV 极度渴望行使 H&F 之前谈妥的额外 25% 股权认购期权，无奈由于在前期并购和布偶戏版权上挥霍无度，账面资金已被掏空。为了凑齐收购款，EM.TV 再次通过激进的高杠杆债务融资筹集了 16 亿欧元：分别从摩根大通（JP Morgan）和雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）处借款 6 亿欧元，并从德国地方州立银行拜仁银行（BayernLB）借贷 10 亿欧元。靠着这笔巨额借款，EM.TV 成功行权持有 F1 75% 的控股权，伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）及其妻子斯拉维卡（Slavica）则保留剩余 25% 股权。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 股权辗转流变图 accDescr: 展示从 H&F、EM.TV、KirchMedia 到银行财团再到 CVC 的流转路径 subgraph S1["2000年 泡沫狂热期"] HF["Hellman & Friedman<br/>（持有1个月净赚2.41亿镑）"] EM["EM.TV<br/>（举债16亿欧元行权控盘75%）"] HF -->|"闪电全额转让"| EM end subgraph S2["2000-2002年 债务崩塌期"] KM["KirchMedia<br/>（接盘18个月后破产）"] BANKS["债权银行财团<br/>（BayernLB、JP Morgan、Lehman）"] EM -->|"无法偿债被接管"| KM KM -->|"债务违约破产清算"| BANKS end subgraph S3["2005年 PE入局重组"] CVC["CVC Capital Partners<br/>（9亿股权+11亿债务，总计20亿美元）"] BANKS -->|"75% 股权出售"| CVC BERNIE["伯尼夫妇<br/>（25% 股权变现并跟投，留任CEO）"] -->|"买断与再投资"| CVC end ``` 音乐戛然而止，泡沫彻底破灭。EM.TV 很快便在庞大的债务利息面前缴械违约。随后，另一位德国媒体大亨莱奥·基尔希（Leo Kirch）旗下的 KirchMedia 前来救场吞并 EM.TV，顺带接下了 F1 的控制权。可仅仅过了 18 个月，庞大的 Kirch 帝国同样轰然倒闭破产。到了 2002 年，F1 75% 的控股股权最终直接落到了当年的债权人手中——也就是拜仁银行、摩根大通与雷曼兄弟组成的银行财团，而伯尼依然稳坐钓鱼台，不仅个人资产毫发无损地揽入数十亿美元现金，手中还紧握着那 25% 的关键少数股权。 ### [01:46:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6399s) 银行逼宫与金蝉脱壳：CVC Capital Partners 的登场 手握 75% 股权的银行财团很快发现自己陷入了前所未有的泥潭。到了 2004 年，银行方面感到无比沮丧：尽管他们是绝对的控股大股东，但伯尼依旧将整个 F1 当作自己的私人王国来经营，独断专行、给自己支取巨额报酬，并将各大银行发来的管理指令视若废纸。忍无可忍的银行财团一纸诉状将伯尼告上法庭，争夺 F1 的实际控制权。最终法官判决银行胜诉，认定银行拥有合法控制权。然而，走下法庭的伯尼在媒体镜头前神情自若，公开讥讽称这份判决“毫无意义”，表示自己将照常开展日常业务。 伯尼敢如此强硬，是因为他早已在暗中留了绝妙的底牌。在与银行对簿公堂的同时，他已经悄悄与欧洲顶级私募股权投资机构 CVC Capital Partners 谈妥了一项整体并购方案。CVC 强势入场，一举买断了三家银行持有的 75% 股权，并连同伯尼夫妇手中剩余的 25% 股权一并收购，彻底肃清了 F1 混乱的股权结构。这笔交易总收购价约为 20 亿美元，其中 11 亿美元为杠杆负债，CVC 实际仅出资 9 亿美元现金股权。 极为精明的是，伯尼不仅再次套现出大笔现金，而且被 CVC 聘任继续担任 F1 的掌舵 CEO，扮演他不可替代的“掌门人”角色。与此同时，CVC 还准许伯尼将部分收益以跟投的方式重新注入新成立的 F1 实体。回顾历史操作，伯尼通过家族信托、历次发债以及多轮股权转让，早已从这项赛事中抽走了超过 30 亿美元的真金白银，如今又以资深合伙人的姿态继续掌控大权。 - **CVC 收购估值架构**：总价约 20 亿美元，由 11 亿美元杠杆贷款与 9 亿美元纯现金股权构成。 - **伯尼套现总额**：在多轮资本腾挪中，埃克莱斯顿家族信托已套现超过 30 亿美元。 - **双重角色保留**：伯尼表面上沦为 CVC 旗下的受雇管理人员，实则通过股权跟投和独家管理权巩固了不可撼动的地位。 ### [01:48:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6524s) 淘金新秩序：主权基金、超级分站与普京谈判逸事 在 CVC 重组所有权后，重获股权激励的伯尼干劲十足，迅速拿出了自己的招牌杀手锏：向赛事推广方（Race Promoters）榨取巨额承办费。大约在 2005 年前后，F1 赛历上的分站大体可以划分为三类： 1. **欧洲传统经典分站**：摩纳哥、蒙扎（Monza）以及银石（Silverstone）等。这些历史遗迹是 F1 的品牌根基所在，承办费虽然低廉，但具有不可动摇的声誉地位； 2. **新兴远征分站（Flyaway Races）**：如新加入的巴林站与中国站，各主办方每年甘愿砸下 3000 万至 5000 万美元（如今甚至高达 6000 万美元以上）的天价承办费只为跻身赛历； 3. **高不成低不就的中游分站**：包括加拿大、澳大利亚、西班牙、比利时，以及当时德国和意大利各自增设的第二场分站赛（如纽博格林等）。这些分站占据了赛历的大半壁江山，既无法带来巨额入场费，又缺乏开拓全新蓝海受众的战略价值。 伯尼的策略是无情地挤压淘汰中游赛事，积极招揽中东与亚洲的新兴财富国家入局。他先后为阿布扎比、新加坡和印度敲定了巨额合同。其中印度分站单年的入场费就达 4000 万美元；阿布扎比更是豪掷千金，承诺在未来几年内为 F1 累计投入高达 10 亿美元，其中就包括在城外沙漠中从零开始平地建造一座超现代化的顶级赛道。 到了 2010 年代初，伯尼迎来了他职业生涯中最大的单笔手笔之一：俄罗斯大奖赛。在索契刚刚赢得 2014 年冬奥会举办权并向当地基础设施砸下惊人的 500 亿美元后，伯尼成功说服俄方：要摊销索契冬奥场馆的巨额基建成本，最好的方式就是在冬奥会后直接把园区改建为 F1 赛道。最终，俄罗斯国家层面与 F1 签下大单，不仅斥资 2.7 亿美元围绕奥林匹克公园修建全新赛道，更承诺在接下来的 7 年内每年向 F1 支付 5000 万美元承办费。 这桩交易还伴随着一段极具传奇色彩的谈判轶事。当合约细节推进到最终敲定阶段时，俄方谈判代表要求伯尼亲自飞往索契，与普京面对面敲定合同。伯尼对此回复道：“我看起来很蠢吗？如果他们以为我会亲自跑去跟普京谈合同条款，绝无可能。如果他们想让我去，先让他们把合同签完寄回来。”俄方果然先签署了合同并寄回给伯尼。字签好后，伯尼才飞赴索契与普京并肩出席新闻发布会，向全球正式宣布这一合作。（注：由于 2022 年俄乌冲突爆发，俄罗斯大奖赛随后被永久取消；伯尼在英国早间电视采访中还语出惊人地表示普京是“一等一的人物”，甚至声称“愿意为他挡子弹”。）与伯尼合作过的人士普遍反映，伯尼虽然极尽商人本色，最终条款往往让对手发现利益被榨干，但其个人魅力十足，谈判风格极其干脆、极重信誉，堪称一位“令人愉悦的合作伙伴”。 ### [01:53:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6829s) 积怨爆发：车队对私募资本“吸血”的怒火 在赛道承办费被伯尼运作到天花板的同时，围场内部与各参赛车队的关系却滑向了深渊。在早年间，伯尼还能凭借“我发财，你们也跟着分杯羹”的说辞稳住各路车队老板；但到了 CVC 执掌的时代，这种承诺已经彻底失效。 各大车队猛然醒悟：此时在赛道背后赚得盆满钵满的，除了伯尼本人，还有庞大的外来私募股权机构 CVC。而源源不断流入这些金融寡头口袋里的巨额分红，完全是建立在各大车队每年自掏腰包投入数亿美元进行研发、制造尖端赛车并承担所有经营亏损的基础之上。各方力量的失衡已达到临界点，一场由车队集体发起反抗的风暴即将在围场内全面酝酿。 ### [01:54:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6867s) 疯狂失控的军备竞赛与赛历混乱 到了2000年代中后期，F1 的支出状况彻底失控。顶尖车队每年在研发赛车上的开销高达4亿至5亿美元，陷入了毫无节制的烧钱陷阱。与此同进，F1 的比赛日程表也变得荒诞不羁。这项运动在1950与1960年代刚起步时，巡回原则是“只要有足够车队愿意去跑，就去哪里比赛”；后来逐渐演变成“谁能掏出4000万美元或更庞大的申办费，大奖赛就去哪里”，将整个大奖赛马戏团通过飞机送往俄罗斯、中国等新兴市场。 这种商业化操作导致当时的转播赛历完全违背常理。伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）及其团队唯一的优化目标就是“谁付给我们的办赛推广费最高”。比赛在一天当中的各种奇怪时段上演，全球车迷不得不半夜或清晨爬起来看比赛，严重损害了转播观感。赛历安排与车队利益脱节，使得车队与赛事管理层之间的关系降到了冰点。 ### [01:55:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=6911s) 2008年金融危机与车队预算帽提议 2008年全球次贷危机爆发，给 F1 带来了致命冲击。此前，预算最高、亏损最严重的车队背后，基本都有量产乘用车大厂商的母公司兜底，包括本田（Honda）、丰田（Toyota）、宝马（BMW）、雷诺（Renault）以及法拉利（Ferrari）。各大汽车巨头愿意每年向车队注入数亿美元巨资，主要是为了战略布局、技术研发（R&D）以及全球品牌营销。然而金融危机一到，除法拉利之外，所有乘用车巨头的核心造车业务都遭遇断崖式暴跌。对于本田或宝马的高管层而言，无论是在财务上还是在公众形象上，继续维持这些吞金巨兽般的 F1 车队都已经完全站不住脚。 面对危机，伯尼、CVC Capital Partners 以及国际汽联（FIA）在2008年联手向各支车队抛出了一条“救生索”——他们建议在整个运动中推行赛车制造的“预算帽”（Cost Cap），由各方联合设计并交由车队表决通过。其本质类似于 NFL 或 NBA 等美国职业体育联盟的薪资帽，只不过限制的不是选手薪资，而是车队投入到赛车研发与制造上的资本规模。部分缺乏财力支撑的车队对此表示欢迎，但以法拉利和迈凯伦（McLaren）为首的传统豪门却对此极度反感。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 2008年金融危机下F1的预算帽危机 accDescr: 展示金融危机如何促使FIA推行预算帽，并遭到传统豪门车队的激烈抵制 subgraph MacroCrisis["外部冲击"] A["2008年全球金融危机"] --> B["量产车企母公司业绩暴跌<br/>(本田、宝马、雷诺等)"] B --> C["巨额F1车队预算无法维系"] end subgraph LeagueResponse["管理层自救方案"] C --> D["伯尼 + CVC + FIA 联手"] D --> E["提议推行制造预算帽<br/>(类比NFL/NBA薪水帽)"] end subgraph TeamReactions["车队阵营分化"] E --> F["独立与小车队支持"] E --> G["传统豪门强烈抵制<br/>(法拉利、迈凯伦)"] G --> H["威胁退赛并筹组FOTA分裂联盟"] end ``` ### [01:56:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7010s) 法拉利抵制与 FOTA 分裂危机 对于法拉利而言，他们根本不在乎每年在 F1 赛车上亏损5亿美元，只要能赢就行。因为只要能在赛道上不断斩获胜利，由此带来的超级跑车品牌溢价与营销回报是无穷无尽的。更关键的是，面对全球经济衰退，真正不受冲击的汽车制造商正是法拉利——无论外面的金融环境多么恶劣，排队购买法拉利超级跑车的富豪客户名单永远排得满满当当。迈凯伦在很大程度上也是类似的逻辑。因此，法拉利和迈凯伦开始以退出 F1 为威胁，并软硬兼施地逼迫其他车队加入反抗预算帽的阵营。 对伯尼、CVC 和 FIA 多年集权谋利积压的怨气最终彻底引爆。2009年，围场内10支车队中的8支宣布联手反叛，成立 F1 车队协会（FOTA，Formula One Teams Association），并正式宣布计划在2010年创立一个脱离现有体系的独立分裂赛事（Breakaway Series）。FOTA 的存在扮演着双重角色：一方面是让车队结成工会统一谈判以争取筹码；另一方面则是一场实质性的“独立起义”。然而，要建立一个独立赛事实在太困难了，不仅需要与全球最顶级的赛道重新签署合同，还要谈判极为庞大的媒体转播版权，而这些正是伯尼与 FOM 真正具备不可替代价值的地方。 - **博弈结果**：预算帽在当时被彻底击溃未能落实，各方退而求其次达成了为期10年的引擎研发冻结协议。 - **政治代价**：车队通过极具威慑力的退赛威胁迫使国际汽联主席马克斯·莫斯利（Max Mosley）妥协，莫斯利同意不再寻求连任并黯然辞职。 ### [01:59:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7152s) 车队联盟的瓦解与信任危机 FOTA 的团结并没有维持太久。伯尼和莫斯利非常擅长“胡萝卜加大棒”的分化策略，他们可以通过向不同车队提供单独利益来逐个击破。当时由原日本本田车队残余人员组建的布朗 GP（Brawn GP）资金极度拮据，几乎是在靠借债维持运转。伯尼此前以“你们换了队名不再是原车队”为由，恶意扣押了本应付给他们的前一年数百万美元奖金分成；此时伯尼只要提出“只要你脱离 FOTA 阵营，我立刻电汇全额款项”，就能立刻迫使布朗 GP 就范，这也是极为经典的瓦解罢工手段。 此外，各家车队造车参赛的底层商业逻辑天差地别，导致利益诉求根本无法长期统一。迈凯伦车队首席执行官扎克·布朗（Zak Brown）在与主播交流时直言，在自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）收购之前，车队虽然多次策划过分裂系列赛，但每次只要一谈到“如何分蛋糕”，谈判就会不可避免地崩溃：法拉利自恃运动历史遗产要求特殊分红，迈凯伦和梅赛德斯（Mercedes）则以竞技实力要求拿更多，车队之间永远无法就利益分配达成共识。 雪上加霜的是，2000年代末的 F1 还接连爆发了严重的声誉丑闻： - **间谍门（Spygate）**：迈凯伦团队离奇获得了一整本包含法拉利当年赛车全套技术规格的机密活页夹，引发了跨国司法调查和高额罚款。 - **撞车门（Crashgate）**：雷诺车队在高层授意下，故意命令旗下二号车手小内尔森·皮奎特（Nelson Piquet Jr.）在新加坡站撞墙引发安全车，以帮助一号车手费尔南多·阿隆索（Fernando Alonso）夺冠。这种直接置车手与其他竞争者生命于险境的行为，让 F1 的竞技诚信和公众信任度跌入了历史最低谷。 ### [02:02:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7331s) 救世主登场与 Statsig 赞助商插播 就在 F1 体系摇摇欲坠、公众形象跌入深渊之际，不可思议的转机悄然降临。并非依靠伯尼的高超财技，而是围场内迎来了两支谁也没有预料到的全新力量：一家是重返赛场的暗黑潜伏汽车巨头梅赛德斯，另一家则是甚至连能量饮料都不亲自制造的品牌营销公司——红牛（Red Bull）。这两支队伍将彻底重塑这项运动的竞技与商业格局。 随后，节目切入长期合作伙伴 Statsig 的品牌赞助环节： - **Statsig 的产品价值**：包括 OpenAI、Notion、Atlassian、Figma、Rippling 及 Brex 在内的顶级产品团队，均依赖 Statsig 进行核心功能迭代与大规模 AI 原生体验的交付。 - **AI 时代的工程挑战**：在当今 AI 研发环境下，快速部署已成基础门槛，真正的壁垒在于能否精准度量哪些功能改动为客户创造了真实价值，以及如何依据这一信号指导下一次发布。 - **应对大语言模型的不确定性**：LLM 带来了非确定性（Non-determinism），相同输入并不总是产生完全相同的输出，真实行为往往在真实使用中发生微妙漂移。离线评估（Offline Evals）只能反映冰山一角，只有在产品向真实用户上线后通过实验测量用户行为变化，才能建立行之有效的持续学习闭环。 ### [02:04:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7470s) 赞助商插播：Statsig 统一实验与产品分析平台 在深入正题之前，节目插播了 Spring '26 季度合作伙伴 Statsig 的介绍。在现代软件开发中，团队最渴望的就是在代码上线生产环境前，能百分之百确定其表现与影响。Statsig 将实验（A/B Testing）、特性开关（Feature Flags）和产品分析整合进同一套系统中，让工程与产品团队既能安全、敏捷地上线，又能进行严密的因果验证，直接将每一次功能迭代与用户的真实行为挂钩。这种紧密的反馈循环能让学习与认知随着时间持续复利，帮助团队不仅“发布得更快”，更“发布得更好”。无论是构建全新的 AI 体验，还是打磨现有的核心产品，都可以通过 statsig.com/acquired 开启数据驱动的竞争优势。 --- ### [02:05:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7507s) 红牛入局：从泰国醒神饮料到极限运动营销帝国 话题随即转向了彻底颠覆现代 F1 竞争格局的红牛公司（Red Bull）。红牛自身的创业史本就堪称商业奇迹，绝对值得未来单独做一期播客。创始人迪特里希·马特希茨（Dietrich Mateschitz）原本是联合利华（Unilever）和宝洁（P&G）旗下的一名奥地利牙膏推销员。1984 年，他在前往泰国出差时偶然发现了一种当地的提神草本糖浆饮料，随即决定彻底改变自己的人生轨迹。他将这种配方带回欧洲，将所有实际的灌装和制造全部外包，自己则全神贯注于品牌与销售，最终将这罐饮料打造成了一家年营收超过 100 亿美元的跨国巨头。 红牛这套商业模式的核心支柱只有两个字：营销。而其营销战略的最核心载体，就是极限运动。红牛向全世界传达的底层逻辑非常明确：“是的，我们卖的是能量饮料，但你买它真正买的是一种生活方式；而我们的任务，就是让你全方位感知并渴望这种生活方式。” 早在 1989 年，即公司创立仅仅五年后，红牛就赞助了第一位 F1 车手，此后持续加大对赛车运动的投入，并在 1995 年正式成为索伯车队（Sauber，即后来的 Stake / 现 Audi 厂队前身）的冠名赞助商。红牛跨入 F1 的时机堪称绝妙——当时欧盟正在出台极其严苛的烟草广告禁令，逼迫统治围场数十年的烟草巨头们彻底撤出。历史充满讽刺：最后填补万宝路（Marlboro）等烟草巨头退场后巨大空白的，居然是一家能量饮料公司。正如乔舒亚·罗宾逊（Joshua Robinson）和乔纳森·克莱格（Jonathan Clegg）在《方程式》（*The Formula*）一书中所写的经典评论： > “在万宝路高管看着 F1 车手、将他们视为美国牛仔接班人的二十年后，马特希茨看穿了这群人的本质——他们不过是一群喝饱了咖啡因、对个人生死安危毫不在乎的肾上腺素瘾君子。这简直是一场在营销天堂里结成的天作之合。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 赞助模式转型 accDescr: 展示F1赞助从烟草时代转向红牛极限生活方式营销的演进 subgraph Tobacco["传统烟草与奢华时代"] T1["万宝路等烟草巨头"] --> T2["塑造'美国牛仔'硬汉与贵族精英形象"] T2 --> T3["受众：成熟、富裕、传统观众"] end subgraph Transition["转折点（2000年代初）"] E1["欧盟全面禁烟法令出台"] T3 -.-> E1 end subgraph RedBullModel["红牛新纪元"] E1 --> R1["马特希茨洞察本质"] R1 --> R2["极度摄入咖啡因的极限运动与亡命之徒"] R2 --> R3["打造狂欢派对与年轻潮流生活方式"] end ``` --- ### [02:07:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7663s) “年轻人不买劳力士”：打破围场贵族潜规则与收购捷豹 红牛的出现彻底打破了 F1 传统赞助商的陈腐做派。以往车队身上的金主清一色是石油巨头、名表品牌或高端奢侈品，他们极力营造的是一种排他性的尊贵感、摩纳哥式的奢华以及欧式老钱贵族风范，谁都不愿出格惹事。更关键的是，不仅伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）自己，连同这帮老派赞助商，压根就对年轻受众毫无兴趣。当被问及 F1 观众群体老龄化的问题时，伯尼曾留下过一句名垂赛车史的傲慢名言：他直言吸引年轻一代根本不是当务之急，因为他们“买不起劳力士”。 而红牛完全站在了这种观念的对立面：他们要的就是年轻人、肾上腺素和极限生活方式。红牛不仅赞助 F1，还赞助甚至自己创办各种不可思议的亡命极限运动，比如让人从平流层乘坐气球升空再跳伞降落。然而，红牛在 F1 的早期征程遇到了一个致命瓶颈——索伯车队的成绩太差了。 马特希茨在《方程式》中再次一语道破品牌赞助的残酷逻辑：“如果一家保险公司赞助的车队输了比赛，普通人是不会跑去退保换公司的；但如果红牛赞助的车队一直输，大家转头就会去买别的饮料喝。” 到了 2004 年，红牛果断决定抛弃索伯车队，并做出了一项在当时看来不可思议的激进抉择：不再做寄人篱下的赞助商，而是自己下场拥有一支车队。正好此时，福特汽车（Ford）因受全球金融危机前夕的财务泥潭拖累，急于甩掉旗下持续亏损、战绩糟糕的捷豹车队（Jaguar Racing）。福特彻底走投无路，最终只象征性地收取了 **1 英镑** 的对价，就把整支捷豹 F1 车队全盘卖给了红牛。红牛车队（Red Bull Racing）就此诞生。如今二十年后福特再度回归，与红牛合作研发 2026 年新规引擎动力单元，两者的命运轮转可谓戏剧性的宿命闭环。 --- ### [02:10:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=7816s) 能量空间站、摩纳哥浮岛与克里斯蒂安·霍纳的野心 收购仅仅花费 1 英镑，但如何把这支烂队改造成冠军争夺者则是另一回事。然而，一旦红牛拥有了属于自己的车队席位，他们就可以在围场内为所欲为，完全不受任何传统礼教的束缚。 2005 赛季（恰逢 CVC 收购 F1 和伯尼开启新体制的第一年），当各路车队抵达揭幕战时，被眼前的一幕惊呆了：红牛拉着一座货真价实的移动夜总会——名为“能量空间站”（Energy Station）的庞大双层活动中心，招摇过市地进驻了全球各大分站的围场。此前，F1 围场是极其森严封闭的特权圣殿，只有挥金如土的企业高管和持有顶级 Paddock Club 通行证的名流才能涉足。红牛直接推行了完全敞开大门的激进策略： - **无门槛开放**：围场里的任何人，不论是来自法拉利、迈凯伦等竞争对手车队，还是其他赞助商、工程师或底层机械师，随时都可以大摇大摆走进去蹭趴体。 - **全天候狂欢**：驻场 DJ 从早到晚轰炸重低音，红牛饮料与烈酒无上限免费畅饮，楼顶甚至还配有露天游泳池。 - **Formula Una**：红牛专门组建了一支年轻靓丽的“Formula Una”官方形象大使与迎宾女郎团队。 - **摩纳哥奇观**：在寸土寸金、连多余停车位都没有的摩纳哥蒙特卡洛港，红牛因为在陆地上抢不到摆放能量空间站的地盘，直接建造了一个巨大的驳船浮岛，将整座多层夜总会架在浮筒上停泊在港湾水面上。 这套把围场变成流动迪厅的狂放举动，是对 F1 守旧建制派的一记响亮耳光。伯尼和那些一本正经的老派车队老板们气得浑身发抖，痛恨红牛把严肃的工程运动变成了轻浮的派对秀场。但红牛的这套商业机器在底层逻辑上与所有传统车队都不同：传统车队要考虑收支平衡或展示汽车工业能力，而红牛哪怕拿到了世界冠军、车队营收极高，车队本身的账面利润也常年接近于零。车队的一切投入都是能量饮料总部的营销成本——正如亚马逊利用流媒体视频吸引 Prime 会员去电商购物一样，红牛是用围场里最耀眼的马戏团奇观去推动全球便利店里的饮料货架。 围场高层虽然暴怒，但全天候跟着全球巡回的年轻赛车手和机械师们却彻底沦陷了。迈凯伦车队甚至不得不颁布严厉铁律：**严禁任何迈凯伦员工踏入红牛的能量空间站一步，一旦被发现直接开除**（毕竟喝醉酒之后极易泄露赛车机密技术）。 然而，正是这家“夜总会”的幕后操盘手——马特希茨一手提拔的年轻车队领队克里斯蒂安·霍纳（Christian Horner），正在密谋一场彻底改变 F1 格局的技术策反。某天深夜，顶着迈凯伦的开除禁令，霍纳悄悄将迈凯伦那位传奇的工程设计天才、技术总监秘密请进了能量空间站……此人正是阿德里安·纽维（Adrian Newey）。 ### [02:14:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8099s) 气动奇才阿德里安·纽维与红牛王朝的崛起 在赛车工程界，阿德里安·纽维（Adrian Newey）是公认的史上最传奇的赛车设计师。人们谈论纽维的方式，就像在洛克希德·马丁专题中谈论臭鼬工厂的凯利·约翰逊（Kelly Johnson）一样，甚至不止一个人评价他“能亲眼看见空气的流动”。在计算机辅助设计（CAD）和人工智能技术泛滥的今天，纽维依然保留着用铅笔在绘图板上手绘赛车设计的习惯；他在脑海中构想赛车的物理形态以及气流绕车身流动的轨迹，然后一笔一笔画在纸上。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 纽维加盟红牛与四连冠王朝 accDescr: 展示霍纳与马特希茨招募纽维，推动红牛在2010至2013年豪取四连冠并转型为实体车企的演进路径。 subgraph 招募与重构 A["迪特里希·马特希茨 & 克里斯蒂安·霍纳"] --> B["挖角传奇设计师：阿德里安·纽维"] B --> C["坚持手绘空气动力学设计"] end subgraph 赛场统治 C --> D["2010–2013赛季：四连冠霸业"] D --> E["维特尔成就车手与车队双料四连冠"] end subgraph 实体延伸 E --> F["红牛动力总成 (RBPT)"] E --> G["超级跑车 RB17 研发"] end ``` 红牛车队领队克里斯蒂安·霍纳（Christian Horner）与红牛创始人迪特里希·马特希茨（Dietrich Mateschitz）成功将纽维招入麾下，这成为红牛打造冠军战舰的基石。在经历了几年的磨合与研发爬坡后，红牛在进入 F1 的第五个赛季（2010年）迎来了彻底爆发，由年轻的塞巴斯蒂安·维特尔（Sebastian Vettel）领衔，开启了从 2010 到 2013 年车手和车队双料“四连冠”的红牛王朝。当时，迈克尔·舒马赫（Michael Schumacher）与法拉利长期统治带来的审美疲劳刚刚消退，一家卖功能饮料的公司却横空出世，接管了这项烧钱运动的最高王座，并在日后成为 Netflix 纪录片《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）以及当代赛场（如马克斯·维斯塔潘时期）的核心叙事支柱。 - 纽维在自传《如何建造一辆赛车》（_How to Build a Car_）中详述了这段工程生涯与赛车设计哲学。 - 红牛早已超越了普通的“功能饮料品牌赞助商”属性，成长为一家具备完整实体研发制造能力的企业：不仅设立了吸收众多前本田技术骨干、并与福特展开合作的红牛动力总成（Red Bull Powertrains），还在纽维离队前由其主导设计了限量版赛道超级跑车 RB17。 --- ### [02:18:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8316s) 舒马赫的吸金纪录与罗斯·布朗的“轮胎漏洞” 在红牛崛起的同时，另一支日后统治 F1 的豪门王朝也在悄然孕育，而它的起点极具戏剧性——它在日后被以区区 1 英镑的象征性价格收购。要理解这支队伍的来龙去脉，必须先回溯 90 年代末到 2000 年代初法拉利的黄金时代。当时迈克尔·舒马赫几乎是统治级的存在，年薪高达惊人的 6,000 万美元，与泰格·伍兹（Tiger Woods）大致在同一时期成为历史上最早跨过“10亿美元职业生涯总收入”门槛的运动员之一。彼时法拉利为了夺冠不惜代价，展现出了“制造无限亏损也要赢”的狂热，而舒马赫展现出了如野兽般的职业精神：他不仅是划时代的车手，更像是一个整日泡在车库里通宵达旦钻研赛车、与机械师打成一片的工程师，测试圈数多到不可思议。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 法拉利轮胎规则漏洞博弈 accDescr: 展示法拉利与罗斯·布朗利用普利司通定制轮胎击败米其林阵营的策略路径。 subgraph 竞争格局 A["米其林轮胎阵营"] -->|通用规格| B["大多数车队妥协适配"] end subgraph 法拉利奇招 C["罗斯·布朗洞察规则漏洞"] --> D["法拉利独家绑定普利司通"] D --> E["双向派驻工程师专属研发"] E --> F["完全契合舒马赫跑法的定制轮胎"] end B -.->|性能劣势| G["法拉利统治赛场"] F --> G ``` 当时法拉利无敌舰队的核心大脑，正是其技术总监罗斯·布朗（Ross Brawn）。在国际汽联（FIA）不断收紧技术规则的大背景下，布朗比任何人都更擅长利用规则漏洞。当时 F1 处于轮胎竞争期，由于普利司通（Bridgestone）遭遇问题，绝大多数车队为了规避风险纷纷倒戈投奔米其林（Michelin）。布朗和法拉利却逆向思考：如果留在普利司通阵营，双方互相派遣工程师深度协作，普利司通就可以专门根据法拉利的底盘特性和舒马赫本人的驾驶习惯量身定制轮胎。而其他车队只能被迫使用米其林为了兼顾各家而妥协出来的“最大公约数”通用轮胎，这成为了法拉利击溃对手的关键杀招。 - F1 赛车极其烧钱的根本原因在于高度定制化：除了近年来全联盟强制统一的光环系统（Halo）和单一供应商轮胎外，车队甚至要自主设计加工赛车上的每一颗螺栓，这与 NASCAR 等大量采用统一部件的赛事截然不同。 - 在当年的规则博弈中，定制轮胎使法拉利获得了巨大的圈速优势，但也直接促使 FIA 随后全面修改规则并封堵了这一轮胎漏洞。 --- ### [02:23:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8619s) 本田大溃退与布朗的绝地游说 在 FIA 堵死轮胎漏洞后，功成名就的罗斯·布朗告别法拉利，于 2007 年底加入本田 F1 车队担任领队，准备全力备战 2008 赛季。然而天不遂人愿，2008 年全球金融海啸爆发，各大汽车巨头面临生死存亡的财务危机。刚刚履职一年的布朗突然收到本田总部的冰冷通知：受经济大环境所限，本田承受不了继续维持 F1 车队的公关压力和财务失血，决定立刻全面退出该运动并关闭车队。 站在顶峰的功勋工程师瞬间面临失业困境，而当时整个汽车和赛车工业都在急剧收缩，根本没有多余的高管空位。面对绝境，布朗立刻展开了极限公关与商业斡旋。他直接切中了本田管理层的要害：本田之所以退出 F1，是担心在全球金融危机面前继续烧钱会招致公众和股东的严厉抨击；但如果直接关闭车队，就意味着必须立刻解雇近千名员工，这引发的舆论风暴和社会反弹只会让本田的企业形象变得更加糟糕。布朗以此为筹码，要求本田管理层给自己留出时间，寻求一个既能保住队伍、又能让本田全身而退的解决方案。 ### [02:25:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8705s) 1英镑的管理层收购与伯尼的横插一脚 2008年全球金融危机爆发，全球经济陷入动荡，本田汽车（Honda）决定退出F1。面对全员下岗的危机，车队领队罗斯·布朗（Ross Brawn）向本田高层争取时间：“我知道你们可能得裁掉所有人，但那是残酷的商业现实。给我几个月，我去给车队找个买家。你们只需要维持员工的薪水，这样车队才有资产可卖。”然而在那个风雨飘摇的年份，外部买家根本无从寻觅。布朗随即拿出了备选方案——管理层收购（MBO）：布朗只出象征性的1英镑象征性对价接手车队，而本田需在过渡期内继续提供薪资资金以实现车队软着陆。这样一来，本田董事会既能在股东面前宣称彻底砍掉了这项烧钱的边缘业务，又避免了在英国直接裁撤近千名员工的社会与公关灾难。 就在协议接近达成时，F1掌门人伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）闻讯赶来。伯尼一向不喜欢罗斯·布朗，更容不得别人以区区1英镑捡到如此大便宜——尤其是任何脱离他掌控或分不到一杯羹的交易。尽管身为整个F1赛事的运营掌舵人，伯尼依然直接找到本田董事会，试图截胡这笔交易，劝说本田把车队卖给自己。但出人意料的是，本田董事会并没有倒向伯尼，而是选择坚守对布朗的承诺，最终同意以1英镑将车队售予布朗。这戏剧性的一幕后来甚至被基努·里维斯（Keanu Reeves）拍成了纪录片《布朗：不可能的F1故事》（*Brawn: The Impossible Formula 1 Story*）。 - 本田面临撤资压力，罗斯·布朗以1英镑完成管理层收购（MBO），本田同意为2009赛季初期的运营薪水提供兜底资金。 - 伯尼·埃克莱斯顿试图凭借赛事掌门人地位截胡收购，但被本田董事会拒绝。 - 该传奇历程被基努·里维斯制作成纪录片《布朗》（*Brawn*）。 ### [02:27:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8822s) 梅赛德斯的引擎援助与“拼装弗兰肯赛车” 虽然收购达成，但本田划下了一条不可逾越的红线：除了兜底部分员工薪资外，本田彻底退出，不再提供任何引擎——即便布朗提出照市价支付1500万美元商业采购费也不行。在F1，并非每支车队都有能力研发制造引擎，赛道上常年只有少数几家引擎供应商（如法拉利除自用外也供应其他车队，凯迪拉克后续也使用法拉利引擎）。走投无路的布朗只得找到梅赛德斯（Mercedes）。此时的梅赛德斯自1955年勒芒惨烈事故后就退出了F1厂商队，当时仅作为迈凯伦（McLaren）的专属引擎供应商。出于对布朗在法拉利时期辉煌战绩的敬重，梅赛德斯在维护迈凯伦优先合作关系的前提下，破例同意向这支新车队提供2009赛季的引擎。 这支仓促成军的车队甚至连正式公司架构和冠名赞助商都没有，队员们干脆直接以领队的名字命名为“布朗GP”（Brawn GP）。更要命的是，梅赛德斯的引擎与原本针对本田引擎设计的底盘根本不匹配，技师们只能做大量极度粗糙的后期改装与强行拼凑，拼装出一辆近乎怪胎的“弗兰肯赛车”（Franken-car）。由于金融危机蔓延，车队拉不到全季赞助，只能一场赛事实打实地谈单场赞助。在所有人眼中，这支毫无预算、拼装上阵的杂牌军注定要在赛道上沦为垫底笑柄。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Brawn GP 诞生与拯救链路 accDescr: 展示本田退出后布朗GP如何获得梅赛德斯引擎支持并依靠双层扩散器赢得世界冠军 subgraph Crisis ["危机与收购"] A["2008金融危机: 本田宣布退出F1"] --> B["罗斯·布朗以1英镑象征性对价完成MBO"] B --> C["本田断供引擎，坚决划清界限"] end subgraph Assembly ["破局与改装"] D["梅赛德斯破例同意供应引擎"] --> E["引擎底盘强行拼合打造'弗兰肯赛车'"] F["本田遗留研发成果: 双层扩散器 (Double Diffuser)"] --> E E --> G["命名为布朗GP (Brawn GP)"] end subgraph Miracle ["赛道奇迹"] G --> H["2009墨尔本揭幕战包揽冠亚军"] H --> I["简森·巴顿前7站豪取6胜"] I --> J["提前锁定年度车手与车队双料世界冠军"] end Crisis --> Assembly Assembly --> Miracle ``` ### [02:29:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=8977s) 双层扩散器奇迹与童话般的双料世界冠军 然而命运开了一个巨大的玩笑。在本田日本工程师团队撤离之前，他们曾暗中研发出一项突破性的空气动力学杀手锏——“双层扩散器”（Double Diffuser）。传统扩散器负责将赛车底部高速流过的气流引导向上并排出车尾，优化尾部空气动力学；而双层结构则产生了惊人的下压力优势。2009赛季揭幕战在澳大利亚墨尔本打响，布朗GP的两辆赛车一出场便震惊世界，直接包揽了冠亚军。一号车手简森·巴顿（Jenson Button）在赛季前7场大奖赛中不可思议地斩获6场胜利，将整个围场掀翻。 其他车队开局阶段愤怒地质疑双层扩散器的合法性，但当国际汽联确认其合规后，所有顶尖车队在赛季中段纷纷效仿采用。Acquired节目主播们回忆起在拉斯维加斯大奖赛期间与简森·巴顿共进午餐的经历，感叹布朗GP是整个F1历史上绝无仅有的“极端异类”——在F1，胜利通常属于砸下数亿美元的法拉利，或是挖来阿德里安·纽维（Adrian Newey）潜心研发数年的红牛，绝不可能发生这种依靠极度拮据的预算和临时拼凑的赛车一击即中的神话。尽管下半赛季对手赶上后布朗GP未再赢过一场比赛，但凭借上半赛季积累的微弱积分优势，简森·巴顿与布朗GP在收官阶段依然奇迹般地夺得了车手世界冠军与车队总冠军。 - 扩散器作用是疏导赛车底盘下方的气流并优化车尾下压力，本田留下的双层扩散器设计带来了统治级的空气动力学性能。 - 简森·巴顿驾驶布朗赛车在前7站取得6胜，墨尔本揭幕战布朗GP实现一二名完赛包揽。 - 下半赛季全场普及该技术，布朗GP未获一胜，但仍凭借前期积分优势惊险斩获2009年车手和车队双料总冠军。 ### [02:32:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9147s) 绝境中的华丽谢幕：梅赛德斯王朝的奠基 在主播看来，正是这种融合了团队拼搏、领袖魅力、逆境坚守与工程智慧的极致故事，构成了F1这项运动最迷人的核心魅力；这绝非仅是周日看看少有超车的赛车巡游，而是现实版的英雄史诗。然而童话落幕后，新晋世界冠军却立即面临无米下锅的残酷现实。由于车队原本就是依靠本田兜底和单场赞助勉强维系，根本没有资金支持下赛季研发全新赛车，布朗GP无法以原有所有权结构继续征战2010赛季。 罗斯·布朗心知必须为车队寻找真正有实力的买家，而最合乎逻辑的选择正是刚刚与他们共享了荣耀的梅赛德斯。渴望组建自己厂队的梅赛德斯在赛季结束后当机立断，放弃了与迈凯伦长达十余年的独家战略绑定，出资2亿美元收购了布朗GP 75%的绝对控股权，并将车队正式更名为梅赛德斯车队（Mercedes-AMG Petronas F1 Team）。谁能想到，这支从布朗GP废墟与灰烬中浴火重生的车队，后来不仅说服迈克尔·舒马赫（Michael Schumacher）复出加盟，更在此后豪取车队八连冠，并见证刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）斩获六座世界冠军，开创了F1历史上最恐怖的现代王朝。 - 夺冠后布朗GP因缺乏研发和运营预算，无法独立参加2010赛季。 - 梅赛德斯与迈凯伦分道扬镳，以2亿美元收购布朗GP 75%的股权，正式组建现代梅赛德斯F1厂队。 - 这支车队成为日后梅赛德斯连续8年夺得车队世界冠军、刘易斯·汉密尔顿斩获6座车手总冠军的王朝基石，建队第一步便是力邀车王迈克尔·舒马赫出山复出。 ### [02:34:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9283s) 梅赛德斯的“奇才乔丹”时期与重塑霸业的艰难开局 买下布朗车队（Brawn GP）后，梅赛德斯将迈克尔·舒马赫从退役状态中请了回来，促成舒马赫与罗斯·布朗（Ross Brawn）这对曾席卷围场的“梦幻组合”再度联手，试图驾驶这台冠军战车延续辉煌。然而现实却令人大失所望，主播们调侃这完全就像当年“迈克尔·乔丹复出加盟华盛顿奇才”——人们总想用汤姆·布雷迪去坦帕湾海盗拿超级碗来做类比，但舒马赫、布朗和梅赛德斯并没有赢得另一个超级碗。2009 年布朗车队的统治力本质上全靠“双层扩散器”（double diffuser）的规则红利，一旦其他车队纷纷参透并跟进这项技术，梅赛德斯的先发优势便荡然无存。梅赛德斯原本以为自己买到的是具有持久竞争力的资产，以为车队已经开始为下一个赛季做足技术储备，结果却愕然发现自己“买到了一辆柠檬车”（lemon）。 面对这种烂摊子，梅赛德斯原本完全可以选择止损离场，抱怨一句“这笔买卖不划算”就甩手走人。但他们反其道而行之，不仅没有抽身，反而果断向车队追加数亿美元的真金白银。更激进的是，在经历了两年的挣扎后，管理层痛下决心推倒重来：他们做出了围场历史上极罕见的决定——同时解雇了罗斯·布朗和车王舒马赫。布朗当年仅用 1 英镑就从本田手中接盘车队，转手以 2 亿英镑将 75% 的股份卖给梅赛德斯，早已赚得盆满钵满；而梅赛德斯则在空出的两个关键位置上，做出了彻底改变近代 F1 格局的历史性引援。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 梅赛德斯F1车队的管理与车手重组 accDescr: 展示梅赛德斯从接手布朗车队到完成重组、开启八连冠王朝的关键节点。 subgraph 初期阵痛 A["1英镑接盘 Honda 的布朗车队"] --> B["梅赛德斯以2亿英镑收购75%股权"] B --> C["舒马赫复出 + 布朗操盘<br/>（双层扩散器红利消退）"] end subgraph 换血与霸权 C --> D["大刀阔斧换血：解雇布朗与舒马赫"] D --> E["聘请托托·沃尔夫（车队领队/CEO）"] D --> F["签约汉密尔顿 + 搭档罗斯伯格"] E --> G["创纪录的车队总冠军八连冠"] F --> G end ``` --- ### [02:36:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9386s) 沃尔夫与汉密尔顿时代：新一代 CEO 型领队与 60 亿美元估值 在车队领队位置上，梅赛德斯招募了此前投资过威廉姆斯车队的奥地利商人托托·沃尔夫（Toto Wolff）；而在舒马赫留下的头号车手席位上，他们签下了极具天赋的英国年轻车手刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）。托托、汉密尔顿与另一位车手尼科·罗斯伯格（Nico Rosberg）组成了不可阻挡的三叉戟，创下了前无古人的车队总冠军“八连冠”伟业。期间罗斯伯格甚至在 2016 年力压队友汉密尔顿夺得车手世界冠军，这从侧面印证了梅赛德斯赛车性能的绝对碾压。但与法拉利舒马赫时代单一车队无聊的独跑不同，这一时期梅赛德斯、红牛以及法拉利之间上演了激烈的剧情冲突——从维特尔、汉密尔顿到初露锋芒的维斯塔潘，每个赛季的高强度对决让整项运动的观赏性跃上全新台阶。 更深层次的变革在于车队运营逻辑的蜕变。红牛车队的克里斯蒂安·霍纳（Christian Horner）和梅赛德斯的托托·沃尔夫代表了围场内“全新一代的领队物种”，包括后来迈凯伦的扎克·布朗（Zak Brown，名义上也是正规 CEO），他们不再只是传统的赛车工程师或车队管家，而是真正的现代商业 CEO。在此之前，整个 F1 历史上只有恩佐·法拉利和伯尼·埃克莱斯顿曾扮演过类似的角色。他们所做的不只是打造赛车，更是在构建庞大的商业帝国：当年罗斯·布朗花 1 英镑收购、梅赛德斯斥资 2 亿英镑控股的车队，如今仅梅赛德斯 F1 赛车队（不含母公司汽车业务）在一笔少数股权交易中的估值就飙升至 60 亿美元。单单这一支车队的价值，就已经是伯尼在巅峰时期从 F1 抽走的全部现金总额的两倍。 - **车队转手利润**：罗斯·布朗以 1 英镑自 Honda 手中购入车队，仅一年后便以 2 亿英镑售出 75% 股权。 - **统治级战绩**：梅赛德斯在 V6 混动时代狂揽连续 8 座车队总冠军，罗斯伯格拿下 2016 年车手世界冠军，其余赛季均由汉密尔顿登顶。 - **单队估值跃升**：在托托·沃尔夫治下，梅赛德斯 F1 车队近期少数股权交易对应估值达 60 亿美元。 --- ### [02:39:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9581s) CVC 的资本游戏与价值核心：那份价值连城的“百年特许权” 在围场竞技格局剧变的同时，F1 联盟本身的资本结构也在酝酿一场终极洗牌。自 CVC 与伯尼重新控制 F1 之后，CVC 便熟练地运用私募股权（PE）的标准操盘手法：一方面，他们以不断攀升的估值，陆续将 F1 的少数股权分拆出售给贝莱德（BlackRock）和挪威主权财富基金（Norges Bank）等顶级资管机构；另一方面，他们不断提高杠杆，先后给 F1 压上了高达 40 亿美元的巨额债务，并将借来的现金直接分红抽走。得益于全球新兴分站的加入和不断水涨船高的电视转播合同，F1 的现金流持续健康增长，支撑了这套资本运作。截至 2016 年，CVC 虽然持股比例已稀释至 35%，但连同前期的债务套现与股权转让，他们累计套现了多达 45 亿美元现金——而当初他们和伯尼入局时的自有本金仅仅只有 9 亿美元。 这套暴利游戏背后的核心底层资产究竟是什么？此时的 F1 既非早期伯尼设立的一堆离岸皮包实体，也不是他妻子名下的信托控股公司，而是一家由 CVC 实际掌控的商业主体。关键在于，这家公司在法理上并不拥有赛车运动本身，它持有的最核心资产是伯尼在 2001 年与国际汽联（FIA）达成的一纸“百年霸王条款”：当时伯尼在没有任何公开竞标流程的情况下，以极其低廉的 3.6 亿美元代价，从 FIA 手中买断了长达 100 年的 F1 商业开发特许经营权。所谓 F1 的全部商业价值，本质上就是这项由 FIA 定义为“一级方程式”赛事的独家商业变现权——包揽除车队自身赞助商和赛道推广方门票收入之外的转播权、冠名权及围场全部商业开发利益。 --- ### [02:42:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9753s) 自由媒体 80 亿美元入主：资本炼金术与美国老炮的入局 到了 2016 年 9 月，F1 迎来了彻底告别欧洲旧时代的转折点——美国传媒巨头自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）正式宣布收购 F1，对应的股权价值为 44 亿美元，在承担 F1 全部存量债务后，整个交易的企业价值（Enterprise Value）高达 80 亿美元。操盘这场交易的正是自由媒体帝国的灵魂人物约翰·马龙（John Malone）和格雷格·马菲（Greg Maffei），他们堪称华尔街最精明的交易大师和财务工程专家。自由媒体首先从 CVC 手中吃下 18% 至 19% 的股权成为最大单一股东，随后巧妙地将上市公司母公司更名为“一级方程式集团”（Formula One Group），并发行了代码为 FWONK（华尔街投行圈戏称为“Funk”）的追踪股票（tracking stock），向包括 CVC 和伯尼在内的其余原股东换发股票，由此让 F1 实现了 100% 的流动性并完成了公开上市。日后自由媒体更是一路将旗下的亚特兰大勇士队（Atlanta Braves）以及 Live Nation（自由流媒体业务）全部拆分剥离，到最后母公司约 90% 的资产就是 F1 自身，自由媒体实质上彻底转变成了 F1 的上市代名词。 在管理层架构设计上，自由媒体最初宣称伯尼将继续留任 CEO，但同时空降了前新闻集团（News Corp）总裁兼首席运营官、福斯传奇高管切斯·凯里（Chase Carey）担任 F1 董事长。切斯·凯里当年协助鲁珀特·默多克创办了 Fox Sports 并一手搭建了极具统治力的 Fox NFL 转播帝国，是体育媒体界绝对的泰斗级人物。凯里随即组建了一支全明星级别的美国体育老炮管理班底，其中包括在 ESPN 与《SportsCenter》黄金时期立下汗马功劳的核心高管肖恩·布拉奇斯（Sean Bratches）。新管理层的核心投资逻辑非常纯粹：F1 是一项拥有无与伦比的底层故事、极高忠诚度粉丝群和顶级商业潜力的绝佳资产，从红牛和梅赛德斯现代化运营的成功就可以看出，它在现代数字时代完全能够大放异彩；过去这项运动之所以被压制，完全是因为伯尼数十年来陈旧而系统的“严重投资不足”——尤其是在巨大的美国市场，彼时整个美国境内仅仅只有奥斯汀美洲赛道（COTA）这孤零零的一站比赛，整片商业蓝海正等待着他们去彻底唤醒。 ### [02:46:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=9969s) 伯尼时代的终结与自由媒体入局 自由媒体（Liberty Media）完成对 F1 的收购前夕，这项赛事的商业运作在现代媒体人眼中简直匪夷所思。当时 F1 几乎没有任何数字业务投资，故事讲述匮乏，完全没有社交媒体曝光，且大部分转播内容都被深锁在付费墙之后，尤其在美国市场门槛极高。其受众画像也极度狭窄，基本被局限为“有钱的年长白人男性”。用现代媒体公司的视角审视，这项资产到处都是唾手可得的果实（low-hanging fruit），是一座随时等待被释放巨大商业价值的金矿。 但要进行改革，权力结构就必须厘清。2016 年秋季宣布收购后不久，由蔡斯·凯里（Chase Carey）担任主席、伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）继续担任 CEO 的“双巨头”设想迅速破产——只要伯尼还在掌权，F1 就不可能容得下第二个人发号施令。2017 年 1 月 23 日，自由媒体正式宣布伯尼卸任 CEO，转任荣誉名誉主席兼董事会顾问，甚至没有保留董事席位。这本质上就是自由媒体将伯尼解雇。这是一次经典的“成也萧何，败也萧何”（what got you here won't get you there）：伯尼从 1972 年起执掌 F1 长达 45 年，凭一己之力塑造了这项全球运动，除了前 NFL 掌门人皮特·罗泽尔（Pete Rozelle）掌舵 30 年外，全球体坛无出其右；但伯尼的铁腕控制与旧思维，在现代体育娱乐格局下已成为 F1 继续向前的最大绊脚石。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 自由媒体管理权更迭与首要改革 accDescr: 展示自由媒体接管F1后驱逐伯尼并推行预算帽新政的核心脉络 subgraph Management["管理层更替 (2017年1月)"] A["伯尼·埃克莱斯顿 掌权45年 (1972-2017)"] -->|被解职并边缘化为荣誉顾问| B["蔡斯·凯里 接任CEO (自由媒体执掌)"] end subgraph TeamReform["优先事项第一条：修复车队生态"] B --> C["推行《协和协议》与预算帽制度"] C --> D["赛车硬性支出上限: 1.45亿降至1.35亿，后因通胀调至1.7亿美元"] D --> E["彻底终结底端车队持续失血破产的恶性循环"] E --> F["头部车队暴利、全员接近或实现盈利，平均估值飙升"] end ``` --- ### [02:48:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=10106s) 自由媒体四步走与预算帽的破局 蔡斯·凯里接任 CEO 后，自由媒体团队面临艰巨挑战，迅速梳理出一套“四点计划”。其中重中之重、位列第一的，就是**修复与各支车队的关系**。虽然此前得益于红牛和梅赛德斯等车队的自我商业化运作，车队逐渐具备了商业思维，但由于伯尼长期分而治之，联盟与车队之间关系高度紧张。过去伯尼与国际汽联（FIA）未能推行成本上限，险些导致 FOTA 独立另立门户，直接反映出原有机制的彻底失灵。如果没有成本上限，背靠独立财团或母公司巨额补贴的车队便能肆意挥霍数亿美元，迫使其他车队被动卷入军备竞赛；结果就是除了前三四家豪门，发车格后排的六支车队每隔几年就因无法维系商业运营而破产轮换。 在自由媒体主导谈判的首份《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）中，这项沉疴终于迎刃而解：所有车队同意引入 1.45 亿美元的赛车研发与制造成本上限。虽然车手薪水、薪酬最高的三位高管、市场营销费用以及动力单元（Power Unit）研发均豁免在外，并且有充裕现金的车队仍可在规则外找到营销 leverage，但这一机制起到了立竿见影的效果，类似于 NFL 的工资帽——正如达拉斯牛仔队可以在营销上砸钱，但球场阵容所受的开销限制与对手别无二致。配合严格的风洞测试时间限制与赛季内测试禁令，这项限制真正落到了实处。该上限后来逐步下调至 1.35 亿美元，后随通胀与分站增加适度放宽至约 1.7 亿美元；相比此前顶级豪门动辄四五亿美元的疯狂投入，所有车队赛车预算如今都被严格锁死在 1.7 亿美元以内。 - **预算帽覆盖范围**：核心针对赛车设计与制造；排除车手薪水、前三高薪高管薪资、市场营销开支及动力单元研发。 - **协同技术限制**：同步配套风洞使用时间配额阶梯限制与严苛的季中测试禁令。 - **行业格局洗牌**：瞬间扭转了后排车队持续失血的局面，让几乎所有车队迈向收支平衡甚至盈利。 --- ### [02:51:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=10284s) 车队商业奇迹与托托·沃尔夫的商业帝国 成本控制制度使各支 F1 车队一夜之间演变为类似 NFL 球队般极具吸引力的优质盈利资产。在 2026 年，F1 车队的平均年营收已高达 4.3 亿美元左右： 1. **赞助收入**：占据绝对大头，约占总营收的 60%； 2. **联盟分红**：包括媒体版权、分站承办费等按《协和协议》分配的收益分成； 3. **商业衍生收入**：5% 至 15% 来源于周边商品销售、客户引擎外售、知识产权授权和 Paddock 车库参观等。 在 4.3 亿美元的均额收入下，面对约 1.7 亿美元的赛车成本帽，即使算上车手及管理层薪酬，绝大部分车队都已能稳定保本甚至斩获丰厚利润。对比 10 至 15 年前顶级豪门普遍亏损的惨状，当前排头兵的数据堪称惊人：红牛车队营收达 4.2 亿美元（其策略特意将运营利润率压低至 1% 或以内，将资金顶格再投资回赛车与极限运动营销中）；迈凯伦营业利润达到约 7,000 万美元；法拉利营业利润约 8,000 万美元（营收达 6.7 亿美元）。而梅赛德斯车队更是其中的绝对超级异类：其年营收冲到了 8 亿美元，并贡献了高达约 2 亿美元的惊人营业利润（营业利润率达到 25%），几乎媲美二三十年前伯尼为整个 F1 联盟创造的利润总额。 更令人称道的是车队负责人托托·沃尔夫（Toto Wolff）的资本眼光与经营手腕。托托在 2021 年曾估算，梅赛德斯光是参与 F1 赛事每年就能斩获等值于 10 亿美元的广告媒介曝光价值。算上 6 亿美元的整体运营投入，梅赛德斯获得了超过 10 亿美元的营销价值外加 2 亿美元现金营业利润的双重底线回报。这直接将梅赛德斯的品牌形象从十二十年前“略显油腻的豪华轿车/S级长途巡航车”重塑为与法拉利平起平坐的先锋超跑标杆。同时，托托·沃尔夫不同于其他普通职业经理人车队领队，他在 2013 年加盟时就谈判拿下了车队近三分之一的股权（当时车队估值仅约 1.65 亿美元）。到了 CrowdStrike 首席执行官通过其控股公司进行战略投资时，梅赛德斯 F1 车队整体估值已飙升至 60 亿美元，使托托个人身价暴涨跻身超级亿万富翁之列。 搞定车队这一头号目标之后，自由媒体计划中的第二大优先级，则是着手修复与赛道承办方（Promoters）的关系——在过去几十年间，赛道举办方始终是伯尼为了最大化榨取赛历价值而无情盘剥的对象。 ### [02:56:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=10581s) 破除“伯尼旧制”：从剥削赛道到合作共赢 在伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）掌控的旧时代，F1 联盟与赛道推广方（Promoters）之间充斥着极度不平等的剥削关系与深层的不信任。当时的 F1 联盟唯一关心的就是向赛道收取高昂的承办费（Race fee），对于如何帮助赛道本身取得商业成功、如何进行市场营销以把蛋糕做大，完全是“零考虑”。这也导致许多中游分站赛办得死气沉沉、无人问津。更夸张的是，由于双方戒备森严，除了白纸黑字的转账付款之外，各分站赛道连最基本的观众入场数据、营销策略都不会与 F1 官方共享。 当时的赛道承办方处境极其被动：如果你拥有一条赛道想办 F1，伯尼的开价是欧洲老牌赛道交 2000 万美元，美国新赛道交 4000 万到 5000 万美元，中东主权财富基金更是要被敲诈 5000 万到 6000 万美元。而在这笔巨额开销之外，最赚钱的高端围场俱乐部（Paddock Club）收入全归 F1，赛道周围的广告赞助权益全归 F1，转播权收入更是一分钱分不到，甚至连媒体摄像机都不准赛道方私自架设。赛道方唯一能做的，就是卖门票和支几个热狗摊卖餐饮，前几年几乎铁定巨额亏损。承办方要想不亏本，唯一的出路就是找当地政府争取财政补贴，用纳税人的钱来填补窟窿。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 与赛道推广方关系的演变 accDescr: 对比伯尼时代对赛道的单向利益榨取与自由媒体时代合作共赢的超级碗模式 subgraph Bernie["伯尼时代：单向榨取与不信任"] B1["赛道承办方支付巨额承办费<br>(2000万-6000万美元)"] --> B2["F1独吞核心收益<br>(Paddock Club / 赛道广告 / 转播权)"] B1 -.-> B3["承办方仅剩门票与普通餐饮<br>数据零共享，普遍陷入巨额亏损"] end subgraph Liberty["自由媒体时代：超级碗周末模式"] L1["建立商业伙伴关系<br>(共享观众数据与跨站营销)"] --> L2["打造22场全球超级碗<br>(协同引入一线明星、音乐节与社媒引流)"] L2 --> L3["赛事娱乐化破局<br>(化解正赛悬念不足，激活全周末消费)"] end ``` 自由媒体（Liberty Media）入主后，立即打破了这种敌对对抗的局面。管理层把全球赛道推广方召集到同一个房间，明确表态：“我们是真正的商业伙伴，赛道之间并不是零和博弈。”他们推动全联盟的数据共享，比如跨国追赛的铁杆车迷数据，让各站协同营销，吸引车迷去更多城市观赛。自由媒体的核心愿景，是把全赛季变成“在全球各个国家和城市举办的 22 场超级碗”。每逢比赛周末，F1 不仅是一场赛车，更是全城狂欢的巨型节日。自由媒体主动协助赛道邀请国际一线巨星助阵演出、对接名流资源、统筹社交媒体宣发。例如美国奥斯汀的美洲赛道（COTA）就深谙此道，先后请来泰勒·斯威夫特（Taylor Swift）、红发艾德（Ed Sheeran）、斯汀（Sting）、阿姆（Eminem）和加斯·布鲁克斯（Garth Brooks），将比赛周末彻底打造成超级音乐嘉年华。这背后其实蕴含着一个清醒的认知：很多时候 F1 正赛本身可能没那么精彩——领跑的永远是那两三支顶级车队，排位赛拿到杆位的车手只要第一圈没撞车，冠军归属基本就失去悬念——因此，必须通过精彩绝伦的周边娱乐体验，让全场观众值回票价。 - 欧洲传统分站赛的承办费大约为 2000 万美元，美国等新兴赛道为 4000 万至 5000 万美元，中东土豪分站则高达 5000 万至 6000 万美元。 - 自由媒体推动的“超级碗化”使赛道周末演变成集音乐节、名流社交、城市公关于一体的综合盛会。 ### [03:00:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=10815s) 重塑车迷连接：从封杀社媒到拥抱数字浪潮 自由媒体整顿的第三个核心利益相关方是全球车迷。在伯尼执掌的漫长岁月里，他对这项运动有着病态的控制欲，“掌控高于一切”——他要垄断电视转播、转播画面呈现、承办费定价、记者采访权，甚至严格把控谁能在什么时间进入围场俱乐部。这种停留在 1990 年代黄金期的保守心态，让 F1 彻底与互联网社交媒体时代脱节。 最荒诞的代表事件发生在刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）身上。作为 F1 历史上第一位也是唯一的黑人超级巨星车手，汉密尔顿具有无可比拟的全球知名度与跨界时尚号召力。作为一个典型的千禧一代，汉密尔顿希望运营自己的 Instagram 账号分享生活与围场幕后，然而伯尼的回应，却是一封接一封的律师函（Cease-and-desist letters），勒令他删除动态，理由竟然是汉密尔顿“非法传播 F1 的知识产权”。当自由媒体接手时，汉密尔顿直接带着厚厚一叠来自伯尼的侵权警告信走进了自由媒体的办公室。自由媒体的新管理团队当场拍板：“求你了，刘易斯，想在 Instagram 上发多少就发多少！” 与此同时，自由媒体迅速收割那些散落在地上的“低垂果实”，开启全方位破圈： - **电竞与电子游戏**：此前英国有一家独立工作室长期制作官方 F1 游戏，自由媒体入主后不久，该团队被艺电（EA）收购，直接并入了运作《Madden》和《FIFA》这套年入数十亿美元的顶尖体育游戏变现体系。 - **借鉴 NFL 的淡季运营法**：自由媒体团队大多出身于福斯体育（Fox Sports）、ESPN 和 NFL 体系。NFL 极其擅长把淡季空档期包装成备受瞩目的商业大事件（如 NFL 选秀大会）。自由媒体如法炮制，将过去毫无商业价值的“季前冬测”（Testing period）电视转播化、事件化，成功制造出海量话题。比如阿德里安·纽维（Adrian Newey）转投阿斯顿·马丁担任车队领队后操刀的激进新车设计，因测试里程严重不足而引发全球体育媒体连篇累牍的戏剧性探讨。 ### [03:04:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11042s) 《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）：体育传媒史上的降维打击 随着游戏和冬季测试的落地，自由媒体顺理成章地将目光投向了好莱坞。起初，管理层的逻辑相当朴素：“赛车电影向来有观众，赛车看起来酷炫、视觉冲击力强，拍影视剧是理所当然的思路。”但后来的事实证明，这个基于“赛车竞速”的初始假设其实走偏了，真正的突破口根本不在赛车，而在“人”。 他们主动找到 Netflix，开启了日后被公认为“体育传媒史上最具颠覆性、影响力最大的影视作品”——《极速求生》（Formula 1: Drive to Survive）。如果说 F1 是三场同时进行的角逐（车手间的速度对决、千人团队的工程世界杯、以及围场内部的办公室政治与豪门恩怨），那么《极速求生》的核心灵魂正是这第三场：“围场办公室政治世界杯”。它本质上是一档极致的人性真人秀，那些以 300 公里时速飞驰的赛车、偶尔发生的惊险撞车，在片中只是锦上添花的视觉点缀；镜头真正聚焦的，是这群二十多岁、外形出众的年轻车手，在摩纳哥等全球最纸醉金迷的奢华胜地开游艇、游泳、狂欢，以及车队领队与赞助商之间充斥着权力博弈与勾心斗角的“真人秀肥皂剧”。这种对幕后人性冲突的深度挖掘，直接击穿了传统硬核车迷的圈层壁垒，成为向全球大众普及 F1 的超级加速器。 ### [03:06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11200s) 幕后围场的极度饥渴与流媒体争夺战 在《疾速争胜》（Drive to Survive）诞生前，外界往往以为赛车运动不需要像篮球那样制作浮夸的真人秀花絮来吸引新观众。然而事实恰恰相反：当时整个 F1 圈子，从普通大众到最资深硬核的“汽油脑袋”（petrol heads），都对车队围场的内幕极度饥渴。哪怕老车迷嘴上说着“这算什么纯粹的赛车”，身体却非常诚实——在此之前，伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）严防死守的围场从未允许任何人揭开这层神秘面纱，大家完全没见识过幕后的真实模样。 自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）入主后，迅速展开了动作。他们同时与 Netflix 和亚马逊（Amazon）接触，试图挑起一场竞价战。有趣的是，亚马逊当时其实已经在筹备一部专门聚焦于刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）和梅赛德斯车队（Mercedes）的纪录片；然而滑稽的法律现实给他们泼了冷水：F1 官方与自由媒体集团牢牢把控着“赛道现场的实际拍摄权”（track rights）。即便亚马逊拿到了汉密尔顿和梅赛德斯的肖像与配合权益，只要 F1 官方不点头，他们就一步也不能踏上赛道拍摄比赛实况，这直接把原计划逼进了死胡同。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 纪录片竞标与制作权决策流程 accDescr: 展示亚马逊与 Netflix 在 F1 纪录片权益竞标中的差异，以及自由媒体集团为何最终选择 Netflix 与 Box to Box Films。 subgraph Amazon_Track["亚马逊竞标"] A["竞标全联盟版权: 出价约 1000 万美元"] B["筹备汉密尔顿/梅赛德斯专拍，但无法获得赛道拍摄权"] end subgraph Netflix_Track["Netflix 竞标与制作"] C["出价约 500 万美元，坚持拒绝加价"] D["承诺庞大全球用户基盘能帮 F1 破圈增长"] E["选用 Box to Box Films（曾制作 2010 年纪录片《塞纳》）"] end subgraph Decision["自由媒体集团决策"] F{"选择权衡：短期版权费 VS 长期运动扩张"} G["授予 Netflix 完整创意控制权与终剪权"] end A --> F C --> F D --> F F -->|接受低报价换取高触达| G G --> E ``` ### [03:07:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11278s) 500 万对 1000 万：用更低的版权费赌一个全球化未来 在全联盟范围的版权谈判桌上，亚马逊开出了最高报价。自由媒体集团拿着亚马逊的数字转头试探 Netflix 能否跟进（坊间传闻亚马逊的报价差不多是 Netflix 的两倍，规模大约在 1000 万美元对比 500 万美元的级别）。但 Netflix 明确表态：这就是我们的预算天花板，不会再多出一分钱；不过如果 F1 认清自己的首要目标是“在全球范围内做大这项运动”，那么 Netflix 当时在美国拥有两倍于亚马逊的订阅基盘，绝对是绝无仅有的最佳宣发放大器。 - **体育转播商业逻辑的反转**：过去体育联盟习惯向流媒体或制片方收取昂贵的版权费，然而《疾速争胜》的爆火彻底逆转了议价权。如今连 NFL 等顶级联盟，都抢着让 Netflix 免费进驻拍摄，因为这种超级聚光灯给联盟带来的曝光价值早已远超区区几百万美元制作费。 - **创意控制权的全面下放**：自由媒体做出了一个前所未有的激进决定——将完整的创意控制权（creative control）与终剪权（final cut）全部拱手交给 Netflix 以及最终中标的制片方 Box to Box Films（该团队正是 2010 年神作纪录片《塞纳》（Senna）的班底，此前也曾接触过红牛的专拍项目）。这一决定确保了整部作品拥有极其鲜明的叙事主见和刺刀见红的戏剧冲突，绝非沦为联盟自我粉饰的宣传片。 - **发布周期的策略考量**：Netflix 坦言制作高品质真人秀无法在赛季进行中做到每周快速交付，因此确立了“在新赛季打响前几天、集中放出上一赛季全部内容”的时差播出策略，把非即时内容变成了新赛季最强大的蓄水预热工具。 ### [03:10:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11423s) 豪门抵制、里卡多破圈与疫情时期的爆发 纪录片最初开局其实极其凶险。刚刚实现八连冠、赚得盆满钵满的梅赛德斯车队自视甚高，不仅觉得抛头露面冒风险，而且心存与亚马逊的潜在合作，直接拒绝拍摄；而法拉利（Ferrari）一见梅赛德斯不玩，立刻端起架子回绝：“梅赛德斯都不去，我们堂堂法拉利更不可能去。”Netflix 手中顿时只剩下排名靠后的八支中下游车队。 然而，制作团队化腐朽为神奇，将镜头对准了丹尼尔·里卡多（Daniel Ricciardo）等极具个性和感染力的车手。第一集播出后便疯狂圈粉。第一季和第二季虽然初期被算法推荐所局限，宛如慢热的火苗，但随着口碑发酵，制作团队惊愕地发现：这项原以为只属于“50岁中年男性汽油脑袋”的狭隘爱好，居然以迅雷不及掩耳之势俘获了全美乃至全球数以千万计的年轻女性群体。 当第三季成为举世瞩目的超级爆款时，原本高高在上的梅赛德斯和法拉利彻底坐不住了——因为他们的各大赞助商纷纷上门愤怒质问：“为什么全世界都在看《疾速争胜》，我们在赛车上花了几千万赞助的 Logo 却连一个镜头都蹭不到？！”最终，两家巨头车队不得不低下高傲的头颅，全员回归纪录片拍摄。 ### [03:11:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11512s) 现象级收视与“真人秀即正史”的文化颠覆 2020 年新冠疫情全球大爆发时，前两季早已就绪上线，正好撞上了全球数亿人被隔离在家、极度匮乏精神娱乐的绝对风口。配合 F1 官方迅速复赛、在同一赛道连开双赛（double-headers）、构建全封闭安全泡泡的超强执行力，甚至车手们掀起的电竞与模拟器狂欢，整个 F1 迎来了奇迹般的爆炸增长。 《疾速争胜》最终在多达 93 个国家和地区的 Netflix 榜单登上榜首。播出的首周官方独立账号观看量就超过 50 万（若计入家庭账号密码共享，首周真实观众轻松破 150 万人）；而单季拉长周期的独立观看账号达到数千万级别，换算成不重复观看的真实自然人，足足有 4000 万到 5000 万人次。对于一档非现场直播的体育纪实节目而言，这已经是天文数字。 这一现象甚至重塑了受众认知：播客主持人分享趣事称，自己在陪妻子看最新一季时随口剧透某车队负责人被解雇，妻子竟大呼“剧透！”，主持人哭笑不得地提醒：“这事在真实世界里已经发生整整半年了！”对海量观众而言，现实比赛只是背景板，《疾速争胜》本身才是真正连贯的“官方正史”。自由媒体集团打造的新商业闭环在此体现得淋漓尽致——即便车迷压根不看周末两个小时的周日正赛，只要他们沉迷于纪录片，赞助商的品牌印记就已经实现了高频次触达，所有人都在源源不断地把钱装进腰包。 - **2018 年（纪录片上线前）**：美国每场 F1 大奖赛的平均收视人数仅约 50 万人。 - **2021 年（纪录片现象级发酵后）**：全美大奖赛平均收视在三年内直接翻番，突破 100 万人，其中至少 80% 的增量必须归功于 Netflix 的破圈效应。 - **2024 年迈阿密大奖赛（Miami Grand Prix）**：收视人数一举飙升至 310 万美国观众。在传统被印第赛车（IndyCar）和纳斯卡（NASCAR）统治的美国本土，单场 F1 分站赛的收视体量甚至直接碾压了绝大多数 NBA 常规赛。 ### [03:16:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11781s) 《极速求生》驱动下的粉丝爆炸式增长与受众转型 在 2020 年至 2021 年的新冠疫情期间，一级方程式赛车（F1）在全球范围内迎来了惊人的粉丝暴增，仅这一年内就新增了 7300 万全球粉丝，涨幅高达 20%。在美国市场，这种爆发式增长尤为剧烈：美国目前的 F1 粉丝总量已达 5200 万人，自 Netflix 现象级纪录片《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）播出以来直接翻了一倍。 尽管这一庞大的新粉丝群体中，绝大多数人其实并不规律收看现场大奖赛——目前美国正赛平均收视人数约为 130 万（迈阿密大奖赛是个巨大特例，收视人数曾飙升至 310 万）——但粉丝们正在通过赛车之外的各种方式与这项运动保持高频互动。其中，最能直接归功于《极速求生》的数据改变是受众的性别结构：F1 的女性受众比例从过去的区区 7% 一路飙升，据部分报道显示目前已接近 40%。即使她们未必全程坐在电视机前观看正规比赛，却对车手个性、车队政治与围场戏剧充满了持续的兴趣。正如研究中所引用的贴切评价：自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）帮助 F1 成功摆脱了过去那种“以中年白人男性为主（male, stale, and pale）”的死板受众标签，而车手丹尼尔·里卡多（Daniel Ricciardo）在荧幕上极具魅力的幽默个性也是功不可没。 - 全球新增粉丝量（2020-2021 年）：7300 万人（增幅达 20%）。 - 美国粉丝规模：5200 万人（较《极速求生》上映前翻倍）。 - 美国赛事平均收视人数：约 130 万人（迈阿密大奖赛峰值达 310 万）。 - 女性受众比例变化：从 7% 大幅跃升至约 40%。 --- ### [03:17:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11865s) 美国战略的扩张：从惨淡历史到六大美洲分站赛 在自由媒体集团入主 F1 之后，深耕美国市场成为第一要务。早先建立的奥斯汀美洲赛道（COTA）运营成果远超预期，但历史上 F1 在美国的足迹堪称灾难。在过去几十年里，F1 曾先后尝试在全美开辟过 9 处不同的分站赛，全部草草收场且大多只撑了一两年：从长滩街道赛、纽约上州的沃特金斯峡谷（Watkins Glen，算维持相对较久的），到底特律、菲尼克斯，甚至在拉斯维加斯凯撒宫酒店的停车场里用紧密折返弯道生硬凑出的低速赛道。在印第安纳波利斯赛车场（Indianapolis Motor Speedway）举办的美国大奖赛更是闹出过灾难性的丑闻——由于轮胎安全隐患，一半的车队退赛抗议，导致正赛仅有 6 辆赛车起步，看台上的车迷怒不可遏，纷纷向赛道内狂掷杂物。 自由媒体集团打破了这种历史魔咒。随着从零平地起建的奥斯汀赛道大获成功，F1 在美洲时区内已经布局了墨西哥城、加拿大蒙特利尔以及巴西圣保罗。随后，自由媒体迅速趁热打铁，于 2022 赛季正式推出迈阿密大奖赛，紧接着又在 2023 赛季启动了重头戏——拉斯维加斯大奖赛。 - 历史遗留问题：此前在美设立的 9 处历史分站赛全数夭折，涵盖长滩、底特律、菲尼克斯、沃特金斯峡谷及臭名昭著的凯撒宫停车场大奖赛。 - 历史低谷事件：印第安纳波利斯大奖赛遭遇大规模轮胎罢赛危机，引发全场观众向赛道扔杂物暴动。 - 美洲时区现有赛事版图：奥斯汀、墨西哥城、蒙特利尔、圣保罗、迈阿密与拉斯维加斯，共计 6 场大奖赛。 --- ### [03:19:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=11996s) 拉斯维加斯豪赌：自建自营模式与围场俱乐部的重金投入 拉斯维加斯大奖赛代表了 F1 商业模式的一次激进颠覆。通常情况下，F1 只负责收取巨额的承办费（Promoter fee），而将赛事的所有运营执行与票房财务风险全部转嫁给当地推广方。但在拉斯维加斯，自由媒体决定彻底放弃这种传统轻资产模式，选择亲自出资、自行承办，独自吃下所有下行风险与潜在收益。 为了让这场街头盛宴长期落地，F1 直接斥资在拉斯维加斯黄金地段购置了实体地产，用于建造常驻的围场俱乐部（Paddock Club）主建筑。然而这笔豪赌目前并未显现出立竿见影的胜利：F1 在前期的基础设施建设上沉没资金已突破 5 亿美元，且长期封锁拉斯维加斯闹市区的主干道引发了当地巨大的交通混乱与抗议。与伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）时代那种“甩手坐收承办费、不冒一丝实体风险”的老派精明相比，这种自营重资产模式投资回收周期漫长，目前在业内普遍被认为难以复制，未来大概率不会被推行至全球其他赛道。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统推广方模式对比拉斯维加斯自营模式 accDescr: 展现F1历史上的赛事运营模式与拉斯维加斯全新自建自营模式的机制和风险对比 subgraph Traditional["伯尼时代的传统承办模式 (轻资产)"] direction TB T1["向当地推广方收取固定巨额承办费"] --> T2["推广方自负盈亏与运营风险"] T2 --> T3["F1 稳赚固定收益，风险极低"] end subgraph LasVegas["拉斯维加斯全新自营模式 (重资产)"] direction TB V1["放弃承办费，F1 亲自全资操盘"] --> V2["斥资 5 亿美元自购土地建围场俱乐部"] V2 --> V3["独吞所有收益，但承担长期基建与财务回本风险"] end ``` --- ### [03:21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12078s) 终极 B2B 盛宴：移动式高管汇报中心与顶级赞助生态 自由媒体接盘之后，围场俱乐部（Paddock Club）被彻底重塑。两位主持人在拉斯维加斯大奖赛期间亲身探访了由 ServiceNow 招待的围场俱乐部，深感当下的 F1 在美国更像一场超高规格的企业级企业软件（B2B）大会。澳大利亚软件巨头 Atlassian 的联合创始人兼 CEO 迈克·坎农-布鲁克斯（Mike Cannon-Brookes）在谈及其赞助威廉姆斯车队（Williams Racing）时直言不讳：Atlassian 并没有在全球到处建设固定的实体高管汇报中心（EBC），他们直接把威廉姆斯车队的赞助以及 F1 围场俱乐部当成了自己的全球移动式 EBC。他们跟随全年赛历飞赴世界各地，把重要企业客户邀请到赛道，当场展示威廉姆斯车队是如何在极致工程中运用其软件产品的。 这种强烈的企业端属性在惊人的商业赞助数据中体现得淋漓尽致。车队冠名赞助已进入年均 5000 万至 1 亿美元的时代。甲骨文（Oracle）对红牛车队的冠名赞助传闻高达 5 年 5 亿美元（年均 1 亿美元），而甲骨文的首席营销官在财报电话会议上坦言，他们此前根本不关注赛车，正是看了《极速求生》后才决定豪掷数亿美元进军 F1。此外，LVMH 集团与 F1 达成的全球顶级协议每年也达 1 亿美元，其品牌要素全方位浸润整个围场：路易威登（Louis Vuitton）的巨幅看板、装放奖杯的 LV 硬箱、泰格豪雅（TAG Heuer）的官方计时，以及领奖台上车手们肆意喷洒的酩悦香槟（Moët & Chandon）。 对于车队而言，赞助收入构成了命脉，占据了总收入的约 60%，如今平均每支车队的赞助总额已达 2 亿美元左右（但贫富差距极大）。即便是最廉价的车身露出——在围场末尾车队的保险杠下方贴一个极不起眼的 Logo——门槛也高达 100 万美元；赛车头盔后方进气口（Airbox）的侧面高光广告位价格高达 600 万至 700 万美元；车手赛车服胸前的黄金广告位也需要 150 万美元左右。然而，与一场只有三四个小时且大家注意力全在球赛本身的 NFL 包厢接待不同，F1 是一整整三天的奢华沉浸体验。正赛仅有两个小时，而且大部分时间不需要紧盯不放，为企业客户与高管之间的深度交流留出了充裕的社交窗口。很多赞助企业甚至坦陈，他们对赛车上印不印 Logo 毫不在意，他们真正买下的，是全球最高阶的商务宴请与客情关系网络。 - 顶级车队冠名赞助价码：年均 5000 万至 1 亿美元（如 Oracle 对红牛的赞助据传为 5 年 5 亿美元）。 - 联盟级官方赞助：LVMH 集团每年 1 亿美元大单（整合 LV 硬箱看板、TAG Heuer 计时与 Moët 香槟）。 - 车身与车手广告位定价： - 尾部车队最边缘 Logo：约 100 万美元起。 - 车手赛车服胸前广告：约 150 万美元。 - 赛车顶部进气口（Airbox）核心曝光位：600 万至 700 万美元。 - 车队财务结构：赞助收入占车队总营收的约 60%，单车队平均赞助规模接近 2 亿美元。 - 商务宴客价值：三天深度社交窗口、全球各大业务核心城市巡回，远优于常规球类赛事单场 3-4 小时的包厢体验。 ### [03:26:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12375s) 顶级品牌的终极赞助磁铁 在深入讨论转播权之前，主持人对 F1 作为商业赞助平台的本质做出了精辟的总结。放眼全球体坛，除了网球或高尔夫等极少数赛事勉强可以作为备选，几乎没有哪个平台能像 F1 一样，让 Atlassian 这样的 B2B 科技巨头直接将其围场俱乐部当作自己的“移动客户简报中心”。 F1 能够成为全球赞助商无可匹敌的磁铁，核心逻辑在于四大支柱：首先，它具备覆盖各大洲的真正全球化品牌曝光；其次，它展现了人类在身体极限与工程智慧两端的极致突破；第三，它是全球最前沿尖端科技的试验场；最后，它在全世界几乎所有市场都确立了高端甚至奢华（Premium and Luxury）的市场定位。这种极其罕见的属性组合，让 F1 在全球企业营销版图中占据了绝无仅有的生态位。 ### [03:26:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12405s) 零元起步的 ESPN 豪赌与美国转播权破局 为了给自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）的美国开拓战略收尾，话题转向了 F1 在美国电视转播权上的惊人逆袭。2017 年自由媒体刚刚入主 F1 时，美国观众对这项运动的认知度依然极其有限。此前数年，F1 的转播权曾辗转于 Speed Channel，后来虽然在 NBC 播出，但也仅限于部分大奖赛，并未实现全赛季完整呈现。自由媒体做出了一个效仿伯尼（Bernie Ecclestone）当年欧洲广播联盟（EBU）策略的果断决策：他们找到 ESPN，提出只要 ESPN 愿意在其电视网完整转播赛历上的每一站 F1 比赛，自由媒体愿意在 2018 赛季（以及随后的 2019 和 2020 赛季）将转播权以“零美元”的价格拱手相送。 自由媒体当时唯一的诉求就是培育市场、在美国打响知名度，而 ESPN 虽然是付费有线电视网而非公共广播网，却是全美每个有线电视套餐中最具价值、触达最广的频道。“如果你是一项运动并渴望在美国扩张，你就必须出现在 ESPN 上。”在《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）爆火叠加疫情红利之后，全美掀起了 F1 热潮，转播权的价值水涨船高。到了 2022 年续约谈判时，ESPN 终于开始支付真金白银，签下了一份为期三年、据传年均高达 8000 万至 9000 万美元的新合同——从一文不值的“免费搭头”蜕变为近亿美元的优质资产。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1美国转播权价值演进 accDescr: 展示F1美国转播权从NBC时代零碎播出，到ESPN免费播送，再到ESPN高价续约以及Apple入局的跃升历程。 subgraph Phase1["破冰与培育期 (2017-2020)"] A["自由媒体入主"] --> B["与 ESPN 达成协议：0 美元转播权"] B --> C["全美完整赛历免费播出，引爆增量观众"] end subgraph Phase2["价值爆发期 (2021-2025)"] C --> D["《极速求生》红利与疫情爆发"] D --> E["ESPN 以年均 8000万-9000万美元 续约3年"] end subgraph Phase3["流媒体竞购与百亿美元时代 (2026+)"] E --> F["布拉德·皮特主演《F1》电影全球狂揽 6.3 亿美元"] F --> G["Apple 据传以 5年/年均 1.5亿美元 锁定新转播权"] end ``` ### [03:28:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12507s) 苹果入局与好莱坞电影效应 ESPN 的转播合同将于 2025 年到期，而科技巨头苹果公司（Apple）则凭借另一场跨界豪赌在 F1 领域拔得头筹。由苹果出品、布拉德·皮特（Brad Pitt）主演的院线大片《F1》（F1 the Movie）在全球院线斩获了惊人的 6.3 亿美元票房，一举打破历史纪录：它不仅是有史以来票房最高的赛车电影，更创下了全球体育题材电影的历史票房之最，同时也是布拉德·皮特个人职业生涯中票房最高的作品。该片由《壮志凌云：独行侠》（Top Gun: Maverick）的原班导演与制片人团队操刀，被业内盛赞为“陆地版《壮志凌云》”。 按平均票价 30 美元简单折算，这部电影售出了大约 2100 万张电影票。这意味着，该片直接触达的受众规模，甚至可能超过了网飞《极速求生》系列纪录片的观看总量。在这一天花板级成功的推动下，苹果顺理成章地以强势姿态杀入美国转播权竞购，据传达成了一份为期 5 年、每年价值 1.5 亿美元的独家流媒体转播协议。 - **媒体版权收入结构**：转播权占 F1 总收入的 33% 左右；全球转播权总盘子约为 11 亿美元，美国区约 1.4 亿至 1.5 亿美元的合同仅占其全球总额的 13%。 - **流媒体竞购张力**：苹果、亚马逊（Amazon）、YouTube 等全球流媒体入局，打破了以往许多海外国家传统电视台寡头垄断的局面，引入了真正的竞价机制，极大推高了 F1 的全球版权溢价。 - **美国收视的真实天花板**：目前 F1 在美国单场平均观看人数仅为 130 万人（迈阿密大奖赛峰值仅 310 万），仅为 NASCAR 场均收视的一半左右，距离美国本土第一赛车运动仍有巨大差距；但对比海外单场周末 6000 万至 7000 万的庞大受众，美国市场未来的上升空间依然不可估量。 ### [03:32:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12776s) 车队版图扩张：美系巨头福特与通用的策略交锋 随着商业价值的水涨船高，全球主流乘用车制造商开始大规模重返 F1 围场。索伯车队由 Stake 冠名后正式转型为奥迪（Audi）厂队；本田（Honda）选择与阿斯顿·马丁（Aston Martin）建立深度合作；而最具戏剧性的看点，莫过于福特（Ford）与通用汽车旗下凯迪拉克（Cadillac）两种截然不同的入场策略。 在发动机领域，红牛曾于 2019 年携手本田，但在本田 2021 年宣布退出后，红牛并未向其他供应商妥协，而是果断成立红牛动力总成部门（Red Bull Powertrains），直接吸纳本田的技术支持并挖角了大批顶尖工程师。此次福特回归并非传统的全套引擎外供，而是作为技术与工程合作伙伴深度嵌入红牛动力总成项目，双方团队互派工程师紧密协作。尽管围场内有人冷嘲热讽这只是一场“贴牌营销”，但福特无疑用极高的性价比直接锁定了领奖台席位——新赛车不仅印上了巨大的福特蓝色椭圆车标，新车发布会更是直接搬到了密歇根州。 与福特借力打力不同，通用汽车（GM）则带领凯迪拉克作为独立车队斥巨资强行敲门。通用支付了高达 4.5 亿美元的巨额反稀释入场费（Expansion fee），正式成为围场的第 11 支独立车队。然而具有讽刺意味的是，这支新军虽然冠以凯迪拉克之名，其底盘内部搭载的却是法拉利的动力单元与变速箱，被戏称为“一台盖着凯迪拉克车壳的法拉利”。 - **通用的战略逻辑**：虽然首个赛季极大概率将在后排起步垫底，但通用拥有完整的车队资产与股权，具备长线打造成超级强队的商业想象空间；新车发布直接买断超级碗（Super Bowl）黄金广告位，并在纽约时代广场举行了声势浩大的线下点亮活动。 - **福特的战略逻辑**：放弃车队完全所有权，通过深度绑定顶级豪门红牛，第一年参赛就能稳坐前排并频繁登上领奖台，将品牌的赛道基因直接转化为冠军级营销声量。两大底特律汽车巨头在 F1 赛场上的隔空互呛与路径抉择，不仅将纯正的美式商业较量注入了欧洲传统的赛车世界，更标志着整个 F1 产业生态迈入了前所未有的健康扩张期。 ### [03:36:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=12970s) 规则大改、排位重洗与混合动力引擎的争议 随着全新一期《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）以及国际汽联（FIA）重写全新规则手册，这项运动迎来了一次全面的技术“大洗牌”（Reset）。外界每每面对规则剧变总会抱有洗牌的幻想，但现实依然残酷：梅赛德斯（Mercedes）、红牛（Red Bull）和迈凯伦（McLaren）大概率依然牢牢占据前四中的三席。在季前测试中，后围车队并未展现出任何研制出“魔法神车”的迹象；反倒是处于前排的法拉利（Ferrari）被发现采用了一种极度聪明的排气管设计来增强下压力。虽然新规则旨在增加超车机会、提升比赛动态与观赏性（两人甚至调侃 F1 应该向 NFL 学习如何提升纯粹体育竞技层面的激烈度与精彩度），但赛道内外对新一代动力单元的怨言已是不绝于耳。 卫冕冠军马克斯·维斯塔潘（Max Verstappen）公开嘲讽新车就像是一辆“经过改装强化的电动方程式（Formula E）赛车”。维斯塔潘在赛季揭幕前就开炮吐槽，虽然充满戏剧张力，但也揭示了深层痛点：引擎声浪的缺失、驾驶手感的怪异，以及让新老观众都无比困惑的复杂电量管理与电池保全策略。更令老车迷痛心疾首的是，2000 年代初期那种高亢狂暴的自然吸气 V10 引擎咆哮已成绝响——那种穿透骨髓的声浪、极致的机械力量与地面震颤，是看视频、听音频永远无法复刻的现场体验。 - **新规期待**：FIA 旨在通过气动与规则改革促进超车，让比赛更具观赏性，改善整体比赛产品质量。 - **技术暗流**：法拉利在季前测试中被曝出利用尾气排气技术辅助制造额外下压力。 - **车手反弹**：维斯塔潘吐槽混动赛车犹如“开外挂的 FE 赛车”，引发对电池能量管理策略过度侵蚀纯粹驾驶乐趣的普遍担忧。 --- ### [03:38:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13112s) “伪善”的环保账：物流排放与重迎 V10 的呼声 对于 F1 执着推行的混动系统与可持续化叙事，主播展开了一场毫不留情的抨击。当年引入混合动力引擎主要基于两大初衷：一是“民用相关性”（Road Relevance），寄希望于 F1 技术能够反哺民用混动及电动车，然而民用车普及速度远不及十年前的狂热预期；二是“可持续发展与环保”（Sustainability）。然而，将环保标签死死贴在赛车引擎上，在现实面前完全沦为一场“荒诞的闹剧”。 F1 真正的碳足迹根本不在赛道上那 22 辆赛车里，而在那个每周乘坐 7 辆波音 777 货机、在世界各大洲之间飞行的庞大“马戏团”身上。即便在欧洲内陆依靠卡车运输，其规模也达到了整整 300 辆重型卡车，排成车队足足有 5 公里长。以 2019 赛季为例，仅将赛车、车队设备和人员运往全球各地的物流碳排放，就是所有赛车在整季自由练习、排位赛和正赛中燃油排放总和的 **64 倍**。F1 赛车的油箱容积上限仅约 30 加仑，一个比赛周末三箱油，全球 22 辆车消耗的油量在整个产业链面前连四舍五入的尾数都算不上。与其在赛车燃油上作秀、妥协引擎性能，不如把相邻大洲的赛程合理编排，或者优化赛历以减少折返飞行。两人更是半开玩笑半认真地倡议：干脆把粗犷悦耳的 V10 引擎带回来，并将北美几站比赛合并为一个春季巡回季，这样既能避开秋季与全美收视霸主 NFL（国家橄榄球联盟）的正面撞车，又能大幅减少跨洋碳足迹，进一步引爆全球最大媒体市场的收视率。 - **物流 vs 引擎能耗**：2019 年 F1 环球物流运输产生的碳排放是赛车赛道排放总和的 64 倍。 - **微不足道的燃油消耗**：每辆 F1 赛车周末仅消耗约 3 桶 30 加仑的汽油，全场 22 辆车加起来在全局碳排放中微乎其微。 - **赛历优化提案**：在春季打造连续六站的北美时区“微型赛季”（Mini Season），避免折返洲际飞行并避开秋季 NFL 星期天转播冲突。 --- ### [03:41:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13302s) 2024 年一级方程式集团商业版图：营收构成与赞助生态 回到 F1 当前的财务大盘，以 2024 年财务数据为基准，一级方程式集团（Formula One Group）的年总营收已达 **34 亿美元**。其收入结构主要分为四大支柱： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Formula One Group 2024 Revenue Breakdown accDescr: 2024年一级方程式集团34亿美元总营收的四大构成板块及各自占比与金额。 subgraph REV["F1 集团总营收：34 亿美元"] MR["媒体转播权 (Media Rights)<br/>33% · 约 11 亿美元"] RP["赛事承办费 (Race Promotion)<br/>29% · 约 10 亿美元"] AS["联盟广告与赞助 (Advertising & Sponsorship)<br/>19% · 6.3 亿美元"] OT["其他商业业务 (Other)<br/>19% · 约 6.46 亿美元<br/>(Paddock Club、授权、周边)"] end ``` 在这四大板块中，联盟层面的广告与赞助（6.3 亿美元）虽然是增速最快的板块，但体量远小于全部 10 支车队的赞助总和——各车队累计赞助收入高达近 20 亿美元。出现这种悬殊反差的根本原因，在于 F1 赛车体系独特的商业属性：最有价值的核心曝光载体（赛车表面、赛车服、车手肖像、车房 Paddock 访问权、高端招待 VIP 套餐、车手演讲及车房参观）全归车队所有。电视转播镜头绝大部分时间紧跟疾驰的赛车，而赛道护栏上的广告牌则一掠而过（导致赛道赞助商必须将同一个 Logo 连续印上一千遍才能给观众留下印象）。正因如此，F1 拥有与其他职业联盟完全不同的生态：即使联盟所有权不归车队所有，媒体版权价值的每一次攀升，都会直接转化为转播曝光度的暴增，进而带动车队赞助溢价的水涨船高。 - **媒体转播权（33%）**：约 11 亿美元，涵盖全球各大电视台及流媒体的转播权售卖。 - **赛事承办推广费（29%）**：约 10 亿美元，各主办国赛道推广方支付的分站承办权许可费。 - **联盟广告与赞助（19%）**：6.3 亿美元，归 F1 集团所有的官方全球合作伙伴赞助。 - **其他收入（19%）**：包括高端贵宾围场俱乐部（Paddock Club）款待套餐、赛事周边商品销售以及品牌 IP 授权。 --- ### [03:44:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13443s) 《协和协议》下的分账机制：资本主义、历史特权与法拉利税 在支出端，F1 集团最大的一笔成本开支就是支付给车队的奖金分红（Distribution to Teams）。与 NFL 遵循的“纯粹资本主义外表下的共产主义”——将联盟收入雷打不动地均分成 32 份完全不同，F1 车队的分成比例极其复杂，且每一期《协和协议》都需要重新经历旷日持久的血腥博弈。不仅要谈判车队与 F1 集团的利益分成比例，还要重新制定 10 支车队内部的切蛋糕规则。 目前，F1 集团大约将总营收的 **37%** 拨付给车队，2024 年这笔奖金总额高达 **12.7 亿美元**。该资金池的分配逻辑主要依托三大支柱计算公式： 1. **基础准入平分（Equal Participation）**：只要符合参赛门槛即可获得的基础参赛补贴。 2. **车队积分榜排位（Constructors' Championship Allocation）**：完全依据车队积分榜（WCC）名次阶梯式派发。车手总冠军头衔无论声望多高，在联盟官方奖金分配中一文不值，全看车队总积分。 3. **历史底蕴贡献溢价（Historical Length / "Ferrari Bonus"）**：这一项俗称“法拉利税”。长期以来，作为自 1950 年元年起全勤参赛、见证并定义了这项运动合法性与威望图腾的元老，法拉利一直享有至少占整个奖金池 5% 的独家保底分红。尽管在后来的谈判中这一特权比例略有压缩，但即便在新协议的非公开条款中，法拉利仍然稳拿一笔令人咋舌的特殊红利——而在主办方和车迷心中，法拉利的号召力确实配得上每一分钱。 ### [03:45:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13548s) 奖金分成机制与围场后排车队的恶性循环 即使在当今由马克斯·维斯塔潘（Max Verstappen）与刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）争霸的时代——尽管主持人笑称汉密尔顿已经转投法拉利，但脑海中往往还是习惯把他与梅赛德斯联系在一起——全球仍有高达 30% 的 F1 车迷将法拉利视为自己的主队。 正因为这种无与伦比的历史地位与品牌价值，F1 在奖金分配上设计了一套复杂的混合机制：由所有人均分的基础参赛奖金（Equal Participation）、根据车队年度积分排名浮动的车队年终锦标赛奖金（Constructors' Championship），以及按车队参赛历史与底蕴发放的专属补贴（即著名的法拉利溢价）。 综合这三项要素后，目前排在积分榜首位的顶尖车队大约能拿走整个奖金池的 14%，而积分垫底的车队只能分到大约 6%。用通俗的简化算术来理解，头部车队能拿到约 1.4 亿美元的奖金，而垫底车队只能入账约 6,000 万美元。 这种差距相较于伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）时代已经大幅收窄。在过去，车队锦标赛奖金分配极度畸形，法拉利的专属溢价也高得离谱。然而，这种差距依然在制约这项运动的竞争烈度： - **正负反馈循环（Flywheel Effect）**：前四五支头部车队始终盘踞前列，而后半区车队寸步难行。 - **非线性放大的赞助价值**：有人认为多给后排车队两三千万美元并不能瞬间带来奇迹般的竞争力，但这些投入是非线性的。车队在锦标赛中每多拿 1,000 万美元奖金，往往能在赞助市场上撬动额外 2,000 万至 3,000 万美元的商业赞助。 - **排头兵与“移动路障”**：车迷固然希望看到超级巨星争冠，但垫底的五支车队如果在赛道上毫无赢面，其存在的意义仿佛只剩下凑足发车格、充当“人肉障碍物”、制造潜在碰撞事故为比赛增添变数。然而，如果发车格只剩下五支车队，对这项运动的长期健康将是灾难性的。 --- ### [03:48:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13703s) 稀缺资产狂欢：从一文不值到平均 36 亿美元的车队估值 在全球受众规模上，F1 展现出了惊人的号召力：全球自认为 F1 车迷的人口高达 8.3 亿人；而在实际收视层面，全球电视观众约为 4.5 亿人（该数据最后一次公开拆分披露是在 2021 年，之后官方将其列为商业秘密不再单独发布）。 伴随《极速求生》（Drive to Survive）带来的全球破圈与 2021 年引入的预算帽（Cost Cap）政策，F1 车队的财务状况与资本估值迎来了翻天覆地的转变： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 车队估值爆发逻辑 accDescr: 预算帽与商业化助推车队估值狂飙 subgraph CostCap["制度红利"] A["实行硬性预算帽"] --> B["终结无底洞军备竞赛"] B --> C["车队财务走向收支平衡或微利"] end subgraph Scarcity["资本属性"] D["全球仅 10 张入场券"] --> E["极度稀缺的超级玩具"] E --> F["主权财富基金与顶级富豪抢购"] end CostCap --> G["估值倍数大幅重估"] Scarcity --> G G --> H["平均车队估值达 36 亿美元"] ``` 根据《福布斯》（Forbes）2025 年的估算，F1 车队的平均估值已飙升至 36 亿美元左右，在短短两年内暴涨了 89%。在伯尼执掌的时代，大部分中小车队在财务上几乎一文不值甚至频临破产，而如今整个围场的身价已今非昔比： | 车队名称 | 估值（美元） | 资产特征与估值逻辑 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **法拉利 (Ferrari)** | 65 亿 | 商业表现未必最暴利，但拥有至高无上的历史底蕴与品牌溢价 | | **梅赛德斯 (Mercedes)** | 60 亿 | 经营质量最高，交易倍数达到营业利润（Operating Income）的 30 倍 | | **迈凯伦 (McLaren)** | 44 亿 | 强大的赛车文化品牌与商业赞助吸引力 | | **红牛车队 (Red Bull Racing)** | 43.5 亿 | 顶尖的赛道统治力与极限运动营销平台 | | **哈斯 (Haas)** | 15 亿 | 围场内估值最低的车队，但同样稳居 10 亿美元门槛之上 | 这种估值倍数脱离了传统现金流折现的框架。与每年能产生丰厚真金白银现金流的 NFL 球队相比，大多数 F1 车队微利甚至亏损。它们能享有极高的估值乘数，纯粹是因为它们是**稀缺资产（Scarce Assets）**。对于主权财富基金或百亿富豪（Deca-billionaires）而言，持有 F1 车队就像是一笔超级套利交易：即便日常运营出现亏损，也可以视作以无息贷款的形式借给车队；一旦未来寻求出售，资产本身的巨额增值将瞬间抹平并远超历史上所有的现金亏损。 --- ### [03:51:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13863s) 700 亿美元的生态帝国：Liberty Media 的资本胜局 从联盟管理机构本身的市值来看，自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）在 2017 年以 80 亿美元的企业价值（Enterprise Value）收购了 F1，其中股权价值为 44 亿美元。到 2026 年，F1 的股票市值已达到 220 亿美元，企业价值攀升至 250 亿美元。 自由媒体用 9 年时间将 44 亿美元的股权价值放大了整整 5 倍，年复合增长率（CAGR）高达约 22%，交出了一份堪称经典的体育商业操盘成绩单。 若对整个 F1 产业生态进行一次全局清算，这项运动的总企业价值已迈入 700 亿美元大关： - **F1 集团（Formula One Group）**：企业价值约 250 亿美元。 - **10 支现有车队总和**：总估值约 360 亿美元（尚未计入即将正式入局的凯迪拉克车队）。 - **各大分站大奖赛资产价值**：F1 自主斥资 5 亿美元打造了拉斯维加斯大奖赛（Las Vegas GP），以此为公允价值锚点，若将全球 22 站大奖赛的分站资产均以每站约 5 亿美元推算，分站赛事资产又可贡献约 110 亿美元。 - **全生态总企业价值**：F1 集团（250 亿）+ 10 支车队（360 亿）+ 赛道与分站资产（110 亿）≈ **720 亿美元**。整个运动的价值重心，正极其有趣地向车队端倾斜。 --- ### [03:52:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=13974s) “胖联盟”还是“剥削者”？车队与自由媒体的精妙利益博弈 体育商业分析中常区分两类联盟组织结构： - **“瘦联盟”（Thin Leagues）**：如北美的 NFL、NBA、MLB、NHL。联盟总部本身不截留利润，也没有独立的企业价值，它们本质上是“穿透实体”（Pass-through Entities），所有收入扣除极低的管理开销后全部分流给各支加盟球队。 - **“胖联盟”（Fat Leagues）**：如欧冠联赛（UEFA Champions League）、印度板球超级联赛（IPL）以及 F1。联盟自身是一家重资产、追求自身盈利并具备独立企业价值的商业公司。 车队到底有没有从自由媒体的这块大蛋糕中分得应得的份额？表面上看，F1 管理层收入中分配给车队的比例从 2018 年的 50% 下降到了上一年度的约 37%，自由媒体似乎在持续蚕食车队的利益。 然而拆解财务报表后会发现事实并非如此简单： - F1 在 34 亿美元的总收入中，扣除各项赛事开支、全球物流转运、商业赞助开发成本、一般行政开销以及拉斯维加斯站的前期重资本投入后，留存的营业利润仅为 **4.92 亿美元**。 - 如果将这 4.92 亿美元全部剥离给车队，车队整体的奖金池也不过是从 12.7 亿美元提升至 17.6 亿美元。 - 这意味着，在自由媒体负责垫付全球运营重资产与开拓风险的前提下，车队当前拿到的分成（12.7 亿）已经占到了“假如车队全资拥有联盟所能拿到的全部理论上限”（17.6 亿）的 **72%**。 车队放弃的那 28% 潜在利润，买到的是自由媒体强大的全球营销网络、物流支撑与源源不断的资本再投资。在每隔数年续签一次《协和协议》（Concorde Agreement）的博弈筹码较量中，这种利润分配已经达成了一种极其精妙的动态平衡——车队拿到了绝大部分价值，既没有被压榨到愤而另立门户（Breakaway Series）的临界点，又省去了自行操盘庞大重工业体育赛事的无穷繁琐。 ### [03:56:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14162s) 关键辩题：F1 的成功真的非伯尼不可吗？ 节目进入商业分析环节，主播们抛出了本期最核心的议题：F1 能够达到今天的商业高度与全球影响力，是否真的必须依赖伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）这种人？面对这个问题，体育商业史上最著名的对照组就是美式橄榄球大联盟（NFL）。从某种程度上看，NFL 的多方博弈甚至更加复杂，因为当时有数量远超 F1 车队的大量俱乐部老板需要被逐一摆平。彼时 NFL 传奇掌门人皮特·罗泽尔（Pete Rozelle）完成了堪称英雄级的创举，成功说服所有自私的老板们接受那套著名的“共产主义资本主义”（即联盟总揽转播权并进行全员平分的分账制度）。这种神迹就像迪·霍克（Dee Hock）创立 Visa 信用卡组织一样，完全是绝无仅有的“孤例”（N of 1）。如果把历史实验重演一千次，几乎不可能再创造出一个像今天这样的 NFL——其他北美传统体育联盟至今都没能完全复刻，NBA 只是稍有接近，而职棒大联盟（MLB）更是相去甚远。 在任何体育联盟建立霸业的转折点，都必须在恰当的时刻涌现出一个具有压倒性统治力的强势领袖。对 NFL 而言，那是 50 至 60 年代的皮特·罗泽尔；而对 F1 来说，正是 70 年代的伯尼。但两人所处的棋局完全不同，这也决定了 F1 绝不可能通过“各大车队联合聘请一个职业经理人雇员”的方式来走通道路。F1 是一项全球性运动，背后牵扯着横跨五大洲的极限跨国物流运输，还要同时应对各怀鬼胎的车队、各国赛道承办方、各路电视台广播网，以及国际汽联（FIA）这样一个机制奇特、非政府组织性质的规则监管机构。如此错综复杂的多元利益冲突，普通雇员根本无法被赋予恰当的利益驱动力。 要将这盘散沙捏合并搭建起商业帝国，掌舵者必须拥有创业者独资经营的顶级利益激励，更必须兼备伯尼那种在二手车行摸爬滚打出来的残酷街头斗士（street fighter）风格与冷血谈判手段。皮特·罗泽尔固然卓越，但他骨子里并不是街头斗士。面对 F1 这帮精明贪婪、随时准备掀桌子的赛车强盗，只有伯尼才能用更强硬的手段将所有人绑上战车。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 与 NFL 早期商业整合模式对比 accDescr: 对比皮特·罗泽尔在 NFL 的经理人模式与伯尼在 F1 的创业街头斗士模式 subgraph NFL["NFL 模式：联盟托管制"] R["掌门人：皮特·罗泽尔<br/>(职业经理人雇员)"] O["众多俱乐部老板"] --> R R --> E1["促成'共产主义资本主义'<br/>全联盟均分全国转播收入"] end subgraph F1["F1 模式：个人帝国集权制"] B["掌门人：伯尼·埃克莱斯顿<br/>(残酷嗜利的街头斗士)"] S["跨国多方博弈<br/>(全球车队 / 各国赛道 / FIA / 全球广播网)"] --> B B --> E2["以绝对产权激励与铁腕手段<br/>自建商业管理公司统一变现"] end ``` --- ### [03:59:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14368s) 车队间博弈：是战略权力还是极致的运营卓越？ 在讨论整个 F1 商业帝国的战略护城河前，主播们先探讨了围场内部各支车队之间的力量对比与竞争壁垒。现代 F1 的本质，就是在技术规则手册的字里行间挖掘哪怕千分之一秒的微小破绽。通常情况下，一支车队研发出的微小气动优势很快就会被对手窥破，并在短短几场比赛内被全盘抄袭。稍大一些的优势可能源自发动机、电池或变速箱的底层物理布局创新，如果赌对了技术路线，或许能为车队赢得整整一个赛季的领先窗口期；而像梅赛德斯车队那样连续八年统治赛场，或者像巅峰期的刘易斯·汉密尔顿（Lewis Hamilton）那样技压全场，看似是不可思议的神话，但深究其内核，这种优势并不能被称为《7 Powers》框架下的“战略权力”（Power）。 顶级车手显然不是一种战略壁垒，因为他们是流动的雇员，任何有钱的车队都能去竞价招揽。不管是空气动力学设计、整车工程还是动力单元调校，本质上都属于“运营卓越”（Operational Excellence）与核心技能胜任力（Competency），完全游离在真正的商业战略护城河之外。依靠战略投机或技术漏洞建立的优势往往寿命极短，很快就会被其他车队套利抹平；而在 F1 历史上能持续三到四季乃至更久的压倒性战绩，无一不是靠登峰造极的工程运营与执行力支撑的。 当然，如果一定要为其寻找壁垒，那就是资产负债表层面的“规模经济”——即便在引入预算帽政策后，拥有更充裕财务弹性的老牌豪门依然能利用规则漏洞开辟更多灰色预算，并随时砸出一亿美元签下全球最好的顶尖车手。但纵观排头几家豪门车队，彼此之间的冠军王座在数年周期内频繁轮替，没有哪家车队能够建立不可动摇的永恒特权。这种“车队在战略层面上毫无垄断权力”的格局，恰恰是一项竞技体育联盟最理想的状态：它确保了每一场较量都取决于最卓越的人才与最极致的表现，而不是被封闭死板的资本结构永久固化。 - **短期优势套利**：空气动力学外形等表面微调通常只能维持几站优势，底盘与动力总成布局等深层设计最多提供一整个赛季的红利。 - **统治力性质界定**：梅赛德斯八连冠与汉密尔顿的个人巅峰被定性为“运营与技能胜任力”，而非不可复制的结构性护城河。 - **电网阶梯流动性**：虽然垫底弱队常常深陷资金溃败的负反馈深渊，但前半区豪门之间具有明显的成绩轮替转移性，证明顶端并不存在绝对壁垒。 --- ### [04:03:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14614s) 为何是 F1：定制工程、贵族光环与 FIA 钦定的垄断地位 将视线从车队拉回到整个一级方程式管理集团（Formula One Group），一个核心问题油然而生：在早期的起飞阶段，F1 究竟凭什么从勒芒（Le Mans）24 小时耐力赛、印地赛车（IndyCar）等众多赛车盛会中脱颖而出，成为全球赛车皇冠上的唯一明珠？主播梳理出了三大核心动因： 1. **彻底的纯定制工程（Custom Engineering）**：与大量依赖统规现成零部件（stock elements）的其他赛车赛事完全不同，F1 几乎是全世界唯一要求参赛车队从零开始全定制自主研发赛车的顶级系列赛，工程竞技的复杂度让比赛自带极高的观赏性与技术话题度。 2. **欧洲旧大陆贵族气质与好莱坞名流文化的交织**：从摩纳哥大奖赛的游艇港湾到欧洲皇室的世代参与，F1 始终绑定着奢华排场与上流社会生活方式。当年格蕾丝·凯莉（Grace Kelly）绝不可能专程去看一场拉力赛（Rally），但她会优雅地出席摩纳哥 F1 围场。如今遍布 Paddock Club 的全球顶流巨星与名流，更是让这项赛事形成了一种排他性的品牌独占资源（Cornered Resource），任何新兴赛事都难以半途模仿。 3. **国际汽联（FIA）官方赋予的“顶点”垄断特权（Cornered Resource）**：最致命的一环在于国际汽联的官方背书。作为全球大部分赛车运动的最高主管机构（虽然并不统管美式 NASCAR 或 IndyCar），FIA 从制度层面直接将 F1 钦定为赛车金字塔的“绝对最高峰”（The Pinnacle）。这种来自顶级监管者的专属许可与封印，从根本上压制了自由资本主义市场的竞争力量，名字里的“一级”（Formula 1）本身就是官方授信的特许垄断牌照。 --- ### [04:05:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14729s) 7 Powers 框架：解析当代 F1 与 Liberty Media 的竞争壁垒 顺着垄断特权的脉络，主播们将汉密尔顿·赫尔默（Hamilton Helmer）著名的《7 Powers》（七大战略维度：规模经济、网络经济、反向定位、转换成本、品牌、独占资源、流程权力）框架，正式代入到自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）旗下的当代 F1 实体进行穿透式剖析。战略权力的本质，在于使企业能够持续保持高于竞争对手的差异化收益与超额利润。那么在当今的商业格局下，究竟有什么力量能够阻止别人抢走 F1 的饭碗？ 当下 F1 商业模式面临的最大潜在命门，在于其“核心供应商”集体掀桌子自立门户的风险——无论是各大知名车队还是拥有专属跑道的赛道运营方，理论上都具备串联并建立独立赛事（如当年差点成型的 FOTA 独立联赛）的潜在能力。然而，绕过现成的 F1 体系另起炉灶不仅成本天文数字般高昂，而且极其繁琐磨人。正是这种高额的系统协调壁垒与 F1 已经形成的庞大全球转播、赞助生态，构筑了阻击叛变的坚厚屏障，使 F1 在现代职业体育联盟中展现出极为独特的权力结构。 ### [04:06:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14794s) 7 Powers 框架分析：坚不可摧的商业护城河 在运用汉密尔顿·赫尔默（Hamilton Helmer）的《7 Powers》商业战略框架分析一级方程式赛车（Formula 1）时，两位主播发现 F1 在多个维度上展现出惊人的防御性与排他性壁垒。首先是网络效应（Network Economies）：这项运动在自身边界内构建了极强的网络生态，赛历上的各站大奖赛与各支车队相互绑定、共同受益。其次是品牌力量（Branding Power）：全球车迷守候在屏幕前专程观看 F1，这种心智认知是低级别赛事（如二级方程式 Formula 2 / FOD）完全无法比拟的。 更关键的是特许资源（Cornered Resource）与转换成本（Switching Costs）。F1 被国际汽联（FIA）官方指定为“赛车运动的巅峰”（the pinnacle of motorsport），这项独家特许资源在法律和行业架构上确立了至高无上的垄断地位。与此同时，车队和承办赛道如果想要脱离体系，将面临天文数字般的转换成本。正如回顾历史所见，即便在伯尼·埃克莱斯顿（Bernie Ecclestone）长达数十年的高压控制和利益盘剥下，各家大车队和经典赛道哪怕百般抗议，也从未真正成功另立门户。最后，规模经济（Scale Economies）在此展现得淋漓尽致：运营顶级全球巡回方程式赛车的开销极其高昂，整个联盟必须通过全赛季 22 站分站赛的规模分摊庞大的固定开销与技术研发成本，才能支撑起数十亿美元级别的媒体转播权价值。分析至此，结论十分明确——只要车迷持续关注这项赛事，F1 的商业护城河就几乎坚不可摧。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1商业护城河架构 accDescr: 展示F1依据7 Powers框架建立的五大核心防御壁垒 subgraph Defense["F1 商业护城河 (7 Powers)"] A["特许资源 (Cornered Resource)<br>FIA官方认证『赛车巅峰』地位"] B["转换成本 (Switching Costs)<br>车队与赛道极高的另立门户门槛"] C["规模经济 (Scale Economies)<br>22站分站摊薄巨额联盟及车队固定开销"] D["品牌实力 (Branding Power)<br>顶级豪华与竞技代名词，观众粘性极强"] E["网络效应 (Network Economies)<br>车队、赛道、赞助商与车迷相互强化"] end A --> F["十亿美元级媒体转播价值与稳固商业垄断"] B --> F C --> F D --> F E --> F ``` ### [04:08:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14886s) 牛熊对比起点：F1 与 NFL 的变现天壤之别 在进入具体的牛市（看多）与熊市（看空）论点之前，节目通过一组鲜明的数据对比拉开了分析的序幕： ``` 8.3 亿全球 F1 车迷 vs 1.8 亿美国 NFL 球迷 $55 亿 F1 产业链总收入 vs $230 亿 NFL 年总收入 $7 / 人年均单客价值 vs $127 / 人年均单客价值 ``` 全球 F1 拥有约 8.3 亿粉丝，整个联盟年营收约 34 亿美元，十支车队自身再创收约 20 亿美元（不含联盟分成），全行业毛收入总计约 55 亿美元。反观美国国家橄榄球联盟（NFL），仅凭 1.8 亿球迷就创造出高达 230 亿美元的惊人年收入——NFL 用四分之一的受众规模，产出了四倍以上的营收。折算下来，NFL 每年在每位球迷身上变现 127 美元，而 F1 在每位全球车迷身上仅仅变现 7 美元。 造成这种悬殊差距的核心瓶颈首先在于“可销售比赛存量”（Inventory）。NFL 每赛季有数百场比赛，而 F1 每年仅有 22 站周末大奖赛，且受限于物流与车队编制，根本无法像常规团队球类运动那样把车队拆开到不同赛道同时比赛（比如哈斯和梅奔去一处，红牛去另一处）。面对有限的库存，自由媒体（Liberty Media）的战略反制之道，就是将这 22 场分站赛每一场都打造成具备超级碗（Super Bowl）级别全球影响力的盛会。 - **全球受众基础**：F1 坐拥 8.3 亿车迷，受众体量是 NFL（1.8 亿）的 4.6 倍。 - **产业收入规模**：F1 整体全产业年收入约 55 亿美元；NFL 单一联盟年收入高达 230 亿美元。 - **单客创收效率**：NFL 达到每人每年 127 美元，F1 仅为微薄的每人每年 7 美元。 ### [04:09:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=14990s) 看多 F1 的四大支柱：美国市场、欧洲版权重构与偶像叙事 针对 F1 的长期增长空间，节目提炼了支撑牛市论点的四大驱动因素： 1. **赛历优化与避开 NFL 锋芒**：美国是全球客单价最高、单用户媒体订阅费最昂贵的高价值市场。但目前 F1 尚未在美国彻底完成深度渗透，尤其是赛程编排存在硬伤——秋季的数站美国关键比赛正撞上 NFL 赛季的黄金档期。如果 F1 重新梳理赛历，错峰竞争，将释放出庞大的收视增量。 2. **欧洲媒体转播权充分重塑**：欧洲本土依然是 F1 最庞大的收视基本盘。长期以来欧洲版权市场缺乏真正的流媒体巨头参与白热化竞拍。只要引入真正的多方竞价，微调版权价值即可带来数以亿计的纯利润跃升。 3. **本土旗帜人物诞生**：美国本土车手或全美资车队夺得世界冠军，将成为引爆全美车迷热情、改变赛事版图的终极催化剂。 4. **女子力量崛起与破圈效应**：伴随 Netflix 纪录片《极速求生》（*Drive to Survive*）及好莱坞 F1 题材大片的推动，女性受众比例急剧上升。若在未来几年诞生一位具备冠军争夺实力的顶级女性 F1 车手，势必将在全球范围内掀起现象级的新一轮狂潮。 ### [04:11:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15087s) 看空论调与估值天花板：列车游行、低垂之果耗尽与观赛体验断层 与看多情绪相对，多重潜在隐忧也对 F1 的未来扩张构成了实质性制约： 首先是竞技观赏性层面的“巡游列车化”（Parade racing）风险。相比 NASCAR 每一圈都在激烈超车的感官刺激，现代 F1 赛车因安全考量车身异常宽大沉重，超车极为困难；比赛往往演变为进站策略、保胎省油、排位赛决定一切的工程算计。对于缺乏技术知识的普通大众来说，这种“不易被直观感知”的枯燥博弈为热度的进一步蔓延设置了天然天花板。 其次是估值倍数的重构。虽然 F1 已经用赛后的持续热度打破了“这只是疫情期间与 Peloton 动感单车、烤酸酵母面包类似的短期风潮”之质疑，但对二级市场投资者而言，自由媒体入主时以 18 到 20 倍市盈率买入，并把所有立竿见影的“低垂果实”（Low-hanging fruit）如社交媒体解禁、新媒体营销、扩充高端分站赛全部采摘完毕。未来从每年 7 美元的客单价向上攀升，将是一场跨越数十年的漫长苦战，短期内难以再现爆发式增长。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: F1转播体验断层与技术解决方案 accDescr: 展示车迷从纪录片到实况转播的脱节，以及苹果技术如何弥补这一体验空缺 subgraph PainPoint["当前观赛断层"] A["Netflix 人设故事<br>（鲜活的情感与冲突）"] -.->|"进入正式比赛"| B["冷冰冰的座舱与头盔<br>（看不见脸、听不到声音）"] C["复杂的进站博弈"] -.->|"缺乏直观可视化"| D["车迷产生认知困惑<br>（领跑者未进站造成假象）"] end subgraph Solution["技术介入可能"] B & D --> E["Apple 定制硬件与算法"] E --> F["头盔微型镜头与动态面部重构"] E --> G["实时超车几率与策略可视化图层"] end ``` ### [04:13:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15214s) 苹果入局与下一代转播革命 另一个贯穿牛熊之间的核心变量是赛事实况转播的数字化革新。很多通过《极速求生》入坑的新车迷在观看正赛直播时，往往会产生严重的割裂感：在纪录片里性格张扬、形象生动的车手，到了比赛里全被遮挡在密闭头盔与巨大赛车中，全程只能偶尔听到断断续续的无线电通话。 正赛转播亟需两项关键进化：第一，**车手人性化呈现**，将赛前准备、微表情以及车手性格特征融入赛事流中；第二，**高动态数据可视化**，用直观的数据包装解释战略——比如用图形清晰告诉观众，某辆车看似排在第一但因尚未进站其实处于劣势，或者根据轮胎磨损情况预测“5 圈后必然发生关键超车”。 苹果公司（Apple）对 F1 的深度介入为这一变革带来了巨大想象空间。在布拉德·皮特主演的 F1 院线电影中，苹果便将 iPhone 级别的精密影像元器件重构并塞入标准赛车机位。随着转播制作的升级，苹果完全有技术实力利用类似 Apple Vision Pro 的空间面部重构（Persona）、微型头盔摄像机等黑科技，在车手高速疾驰的同时实时捕捉并重构其面部表情与眼神，彻底打破赛车运动与观众之间的情感屏障。 ### [04:16:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15371s) 终局精髓：一门不看直播也能狂热热爱的奇特运动 在结束了关于苹果与 F1 合作前景的看多与看空讨论后，节目进入了 Acquired 标志性的“精髓总结”（Quintessence）环节——即主播们试图将这架飞速运转的“F1 赛车”稳稳停进维修区（Box, Box），提炼出那颗最挥之不去的核心洞察。 本·吉尔伯特分享的观点让许多人感同身受却又倍感震惊：F1 可能是全球唯一一个“拥有极其庞大的受众群体、但这群人却几乎从不看比赛直播”，却依然能保持长期火爆的体育运动。在任何其他主流竞技项目中，这种情况都不可想象——没人会声称自己是狂热的橄榄球迷，同时承认整年没看过一场完整的 NFL 比赛。但在 F1 的受众（尤其是美国新受众）中，大批粉丝能如数家珍地背出车手姓名、购买昂贵的车队周边周边、支持赞助商的品牌、清楚知道年度总冠军归属，却极少甚至从不准时守在屏幕前收看正赛直播。这种脱离于实时赛事本身的庞大流行度，在现代体育商业中独树一帜。 - **脱离赛事的受众黏性**：大批年轻与跨界粉丝的关注点在于叙事、八卦、幕后真人秀与流行文化，而非必须收看长达两小时的排位赛和正赛。 - **美国市场的反常现象**：在美国受众中，“知晓并消费 F1、但极少看直播正赛”的人群甚至可能已经占据了主流。 ### [04:17:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15457s) 复杂的商业奇迹：无法被从零复制的“重型联盟” 戴维·罗森塔尔提出的核心精髓则是：F1 是人类商业史上极其复杂、甚至前所未见的体育联盟范本。从商业模型来看，它不像传统球类联赛那样依靠主客场固定球场，反而更接近拳击或 UFC——由推广方牵头，在特定的时间和地点举办巡回大奖赛。但与拳击只有两名上场选手不同，F1 赛场上有 10 支车队，每支车队背后是耗资数亿美元研发的尖端赛车，以及超过千人的庞大工程与后勤团队。 这种结构宛如让 NFL 车队里的设备管理员成为整个团队的核心，并配给其 800 到 1000 人的技术军团。两人感叹，如果让人从一张白纸开始设计，绝没有任何理性的商业领袖会勾勒出像 F1 这样错综复杂、充满内部撕扯的联盟形态。印度板球超级联赛（IPL）同样是一个重度掌控的“厚重型联盟”（Thick League），但 IPL 是平地起高楼、迅速以现代商业逻辑引爆的产物；而 F1 则是历经 70 年野蛮生长、政治博弈与混乱摩擦，才奇迹般沉淀下来的有机生态。正是因为其聚合多方利益所需的“活化能”（Activation energy）高到近乎天文数字，外界根本不可能打造出一个直接模仿 F1 的竞品，这也是其最宽阔的护城河。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: F1 与其他商业体育模式对比 accDescr: 对比传统球类联赛、UFC/拳击以及 F1 在组织形态、比赛场地与后勤规模上的巨大差异 subgraph Conventional["传统球类联赛 (如 NFL / NBA)"] C1["固定主客场球场"] C2["标准化球类竞技"] C3["球员为绝对核心 / 后勤占比较小"] end subgraph Combat["格斗巡回赛 (如 UFC / 拳击)"] CB1["特定时间与场地的巡回赛事"] CB2["推广人 (Promoter) 机制"] CB3["核心仅为 2 名对决拳手"] end subgraph F1Model["一级方程式赛车 (Formula 1)"] F1["全球分站巡回 / 无固有主场"] F2["极高活化能：70 年博弈沉淀的有机生态"] F3["10 支车队 + 1000 人工程技术后勤 / 队"] F4["3 亿美元尖端研发赛车 + 20 位顶流车手"] end ``` ### [04:19:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15584s) 精彩好物分享：太阳马戏团的极境表演与超级碗声画纪实 进入轻松的好物推荐（Carve Outs）环节，本·吉尔伯特首先分享了他为妻子庆生时观看的太阳马戏团（Cirque du Soleil）最新剧目《Echo》（在西雅图玛丽摩尔公园的常驻帐篷内演出）。本由衷赞叹这群表演者展现出人类肉体与技能的极限：在日常的大多数现场表演中，演员若失误往往还有备选方案或补救措施，但太阳马戏团的顶尖杂技没有任何退路，每位演员必须分秒不差地完成如同超人般的动作。那种穷尽一生训练、全球绝无仅有的“N of 1”极致技艺与天马行空的创意结合，令人叹为观止。 本的第二个分享则是 NFL Films 在 YouTube 上释出的一部 40 分钟超级碗纪录短片《Mic'd Up》。此前西雅图海鹰队刚刚夺冠，尽管现场比赛的节奏较为沉闷（两人甚至打趣其节奏像是一场毫无悬念的 F1 巡游），但这段带有现场收音的幕后纪录片生动捕捉了球员之间在赛场上的即时对话与心理博弈，让整场比赛焕发出完全不同的魅力。 - **太阳马戏团《Echo》**：极致的人类体能、零失误容错率的舞台奇观与超现实的艺术编排。 - **《Mic'd Up》（NFL Films）**：通过赛场近距收音让沉闷的决赛重获生机，真实还原了最高水平橄榄球对抗中的临场心智。 ### [04:21:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15695s) 智能居家健身与《碧姬公主：表演时刻！》 戴维·罗森塔尔接着分享了他的两件好物。首先是智能健身设备 Tonal。由于戴维此前在旧金山家中地下室重新改造了一个小型健身房，空间非常有限，原有的全尺寸深蹲架占地过大。在听过往期节目的 Tonal 团队听众推荐下，他安装了挂壁式的 Tonal 智能力量设备。戴维表示，该设备几乎不占任何地面空间，却能通过电控阻力提供近乎无限种力量训练方式，体验远胜传统的深蹲架。 戴维的第二个分享是一段充满温情的亲子经历：陪伴大女儿探索电子游戏世界。他在大学时代的校友 Ryan 给他发邮件推荐了任天堂 Switch 新游戏《碧姬公主：表演时刻！》（Princess Peach: Showtime!）。任天堂敏锐捕捉到了女性年轻玩家群体的庞大潜力，设计出由碧姬公主担任绝对主角的冒险故事。故事中，邪恶女巫“葡萄”（Grape）占领了奇幻剧院，碧姬公主需要换上各种舞台装扮化身不同角色夺回剧场。看着女儿从零起步逐渐熟练掌握这款游戏，让戴维联想起自己当年初次接触《超级马里奥 64》时的纯粹快乐，极力推荐给拥有 Switch 的年轻父母家庭。 ### [04:23:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15822s) 季末致谢与 F1 重磅访谈智囊团 在节目的尾声，两位主播向支持本季播出的赞助合作伙伴表达了诚挚感谢，包括企业级支付基础设施 J.P. Morgan Payments、前端与云基础设施平台 Vercel、企业 AI 与数字化工作流平台 ServiceNow，以及集成了特性开关与产品分析的 Statsig。 与此同时，主播揭示了为了还原这部波澜壮阔的 F1 商业史，背后所调动的前所未有的庞大访谈智库。他们特别致谢了： - **学术与研究撰稿人**：Worldly Partners 的 Arvin Navaratnam（撰写了极其详实的 F1 数十年商业研究研报）；《华尔街日报》记者 Joshua Robinson 与 Jonathan Clegg（商业传记《The Formula》的作者）。 - **行业高管与一线操盘手**：迈凯伦车队（McLaren Racing）CEO 扎克·布朗（Zak Brown）；自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）前 CEO 格雷格·马菲（Greg Maffei，主导了当年对 F1 的划时代收购）；福特汽车的 Will Ford 与 Mark Rushbrook。 - **媒体与娱乐核心推手**：Netflix 负责非虚构与体育内容的副总裁布兰登·里格（Brandon Riegg，促成了现象级纪录片《极速求生》）；《极速求生》制作方 Box to Box Films 联合创始人詹姆斯·盖伊-里斯（James Gay-Rees）；以及苹果公司互联网软件与服务高级副总裁、资深 F1 车迷埃迪·库伊（Eddy Cue）。 - **投资界专业视角**：Foundation Capital 合伙人 Sid Trivedi、迈凯伦车队前副主席 John Neff，以及二级市场投资人与分析师 Pavan Gami、Alex Knight 和 Jimmy Fairbanks 等，正是这些跨界领袖的深度输入，共同拼凑出了现代 F1 商业帝国的全貌。 ### [04:26:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=15962s) 调研致谢与幕后智囊团 在节目的尾声，Ben 和 David 向为本期长达四个多小时的 F1 商业史巨作提供帮助的各方专家与朋友致以由衷的谢意。首先是达成了红牛车队（Red Bull Racing）引擎合作项目的相关团队；接着是多年好友兼资深 F1 车迷 Nathan Bashez；以及来自 Shopify 的联合创始人兼 CEO Tobi Lütke 等人——他们不仅是狂热的赛车迷，Tobi 本人甚至还亲自参加其他巡回赛事的竞速，从专业车手的第一视角为节目提供了极具价值的洞察。 紧接着被致谢的还有前 IndyCar 主席兼体育营销顾问 Andrew Craig、协助梳理叙事宏观脉络的前《华尔街日报》编辑 Mike Miller，以及在职业生涯中操盘过多项车队与大奖赛赞助合作的 Dustin Sedgwick。此外，ServiceNow 的 Colin Fleming 及其团队更是邀请两位主播亲临拉斯维加斯大奖赛（Las Vegas Grand Prix）的 Paddock Club 围场俱乐部，让他们得以开展沉浸式的现场一线调研；奥斯汀美洲赛道（Circuit of the Americas, COTA）CEO 兼美国大奖赛推广人 Bobby Epstein 也为内容提供了关键支持；而金融数据服务商 Daloopa 则为本期节目提供了详尽详实的 F1 历史财务模型与数据报表，如同以往在可口可乐和谷歌专题中所做的那样。最后，David 特别致谢了前 F1 集团首席执行官、现任 Liberty Media 与 Fox 董事的 Chase Carey，感谢他接受交流并分享一手见解。面对长长一串横跨体育界、科技圈与华尔街的豪华致谢名单，两位主播不禁感叹致谢阵容愈发庞大，也向所有在幕后提供协助却未及提及名字的朋友们表达了由衷的敬意。 - **调研支持名单：** - **红牛动力合作方相关团队**：提供车队引擎合作与技术维度的背景信息。 - **Nathan Bashez**：主播挚友、资深 F1 车迷。 - **Tobi Lütke（Shopify）**：赛车运动狂热爱好者兼现役业余巡回赛车手，提供车手驾驶视角的独到见解。 - **Andrew Craig**：前 IndyCar 赛事主席、资深体育营销顾问。 - **Mike Miller**：前《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）编辑，协助把关本期故事的核心脉络与结构节奏。 - **Dustin Sedgwick**：拥有丰富车队与大奖赛商业赞助操盘经验的行业专家。 - **Colin Fleming 及 ServiceNow 团队**：促成拉斯维加斯大奖赛 Paddock Club 现场调研。 - **Bobby Epstein**：美洲赛道（COTA）首席执行官、美国大奖赛推广人。 - **Daloopa**：提供全套 F1 历史财务数据整理与精细化财务分析模型支持。 - **Chase Carey**：前 F1 集团 CEO、自由媒体集团（Liberty Media）及福克斯（Fox）现任董事会成员。 ### [04:27:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg&t=16050s) 往期推荐、新赛季展望与节目结语 随着致谢告一段落，两位主播向听众推荐了 Acquired 以往制作过的其他经典体育商业特辑，包括对北美两大职业联赛 NFL、NBA 以及印度板球超级联赛（IPL）商业帝国的深度剖析。他们提醒听众，如果听完本期内容后对 F1 燃起了无限热情，新赛季的首场大奖赛在短短几天之后就将正式打响。 最后，主播们给出了互动指引：想要查阅本期节目中涉及的丰富历史图片、图表与重点结论总结的听众，可以前往 `acquired.fm/email` 订阅邮件列表，订阅者还可以参与投票、推选未来节目选题并提前获取下一期主题的线索提示；同时，欢迎加入官方 Slack 社区（`acquired.fm/slack`）与全球听众展开交流讨论。在标志性的 Acquired 片尾曲旋律中，长达四个半小时的 F1 商业史诗特辑圆满收官。 ## Video description Formula 1 is three competitions in one: a 200mph battle of the world's best race car drivers, the world cup of engineering where thousand-person teams spend hundreds of millions designing cars from scratch, and — as one of our listeners perfectly put it — the “Real Housewives of the Garage”, a soap opera of billionaire egos, team politics, and paddock drama that makes for incredible reality television. It's also the world's most popular annual sporting series with over 827 million fans globally — a fact that would shock most Americans, who until a recent viral Netflix series had barely heard of it. Today we tell the story of how a chaotic, deadly, and gloriously dysfunctional European racing series became one of the greatest business stories in sports. For decades, brilliant engineers and daredevil drivers dedicated their lives (and too often lost them) to a league controlled for 45 years by a single man: a former London car dealer named Bernie Ecclestone, who centralized power and extracted billions, while also undeniably single-handedly making the sport successful. Then, in a move no one saw coming, the American company Liberty Media bought the whole thing in 2017, installed a team of Fox Sports and ESPN veterans, and did what Bernie never would — professionalized it. All of a sudden famously money-losing F1 teams turned into real businesses, with the average team valuation today clocking in at an astounding $3.6 billion. Buckle up for one of our most-requested episodes: the wild story of Formula 1. *Sponsors:* Many thanks to our fantastic Spring '26 Season partners: - J.P. Morgan Payments https://bit.ly/acquiredJPMPf1yt - ServiceNow https://bit.ly/acquiredservicenow26 - Vercel https://bit.ly/acquiredvercel26 - Statsig https://bit.ly/acquiredstatsig26 *Links:* - _The Formula_ by Joshua Robinson and Jonathan Clegg https://www.amazon.com/Formula-Rogues-Geniuses-Reengineered-Fastest-Growing/dp/0063318628 - _Drive to Survive_ on Netflix https://www.netflix.com/us/title/80204890?s=i&trkid=13747225&shareType=Title&shareUuid=45562EBF-7469-47D9-AB12-03CEEEAD7505&trg=cp&unifiedEntityIdEncoded=Video%253A80204890&vlang=en - _F1_ The Movie on Apple TV https://tv.apple.com/us/movie/f1-the-movie/umc.cmc.3t6dvnnr87zwd4wmvpdx5came - Adrian Newey, _How to Build a Car_ https://www.amazon.com/How-Build-Car-Autobiography-Greatest/dp/000835247X - _Senna_ documentary https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1424432/ - Worldly Partners' Multi-Decade Formula One Study https://worldlypartners.com/businesshistory - All episode sources https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ysqphcScUdKoP3zTyGEqyrlZK3_m_YVhgjfXp7sTNZ8/edit?usp=sharing *Carve Outs:* - Cirque du Soleil Echo https://www.cirquedusoleil.com/echo - Super Bowl LX Mic'd Up https://www.nfl.com/videos/best-of-mic-d-up-super-bowl-lx - Tonal https://tonal.com/ - Princess Peach: Showtime! on Nintendo Switch https://www.nintendo.com/us/store/products/princess-peach-showtime-switch/ - Daloopa for historical financial data https://daloopa.com *More Acquired:* - Get email updates https://www.acquired.fm/email and vote on future episodes! - Join the Slack http://acquired.fm/slack - Subscribe to ACQ2 https://pod.link/acquiredlp - Check out the latest swag in the ACQ Merch Store https://www.acquired.fm/store! 00:00:00 Start 00:00:37 Intro 00:05:52 Origins of F1: Britain, Italy, and Monaco 00:30:43 Bernie's Entrance 00:37:42 Bernie Consolidates Power 00:50:33 F1 as a Global TV Sport (Except America) 01:08:08 F1's Incredible Engineering Achievements 01:19:34 Senna's Crash and a New Era for Safety 01:33:18 The Many Owners of F1, and Bernie's Liquidity Drama 01:57:48 FOTA: The attempted breakaway series 02:05:07 RedBull, Mercedes, and Reinventing the Sport 02:42:33 Liberty Media buys F1 and Brings it to the Modern Era 03:05:03 Drive to Survive 03:26:45 Apple, TV Rights, and Success in America 03:41:52 F1: The Business Today 03:56:23 Analysis: Why Did F1 Work… and Was Bernie Necessary? 04:05:40 7 Powers 04:08:23 Bear vs. Bull Cases 04:16:32 Quintessence 04:20:08 Carve-Outs + Outro ‍Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyFzfgrZUYg)

[12:04] Colin Chapman: Adding power makes you faster on the straights. Subtracting weight makes you faster everywhere. [27:30] Bernie Ecclestone: Formula 1 is Ferrari and Ferrari is Formula 1. It's that simple. [27:30] Bernie Ecclestone: There wasn't enough money on that train for me to be involved. I could have done something bigger. [43:49] He may be a thug, but at least he's our thug. [55:03] Bernie Ecclestone: I don't like contracts. I like being able to look someone in the eye and then shake them by the hand rather than do it the American way with 92-page contracts that no one reads or understands. [61:38] Ken Tyrrell: stealing F1 from the teams. [71:21] Mario Andretti: as if it was painted to the road [89:05] Bernie Ecclestone: Your problem, Max, is you always want things absolutely clear, and sometimes it's better if things are not clear. [90:10] Eddie Jordan: Bernie Ecclestone was someone who sold Formula 1 four times, has never bought it back, has never lost its control, and still owns it. And do you know the most important thing? He never effing owned it in the first place. [125:07] Dietrich Mateschitz: overcaffeinated adrenaline junkies with scant regard for their personal safety [138:34] generate an infinite amount of losses in order to win in Formula 1 [193:18] 22 Super Bowls every year [193:18] the most impactful piece of sports media in history [206:45] Max Verstappen: a souped-up Formula E car [224:03] communist capitalism

[0:00] I was just listening to the F1 theme [0:03] song to get pumped up. [0:04] >> Me too. Were you really? [0:05] >> Yes. It's so good. [0:07] >> I just got new speakers here in Acquired [0:10] HQ North and actually thanks to a [0:13] recommendation from a listener in the [0:15] Acquired Slack and yeah, it was bumping [0:17] >> amazing. [0:18] >> All right, let's do this. [0:19] >> Let's do this. [0:21] >> Who got the truth? [0:24] Is it you? Is it? Is it you? Who got the [0:27] truth? [0:29] Is it [0:32] me down? [0:34] Another story on the way. [0:38] >> Welcome to the spring 2026 season of [0:40] Acquired, the podcast about great [0:42] companies and the stories and playbooks [0:44] behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. [0:46] >> I'm David Rosenthal. [0:47] >> And we are your hosts. Today we dive [0:50] into a sport that started in the 1930s [0:52] that began for the pure love of [0:54] autoracing. extremely dangerous auto [0:58] racing. Then after World War II, the [1:00] British Air Force veterans and [1:01] mechanical engineers joined the sport to [1:03] push the limits of technology and [1:05] physics. It eventually became the sport [1:07] of rich guys who want to own teams to [1:09] gallivant around Europe, losing colossal [1:12] sums of money along the way. And in [1:13] fact, David, since the sport began, over [1:16] 100 separate teams have entered and [1:18] exited the competition, mostly because [1:21] they went bankrupt. And today, the sport [1:23] has been dragged kicking and screaming [1:25] into being professionally managed and is [1:28] now owned by the publicly traded US [1:30] company that has owned the Atlanta [1:32] Braves, SiriusXM, and Live Nation. That [1:35] is Liberty Media. And against all odds, [1:38] Liberty has managed to turn the sport, [1:40] the teams, and the drivers into real [1:43] viable businesses. Today's episode, [1:46] listeners, is on Formula 1, the world's [1:49] premier motorsport series. Woo. I was [1:52] going to save this for um later in the [1:54] episode, but do you know what else among [1:56] the many other like hundreds of [1:58] companies that Liberty has owned? Do you [2:00] know what else they owned? You won't [2:02] guess it because there's so many. Excite [2:04] at home. [2:05] >> No way. [2:06] >> From our Google series [2:07] >> throwback. That's awesome. Well, [2:09] listeners, really what we're doing here [2:11] today with Formula 1, it's three sports [2:14] in one. It is, of course, the world's [2:17] best race car drivers showcasing their [2:19] skills, but it's also the World Cup of [2:21] Engineering. These days, it's fair to [2:23] say that the races are more determined [2:25] by the design feats of the thousand plus [2:27] people that work on each car than the [2:30] drivers. And Formula 1 is the only [2:32] motorsport in the world that requires a [2:34] team to design and build their own car [2:37] from scratch, which is an insane [2:39] engineering feat to enter the [2:40] competition. And as one listener put it [2:42] to us, it's also the World Cup of Office [2:44] Politics. Or as another one put it, it's [2:47] Real Housewives of the garage, which [2:50] that makes for a fantastic Netflix show. [2:52] >> Oh, does it ever. We might talk about [2:54] that towards the end of the episode [2:55] here. [2:56] >> Yes. The sport itself is completely [2:58] insane. It is a grid of 20 drivers [3:01] competing at over 200 mph in races that [3:04] last 190 miles. And they do this every [3:07] week or two in a different city around [3:10] the world. They load the entire circus, [3:12] the cars, the teams, the hospitality [3:14] onto a fleet of seven Boeing 7s between [3:18] races and they set up shop in 24 [3:20] different cities from Monaco to Bahrain [3:22] to Melbourne, Australia. Each car costs [3:25] $20 million to make and hundreds of [3:27] millions of dollars to develop. The cars [3:29] have three to 600 sensors on them. And [3:32] shockingly to me as an American, David, [3:34] I don't know if you knew this before we [3:35] started researching. It's actually the [3:37] world's most popular annual sporting [3:39] series with over 827 [3:42] million viewers. [3:44] >> Yeah, I had no idea until we started [3:45] researching because we're Americans [3:47] >> and you know the Olympics and the World [3:49] Cup don't count because they're every [3:50] two and four years. So pretty crazy. [3:53] Listeners, starting in just 5 days, a [3:55] season will kick off that's going to see [3:56] some of the biggest changes in the sport [3:58] in decades. So, we've got new [4:00] regulations, which means all new car [4:01] designs, an expansion to an 11th team [4:04] with Cadillac, Audi and Ford are also [4:07] entering the sport, and a brand new [4:09] broadcast partner in the US in Apple TV. [4:12] And well, uh, everything got much more [4:14] professionalized. It's still owned by a [4:16] bunch of rich guys who love auto racing. [4:20] >> They're just no longer money losing rich [4:22] guys. [4:22] >> That's right. So listeners, just like [4:24] our NFL, NBA, and IPL cricket episodes, [4:27] this show is about the business of F1. [4:29] So, uh, we apologize in advance if we [4:31] don't spend time on your favorite [4:32] rivalry or regulation detail or the V10 [4:36] engine sound. You can join the email [4:38] list to get updates every time an [4:40] episode drops at acquired.fm/e. [4:43] You get to vote on future episodes. And [4:46] the email list is just getting much, [4:47] much better. So, we now have episode [4:49] summaries, our big takeaways, and [4:51] exclusive photos from our research [4:53] process. That's acquired.fm/email. [4:57] Chat about this afterwards with us with [4:59] the whole acquired community in the [5:00] Slack. Acquired.fm/slack. [5:03] And before we dive in, we want to thank [5:05] our presenting sponsor JP Morgan [5:07] Payments. Yes. And just like how we say [5:09] every company has a story, every [5:11] company's story is powered by payments. [5:13] and JP Morgan Payments is a part of so [5:15] many of their journeys from seed to IPO [5:18] and beyond. [5:19] >> So with that, this show is not [5:20] investment advice. David and I may have [5:21] investments in the companies we discuss [5:23] and this show is forformational and [5:25] entertainment purposes only. David [5:28] Rosenthal, where do we dive in? Well, [5:30] first off, we owe a huge thank you to [5:32] Joshua Robinson and Jonathan Kle who are [5:36] the sports editors over at the Wall [5:37] Street Journal and just recently [5:40] published I think the best business [5:43] history book of Formula 1 called The [5:46] Formula. It was one of the main sources [5:48] for this episode and uh they both [5:50] actually helped us in the research. So, [5:51] thank you guys. [5:52] >> Yep. So, Ben, Formula 1 as we know it [5:55] really started after World War II in [5:58] 1950. But unlike a traditional company [6:02] or even many of the sports leagues that [6:04] we've studied over the years, it doesn't [6:06] have a exact sort of founding moment. [6:08] Its origins are really part and parcel [6:10] with the beginning of motor racing [6:13] itself. So, it didn't take long after [6:15] the invention of the modern automobile, [6:17] which is generally agreed upon to be by [6:19] Carl Benz in Germany in the late 1800s, [6:22] that people had the idea to start [6:24] >> racing racing. I mean, after all, like [6:27] people raced horses, why wouldn't they [6:29] race cars, too? [6:30] >> Y [6:31] >> So, throughout the first few decades of [6:33] the 1900s, various automobile clubs [6:36] popped up across Europe, and they would [6:38] host these races. They'd sell tickets [6:40] and advertising to fund prize purses and [6:44] drivers and manufacturers would travel [6:46] from all over the world to compete in [6:48] these races. 1906, the Automobile Club [6:51] of France, which was the largest in [6:53] Europe at the time, hosts an inaugural [6:56] race just to the southwest of Paris [6:58] called Lemon, Lan. [7:02] And this group of organizers, they [7:04] decide to call this Lemon race by a very [7:07] literal name in order to attract [7:10] spectators and participants. They call [7:12] it the Grand Prix de Lemon. Literally [7:17] translated as the big prize. [7:19] >> It's great. Carries all the way forward [7:21] to this day. [7:22] >> Yes. The names in this sport are very [7:24] literal. [7:25] So the success of this Leong Grand Prix [7:29] causes a bunch of similar races to pop [7:31] up across Europe all throughout the [7:33] teens and 20s copying the same rules or [7:36] formula as the Automobile Club of [7:38] France. You had Monza pop up in Italy. [7:41] You had the Monte Carlo race in Monaco. [7:43] You had the Nurburg Ring in Germany, [7:45] etc., etc., etc. You've probably heard [7:47] of all these places. [7:48] >> Yep. Eventually in the 1920s all the [7:52] major European automobile clubs get [7:54] together in Paris and they say why don't [7:56] we centralize oversight of this formula [7:59] into one international organization and [8:01] that becomes after a series of name [8:03] changes over the years the Federas [8:06] International Delotmobile [8:08] or the FIA which still exists today and [8:12] still administers the rules of Formula [8:16] 1. And as Josh and Jonathan point out in [8:18] the book, the sport is literally named [8:21] after the rule book. [8:23] >> There's a lot of fighting about the [8:25] rules in this sport, both when they're [8:27] setting the rules every few years and in [8:29] races when they're going up to yell at [8:31] the race stewards, oh, this is illegal, [8:33] this is not illegal. Anyone who is sort [8:36] of complaining that this sport is too [8:37] into the rules, needs to remember it is [8:39] named after them. [8:40] >> It's named after the rule book. Yes. [8:41] >> Yes. [8:42] >> Okay. So at this point, you've got all [8:43] these Grand Prix and these famous [8:45] racetracks that you know today, and you [8:47] have the FIA as this sort of rules body [8:50] overseeing the common regulations [8:52] amongst them, but they're all [8:53] independent events. There's no [8:56] championship series. There's no league. [8:58] There's one winner at the end of each [9:00] race and then you go to the next race. [9:01] >> Yeah. [9:02] >> There a couple attempts before World War [9:04] II to create a championship series, but [9:07] they all fizzle and then of course the [9:08] war disrupts everything. After the war, [9:12] however, there's renewed interest. [9:13] Everybody wants to have a world drivers [9:15] championship. And so in 1949, the FIA [9:18] announces the inaugural Grand Prix World [9:22] Championship for Formula 1 drivers, a [9:26] global drivers competition of seven of [9:29] the most prestigious Grand Prix races [9:32] set to begin the following May 13th with [9:35] the running of the British Grand Prix at [9:38] the Silverstone [9:40] Circuit in England. And that becomes the [9:43] first race of the first season [9:44] officially of F1 [9:47] >> 1950. [9:48] >> Now there really are three sort of [9:51] foundational pillars of this early era [9:54] of the sport. There's one in the UK, [9:56] there's one in Monaco and there's one in [9:58] Italy. So taking them in turn first in [10:01] the UK. Britain was and is the heart of [10:05] the sport both in the early days and all [10:07] the way through to today. So today 70% [10:09] of the F1 teams are based in the UK. [10:12] Really the only notable exception is [10:14] Ferrari which of course is in Italy. [10:17] >> Yes. All of these teams despite having [10:19] such different cultures and opinions and [10:21] rivalries a giant amount of their [10:23] employees at least on the technical side [10:25] work in a very small area in the English [10:28] Midlands within tens of miles of each [10:31] other. [10:32] >> Yes. It's like very you know seemingly [10:34] random. So why was the UK and this weird [10:38] part in the middle of the country like [10:40] the natural home of F1? If anything, [10:43] given the proto history, it should have [10:44] been France or maybe Germany. Well, [10:46] after World War II, Britain had been, as [10:49] you alluded to in the intro, absolutely [10:52] the right set of circumstances for this [10:54] all to come together. Yep. [10:56] >> One, unlike Germany, they'd actually [10:58] just won the war, but the country was in [11:02] bad shape and like in desperate need of [11:04] entertainment and redevelopment. And [11:06] then, unlike France, Britain had a ton [11:09] of empty airfields and lots and lots of [11:13] newly unemployed British fighter pilots [11:17] and mechanics. And what better way to, [11:20] you know, redevelop the infrastructure [11:22] in the heart of the rural area of the [11:24] country than to put all of these people [11:27] and abandoned airfields to work racing [11:30] fast cars. And much like the development [11:32] of Silicon Valley, which we talked about [11:34] in our Loheed Martin episode, there's [11:36] sort of this positive feedback loop that [11:38] keeps that area the main area for this. [11:41] So there's universities that specialize [11:43] in aerodynamics and engine design and [11:46] mechanical engineering. It's still the [11:48] best place to source talent to build an [11:50] F1 team. [11:51] >> Yeah. Even the teams that are owned and [11:54] nominally operated by companies in other [11:56] countries, most of them still base their [11:59] actual operations in the countryside in [12:02] the UK for this reason. [12:04] >> Yep. So, one of these newly unemployed [12:07] Royal Air Force pilots is a man named [12:10] Colin Chapman who also happened to be a [12:12] mechanical engineer in addition to a [12:14] former pilot and who along with Enzo [12:17] Ferrari probably did more than any [12:19] single person to shape the first era of [12:22] F1. So Chapman founded the Lotus Racing [12:26] Team in 1952 with 25 pounds as his [12:31] initial startup capital in a set of [12:33] empty stables in North London. Even then [12:37] 25 British pounds was not enough to [12:39] build a car capable of racing an F1. So [12:41] he had to have another way of making [12:43] money. In parallel, he also started the [12:46] Lotus road car business, which quickly [12:48] became, you know, look, hey, it's not [12:50] Ferrari, but like decently successful. [12:53] >> In fact, the first uh Tesla Roadster was [12:56] based on a Lotus Elise chassis. [12:58] >> That's right. So, in 1958, Chapman [13:01] finally has enough capital together to [13:02] build an F1 car. He enters his first car [13:05] in Formula 1, and he revolutionizes the [13:09] sport. I mean, today teams are super [13:12] professional operations with hundreds of [13:14] engineers and tons of equipment. Back [13:18] then, it was much more like the early [13:19] days of the NFL. You have like one or a [13:22] couple people who are team owners, [13:25] managers, coaches, and sometimes also [13:27] players or drivers. [13:29] >> Yes. And it says a lot that there [13:31] actually was not a constructor's [13:33] championship when it first got started. [13:35] That wasn't until 1958. [13:38] >> Yes. It was just about the drivers, [13:40] >> right? It was just the drivers [13:41] championship [13:42] >> because often these were the same [13:43] people, [13:43] >> right? So for anybody who follows the [13:45] sport today, there's sort of two [13:46] different things you're competing for. [13:47] Can the driver individually win the [13:50] season or can the team between its two [13:52] drivers win the constructor's [13:54] championship called constructor's [13:56] championship? Of course, because each of [13:57] these teams is required to construct [13:59] their own vehicle. [14:01] >> Yep. And enter two cars and thus two [14:03] drivers in the competition. So Chapman [14:07] was the first constructor to realize [14:10] that building a winning race car wasn't [14:13] just about adding more horsepower to the [14:15] engine, [14:16] >> which was kind of the Ferrari prevailing [14:18] people at the time. [14:19] >> That was Enzo's, you know, arguably till [14:21] he died, what he really cared about was [14:23] power. Chapman had a great quote on [14:25] this. He said, "Adding power makes you [14:27] faster in the streets. Subtracting [14:29] weight makes you faster everywhere." So [14:31] he realized like a whole bunch of stuff [14:33] that like being lighter is better, [14:35] having better handling is better because [14:37] it's not like these racetracks are like [14:39] NASCAR racetracks where the cars just go [14:40] around in a circle. There's all these [14:42] technical corners, there's hairpin [14:43] turns, there's chicanees, there's double [14:45] apexes. It's a very technical sport, not [14:48] just from the engineering for the cars, [14:50] but also for the drivers. [14:52] >> Yep. There's one other very important [14:54] element that Colin Chapman introduces to [14:57] the sport during his time in F1, which [15:00] was sponsor logos on the cars. So, until [15:05] Chapman adds sponsorship to his cars, [15:07] all the F1 cars had just been painted [15:10] whatever color the FIA assigned their [15:13] country. [15:13] >> Yes. And that's how you have silver with [15:16] Mercedes and British racing green and of [15:18] course Ferrari red. [15:20] >> And they stick to this day. So Chapman [15:23] when he goes out in the 60s and finds a [15:24] sponsor to, you know, finance his [15:26] building activities, he paints his [15:28] lotuses red and white in the corporate [15:31] colors of his new sponsor, Gold Leaf [15:33] Tobacco. And this is the start of one of [15:36] the most important partnerships in F1 [15:38] history, Fast Cars and Cigarette [15:41] Companies. [15:42] >> Yes. And this was illegal for a long [15:44] time. The FIA did not allow you to have [15:47] sponsorship. And then they realized, [15:49] okay, we're being too much a purist [15:50] about this. these teams are all going to [15:51] go out of business, but there are [15:53] companies lining up to try to pay them [15:56] to put the logo on it. Okay, this is the [15:58] way to make the sport viable. [15:59] >> Yep. Ironic because then the EU would [16:02] legislate tobacco advertising and [16:04] sponsorship out of existence in the [16:06] early 2000s once again. But it's [16:08] actually really weird. Go look at any of [16:10] the sports historical greats like Senna [16:13] or Michael Schumacher or Alan Pros. They [16:16] all had the Marbor logo all over them [16:19] >> or John Player Special. I mean, there [16:21] were these cigarette companies, some of [16:23] which I'd never even heard of, but [16:24] they're so dominant on the cars for a [16:26] long time there that you actually don't [16:29] see the team name. At least on the [16:30] liveries now, you see the team name and [16:32] their big sponsors. This looked like it [16:35] was team Marlro Racing or team John [16:37] Player Special, not you know, McLaren or [16:40] >> Yeah. I mean, they actually painted the [16:41] cars to look like cigarette boxes going [16:43] down the track. Yep. [16:45] >> Unfortunately, his story has a sort of [16:47] strange and sad ending. Did you find [16:49] this, Ben? [16:49] >> Oh, yes. [16:50] >> Yeah. So, in the uh late 70s and early [16:53] 80s, he gets tied up in an embezzlement [16:56] scheme with John Delorean. Chapman [16:59] designed the chassis for the DMC12, you [17:01] know, like the Back to the Future car, [17:04] >> which would be awesome if the car didn't [17:06] suck and the company didn't end in a [17:09] giant scandal. [17:10] >> Totally. The company collapsed and [17:12] British prosecutors accused John [17:14] Delorean and Colin Chapman of each [17:16] embezzling $8 million in government [17:18] incentives that they supposedly were [17:19] going to use to build the factory. [17:21] Chapman dies of a heart attack once this [17:24] comes out at age 54. Truly sadly. And [17:27] then Delorean goes on to be arrested by [17:30] an FBI sting in LA attempting to buy 220 [17:34] pounds of cocaine with the intent to [17:37] distribute to like pay off his debts for [17:39] Delorean. Man, you can't make this stuff [17:41] up. [17:41] >> He was a man with a dream. David. [17:43] >> Yeah. [17:45] >> Through all of this though, the cowboy [17:47] nature of the teams, the individual [17:50] iconoclastic owner, mechanic [17:53] slashdesignerd drivers, the cigarette [17:56] money, the vague or not so vague whiff [17:58] of fraud that totally embodies the early [18:02] era of F1. It was the wild west in [18:05] Europe. [18:06] >> Yep. And just so people can really [18:08] picture it, I think you kind of know [18:10] what an F1 car looks like now. Uh an [18:13] open wheel car with a giant spoiler or [18:16] rear wing. It's got a front wing. When [18:18] we first started here in 1950 and really [18:21] even into the '60s, too, these cars [18:24] didn't look anything like that. [18:25] >> They look like soapbox derby cars. [18:27] >> That's exactly right. Almost like little [18:29] bullets. [18:29] >> Yep. So the UK contribution and the [18:32] Chapman story really reflects this wild [18:34] west aspect of F1. If that's all there [18:38] was in the beginnings of the sport, I [18:40] don't think we'd be doing this episode [18:42] today. Right around the same time that [18:45] Lotus is coming into the league, there's [18:48] another very different founding pillar [18:51] number two of F1 taking place in Monaco, [18:55] which is that in 1956, the sovereign [18:58] Prince Reineer III of Monaco, as we [19:01] talked about at great length in our [19:03] Hermes episode, married the American [19:06] movie actress Grace Kelly and brought [19:08] her to live in the Prince's Palace of [19:10] Monaco. This brings together all of the [19:14] oldw world luxury and heritage and [19:17] legitimacy of Europe with the glitz and [19:19] the glamour of Hollywood and the new [19:21] world in a way that's still very much [19:23] part of F1 today. I mean basically this [19:26] marriage was like the 20th century's [19:27] version of you know Travis and Taylor [19:29] the NFL and you know Swifty crossover [19:32] like it was the crossover event of the [19:34] century. So, as we said a minute ago, [19:36] there had been Grand Prix races on the [19:38] streets of Monaco for many years going [19:40] back to before World War II, and the [19:42] track and the location was already quite [19:44] prestigious. But when Princess Grace [19:47] comes to the party, things go to a whole [19:49] new level. So, all of her Hollywood [19:51] circles start coming out to the race to [19:54] visit her. And conveniently on the race [19:57] calendar, it, you know, just happens to [19:59] coincide with the Ken Film Festival [20:01] right up the road in Ken in France. So [20:04] Frank Sinatra becomes a regular attendee [20:06] to the Monaco Grand Prix, the Beatles, [20:09] the Rolling Stones, etc., etc. [20:12] Eventually, many, not most of the F1 [20:14] drivers start moving to Monaco and [20:16] becoming stars themselves. I mean, like [20:19] today, Lewis Hamilton, Max Verstoppen, [20:21] Charleslair, Lando Norris, they all live [20:23] in Monaco. [20:24] >> Well, it also has some tax benefits. [20:25] >> Yeah, it also has some tax benefits. But [20:28] for anybody who has been to Monaco or [20:30] seen pictures of Monaco or really any [20:33] towns sort of on the French Riviera in [20:35] that area, you might think, "Wait, but [20:37] it's like cliff side and the streets are [20:40] all really narrow and old and winding. [20:43] These cars that we were talking about at [20:45] that time, it kind of made sense to race [20:47] those cars in these types of [20:49] environments. It makes a lot less sense [20:51] now. There's no chance they would add [20:53] Monaco, with the cars being the size [20:55] that they are today, to the race [20:57] calendar. Yep. But there's also no [20:59] chance that they would ever get rid of [21:00] Monaco. This is what brings luxury into [21:04] the sport. And today, again, also this [21:06] doesn't seem that radical. It's part of [21:08] sports league setup playbook 101. Like [21:11] look at, you know, our episode on the [21:12] IPL. This was so far ahead of its time [21:15] back in the 1950s and also totally by [21:18] accident. Which leads us then to the [21:21] third Italian founding pillar of F1, [21:25] Ferrari. Undeniably the most important [21:29] team, company and person of this first [21:33] age of F1 was Enzo Ferrari. Enzo [21:37] actually founded the company before [21:39] World War II purely as a racing company. [21:42] >> Yeah. Wasn't he racing Alfa Romeo cars? [21:45] >> Yes, that was the purpose of the company [21:46] was to race Alfa Romeo cars. [21:48] >> Also a red racing team because they were [21:50] Italian. [21:51] >> Yes, indeed. Ferrari itself didn't start [21:53] making cars until after World War II. [21:56] But of course, when the F1 championship [21:58] series starts in 1950, Enzo has to join. [22:01] This is the pinnacle of racing. And [22:03] Ferrari is the only team that's been [22:05] part of every single F1 season going all [22:08] the way back to the beginning. [22:10] >> There's a funny thing here where you [22:12] might think, oh, Formula 1, that's the [22:14] big established series that legitimizes [22:17] an automaker by being a part of it. It [22:20] actually works the other way with [22:21] Ferrari. Ferrari participating in [22:24] Formula 1 legitimizes the series. [22:27] Ferrari, if they ever decided to stop [22:29] racing in Formula 1, would make people [22:31] go, "Oh, so what is the big racing [22:33] series?" Yes, totally. Formula 1 is [22:36] actually the marriage of two separate [22:39] things. The teams and the racetracks. [22:42] Unlike just about every other sport out [22:45] there, these are separate entities. It'd [22:48] be like if the Seahawks, you know, were [22:50] a team that would play wherever, [22:52] >> whenever they could get a game going [22:54] >> and they didn't have any relationship [22:55] with, you know, Lumenfield in Seattle. [22:57] So, what Formula 1 the organization is [23:00] doing is they are bringing this set of [23:03] teams and this set of racetracks on the [23:06] calendar, this set of Grand Prix [23:09] together. [23:09] >> And in the early days, it was kind of a [23:11] different set of teams and drivers at [23:14] each of the Grand Prix. who can we get [23:16] to come race at this track when and it [23:19] would come together in a very haphazard [23:20] way. [23:21] >> So, back to Enzo and Ferrari. Unlike [23:24] Chapman and Lotus and the Brits, Enzo [23:26] actually had business sense. He was an [23:29] entrepreneur and he was the first person [23:31] who realized that there was an [23:34] absolutely incredible business [23:36] opportunity at the intersection of these [23:40] really fast cars, these sort of [23:42] legitimizing racing heritage and all the [23:46] glitz and the glamour and the wealth of [23:48] the celebrity that was represented by [23:50] Monaco. And that opportunity was selling [23:53] fast cars to the rich and famous. [23:56] >> Yep. So Ferrari pretty quickly after [23:59] World War II becomes a legitimate luxury [24:02] brand. I think you could maybe even [24:04] argue they are the only legitimate [24:07] luxury brand established in the second [24:10] half of the 20th century. [24:12] >> Oh, that's interesting. Yeah. And it's [24:14] very impressive how fast it happened. [24:16] >> Before the war, it was Enzo racing a [24:18] bunch of Alfa Romeos [24:19] >> and then suddenly it's Ferrari, [24:21] >> right? because as he's participating in [24:24] F1, Enzo's also handmaking cars for all [24:28] the European royalty and all the [24:30] American movie stars that are flowing [24:32] through F1. And so just like the [24:34] equestrian heritage kind of serves as [24:36] the like legitimizing soul of Hermes, [24:40] motor racing in F1 serves as the [24:42] legitimizing soul of Ferrari. It's just [24:44] that they were co-developed together [24:46] here in the 50s and 60s after World War [24:48] II. H. [24:49] >> So, we need to talk much more about [24:52] Ferrari on another episode of its own. [24:55] >> Oh, yeah. We should do a Ferrari episode [24:56] >> for the purposes of F1. They really were [24:59] that unifying factor that pulled [25:01] together the glitz and the glamour and [25:03] the luxury and the hardcore racing [25:06] because the Ferrari cars became this [25:09] tangible way that fans, even though they [25:11] couldn't afford to buy them, could [25:13] relate to what was happening on the [25:16] track by dreaming about buying these [25:18] road cars that they saw their favorite [25:20] celebrities or, you know, royal monarchs [25:23] driving around. Because a lot of these [25:24] other teams are building one or two or [25:27] three cars period and they're racing [25:29] them and then that's it. [25:30] >> Yep. Totally. Whereas with Ferrari, [25:32] probably every boy growing up around the [25:35] world, you know, myself included, [25:36] probably you too, like has had a poster [25:39] of a Ferrari or a model of a Ferrari in [25:41] their bedrooms. [25:42] >> Okay. So, you might be wondering where [25:44] are the Germans in all of this? We've [25:46] talked about the Brits with Colin [25:47] Chapman. We talked about Monaco. We [25:49] talked about Ferrari. In the 50s, [25:51] Mercedes actually was a major player in [25:54] Formula 1 and auto racing. But while [25:57] they were racing one of their cars in Le [25:58] Man, it actually crashed and killed 82 [26:02] people. [26:02] >> Oh, yeah. It was one of the worst [26:04] disasters in motor racing history. [26:06] >> They actually pulled out of I think all [26:08] racing and they didn't return to Formula [26:09] 1 for another 40 years. That accident [26:12] was so devastating that four of the [26:14] remaining Grand Prix were cancelled. [26:16] Racing was just so dangerous in this [26:18] time. I mean, you had 14 deaths in F1 [26:22] alone, not even counting other racing [26:24] series or audience attendees across this [26:27] first decade. [26:28] >> Totally. Mortal danger was actually, I [26:31] think, a core part of the appeal of the [26:34] sport in those early days. What better [26:36] to go along with all your glitz and [26:38] glamour than an element of mortal [26:40] danger? These guys were gladiators. They [26:42] were risking their life every time they [26:46] got in a car. In the 1950s, you had 14 [26:49] deaths. So that's 1.4 a year. In the [26:52] 1960s, you also had 14 deaths plus 15 [26:55] spectators. In the 1961 Italian Grand [26:58] Prix crash in the 1970s didn't get much [27:01] better. You had another 12 deaths. And [27:03] then it starts to get safer from there, [27:04] and we'll talk about all that later. But [27:06] the first three decades, you were on [27:08] about a one to two death per year rate. [27:11] >> So that's five to 10% of the entire [27:14] racing field would die every year. Yep. [27:17] And there were many, many more crashes [27:19] and many, many more injuries. These were [27:20] just fatalities. Famously, Nikki Laua's [27:23] head caught on fire and he was scarred [27:25] for the rest of his life. [27:26] >> Yeah. And then he was back out racing [27:28] several weeks later. It's insane. [27:29] >> It's unbelievable. [27:30] >> So, back to Ferrari, though. He's really [27:33] the entrepreneur that figures out how to [27:36] build a real big business at the [27:39] intersection of everything that's going [27:40] on here. He's just doing it through his [27:42] road car business. There's a great quote [27:44] from another team owner during this era [27:48] and it goes, "Formula 1 is Ferrari and [27:52] Ferrari is Formula 1. It's that simple." [27:55] This is another team owner that is [27:57] saying that like a competitive team to [28:00] Ferrari. And you might know who the team [28:04] owner was who said that quote. [28:07] >> Oh, it's Bernie. [28:08] >> Yep. It was the person who quite [28:11] literally would replace Enzo in that [28:14] quote. Bernie Eckleston, the uh supremo [28:20] imprario [28:22] owner of F1. [28:24] >> Owner of some part of F1, but controller [28:27] of all of F1. [28:29] >> So Josh and Jonathan in the formula book [28:32] have a great quote about Bernie and [28:35] Ferrari. As it turned out, no one would [28:39] get richer off the Ferrari mystique than [28:41] Bernie, a man who has never once [28:44] employed in Marinelo. [28:46] >> Yep. [28:46] >> And that will be our protagonist today. [28:50] But before we begin Bernie's tale, now [28:53] is a great time to thank our presenting [28:55] partner, JP Morgan Payments. [28:58] >> Yes, the modern sports fan experience [29:01] extends far beyond just attending an [29:03] event. The entire customer journey from [29:05] tickets to concessions and merch, [29:07] practically every touch point involves a [29:09] payment. And when they're fast and [29:10] frictionless, it makes the entire [29:12] experience better for fans and the [29:13] business behind it. 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[30:29] So, if you want to learn about how JP [30:31] Morgan Payments powers seamless [30:33] experiences for fans and businesses [30:35] across all industries, check out [30:36] jpmorggan.com/acquired [30:38] to discover what solutions can help [30:40] accelerate growth for your business. [30:43] Okay, so David, enter Bernie Eccleston. [30:46] >> Bernie Eckleston. [30:49] So Bernie was born in 1930 and he was a [30:54] hard scrabble kid. He grew up in [30:56] Suffach, which is to the northeast of [30:58] London. His dad was a commercial [31:00] fisherman and his mom was a [31:02] authoritarian homemaker according to [31:05] many biographies about him. You never [31:07] really know what the legends about [31:08] Bernie, but that's the story at least as [31:11] he wanted it told. [31:12] >> Yep. After the war, Bernie ends up [31:17] getting into the uh wheeler dealer [31:20] business in London with surplus cars and [31:24] motorcycles from the war. He opens his [31:28] own showroom in the outskirts of London [31:32] where he starts to specialize in selling [31:35] luxury automobiles to the newly rich and [31:38] famous. Basically, he becomes like the [31:40] London celebrities car guy. You know, [31:42] you got your jewelry guy, your clothes [31:44] guy, you got your drugs guy in the 60s, [31:47] you got your car guy. Birdie's the car [31:48] guy. [31:49] >> People refer to him as a former used car [31:51] dealer, but that's not really right. [31:54] >> Yeah. Well, I mean, it is right. He [31:56] started that way. [31:57] >> It's like calling someone else's puzzle [31:59] dial Rolex a used watch, you know? It's [32:01] not really used. [32:03] >> No. No. It's like, you want a Ferrari or [32:06] you want a Bugatti? Hold the phone. Let [32:08] me make some calls and see if I can get [32:10] you one. [32:11] >> Right. There's also always been plenty [32:13] of gossip over the years that Bernie was [32:15] involved in more um underground [32:18] activities, shall we say, at the time. [32:20] And Bernie himself would encourage this. [32:22] So, specifically, there was a [32:23] long-standing rumor that Bernie was the [32:27] mastermind behind the great train [32:29] robbery of 1963, [32:31] where 2.6 million pounds was stolen from [32:35] a British Royal Mail Train. This is like [32:37] one of the most famous train robberies [32:39] in history. [32:41] Bernie loved this speculation. It's so [32:43] in 2005, a long time later, he finally [32:46] addressed it [32:46] >> when he's what, 70 years old or [32:48] something. [32:49] >> Yeah, 75 years old. He gives a quote to [32:52] the media when asked about it. There [32:54] wasn't enough money on that train for me [32:56] to be involved. I could have done [32:57] something bigger. [33:00] You start to get a flavor of, you know, [33:02] who Birdie is, [33:02] >> which actually is correct given what he [33:05] would go on to do. [33:06] >> Very correct. 2.6 million pounds. That's [33:08] jump change. So, criminal mastermind or [33:11] not, Bernie is smart. Once he gets into [33:16] hawking cars to the new money rich folks [33:18] in London, he doesn't just sell them the [33:22] cars. He also steers them into [33:25] financing, which I think is basically [33:28] how car dealers make money. They mark up [33:31] the cars a little bit, but then they [33:32] really get you on the financing and the [33:33] servicing fees, etc., etc. And when [33:36] you're selling really expensive cars, [33:37] the financing fees start to add up. So [33:40] this nets Bernie his first small [33:43] fortune. Now the deeper that he gets [33:46] into this luxury auto world, Bernie has [33:49] the same realization that Enzo Ferrari [33:51] had a decade or two earlier, which is [33:54] that motorsport and racing is the [33:56] legitimizing heritage of all of these [34:00] fast luxury cars. So, just like Enzo [34:03] himself, Bernie wants to have his [34:05] dealership and his brand associated with [34:09] Formula 1. So, in the mid60s, Bernie [34:12] starts hanging around with F1 drivers. [34:14] And being the Wheeler dealer that he is, [34:17] he pretty quickly becomes the agent for [34:20] a few of his pals, negotiating better [34:23] deals for them with their teams for [34:26] their salaries, you know, for a small [34:27] fee, of course. [34:28] >> Yes, of course. Eventually, he cooks up [34:31] a scheme with one of his star clients [34:34] who actually drives for Lotus for Colin [34:36] Chapman, a driver named Yoken Rint to [34:40] leave Lotus and buy a team together for [34:43] themselves. They're going to become not [34:46] just the talent. Yoken's going to become [34:48] an owner. Yoken at the time, he's one of [34:50] the best drivers in the world. He's on [34:51] top of the standings in F1. He's blowing [34:54] away the field throughout the 1970 [34:56] season. And then tragically during his [34:59] practice session at the fourth to last [35:02] Grand Prix of the season crashes and is [35:04] killed and Rent and Chapman were [35:06] constantly fighting about the safety of [35:08] the Lotuses that he was driving. Rint [35:10] was so far ahead of the pack in the [35:13] standings when he was killed that he [35:15] would actually win the driver's [35:17] championship that year. [35:18] >> Oh, he still won, right? [35:20] >> Yeah. Postumously. He's the only driver [35:22] ever to um win a championship. So, he [35:26] got zero points in all of the races [35:28] after his death, but he was so far ahead [35:29] that he still won. [35:31] >> Bernie, as the story goes, is devastated [35:34] after Ren's death. And to honor the [35:37] memory of his friend, he decides that [35:39] he's going to carry through on the plan [35:41] that they had together, the dream they [35:43] had. And in 1972, Bernie buys the Brabom [35:48] F1 team for a h 100,000 British pounds, [35:52] which would be about 2.3 million today. [35:56] Today, I think every single F1 team is [35:59] worth at least one a half billion, I [36:02] think, is the floor. [36:03] >> That's exactly right. [36:05] >> Uh Bernie doesn't make that much money [36:07] on the Bravom team, as we will see. But [36:09] >> he sells it for what, five million [36:10] later? [36:11] >> Five million a couple years later. Yeah. [36:12] So, uh, you know, a nice return, but [36:14] definitely the fact that team valuations [36:16] go from £100,000 to a floor of one and a [36:20] half billion is thanks to Bernie. [36:22] >> Well, thanks to Bernie for part of it [36:24] and then specifically thanks to Bernie [36:26] leaving after that. [36:27] >> Yes, for the other part of it as we will [36:30] get into. So when Bernie buys the Brabom [36:33] team in 1972, [36:35] along with it, he also gains membership [36:38] into the quote formula 1 constructors [36:42] association. Now this is a very loose [36:47] organization. [36:48] Organization is being generous here of [36:52] all the team owners that Colin Chapman [36:55] had actually kind of taken the lead in [36:56] pulling together back in 1963 with the [36:59] original purpose. solely of coordinating [37:02] joint travel and transport logistics to [37:05] getting their teams and cars to all the [37:07] various races around the world. It's [37:09] like, hey, you're my bitter rivals. I [37:12] never want to associate with you. I [37:14] battle to the death with you out on the [37:16] tracks. But [37:16] >> we are going to the same place. [37:18] >> We're going to the same place. Why don't [37:19] we share a ride, so to speak? [37:21] >> And today, actually, Formula 1 [37:23] management does handle all this. And I [37:24] think they make a little bit of profit [37:26] on it. Like it's a service that they [37:27] sort of sell to teams. a tiny amount of [37:29] profit relative to the rest of it, but [37:31] they handle the logistics of moving the [37:33] whole circus around the world. [37:35] >> Yep. Well, one thing I can guarantee is [37:36] that once Bernie takes it over, he's [37:38] definitely making a profit on it. [37:41] So, Bernie, when he joins this owner's [37:44] table, shall we say, pretty quickly [37:45] realizes a couple things. One, except [37:49] for Enzo Ferrari, none of these other [37:52] guys have a lick of business sense. All [37:55] they care about is fast cars and winning [37:58] races. Whatever money they have or don't [38:01] have, it's all going down the tubes in [38:03] pursuit of victory. [38:06] The second thing he realizes is that [38:09] except for Ferrari, and by this point in [38:12] time, Enzo has sold half the company to [38:14] Fiat, so he has major resources behind [38:17] him in Italy, none of these other guys [38:20] actually have any real money. I mean, [38:22] for God's sakes, Colin Chapman is about [38:23] to nearly go to jail over a $8 million [38:26] embezzlement case with Delorean. $8 [38:29] million went a lot farther back in the [38:31] 70s. But these cars are quickly becoming [38:33] very expensive, and the teams are [38:35] becoming very expensive to run. There is [38:37] not a sustainable way to run a team. I [38:40] think the average tenure over the entire [38:41] existence of Formula 1 is about six [38:44] years for a given team. Just to make [38:46] this exact point, here is the list of F1 [38:49] teams in 1972, the year that Bernie buys [38:52] into the league. Lotus, Tyrell, McLaren, [38:56] probably know that. Ferrari, you [38:58] definitely know that. Certis, March, [39:01] BRM, Matra, and Braum. [39:04] >> So there's two that exist today. [39:06] >> And at that point in time, only one of [39:08] them is a real business. So Bernie sees [39:11] this and he's like, "Dang, there's an [39:14] opportunity here. [39:16] All these other guys are focused on [39:18] winning races. [39:20] Yeah, I'd like to win, but I really care [39:23] about getting rich. And there's quite a [39:25] void of power here that I can insert [39:27] myself into. So, just to paint the [39:29] picture of the business state of F1 when [39:32] Bernie came into the league, each [39:35] individual team negotiated their [39:38] appearance fees with each individual [39:42] Grand Prix separately. So, they're like [39:45] a whole bunch of Grand Prix, each with [39:47] their own race promoters and organizers. [39:49] They're a whole bunch of teams, nine of [39:51] them to be exact, and they're all [39:53] negotiating separately with each other. [39:56] >> Assuming there's, I don't know, 15 races [39:58] or something, that would be 135 distinct [40:01] agreements between teams and local [40:04] races. [40:05] >> Everybody's getting paid wildly [40:07] different amounts and usually not very [40:09] much. And these things sort of need to [40:11] depend on each other because how [40:14] valuable is a race to go to if the other [40:17] teams aren't going to show up to that [40:18] one, [40:19] >> right? I mean, this is like the sports [40:21] business world's worst practice number [40:24] one. Not only is it bad for overall [40:27] revenue, you know, you have no [40:29] centralized leverage over the tracks if [40:31] you're all negotiating separately. To [40:33] your point, Ben, it's just plain bad for [40:34] the sport. [40:35] >> How are you supposed to sell tickets and [40:37] tell fans they should come if [40:38] >> right? You don't know if Ferrari's going [40:40] to show up or if McLaren's going to show [40:42] up. There's no way to know as a fan [40:45] until you actually showed up at the [40:47] racetrack who was going to be there. [40:51] The other aspect of the sport that I say [40:54] would be in shambles, but wasn't even in [40:56] shambles because it didn't exist, was [40:59] broadcast and television and promotion. [41:02] There was none of it. [41:03] >> Yeah. Thankfully, Bernie came along [41:06] before that became too big. I mean, can [41:08] you imagine if each of these racetracks [41:10] was trying to do their own media rights [41:12] deal? [41:12] >> I mean, he came along at the perfect [41:14] time. It was already criminally too late [41:17] that F1 and the Grand Prix hadn't gotten [41:20] to television. I mean, we're talking [41:21] about the mid70s. If you look over at [41:23] the NFL in America, they're already [41:26] making like 50 million plus a year in [41:29] broadcast rights. [41:30] >> Yeah, it was 10 years into their I think [41:32] 1961 was their first national broadcast [41:34] deal. I mean, they had already launched [41:36] Monday Night Football in 1970. It's not [41:38] like there wasn't a playbook for this [41:40] out there. [41:40] >> Yes. [41:42] >> F1, meanwhile, is just as, if not more, [41:45] popular, is a global sport, has great [41:48] demographics, and is making zero dollars [41:51] in meteorites. So Bernie shows up. He's [41:54] hardly a media professional here. But [41:56] even he can see that there's room for [41:58] improvement on both of these fronts. [42:00] >> Even before realizing, hey, media rights [42:03] are going to be super valuable. The [42:04] thing that he clearly sees is [42:06] centralizing these negotiations is going [42:09] to be the way to extract the most value. [42:11] >> Yes, there's two opportunities here. The [42:14] near-term easy one is centralize the [42:16] negotiations with the racetracks, [42:18] extract the most value, capture a bunch [42:20] of it for myself. And then there's a [42:22] longer term play of like, oo, what can I [42:25] do about these television deals? I think [42:26] it's actually worth one more quick pause [42:28] here to compare contrast Formula 1 in [42:32] the NFL and Bernie and Pete Riselle [42:35] because these are sort of happening at [42:37] the same time. But Bernie is like the [42:39] anti- Pete Riselle. [42:41] You know, Pete Riselle was this consmate [42:44] manager, professional media guy from Los [42:47] Angeles. He started as the LA Rams PR [42:49] guy and then he gets drafted by the [42:53] owners of the NFL to be an employee of [42:55] the league to serve them and their [42:58] interests as commissioner and the league [43:00] is owned 32 ways by the owners of the [43:03] teams. [43:04] >> Right? So Roselle's unifying vision to [43:07] the NFL owners was communist capitalism [43:10] as we talked about on that episode. Like [43:12] hey, this league first, we're all in [43:14] this together. Let's centralize our [43:16] negotiating and our media rights so that [43:18] we can all grow the pie and share the [43:20] spoils evenly. Bernie's MMO isn't league [43:24] first, it's me first. [43:27] He does centralize things, but it's not [43:29] like Formula 1 becomes owned by all the [43:33] teams equally. It's more like he says, [43:36] "Okay, I'm going to start a company, and [43:39] that company is going to go sign [43:40] agreements with racetracks, and then [43:42] you're all open to do business with me [43:45] to figure out what it's going to be like [43:48] for you to race at those racetracks." [43:49] >> Yep. So, the way he does this, he [43:52] proposes to the other team owners, hey, [43:55] obviously we need to centralize our [43:57] negotiations, and you know, I can tell [44:00] that you guys don't want to do this, or [44:02] you would have already done it. Why [44:04] don't you just leave it to me? I'll take [44:06] care of everything. You give me your [44:08] rights for your team appearances and I [44:12] will go fight with these race promoters, [44:15] many of whom are probably gangsters [44:16] themselves, and I will get us the best [44:19] collective deal. I'll tell you what, I [44:22] will even take all the risk and [44:25] guarantee to all of you other guys [44:28] upfront that you're going to get paid at [44:30] least as much as you're making now. Um, [44:33] and you must come to the races. That was [44:35] the teeth. No more of this like I might [44:36] show up, I might not. [44:38] >> Yes, that was also part of the [44:39] motivation of we got to fix the sport. [44:41] Nobody says, "So, I'll do all this and [44:43] I'll just take a small fee off the top [44:45] for my services." Supposedly, in the [44:49] meeting of the constructor's [44:50] association, he verbally says that he [44:53] will only take 2% of the total race fee [44:57] revenue off the top for his services. [44:59] >> Really? But of course, nobody writes [45:02] anything down because Bernie never [45:03] writes anything down. And when the dust [45:06] finally gets settled and many decades [45:08] later, all of the books and stuff become [45:11] public through whole series of court [45:13] cases. Turns out Bernie's actually [45:15] taking 8% off the top for his fees, [45:18] which is, you know, a healthy amount. In [45:21] addition, he's also an owner of one of [45:23] the teams, so he's getting his owner [45:25] split. Honestly, 8% is not bad. If you [45:28] are massively increasing the amount that [45:31] every team is getting paid by doing this [45:34] and you are sort of like organizing and [45:36] orchestrating the sport, taking 8% for [45:38] those services, it seems quite [45:40] reasonable. [45:41] >> Absolutely great point and you are 100% [45:44] correct. Bernie is doing a great service [45:48] for all the F1 teams and owners. He is [45:52] instantly making the sport a lot more [45:55] valuable [45:56] >> and sustainable. [45:57] >> And sustainable. Totally. [45:58] >> Every single team would go bankrupt [45:59] except Ferrari otherwise. [46:01] >> Yep. So before Bernie gets there, the [46:04] average prize purses and payments that [46:07] teams would get from a Grand Prix. And [46:09] obviously they varied wildly, but on [46:11] average it was like $10,000 per team. So [46:15] like nothing. In Bernie's first year [46:18] running the show, he takes the average [46:21] prize and fee payment up to $40,000 a [46:24] year. So 4x in one year and then a [46:28] couple years later by the mid70s it's up [46:30] to 150k per race. And then by the end of [46:34] the decade he's gotten it up to 200k. So [46:37] like massive massive improvements [46:40] >> per team per race. Yeah. So suddenly you [46:43] can start to actually fund your [46:44] operation if you know that every time [46:45] you show up to the track you're getting [46:46] 200k to do it. [46:48] >> As Bernie would never fail to point out, [46:51] all of the other team owners should be [46:54] massively grateful to him for [46:56] essentially saving their asses here at [46:58] funding their teams. Yep. And back to [47:01] the original purpose of the [47:02] constructor's association of [47:04] coordinating travel costs, Bernie also [47:06] goes out and negotiates competitive [47:08] rates with freight providers and [47:10] massively improves travel costs on the [47:13] logistic side of the business for the [47:15] teams. Basically, Bernie's sort of first [47:18] act in F1 reminds me of one of my [47:20] favorite sayings that I heard earlier in [47:22] my career from a mentor. He may be a [47:25] thug, but at least he's our thug. [47:29] Yes. So, it's worth taking a pause to [47:31] say the FIA is still the governing body [47:35] of the sport of this racing series. And [47:37] so, Bernie takes over this thing called [47:39] the constructor's association, but [47:41] really the FIA and their set of rules is [47:45] still governing what happens between [47:47] these teams at the racetracks. He's just [47:50] the one sort of organizing the commerce [47:52] through the constructor's association. [47:54] >> Yes. And importantly, the FIA is the one [47:57] who blesses each of the racetracks with [48:01] being a Grand Prix part of Formula 1. [48:06] >> So, what happens next? As you might [48:08] imagine, you know, these race promoters [48:10] are none too happy about this little guy [48:13] from England coming and beating them up, [48:15] >> right? Someone's aggregating all this [48:17] power in the ecosystem and they're [48:18] negotiating with us and it doesn't feel [48:20] good because they've got all this [48:21] leverage now. [48:22] >> Yep. They go to the FIA and say, "Hey, [48:26] you got to do something about this [48:27] Eccleston guy. [48:29] He thinks he's running F1." Yep. This [48:32] results in a whole series of protracted [48:37] negotiations between Bernie and the [48:40] Constructor's Association [48:42] and the FIA that finally get hammered [48:46] out in 1981 with the first Concord [48:50] agreement, which is still the name of [48:51] the roughly every five-year agreements [48:54] that govern F1 to this day. Do you know [48:57] why they're called the Concord [48:58] agreements? [48:59] >> I do. That is the physical location in [49:02] Paris of where they were negotiated, [49:05] right? [49:05] >> Yes. Of the FIA headquarters at the [49:07] Plaster Concord, which gives you a sense [49:10] here, the Plaster Concord in Paris is [49:12] one of the ritziest, most famous parts [49:15] of Paris. It was a bunch of like uh [49:18] stuffy bureaucrats. [49:20] >> And so what is the FIA? Is it a [49:21] nonprofit? Is it a government body? Is [49:23] it like an NGO? [49:24] >> It is an an NGO. That's exactly what it [49:26] is. It is an international organization [49:29] that was formed by all of the respective [49:32] European country motoring clubs. So the [49:35] FIA also regulates like rally sports, [49:38] endurance racing, etc., etc. It's not [49:40] just Formula 1. It's just that Formula 1 [49:42] is the pinnacle of racing. It's a [49:45] standards body. [49:46] >> Yeah. Exactly. So in this first Concord [49:49] agreement, the two sides, Bernie and the [49:51] Constructors Association and the FIA and [49:54] Racetracks by proxy agree on four [49:58] things. One, the FIA will have full [50:03] unilateral and unchallenged jurisdiction [50:06] over the rules of the sport going [50:08] forward. The Constructor's Association [50:11] and Bernie, they have no say over the [50:13] technical rules of the sport. Two, the [50:15] constructor's association teams will [50:18] commit to showing up and participating [50:20] in every official Grand Prix race. In [50:22] return, all of the race fees and prize [50:25] money now contractually must be paid [50:28] centrally to Bernie and the [50:31] Constructor's Association. [50:33] And two, Bernie and the Constructor's [50:36] Association [50:37] will control all rights and income from [50:41] any future televising [50:44] of F1 races for the next five seasons. [50:50] >> No rights to the race organizers, no [50:52] rights to the FIA, [50:54] all the TV money flowing through Bernie, [50:57] >> which if you look today, that is the [50:59] single largest revenue stream of the [51:01] whole thing. Of course. How could it not [51:03] be? [51:03] >> Yep. So, what's interesting is both [51:06] sides here actually feel like they're [51:08] getting a pretty good deal. And to be [51:10] fair, the reason that they thought that [51:14] was the TV media rights weren't actually [51:18] worth anything yet. Well, did they put [51:20] in that the TV media rights when they do [51:22] happen, Bernie still only gets 8% and [51:25] the teams get the rest of the 92%. Or is [51:27] that yet to be negotiated? [51:29] >> Gray area. [51:30] >> Okay. Bernie thrives in the gray zone. [51:33] So at the time, European and British [51:36] television was a mostly statec [51:40] controlled with organizations like the [51:41] BBC and its peers all across Europe and [51:44] bh [51:46] behind the US in terms of monetization [51:49] and sophistication of televising [51:53] sports especially, but any kind of [51:55] media. Again, these are mostly like the [51:57] equivalent of PBS in the US. They're [51:59] public broadcasters. There's not a [52:01] competitive ecosystem. There's really [52:02] one party to go to. [52:03] >> Yep. So, the teams and the FIA and the [52:06] tracks. Yeah. Even though they're giving [52:08] up all the TV rights to Bernie, they [52:10] don't look that valuable to them. [52:12] They're like, "All right, you want to go [52:13] have a boondoggle and see if you can [52:14] figure this out? Good luck to you." [52:16] >> Right. And to be honest, it sounds hard [52:18] to film. You got these racetracks with [52:22] 15 turns and cars that whiz by real fast [52:26] and crappy technology at the time to try [52:28] to film them. and you want to go do [52:31] business with the government to try to [52:33] get them to broadcast. Okay. [52:35] >> Yep. [52:36] >> Have fun. [52:37] >> So Bernie unclear if he had a vision for [52:40] this all along or if he was like, "Oo, [52:42] here's something I can grab. Let me go [52:43] see what I can do with it." Either way, [52:46] he basically executes it perfectly. So [52:50] once he gets the TV rights, he goes to [52:54] an umbrella group of all the public [52:57] broadcasters all across Europe called [52:59] the European Broadcasting Union and it [53:02] represents 92 different countries, [53:06] national public broadcasters, including [53:09] the BBC in the UK, and says, "Hey, you [53:13] have a lot of F1 fans in your respective [53:16] countries. That's a big sport in Europe. [53:18] I now have the rights to broadcast this [53:21] sport. How about I'll sell them to you [53:24] for super super super cheap. A couple [53:27] million a year for all 92 countries. So [53:30] like amvertised in aggregate basically [53:33] nothing [53:33] >> for any individual broadcaster to take [53:35] these rights. [53:37] The only thing I want them all to do is [53:41] promise to show every single race on the [53:45] calendar, not just the ones that are in [53:48] their home country. [53:50] >> So, seems like a pretty good deal, [53:52] right? [53:52] >> So, he's in grow the sport mode, right? [53:54] Not capture value right here. This is a [53:57] growth opportunity. [53:58] >> Yep. This is a long game. So, they all [54:00] say yes. And then Ben, as you were [54:03] saying a minute ago, it pretty quickly [54:04] becomes clear, hey, all 92 public [54:09] broadcasting entities don't really have [54:11] the expertise or the interest in [54:13] figuring out how to televise this sport. [54:17] Seems hard. [54:18] >> It's still true today. The way that most [54:20] of the broadcasters around the world [54:22] take F1 is they take one main feed that [54:25] is produced and then they do more stuff [54:27] on top of it. [54:27] >> So this is when that starts. Bernie [54:29] says, "All right, no problem. I'll take [54:32] the risk. I'll fund the investment [54:34] upfront personally to create a central [54:38] single television feed for each race [54:41] that Formula 1 quote unquote slashme [54:45] Bernie." [54:45] >> Yeah. What is Formula 1 at this point? [54:48] >> Yeah. What is Formula 1? So, we should [54:51] say Bernie loved to operate without [54:54] contracts. Here's his exact quote. I [54:57] carry out my business in a very unusual [54:59] way. I don't like contracts. I like [55:01] being able to look someone in the eye [55:02] and then shake them by the hand rather [55:04] than do it the American way with 92page [55:07] contracts that no one reads or [55:09] understands. If I say I'll do something, [55:11] I'll do it. If I say I won't, I won't. [55:14] >> Yeah. [55:14] >> And who owns these things? I don't know. [55:17] I'm making sure it happens. So Bernie [55:19] goes and sets up a new company, Formula [55:22] 1 Promotions and Administration or FOPA, [55:27] >> not to be confused with FOA, FOCA, which [55:30] was the constructor's association that, [55:32] you know, just did that deal with the [55:34] FIA, [55:34] >> right? That Bernie is now de facto head [55:36] of, but doesn't have any legal ownership [55:39] of, [55:40] >> right? The first thing that he has Phopa [55:42] do is create this centrally produced TV [55:45] feed from England and then distribute it [55:47] out to all the various broadcasters all [55:50] across Europe. [55:51] >> He just keeps running this playbook over [55:53] and over again of, okay, cool. I'll [55:54] centralize something. I'll aggregate [55:56] something and now I have leverage to go [55:58] and do business with the rest of the [56:00] ecosystem. [56:00] >> Yep. And his plan has been like you [56:02] identified, I'm going to get all these [56:03] public broadcasters across Europe to [56:06] basically go develop the market for me, [56:09] >> right? They're making the next [56:10] negotiation much more favorable to me. [56:12] They're out there right now. Sure, we [56:14] didn't really exchange much money, but [56:15] they're out there building the brand, [56:17] getting people are excited, and then as [56:18] soon as that agreement period is up, [56:20] then I'll go to them and say, "Okay, [56:22] it's really expensive and I am the one [56:25] who you have to pay." [56:26] >> Yes. I'm going to be sitting in the [56:27] middle as the choke point for what will [56:30] now be a hugely in- demand television [56:32] product, which is exactly what happens. [56:35] Now Bernie also gets really lucky here [56:38] because in the intervening years the pay [56:41] TV ecosystem in Europe finally comes [56:45] online. [56:46] >> So one of the reasons why America was [56:48] farther ahead in developing the [56:50] television market is that cable and pay [56:52] TV had become a thing earlier in [56:55] America. And so there's just a lot more [56:56] biders for content out there in America. [57:00] When Bernie started this adventure, it [57:02] wasn't clear that the same thing was [57:04] going to happen in Europe, but it did. [57:07] >> Yeah. And there was one other element [57:08] that developed in all this, too. In [57:10] addition to these agreements that Bernie [57:13] was having everyone sign, race [57:15] organizers were required to surrender [57:17] income from trackside advertising and [57:20] corporate hospitality to Formula 1 owned [57:23] entities. So this now means that the [57:26] race organizer, the track business model [57:28] is really just ticket sales. [57:31] >> Yep. So as it's becoming clear that TV [57:34] rights are now going to be really [57:35] valuable, the original 1981 Concord [57:38] agreement term comes up and Bernie now [57:42] needs to go negotiate a new deal. [57:46] >> Oh. Because FOHA and the TV rights were [57:49] actually not a party to the previous [57:51] Concord agreement. [57:52] >> Right. Exactly. It didn't exist yet. [57:54] Bernie created it in the inter [58:02] TV rights a thing. We're pretty sure [58:04] they're going to be valuable going [58:05] forward. We deserve a cut. No teams, no [58:09] tracks, no races. We want in on this. [58:11] >> Yep. [58:12] >> So Bernie says, "Okay, okay." He starts [58:14] with, "Why don't we just divide it all [58:16] up a third? A third, a third. FOCA and [58:19] the teams, you'll get a third. FIA, you [58:22] guys can get a third. But then a third [58:25] really should officially go to FHOPA. [58:29] I'm the one that created this and we're [58:31] producing the broadcast. So after a [58:34] whole bunch of negotiation, it ends up [58:37] splitting out that the FIA gets 30%. [58:40] FOCA and the teams get 47%. [58:43] And FOA, Bernie's company, gets 23%. [58:47] >> FOHA is just a guy. You're just saying [58:49] and 23% of it goes to me, a thing I [58:52] fully own. [58:53] >> Yes, this company that I created. Bernie [58:55] is a master at playing everyone off [58:58] here. This split gets negotiated before [59:02] Bernie really ramps up running bidding [59:05] processes in each country for the TV [59:09] rights. So, he actually renews the [59:11] European Broadcasting Union deal for [59:15] another three-year term to sort of keep [59:18] growing the sport and not value maximize [59:22] just yet because he doesn't want a lot [59:25] of money to start going to the other [59:26] organizations. [59:28] >> So, that was the second Concord [59:30] agreement. When the third Concord [59:33] agreement comes up for negotiation in [59:35] 1992, Bernie goes to the FIA and he's [59:38] like, "You guys, you're getting the TV [59:41] money, but you can't be happy because [59:43] it's really not that much, you know, and [59:45] there's a lot of complexity here. You're [59:48] a international organization. [59:51] What if I just make this easy for you? [59:54] I'll pay you a flat fee. [59:58] Rather than you taking 30%, I'll pay you [60:01] $5 million a year going up by 1 million [60:05] every year up to 9 million at the end of [60:08] this term in exchange for your [60:11] percentage of the TV rights. This will [60:14] be way easier for you. And the FIA is [60:17] like, great, that sounds like a great [60:19] deal. Let's do that. [60:21] So Bernie now has the 23% he originally [60:24] had plus another 30% that used to belong [60:28] to the FIA for which he has to pay 5 to9 [60:31] million a year. [60:32] >> And you can actually imagine if you're [60:34] an international regulatory standards [60:36] body, the fact that a guaranteed payment [60:38] is being made available to you so you're [60:40] not taking risk anymore might actually [60:42] be great. [60:43] >> Of course, and this is the justification [60:44] that they all give to the press when the [60:46] deals are done. So deal gets done. [60:49] Bernie's now got 53% plus all of his [60:53] cuts that he's taking from the [60:55] constructor's association for his [60:57] services plus his team ownership etc [61:00] etc. Deal gets signed he goes out runs [61:04] auctions across Europe and really across [61:06] the globe with any TV provider who's [61:09] interested in showing F1. [61:11] All of a sudden, TV rights go from small [61:14] singledigit millions in aggregate to F1 [61:18] to over 25 million a year just flowing [61:22] into FHA and Bernie from the TV rights. [61:25] >> Oh wow. [61:26] >> But call it 40 to 50 million a year. So [61:29] a big big step up. [61:31] >> Okay. So how do the teams feel about [61:32] this? I mean that suddenly there's this [61:34] guy that's getting halfish [61:37] the revenue from the broadcast of their [61:39] sport. That is the key question. You [61:42] would think that the other owners would [61:45] be pretty pissed and some of them were [61:47] to be fair. One of the other owners, Ken [61:50] Tyrell of Tyrell, which fun fact is [61:53] actually the forerunner of the Mercedes [61:55] team today, [61:57] >> publicly accuses Bernie of quote [61:59] stealing F1 from the teams. But that's [62:03] kind of a minority opinion. By and [62:06] large, they're all still pretty grateful [62:09] to Bernie at this point because turning [62:12] F1 into this major TV sport meant that [62:16] all of a sudden all of their individual [62:19] team sponsorship deals just got way, [62:21] way, way more valuable. [62:24] >> Ah, [62:26] that makes sense. Before F1 was [62:29] televised, [62:30] all that sponsors were getting when they [62:33] got their logos on the cars was just [62:36] exposure to whoever happened to show up [62:39] at uh any given track for any given [62:42] race. And really, it wasn't even the [62:45] totality of the fan base that showed up. [62:48] It really was only fans that were [62:51] sitting close enough or at the right [62:52] angles where they could actually read [62:55] the logos on the cars. [62:57] >> It's interesting because at this point [62:59] in time, the more valuable real estate [63:02] would have probably been the trackside [63:03] advertising, whereas today the trackside [63:06] advertising is not nearly as valuable as [63:08] the space on the car because the cameras [63:10] stay fixed on the cars and on the [63:13] drivers. That's the valuable space that [63:16] people are after. And unless you're [63:17] televising it, the cars are the thing in [63:19] motion whizzing by, [63:21] >> right? Yeah. There's no way you're going [63:22] to be able to read what's on an F1 car [63:24] when it's whizzing by live. [63:26] >> Right. [63:27] >> So, this is when sponsorship money and [63:30] in particular tobacco money really [63:33] starts funneling into the sport. In [63:37] aggregate until it finally gets banned [63:39] by the EU in 2006, tobacco company [63:43] advertising poured $4.5 [63:47] billion [63:49] into team sponsorships in F1 over the [63:53] years. That is a lot of money. And that [63:56] was just one category. And in [63:58] particular, part of the reason why [63:59] tobacco is so interested in here is [64:01] there was sort of a loophole that as [64:03] there was all this pressure to ban [64:05] tobacco advertising on TV and on radio [64:08] and on billboards and in newspapers, [64:10] putting it on a car that happened to [64:12] show up in a TV broadcast. Oh, that was [64:14] a sponsorship of a team. It's sort of [64:16] this way that the tobacco companies got [64:18] to stay on TV and it was heavily [64:21] associated with a brand image that they [64:23] wanted to cultivate. It's glamorous. [64:25] There's speed. It's risk-taking. They [64:28] get to do these full takeovers of the [64:29] liveries of the cars. I mean, it is a [64:32] full screen ad. It's just not classified [64:34] as a TV advertisement. Okay. So, [64:36] finally, thanks to tobacco companies and [64:39] TV meteorites and Bernie, there's all [64:41] this money flowing into Formula 1 to [64:42] fund these ever increasingly expensive [64:45] operations. And of course, the question [64:47] then is what do they do with all this [64:50] money? You know, these teams want to [64:52] just go out and beat each other. And so [64:54] they're going to spend into an infinite [64:56] limit to attempt to do so. [64:58] >> Oh, yes. And of course, they come up [64:59] with some pretty clever ways to uh [65:02] invest slash burn that money and make [65:06] the cars go faster on the grid. [65:08] >> Yes. But first, listeners, now is a [65:11] great time to thank longtime friend of [65:13] the show, Service Now, the platform that [65:15] puts AI to work for people. And [65:17] listeners, we're doing something fun and [65:19] special today. One of the main ways that [65:21] we did research for this episode was to [65:23] go to the Las Vegas Grand Prix with [65:25] Service Now, and we spent a ton of time [65:28] with their CMO and EVP, Colin Fleming. [65:31] Colin also happens to be a former Red [65:34] Bull test driver. So, it was amazing to [65:36] hear a lot of research directly from him [65:38] and just grill him with questions all [65:40] weekend. We have him here with us today. [65:42] Hello, Colin. [65:43] >> Thanks for having me, guys. So, we [65:45] thought a fun thing to do this segment [65:46] would be to share one of the F1 tidbits [65:49] that you shared with us when we were in [65:50] the paddock club together. So, what is [65:52] one of the things that you think most [65:54] people don't know about the sport? [65:56] >> Everyone talks about the technology and [65:58] speed, but the underdisussed component [66:00] is the human side. An F1 driver is [66:02] operating at fighter pilotike cognitive [66:04] load for 90 minutes straight. 6G's under [66:07] pressure, which means their head weighs [66:08] like 80 pounds at that moment. Their [66:10] heart rate is 180 beats a minute or more [66:12] and they've lost 5% of their body weight [66:14] during the course of the race. They're [66:16] doing this making micro decisions of [66:18] thousands of times with no timeouts, no [66:21] commercial breaks, and I don't think [66:22] there's another sport like it. [66:24] >> We're talking a lot this episode about [66:25] the specific technologies that were [66:28] leaps forward in different F1 eras. What [66:30] do you think was the most significant [66:32] over the years? [66:33] >> For me, it was the hybrid introduction. [66:35] I think it was 2014. It moved the sport [66:37] from being about pure horsepower to [66:39] being about energy management. And as a [66:41] result, the drivers lives got way [66:43] busier. Now they're managing battery [66:45] deployment, harvest modes, engine maps, [66:47] and they're doing this at unreal speeds. [66:50] And Mercedes cracked it first. They won [66:51] eight straight championships. [66:53] >> Okay. Now, from the Service Now angle, [66:55] I'm very curious why you decided to uh [66:57] sponsor an F1 team in Aston Martin. What [66:59] is the business case? [67:00] >> Three things that are really critical [67:02] for us. Storytelling, hospitality, and [67:04] brand. It's a super complex sport and as [67:06] we know logistics uh technology [67:08] everywhere and that is the life that our [67:10] customers live every single day. So we [67:12] didn't just slap a logo on it. We deeply [67:14] embedded our technology into the [67:15] organization to help them really find [67:18] that onetenth of performance they're all [67:19] looking for. The hospitality gives us [67:21] the opportunity to tell that story and [67:23] the brand is truly a lead. We're [67:24] thrilled to be part of it. [67:25] >> Okay, last question while we have you. [67:27] What's the latest in the world of [67:28] Service Now? [67:29] >> Well, anybody that's deploying AI today [67:31] knows it's absolute chaos. Companies [67:33] don't know what's running, what's [67:34] working, what's not. And that's why [67:36] we've built the AI control tower. It [67:38] helps companies turn that chaos into [67:39] control, giving them visibility, [67:41] governance, orchestration, and to really [67:43] understand what value it's bringing [67:45] together. So, we think the answer is [67:46] ultimately this incredible probabilistic [67:48] intelligence with deterministic controls [67:50] and that orchestration layer from [67:52] Service Now. And in May, we're going to [67:54] show it all off at Knowledge. [67:56] >> We'll be there. [67:56] >> Amazing. We hope all of your listeners [67:58] will join us. Well, a huge thanks to [68:00] Colin for joining us today and to our [68:02] friends at Service Now. You can go to [68:03] serenow.com/acquired [68:06] to learn more. Okay, so we're in this [68:09] era now where team owners have a lot [68:12] more resources at their disposal and boy [68:15] are they deploying it? Ben, what are [68:19] some of the crazy things that they start [68:20] doing during this time? So, in 1968, [68:23] Colin Chapman from Lotus had become a [68:25] really big believer that the way that [68:27] his drivers could go faster in the turns [68:29] was applying more downforce so they'd [68:31] have better traction on the road. And [68:33] they put the first air foils or wings on [68:36] the car. And in ' 68, that was just [68:38] really small wings. They almost look [68:40] like early Formula 1, the cars that were [68:43] just these like long tubes, but with [68:46] like little hints of what Formula 1 [68:48] would become on them. It's this kind of [68:50] amazing transitional period. We'll link [68:52] to it in the show notes. [68:53] >> And then don't they go to like big wings [68:56] before the FIA regulates those out of [68:59] existence? Right. [69:00] >> There is a lot of experimentation. Yeah. [69:02] That happens in this period. It's really [69:04] fun. In the email, we'll put a bunch of [69:06] pictures of crazy F1 cars that were [69:09] technically within regulation when they [69:10] were first tried before all these [69:12] tactics were made illegal. But it's [69:15] probably time to stop and do a little [69:17] physics lesson here. I never really [69:19] understood this. So, this is listeners [69:23] education for me. Lighter cars are [69:25] faster. So, why would you want to put a [69:28] spoiler on a car that pushes it into the [69:31] ground harder? You don't want a heavier [69:33] car. And so, you sort of have to [69:35] separate this idea of downforce pushing [69:38] down on the ground from just weight. [69:40] There are ways to get downforce, which [69:42] can be good that is different than a [69:45] heavy car. [69:46] >> Yeah. It's funny. Before doing this [69:48] episode and learning all this alongside [69:50] you, I always just sort of assume that [69:52] like at least road car manufacturers put [69:55] this stuff on cars to make them look [69:56] cool, not to actually do anything, [69:58] >> right? But you want downforce to make it [70:01] stick to the road better on turns. But [70:04] the issue, of course, is that with a big [70:06] spoiler, yeah, you're creating [70:08] downforce, but you're actually creating [70:09] a ton of drag also. So the car is facing [70:12] resistance to going forward as a [70:15] byproduct of what you're attempting to [70:17] really do is force the car down. So if [70:19] you focus too much on optimizing for [70:20] downforce on the turns, you end up [70:22] slowing yourself down in the [70:24] straightaways. So the takeaway from [70:26] lesson number one here is downforce [70:28] good, drag bad. [70:30] >> Yep. So let's flash forward 9 years from [70:32] that 1968 initial aerodynamics [70:36] experiment. So we're now here in the [70:37] late 1970s. Lotus is still working on [70:40] this issue. They were trying to figure [70:41] out a way to produce downforce that [70:43] doesn't produce a lot of drag. And what [70:46] followed is the stuff of F1 lore. You [70:48] will hear racing nerds talk about the [70:50] Lotus 78 and the Lotus 79 as if these [70:53] are like gilded vehicles, [70:55] >> mythical beasts. [70:56] >> Yes. [70:56] >> Yeah. [70:57] >> So, the first breakthrough is, well, [71:00] wait, what if we can turn the whole car [71:02] into a wing? I mean, rather than our [71:04] traditional shaped car with a wing [71:06] slapped on top, what if we made it [71:08] actually part of the body style itself? [71:10] So, the whole thing gets pushed down. [71:13] And when you look at the Lotus 78, it [71:15] really does look like one big wing. I [71:17] mean, Google it. We'll put it in the [71:18] email. It's really cool. The second [71:21] breakthrough is a fun one from the world [71:23] of fluid dynamics. Everyone listening is [71:26] probably familiar with how airplanes [71:29] generate lift. The wing is shaped in a [71:31] special way such that when the plane [71:32] moves forward, you generate high air [71:35] pressure underneath the wings, low air [71:37] pressure over the wings, and thus the [71:38] airplane is pushed up into the air. [71:40] Well, what if you did the opposite? That [71:43] is what the Lotus team did. They shaped [71:45] a car like an upside down airplane wing. [71:49] So, the bottom of the car had a special [71:51] skirt on it that shaped air flow to [71:53] speed up under the car, squeezing air [71:56] into a very small space since it's super [71:58] close to the road. as the air molecules [72:00] move along at high speed under the car, [72:02] which creates that low air pressure zone [72:04] and then carefully control the air with [72:06] a gradual UPS slope and a diffuser to [72:09] guide how the air comes out from [72:12] underneath the car in the back. The [72:14] effect this had was to create low air [72:16] pressure under the car, high air [72:17] pressure over the car, and essentially [72:19] suck the car onto the ground. And in [72:22] physics, this is called the venturi [72:24] effect. So the areas under the car are [72:26] called venturi tunnels. [72:29] >> Ah, that's why it is funny. When you and [72:32] I were at the Vegas Grand Prix and we [72:34] kept saying, "Oh my god, these are like [72:36] fighter jets on the ground." They [72:38] actually are like fighter jets on the [72:40] ground. [72:40] >> Yes, they really are like upside down [72:42] fighter jets. So did it work? [72:45] Absolutely. Mario Andredy upon driving [72:47] it said that it cornered as if it was [72:49] painted to the road and he won both the [72:52] drivers championship and Lotus won the [72:54] constructor's championship in 1978. [72:57] Interestingly, by the 1980s, it was [72:59] producing so much downforce that the [73:01] drivers could take these corners at [73:03] super fast speeds, and it actually [73:05] became a safety hazard, especially [73:07] because if the car would go up on a curb [73:09] or the skirt slipped in any way, the [73:12] cars were then going way faster than [73:13] they otherwise could have without that [73:15] sort of uh sucking to the ground, the [73:17] ground effect to cause the traction. So, [73:19] in 1983, these ground effects were [73:22] outlawed and regulations were updated to [73:24] say that you must have a flat bottomed [73:27] car. [73:29] >> Interesting. [73:30] >> Yes. But for fans of ground effects, [73:33] they would make their way back for the [73:34] 2022 to 2025 regulations, which that's [73:38] what we saw in Vegas. David, it was [73:40] crazy cool to watch because I think 70% [73:43] of the downforce from those cars is [73:46] created by the ground effects, not from [73:49] the pushing down of the spoiler, but the [73:51] sucking of the car onto the track. And [73:53] so it was kicking up all that dirt, [73:56] especially during qualifying cuz it's [73:58] driving around on these Las Vegas roads [74:00] that just have sand and dirt and silt [74:02] that sort of builds up and creates these [74:04] just like huge clouds of dust in the air [74:07] from all the sucking. And then [74:08] qualifying in the rain was insane. [74:11] Seeing like all the rain water just [74:13] shooting up off of these cars. [74:15] >> Yeah. The rooster tails as they call it. [74:17] And I think it was 2 years before we [74:19] went in Las Vegas, one of the cars even [74:23] sucked up a drain cover that had been [74:26] welded shut and basically wrecked the [74:28] car. But these cars produce so much [74:30] downforce that if you drive over even a [74:32] welded shut manhole cover, junk, it [74:34] sucks it right up. [74:36] >> Wild. Yeah. So ground effects very very [74:39] powerful. There are a few other just [74:41] giant leaps forward that would happen in [74:43] areas other than aerodynamics also. So [74:46] engines over the years have gotten way [74:48] more fuel efficient with only 50% of [74:51] energy in an F1 engine lost to heat [74:54] compared to 70 or 80% in a road car [74:57] being lost to heat. So this obviously is [74:59] something that F1 teams care a lot about [75:01] because if it's more efficient, you can [75:03] carry less fuel, have a lighter car, go [75:05] faster. So huge, huge advantage. They've [75:08] also gotten a massive increase in [75:11] horsepower, tripling from 300 something [75:13] horsepower engines when we first started [75:15] in the ' 50s to a,000ish horsepower [75:19] coming out of these engines today. [75:21] >> Insane. In cars that are light enough [75:23] that you could basically pick them up, a [75:25] half to a third as heavy as like an [75:28] average road sports car. [75:30] >> The F1 cars were that light because of [75:31] all the carbon body work. [75:33] >> Yeah. So, a 1000 horsepower in something [75:36] that's basically light as a feather as [75:38] far as cars go. [75:39] >> And then, of course, there's [75:40] turbochargers, which are an insane [75:42] invention. This harnesses the unused [75:45] energy from the exhaust gases to spin a [75:49] turbine and then use that to compress [75:52] the air that is going into the engine, [75:54] which ultimately means then there's more [75:56] oxygen in each engine cycle. So you can [75:58] have a more powerful combustion every [76:01] single engine cycle and thus more power [76:03] again in the car. [76:04] >> Which actually raises a important point [76:06] too. It's not like any of these teams, [76:10] even the ones that were backed by actual [76:12] car manufacturers were doing this with [76:15] the goal of advancing technology for [76:17] consumer road cars. But as a byproduct, [76:21] a lot of this technology over the years [76:23] did make its way into the consumer [76:26] landscape. Yes. And it did become an [76:29] intentional strategy over time and it [76:30] provided a air cover for a lot of spend [76:33] especially for these constructors that [76:35] were also consumer car makers if they [76:37] could say, "Oh, this is R&D and stuff's [76:38] going to go into cars." And it did. I [76:40] mean, you had paddle shifters and carbon [76:44] >> or even just turbos. I mean, so many [76:45] cars, even like not sports cars are [76:48] turbos these days, and a lot of that [76:50] technology got perfected in F1. [76:52] >> Yeah. I think people sort of overstate [76:54] this when they say there's all this [76:55] technology that came from F1 cars, but I [76:58] think it's more like the technology was [77:00] sort of iterated and perfected or they [77:02] would explore new material science or [77:04] something in F1 cars that would [77:06] eventually go into road cars. [77:07] >> Yep. [77:08] >> So that's engines on top of [77:09] aerodynamics. Then there's this whole [77:11] third category where they really had a [77:13] breakthrough in electronics. So all the [77:15] cars we've been talking about at this [77:17] point were very very manual and analog. [77:20] And in the early '9s, the Williams team [77:22] comes along and realizes, oh, this [77:25] technology is finally good enough for us [77:28] to try to automate some of the systems [77:29] in the car in real time. [77:31] >> Let's add software, baby. [77:33] >> This is the early '9s. I mean, this is [77:35] pre- internet. So, they come up with [77:37] this whole crazy broad set of ideas and [77:41] remarkably they implement basically all [77:43] of them and they work very very well. [77:46] So, the systems are traction control, [77:49] anti-lock brakes, active suspension, [77:53] semi-automatic transmission. Speaking of [77:55] road relevance, David, and [77:56] transferability to consumer cars. [77:58] >> Yeah, totally. [77:59] >> All of these worked together, and the [78:02] car even automatically adjusted its ride [78:04] height, customized to each corner on [78:07] each racetrack. So, competitors saw this [78:10] and got so mad and accused Williams of [78:12] making a car that drove itself. Uh but [78:14] for a couple of years this was legal and [78:17] they won both drivers and constructors [78:20] championships in 1992 and 1993 with [78:23] Nigel Manel and Alan Prost. In fact, the [78:26] car was so dominant that Pro's old [78:28] teammate and rival from McLaren, the [78:31] great Ayton Senna, who we have not yet [78:33] talked about in this episode, the [78:34] three-time world champion, wanted to [78:37] jump ship from McLaren to join Williams. [78:40] And Pro was actually retiring after that [78:44] 93 season. So, a spot did open up for [78:47] Senna to join Williams in '94. Uh, but [78:51] then the FIA made it illegal to do all [78:53] this software stuff, [78:54] >> change the rules as soon as he gets [78:56] there and says, "Hey, you can't have all [78:58] these electronic driving aids." I mean, [79:00] I know it makes the car really [79:01] desirable, but no, this is not the same [79:04] sport anymore because it actually [79:07] decreases the amount that the driver [79:08] matters so much that we aren't really [79:11] willing to go there. So Senna is then [79:13] left on a new team with a car that's [79:17] just on par or quite possibly behind the [79:20] quality of the whole rest of the grid [79:22] when they had to take out all these [79:23] electronic innovations. And sadly early [79:26] in that 1994 season, the racing world [79:28] would witness its most infamous and [79:30] fatal crash in that Williams car. [79:33] >> Yeah. which was obviously Senna's death [79:36] in 1994 [79:37] which becomes this global moment. I [79:41] believe still to this day Santa's [79:45] funeral in Brazil is the largest [79:49] attended public funeral in history. [79:52] >> I think three million people showed up [79:54] in the streets. [79:55] >> That's right. [79:56] >> For his funeral. [79:57] >> It's this horrible tragedy. He had just [79:59] sort of gone from rising star to clearly [80:03] the best race car driver in the world. [80:05] Just this natural talent. There's a [80:07] beautiful documentary released in 2010 [80:09] for anybody who's interested to go learn [80:11] about his life and this crash. [80:13] >> I mean, one, it shined this light on [80:15] just the sport in general in a way that [80:17] hadn't happened since the modern [80:19] television era began. [80:22] >> Yeah. [80:22] >> Two, it specifically shined a light on [80:25] how unsafe it still was. [80:27] >> Yeah. So it's interesting because by [80:29] this time the fatalities had really [80:31] dropped off. So we mentioned I'll just [80:32] go through the counts here by decade. [80:34] 1950s there were 14. In the60s there was [80:37] another 14. In the 70s there were 12. [80:40] >> Yeah. You know more than one a season. [80:42] >> Yes. So then they start implementing a [80:44] bunch of obvious stuff. The FIA has to [80:47] inspect every track and make sure it is [80:49] complying to all the rules before every [80:51] race. You can't have straw bales [80:53] anymore. [80:54] >> That's right. The barriers used to be [80:55] straw bales. Yes. Now you need these [80:58] guardrails. They have to be double [81:00] reinforced. You need separation on the [81:02] pit walls. There was a lot of stuff [81:04] going on sort of near the pits that [81:05] drivers were going too fast or [81:07] accelerating too fast. Finally, you get [81:09] fireproof overalls in the 1970s. You get [81:12] fuel safety cells, mandatory seat belts, [81:15] multi-point harnesses. So big steps in [81:18] the 70s. Yeah, this is one of the [81:20] craziest things to me in doing the [81:22] research was for a long period of time, [81:25] F1 drivers actually refused to wear [81:28] their seat belts because they wanted to [81:31] get thrown out of the car so they didn't [81:33] catch fire after it crashed, [81:35] >> right? [81:35] >> Insane. [81:36] >> They didn't want to limit their options [81:38] in a dangerous situation. So, after all [81:41] that, then in the 1980s, you have four [81:44] deaths, a lot better than 14 or 12. And [81:47] in the 90s, the only two deaths were [81:50] this one weekend, Roland and Senna. And [81:54] so it did kind of come as a shock [81:56] because I think people felt like, oh, [81:58] we're through this era, things are a lot [82:01] safer, but obviously they still have a [82:03] long way to go. So what happened after [82:06] Santa's death from a safety perspective? [82:09] And what impact did it have? The biggest [82:11] one is they just slowed down the cars, [82:13] right? I mean, all this R&D and sticking [82:16] to the road and getting crazy traction [82:18] and taking high-speed turns, the faster [82:20] you go, the more dangerous it is. And [82:22] so, interestingly, F1 racing today is [82:25] not that much faster than it was in [82:27] 1950. The top speed is like 40 mph [82:31] faster than the old top speed. I would [82:33] have thought, oh, all this R&D, these [82:35] cars are probably 2, three, four times [82:37] faster. No, they're not. And so right [82:40] after Senna's death, they limited the [82:42] aerodynamics of the cars. You couldn't [82:45] use as big of wings. You couldn't use as [82:47] big of diffusers. In 1998, a few years [82:50] later, they groove the tires to reduce [82:53] cornering speed. So they actually looked [82:54] a little bit more like the tires we use [82:56] on the roads instead of the flats or the [82:58] slicks that you see real race car tires. [83:01] There were also some structural things [83:03] they put into the cars. So deformable [83:05] crash structures, survival cells, front [83:07] impact testing, higher sides on the [83:10] cockpits, and they changed the tracks [83:12] too. A lot of corners were given larger [83:15] runoffs and upgraded barriers. So that [83:18] all did help. But in the 2010s, there [83:20] were also two fatalities. And so this is [83:23] when the really big noticeable change [83:25] happened. [83:26] >> The halo. [83:27] >> The halo. So in 2018, in response to the [83:31] 2014 crashes, the FIA says enough is [83:34] enough. We are gonna mandate that every [83:38] car has this really, really rigid, [83:42] robust, heavy thing that you put right [83:46] on top of the driver. And there's a [83:48] giant bar directly in the center of the [83:51] driver's field of view. So, there's a [83:53] giant compromise here, but it has saved [83:55] at least three people's lives since then [83:58] because it can protect a driver even [84:00] when a car is upside down and skidding. [84:02] These innovations have made it so we [84:04] have had zero fatalities since 2014. [84:08] It's, I think, the longest stretch in F1 [84:11] history without a fatal accident. [84:13] >> Yep. It certainly seems like this board [84:15] is a lot safer these days. Yeah, it's [84:17] still dicey, but over the last 70 years, [84:19] they've observed all the lowest hanging [84:21] fruit of ways that they can protect the [84:23] driver. [84:23] >> Yep. So, bring it back to the business [84:27] narrative here, one of the kind of great [84:30] ironies here of the obvious right [84:31] decision to focus on safety and slow the [84:33] cars down. Is it just further fuels this [84:37] sort of spending spiral amongst the [84:40] teams? Because the harder you make it to [84:42] go fast, the more they're going to be [84:45] incentivized to spend every last dollar [84:48] and look in every last little corner and [84:50] find every last little loophole to get [84:53] an advantage. [84:54] >> Yeah. I mean, when the sport first [84:56] started, there were giant gains to pick [84:58] up left and right, and you could sort of [85:00] do all sorts of crazy stuff. And we were [85:02] talking about all the different car [85:03] designs with spoilers that are up on [85:05] giant poles. And I mean, truly wacky [85:08] ideas. There was a six-w wheeled car at [85:10] one point, right? Cuz it wasn't in the [85:12] rules that you only had to have four [85:13] wheels. And over time, as they start [85:16] adding more and more guidelines for [85:17] safety and for all these other reasons, [85:19] the way to succeed in Formula 1 shifted [85:22] from making a more powerful engine or [85:25] figuring out the very best arrow to [85:28] figuring out how to exploit the rules. [85:30] >> Yeah. And do more and more exotic stuff. [85:32] >> Yes. what is left unclear in the rules [85:35] where I can see a little bit of daylight [85:37] between what they intended to write and [85:39] what they did write and what can I catch [85:41] that the other teams won't catch and how [85:43] do I sink $50 million of R&D into uh [85:47] achieving some speed outcome with that [85:50] >> it's really funny I hadn't thought about [85:51] this till now but actually the right [85:53] analogy is the semiconductor industry [85:55] and Moore's law it's like a different [85:57] set of rules it's like the rules of [85:58] physics instead of the rules of the FIA [86:00] but [86:01] >> as you progress like TSMC and ASML and [86:04] they got to spend incrementally more and [86:07] more capex and more R&D every year to [86:09] push the boundaries farther and farther [86:10] and all the lowh hanging fruit is gone [86:12] and they get more and more exotic with [86:15] lasers melting tin just in time, you [86:17] know, etc., etc. [86:19] >> Good point. Yeah, I had thought about [86:20] that way. Meanwhile, [86:22] while the teams are spending themselves [86:24] into unprofitable oblivion, Bernie, [86:27] starting in 1993, becomes the highest [86:30] paid corporate executive in Britain, [86:33] taking home in 1993 [86:35] $44.5 [86:37] million in cash, and that's only what's [86:41] reported to her majesty the crown in [86:43] that year, as we'll get into. He's also [86:46] getting older by this point in time. [86:48] He's in his late 60s. He's on his second [86:53] marriage. He has two young daughters [86:56] with his second wife, Slavica. And he [86:59] starts to think about estate planning [87:02] and maybe some liquidity for his family [87:05] and his estate. But in doing so, he just [87:09] about causes the whole thing to fall [87:10] apart. Because even though he was the [87:12] highest paid corporate executive in [87:15] Britain, that didn't necessarily mean [87:18] that he was running FHA and F1 like any [87:21] kind of professional organization. He [87:24] did everything himself and intentionally [87:27] didn't keep any records. He minimized [87:29] the number of contracts that he would [87:31] sign intentionally. He kind of operated [87:33] F1 like a sole proprietorship, shall we [87:36] say? The whole corporate operation was [87:40] run out of a building in London that was [87:42] also his house. Seriously, like the [87:45] bottom four floors of the building were [87:47] F1 offices and then he had the floors [87:49] above and supposedly he had all the [87:52] rooms in the offices bugged so he could [87:54] listen to what everybody was saying at [87:55] every point in time. And famously he [87:59] would kick everyone out at 6:00 p.m. [88:01] He'd be like, "All right, leave my house [88:03] now. It's time for y'all to go home." [88:06] Yeah. [88:06] >> Wow. This continued until Liberty takes [88:09] over in 2017. He had a few lawyers and [88:12] finance people to make it all function. [88:14] But there was no marketing department [88:16] for F1. There was no research or data [88:19] department. There was no sales [88:20] department besides Bernie. Well, there [88:22] weren't actually that many things to [88:23] sell. They weren't selling a lot of [88:25] sponsorship at the league level at that [88:27] time. That was pretty much all teams. I [88:29] guess TV rights you have to sell. [88:30] >> Exactly. like uh yes on the sponsorship [88:33] side, but TV rights, you know, they're [88:35] in 90 soon 100, 120, 130 countries, all [88:40] with different contracts and different [88:41] providers. Bernie's just out there doing [88:44] this more or less all by himself, [88:47] though, we should say he also had a [88:49] right-hand man and essentially number [88:51] two in the business. a former Formula 2 [88:55] driver and also owner of another team in [88:59] the league, the March team, a man named [89:02] Max Mosley, who happened also to be a [89:06] lawyer. Very useful for Bernie's [89:08] activities. There's this great quote [89:10] that Bernie recalls saying to him when [89:12] they first start working together. Your [89:14] problem, Max, is you always want things [89:17] absolutely clear, and sometimes it's [89:19] better if things are not clear. [89:22] So he gets with the program and uh they [89:24] pretty quickly become two P's in a pod. [89:27] In 1993, that same year that Bernie [89:29] becomes the highest paid executive in [89:31] the UK, he kind of shadow arranges to [89:36] get Max installed as the new president [89:40] of the FIA. Meanwhile, he had already [89:44] somehow connived to get himself Bernie [89:48] already an official role at the FIA as [89:50] the vice president in charge of [89:52] promotional affairs. In addition to all [89:54] this, at one point along the way, he [89:56] also took over as the promoter of the [89:58] Belgian Grand Prix at Spa. [90:00] >> Oh, so he was paying a race fee to [90:01] himself. [90:02] >> Yes. So at various times, Bernie was [90:05] serving in a principal role in all of [90:09] the major F1 stakeholder categories. [90:12] Team owner, race promoter, [90:15] official FIA representative, and of [90:19] course CEO and owner of FHA and de facto [90:24] the league itself. [90:26] And I think at every point in time, he [90:30] was always in at least two, if not three [90:33] or four of those roles simultaneously. [90:35] >> Unbelievable. [90:36] >> He really takes the, you know, no [90:38] conflict, no interest phrase, to new [90:39] heights. [90:40] >> Absolutely unbelievable. There's a great [90:43] quote from Eddie Jordan, who is a [90:45] Formula 1 legend. Do you know this [90:47] quote? [90:47] >> Uh, no. No, no. He said that Bernie [90:49] Ecklestone was someone who sold Formula [90:51] 1 four times, has never bought it back, [90:54] has never lost its control, and still [90:57] owns it. And do you know the most [90:59] important thing? He never effing owned [91:01] it in the first place. [91:04] >> Yes. So, let's tell that story about how [91:09] he sells it four times, never buys it [91:11] back, and still owns it and never owned [91:13] it in the first place. That is such a [91:15] great quote. I hadn't found that. I love [91:16] it. I love it. Yes. But listeners, [91:19] before we do that, now is a great time [91:22] to tell you about one of our favorite [91:23] companies, Verscell. And funny enough, [91:26] as we were preparing for this episode, I [91:28] was in the pit lane at the Las Vegas [91:30] Grand Prix, and I ran into none other [91:32] than Verscell founder and CEO, Guiermo [91:34] Roush. [91:35] >> Of course you did. [91:36] >> Which is very fitting since Verscell is [91:38] uh known for speed. [91:40] >> Yep. Yep. Yep. [91:41] >> Yes. They are known for lightning fast [91:43] performance and the insane iteration [91:46] velocity that they enable for [91:47] developers. So it's no surprise that [91:49] they are emerging as the ideal [91:51] production layer for AI agents. [91:54] >> Yeah, I mean gosh, all signs are [91:56] pointing to 2026 as the year that AI [91:58] moves into actual agents that do actual [92:01] work. But building an agent is the easy [92:05] part. Operating a whole fleet of agents [92:07] at scale, that's hard. and doing it with [92:10] governance, isolation, enforcement [92:13] really hard. [92:14] >> So that's where Verscell comes in. [92:15] They've already built the modern [92:17] platform for the web that is trusted by [92:18] companies from Notion to Door Dash to [92:21] Stripe. And that makes them uniquely [92:23] positioned for the agentic web because [92:25] they already power the plumbing [92:26] underneath many of the world's biggest [92:28] applications. [92:29] >> Yep. If you're building with AI right [92:31] now, you're almost certainly already [92:33] touching Versel's infrastructure. Their [92:36] AI gateway and sandbox are used by [92:38] everyone from one-person startups to the [92:40] biggest global enterprises. And their AI [92:43] SDK is the toolkit to build AI powered [92:45] products. And it's downloaded 7 million [92:47] times each week. They recently launched [92:49] Verscell agent, a suite of AI powered [92:51] developer tools that they are calling [92:53] self-driving infrastructure for [92:54] building, deploying, and operating [92:56] agents. It's the first step toward a [92:58] fully autonomous cloud operation. [93:00] Verscell is your one-stop shop for [93:02] everything you need to build for this AI [93:04] era. Agents, apps, sites, dashboards, [93:08] whatever. With Verscell, you can just [93:10] ship. [93:11] >> So, you can visit verscell.com/acquired [93:13] to get started. That's [93:14] veral.com/acquired [93:16] and just tell them that Ben and David [93:18] sent you. [93:19] >> Okay. So, Bernie's many sales and [93:23] monetization opportunities. Here in the [93:25] mid 90s, he starts exploring liquidity [93:28] options for himself. And in particular, [93:31] he wants to funnel that liquidity into a [93:34] new set of offshore vehicles to avoid [93:37] British estate taxes for his family [93:39] after he dies. And you know, this is [93:42] like a natural activity for somebody [93:44] approaching their 70th birthday. What [93:47] Bernie didn't foresee or anybody else is [93:50] >> he had another 25 years at least in him. [93:52] at least cuz he's still alive in 2026. [93:54] >> Yep. Now, also to be somewhat fair here, [93:58] protecting his estate from the heavy [94:00] British inheritance taxes is a [94:03] legitimate concern because otherwise [94:06] there would be no way that his family [94:08] could keep control of F1 after his [94:10] death. It would have to be broken up and [94:12] sold just purely to fund the estate [94:15] taxes. [94:16] So if you actually are a team, this is [94:19] starting to become kind of an [94:20] existential risk of what if Bernie dies [94:22] suddenly and then they have to sell F1 [94:26] off into different parts with different [94:28] owners. [94:29] >> And you say, you know, if you're a team [94:30] owner, it's not just if you're a team [94:31] owner. If you're a team owner or a race [94:33] promoter, you want to play on here. So [94:36] it just so happens here in the mid to [94:38] late 90s that we're in the height of the [94:41] dot era. [94:42] >> Wait, that plays into this? [94:44] >> Oh, yeah. So, what's the natural thing [94:46] to do? Bernie's gonna IPO [94:50] F1. [94:51] >> Oh, I've totally missed this. [94:54] >> Oh, yeah. Oh, there is so much delicious [94:56] chaos that gets unleashed here. By this [94:59] point in time, Bernie's various [95:02] companies, and there are even many more [95:04] than we have talked about on this [95:05] episode, just for simplicity. [95:07] Collectively, they're earning about 250 [95:10] million British pounds a year in [95:13] revenue. and they have 50% plus EBITD [95:18] dot margins. And remember this is at a [95:20] time when the British pound is worth [95:23] call it 60 to 70% more than the US [95:26] dollar. This is a very IPOable business [95:30] if it were a you know regular business. [95:34] >> Yes. Nonetheless, times are so crazy [95:37] that Bernie hatches a plan with his [95:39] bankers at Solomon Brothers to [95:42] consolidate all the various F1 companies [95:45] that he owns into a single holding [95:47] company called Sleek Holdings, SLEC [95:51] Holdings. And he's going to transfer his [95:54] ownership of that new company to his [95:57] then second wife, Slavica, for tax [96:00] reasons. So SLC was short for Slavica [96:03] Eckleston [96:05] >> and float it in a duallisted IPO in the [96:10] US and England with an anticipated [96:14] valuation of around $4 billion. [96:18] H we should also note here too, we've [96:22] being a a little glib in this episode. [96:24] In 2023, Bernie ultimately pleaded [96:27] guilty to tax fraud as a result of all [96:30] the machinations we're about to talk [96:31] about and had to pay a 653 million pound [96:35] payment to the crown in back taxes and [96:39] fines. And he also received a I think [96:42] 17-month jail sentence which was then [96:45] suspended probably in large part to his [96:48] advanced age. [96:49] >> Crazy. All of this lurking in the [96:51] background may have been part of the [96:53] reason that famously he turned down [96:55] several offers of knighthood throughout [96:57] his life. [96:59] >> Yeah. [96:59] >> Although you'd think it would actually [97:00] bode better for you if you're a knight [97:02] going into some lawsuit with the [97:04] government over owing the government [97:06] money. [97:06] >> Good point. Yeah. Does the crown sue one [97:08] of their own? I don't know. [97:11] >> Anyway, as he starts formulating all [97:14] these plans with Solomon Brothers, [97:15] they're like, "Well, I see your revenue. [97:19] I see your EBITDA. [97:21] >> And what were those again? [97:23] >> 250 million British pounds of revenue [97:25] and call it uh 50 plus percent margins [97:28] on that. [97:29] >> Good business. [97:30] >> Yeah, great business. What they don't [97:33] see is any sort of formal legal control [97:38] or document that he has from anybody [97:41] giving him the actual rights to a lot of [97:45] this. you know, he's got the actual [97:46] rights to the TV stuff, but the promoter [97:49] fee stuff, the transportation, [97:52] uh, we haven't even mentioned the [97:53] Paddock Club that gets set up along the [97:55] way here, there's a lot of money flowing [97:57] through that. And to be clear, these are [98:00] all income streams to Bernie. I mean, so [98:03] of course we've talked about the meteor [98:04] rights, but what a race promoter does is [98:07] if F1 is thinking about going to a [98:09] racetrack, the person who owns the [98:11] racetrack or a company affiliated with [98:13] the racetrack or a government affiliated [98:14] with the racetrack pays a giant amount [98:17] of money to Bernie for the privilege of [98:20] having a race there. That's a promoter [98:21] fee. [98:22] >> Yep. So conveniently, right at this same [98:26] time as they're doing IPO preparations, [98:29] it comes time to negotiate the fourth [98:32] conquered agreement with the teams and [98:34] the FIA. [98:36] In this new agreement, Bernie swaps in a [98:41] new entity called Formula One [98:45] Constructors Association [98:47] Administration Limited, a new company [98:51] owned by Bernie Fa, [98:55] for the original FOA, [98:57] >> so that he can now legally have all the [99:00] rights to everything he's doing. And [99:02] remember who the new president of FIA is [99:05] that just got installed. [99:07] >> Max Mosley. [99:08] >> Yeah. [99:10] >> So he's just gonna rubber stamp it, [99:12] >> of course. [99:12] >> Or that's at least the belief. [99:14] >> Yeah. Well, it passes. Let's just say [99:17] that the path is now paved to IPO. [99:22] Except there's one snag that comes up. [99:25] News of the plans as well as Bernie's [99:27] recent sort of consolidation of legal [99:29] power gets leaked to the press. And this [99:32] causes the European Union antirust [99:34] investigators [99:36] to start poking around. [99:37] >> You don't say. [99:39] >> Bernie is doing so much self-deing here [99:41] that there's no way he's going to [99:43] survive an investigation. [99:45] >> So Bernie shelves the IPO idea and also [99:48] resigns from his official role as a vice [99:50] president at the FIA. And the [99:52] combination of those two things is [99:54] enough to at least get the EU off his [99:56] back for the moment. But he needs [99:58] another plan for getting liquidity. So [100:01] he switches banks to Morgan Stanley and [100:04] convinces them that instead of IPOing, [100:08] they should issue debt on F1 and use the [100:12] proceeds from the debt to pay himself [100:14] and his new offshore entities a special [100:18] $1.4 billion dividend. [100:20] >> What? secured by the future TV right [100:26] streams by the revenue streams from the [100:28] future TV rights. [100:29] >> This deal actually happens. It's called [100:31] the burning bonds. [100:33] >> It is always something you should be a [100:35] little bit worried about if a company is [100:37] raising a giant amount of debt [100:39] principally to pay out its primary [100:41] shareholder a special dividend. [100:43] >> Yes. Especially if it's Bernie. [100:45] >> Why would you buy that debt? [100:46] >> That's a really good question. The [100:48] offering, I believe, was intended to [100:50] be$2 billion dollars. Ah, [100:53] >> but there was not enough demand and that [100:54] Morgan Stanley could only rustle up 1.4 [100:57] billion worth of money that was willing [101:00] to do this deal. [101:01] >> Either way, the deal happens on a [101:04] Friday. All gets done. Debts issued. [101:06] Bernie gets his dividend. Money gets [101:08] transferred to the offshore entities. On [101:11] the following Monday, Bernie calls up [101:14] his bankers and says, "Oh, there was [101:17] something else that I didn't tell you. [101:20] I'm having triple bypass heart surgery [101:24] today." [101:27] >> Today. So, they just did the debt deal, [101:30] just issued the special dividend, took [101:32] $1.4 billion out. Three days later, [101:35] Bernie is having triple bypass heart [101:37] surgery. The entire future success of [101:40] this thing is heavily dependent on [101:41] Bernie being in the seat. [101:43] >> Yes. Fortunately for him and everybody [101:45] else, he survives the surgery, gives a [101:48] quote to the press from the hospital [101:50] room, I have disappointed so many [101:52] people, [101:55] which uh later one of his principal [101:57] bankers would recall her response being, [102:00] "If you make it out alive, I'm gonna [102:01] come kill you myself." [102:05] Oh man. Well, Bernie survives. Later [102:09] that year, we're in 1989 now. His wife [102:13] Slavica, i.e. really Bernie starts [102:17] selling off equity stakes in select [102:20] holdings to various private equity firms [102:24] including cannot make this up in [102:27] February of 2000 they sell a 37% stake [102:32] in F1 to Helman and Freriedman the giant [102:36] private equity firm based in San [102:38] Francisco H&F then goes and buys out [102:43] some of the other minority owners ers [102:44] that Slavica/Bernie had been selling [102:47] stakes to and Helman and Freeman [102:50] collectively gets a 50% ownership stake [102:54] in F1 and then they go negotiate with [102:58] Slavica and Bernie an option to buy [103:01] another 25% from them for 600 million [103:05] pounds and gain 75% majority ownership [103:09] of F1. So they get the option, the [103:11] option's papered [103:13] one month later in March of 2000. [103:18] >> This was in March of 2000, right when [103:20] the dot crash happened. [103:22] >> The.com crash is about to happen, but it [103:25] gets crazier before the bubble pressur. [103:28] >> Really? [103:29] >> In March, H&F gets an unsolicited [103:33] over-the-top bid from a German new media [103:37] company called EM.tv. TV [103:42] to buy their entire stake in selectf [103:46] immediately right away. This is the [103:50] height of dot craziness right before the [103:53] crash. So this German company em.tv, [103:57] they had just previously bought the Jim [104:00] Henson company in the US, which of [104:03] course makes the Muppets. and they were [104:05] just trying to roll up all of these [104:08] media properties and they were going to [104:09] bring them into the digital era or [104:12] something some sort of do fever dream. [104:16] H&F hits the bid. They sell out. [104:20] >> So, how long did H&F own Formula 1? [104:23] >> One month. [104:24] >> H&F owns Formula 1 for one month. They [104:26] make an immediate 241 million pound [104:32] profit in one month. on how much [104:35] invested? [104:36] >> 1.1 1.2 billion invested. [104:38] >> Oh my god. [104:39] >> So, you know, a 20% return, but like [104:41] >> in a month [104:42] >> I got more. So, 50% of F1 is now in the [104:47] hands of em.tv. [104:49] They want to exercise the 25% option [104:53] that H&F had negotiated, but they don't [104:56] have any more cash. They blew it all on [104:59] the first transaction. [105:00] >> And the Muppets. [105:02] >> The Muppets. [105:04] So, em.tv [105:06] goes out and does another 1.6 billion [105:11] euro debt deal to raise the money. So, [105:15] they take 600 million from JP Morgan and [105:19] Lehman Brothers and they take a billion [105:22] from a local German bank called Bayern [105:25] LB. They use this debt. They exercise [105:28] the option. They now own 75% of F1 and [105:32] Bernie and Slavica hold the last 25%. [105:35] >> Wow. [105:36] >> And then the bubble burst [105:38] >> and Wow. So all that was done like in [105:40] days, weeks, [105:42] >> like right up to the end times. The [105:44] music is ending as this is all [105:46] happening. Bernie, meanwhile, is just [105:48] getting tons of money into his bank [105:51] accounts. [105:52] >> The bubble bursts. EMTV [105:55] misses their interest payments. [105:58] Shocking. Shocking. [106:00] >> Another German media mogul named Leo [106:02] Kersh comes in and saves the company. [106:05] His company, Kersh Media, takes over [106:07] EMTV. They now assume F1 ownership. 18 [106:10] months later, they go bankrupt. [106:13] >> So 2002, the net result of which is that [106:18] ownership of the 75% stake in F1 [106:22] transfers to the debt holders, [106:25] >> which is who? [106:26] >> Bayer and LB. the German bank, JP [106:29] Morgan, and Lehman Brothers. [106:32] With Bernie and Slavica still owning the [106:34] 25% minority share. [106:36] >> Oh my god. [106:38] >> Crazy. [106:39] >> Okay, so it all comes to a head in 2004 [106:42] when the banks are super frustrated [106:44] because Bernie's still running the thing [106:46] as he always did, paying himself [106:48] everything. The banks keep trying to [106:51] tell Bernie what to do. They're like [106:53] issuing him directions as if he's their [106:55] employee. and Bernie just keeps ignoring [106:58] them. So, the bank consortion sues [107:01] Bernie for control of the sport. [107:04] The judge rules in favor of the banks. [107:08] However, Bernie addresses the media [107:10] after the court proceedings and says [107:13] that the verdict would mean quote [107:15] nothing at all and he's planning to [107:17] continue business as usual [107:20] because he's got an ace up his sleeve. [107:22] separately. He has been negotiating with [107:26] CVC Capital Partners, the large European [107:29] private equity firm. The deal gets done [107:31] with CVC. They buy out the banks. They [107:34] also buy out Bernie and Slavic's 25%. [107:38] So, more money going to Bernie now here. [107:40] >> Whoa. But Bernie will remain CEO. [107:44] >> He's just an employee. He's hired by CBC [107:46] to continue being Bernie. and he gets [107:50] the opportunity to use some of his [107:52] proceeds to invest with CVC alongside [107:55] them in the deal. [107:56] >> Amazing. [107:57] >> All told, CVC [108:00] and Bernie for his portion, spend about [108:03] $2 billion acquiring 100% ownership. [108:07] They finance 1.1 billion of it with [108:10] another set of debt. So, they put 900 [108:14] million of cash equity [108:16] >> into the deal. [108:18] compared to I believe over three billion [108:21] that Bernie and his trust had pulled out [108:24] of the company through all the debt and [108:26] equity machinations that we discussed [108:29] earlier. [108:29] >> Unbelievable. [108:30] >> Oh my goodness. [108:31] >> This is important to know. The [108:33] CBC/Bernie [108:35] buyin to this new F1 entity is about 900 [108:40] million of equity. [108:41] >> Yes. [108:42] >> $2 billion total purchase price [108:44] including the debt. Bernie resumes his [108:47] job with renewed vigor now that he is [108:50] newly incentivized to uh grow revenue [108:53] and profits again. So the first thing [108:56] that he does after CBC cleans up the [109:00] ownership is he kind of goes right back [109:03] to his original bag of tricks which is [109:06] extracting more money from race [109:08] promoters. So by this point in time, [109:11] 2005ish, [109:12] there are basically three types of Grand [109:15] Prix races. You have the prestigious [109:18] historic ones like Monaco and Monza and [109:20] Silverstone. They're not going anywhere. [109:23] >> The European heritage tracks, if you [109:25] will. [109:25] >> Exactly. They don't pay nearly as much [109:28] in race fees to F1, but they're sort of [109:31] there to build and maintain the brand. [109:34] >> Yep. Then you have a new set of races [109:37] like Bahrain and China that had just [109:39] come on, [109:40] >> the flyaway races. [109:42] >> They are paying huge fees to F1 in order [109:47] to have their races on the calendar. [109:49] >> We're talking 2 to 3x. [109:51] >> Yes. 30 40 50 million a yearish [109:55] >> and today even into the 60 millions. [109:58] >> Yes. The problem opportunity at this [110:00] point in time is you had a whole bunch [110:03] of races in the middle. Canada, [110:06] Australia, Spain, Belgium, the second [110:09] race in Germany that wasn't the Nurburg [110:11] Ring, the second race in Italy that [110:13] wasn't Monza, etc., etc., etc. Those [110:16] other races actually made up most of the [110:18] calendar, but they neither brought in a [110:21] lot of revenue, nor were they any sort [110:24] of strategic value. Like, nobody got [110:26] excited, [110:26] >> right? They weren't an expansion [110:28] opportunity for the sport. They weren't [110:29] a way to find new audience. [110:31] >> Yep. So Bernie goes out and he courts [110:35] Abu Dhabi, Singapore, and India to come [110:39] in and displace some of those middle [110:42] races and be new Grand Pris. And just [110:44] like Bahrain and China, these are big [110:46] money deals. So India is 40 million a [110:50] year just in race fees to F1. Abu Dhabi [110:54] is the biggest. They commit to a billion [110:56] dollar total F1 investment over the [111:00] coming years, including constructing a [111:03] whole new track from scratch in the [111:06] desert outside the city. So Bernie's on [111:08] a roll with these new races. So then in [111:11] the early 2010s, Bernie lands the big [111:14] one, Russia. He'd been trying to get a [111:18] Russian Grand Prix for a long time. [111:21] Russia had just won the 2014 Winter [111:24] Olympic bid for Sochi. Yep. And put $50 [111:29] billion dollars into the ground in [111:31] infrastructure at Sochi for the [111:33] Olympics. Bernie in F1 goes and [111:36] convinces them that the best way to sort [111:39] of amortize the cost of this investment [111:41] in Sochi is to put a race there after [111:45] the Olympics. Probably not wrong. [111:47] Totally not wrong. So they sign a deal [111:49] with Russia and of course it's a deal [111:51] with the state. You know, anytime you're [111:53] negotiating with Russia, you're [111:54] negotiating with the state. [111:56] >> Increasingly, a lot of these flyaway [111:57] races are. [111:58] >> Yes. This is not unique to Russia here. [112:00] >> It's not a local entrepreneur race [112:02] promoter with a racetrack. These are [112:03] sovereign deals. [112:04] >> Yes. to construct a new $270 million F1 [112:10] track around the Olympic Park and pay F1 [112:15] $50 million a year for seven years to [112:18] host the race. There's an amazing Bernie [112:20] and Putin story. [112:23] As they're in final negotiations for the [112:25] deal, the Russian contingent asks Bernie [112:29] to fly over to Sochi and sit down with [112:32] Putin to finalize the deal. [112:35] To which Bernie responds, "Do I look [112:39] stupid? If they think I'm going to go [112:41] negotiate this contract with Putin, no [112:44] way. If they want me to go, they can [112:46] send back the contract first." Signed, [112:49] which they do. [112:51] And then Bernie goes to Sochi and sits [112:53] down with Putin and do a press [112:54] conference and announce the whole thing. [112:56] >> Wow. [112:58] >> I guess that's how you negotiate with [112:59] Putin is you you don't negotiate with [113:01] Putin. So ultimately the Russian Grand [113:03] Prix would get canned early in 2022 [113:06] after Russia invaded Ukraine. [113:08] >> I was going to say it's not on the [113:09] calendar I saw. [113:10] >> No. No. Bernie would get asked on a [113:12] British morning TV show after the [113:15] Ukraine invasion what he thinks about [113:16] all this and he famously says that Putin [113:18] is a quote first class person and that [113:21] he Bernie would take a bullet for him. [113:24] >> Wow. Okay. [113:26] >> Yeah. Okay. I did hear from some folks [113:28] that I talked to and I'd always ask the [113:30] question, "What was it like working with [113:32] Bernie?" overwhelmingly people said [113:34] delightful. [113:35] >> I could believe that [113:36] >> that like when all the dust settled like [113:38] the term you kind of look at the terms [113:39] and go oh whoa there's actually not much [113:42] here for me. [113:43] >> Yeah. [113:44] >> But just delightful to work with. [113:47] >> He's a very loyal partner. [113:49] >> Yeah. So anyway, that's the racetrack [113:52] side of things under the reinvigorated [113:55] Bernie and CVC. The other big piece, of [113:58] course, is the team relations side of [114:00] things. We previewed this earlier, but [114:03] at this point, the whole stick of, "Hey, [114:07] I'm getting rich, but you're getting [114:09] rich, too," has way worn out its [114:12] welcome. M [114:14] >> there's also the fact too that now it's [114:15] not just Bernie getting rich, it's the [114:17] private equity firm that's also getting [114:19] rich on the backs of the teams and all [114:21] the investments that they're making into [114:23] the cars and R&D. And by this era in the [114:27] kind of mid late 2000s, it's truly [114:30] gotten out of control. The top teams are [114:33] spending like4 to500 million a year on [114:37] their cars. And the race calendar is [114:40] insane because you know it started in [114:42] the 50s60s of hey we'll go wherever we [114:45] can get enough teams to race and then it [114:46] turned into we'll go wherever anybody [114:49] will write a $40 million or larger [114:52] check. [114:52] >> Let's put this circus on a plane to [114:54] Russia in China. [114:55] >> And now the like by this point in [114:57] history we're talking about here the mid [114:59] late 2000s the broadcast calendar makes [115:01] no sense. You've only optimized for who [115:05] will pay us the biggest race promotion [115:06] fees. These races are being run at all [115:09] hours of the day and night. [115:11] >> Yes. [115:11] >> So, team relations are pretty bad. And [115:14] then 2008 hits. The biggest teams with [115:18] the biggest budgets, yes, they're [115:20] spending themselves way into the red, [115:22] but at least they were sort of [115:24] backstopped by actual consumer car [115:26] manufacturers that own them and were [115:29] investing into them for all sorts of, [115:31] you know, strategic or R&D or brand [115:33] marketing purposes. So, you know, you [115:35] had Honda in the sport, Toyota, BMW, [115:39] obviously Ferrari, [115:41] >> Renault. [115:42] >> Yeah. As we hit 2008 in the financial [115:44] crisis, the consumer car businesses for [115:48] all of these guys except Ferrari just [115:50] fall off the cliff. So, all of a sudden, [115:52] it becomes no longer tenable either [115:55] financially or just public perception [115:57] wise for Honda or BMW, etc. to keep [116:02] operating these money sinkhole F1 teams. [116:06] >> Yep. [116:06] >> So, as they get into 2008, Bernie, CBC, [116:09] and the FIA all team up and they float a [116:13] solution, a lifeline to the teams. We [116:16] are going to help you guys institute a [116:19] cost cap on manufacturing [116:22] and we'll help you design it. Let's get [116:25] it approved by all the teams. This will [116:26] save you. Basically, what they're [116:28] proposing is the F1 equivalent of a [116:30] salary cap in other sports like the NFL [116:33] or the NBA, except instead of on the [116:35] players, the salary cap is going to be [116:37] on the investments into the cars. [116:40] >> Yes. And there are some teams that are a [116:44] fan of this. And there are other teams [116:46] who hate this more than anything they [116:48] could possibly imagine. [116:50] >> Yes. Specifically Ferrari and McLaren. [116:52] Ferrari would like nothing more than to [116:54] lose half a billion dollars a year [116:57] making their F1 cars as long as they get [116:59] to win. They do not care. It pays back [117:02] infinitely in brand marketing if they [117:05] are just a winning F1 team for their [117:08] particular line of business. [117:09] >> You know what car manufacturer is [117:11] basically unaffected by a global [117:13] financial recession? Ferrari. [117:15] >> Yes. [117:17] their customers are staying on the wait [117:20] list no matter what the financial [117:22] climate is out there. So Ferrari and [117:25] McLaren has a lot of the same dynamics. [117:27] They threaten to pull out of the sport [117:30] and ultimately they bully all the other [117:33] teams into joining them in opposition to [117:36] the cost cap. There's also all of this [117:39] pent up bad will against Bernie, all [117:43] these deals that have happened, CBC, the [117:46] FIA, etc. In 2009, [117:50] eight of the 10 teams threatened to pull [117:53] out of the sport and start a rival [117:56] breakaway league called FOD, the Formula [118:00] One Teams Association. [118:03] >> Yeah. and they announced that they're [118:04] doing it and they're creating their own [118:06] series starting in 2010. [118:09] >> Yeah. So, the Formula 1 Teams [118:10] Association or FOD was really two things [118:14] in one. One, it's can we band together [118:16] as a team to negotiate as one to get [118:18] leverage in whatever we're negotiating [118:20] over. And in this instance, it's we [118:22] don't want a cost cap. The other thing [118:25] is it is a legitimate breakaway series. [118:28] >> Y [118:28] >> which it would be a really hard thing to [118:30] start. I mean to go figure out how to [118:32] sign all these new deals with the best [118:34] tracks in the world and media rights [118:37] deals. There's a lot of value in what [118:41] Bernie and the series are actually [118:43] doing. [118:43] >> Y so it works. The cost caps didn't [118:46] happen. They did impose a 10-year freeze [118:50] on engine development. And so in the [118:53] short term, this is kind of how these [118:55] negotiations go. The teams got what they [118:57] wanted without actually having to leave [119:00] by having a credible threat to leave. [119:03] >> Yep. And specifically [119:05] what they got was Max Mosley's [119:07] resignation from the FIA or at least [119:10] agreement not to stand for reelection. [119:12] >> It's hard for them to actually link arms [119:14] for too long because kind of two [119:18] reasons. One, Bernie and Max could offer [119:20] different things to different teams to [119:22] get them to individually cave. So, like [119:25] they can go to the Braun team, and we'll [119:26] talk about the Braun team in a minute, [119:28] but there was this shoestring budget [119:30] team, scrappy upstart. Bernie had been [119:32] withholding their payments from the [119:34] previous year when they had raced as [119:36] Honda because Bernie's opinion was, [119:38] "Well, you're not the same team, so you [119:40] don't deserve your payout." And so, [119:42] >> save it. [119:43] >> Braun really needs the cash. So, it's [119:45] very easy to go and get them to [119:47] capitulate when you owe them a few [119:49] million bucks. And you're going to wire [119:51] the money immediately as long as they [119:52] break ranks with the other team. It's a [119:54] great way to bust a strike. But the [119:56] biggest thing is it's just this kind of [119:58] misaligned incentives where all these [120:01] constructors actually have very [120:02] different reasons for racing and [120:05] different incentives and so it's hard [120:07] for them to be unified on anything given [120:10] the wildly different incentive set. [120:12] >> Yep. So, I don't know if you knew this, [120:14] David, I talked to Zack Brown, the CEO [120:17] of McLaren Racing to prep for this [120:19] episode, and I specifically asked him [120:22] why teams don't form a breakaway series [120:24] now. And we'll talk about the economics [120:26] of what the business looks like today. [120:28] And he had a great answer. So, he said, [120:29] "Prior to Liberty's acquisition of F1, [120:31] there had been many discussions and even [120:33] attempts at a breakaway series. Of [120:34] course, the teams would unite around the [120:36] sport themselves, but it always fell [120:38] down when the teams had to discuss how [120:40] to share the pie. And you know, it's one [120:42] of these things where Ferrari is gonna [120:44] say, "We're entitled to this and our [120:46] heritage for the sport." And McLaren and [120:49] Mercedes, they're gonna say, "Oh, we're [120:50] really good, so we deserve more." So, [120:52] yeah, they just never would agree on how [120:54] to divide up the pie. [120:55] >> Yeah. The net of this is that team and [120:58] league relations in F1 are at a all-time [121:01] low. [121:02] >> Yes. [121:02] >> Here at the end of the 2000s. [121:04] >> Yeah. And we didn't even talk about, if [121:06] you're a fan of F1 during this time [121:08] period, you know about uh Spygate and [121:10] CrashGate. both of these uh McLaren [121:14] magically wound up with a giant binder [121:18] full of the complete specification of [121:20] Ferrari's car for that year and there [121:22] was this all giant hullaloo and case [121:25] court hearings and everything about the [121:28] these stolen documents and did they use [121:30] them to win? Uh at the same time you [121:34] have crashgate. [121:35] >> Yeah, this is bad. where it ended up [121:38] looking pretty conclusive that a team [121:42] intentionally had one of their drivers [121:44] crash in order to get a safety car to [121:48] come out which would advantage their [121:50] other driver to do better in that race [121:53] putting one of their drivers life at [121:55] risk. [121:55] >> Not just one of their drivers, like [121:56] other drivers, too could be involved in [121:59] the crash. Yeah. and and they're [122:00] covering it up and they're [122:01] >> these are major sports integrity issues [122:04] >> public trust is at an all-time low. [122:06] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, ironically, [122:11] miraculously, [122:13] and certainly despite all of Bernie's [122:16] best efforts to the contrary, pretty [122:19] much this whole situation [122:21] gets fixed [122:23] by two new teams [122:27] that enter Formula 1 who nobody saw [122:32] coming. [122:33] One of which was a auto manufacturer and [122:37] uh dark horse re-entrant into the sport. [122:41] >> Yep. [122:41] >> The other was a Well, I was going to say [122:45] energy drink manufacturer, but I don't [122:47] think we can say manufacturer because [122:49] they don't actually make the drink. [122:52] >> An energy drink company. [122:53] >> An energy drink marketing company named [122:57] Red Bull. But before we tell their [123:00] stories, now is a great time to talk [123:03] about one of our favorite companies, [123:06] Stats Egg. [123:07] >> Yes, longtime acquired partner. There is [123:10] a reason why the best product teams at [123:12] companies like OpenAI and Notion, [123:14] Atlassian, Figma, Rippling, Brex, and [123:17] more rely on Statzig. Whether they are [123:20] iterating on their core product features [123:22] or shipping AI powered experiences at [123:24] scale. [123:25] >> Yep. In the crazy speed of today's AI [123:28] world, shipping fast is just table [123:30] stakes. Now, it's basically trivial to [123:32] build and deploy your app constantly. [123:35] The real advantage is how quickly you [123:37] learn what changes actually created [123:40] value for customers and how fast you can [123:42] use that signal to guide what you ship [123:44] next. Whether it's a feature tweak, a [123:47] pricing change, a performance [123:49] improvement, or an AI update like a [123:51] model change or prompt adjustment, [123:53] they're not relying on instinct. They're [123:55] measuring what actually moved [123:56] engagement, retention, and ultimately [123:58] revenue. And as more teams build with [124:00] AI, that learning loop becomes even more [124:03] important. Building with LLMs introduces [124:06] non-determinism into your product [124:07] experience. The same input doesn't [124:09] always produce the same output, and [124:11] behavior can shift in subtle ways in [124:13] real world use. So doing offline evals [124:17] will give you part of the picture, but [124:18] you can really only understand the [124:20] impact once your product is live with [124:23] real users. And then you can measure how [124:25] their behavior actually changes. It's [124:27] very different than the way that you [124:28] would ship features in a pre-ai world [124:30] where you knew exactly what the software [124:33] was going to do in production. [124:34] >> Yeah, exactly. [124:36] >> So this is where statig comes in. It [124:37] brings experimentation, feature flags, [124:39] and product analytics into one unified [124:41] system so teams can ship safely, test [124:44] rigorously, and directly link what they [124:46] changed to how users actually behaved. [124:49] The result is a tighter feedback loop [124:51] and learning that compounds over time. [124:52] So you don't just ship more, you ship [124:55] better. [124:55] >> So if you want to make learning your [124:57] competitive advantage, whether you're [124:59] building new AI experiences or just [125:01] evolving your existing core product, go [125:03] to statsig.com/acquired [125:05] to get started. [125:07] >> All right. So David, uh, you mentioned [125:09] an energy drink company. [125:11] >> Yes. So let's start with Red Bull. The [125:15] Red Bull company story itself like [125:18] absolutely deserves its own acquired [125:20] episode someday because it is truly [125:23] insane. So briefly, Dietrich Matitz was [125:30] an Austrian [125:31] toothpaste salesman for Unilever and PNG [125:36] who goes on a business trip to Thailand [125:38] in 1984, [125:40] decides to radically change his life and [125:44] brings back a local Thai energy tonic to [125:48] start bottling and selling or or again I [125:51] can't even really say that because he [125:52] outsources [125:54] manufacturing. starting bottling and [125:55] selling it and turns it all into a [125:57] company that now does over $10 billion a [126:01] year in annual sales. Like astonishing. [126:04] The key pillar of what Red Bull the [126:07] company actually does [126:09] is of course marketing. And one of the [126:12] main pillars of its marketing strategy [126:14] has always been extreme sports. Red [126:17] Bull, their entire business model is, [126:19] "Yeah, we sell these drinks, but really [126:21] you're buying the drinks to associate [126:23] with a lifestyle, and we need to uh [126:26] educate you about the lifestyle that you [126:28] are uh, you know, associating yourself [126:30] with." [126:31] >> So, in 1989, like I mean, actually five [126:34] years, pretty quickly after Dietrich [126:36] starts the company, Red Bull sponsors [126:39] its first F1 driver. And then they [126:42] steadily grow their investment in the [126:44] sport until ultimately they become the [126:46] title sponsor of the Saur team in 1995. [126:51] >> Is that the team that's now Audi? [126:53] >> Yes. [126:54] >> Saur steak. [126:55] >> Sour steak. Yep. Yep. Yep. Yep. This is [126:57] where Red Bull starts. [126:58] >> Huh. The Red Bull entrance into F1 [127:03] was so perfectly timed because this is [127:05] right as the EU regulation is coming [127:08] online, forcing tobacco finally out of [127:12] the sport. [127:13] >> And so the great irony is that it's [127:15] actually like an energy drink company [127:17] that replaces the the cigarettes. [127:19] There's a great quote that Josh and [127:22] Jonathan have in the formula. Two [127:24] decades after Marborl execs looked at F1 [127:27] drivers and saw the heirs to the [127:29] American cowboy, Matishitz recognized [127:32] them for what they really were. [127:34] Overcaffeinated adrenaline junkies with [127:37] scant regard for their personal safety. [127:39] It was a match made in marketing heaven. [127:42] >> Perfect. [127:43] >> Perfect. So Red Bull totally breaks the [127:48] mold of what an F1 sponsor should be [127:51] doing. Previously, the sponsors were all [127:53] leaning into like the prestige aspect of [127:57] the sport, you know, the the the luxury, [128:00] the aristocraticness of it, you know, [128:02] all the Monaco stuff, the oil companies, [128:05] the watch companies, none of these [128:07] sponsors are rocking the boat, right? [128:11] And importantly, [128:13] just like F1 and Bernie itself, none of [128:16] these sponsors except maybe the [128:18] cigarette companies are interested in [128:20] younger audiences. Bernie has a great [128:22] quote about this when he's asked about [128:24] the challenges F1 faces of its aging [128:26] demographic. He says that younger [128:28] audiences are not a priority because [128:30] they quote don't buy Rolexes. [128:33] >> Yet [128:34] >> yet that is the key thing Bernie yet. [128:37] Yet [128:38] >> y [128:39] >> anyway Red Bull though of course is the [128:41] opposite of this. They are all about [128:43] young people the extreme lifestyle. They [128:46] don't just sponsor F1. They sponsor all [128:47] these extreme [128:50] sports like jumping out of planes in the [128:53] stratosphere, you know, [128:55] >> balloons. [128:56] >> Yeah, they are uh unique among the F1 [128:59] sponsor set. The problem though for Red [129:03] Bull is that Saur isn't very good. [129:08] So there's another great quote from [129:10] Mattis in in the formula. If an [129:12] insurance company sponsors a team and [129:14] that team loses, people don't change [129:16] their insurance company. But when the [129:18] Red Bulls lose, people get a new drink. [129:21] >> Yeah. [129:21] >> In 2004, [129:23] Red Bull dumps Saur and makes the [129:27] radical decision that rather than [129:29] sponsoring another team, they are going [129:32] to directly get into the business. and [129:36] Matt Shitz and Red Bull buy the failing [129:40] Jaguar racing team which was at this [129:44] point in time owned by Ford because Ford [129:46] had acquired Jaguar and with it came the [129:48] F1 racing team. Jaguar was going through [129:51] all sorts of trouble as was Ford during [129:54] the financial crisis and the leadup to [129:55] it. Things are so bad for the team that [129:59] Ford is willing to sell the whole team [130:03] to Red Bull for one British pound. [130:07] >> Really? I didn't realize that. [130:09] >> Yep. The purchase price that Red Bull [130:11] paid was one British pound to establish [130:14] Red Bull Racing. [130:16] >> Now, the problem is they still got to [130:17] make the team good. But [130:18] >> can we talk about the like amazing full [130:20] circle moment of this year now that Ford [130:22] is [130:23] >> Yes. the partnering with Red Bull on [130:26] their power units. [130:27] >> Yes. Yes. It's so full circle. It's [130:29] amazing. [130:30] >> Also, Ford actually did make engines for [130:32] F1 for a long time. So, it's interesting [130:34] that like their exit from the sport was [130:36] they were no longer an engine [130:38] manufacturer. Then they had this weird [130:40] team with Jaguar. They divested that and [130:42] then they're dormant in the sport for 20 [130:44] years. Yeah. Back to Red Bull taking [130:47] over. Yes. They need to make the team [130:48] good. Obviously, that's not going to [130:50] happen overnight, but they start, you [130:51] know, putting steps in place. What they [130:54] can do now that they actually own a team [130:56] instead of just being a title sponsor [131:00] is they can act however they want within [131:04] the paddic. So when Red Bull rolls up to [131:07] the paddic the next year in 2005, which [131:10] remember is the first year of CBC's [131:12] ownership and the new Bernie regime, [131:15] they bring, no joke, a mobile nightclub [131:20] named the energy station as their team [131:24] paddock facility to all the Grand Prix [131:26] around the world. And they have a [131:30] radical open door policy. So previously [131:33] the paddock was like the you know sacred [131:35] place corporate sponsors and high [131:36] rollers could spend for paddock club [131:38] access was very limited. Red Bull rolls [131:41] in and we're like the door is open all [131:43] the time. Anybody who is in the paddic [131:46] can come in to our energy station. Uh [131:50] you could be from any other team, you [131:52] could be any other sponsor, you could be [131:54] a guest. Just come on in and party with [131:57] us. So they have DJs at all hours. Uh [132:01] they have uh a a team of girls, the the [132:04] Red Bull Formula Una's team of you know [132:07] hostesses [132:09] who are there. They have a swimming pool [132:11] on the roof. [132:13] >> Do you know what they did in Monaco? [132:15] >> I read about this but I can't remember. [132:16] >> They there's not room for the Red Bull [132:18] energy station because it's Monaco and [132:20] there's not room for anything. Right. [132:21] And so they constructed a temporary [132:25] building that they put on pontoons and [132:29] they have it out in the harbor. [132:31] >> Amazing. Amazing. Yeah. They're just [132:33] like giant middle finger to the whole [132:36] establishment. [132:37] >> Yes. [132:37] >> Uh there's alcohol everywhere. Drinks [132:40] are flowing. And of course there is Red [132:42] Bull free for I mean it's genius. It's [132:44] absolutely genius. So, all of this is [132:47] masterminded by Dietrich and the young [132:51] team principal that he hires takes a [132:53] chance on to run the team. Christian [132:57] her. [133:00] >> Yep. [133:00] >> Who uh you know, if you watch Drive to [133:02] Survive, uh you probably know all about [133:03] Christian her. [133:04] >> Yes. [133:05] >> The other team owners and principles and [133:07] Bernie hates this. Like hate it. They [133:10] hate it so much. You know, they're [133:12] trying to control everything. This is a [133:14] serious sport. This is a serious [133:16] enterprise. And here's Red Bull just [133:18] partying. [133:19] >> And Red Bull got much better as a racing [133:22] team. But the essence of the strategy is [133:24] basically still the same. They generate [133:28] zero profit despite being one of the [133:29] best teams and the highest revenue teams [133:31] or near zero profit, very thin to create [133:34] the biggest marketing spectacle that [133:35] they can to sell energy drinks. It's a [133:37] just a super different business model [133:39] than anyone else in the [133:42] >> It's almost like uh like Amazon and [133:44] streaming, you know, like Prime Video, [133:45] which we'll talk about later. Like the [133:47] business model is not the streaming, [133:49] it's [133:50] >> the retailer. [133:52] >> Anyway, obviously all the other team [133:54] owners hate it, but the drivers and the [133:58] staffs love it. You know, these are all [134:01] young people mostly who are driving the [134:03] cars, working on the engineering as [134:06] mechanics, etc. All of a sudden, there's [134:09] like a 247 party following them around [134:11] the world. Like, hell yeah. [134:13] >> Y [134:14] >> So, McLaren goes so far, they even [134:18] forbid all members of their team from [134:21] entering the energy station. Like, it's [134:23] like a fireable offense if you're [134:25] caught. [134:26] >> No fun. And honestly, like you're gonna [134:28] go have drinks, you're probably gonna [134:29] share team secrets. It's probably a good [134:30] policy. [134:31] >> Exactly. Exactly. So, one night, back to [134:35] Christian her and the strategy of like, [134:37] how do we actually start building a [134:38] winning team here? He clandestinely [134:42] invites McLaren's [134:45] legendary technical director over to the [134:49] energy station for a chat late at night [134:54] against rules. And that technical [134:57] director just happened to be a man named [134:59] Adrien Newi, the single most legendary [135:05] >> car designer probably in history. [135:09] >> The way people talk about Adrien Newui [135:11] is basically the same way that they talk [135:13] about Kelly Johnson from Skunk Works [135:16] from our Loheed Martin episode. And I've [135:18] I've heard the comment from more than [135:19] one person. It's like he can see air. [135:22] Yes, he is a savant of aerodynamic [135:26] design [135:26] >> and Adrien's book is great talking about [135:28] sort of his career in F1 and what he's [135:30] learned. Uh he still draws by hand. [135:34] >> Yeah. Yeah. In the age of CAD and AI and [135:38] everything. [135:38] >> He just sort of like envisions [135:41] physical forms of cars, how air will [135:44] flow around them and then draws with a [135:46] pencil. [135:47] >> Yep. [135:49] So her and Dietrich [135:52] lure Newi into joining Red Bull. And [135:56] this is how they build a winning team. [135:59] It takes a couple years to ramp, but [136:01] starting in 2010, so what's that? Five [136:05] seasons after they enter the league, uh, [136:09] Red Bull starts a run of four [136:12] consecutive drivers and constructor's [136:15] titles [136:16] >> from 2010 to 2013. and importantly for [136:21] the product on the field. Up until this [136:23] point, [136:25] the racing had gotten pretty boring [136:28] because Ferrari had been on this huge [136:32] run where Michael Schumacher was just [136:34] dominating the sport and like blowing [136:36] away all competition. [136:37] >> Well, I mean, there were some years [136:39] where it really came down to the wire or [136:41] didn't go shoe marker's way. But if you [136:43] were an F1 fan in the '9s and early [136:45] 2000s, it is totally fair to say there [136:48] was Schumacher and then there was [136:50] everyone else. [136:50] >> Yeah. And that had started to fade, as [136:52] we'll get into in a minute. [136:54] >> And was this Sebastian Viddlele in 2010 [136:56] that kicked off the Red Bull run? [136:58] >> Yep. This starts a new dynasty within F1 [137:04] of an energy drink company. [137:06] >> I know. And it's so fun watching. I [137:08] mean, it's they they are truly a central [137:11] figure of the drive to survive [137:13] narrative. Uh, starting with Sebastian [137:15] all the way through, you know, Max is [137:17] arguably the best driver in the sport [137:20] today. And so, it's so fascinating that [137:22] he's on an energy drink team, [137:24] >> right? The most insane thing about Red [137:26] Bull, I think, is [137:29] I used to think they were like a [137:31] sponsor, like, oh, this energy drink [137:32] company uses F1 for marketing, but they [137:36] have developed so much competency in [137:38] actually being a constructor that [137:41] >> they're building a car, right? Like a [137:43] like a road car. [137:45] >> Yeah. They're like a real car company [137:46] now. [137:47] >> Yeah. [137:47] >> Not technically road, but track. So, [137:49] they're building a super car. limited [137:50] production and all that, but like a car [137:53] that you can go buy and race on a [137:55] racetrack. I think it's the RB17. [137:58] It's the last thing Adrian Newui did [138:00] when he was there is design this car. [138:02] And I mean, you look around like what [138:04] does a car company do? It makes the [138:05] body. It makes the power units. Red Bull [138:08] has Red Bull power trains, which is a [138:10] lot of former Honda people that they've [138:13] sort of hired and now they're working [138:14] with Ford. But like they they do a lot [138:17] of the things that a car company does. [138:20] >> Yep. It's an incredible story. And as [138:24] you start to think about dragging this [138:25] sport kicking and screaming into the [138:28] 21st century and positioning for the [138:31] social media era, you could imagine that [138:34] uh this is a really good thing. So [138:36] meanwhile during this era, as we alluded [138:40] to earlier, there is another hugely [138:44] successful team that builds its own [138:47] dynasty [138:48] >> that comes out of nowhere, [138:49] >> also gets purchased for one British [138:53] pound. [138:57] And uh listeners, I suspect unless you [139:01] are a hardcore F1 fan, you probably will [139:04] not be able to guess what team this is, [139:07] but see if you can figure it out as we [139:09] go along. [139:10] >> But who is it in 2006, David? What is [139:14] what does the team start as? [139:16] >> So, we talked a second ago about Michael [139:18] Schumacher's dominance of the league in [139:21] the late 90s and early 2000s at Ferrari. [139:24] Side note, did you know he is one of the [139:26] first athletes to pass a billion dollar [139:29] in career earnings? It was apparently [139:31] right around the same time as Tiger [139:33] Woods. [139:33] >> No way. I didn't know that. [139:35] >> Yes. [139:35] >> How? [139:36] >> Michael Schumacher was getting paid $60 [139:38] million a year. [139:39] >> Wow. [139:40] >> In that era. Like that's what Max and [139:42] Lewis make today. [139:44] >> Today. [139:44] >> And and with all the inflation that's [139:46] happened with the growth of the sport. I [139:48] mean, this illustrates just how much [139:50] Ferrari is perfectly willing to burn [139:53] money to win. Like they they will [139:56] generate an infinite amount of losses in [139:58] order to win in Formula 1. You had the [140:01] driver of his generation, sort of the [140:03] the person who took the torch post Senna [140:05] and is so obviously the best driver. [140:07] >> And obviously, you know, most athletes [140:10] that you would think of who be have [140:12] become billionaires didn't become [140:14] billionaires because of their sport [140:16] salaries, right? It was off the field, [140:17] but [140:18] >> and Shoemarker had a lot of off the- [140:19] field stuff, too. Interesting. [140:21] Interesting. Huh. All right. Well, so [140:24] one thing we didn't talk about in [140:26] Shoemarker's dominance at Ferrari was [140:29] like, yes, it was him. He was the driver [140:31] of his generation, [140:34] but it was also the engineering team [140:37] behind him. and specifically the [140:40] engineering team led by technical [140:43] director at Ferrari at the time, Ross [140:47] Braun. [140:48] >> Okay. And the whole tires thing. We got [140:49] to talk about that. [140:50] >> Okay. Well, well, I'm going to get into [140:51] it. So, so what Braun realized, maybe [140:54] not first, but I think better than [140:56] anybody, was the dynamic we talked about [140:59] earlier, that after the FAA started [141:02] clamping down so much on the rules, the [141:04] way to win was to exploit loopholes. So [141:08] Braraw figured out a whole bunch of [141:10] stuff together with Schumacher [141:13] >> and Schumacher's work ethic was [141:15] unbelievable. I mean there's another [141:17] great documentary that people should [141:18] watch, Schumacher on Netflix, but he was [141:20] like a driver and an engineer or like a [141:23] driver and a mechanic. He's always in [141:25] the garage. He's there at all hours. [141:27] He's getting as many test laps in as he [141:29] can. And this is an era where you could [141:30] do that. He's spending, you know, if [141:33] he's not on the track and he's not in [141:36] the garage, then he's working out and [141:38] he's his work ethic is just like [141:40] unbelievable. [141:40] >> Yeah. He's an animal. He's like he's the [141:42] Max Verstoppen of his era, [141:45] >> but he's got a wrench in his hand and [141:46] he's like, he's also ultimate [141:48] collaborator for the engineers. [141:49] >> Yes. So, they figure out that there's a [141:53] loophole with the way tires work in F1. [141:57] So for a brief period of time, you could [141:59] pick between one of two tire [142:02] manufacturers. Bridgestone had a big [142:04] issue. So almost everyone said, "Oh, [142:07] we're going to move away from [142:08] Bridgestone to Michelin." And Ferrari [142:10] and Ross Bronn in particular realized, [142:12] "Well, wait a minute. If we're the only [142:15] ones that stick with Bridgestone, like [142:18] yeah, it's counterintuitive to do that [142:19] because like these tires apparently have [142:20] a big problem, but like if we send a [142:22] bunch of engineers over there, they send [142:23] a bunch of over engineers over here, we [142:25] can effectively have custommade tires [142:28] just for our car and just for Michael's [142:31] driving style. And so they spent a year [142:34] working together basically getting to [142:36] develop their own custom tires whereas [142:39] everyone else who were on the Michelins [142:40] had to use this sort of like common [142:42] denominator tire that worked with all [142:44] the cars and all the driving styles. [142:45] >> Yep. It's important we should note here [142:47] for folks who are not deep F1 fans. [142:51] The one I think maybe the only part of [142:54] F1 cars that commonmandated across the [142:58] whole league [142:59] >> tires in the halo. [143:00] >> Tires in the halo. Yep. Yep. Whereas if [143:02] you look at like NASCAR or like other [143:04] motorsports out there, a lot of stuff is [143:06] mandated to be common and like the [143:08] degrees of freedom of parts of the car [143:11] that you can actually engineer is like [143:12] much much much narrower. It's part of [143:14] what makes F1 unique is and and so [143:16] expensive is that every car truly is [143:19] custom engineered except for the halo [143:21] and the tires. [143:22] >> Yeah. Teams are designing their own [143:24] bolts. [143:25] >> Yes. Yes. So here, Bronn and Schumacher [143:29] and Ferrari are like, "Oh, wow. We just [143:31] found a way to custom engineer our own [143:32] tires." Like, "Hell yeah." So that was a [143:35] big part of Schumacher and Ferrari's [143:37] dynasty. [143:39] >> So the FIA eventually closes the tire [143:42] loophole. Braun leaves Ferrari and [143:47] becomes the team principal of Honda, [143:51] which he joins in 2007 ahead of the 2008 [143:55] season. Now, remember we said a minute [143:58] ago that in 2008 with the financial [143:59] crisis, Honda exits the sport. [144:03] >> Yep. [144:03] >> So, Braun is one year into the job and [144:06] they come to him and they're like, [144:08] "Ah, sorry, we're going to shut the team [144:12] down. We got to get out of the sport. [144:14] Like, this is untenable in this [144:16] environment. We can't be operating an F1 [144:19] team. Braun is scrambling. He just went [144:21] from like top of the world at Ferrari to [144:24] getting to be team principal at Honda [144:26] and now he's out of a job with, as good [144:29] as he is, no real prospects for another [144:30] one because this is bad times for the [144:32] sport. [144:33] >> And there are very limited chairs in [144:35] this world. [144:36] >> Yes. So, he's scrambling and he's like, [144:39] "Wait, wait, wait, wait a minute, Honda, [144:43] you're worried about looking bad to the [144:47] public and shareholders by continuing to [144:49] operate an F1 team in this climate. You [144:52] know what's going to make you look even [144:54] worse? If you lay off the like thousand [144:57] people that are part of this team. So, [145:00] how about instead instead [145:03] >> you just give me some time. Yeah, you [145:05] don't I understand you might need to lay [145:07] everyone off. Look, that business [145:08] reality. Give me a few months and I will [145:12] find a buyer for the team. I just need [145:15] you to keep everyone employed so that [145:17] there's something to sell. [145:19] >> Yes. Yes. [145:20] >> Looks around, can't find anything as you [145:23] would expect. Come [145:24] >> 2008, the world's falling apart. [145:26] >> Back to Honda and says, "Look, I know we [145:27] have very limited time left. We're not [145:28] going to find another buyer. [145:30] >> What about a management buyout?" [145:32] >> Yeah, I'll take it off your hands. And [145:34] when I say buyout, I'm also not really [145:38] going to give you any money. [145:39] >> Yeah. [145:40] >> But what if what if [145:45] there's some period of time where you [145:46] agree to keep funding people's salaries, [145:48] I'll give you one British pound. Yep. [145:51] >> You give me the team and then at some [145:53] point you're fully out, but we have some [145:55] sort of consulting agreement in the [145:57] meantime. some some contract [145:59] >> you know run way down to you know do a [146:02] soft landing here for the team and these [146:04] people [146:04] >> but you get to tell your board and the [146:05] shareholders that like you are no longer [146:07] wasting money on this extraneous thing [146:09] >> and you're not going to lay off you know [146:11] a thousand people in England [146:12] >> y [146:13] >> y [146:14] >> so apparently I don't know if you read [146:16] this Bernie of course gets wind of [146:18] what's going on [146:19] >> oh Bernie does not like Ross Bron [146:21] >> he does no no no he doesn't like Braraw [146:23] anyway he definitely doesn't like [146:25] somebody else buying a team for one [146:28] pound. He tries to swoop in and convince [146:30] the Honda board that they should sell it [146:31] to him instead. [146:32] >> Oh, I didn't realize that. [146:33] >> Yes. Yes. Yes. Never mind that he's like [146:37] head of F1. [146:38] >> Yeah. Well, [146:39] >> he's still willing to buy the team. [146:40] >> He just generally doesn't like the idea [146:42] that there's a transaction that doesn't [146:43] go through him. [146:44] >> Yes. Or or that there's a good deal to [146:47] be had and he's not getting in on it. [146:48] Great drama. If only this drama could be [146:50] televised. [146:52] >> In fact, there is a great Keanu Reeves [146:54] documentary. [146:55] >> Yes. Yes. It's called Braun. [146:57] >> called Braun on this team. It's awesome. [146:59] >> Anyway, back to the story at hand. [147:02] Amazingly, Honda doesn't go with Bernie. [147:05] The board decides, you know what? We're [147:07] going to stick with who br us. We'll [147:09] sell the team to you, Ross, for one [147:12] pound. But when we say we're out, we'll [147:16] fund you for the year, but we're really [147:18] out. We're not going to give you an [147:19] engine anymore. [147:21] >> Right. That's So Ross is like, "But [147:22] surely I can just like enter into a [147:24] commercial agreement and pay you like [147:26] $15 million or, you know, whatever it is [147:28] to be the engine supplier and and you'll [147:30] give me an engine. Like you've already [147:33] made the engines in the years past. [147:34] They're going to be the same or similar. [147:36] >> This used to be your team, [147:37] >> right?" [147:38] >> Nope. They're like, "This is where we [147:39] draw the line. We can't be putting any [147:42] more money besides the salaries of these [147:44] people into F1." [147:46] >> So quick pause. Uh it is worth noting [147:49] every team makes their own engines. [147:50] There's only at any given time a handful [147:52] of engine suppliers. And so like [147:54] Mercedes today makes the engine for the [147:57] Mercedes car, but McLaren also goes and [148:00] buys the engine from Mercedes. So this [148:02] is like a reasonably common. [148:05] >> Yeah. Ferrari will supply engines to [148:07] other teams. [148:08] >> Cadillac is racing in a a Ferrari [148:10] engine. [148:11] >> Yep. Yep. Yep. Exactly. So Ross is [148:13] desperate. He goes and chats with [148:16] Mercedes who, as you said, Ben, have [148:19] been out of the sport since I think 1955 [148:22] or whatever we said earlier. [148:23] >> Yeah, they at this point in time do not [148:25] have a team and since that horrific [148:27] crash all those decades before, y [148:30] >> not in F1. [148:30] >> Not in F1, but they had been supplying [148:33] engines to McLaren. So, Mercedes says, [148:37] "Okay, Ross Braun. [148:39] We have our McLaren relationship that's [148:42] very important to us, but we respect you [148:45] and your body of work at Ferrari, and we [148:46] respect what you're trying to do here. [148:49] We will supply you an engine for 2009. [148:51] You know, we're we're still loyal to [148:53] McLaren, but like we will give you an [148:55] engine so that you can compete with your [148:57] team this season and not shut it down." [148:59] >> And it like it sort of doesn't fit in [149:01] the chassis that Honda had developed. [149:04] They had to like do some real [149:06] aftermarket janky stuff. So, everyone [149:08] thinks this car is going to absolutely [149:09] suck. [149:10] >> Suck. Yes. Suck. [149:11] >> Oh, by the way, the team is called Brawn [149:14] GP. It's not even like a real company. [149:16] They The team just looked at Ross Braraw [149:18] and they were like, "You're a leader, so [149:20] how about calling it Braun?" Like the [149:21] whole [149:22] >> Yeah. They couldn't even line up a title [149:23] sponsor. [149:23] >> And they're even landing sponsors for [149:25] like individual races because they can't [149:28] actually land for [149:29] >> the financial crisis. Nobody wants to [149:30] Yeah, exactly. [149:31] >> The whole thing. Nobody expects anything [149:34] performance-wise [149:35] >> out of this team. [149:36] >> Yes. [149:37] >> Well, it turns out that before the Honda [149:41] engineers [149:43] got pulled away back to Japan. [149:46] They had come up with a new aerodynamic [149:51] innovation called the double diffuser. [149:54] >> Oh yes. [149:55] >> I have no idea how this thing works. I [149:57] just know that it performs like a beast. [149:59] And most things you read about it really [150:01] don't explain how it works either. In [150:03] general, what diffusers do is they [150:06] direct the air flow that is coming out [150:08] from the bottom of the car uh up and [150:13] sort of out of the way to ideally shape [150:15] the aerodynamics as the air escapes the [150:18] back of the car. [150:19] >> Somehow they came up with a double [150:21] version of it. [150:22] >> But everyone's challenging it at the [150:24] beginning of the season going, "Wait, [150:25] wait, wait. This isn't legal. It [150:27] performs so well that by mid-season [150:30] everyone else has adopted double [150:32] diffuser too. [150:33] >> Yeah. I mean you're burying the lead [150:35] which is first race of the season in [150:38] Australia in Melbourne. These two Braraw [150:41] GP Franken cars roll out and they win [150:44] first and second place. [150:46] >> Like they blow away the field. Uh Jensen [150:48] Button who was the the first driver on [150:50] the team. He wins six of the first seven [150:53] races of the season. Uh, it's like [150:56] sending the sport into chaos. [150:59] >> Yes. And I I wish I had known this, [151:02] David. We had just started our research [151:04] on F1. [151:05] >> And we met Jensen. [151:06] >> We met Jensen. We went to the Las Vegas [151:08] Grand Prix with Service Now. And part of [151:10] the whole weekend of festivities they [151:12] had planned for us was a lunchon with [151:14] Jensen Button. He was telling the [151:15] stories of the Bron GP. I did not [151:17] appreciate this is the outlier of [151:19] outliers. No, no team has been on this [151:22] shoestring of a budget with this type of [151:24] Franken car uh and this real [151:28] underdogness and performed in such [151:30] spectacular success the way they did. [151:32] >> Yeah. Usually it's like either you're [151:34] Ferrari and you invest hundreds and [151:36] hundreds of millions of dollars or [151:38] you're Red Bull, you hire away Adrian [151:40] Newui and even then it takes several [151:42] years to develop a winning car. This [151:45] just doesn't happen in F1. [151:46] >> No. And so David, how does the season [151:48] end? So by like a hair's width, Jensen [151:54] and Braun had accumulated enough of a [151:57] lead in the first half of the season [152:00] that even though they don't win a single [152:02] race in the second half of the season [152:04] after everybody else also figures out [152:05] the double diffusers, they still end up [152:08] winning both the constructors and the [152:11] drivers championships. [152:14] So, in one year, this team and Ross [152:16] Braun went from like new Honda team [152:19] principal to nearly out of the sport to [152:22] owner of his own team for one pound to [152:26] world champion. [152:27] >> This is what makes F1 great. It's It's [152:30] really not watching the races. The The [152:32] races are fine. There's not that much [152:34] passing. Once you get through the first [152:37] turn, you know, you kind of know who's [152:40] most likely to win. and it's probably [152:42] from one of the top four teams anyways. [152:44] It's not any given Sunday the way that [152:46] that NFL game is. [152:48] >> But this act of heroics and teamwork and [152:53] personality and perseverance [152:55] >> and engineering [152:56] >> and engineering like this is what makes [152:58] F1 great. [153:00] >> So there's just one problem for the you [153:02] know new world champions. They don't [153:04] have funding for the next year. Uh, [153:08] there's no way, as cool as it would be [153:11] to continue the Cinderella story. [153:14] Braun GP and its current financial state [153:17] and ownership can't continue for the [153:20] 2010 season. [153:21] >> Yeah, [153:22] >> there's just not enough money to invest [153:23] in developing the next car, etc., etc. [153:27] So, Ross knows that he has to sell the [153:29] team. And of course, who's the logical [153:33] buyer now? Mercedes. [153:37] They don't currently have a motorsport [153:38] team. They clearly are interested. [153:41] >> They make your engine. [153:43] >> Make the engine. They've just had all of [153:46] this success with Brawn. Yeah, they have [153:50] the strategic partnership with McLaren, [153:52] but like, hey, what's McLaren compared [153:55] to an opportunity to own their own team? [153:59] So, they announce in the offseason that [154:01] they're dumping McLaren. Mercedes is and [154:04] buying a 75% majority share in brawn for [154:08] $200 million and renaming the team to [154:13] Mercedes. the storied Mercedes team that [154:19] you know of today where Lewis Hamilton [154:22] won six drivers championships and the [154:25] team won eight straight constructors [154:27] championships is the team that rises out [154:30] of the ashes of Braun GP. [154:32] >> Incredible. Just incredible. The first [154:34] thing they do after they buy their team, [154:36] they're so excited. They hire Michael [154:39] Schumacher to come out of retirement. [154:42] Lewis Hamilton is still a young kid at [154:43] this point in time. They hire Schumacher [154:46] out of retirement to come reunite with [154:48] Braun, the dream team, and you know, [154:52] drive this monster car. Yeah. Doesn't [154:56] work out. [154:56] >> It's like Jordan on the Wizards. [154:57] >> Yeah. This is the Jordan and the Wizards [154:59] era. [155:00] >> Although, I mean, I was going to say [155:01] it's like Tom Brady, but Tom Brady won a [155:03] Super Bowl with the Bucks. So, [155:04] >> yeah. Yeah. No, Schumacher and Braun and [155:06] Mercedes do not win another Super Bowl. [155:10] Everybody else had picked up the double [155:11] diffuser and that that really was the [155:13] advantage that they had. It wasn't any [155:15] more than that. [155:16] >> And I think Mercedes thought they were [155:19] buying something that had somewhat of a [155:23] durable advantage. You know, oh maybe [155:25] you've started thinking about next year. [155:28] The team really hadn't. And so there's [155:30] sort of this realization at Mercedes of, [155:31] oh crap, we bought a lemon. [155:33] >> Yeah. we need to put hundreds of [155:35] millions of dollars into this on top of [155:38] that stake that we already bought. And [155:41] to Mercedes's credit, they did. I mean, [155:44] they they could have cut their losses [155:46] and said, "Ah, this doesn't make sense [155:47] for us." And instead, they built [155:50] arguably the best Formula 1 team to ever [155:53] exist across multiple decades. [155:56] >> Well, they bring on a partner. [156:01] >> Yes. [156:02] So, after a couple years of Schumacher [156:04] and Braun, [156:05] >> Braun, by the way, who bought the team [156:07] for a pound and then sold 75% of it for [156:10] $200 million. [156:11] >> Yeah, he's doing just fine. [156:14] But after a couple years, Mercedes [156:15] decides this isn't working. They fire [156:18] Braraw and Schumacher, which is crazy. [156:21] Who fires Michael Schumacher, [156:22] >> right? [156:23] >> Mercedes F1. This is what happens. and [156:26] they make two key hires in each of their [156:29] places. As team principal, they bring in [156:33] Austrian businessman who previously had [156:36] been an investor in the Williams F1 team [156:40] named Toto Wolf. And again, if you watch [156:44] Drive to Survive, you definitely know [156:46] Toto. [156:47] >> Yep. [156:47] >> Probably the best Formula 1 team [156:49] executive in history. Certainly by [156:51] valuation increase. [156:52] >> Yes. Yeah. I've got some numbers for you [156:54] later on why. [156:55] >> Yes. Okay. So, put a put a pin in that. [156:58] Who could you possibly hire to replace [157:00] Michael Schumacher as your number one [157:03] driver on the Mercedes team? Well, [157:05] obviously you know the answer. A young [157:08] British racing driver, Lewis Hamilton. [157:11] >> Yep. [157:11] >> Yep. So, Toto Lewis and then the other [157:15] driver they bring on, Nico Rosberg, as [157:17] you said, Ben, would go on to win eight [157:19] constructors championships in a row. And [157:22] Nico won the drivers championship one of [157:25] those teammates Lewis. Yeah. [157:27] >> So it's not even like, oh well, they had [157:28] Lewis Hamilton, so how good was the car [157:30] really? It's like, no, [157:31] >> no, no, it was the car. [157:32] >> The one year that Lewis didn't win, Nico [157:35] won. [157:36] >> Yep. Certainly the most dominant run in [157:38] the history of the sport. And this ended [157:40] Red Bull's own run. But what was so [157:43] great for the sport during this period [157:46] is it's not like the shoeer era where [157:50] the top team is just blowing away the [157:52] field. You now have this great drama of [157:55] the fight every season between Mercedes [157:58] and [157:59] >> is it Vettle? Is it Hamilton? Is it the [158:02] young upand cominging Versappen? [158:04] >> Yes. Yes. It's these epic dramas that [158:08] are playing out on the track and really [158:11] it's these two teams that create the [158:14] modern era for the teams and for the [158:17] sport. I mean Christian Horner at Red [158:20] Bull and and certainly Toto at Mercedes. [158:24] They are a totally new breed of team [158:26] principles. These guys are CEOs and and [158:29] Zack Brown at McLaren is also he [158:31] actually is the CEO. [158:32] >> He's literally not the team principal. [158:34] He is just the CEO. [158:35] >> He's just the CEO. They're playing roles [158:39] that nobody at the team level had ever [158:41] played before except Enzo Ferrari and [158:45] Bernie. And Bernie, of course, had [158:47] greater aspirations. [158:49] >> They're building these businesses. [158:50] They're not just building race cars and [158:52] and race teams. [158:53] >> Yep. So, just to quickly take the [158:55] Mercedes example, Ross Braun buys it in [158:59] 2008 2009 for one pound from Honda. [159:03] Mercedes buys it a year later or 75% of [159:06] it for200 million pounds. [159:09] Today, Mercedes is worth6 billion under [159:14] Toto. Not not Mercedes, the car company. [159:17] The Mercedes racing team alone [159:20] just did a minority transaction valuing [159:23] the team at $6 billion. [159:25] >> Yes. That is what, twice as much as all [159:29] the cash that Bernie pulled out of F1 in [159:33] its entirety during his heyday just for [159:36] one team. [159:37] >> Yep. And speaking of valuations and [159:41] Bernie and cashing out [159:44] in 2016, [159:47] as all this is taking place, F1 finally [159:50] lands in the right set of hands to [159:53] shepherd the sport going forward. Yep. [159:58] So, starting a few years after CVC and [160:02] Bernie reacquired [160:06] F1 the league, [160:08] CBC starts reselling minority pieces of [160:12] F1 to other asset managers out there, [160:16] including BlackRock, um the Norwegian [160:18] Sovereign Wealth Fund, Noris Bank at [160:21] increasing valuations. [160:24] They also load F1 up with a bunch of [160:26] debt again and pull cash out. They [160:29] actually put $4 billion dollar of debt [160:32] on the league. I mean, this is what [160:33] private equity does, but [160:35] >> and the cash flows are growing at F1, [160:37] like thanks to the new races and the [160:39] increasing TV contracts, etc., etc. But [160:43] by 2016, CBC is now down to a 35% [160:49] ownership stake. They've pulled out a [160:53] total of $4.5 billion dollars of cash [160:56] through a combination of the debt and [160:58] equity sales. Remember, they and Bernie [161:00] only put in 900 million to start. And [161:04] they still own the largest single stake [161:08] in 35% in the league. But it's time for [161:13] a transition of power, shall we say, a [161:16] full exit. [161:17] >> And we've checked in a few different [161:19] times along the way. What is Formula 1 [161:21] at this point? Cuz it was the weird [161:23] Bernie entities and then it was the [161:25] holding company in his wife's name. [161:27] >> Yeah. [161:28] >> At this point, it is a company that is [161:30] owned by CBC. [161:33] >> But interestingly, a thing to know is [161:34] that company doesn't actually own the [161:37] sport. [161:38] >> But what it does have, did you find this [161:40] David? The 2001 deal [161:41] >> 100year uh management rights. Yeah. The [161:44] the key asset that this company owns is [161:47] in 2001, [161:50] Bernie had secured the 100-year [161:53] commercial rights to Formula 1 from the [161:57] FIA [161:58] >> in a no bid process. [161:59] >> In a no bid process for $360 million. [162:04] When you think what is the asset really, [162:07] the asset is the right to run the [162:12] business of what FIA defines as Formula [162:16] 1. [162:16] >> Yeah. So basically all the commercial [162:18] activities except team sponsorships [162:21] which are the providence of the teams [162:23] and race tickets which are the [162:25] providence of the promoters. [162:26] >> And there's some other little things [162:28] that the teams make money on and that [162:30] the promoters make money on but but [162:31] basically yes. So, in September of 2016, [162:34] it finally gets announced that the [162:36] American media company Liberty Media is [162:39] acquiring F1 [162:42] for $4.4 billion of equity value and [162:46] assuming all of the outstanding debt [162:48] that the company has for a combined [162:51] total enterprise value of $8 billion. [162:55] Now, the way they do it is interesting. [162:57] uh Liberty and John Malone and Greg [163:00] Mafay. We've talked about Liberty many [163:02] times over the years. Unacquired. They [163:04] are masters of deals and financial [163:07] engineering. The way they do it, they [163:10] initially acquire a like 18 19% stake in [163:16] F1 from CVC. So enough to make them the [163:20] largest shareholder. And then they [163:23] actually changed the whole name of [163:25] Liberty Media, the company, the publicly [163:27] traded company into the Formula One [163:30] group, create a new tracking stock to [163:33] track the value of F1 Group, [163:37] >> FW [163:38] K or Funk as the investment community [163:41] refers to it. [163:42] >> I know. It's so great. And then they [163:44] issue flunk shares to the remaining [163:48] equity holders including CBC and Bernie [163:51] etc. such that a 100% of the company is [163:54] now liquid and publicly traded. The [163:57] completely fascinating thing about [163:58] Liberty Media today is it sort of [164:00] doesn't exist anymore. They bought F1, [164:05] then they did enough other spin-offs [164:08] through the Atlanta Braves spin-off, [164:10] through Liberty Live, the the Live [164:13] Nation spin-off. At this point, like 90% [164:16] of Liberty itself is Formula 1 and the [164:20] stock is actually Formula 1. It's like [164:22] they spun out everything else that was [164:25] left and so the holding company is [164:27] actually basically Formula 1 now. And so [164:30] the plan that they announced is that [164:33] former Fox and News Corp executive Chase [164:36] Kerry, who had been president and COO of [164:39] News Corp, would become chairman of F1, [164:43] but that Bernie would remain as CEO. [164:47] Now, Chase Kerry had been a total legend [164:51] at Fox. I mean, I remember him when I [164:53] worked at News Corp and at Dow Jones. [164:56] Chase helped Rupert launch Fox Sports [165:00] and built the whole Fox NFL program. [165:04] >> Like [165:08] that was Chase. So he's the right man [165:10] for the job. And he brings over a team [165:12] of like all the NFL OGs, Fox and NFL [165:18] OGs. So Sean Bratche who had been one of [165:21] the key people who had built ESPN during [165:24] its kind of parallel rise with Sports [165:26] Center and comes and joins the team and [165:29] the whole thesis is that Formula 1 is [165:33] this incredible sport, incredible fan [165:36] base, incredible asset, [165:38] and we can see with what's going on at [165:42] Red Bull and at Mercedes that like it's [165:45] going to crush in the modern era. it [165:47] just needs the right management to like [165:49] get out of the way and let this happen [165:51] >> and that Bernie had sort of [165:53] systematically underinvested which which [165:56] created opportunity. So [165:58] >> yes, [165:58] >> there was almost no US market [166:00] development. I mean they by this point [166:02] they had circuit of the Americas in [166:05] Austin uh but no other US races yet. [166:09] There was very limited sort of [166:10] storytelling around the sport and [166:12] digital investment. There was no social [166:14] media presence. The property was mostly [166:18] behind like a closed pay wall with [166:20] restricted ass access especially in the [166:22] US and really it was about old white [166:25] guys with money as the demographic. So [166:27] is this like if you kind of like looked [166:29] at it with a modern media company [166:32] approach you're like oh there's low [166:35] hanging fruit everywhere here [166:37] >> asset just waiting to be unlocked. [166:39] >> Yes. So pretty quickly when Chase and [166:43] Liberty come in, um it becomes clear [166:45] that there's not enough room for two [166:47] bosses in F1 of Chase being chairman and [166:50] Bernie remaining as CEO. I mean really [166:53] there as long as Bernie's there, there's [166:54] not room for anyone else to run [166:57] anything. [166:58] Mhm. [166:59] >> So on January 23rd, 2017, after they had [167:03] announced the acquisition the previous [167:04] fall, Liberty announces that Bernie is [167:09] stepping down as CEO. He will become [167:11] honorary chairman emeritus and an [167:13] advisor to the board of directors of F1, [167:17] but not actually on the board. So in [167:20] other words, Liberty fires him. I mean, [167:23] they had to. There's no way that they [167:26] could do what they wanted to do and and [167:29] what needed to be done as long as he was [167:32] still there holding the reigns. [167:33] >> This is a classic what got you here [167:35] won't get you there situation. [167:37] >> Yeah. [167:38] >> All that stuff that Bernie did no doubt [167:41] built the sport and created the sport [167:43] and the way in which it needed to go [167:46] from here. Bernie could do almost none [167:49] of those things and was probably holding [167:50] it back at this point. [167:51] >> Yep. Yep. So, I was doing the math on [167:54] his run. What year did he sort of start [167:58] becoming the steward of Formula 1? [168:00] >> 1972. [168:02] >> And he left in 2017. [168:06] >> Long run, [168:07] >> 45 year run. I can't think of a sport, a [168:11] sporting league in the world that was [168:13] basically controlled by a person for [168:16] almost half a century like that. The [168:18] closest that I can think of is Pete [168:21] Riselle, 30 years at the helm of the [168:24] NFL. [168:25] >> Yep. [168:26] >> Yeah. So, Chase takes over as CEO and he [168:31] and Liberty know they have their work [168:33] cut out for them. So, they come up with [168:36] a fourpoint plan. Number one, most [168:40] importantly, they need to fix the [168:43] relationships with the teams. Thanks to [168:46] Red Bull and Mercedes, teams had started [168:48] to become more successful financially, [168:51] more businessminded on their own, but [168:54] the relationship with Formula 1, the [168:56] league was still like highly contentious [168:59] through all of this. Arguably even more [169:01] so as they were growing in power under [169:03] Bernie. [169:04] >> So the cost cap is the obvious thing to [169:08] do. And like we said, really it it was [169:10] the indication of how broken things were [169:12] before that Bernie and the FIA couldn't [169:16] get it done and it resulted in the photo [169:18] breakaway attempt. Like [169:20] >> cuz if you don't have a cost cap, you [169:21] are just going to have teams that have [169:24] some either independent funding or some [169:27] other business that lets them go [169:29] hundreds of millions of dollars into the [169:31] red, which basically means everyone [169:33] needs to to compete with them. Which [169:35] means that other than those 1 2 3 four [169:38] teams, you're just going to keep [169:40] churning your bottom six on the grid [169:43] over and over and over again because [169:44] they can't run a viable business. [169:46] >> So number one priority is they got to [169:49] fix the teams, which they do in the [169:52] first Concord agreement that Liberty [169:54] negotiates. They get everyone to agree [169:58] to a cost cap of $145 million in [170:02] expenses on the car. So, not including [170:05] driver salaries, that's separate. [170:08] This is huge. [170:09] >> And not including the three most [170:11] powerful executives or the highest paid [170:14] executives, not including marketing [170:17] spend. And power units are outside the [170:20] cost cap, too. So, it's a cost cap for [170:23] sure. And um you know, it it gets some [170:26] of the job done, but if you spit off a [170:28] lot of cash, there's still plenty of [170:29] ways to spend that cash to become more [170:32] successful. Yes, that is definitely [170:34] true. But I think it really does end up [170:37] functioning kind of as intended, like a [170:39] salary cap in other sports. The Cowboys [170:42] can spend a lot more on marketing than [170:44] the other teams, [170:45] >> but but they haven't been to the Super [170:46] Bowl in a while. [170:47] >> Yeah. Right. Right. Right. You know, the [170:48] amount that they can spend on, you know, [170:49] their equivalent of the car on the [170:51] field, in that case, the players is same [170:53] as everybody else. [170:54] >> And they also implement wind tunnel [170:56] restrictions. You can only spend so much [170:58] time in the wind tunnel. We already have [170:59] the restrictions on testing in season. [171:02] So there really are at this point heavy [171:05] restrictions. It's gone from 145 million [171:07] down to 135, but then it got adjusted [171:09] now up to 170 with inflation and with [171:12] adding more races because you get to add [171:14] more to the cost cap for that. But you [171:16] know, they're they're now spending every [171:18] team under 170 million. Then there were [171:21] several teams that were spending four [171:22] 500 million before. [171:24] >> This is huge. It instantly makes every [171:28] team at least close to break even. It [171:31] doesn't make every team profitable, but [171:32] it makes a lot of teams profitable. And [171:34] for the top teams, this overnight makes [171:37] them like immensely profitable. So, when [171:40] we talked about Mercedes going from [171:42] being worth one pound to6 billion, this [171:46] is why the Mercedes team is a great [171:49] business now, like an NFL level [171:51] business. [171:52] >> Yes. And Ferrari obviously hasn't [171:54] traded, but certainly is worth more than [171:57] that. And every team, as we talked about [171:59] at the top of the episode, is worth at [172:01] least a billion and a half now. [172:03] >> Yeah. So, the numbers on this now are [172:05] the average revenue per team today in [172:08] 2026 is about 430 million. About 60% of [172:12] that comes from sponsorship. And the [172:15] next highest comes from the sort of [172:17] distributions coming from Formula 1 [172:20] Group. We'll talk about how those [172:21] distributions work later, but what's [172:23] their share of meteorites and [172:25] everything. Uh then they have kind of [172:27] five to 15% uh that come from selling [172:30] merch or engines or licensing or garage [172:32] tours or what have you, but 60% is [172:35] sponsorship. Um, and so if your average [172:38] revenue team per team is around 430 [172:40] million and the cost cap is only 170 [172:42] million plus your driver plus your [172:44] marketing expenses plus your you can [172:46] kind of see how these become pretty [172:47] quickly at least break even or close to [172:50] break even businesses. [172:51] >> Now there there are some outliers uh [172:54] toward the front of the grid like you [172:55] were saying Mercedes does 800 million in [172:59] revenue now. [173:00] >> Wow. Ferrari 670, McLaren somewhere [173:03] right in that neighborhood too around 6 [173:05] 650 to 700 uh 420 for Red Bull Racing. [173:10] 15 years ago all four of those teams [173:13] were operating at a loss and 10 years [173:15] ago most of them were operating at a [173:16] loss. [173:17] >> Yeah, it's interesting back to your [173:18] point earlier about Red Bull strategy. [173:21] They could be making much more I think [173:23] and they intentionally choose not to. [173:26] >> That's exactly right. They they try to [173:27] keep their profit margin at their [173:29] operating margin at like 1% or less. [173:31] >> Yeah. [173:31] >> So McLaren now does 70ish million uh in [173:35] profit. Ferrari does about 80 million. [173:38] But the real outlier, Mercedes does an [173:41] estimated 200 million in operating [173:44] income from Formula 1 now. [173:46] >> Wow. I mean that's like the level that [173:48] Bernie was making for the whole league a [173:51] couple decades ago, [173:52] >> right? 25% operating income. [173:54] >> Yeah. And on top of being phenomenally [173:57] profitable, Toto Wolf estimated in 2021 [173:59] that Mercedes that he thinks Mercedes [174:02] gets a billion dollars of advertising [174:04] equivalent value for being involved in [174:06] the sport. [174:07] >> Yeah, easy. [174:08] >> So on $600 million of total spend last [174:10] year, Mercedes generated a double bottom [174:12] line of over a billion dollars in [174:15] marketing equivalent value plus $200 [174:17] million in actual profit. [174:19] >> I mean, think back to 10, 20 years ago. [174:22] Mercedes was just like luxury cruisers, [174:24] you know, like yeah, they had AMG, you [174:26] could get more horsepower in your [174:28] S-Class, but like nobody thought these [174:30] things were Ferraris. [174:32] >> Yeah. [174:33] >> Now they're a legitimate sports car [174:35] maker. [174:36] >> Yep. [174:37] >> We should say Total Wolf is just so [174:40] unbelievably impressive. So they're an [174:43] extreme outlier in doing 200 million a [174:45] year in operating income. And this isn't [174:48] like they're underinvesting. They are a [174:51] competitive team at the front of the [174:53] grid. So they're not holding back an R&D [174:54] investment. That $6 billion number that [174:57] you cited, David, is is real because [175:00] that is a transaction that happened [175:02] where the CEO of Crowdstrike bought into [175:05] Toto's holding company to get a sort of [175:07] proxy ownership in the team. So why does [175:09] Toto have a [175:12] uh a little holding company of his own? [175:15] Unlike all the other team principles, [175:18] Toto is a major equity owner in the [175:21] team. So when he joined the team in [175:23] 2013, he negotiated to own almost a [175:27] third of the team, which at the time the [175:30] whole team was worth about 165 million [175:33] and it's now 13 years later worth $6 [175:35] billion. [175:37] So he's now a billionaire from his team [175:40] ownership even though it's actually like [175:43] the the main owner is Mercedes. He just [175:45] managed to become a major equity owner [175:47] and that is really unique among team [175:49] principles. [175:50] >> Yeah. So that's obviously priority [175:53] number one for Liberty is we got to fix [175:56] the teams to fix the sport. less [175:59] obviously [176:01] priority number two was they had to fix [176:04] the relationships with the race [176:07] promoters with the tracks. Talk about a [176:10] stakeholder that Bernie had just been uh [176:12] extracting from [176:14] the whole calendar as we talked about a [176:17] minute ago was just designed to maximize [176:21] race fee payments to F1. There was zero [176:25] consideration or thought at the league [176:28] level about how to make the races [176:30] themselves successful. [176:33] Like how do you market each one and grow [176:36] the pie and you know avoid a situation [176:39] where you have this huge middle of the [176:40] pack of the races that nobody cares [176:42] about? That's not good for the sport. I [176:46] mean, when Liberty came in, there was so [176:48] much mistrust with the race promoters [176:52] that other than the just straight [176:54] economic fee payments, none of the races [176:57] shared anything [177:00] with F1 the league. So, no data on fan [177:04] attendance, no marketing strategies, [177:06] nothing. Well, think about just how [177:09] squeezed you were getting. You walk up [177:10] to F1 as a race promoter and say, "Hi, [177:12] I'd like to have a race, please. is I [177:14] own a racetrack and they say, "Okay, [177:16] well, [177:17] >> send back this contract and a $50 [177:18] million payment, [177:19] >> right? Pay us $20 million if you're, you [177:21] know, one of the European tracks. Pay us [177:23] $40, $50 million if you're one of these [177:26] new US ones trying to come online. Pay [177:27] us $50 to $60 million if you're a Middle [177:31] East sovereign wealth fund. Oh, and your [177:33] revenue streams, right? Well, the [177:35] Paddock Club, that's all going to belong [177:36] to us." Yeah. [177:38] >> And um the sponsorships on the [177:40] racetrack, that's going to belong to us, [177:42] too. [177:43] Um, [177:44] >> I guess you can sell tickets. [177:45] >> You can sell tickets. Uh, you should set [177:47] up some hot dog stands. I think food and [177:49] bev that that you [177:50] >> Oh, yeah. But also food and bev for [177:52] paddic club. We're doing that. [177:53] >> No cameras cuz of course we've already [177:56] sold the media rights and that [177:57] exclusively flows to us and you don't [177:59] get to participate in that. [178:01] >> So, you probably aren't going to be [178:03] profitable on this. And if you are, [178:05] certainly not in the first few years. [178:07] You might want to get your local [178:08] government to kick in. This is gonna be [178:11] great for the city, which it is. So, my [178:14] advice on getting profitable on this [178:16] thing would be go get some tax help. [178:19] Find other people's money. Yeah. [178:20] Exactly. Exactly. So, one of the first [178:23] things they do is they get all the race [178:25] promoters together, you know, in a room [178:29] and say [178:30] >> they're business partners. They should [178:31] be. [178:31] >> Yes. We're partners. We're partners. [178:33] >> They're not competing with each other. [178:35] >> We got to work together here and let's [178:37] share data. like, hey, there's a lot of [178:39] hardcore fans that like travel race to [178:42] race. Shouldn't we all be sharing data [178:43] and like marketing to those people and [178:45] getting them to come to more races in [178:46] more cities? Just no-brainer stuff. [178:49] Ultimately, the vision here, which has [178:52] mostly been realized, I think, is this [178:54] is an opportunity for 22 Super Bowls [178:58] every year [178:59] >> in cities and countries around the [179:01] world. when F1 comes to your country, [179:04] comes to your city, it is an entire [179:06] weekend that should be treated just like [179:09] the Super Bowl. So like, let us help you [179:12] make that happen. Let us help you get [179:14] musical acts. Let us help you coordinate [179:16] the celebrity attendees. Let us help you [179:20] coordinate social media. [179:21] >> Austin has been really smart about this. [179:23] The Circuit of the Americas, they've [179:25] landed Taylor Swift, Ed Sheeran, Sting, [179:28] Eminem, Gar Brooks. they really do turn [179:30] it into this just giant festival. And it [179:35] all kind of stems from uh an admission [179:39] that the race might not be that good. [179:41] So, you need to provide an experience [179:43] for everyone. Whether [179:45] >> I think they would argue that the whole [179:47] weekend needs to be great, [179:48] >> right? There's one of four teams who are [179:51] going to be on the podium and after you [179:54] do the qualifying, whoever's in poll has [179:56] like a very good chance of winning. And [179:59] um after the first turn, if there's no [180:01] crashes and after the first lap, then we [180:04] pretty much know. So I hope the rest of [180:07] the activities are fun. [180:08] >> Yeah. So fix stakeholder relations with [180:12] the tracks. Number two. [180:15] >> Number three, [180:16] >> fix stakeholder relations with the fans. [180:20] We've alluded to this a little bit, but [180:22] and Red Bull and Mercedes and Lewis [180:24] Hamilton were starting to push the [180:25] edges, but like F1 had a huge social [180:30] media problem. [180:32] Bernie and and F1 had been doing [180:36] everything they could to keep the sport [180:39] in sort of the heyday state for them of [180:42] the mid 90s where he controlled [180:45] everything. It all flowed through [180:46] Bernie. [180:47] >> Control over growth. If you have to pick [180:49] between those two things, control. [180:51] >> Yes, I control TV. I control the [180:53] presentation. I control the race fees. I [180:55] control the journalist access. I control [180:57] who gets to go where in the paddock club [180:59] and when, who gets to see what, etc., [181:02] etc., etc., It was so bad that Lewis [181:06] Hamilton when he came into the sport as [181:08] this incredible star who, you know, had [181:13] global appeal, was the first real F1 [181:16] driver to become a legit celebrity in [181:18] America, [181:19] >> the first superstar black athlete in [181:22] Formula 1, like [181:23] >> first black athlete period. There were [181:25] no other black athletes before since all [181:27] the things that Lewis Hamilton is. He [181:29] being a native millennial wanted to have [181:33] an Instagram account [181:35] >> and and that's underelling like being [181:37] one of the most fames savvy individuals [181:40] >> that too. [181:40] >> And what he had that he brought into [181:44] Liberty's office was a stack of cease [181:47] and desist letters [181:48] >> that Bernie kept sending him to take [181:51] down posts on his Instagram because he [181:53] was quote illegally distributing F1's [181:56] intellectual property. [181:59] That's how bad this was. [182:00] >> Nothing sums it up better than that. [182:02] >> Yeah. So, Liberty immediately is like, [182:04] "Yes, please, Lewis, post as much as you [182:07] want on your Instagram." [182:11] >> Yep. [182:11] >> And then finally, and related, there was [182:14] also just a whole basket of lowhanging [182:18] fruit opportunities to grow the sport. [182:21] So, one of these was esports and video [182:24] games. There had been an independent [182:26] video game studio in the UK that had [182:29] been making official F1 video games for [182:31] several years. Shortly after Liberty [182:34] acquires F1, that studio gets acquired [182:36] by Electronic Arts, makers of Madden and [182:40] FIFA that do billions of dollars of [182:43] revenue for EA and their league partners [182:46] every year. Liberty works with them. [182:49] Another initiative, again, remember [182:51] Chase and the whole crew, they're coming [182:53] from the NFL world. Among the many [182:56] things that the NFL has done so great [182:57] over the years is turning all the [183:00] offseason content into exciting [183:04] marketable events like the NFL draft. [183:06] Well, what's the equivalent of the NFL [183:08] draft for F1? The testing period. Let's [183:12] televise the testing period. Let's make [183:14] it an event. Let's generate revenue and [183:17] grow the sport. Can we generate [183:19] narrative out of it? I mean, all the [183:21] sports journalists who cover F1 right [183:23] now can't stop writing about how little [183:25] track time the Aston Martin team has [183:28] gotten because of the new crazy stuff [183:30] that, by the way, Adrien Newi is now [183:33] designing for Aston Martin. [183:34] >> He's team principal now. [183:36] >> So, he's got some new crazy design that [183:38] uh isn't, I guess, super reliable yet. [183:41] And so there's all these great, you [183:44] know, stories being talked about of how [183:46] are the drivers going to do when they've [183:47] had so little time to actually practice [183:50] with all the other drivers. This is [183:52] exactly what you want. [183:54] >> Yep. And all that was just falling on [183:56] the floor before. No engagement, no [183:59] revenue, no utilization of that. [184:02] >> Yep. [184:02] >> So then the last bucket is also pretty [184:06] obvious. We should probably go start [184:09] courting Hollywood. Uh, racing movies [184:14] seem to be pretty popular. [184:17] >> Medium popular. [184:18] >> People like them. I mean, especially for [184:20] the budgets that they've been made for [184:22] in the past. Uh, certainly this is a [184:24] sport that lends itself to visually [184:27] compelling narratives. [184:30] >> I think you're right that the initial [184:31] thing was, oh yeah, people like racing [184:33] and this is visually compelling. That [184:35] was actually wrong. That is not the [184:38] correct thesis, but it is the place to [184:39] start. [184:40] >> Yep. Of course, what we're getting at is [184:45] they end up with [184:48] I think the most impactful [184:53] piece of sports media in history, [184:56] >> ever across any sport. Absolutely. And [184:58] that is Netflix's Drive to Survive. [185:01] >> Oh, yeah. [185:03] >> All right. So they go to Netflix, these [185:07] clever F1 guys, and they say, "Hey, I I [185:10] think you should do a series." And the [185:12] initial idea, David, like you're saying, [185:14] is race cars are cool, visually [185:17] compelling, people like racing. [185:20] >> Seems like a no-brainer. [185:21] >> And what it would evolve to really, it's [185:23] a human drama. [185:25] >> Yes. [185:25] >> It's about when we said there's three [185:27] concurrent competitions. There's a [185:28] driving competition, there's the World [185:30] Cup of Engineering, and there's the [185:32] World Cup of Office Politics. It turns [185:34] out the World Cup of Office Politics is [185:36] an amazing amazing thing for a uh [185:40] effectively a reality TV show, [185:42] especially [185:42] >> the most compelling television product [185:44] >> when you then uh as secondary flare [185:48] elements layer in race cars going super [185:51] fast, [185:52] >> occasionally crashing. [185:54] >> Yes. attractive mid20s dudes in the most [185:58] extravagant amazing places on earth [186:01] swimming and being on yachts and [186:03] partying the night before your big race [186:06] and it it's it's just perfect. [186:10] >> It's incredible. But the human story, [186:12] that is the killer unlock of Drive to [186:14] Survive. [186:15] >> And it was so perfectly made for what [186:20] everybody in the sport needed at the [186:22] time because if you had made Drive to [186:26] Survive for, I don't know, let's take um [186:29] the NBA. Sure, it would have succeeded [186:33] on a lot of the dimensions you just [186:35] mentioned, but the hardcore fans would [186:38] hate it because they'd say like, "This [186:40] isn't basketball. Come on." Right? This [186:43] is just fluff for attracting new [186:45] audiences. [186:47] The thing about F1 at this moment is [186:49] everybody was so starved for access. Any [186:53] glimpse behind the curtain that even the [186:56] most hardcore petrol heads who would be [186:59] the first to say like, "Yeah, of course [187:00] this isn't the sport. This isn't F1." [187:03] They loved it, too. They'd never gotten [187:06] to peek behind the curtain. [187:08] >> All right. So, how did it come to be? [187:10] So, Netflix and Liberty start talking. [187:13] F1 was also pitching Amazon on doing [187:15] something, trying to get a little bit of [187:16] a bidding war here. Who's it going to [187:18] be? Netflix or Amazon or someone else. [187:20] Amazon already had something in the [187:21] works with Mercedes and Lewis Hamilton [187:23] that was just focused on them. But [187:26] hilariously, [187:27] F1 and Liberty control the actual track [187:30] rights. So even though Amazon was going [187:32] to get the rights to Lewis and Mercedes, [187:34] they couldn't film the documentary on [187:36] track. [187:38] So it kind of ruins the whole thing. [187:40] Ultimately, [187:42] you do need F1 to play ball. So, Amazon [187:45] ends up bidding the most for the [187:47] leaguewide thing, the thing that would [187:48] become Drive to Survive. Liberty comes [187:50] back with that bid in hand to Netflix [187:52] and says, "Hey, can you guys match [187:53] this?" Rumors are that it was about [187:57] double the Netflix bid. [187:58] >> This is the rights payment that Netflix [188:02] or Amazon would pay to F1 for the right [188:05] to go make this series, [188:07] >> which is the way it used to work. But [188:09] based on how successful Drive to Survive [188:11] has become, you don't have to pay the [188:13] sports leagues anything. [188:14] >> Netflix doesn't pay those sports [188:15] leagues. Even the NFL, they don't pay [188:17] them anymore. [188:18] >> It's such a giant giant spotlight on [188:22] your sport. Yeah. [188:23] >> You know, they're small numbers. I think [188:24] it was the order of like 5 million [188:26] versus 10 million or something like [188:27] that. But Netflix comes back and says, [188:29] you know what, we're at our ceiling, but [188:33] we do think we're the best partner for [188:34] this. So, our offer remains the same. If [188:37] you guys are really focused and really [188:39] mean it about growing the sport is the [188:40] priority here. Our global audience is [188:43] gonna grow the sport. [188:44] >> So Liberty goes for it. They say, "Yep, [188:47] we're in for the lower price." And at [188:49] this point in time, Netflix's audience [188:51] in the US was something like 2x what [188:55] Amazon's. Once Netflix secures these [188:57] rights, they then start working down a [188:59] list of production companies. Boxtobox [189:02] Films wins because they had done that [189:05] 2010 Senna documentary which is great. I [189:08] highly recommend folks find it and watch [189:10] it. BoxtoBox had already been working [189:12] with Red Bull Racing on a documentary [189:15] idea just focused on them. I had heard [189:18] rumors that the whole thing started as a [189:19] Red Bull documentary. Now it makes [189:21] sense. [189:21] >> Yes. So ultimately the Red Bull idea [189:23] gets scrapped along with that Lewis and [189:25] Mercedes idea that that Amazon was [189:27] working on that gets scrapped. Although [189:29] listeners, we have heard rumors that [189:31] that one is back in the works now with [189:33] with someone else. F1 takes a big leap [189:37] of faith and gives Netflix and boxto-box [189:40] films complete creative control and [189:42] Final Cut, which I also think is really [189:45] important that like that this this is a [189:48] highly opinionated version with full [189:51] access that is not controlled by the [189:53] sport. The other really interesting [189:55] nuance here is Netflix is like, "Yo, yo, [189:57] we make highly produced content that [190:00] doesn't come out right away. We can't [190:02] turn around a new episode every week [190:04] during the season." [190:05] >> Right? Drive to Survive comes out right [190:07] before the next season starts. Once [190:11] >> always, always a season behind. In fact, [190:13] if you're listening to this episode, [190:15] then like 3 days ago, the most recent [190:17] season of Drive to Survive will come [190:20] out. So, [190:23] Mercedes, interestingly, declines to [190:25] participate probably partly because of [190:29] the documentary that they think they [190:31] have in the works at the time with [190:33] Amazon, but also because they're [190:35] Mercedes, [190:36] >> right? This seems like a risk. [190:38] >> They've just won everything you could [190:41] possibly win like eight years in a row. [190:43] They're very profitable or they're [190:44] getting very profitable at this point. [190:46] Why would you take any risks? And then [190:48] Ferrari looks over and says, "Well, if [190:50] Mercedes is out, we're definitely out. [190:52] We're Ferrari." [190:53] >> So things are actually looking kind of [190:55] dire. Netflix is left with the bottom [190:57] eight teams. [190:58] >> And they ended up creating something [191:00] really amazing out of Daniel Ricardo. I [191:02] mean, that first episode just hooked a [191:05] lot of people after the success of [191:07] seasons one and two, which we heard was [191:09] kind of a slow burn. People loved it if [191:12] they watched it, but the algorithm [191:13] wasn't surfacing it to that many people. [191:15] And over time they sort of realized, oh [191:18] wow, this is actually applicable to many [191:20] more people than we thought. Young women [191:22] across America and the world are into [191:24] this. And we thought it was going to be [191:25] 50-year-old petrol head men or at least [191:27] we we feared that it might be. So we [191:29] sort of started in that narrow circle. [191:31] As it grows and grows and grows and [191:33] season 2 is doing well and season 3 was [191:35] this massive smash hit. Suddenly then [191:38] all the Mercedes and Ferrari partners [191:41] and sponsors are coming to them and [191:42] going why are we not in drive? not [191:45] getting these. [191:47] >> And so then of course in the later [191:48] seasons all the teams are in it. [191:50] >> Yeah. Amazing. [191:52] >> So the other thing you may remember is [191:55] seasons one and two were fully filmed, [191:59] released, and on Netflix when the [192:02] pandemic hit. [192:03] >> Yep. [192:03] >> But it was sort of like the perfect [192:05] thing for everybody to get really into [192:08] just when they were starting to get [192:09] trapped at home. And F1 actually did a [192:12] pretty amazing job of reacting to the [192:15] pandemic. Within a few months, they were [192:18] back on the track racing. They were [192:20] doing these clever sort of double [192:21] headers where they would race twice in a [192:23] row at the same track. They were [192:25] creating bubbles just like other sports [192:28] were creating bubbles. But the pandemic [192:30] was weirdly very successful for the [192:32] sport because they had drive to survive [192:35] ready to watch and the sport sort of [192:38] lent itself to their ability to recover [192:40] quickly. [192:41] >> Remember when everyone was uh building [192:43] an F1 simulator and playing the esports [192:45] too? Yeah. [192:46] >> Yes. [192:47] >> So eventually it would become the number [192:50] one Netflix show in 93 countries at [192:53] peak. And when you try to walk through [192:55] some of the numbers trying to figure out [192:56] what actually was the impact of this in [192:59] the first week, and that this is an [193:01] official reported number, there tend to [193:03] be over 500,000 [193:06] accounts that view the new season just [193:10] in that first week. And with the Netflix [193:12] stuff, it's always reasonable to [193:13] multiply it by two or three because of [193:15] password sharing. So call it like a [193:17] million and a half people that watch [193:18] just in that first release week. We [193:21] heard elsewhere that in the fullness of [193:22] time a season of drive to survive is [193:25] viewed in the sort of low tens of [193:27] millions of accounts. So again with [193:29] password sharing you could generously [193:30] assume call it 40 to 50 million unique [193:33] people would watch the show [193:35] >> which by the way that is a huge number [193:37] of people watching a single piece of you [193:40] know non-live event non-sporting event [193:43] content. [193:44] >> In fact it's um here's a funny story. I [193:46] was watching Drive to Survive the most [193:49] recent season with my wife to prep for [193:51] this episode. And while we're watching [193:54] it and Christian her getting [193:55] interviewed, I made a comment of like, [193:57] "Yeah, it's crazy. He like gets fired. [194:00] He's not with with Red Bull anymore." [194:03] And she's like, "Whoa, spoilers." [194:05] And I was like, "That happened six [194:07] months ago." Like that's it. Her mental [194:11] model is real life is irrelevant. Drive [194:13] to survive is canonical. That's the [194:16] really unique thing about this sport is [194:18] how many more people are fans of the [194:20] sport but don't watch races. [194:22] >> Yeah. And this is where the modern [194:26] media business model that Liberty came [194:28] and embraced [194:30] thrives and Bernie World never could [194:33] have realized or seen this. Everybody [194:36] still makes money even when fans only [194:39] watch Drive to Survive. Why did the [194:42] Mercedes and Ferrari sponsors pressure [194:45] them to participate? It's all the [194:47] impressions of the sponsor logos. [194:50] >> Yeah. Okay. So, impact. Obviously, Drive [194:53] to Survive worked, but how do you slice [194:55] it? How how much? What stats did you [194:57] find, David? [194:58] >> So, one part of the Liberty strategy [195:00] that we hadn't hit yet because we were [195:02] saving it for Drive to Survive was bring [195:04] this sport to America. [195:06] >> Yes. [195:07] feels like it should have an audience [195:09] here in a way that it never had under [195:12] Bernie. And so Drive to Survive was a [195:14] big part of that strategy. So if you [195:16] look at F1 viewership in the US in 2018 [195:21] before Drive to Survive launched, about [195:24] half a million Americans watched races. [195:29] In 2021, [195:31] that has doubled in three years to over [195:34] a million Americans watching F1 Grand [195:38] Prix. I don't know what percentage of [195:39] that doubling is attributable to Drive [195:41] to Survive, but it's not 10%, it's [195:44] probably more like 80%. Yep. [195:47] >> So then 3 years later on in 2024, [195:52] once there are more US races on the [195:55] calendar, which we'll get to in a [195:56] second, viewership of the Miami Grand [195:58] Prix in 2024 was 3.1 million Americans. [196:03] Now granted, that's optimal like a US [196:05] time zone, a US race, so there's natural [196:07] interest, etc. But like the idea that [196:10] 3.1 million Americans would be watching [196:13] an F1 race before Drive to Survive, [196:16] totally insane. [196:17] >> It's more than most NBA games. [196:19] >> So that's just in America. [196:21] Globally, [196:23] F1 added 73 million new fans between [196:29] 2020 and 2021 alone during the COVID [196:32] period. That's a 20% increase in fans [196:36] during CO. [196:37] >> Yeah. The stat on that in the US is that [196:40] the US now has 52 million American fans, [196:45] which has doubled since Drive to Survive [196:47] came out. [196:48] >> Most of those fans don't watch the [196:49] races, [196:50] >> right? The average viewership of a Grand [196:52] Prix in the US is about 1.3 million [196:54] people today. Miami is a giant outlier [196:57] at 3.1 million US viewers. [197:01] >> But there's all sorts of other ways that [197:03] fans can engage with F1 beyond the [197:05] races. And then probably the most [197:08] obviously directly attributable stat to [197:11] drive to survive. The percentage of F1 [197:15] audience that is women [197:18] went from 7% to there are reports out [197:20] there that it's like 40% today [197:24] >> of F1 fans or women [197:25] >> of F1 fans again not watching the races [197:28] necessarily but follow the sport are [197:31] interested in what's happening. [197:33] >> Yeah. One uh quote I heard in research [197:35] was that Liberty helped F1 move away [197:38] from the male stale and pale audience. [197:40] >> Yes, that it certainly did. Thank you, [197:43] Daniel Ricardo. [197:44] >> Yes. [197:45] >> So, staying on the America strategy for [197:47] Liberty and F1. Obviously, adding races [197:50] in the US is a big priority here. [197:54] >> I think Austin went much better than [197:55] they thought it was going to. [197:57] >> Yeah. And Austin obviously launched [197:59] before Liberty bought the sport, but [198:01] >> they make it a priority. Uh, do you know [198:03] about the previous US track record with [198:07] >> Oh, it's awful. It's so bad. [198:11] >> They raced in Long Beach at one point, [198:13] right? [198:14] >> Yeah. So, anyone who's familiar with F1 [198:15] today probably doesn't realize there [198:18] were nine different races historically [198:22] that attempted to run in the US, all of [198:24] which are defunct and they typically [198:26] only lasted a year or a few at a time. [198:29] >> So bad. The most successful one uh [198:34] longunning one was in upstate New York. [198:36] >> Yeah. Watkins Glenn, right? [198:37] >> They held Grand Prix in Phoenix. They [198:41] did have one in Vegas before, but it was [198:43] confined to just the Caesar's Palace [198:45] property and it was just like all tight [198:48] turns back and forth and back and forth [198:50] and back and forth. They were in Detroit [198:52] and they were also at the Indianapolis [198:53] Motor Speedway where the Indy500 is, but [198:56] they they never really uh made a good [198:58] impression. [198:58] >> Yeah. Well, there was a bad there was a [198:59] horrible thing where like half the teams [199:02] refused to race one year there, right? [199:04] And the fans revolted and threw stuff on [199:06] the track and like [199:07] >> Yeah, [199:07] >> it was bad. [199:08] >> Yeah. [199:09] >> So, the US track record not good. And [199:11] and then they come in and do brand new [199:14] from scratch built track for Circuit of [199:17] the Americas in Austin and does quite [199:19] well. You now have that. You've got in [199:23] the similar time zone window in the [199:25] Americas, you've got Mexico City, you've [199:28] got the Canadian Grand Prix in Montreal, [199:31] and you've got the Sa Paulo race. So, [199:33] you now have sort of four in this time [199:36] zone window. And Liberty and F1 really [199:41] go for it at this point. [199:43] >> Yes. So, pretty quickly after Liberty [199:46] buys the league, they start working on [199:48] adding another race in the US. [199:52] Uh and that becomes Miami which launches [199:54] in the 2022 season. [199:56] >> And then uh just one year later they [199:59] launch the Vegas race. But this is a [200:01] different type of race. There is no [200:03] promoter. Rather than charging a fee and [200:07] having someone else run the race, they [200:11] say, "Okay, we're going to forego the [200:14] promoter fee and we're just going to [200:15] operate this race oursel. We're going to [200:16] take all the risk and and get all the [200:18] reward." But it's a a pretty big bet [200:21] because they actually bought the real [200:23] estate to build the Paddock Club. So [200:26] after talking to a lot of the different [200:27] folks around F1, I would say it hasn't [200:31] been an obvious win. I I don't think [200:34] they will pursue this model [200:38] >> elsewhere. If I'm reading the tea leaves [200:39] right now, these things take a long time [200:41] to pay back. And I think they've sunk [200:44] over half a billion dollars into [200:47] building this out. And they really shut [200:50] down the city for a long period of time [200:52] and block off a lot of stuff to to make [200:54] it happen. It's much easier to run a [200:57] business where you say, you know what, [200:58] we're not going to keep every little bit [201:00] of upside for ourselves. [201:01] >> You guys handle that. We'll just take [201:03] the money. [201:03] >> Yes. [201:04] >> Bernie had some things, right? [201:06] >> Yes. You got a lot of things, right? [201:08] >> Yeah. But there are now six races in the [201:12] North American, South American time [201:14] zone, and the US is the biggest media [201:16] market in the world. So, they're leaning [201:17] in hard. [201:18] >> Yep. Well, speaking of the Paddock Club [201:21] you mentioned, it has totally [201:24] transformed [201:25] since Liberty's acquisition of F1. You [201:30] and I got to experience it with Service [201:32] Now in Vegas. We were just beginning our [201:35] F1 research at that phase and we left [201:38] for like weeks afterwards saying, "Oh, [201:41] F1 is a corporate sport. The consumer [201:44] side must really not be big at all." But [201:46] man, it's the most B2B thing we've ever [201:49] seen. There's a strategy interview that [201:51] Ben Thompson did with Mike Cannon [201:54] Brooks, the Atlassian CEO last year. [201:57] They're the title sponsor of Williams. [201:59] And Mike says this. He says, "Hey, we [202:03] view our Williams sponsorship and our F1 [202:06] participation as we get to have a mobile [202:09] executive briefing center [202:11] >> that we can go around the globe [202:14] throughout the year and bring our [202:15] customers to this amazing event and have [202:19] an amazing customer example to show them [202:22] in Williams of how they use our [202:24] software." Like I don't think Atlassian [202:26] has a physical executive briefing [202:29] center. I think F1 and the Paddock Club [202:32] is their executive briefing center. [202:34] >> It's funny. Yeah. Since this was our [202:35] first experience with it, it it was [202:37] shocking to me realizing how large the [202:40] consumer element of the sport was [202:43] globally because in America it feels [202:45] like this like a little enterprise [202:47] software conference. [202:48] >> Exactly. [202:49] >> Okay. So, what are the economics of all [202:51] of this and how does that play into F1 [202:53] as a business? So apparently the title [202:56] sponsorship at the front of the grid now [202:58] can be a $50 to hund00 million deal and [203:02] Oracle's title sponsorship of exactly [203:04] per year of Red Bull Racing is [203:06] reportedly a hundred million. [203:08] >> Uh other places site that the big title [203:10] sponsorships are are more around 50 [203:12] million. [203:13] >> But either way, I mean really big [203:14] numbers and right in line with the [203:16] biggest deals that F1 itself does. So [203:19] the LVMH deal is $und00 million per year [203:22] and that's the Louis Vuitton banners [203:24] everywhere, Tag Hoyer being the official [203:26] timekeeping sponsor, the LV trunk and of [203:29] course they spray Moette all over each [203:32] other on the podiums. So you get sort of [203:34] um wrapped in a blanket of LVMH now when [203:37] you watch a a race. [203:39] >> Yes. And back to the impact of Drive to [203:41] Survive for a minute. Oracle's CMO said, [203:45] I believe on an earnings call [203:48] >> that Drive to Survive was the reason [203:52] that they decided to get into F1 and do [203:56] the big Red Bull sponsorship. [203:57] >> Really? [203:57] >> Yes. [203:59] >> Fascinating [203:59] >> that they weren't engaged with the sport [204:02] beforehand and then started to watch [204:04] Drive to Survive and that led to [204:06] >> Wow. ultimately, you know, multiund [204:09] million dollar investment over several [204:11] years. [204:11] >> 500 over five years is the the rumored [204:14] value. So, thank you Netflix for that [204:16] gift. So, the cheapest deals you can [204:18] get, let's say you want to slap your [204:19] logo on a car somewhere, you know, a [204:21] little under a bumper or something. Uh, [204:24] the cheapest deal is about a million [204:25] dollars and that's a back of the grid [204:28] car. The most valuable real estate, I [204:31] thought this was interesting. There's an [204:32] airbox on the car that sort of sticks up [204:34] behind the driver's head that you can [204:36] see from the side. Those go for the sort [204:39] of six to seven million dollar range. [204:41] And the logo placement on a driver's [204:43] chest is also very desirable. That's [204:46] about a million and a half, especially [204:47] toward the front of the grid. And this [204:50] really is the way that these teams make [204:52] money. It's about 60% of the revenue [204:55] comes from sponsorship. And the teams [204:57] are now averaging about $200 million of [205:00] total sponsorship per team. But average [205:03] is kind of the wrong way to look at it [205:04] because it varies wildly from front of [205:05] the grid to back of the grid. [205:07] >> Yeah. [205:08] >> The other big thing is that hospitality [205:10] is rolled in. So if you're entertaining [205:13] a client at a football game, like let's [205:15] say you do a big sponsorship deal with [205:16] an NFL team and you get a suite, you get [205:19] three to four hours together. And most [205:21] of that is actually consumed by watching [205:23] football because you care about it. It's [205:25] an exciting game. Anything can happen. [205:27] If you bring a client to an F1 race like [205:30] Service Now brought us, you spend three [205:32] days together and the race is only like [205:35] two hours and actually in the race [205:37] there's not that much you need to pay [205:38] attention to most of the time that [205:40] there's some really exciting moments and [205:42] you pay a lot of attention then, but [205:44] there's plenty of time for a [205:45] conversation otherwise. So, it's much [205:47] more conducive to forming real [205:49] relationships versus a traditional 2 [205:52] three-hour sports game. And you get to [205:55] do it in geographies where your business [205:57] operates all over the globe, not just a [206:00] stadium near your office. And I even [206:02] heard some uh comments of sponsors [206:04] saying, "Oh, we didn't even bother with [206:06] a logo placement on the car. It's [206:08] actually more about the relationships [206:10] and hospitality." [206:11] >> Totally. So, I can totally see why if [206:14] your strategy is something like [206:15] Atlassian and this is our mobile [206:17] briefing center, it's really only F1. I [206:20] mean maybe like uh tennis or golf or [206:22] something like that that you could think [206:25] about as a alternative. [206:27] >> Here's my last bullet point on this. [206:28] Ultimately, this sport is a magnet for [206:30] sponsors because it is a global reach [206:32] for brand. It's humans pushing the [206:34] limits both in physical competition and [206:36] engineering cleverness. It's bleeding [206:38] edge technology and the sport is premium [206:41] if not luxury in its positioning in [206:43] almost every market around the world. [206:44] >> Yep. [206:45] >> All right. Meteorites. [206:47] >> Meteorites. Well, to put a bow on the [206:50] Liberty strategy, or at least the come [206:53] to America part of it, right after [206:56] Liberty takes over in 2017, they do a [207:00] deal with ESPN, [207:03] much like Bernie's original European [207:06] Broadcasting Union deal. [207:08] Liberty says, "Will you please show all [207:12] of the F1 races on the calendar on ESPN? [207:16] We will give it to you for zero dollars. [207:18] >> Was it actually zero? [207:20] >> It was actually zero dollars for the [207:22] 2018 season and I think maybe 2019 2020 [207:27] as well. We just want to grow the sport. [207:29] >> Yep. [207:30] >> Get something going, some traction in [207:32] America. [207:33] >> And ESPN, despite being a cable company, [207:35] not a broadcaster, does have huge reach. [207:37] It's the most valuable channel in every [207:39] cable package. [207:40] >> Yeah. If you're a sport and you want to [207:42] grow in the US, you need to be on ESPN. [207:44] Previously [207:46] F1 had bounced around for a while. It [207:48] was on the Speed Channel. Yeah. Yeah. It [207:51] was on NBC for a while, but only certain [207:54] Grand Prix. They didn't show the whole [207:56] season. Anyway, after Drive to Survive [207:59] in COVID, uh those rights become a lot [208:02] more valuable in America. So, ESPN comes [208:05] back in for another three-year round of [208:07] rights. In 2022, after the sport has [208:10] grown so much, ESPN does start paying [208:15] real money for the rights. Rumored 80 to [208:18] 90 million a year for a three-year deal [208:20] for the US TV rights, [208:22] >> up from zero. That's huge. [208:23] >> The ESPN contract ends in 2025. [208:27] In the interim, [208:29] Apple had their own F1 media success on [208:34] their hands this past summer with the F1 [208:38] movie with Brad Pit. [208:40] >> F1 the movie to say the title precisely, [208:42] David, [208:43] >> which grossed $630 [208:46] million worldwide at the box office. The [208:50] highest amount not only for a racing [208:53] film, for any sports movie ever. and the [208:58] highest grossing [209:00] box office movie of Brad Pitt's entire [209:03] career. That's wild. And this massively [209:07] exceeded people's expectations. It It [209:09] kind of shouldn't like it was Brad Pitt. [209:12] It was beautiful camera work. It was a [209:13] feel-good story. It had incredible [209:15] special effects. It was the same [209:17] director and producer of Top Gun. Like [209:20] people were calling it Top Gun on Land. [209:22] >> Yeah. I mean, you can't go wrong, [209:23] >> right? The only thing working against it [209:25] really is it was a racing movie and [209:26] racing movies other than Ford versus [209:29] Ferrari haven't ever really been like [209:31] big box office smashes. [209:33] >> Yeah. [209:33] >> And even that was fine. [209:36] >> Well, nobody had ever made a racing [209:37] movie like this before, [209:38] >> right? So, if you do the quick math on [209:41] that 630 million and call it, I don't [209:45] know, $30 a ticket that you you come to [209:47] the number of 21 million tickets sold at [209:50] the box office. And depending on which [209:52] estimates you believe from our Drive to [209:54] Survive conversation earlier, there's a [209:56] chance that the movie actually reached [209:58] more people than Drive to Survive has. [210:01] >> Or at least it's kind of in the same [210:03] ballpark. [210:03] >> Yes. [210:04] >> Either way, both are home runs. So, on [210:07] the back of that, Apple comes in over [210:11] the top for the US media rights [210:14] negotiations with a five-year deal at [210:18] $150 million a year. [210:20] >> Rumored. [210:21] >> Rumored, [210:22] >> but probably close. [210:23] >> Probably close for the media rights. I [210:25] mean, on the one hand, sure, this is not [210:27] NFL dollars yet, but this is real money [210:31] for again a geography that was zero when [210:34] Liberty took over. was a huge deal to [210:36] get ESPN up from zero to call it 80 to [210:39] 90. Now you're talking about almost [210:42] double that. And for Apple, [210:46] this is probably just the tip of the [210:47] iceberg of what they can do with F1. [210:50] >> Yeah. F. So if you think about the a [210:52] bullc case for F1 here, 33% of F1's [210:55] revenue comes from media rights. And [210:57] that 140 million is only 13% of the [211:01] total meteor rights worldwide which is [211:03] 1.1 billion total. So this is you know [211:07] important to F1 but this is not the bulk [211:11] of their consumption and the bulk of [211:13] their media rights dollars are outside [211:15] the US. And hey, Apple's a global [211:17] company. Like, sure, they love their US [211:20] Apple TV subscribers and Apple [211:22] customers, but they love their European [211:25] Asian, Middle Eastern customers just as [211:28] much. They'd love [211:29] >> to show them, you could imagine, [211:32] >> F1 on Apple TV someday. And the the real [211:35] bullcase for I know we'll do Baron bull [211:37] casecase later, but just to pull this [211:38] one forward for F1 here is in a lot of [211:41] those markets like we were talking about [211:43] earlier they've got these vertically [211:44] integrated sort of the channel is the [211:47] broadcaster is the network thing and [211:48] they don't have a competitive bidder and [211:50] so with Apple with Netflix with uh more [211:54] likely Amazon I think than Netflix but [211:56] with streamers and with YouTube buying [211:59] meteorites now you have these tech [212:00] companies as real viable biders against [212:03] the, you know, one or two broadcasters [212:07] in the country. So, you actually can [212:08] sort of more fully realize the media [212:10] rights when there's a a real market for [212:12] them. [212:12] >> Yep. [212:13] >> But I will say, just so listeners like [212:15] are really grounded in this, US [212:17] viewership is only 1.3 million people [212:21] actually watching any given race with a [212:23] peak of 3.1 million at the Miami Grand [212:26] Prix. That is half of what NASCAR [212:29] averages. Like, this is not even the [212:31] number one motorsport in the US. and [212:32] actually quite far from the number one [212:34] motorsport in the US. International [212:36] viewership is 60 to 70 million people on [212:39] a race weekend. So there the US if if [212:43] they crack the code, man, the US has [212:45] running room ahead of it. [212:46] >> Yep. And I mean, hell, clearly it's [212:48] working so far. [212:49] >> Yes. All right. Before we catch up to [212:52] today, should we do the uh the quick [212:54] update on the teams that are hitting the [212:56] grid this year? [212:56] >> Yeah, got some new teams coming in. So, [212:59] we've got the return of consumer auto [213:01] manufacturers. Stake has become Audi. [213:04] Honda is partnering with Aston Martin. [213:08] Ford has joined with Red Bull as an [213:10] engine partner. Honda used to be the [213:12] partner who would make Red Bull's [213:14] engines in around 2019. And then in [213:17] 2021, Honda left the sport. And Red [213:21] Bull, instead of picking another engine [213:23] supplier, they actually took it in-house [213:25] and started Red Bull powertrains with [213:28] Honda's technology and technical [213:29] support. And I think they hired a bunch [213:31] of the people away from Honda. [213:32] >> Yeah. This Ford partnership is actually [213:35] like a more of a partnership, right, [213:37] with Red Bull and less of a straight [213:39] we're supplying you the engine. [213:41] >> Oh, you Ford is very much not supplying [213:44] the engine to uh Red Bull. They are sort [213:47] of a uh engineering partner on Red Bull [213:50] power trains and I know there's [213:51] engineers sort of flying back and forth [213:53] and multiple uh Ford sites that are sort [213:56] of collaborating with Red Bull on [213:58] building their engines. A lot of shade [214:00] has been thrown at Ford saying that this [214:02] is just a marketing exercise and hey, [214:05] Red Bull was all prepared to take engine [214:07] manufacturing in house. So why do they [214:09] need Ford's help? Um, but speaking of a [214:13] marketing exercise, Cadillac is entering [214:15] the sport this year. And, uh, you might [214:18] say, well, that's a whole team. Like, [214:19] that's that's not just marketing. [214:21] They're really, you know, an equity [214:23] owner and and putting their best foot [214:25] forward. This is a team called Cadillac [214:28] that uses Ferrari engines and a lot of [214:30] other components, too. The whole power [214:32] unit, the gearbox. I mean, it's like [214:35] still a major deal that it's a major [214:37] American manufacturer that is joining [214:39] the sport, but this is a Cadillac with a [214:42] Ferrari under the hood. And Cadillac is [214:45] shelling out $450 million in a like an [214:49] expansion fee effectively just to join [214:52] the grid. It's just great for the sport [214:54] that all of this is happening and just [214:56] really reflects how far things have come [214:59] with relations with the teams and it's [215:01] so healthy that manufacturers are coming [215:04] back and the number of teams is [215:05] expanding. Dude, the the GM Cadillac [215:09] versus Ford kind of opposing case [215:11] studies are really interesting. [215:12] >> I kind of love the rivalry though, [215:14] right? [215:14] >> Yeah, the rivalry is amazing. sniping at [215:15] each other. They're really getting in [215:17] the F1 spirit [215:18] >> and it's really unclear like what you [215:21] should do and what the better strategy [215:22] is. You pointed out some of the [215:24] downsides in both. You know, the upside [215:26] for GM and and choosing to use Cadillac [215:29] as the brand is they own the team. They [215:32] can over time invest build this into a [215:34] powerhouse or if they can that would be [215:36] great. They're certainly going to start [215:38] in the back of the pack. It would be a a [215:40] real coup if they didn't. Whereas Ford [215:43] is coming in with Red Bull, one of the [215:45] top teams. Like they're gonna be on the [215:48] podium from season. [215:50] >> I know. It's kind of genius. Yeah. Real [215:52] big blue oval on that car. They [215:54] announced and unveiled the car in [215:56] Michigan. I mean, it was like a Ford Red [215:58] Bull event. [215:59] >> Yeah. [216:00] >> And uh [216:01] >> meanwhile, uh GM and Cadillac unveiled [216:03] theirs during the Super Bowl, right? [216:05] >> They did with a Super Bowl commercial [216:07] and then with an activation in Times [216:09] Square. [216:09] >> Yep. [216:10] >> But I love it. I I love to see it. [216:12] >> Yep. And the other big thing for this [216:15] year is there's a new Concord agreement [216:18] complete with a full rewriting of the [216:21] rule set by the FIA. [216:22] >> So there's a resetting of the field. [216:25] >> And people always say these things come [216:26] with a big reset. But [216:27] >> do I think Mercedes and Red Bull and [216:29] McLaren are not going to be, you know, [216:31] three of the top four teams? No. I think [216:33] that's going to stay. Have we seen [216:35] anything in preseason from any of the [216:37] teams at the back of the grid where they [216:39] have some magic car that they've [216:40] developed? Not really. I mean, the [216:43] biggest thing I think we've seen is [216:44] Ferrari, who is a front of grid team, [216:47] uh, is doing something very clever to [216:49] create downforce with their exhaust, but [216:52] we'll have to see how that actually [216:53] plays out. Yeah, [216:54] >> we should say there's some excitement [216:57] around this new rule set where it's [217:00] going to enable more passing which make [217:02] should make for more dynamic races, [217:03] which I've been ripping on the whole [217:05] time. I do like watching F1 races, but I [217:08] do also think they could learn something [217:09] from the NFL and figure out how to make [217:11] it more competitive and a better pure [217:14] sport, [217:14] >> more exciting. Yeah, better product on [217:16] the field. [217:16] >> On the cons, man, there's a lot of [217:18] graping about these hybrid engines. the [217:21] uh what Max Versappen called it like a [217:24] souped-up Formula E car or some which is [217:27] you know it's it's actually perfect [217:29] Formula 1 drama that he's out there you [217:32] know making fun of the cars even before [217:33] the season starts but you know [217:35] everything from the the noise to the [217:38] Max's comment about how they drive to [217:40] the kind of confusing nature of watching [217:43] the sport and trying to on top of [217:45] everything else now understand the [217:46] strategy behind battery preservation [217:49] that that might be a little tough for [217:51] them to overcome in presenting to the [217:53] viewer, especially new viewers. [217:55] >> Yep. One thing that we heard kind of [217:58] unanimously from folks who've been [218:00] around the sport for a while, it's just [218:02] sort of a shame that no one can [218:05] experience the old cars. Yes. Anymore. [218:08] Like you can watch videos, you can [218:10] listen to audio. [218:11] >> Early 2000s V10. You just had to be [218:13] there. [218:14] >> But everybody says Yeah. There's nothing [218:16] like having one of those old big engines [218:20] go by you and just the sound and the [218:22] power and the vibrations or something [218:25] you would never experience anywhere [218:26] else. Certainly kills any uh you know [218:29] sustainability angle that Formula 1 is [218:31] trying to push these days. [218:32] >> Okay, I have a major beef with this. So [218:35] there's two reasons why they switched to [218:37] hybrid engines. One is road relevance [218:39] because 10 years ago or whatever, [218:40] everyone thought that electric cars were [218:42] going to take over the world or at least [218:43] hybrid cars were and it was good to [218:45] start investing in Formula 1 in these [218:48] technologies so they could trickle into [218:50] the cars that everyone's driving. [218:52] Adoption has been much slower than we [218:53] expected there. The other reason is this [218:56] sustainability push, which look, I'm I'm [218:58] all for sustainability. The carbon [219:01] footprint of Formula 1. It is absolutely [219:04] hilarious to me when people talk about [219:06] the sustainability of the power units [219:08] like the engines in the cars when they [219:10] are flying the whole circus around the [219:12] world every week on a fleet of seven [219:16] trip 7s. I mean, okay, the European [219:18] races everything goes by truck, which is [219:20] a little better, but it's still 300 [219:23] trucks. If if you line these up, it [219:25] would form a convoy over five kilometers [219:28] long. And so I I was trying to like do [219:31] some math of okay, how much of the [219:32] carbon footprint is actually from the [219:35] power units themselves when they're [219:37] driving on track. During the 2019 [219:40] season, the logistics operation, moving [219:42] the these cars in the circus around [219:45] accounts for 64 times the emission of [219:48] the cars themselves, even when you [219:50] include practice, qualifying, and races. [219:55] I mean, these F1 tanks have 30 gallons [219:57] of gas max, right? It's three 30-gallon [220:00] tanks over the course of a weekend, and [220:03] there's only 22 cars. It's a rounding [220:07] error. This is a complete farce. [220:09] >> I I think I'm hearing a passionate [220:11] argument from you to bring back the [220:12] V10s. [220:13] >> Bring I've never heard one and I want to [220:15] hear one. I don't know. My my general [220:18] belief on this is let the sport be the [220:20] sport and do whatever is going to be the [220:22] best sort of fan and driver experience. [220:25] And I think they are trying to cram too [220:28] many things into F1. Like let let it be [220:31] a sport. [220:33] Secondarily, let it be a innovation [220:35] playground for auto manufacturers, but [220:38] like don't die on the hill of [220:40] sustainable fuels. H how about just [220:43] putting two races really close to each [220:44] other and just rearranging the flight [220:47] calendar a little bit? That would that [220:48] would do so much more even if you just [220:50] change one race than any compromises [220:52] you're making on power units. [220:54] >> Well, you know what would make a really [220:57] big impact to American viewership of F1 [221:01] races and adoption of the sport? If they [221:04] stopped going head-to-head with the NFL [221:06] on Sundays in the fall. [221:10] >> Yes. In research, we heard some strong [221:13] and very compelling arguments for uh [221:16] creating sort of a a mini season in the [221:19] spring for US time zones. Yeah. And kind [221:22] of staying over here, so it's good for [221:23] carbon footprint. It's great for [221:25] viewership because you get six races [221:27] that all build on each other and [221:28] excitement. [221:29] >> It great for US ratings, the biggest [221:31] media market in the world. I'm [221:33] amendable. [221:34] >> I I think it's a win-win. And bring back [221:36] the V10s. And you know, what do [221:38] Americans love more than loud engines? [221:40] That's right. That's right. All right. [221:42] The business today. [221:43] >> Tell us about the business today. [221:44] >> Yes. All right. So, Formula One Group [221:49] does $3.4 billion in revenue. And the [221:52] most recent numbers here are from 2024. [221:55] The revenue mix is the media rights, [221:58] which is broadcasting is exactly 33% [222:01] about $1.1 billion. [222:03] Race promotion is the next biggest [222:05] budget at 29% about a billion dollars. [222:08] Those are the fees from the race [222:10] promoters. [222:11] >> Exactly. Advertising and sponsorship is [222:13] the smaller bucket, 19%. That's $630 [222:17] million. It is their fastest growing. [222:20] >> And to be clear, that's advertising and [222:22] sponsorship to the league to squad, [222:24] >> not to the individual teams, [222:26] >> which you'll notice, uh, that 630 [222:29] million is pretty small compared to the [222:32] sum of all the teams. The teams earn [222:33] about $2 billion in total sponsorship [222:36] across all of them, which makes sense [222:38] because the teams actually have a lot [222:40] more to sell in the way of driver [222:42] access, hospitality packages, speaking [222:45] engagements, garage tours. Also, the [222:48] best sponsorship placements are on the [222:50] cars and the drivers, which the teams [222:52] own. So the the camera is actually [222:54] focused on those while the walls of the [222:56] track just kind of go whizzing by, which [222:57] is why they need to repeat the same logo [222:59] a thousand times on the wall of the [223:01] track for you to to get an impression of [223:03] it. So the the best assets that are [223:05] sponsorable actually belong to the [223:07] teams. You know, this is one of the [223:09] really unique aspects of F1 as a sport [223:12] that actually allow it to operate in [223:15] this really weird way where the league [223:16] is not owned by the teams because so [223:20] much of the media rights value de facto [223:24] will go to the teams. Like as the media [223:27] reach grows, the value of the team [223:29] sponsorship grows and that's their [223:31] primary revenue driver, [223:32] >> right? Yeah. It's a funny way to think [223:34] about it. their exposure grows, [223:36] therefore their own direct sponsorships [223:38] can grow. [223:39] >> Yeah. [223:39] >> So, back to the revenue mix we talked [223:42] about for the the parent company, 33% [223:44] broadcast, 29% raise promotion, 19% [223:47] advertising and sponsorship. Uh, and [223:48] then they've got this other bucket at [223:50] 19%. That's hospitality packages, merch, [223:54] and licensing. [223:56] So, that's on the revenue side, total [223:58] 3.4 billion. Now, let's look at costs. [224:03] The biggest cost is the distribution to [224:05] teams, which we haven't talked that much [224:08] about how this works yet. This couldn't [224:10] be more different than the way it works [224:12] in the NFL. The NFL splits the league [224:14] revenue exactly 32 ways, even no [224:18] questions asked. Communist capitalism is [224:21] delightful. The distribution to teams is [224:25] renegotiated in every Concord agreement. [224:28] Both the split with Formula One group is [224:31] renegotiated and the [224:34] >> distribution mechanisms amongst the [224:35] teams. Yeah, [224:36] >> exactly. They currently distribute about [224:39] 37% of Formula 1 group's revenue out to [224:43] the teams which comes to 1.27 billion of [224:47] their 3.4 billion. There are three [224:49] components to how this formula works. [224:52] The first is equal participation. The [224:55] second is the constructor's championship [224:58] allocation, which is kind of [225:00] interesting. The driver's championship [225:01] has nothing to do with how prize money [225:02] is paid out. It's just about the [225:04] constructors. And then the third is uh [225:07] historical length in the sport. [225:11] >> Ferrari. [225:13] >> So for a long time, Ferrari was [225:14] guaranteed at least 5% of the total pool [225:17] just as like a thank you for being [225:18] Ferrari. You've been a part of the [225:20] series uh every year since its [225:23] inception. You help legitimize the [225:25] sport. You continue to help legitimize [225:26] the sport. [225:27] >> Absolutely. [225:28] >> This has gotten negotiated away a little [225:30] bit over time, but when you look at the [225:33] the the rumored distributions because [225:35] this is the Concord agreements are not [225:37] public. There is definitely still a [225:39] large chunk as a thank you Ferrari for [225:42] being Ferrari. [225:43] >> And you know what they're worth every [225:45] penny. So the stats that I've seen is [225:48] that even today in the Max vers stopen [225:53] Lewis Hamilton well I guess Lewis is now [225:55] with Ferrari but thinking [225:57] >> I know I still think I think it's [225:59] Mercedes. Yeah yeah yeah exactly even [226:01] today 30% of all F1 fans their favorite [226:06] team is Ferrari. [226:09] >> Wow. So when you blend those three [226:12] factors together, the participation [226:14] which is equal, the constructor's [226:16] championship allocation and the uh [226:18] historical length in sport, the [226:21] estimates are that the top team gets [226:23] around 14% of the pool and the bottom [226:26] team gets around 6%. So to keep the math [226:29] kind of simple, imagine it as the top [226:32] team getting 140 millionish in prize [226:35] money and the bottom getting 60 [226:36] millionish. [226:38] This is a lot closer than it used to be. [226:40] The the constructors used to wildly skew [226:42] the distribution and the Ferrari premium [226:44] was even higher. But like this is [226:48] holding the sport back in my opinion. [226:50] You you get a positive feedback loop and [226:52] a negative feedback loop at the top and [226:54] the bottom. And so we're sort of stuck [226:58] in this world right now where the the [227:01] teams on the front four or five of the [227:03] grid stay there and the back stay there. [227:05] And you could make the argument that, [227:08] hey, making another 20, 30, $40 million [227:12] from the back of the grid is not going [227:13] to make you magically competitive. [227:17] But every little bit helps. And I think [227:20] these things are nonlinear. They sort of [227:22] spiral up or spiral down is maybe [227:24] another way to think about it. And for [227:27] every $10 million you get out of the [227:30] constructor's championship, you probably [227:32] can go find 20 or 30 more million in [227:36] sponsor dollars. So, a few people have [227:39] tried to tell me, "Hey, I actually don't [227:41] think money is really the answer here." [227:43] It's certainly not helping to keep the [227:46] back of the pack penalized with less [227:48] dollars per year. [227:49] >> Yep. People want to see the stars win. [227:52] >> That's true. But the bottom five may as [227:55] well not even be racing. [227:56] >> Well, you need you need them on the [227:57] grid. But [227:59] >> do you need some warm bodies there [228:01] >> just to like clog it up. They risk [228:03] causing crashes and getting in, you [228:06] know, the top few guys's way. And I [228:09] guess that throws a race up in the air [228:10] and anything can happen. But yeah, the [228:12] back of the grid's just the back of the [228:14] grid. [228:14] >> Yeah. But I can't imagine it being a [228:16] healthy state for the sport if there [228:18] were only five teams. [228:20] >> True. Very true. All right. So, back to [228:23] Formula 1 itself. By the numbers, [228:25] there's 830 million people who identify [228:29] as fans globally. This is different than [228:32] viewers. There are 450 million Global TV [228:36] viewers. The last time that they broke [228:38] this out and reported it in 2021 seems [228:40] to have become like a state secret since [228:42] then where they no longer report this [228:43] information. Now, on to team valuations. [228:47] So, as of 2025, Forbes estimates team [228:50] valuations at about $3.6 billion on [228:55] average. Average. This has been a huge, [228:57] huge growth recently. It's an 89% [229:01] increase in the last two years. [229:04] >> Wow. Wow. [229:05] >> It's completely night and day since they [229:07] put in this the the cost caps. I mean, [229:09] these these teams used to be basically [229:11] worthless in the Bernie era and now have [229:15] an average value of $3.6 billion. [229:18] >> Yes. [229:19] >> Every team is now north of a billion [229:21] dollars with the least valuable team H [229:23] at 1.5 billion. Then at the top end, uh [229:27] we've got [229:29] $6.5 billion for Ferrari. Again, not the [229:32] best business, but the most valuable [229:34] asset. Love Ferrari. Uh $6 billion for [229:37] Mercedes, 4.4 4 billion for McLaren and [229:39] 4.35 billion for Red Bull Racing. The [229:43] multiples on these things are very [229:45] silly. Like if you compare them because [229:48] again most of these teams except for the [229:51] top three produce very very little in [229:54] the way of profit. And so if you look at [229:57] an NFL team, they actually spit off a [230:00] lot of cash. If you look at these teams, [230:03] I mean even the most connected to their [230:06] intrinsic value, Mercedes is trading at [230:08] 30 times operating income. They trade at [230:11] values because they're scarce assets, [230:12] not because they are cash generative [230:14] assets. [230:15] >> Yes, [230:16] >> people got very excited when they [230:17] started not being absolutely horrible [230:20] businesses. And when they started being [230:21] fine businesses, everyone sort of pulled [230:25] forward many, many years of growth and [230:27] potential profitability into their [230:28] valuations. Or they basically said, "I [230:30] don't care what the valuations are at [230:31] all. I'm a sovereign wealth fund or deca [230:34] billionaire and this sounds fun." [230:36] >> Yes. And in defense of this, I can think [230:38] of a million reasons why being an owner [230:40] or part owner of an F1 team [230:42] >> makes sense [230:43] >> is a highly profitable trade for a [230:45] person or an entity. The funny thing is [230:48] a lot of these people if they're [230:50] currently cash flow negative if they [230:53] ever decided to sell the team would make [230:55] up all the cash that they lost in the [230:56] business ever from the asset [230:58] appreciation. [230:59] >> Right? It's almost like you're loaning [231:00] money to the team for a while and then [231:02] you get it back. [231:03] >> So market cap of Formula 1 itself. Now [231:06] remember Liberty bought in 2017 the [231:09] company for 8 billion with 4.4 billion [231:12] of that being equity value. Today in [231:14] 2026, it has a market cap of 22 billion [231:17] with an enterprise value of 25 billion. [231:20] So, Liberty has done quite well turning [231:22] 4.4 billion of equity in 2017 into 5x [231:25] that in 9 years. That's about a 22% [231:29] compound annual growth rate. So then on [231:32] top of the series itself, Formula 1 [231:35] Group being worth $25 billion of [231:38] enterprise value, you look at the teams, [231:40] those if you sum them all up, are worth [231:42] another 36 billion or so, not including [231:45] Cadillac yet. And so there's a grand [231:47] total then of 61 billion of enterprise [231:50] value between the teams and Formula 1 [231:53] itself. Interestingly skewed toward the [231:56] teams. [231:57] >> Yeah. And that is valuing the races at [232:01] zero, which I think the races probably [232:04] have value. What did you say? You think [232:07] that F1 invested in Vegas? Half a [232:09] billion. [232:10] >> Half a billion. [232:11] >> Okay. Let's say the Grand Prix are all [232:13] worth half a billion just as a swag. [232:16] There are 22 of them. [232:18] >> Yep. [232:18] >> Is that right? So there's another 11 [232:20] billion in value. [232:22] >> You're assuming that's money well spent. [232:24] Well, [232:26] if if Formula 1 itself is willing to put [232:29] $500 million up to stand up a Grand [232:31] Prix, then [232:34] >> yeah, [232:34] >> that seems a reasonable proxy for the [232:36] value of a Grand Prix. [232:38] >> Yeah, that's a great point. So, you you [232:39] say, "Okay, the whole sport inclusive of [232:41] of races then has 70ish billion of [232:44] enterprise value all told." [232:46] >> Kind of a fun that [232:48] >> seems reasonable [232:48] >> like mental gymnastics to go through to [232:51] think about how the value all breaks [232:52] down. [232:53] Yep. [232:54] >> So then my key question the and and the [232:57] one the one unfilledin puzzle piece in [232:59] all of your minds should be Ben and [233:01] David are obsessed with the communist [233:03] capitalism of of the NFL and the fact [233:05] that the NFL, the NBA, MLB, NHL, these [233:09] are thin leagues. These leagues do not [233:11] retain earnings or or have their own [233:14] enterprise value. They are purely [233:17] distribution mechanisms where nothing's [233:18] left over at the end. They're like pass [233:20] through entities of of of a sort. This [233:23] is a fat league much like the UEFA [233:26] Champions League or IPL. It's a company. [233:29] It has its own earnings. It generates [233:30] profits. It has enterprise value. So the [233:32] key question you should all be thinking [233:34] about is are teams getting their share [233:37] of the overall dollars compared to what [233:40] Liberty gets? And how does it compare to [233:44] a league like the NFL where the teams [233:46] are entitled to all the profits? Well, [233:48] on the one hand, we can look back at the [233:50] percent of F1 management revenue that [233:52] goes to teams, which was 50% back in [233:55] 2018 and has shrunk to about 37% [233:59] last year. So, something's going on [234:01] there. F1 is actually getting leverage [234:02] over the teams. On the other hand, [234:05] there's actually just not that much [234:07] operating income left over once Formula [234:11] 1 pays for all the other stuff. [234:13] generated 492 million in operating [234:16] income on revenues of 3.4 billion. [234:21] So even if we take all that operating [234:23] income and we say okay what if we were [234:24] to distribute that 490 million to the [234:27] teams that would only grow the team's [234:30] distribution from 1.27 billion to 1.76 [234:35] billion. [234:36] >> Yeah. In other words, the teams are [234:38] already making 72% of what they would [234:41] make if they owned the league because [234:43] there's just not that much profit left [234:45] over after all the cost to run the [234:47] league, after selling all the [234:48] sponsorships at the league level, [234:50] general overhead, administration, and of [234:53] course running the Las Vegas race. [234:55] >> Yep. I suspect if we were to have access [235:00] to all the books during the Bernie era, [235:02] that would be a very different story. [235:05] >> Yes. And I I think it's because what's [235:07] going on is Liberty is investing in the [235:09] sport. [235:09] >> Yes. Certainly there would be more [235:11] operating income if if Vegas was on not [235:14] on their books. It has reached this very [235:16] interesting equilibrium where if the [235:18] teams were making significantly less [235:20] than this 72% of what they could make, [235:22] I'd start going like, gosh, maybe they [235:25] should break away. Maybe the league is [235:27] keeping too much. But it somehow seems [235:29] like this 28% [235:33] uh of of [235:35] what the teams are leaving on the table [235:38] is like just right, you know. [235:41] >> Mhm. [235:42] >> The racing series is complicated and [235:44] expensive and has to maintain this big [235:47] global footprint and run this logistics [235:49] operation and ultimately we are not [235:52] starting from whole cloth here. the F1 [235:54] management exists and it's just a matter [235:56] of every time the Concord rolls around [235:59] uh how much leverage do the teams have [236:00] in that particular year. [236:02] >> Yep. So that leads us to I think maybe [236:05] the most interesting question of the [236:08] analysis section for this episode, which [236:10] is [236:12] did F1 require Bernie? [236:15] >> Yes, that is the key question. [236:16] >> Get to where it got to. [236:21] Uh, [236:23] obviously there is this incredible [236:25] counter example out there with the NFL [236:28] of [236:29] a similar dynamic, arguably a much more [236:32] complicated dynamic because there were a [236:34] lot more teams in the NFL that needed to [236:37] be wrangled. [236:39] >> Yep. [236:39] >> It was heroes work by Pete Riselle to [236:43] get them all to buy into communist [236:45] capitalism. [236:46] I think though you did need a Bernie to [236:51] get F1 to where it is today [236:54] for two reasons. One, doing this episode [236:58] and telling the Bernie story has made me [237:01] appreciate much more how unique what [237:04] Pete Rosselle did at the NFL was. [237:07] >> It's like Dehawk at Visa. [237:09] >> Yes. He was an N of one person who did [237:12] an Nof of one job. [237:15] Uh, you could rerun that experiment a [237:17] thousand times and almost assuredly not [237:21] end up with the NFL today. [237:23] >> I mean, the other major US sports [237:26] haven't managed to do it. [237:27] >> Nope. I mean, the NBA is inching closer, [237:29] but still isn't there. Baseball's a long [237:32] way away. [237:33] >> Yep. At a minimum, I think you [237:37] absolutely needed a strong individual [237:41] personality to emerge at the right [237:43] moment in time. And for the NFL, that [237:46] was Pete Riselle in the 50s and 60s. And [237:49] for Formula 1, that was Bernie in the [237:52] 70s. And then you're kind of at the whim [237:55] of the personality of that person. Is [237:58] there something about the other parties [238:00] you're dealing with and their [238:02] personalities [238:03] or something about the global nature of [238:05] the sport? [238:06] >> So, here's where I was going with the [238:07] second reason why I think you needed a [238:09] Bernie. The global nature of the sport, [238:13] uh, the insane logistics required to be [238:16] operating a global sport. You know, the [238:19] idea that an employee that that that the [238:21] teams, the F1 teams could have gotten [238:24] together and hired an employee like the [238:26] NFL did with Pete Riselle to go and [238:30] create all this. There's no way you [238:31] could incentivize [238:32] >> Yeah, that's a good question. [238:33] >> somebody in the right way? [238:34] >> Why was the NFL able to do it? Could [238:37] Pete Riselle have developed the same [238:40] structure in F1? [238:42] >> No, definitely not. [238:43] >> Why? to go and negotiate [238:46] with all of these teams, all of these [238:48] tracks, uh, all of these broadcasters, [238:52] the FIA and this crazy NGO rules regul [238:57] rules regulator. [238:58] >> Because of the complex multi-partiness, [239:00] you have to have the incentives of like [239:02] being your own entrepreneur with a [239:04] company. [239:06] Not just an entrepreneur. I think you [239:07] need somebody truly with Bernie's [239:10] background as a ruthlessness. Like you [239:13] need a street fighter to do this. Pete [239:15] Riselle was many great things, but he [239:17] was not a street fighter. [239:19] >> Yeah. Hm. [239:20] >> What do you think? [239:21] >> I largely agree with you. [239:22] >> You have uh nothing more to add in [239:25] Charlie's words here. [239:26] >> Nothing more to add. All right. Power. [239:28] >> Power. Yes. But actually first there's [239:32] something interesting to think about [239:33] which is power between teams. [239:37] >> So F1 has become about exploiting the [239:41] tiniest little advantages or cracks in [239:42] the rule book as we've talked about and [239:44] usually other teams can figure out what [239:46] you did and copy it very soon like [239:50] within a few races. There are some [239:52] advantages that last a whole season like [239:54] if you do something different in the [239:56] fundamental layout of the engine or [239:58] battery or gearbox that that will buy [240:00] you a year of edge if it is the correct [240:04] decision. And there's real magic when [240:06] you can do something that lasts multiple [240:08] seasons, like what Mercedes did where, [240:11] you know, I I I can't exactly explain to [240:13] you why, but something happened where [240:15] they were just better at designing the [240:17] car than anybody else and they won for [240:19] eight seasons or having a driver that [240:23] was just so much better than anyone else [240:24] in that era with Lewis Hamilton. [240:27] >> But those things are more operational [240:29] excellence [240:30] >> than strategy. I mean the drivers are [240:33] the ultimate definition of not a power [240:35] because anybody else can hire them, [240:37] >> right? Not a power. I think they exist [240:39] entirely outside the world of strategy. [240:40] It's it's uh competency. It's [240:43] operational excellence. And like being [240:46] good at aerodynamics and car design and [240:48] engine design is kind of that too. And [240:51] so the the thing that I would throw out [240:52] here is I think skill or operational [240:56] excellence is actually more important in [241:00] building a successful F1 team than [241:02] strategy. Because a lot of these ways [241:05] that you can win via strategy have a [241:08] short window that closes when other [241:11] teams can sort of quickly arbitrage the [241:13] value away. And from what I can tell, [241:16] almost all durable advantages [241:20] in F1 that last three, four seasons or [241:24] more come from operational excellence. H [241:28] yeah, I could probably make an argument [241:30] for scale economies too in that even [241:33] with the cost caps, [241:36] if you have more financial resources, [241:41] you're going to be able to [241:43] >> certainly more loopholes. [241:44] >> Hire the best driver. I mean, if you uh [241:47] have if if you have an extra hundred [241:49] million versus your nearest competitor, [241:51] you pretty much should be able to go [241:53] sign the best driver of the world. [241:54] >> Yeah. So at least there and like [241:57] >> you know that's I guess sort of more [241:58] like balance sheet financial scale [242:00] economies but [242:02] >> there does seem to be persistence in the [242:05] top teams on the grid [242:07] >> that doesn't seem related to power to [242:10] me. [242:10] >> Yeah. [242:11] >> Like what what power do [242:12] >> Oh. So you're just saying that you think [242:13] the top teams on the grid grid just are [242:16] uh they're just operationally better. [242:18] >> Yes. Competency. Skill competency. [242:21] Operational excellence. not a strategy [242:24] they pursued that differentiated them on [242:26] on a durable basis. I think that exists [242:29] yeartoear but not for a eightyear [242:31] winning streak. [242:32] >> I could see that by your argument the [242:35] teams are all about operational [242:36] >> the teams are powerless. [242:38] >> Yeah. Which I think is what you want [242:42] right a league. I think in sport, yes, [242:44] you you always want the most talented [242:48] and highest performing team to be able [242:50] to win and you don't want structural [242:54] barriers or advantages the way that you [242:57] sort of uh do want if you're a [243:00] capitalist investor. [243:01] >> Yeah, let's narrow this at least to like [243:04] the front half of the grid. Put the [243:07] bottom teams that are kind of always the [243:08] bottom. There's there's definite [243:10] negative power spirals for the yeah the [243:13] the the bottom set of teams. But for the [243:16] top half of teams [243:18] >> over the arc of a couple seasons [243:22] there is transference. [243:24] >> Yes. [243:24] >> Among that set. [243:26] >> Yes. [243:26] >> Yeah. Okay. I buy it. I buy it. [243:28] >> Exactly. [243:28] >> And so thus there must not be real power [243:31] there. [243:31] >> Yes. [243:32] >> Great. I like it. All right. So back to [243:34] the Formula One group. [243:37] >> Yeah. Let's analyze the takeoff phase [243:40] different than the scale phase. Why did [243:43] it become the premier motor racing [243:46] series? Like why is it bigger than Lama [243:48] or Indie Car? [243:49] >> I can think of a few reasons. I believe [243:51] Formula 1 is the only racing car series [243:57] where pretty much everything is custom [244:00] engineered by the teams. [244:02] >> There's very little stock elements y to [244:06] it. [244:07] uh which inherently makes it more [244:09] interesting and exciting. [244:10] >> Yep. [244:11] >> Two, the prestige luxury oldw world [244:16] European royalty ties. [244:18] >> Yep. [244:18] >> Plus the crossover with Hollywood. [244:20] >> Yep. And once you have that, you can [244:22] kind of like hold on to it. Like that's [244:24] sort of cornered resource [244:26] >> that no other racing series once you [244:27] have it can get it. [244:29] >> Like rally racing may be cool. Grace [244:32] Kelly was never going to go to a rally [244:35] race. Yeah. [244:36] >> Or all the slew of celebrities who come [244:38] to F1 races these days. [244:40] >> Probably most important though, I think, [244:44] is the FIA's [244:47] explicit designation of Formula 1 as the [244:51] pinnacle. Yeah. [244:53] >> You have the more or less global [244:55] regulating body for many other [244:58] motorsports, though obviously not all. [245:00] FIA doesn't regulate NASCAR or Indie Car [245:02] stuff like that, but for many other [245:03] sports explicitly saying this is the [245:07] pinnacle, [245:07] >> right? So, you sort of have a like [245:09] regulatory granted monopoly. [245:11] >> Yes. Yes. It's like the royal seal of [245:13] approval. [245:13] >> Yes. Our normal capitalist forces aren't [245:16] really allowed to play out in the same [245:17] way because it's it's been declared it [245:20] is the number one motor racing series in [245:22] the world. [245:23] >> It's right there in the name, Formula [245:24] One. [245:25] >> Yeah. So that would be a cornered [245:27] resource in the power framework for [245:29] sure. [245:29] >> So now let's ask like a more literal [245:31] question uh which is just the the seven [245:34] powers framework applied to the Liberty [245:37] Media Formula 1 entity today. And the [245:41] framework for power is what is it that [245:44] enables your business to have persistent [245:46] differential returns or basically to be [245:48] more profitable than your closest [245:50] competitor on a sustainable durable [245:52] basis. [245:53] >> Yep. And the seven are scale economies, [245:55] network economies, counterpositioning, [245:57] switching costs, branding, cornered [245:59] resource, and process power. [246:02] >> All right. So, what is stopping someone [246:04] from eating Formula 1's lunch today? [246:07] >> What is stopping uh the teams from [246:09] breaking away and starting FOD? That's [246:12] the biggest thing is that your [246:14] suppliers, [246:16] >> both at the track side and at the car [246:20] side, could build something and go [246:23] around you. It's expensive and annoying [246:27] to do that. [246:28] >> Yeah, Formula 1 is pretty interesting as [246:32] a sports league in that it has inherent [246:34] network economies within the boundaries [246:37] of the sport. Yeah. of the Grand Prix [246:40] and the teams. [246:41] >> Yep. There's also real branding power. I [246:45] mean, people will tune in to watch F1 in [246:47] a way that they wouldn't tune in to [246:49] watch FOD. [246:50] >> It is designated as the pinnacle of [246:51] motorsport. [246:52] >> Yes. [246:54] >> Yes. Uh and they've got that as a [246:56] cornered resource uh that has been [246:59] designated by the FIA. I think that [247:00] that's what I would classify that as. [247:03] >> There are switching costs certainly for [247:05] the teams. major switching costs for the [247:07] teams and the circuits, too. [247:09] >> Yep. In fact, this is actually looking [247:11] like a very protected business the more [247:13] we analyze it that they're they're [247:14] pretty dug in with all their parties. [247:18] >> Look, I mean, it really speaks to how [247:21] powerful [247:23] the F1 group is that despite all the [247:27] years of abuse from Bernie, the circuits [247:30] and the teams never actually broke away. [247:33] >> Yep. Certainly scale economies. This [247:35] type of racing series is so expensive to [247:37] operate that you kind of have to have [247:39] this scale. [247:40] >> Yep. You have to amortize all the [247:43] overall costs of the league across a [247:45] series of 22 races. [247:47] >> 22 races across the teams across all the [247:50] viewers such that you can generate the [247:52] billion dollars in in media rights. [247:54] >> Yep. [247:55] >> Actually, I'm coming away feeling like [247:57] this is very defensible. [247:58] >> Very very defensible. Uh, [248:00] >> I guess the key to the whole thing is [248:02] fans continuing to care. All right, [248:04] Baron Bull. [248:05] >> Yep. Let's do it. [248:06] >> Okay, so I have a a table setting [248:09] exercise for us getting into this. [248:11] >> Great. Great. [248:12] >> So, there are 830 million global F1 fans [248:15] for a league that does 3.4 billion and [248:18] teams that generate another two billion [248:21] or so on top of what the league pays [248:23] them. So that's about five and a half [248:26] billion dollars gross total revenue [248:30] across the whole sport for 830 million [248:33] fans. [248:34] >> Wow. Sure feels like there's a lot of [248:36] room to grow there. [248:37] >> The NFL generates $23 billion of revenue [248:41] across just 180 million fans. So So [248:46] that's four times the revenue on [248:49] the number of fans. [248:51] >> Yep. The NFL monetizes a fan at $127 per [248:56] year and Formula 1 monetizes a fan at $7 [249:00] per year. David, what is going on here? [249:03] >> Well, one major thing that is an issue [249:06] for F1, similar to IPL on our IPL [249:10] episode, uh they just don't have [249:13] anywhere near as much inventory, right, [249:14] as the NFL. 22 races a year and there [249:18] there's no path for them to get to a [249:21] hundred races a year [249:22] >> unless they start sending like just H [249:26] and Mercedes are going to head out to [249:27] this circuit on this day [249:29] >> and at the at the same weekend you're [249:31] going to see Red Bull. It's not [249:33] happening. [249:33] >> Yeah. So, they're just fundamentally [249:34] limited by inventory. Now that said, the [249:37] flip of that is they absolutely have the [249:39] opportunity, like Liberty identified, to [249:42] make those 22 races into 22 Super Bowls, [249:45] which they're well on their way to [249:46] doing, [249:47] >> right? They have to. So, there's that. [249:50] The biggest thing is the US is the [249:51] biggest media market in the world with [249:53] the highest uh revenue per consumer and [249:56] the highest subscriber fee per media [249:59] broadcast. And you just don't you don't [250:03] have penetration here yet. They're [250:04] working on it. So that I think is like [250:06] the easy answer. And then I think [250:07] inventory, you're right. There's sort of [250:08] a structural thing. [250:10] >> Yeah. And then that, you know, leads to, [250:12] hey, if you really care about growing [250:15] revenue and you really care about the US [250:18] strategy, you got to fix the race [250:20] calendar. [250:21] >> Yes. [250:21] >> You cannot be going up against the NFL [250:24] in the fall and especially not with two [250:26] of the three big US races in the fall. [250:29] >> Yep. So that's a bull case. They figure [250:32] that out. Another bull case is actually [250:34] around the European TV rights, the thing [250:36] we were talking about, they more fully [250:38] realize the value where you have actual [250:39] competition bidding for those rights. [250:42] And since so many of the viewers are [250:44] there, moving the needle a little bit [250:46] actually is a giant amount of revenue [250:48] change for F1. [250:49] >> Yep. [250:50] >> The uh last bullcase that I had thought [250:53] of that we haven't really covered yet is [250:55] a US driver or US team becoming world [250:58] champion. [251:00] >> Yep. that could really kickstart fandom [251:02] here. [251:03] >> Yep. I think there's a related bullc [251:06] case of a champion or champion level [251:10] female driver emerging in the coming [251:12] years. Feels like that's [251:14] >> going to happen, has to happen, should [251:16] happen. And given how much of the sports [251:19] fandom has already shifted [251:21] >> towards women thanks to Drive to Survive [251:23] and the movie, that feels like it could [251:25] be a further acceleration there. [251:27] >> Yep. bare cases. The biggest one that I [251:31] just keep hearing is that it is more of [251:33] a parade than a race. I mean, like [251:35] NASCAR, you have aggressive overtaking [251:37] lap after lap. It's just constantly [251:38] exciting. And F1 is this beautiful [251:41] competition, but so much of it is [251:43] strategy, engineering, stuff that [251:46] happens in qualifying, conserving [251:48] resources, pitting at the right time. It [251:51] takes away from the like natural [251:53] observability of the sport. And so the [251:57] bare case is that despite everything [251:59] they'll try to do in regulations to make [252:01] it more competitive, you know, these are [252:03] really big cars because of safety that [252:07] it's just hard to pass and you're really [252:10] incentivized to conserve fuel, not burn [252:12] your tires when you don't need to, etc., [252:14] etc. [252:15] >> Yep. [252:16] >> Which puts a natural ceiling on the [252:18] amount of fervor around it. [252:20] >> Yep. One thing that I think you could [252:22] have argued a couple years ago was a [252:24] bare case, but I think has been put to [252:28] rest is [252:30] this was a COVID driven fad. I think F1 [252:33] has proven enough staying power postco. [252:36] >> That's true. I probably would have bet [252:38] that actually it was a co fad in the US [252:40] one or two years after Drive to Survive, [252:41] which would have been wrong. I mean, it [252:42] was really in that category with like [252:45] COVID tropes like you got your Pelaton, [252:47] you got your F1 simulator, you're [252:49] watching Drive to Survive and Tiger [252:51] King. But of that set of activities, [252:55] F1 feels like one of the few that has [252:58] persisted. [252:58] >> Yep. If you're an investor, one reason [253:02] why you might not give it the multiple [253:04] that it used to have, like Liberty [253:07] bought it for 18 or 20 times earnings, [253:09] something like that. One reason you [253:11] might not be as generous in its future [253:14] growth is it's kind of optimized now. A [253:17] lot of the lowhanging fruit that was [253:19] available for Liberty to do is levers [253:21] that they have pulled. So everything [253:23] from here is going to be a little bit [253:24] more of like a multi-deade slog than [253:27] some easy quick fixes. Not that that's [253:30] really a bare case, but it won't show up [253:32] right away. [253:33] >> Yep. [253:34] >> This last thing that I just keep [253:35] thinking about, I don't know if it's a [253:36] bull case, bare case. It really could be [253:38] either is the broadcast right now, at [253:41] least when I watched it last season, do [253:43] leave a lot to be desired if you are not [253:46] super into the sport. So there's this [253:48] bullcase of bringing drive to survive [253:51] storylines into the race. Like let us [253:54] see the drivers before the race more. [253:56] After getting to know these people so [253:57] much on drive to survive, it felt weird [253:59] that I was watching a race and I like [254:01] didn't get any of their human sense. [254:03] >> Yeah, it's like a different [254:04] >> It's like are these the same people? It [254:07] says their names, but like I can't see [254:08] their face. I can barely hear their [254:10] voice. Like once or twice a race, I get [254:12] some little tiny amount of radio [254:15] chatter. So I think there there's more [254:18] you could do of like bringing the people [254:21] from drive to Survive into the race that [254:24] they're the same people, so you should [254:25] be able to do it. And second, uh data [254:27] visualization to make the dynamic [254:29] moments of the race like there are [254:31] amazing moments in the race, but make [254:33] them more understandable to new fans. [254:35] So, if we're likely to see an overtake [254:38] five laps from now when so and so has [254:40] the right tires and so and so else has [254:42] pitted, like exposing that, start [254:44] talking about it, building toward it, [254:45] and help me visualize it. Like, why is [254:47] that going to happen in five laps and [254:49] not two laps? Like a sensible way to [254:51] show, hey, that person on our little [254:53] thing, it says they're in first, but [254:55] really they're not in first because they [254:56] haven't pitted yet. And those other four [254:58] people have. So, like some of that [255:01] stuff. [255:02] >> Yeah. Help me understand better what's [255:03] going on. Yep. This is actually a [255:05] opportunity or or maybe we could frame [255:07] it as part of the bullcase for Apple's [255:09] involvement in the sport. You know, they [255:11] already developed special cameras for [255:16] the F1 movie. Uh Apple did. [255:19] >> Yep. [255:19] >> And they're bringing those to their [255:21] coverage of the races. [255:23] >> It's basically an iPhone and they [255:25] rearrange the components to fit in the [255:27] standard F1 camera package. [255:28] >> Yep. And it's not that difficult to [255:32] imagine some of the vision pro [255:34] technology being really gamecher on this [255:37] front for F1. I'm not even really [255:40] thinking about consumers wearing Vision [255:42] Pro and watching these things. But to [255:45] your point about seeing the drivers, [255:47] experiencing the drivers more during the [255:49] race, like Apple absolutely has the [255:52] technological ability and resources to [255:55] invest in in helmet cams, driver facial [255:59] recognition. [256:00] >> Oh yeah, they should reconstruction. [256:01] >> What do they call it in the Vision Pro [256:03] where uh I could take a video call [256:05] wearing the Vision Pro and it uses my [256:06] avatar. [256:07] >> Do do that with the drivers. [256:09] >> Totally. [256:10] >> I don't know. It'd be hard though. Their [256:11] faces are so squeezed in those helmets. [256:13] But you're right, there's technology [256:14] solutions to this. [256:15] >> Acquired doesn't need to do product [256:17] development for Apple and F1 here, but [256:18] like uh this is a bullcase for Apple [256:22] becoming a major partner of F1. [256:23] >> Yep. Anything else in Baron Bull? [256:26] >> That's what I got. [256:27] >> All right. Quintessence. [256:29] >> Oh man. [256:30] >> Listeners, this is where we try to land [256:32] the plane. What is the thing that still [256:34] >> the F1 car? [256:35] >> Yes. That uh to pit the car that we [256:38] still can't stop thinking about. [256:39] >> Box. Box. [256:40] >> Box. Box. Box. Box is left. All [256:47] right. So, here's mine. It won't come as [256:49] a shock to anyone, but I am so [256:51] astonished that this is a sport that [256:56] might be durably popular with a giant [257:00] group of people who never watch the [257:02] sport. I can't think of another sport [257:05] where that is true, where someone would [257:07] say, "Oh, I'm a big football fan, but [257:09] I've watched zero NFL games this year." [257:12] But there are lots of people who say [257:13] they love F1, who can name people, who [257:17] will buy merch, who will associate and [257:21] purchase from sponsors of teams, and who [257:24] can tell you who won the championship [257:27] last year, but will never tune in live. [257:29] And that might be like the majority of [257:31] the US audience. [257:33] >> Yep. I can't think of another one [257:34] either. [257:35] >> Yep. [257:37] My contestants, this is by far [257:42] the most complex sports business and [257:47] league certainly that we have studied [257:50] and it's hard to think of others at this [257:52] scale that might match it in complexity. [257:58] >> It's more akin to boxing or UFC with [258:01] this sort of a competition happens in a [258:04] place at a time. It's not anybody's sort [258:07] of home stadium. There's a promoter. [258:10] >> Yeah. [258:10] >> But this has 10 teams, not two fighters, [258:15] and they have $300 million race cars. [258:19] So, [258:20] >> with a thousand person teams behind it. [258:23] I was gonna make the point earlier in [258:25] the episode that it'd be like if the [258:27] equipment manager and an NFL team was [258:30] the most important person on the team [258:33] >> and had 800 people who worked for him or [258:36] her. [258:38] >> Yeah. [258:39] >> Yeah. Uh I can't imagine any other sport [258:41] that is anywhere near as complex as [258:43] this. And so you've had this crazy [258:47] history as a result, but it's still been [258:52] durable because nobody else could pull [258:55] all of these disperate parties together [258:58] in the way that Formula 1 has managed [259:00] to. [259:00] >> The activation energy to do something [259:02] similar than this is prohibitively [259:04] insane. [259:05] >> Yes. Yes. [259:06] >> The next Formula 1 is not a direct thing [259:09] that looks like Formula 1. It's [259:10] something completely different that can [259:12] start small and grow organically from [259:14] here. [259:15] >> To the point you made a few minutes ago, [259:16] nobody would ever draw up a league that [259:20] looked like this on paper, [259:21] >> right? It's it's like wonderfully [259:22] organic. [259:23] >> Yes. Yes. And chaotic. [259:26] >> And it's funny, even though it is a [259:28] thick league or a fat league just like [259:30] IPL cricket is, that started out of [259:32] nowhere and was came out guns blazing [259:36] and burned hot and worked. [259:37] >> Yep. [259:38] >> And this is kind of the opposite. It [259:39] took 70 years. [259:40] >> Yep. All right. That's my quintessence. [259:43] What I got? [259:44] >> Carveouts. [259:45] >> Carveouts. Let's do it. [259:46] >> So, for anyone new to the show, this is [259:48] where we highlight one or two things [259:50] that we have loved recently that are [259:52] totally unrelated to the episode that we [259:54] wanted to share with all of you. So, for [259:56] my wife's birthday, we went to Marymore [259:59] Park in Seattle where they have a I [260:02] can't figure out it seems reasonably [260:04] permanent, but it's a tent with a cirle [260:07] show in it. And the show [260:09] >> told me about this [260:10] >> is called Echo and it is so awesome. [260:13] Cirusle it blows me away every time. But [260:17] the performers are just otherworldly in [260:20] their talent. They're unlike many live [260:22] performances. It's not like oh we'll see [260:24] if this works and if not I can bail out [260:25] and I have a a fallback plan. There's no [260:27] fallback plans. They hit their marks [260:29] perfectly every time doing absolutely [260:31] superhuman stuff in an awe inspiring [260:33] way. Go see it if you can or really any [260:36] Circus because it's just so so [260:38] impressive. I want to go see five more. [260:40] Like I I'm I'm in. I'm super. [260:42] >> Yeah, you make it sound like actually [260:44] really awesome. [260:45] >> If you appreciate N of one performers [260:48] who are doing something that well you [260:50] you'd have to train your entire life for [260:51] it and you're the very best in the world [260:52] and you make no mistakes and it's [260:55] coupled with like unbelievably creative [260:57] clever things where you think like how [260:59] did they even think of this? That's [261:00] Cirle. [261:01] >> Awesome. My second one is super quick. [261:04] The Seahawks just won the Super Bowl and [261:05] NFL Films released on YouTube a 40inute [261:08] cut of the game called Miked Up and you [261:11] get to hear a whole bunch of the players [261:12] talking to each other and it is awesome. [261:14] Uh whether you're a Seahawks fan [261:16] >> and it actually makes the game [261:17] interesting. [261:18] >> God, was that a boring Super Bowl and I [261:20] loved it. [261:20] >> Oh man, we had a great time. [261:22] >> God, that Super Bowl game was like an F1 [261:24] race. [261:24] >> Yeah, [261:27] >> it was super super special doing the [261:29] innovation summit and then going to the [261:31] game with you. That was [261:32] >> that was [261:33] >> that was a real life moment. [261:34] >> Yeah. [261:35] >> All right. My first carveout is Tonal, [261:39] the exercise equipment. So, we have some [261:43] acquired listeners at Tonal and they [261:46] heard me on a previous carveout talking [261:48] about how I'd redone my home gym and uh [261:52] which I'm very happy about, but it is a [261:54] very small space is on my bottom floor [261:56] here in my San Francisco house and uh so [261:59] so space is at a premium. Before we [262:02] redid the space, I had a full squat rack [262:03] in there. I had enough room for that and [262:06] kind of don't have enough room for it [262:07] anymore. And so the folks at Tonal [262:09] reached out. This thing is awesome. It [262:11] just mounts to the wall and it takes up [262:12] no space. It's perfect and it's better [262:15] than a squat rack because I can do a [262:17] infinite number of strength training [262:19] exercises on it. So, uh, very happy user [262:22] of Tonal now. Thank you for making my [262:25] home gym much better. My second carve [262:27] out is continuing my truly amazing and [262:32] gratifying saga as a parent of my older [262:34] daughter discovering video games. [262:36] Because I've been documenting this whole [262:38] saga via carveouts for the last several [262:40] months, listeners have been reaching out [262:42] and one of my old classmates from [262:45] college, Ryan, actually sent me an email [262:48] about a game called Princess Peach [262:51] Showtime. Nintendo finally got the [262:54] picture that like, hey, girls are a [262:57] growth audience for them. [262:59] >> And they made a Princess Peach game [263:00] where Peach is the heroine. Peach goes [263:05] to a magical theater [263:07] >> and an evil witch named Grape takes over [263:10] the theater and Peach has to dress up in [263:12] different costumes and go reenact all [263:14] the plays [263:16] to save the theater. My daughter loves [263:19] this thing and it's been so fun to watch [263:22] her like become an expert at this game [263:24] the way that I fell in love with Super [263:26] Mario 64 back in the day. Uh it is so so [263:30] so cool. Uh so highly recommend to [263:33] anyone with little kids and a Nintendo [263:36] Switch, go get Princess Peach Showtime. [263:38] And especially if you have a young [263:39] daughter, might be their gateway into [263:41] video games. [263:42] >> Nice. Well, we have some thank yous and [263:46] lots of great people we spoke with this [263:47] episode. But first to our partners this [263:50] season. JP Morgan Payments, trusted, [263:52] reliable payments infrastructure for [263:54] your business no matter the scale. [263:56] That's jpmorggan.com/acquired. [263:58] Verscell, the developer tools and cloud [264:00] infrastructure to build and scale fast, [264:03] secure applications on the web. [264:05] Verscell.com/acquired [264:08] to Service Now, the platform that puts [264:10] AI to work for people. That's [264:12] serviceow.com/acquired [264:13] and to stats, bringing experimentation, [264:16] feature flags, and product analytics [264:17] into one unified system for product [264:19] teams. stats.com/acquired. [264:22] As always, you can click the links in [264:24] the show notes to learn more or see all [264:26] of our sources. And special thank you as [264:29] always to Arvin Navaratnam at Worldly [264:32] Partners for his awesome, awesome [264:35] writeup on Formula 1 linked in the show [264:38] notes. [264:38] >> Arvin really did a banger job. It's he [264:41] does a great job every time, but like [264:43] this was a bad [264:43] >> he's become a real indispensable part of [264:45] uh of research for acquired episodes. [264:48] >> Similarly, on my end, thank you again to [264:50] Joshua Robinson and Jonathan Kle at the [264:52] Wall Street Journal, authors of the [264:55] formula. Truly the best business history [264:57] book on F1 out there. [264:59] >> All right, and I've got a great list [265:00] here. Big thank you to Zack Brown, the [265:03] CEO at McLaren Racing. Thanks so much [265:05] for your time and prepping. to Greg [265:07] Mafay, the former CEO of Liberty Media [265:10] when they of course bought Formula 1 [265:12] from CBC. Thanks, Greg, for helping me [265:14] understand the whole company. To Brandon [265:17] Reg, who oversees non-fiction and sports [265:19] at Netflix, very helpful for [265:21] understanding Netflix's strategy with [265:23] Drive to Survive and the impacts it had. [265:25] To James Gay Ree, the co-founder of [265:28] Boxtobox Films, the production company [265:30] behind Drive to Survive. to Eddie Q at [265:32] Apple, longtime Formula 1 fan, and of [265:35] course who recently bought the US [265:37] broadcast rights to Pavangami, Alex [265:40] Knight, and Jimmy Fairbanks, who are [265:42] equity investors and analysts who really [265:44] helped me understand the investor [265:46] perspective on Formula 1 Group and [265:48] Liberty Media. To Sid Trevetti, partner [265:51] at Foundation Capital and lifelong F1 [265:53] fan to John Nafi, the former vice [265:56] chairman of McLaren Racing. And from [265:59] Ford, Will Ford and Mark Rushbrook, who [266:02] obviously did the big engine partnership [266:04] with Red Bull Racing. Thanks for your [266:05] time, guys. [266:06] >> Yep. [266:07] >> To Nathan Bashez, my good friend and [266:09] longtime F1 fan. To our friends at [266:12] Shopify, Toby Lutka and Male Paraken. [266:15] Both total motorsports nuts. And uh Toby [266:17] actually races in another racing series, [266:19] so kind of fun to get his uh his [266:20] perspective as a driver. [266:22] >> Toby. [266:24] to uh Andrew Craig, former chairman of [266:26] Indie Car and sports marketing [266:27] consultant. To Mike Miller, former Wall [266:30] Street Journal editor, who helped us [266:31] think through a lot of the big beats on [266:33] the story on this one, to our friend [266:36] Dustin Sedwick, who has done [266:37] partnerships and sponsorships with teams [266:40] and races all over the course of his [266:41] career. To Colin Fleming and the whole [266:44] Service Now team for bringing us to the [266:45] Paddock Club for the Las Vegas Grand [266:48] Prix for some first party research. to [266:50] Bobby Epstein, CEO of the Austin track [266:53] circuit of the Americas and promoter of [266:55] the US Grand Prix. And lastly, to our [266:57] friends at DUPA for providing us with [266:59] some amazing financial models and [267:01] spreadsheets of all the historical data [267:03] on Formula 1, just like they did for us [267:05] on Coca-Cola and Google. [267:07] >> Yep. And just one more on my end to [267:09] Chase Carrie, uh, board member now of [267:12] Liberty and Fox, but obviously former [267:15] CEO of the F1 Group. Yep. [267:17] >> Thanks for chatting with us. [267:19] really uh quite the cast this time. [267:21] David, these lists are getting a little [267:23] nuts. In addition to all the people that [267:25] we aren't even saying that that helped [267:26] us, too. So, thanks if if you didn't [267:28] hear your name. [267:29] >> Yes. [267:30] >> All right. If you like this episode, go [267:31] check out our other sports episodes, the [267:33] NFL, NBA, IPL, Cricket. Some good ones [267:36] in there. And uh now, if you're fired up [267:38] about F1, the first race is just a few [267:41] days away. So, if you want to see any [267:43] images from this episode, you can join [267:46] our email list, acquired.fm/email. [267:47] fm/email. We'll also share our big [267:50] takeaways from every episode, episode [267:52] summaries, uh where you're going to get [267:54] involved in helping us pick future [267:55] episodes. We we do polls and little [267:58] hints to that email list of what our [268:00] next episode will be. So, sign up at [268:02] acquired.fm/e [268:04] and come talk about it in the Slack at [268:06] acquired.fm/slack. [268:09] With that, listeners, we'll see you next [268:11] time. [268:11] >> We'll see you next time. [268:13] >> Who got the truth? [268:16] Is it you? Is it you? Is it you who got [268:18] the truth now? Huh?