Eisman Warns OpenAI Collapse Would Drag US Economy Into Recession

How OpenAI Could Cause a US Recession | TCAF 264 — The Compound

The Compound

Extreme revenue concentration across Nvidia, Oracle, and cloud hyperscalers means an AI lab price war or failure would trigger an economy-wide downturn.

AI-assisted summary of How OpenAI Could Cause a US Recession | TCAF 264 — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • Steve Eisman argues an OpenAI bankruptcy would drag the US straight into a recession due to extreme supply chain concentration: 70% of Nvidia's accounts receivable come from just five customers, while OpenAI accounts for half of Oracle's backlog and, along with Anthropic, represents 70% of hyperscaler dedicated AI revenue. (10:00)
  • The era of 'tokenmaxxing' has ended after corporate bill shocks—such as Uber burning its annual AI budget in three months—driving enterprise demand toward open-weight models that offer 90% of frontier performance at 10% of the cost. (0:00)
  • NeoCloud provider CoreWeave faces mounting financial pressure with secondary debt yields reaching 15%, an estimated 60% equity drawdown, and annual debt service of $640 million, alongside reports of attempting to fund infrastructure via insurance float. (7:46)
  • The 10-year Treasury yield dropped from 5.4% to 5.1% during tech volatility, revealing that rising yields were driven by heavy corporate and private credit issuance for AI infrastructure builds rather than ballooning federal deficits. (23:44)

Detailed notes

## Background This episode of *The Compound and Friends* (TCAF 264), titled "How OpenAI Could Cause a US Recession," was published on YouTube by The Compound on October 16, 2026. Recorded live before a student audience at the University of Miami, hosts Downtown Josh Brown and Michael Batnick welcome guest Steve Eisman to examine the macro vulnerabilities of the AI boom, CoreWeave's debt, hyperscaler concentration, and housing market strains.

## TL;DR Steve Eisman deconstructs the commercial hype around AI, arguing that existential-risk warnings from frontier labs are merely attempts at regulatory capture to insulate themselves against cheap open-weight models after the end of corporate 'tokenmaxxing.' He explains that extreme customer concentration—stretching from Nvidia down through cloud hyperscalers to Anthropic and OpenAI—creates an economic bottleneck where a lab failure or an aggressive price war could pull the broader economy into a recession, even if it does not threaten global banking solvency like 2008. The panel also scrutinizes CoreWeave's aggressive debt load and tapping of insurance float, private valuation tracking via Hyperliquid synthetic contracts, and the deepening housing affordability stalemate. Reflecting on his own career, Eisman pushes back on Wall Street commentators attempting to engineer the next 'Big Short,' emphasizing the grim reality and immense anxiety of shorting systemic crises.

## Atmosphere & style The discussion carries a lively, collegiate energy propelled by the live student crowd in Miami, balanced by Eisman's trademark blunt, deadpan cynicism. The rapport between Brown, Batnick, and Eisman is fast-paced, humorous, and irreverent, punctuated by running jokes about corporate absurdity and Wall Street fame-seeking. Beneath the banter lies an analytical, grounded sobriety that strips away tech-utopian narratives, leaving listeners with a gritty, unvarnished look at credit risks, capital cycles, and macro reality.

## Bulletin - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) Steve Eisman argues an OpenAI bankruptcy would drag the US straight into a recession due to extreme supply chain concentration: 70% of Nvidia's accounts receivable come from just five customers, while OpenAI accounts for half of Oracle's backlog and, along with Anthropic, represents 70% of hyperscaler dedicated AI revenue. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) The era of 'tokenmaxxing' has ended after corporate bill shocks—such as Uber burning its annual AI budget in three months—driving enterprise demand toward open-weight models that offer 90% of frontier performance at 10% of the cost. - [07:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=466s) NeoCloud provider CoreWeave faces mounting financial pressure with secondary debt yields reaching 15%, an estimated 60% equity drawdown, and annual debt service of $640 million, alongside reports of attempting to fund infrastructure via insurance float. - [23:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1424s) The 10-year Treasury yield dropped from 5.4% to 5.1% during tech volatility, revealing that rising yields were driven by heavy corporate and private credit issuance for AI infrastructure builds rather than ballooning federal deficits.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) Steve Eisman dismisses claims that LLMs pose an existential threat to humanity, characterizing them as sophisticated next-token retrieval engines lacking actual sentience. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) Frontier AI lab warnings about catastrophic risks are viewed as regulatory capture attempts designed to build entry barriers, lock out cheap Chinese open-weight models, and safeguard an enterprise duopoly. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) Unlike consumer search monopolies, foundational AI models lack defensible enterprise switching costs, leaving proprietary labs vulnerable to open-weight price competition. - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) An AI bust resembles a corporate default like General Motors rather than the 2008 banking crisis, but an OpenAI failure could trigger an economy-wide recession due to extreme supplier concentration. - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) Nvidia, major cloud hyperscalers, and Oracle exhibit extreme concentration risk around OpenAI and Anthropic, including Oracle's $300 billion backlog expansion being heavily tied to OpenAI. - [13:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=831s) OpenAI's revenue growth decelerated from 140% in Q2 to 43% in Q3, accompanied by unexplained drops in annualized revenue projections from $70 billion to $50 billion. - [16:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1005s) Physical and regulatory bottlenecks, such as local community opposition and high borrowing costs, are increasingly constraining the physical construction of new data centers. - [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1200s) A shift to usage-based AI pricing leaves enterprise budgets volatile, creating corporate pressure to adopt cheaper alternatives and threatening a destructive price war between Anthropic and OpenAI. - [23:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1424s) The drop in Treasury yields during tech selloffs indicates bond markets were primarily responding to the massive private and corporate debt required for AI capex rather than federal fiscal deficits. - [27:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1641s) Private cloud operators and alternative asset managers tapping life insurance float to finance illiquid, depreciating AI hardware create substantial balance sheet and yield mismatch risks. - [31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) Expectations of personal criminal liability for tech executives in the event of major AI failures are unrealistic given the historical precedent of the 2008 financial crisis. - [35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) Drawing parallels to the dot-com era, Eisman suggests the first wave of AI infrastructure builders may be commoditized while a second generation captures the lasting value. - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2400s) Approximately 65% of the S&P 500—spanning mega-cap tech, investment banks, and industrials like GE Vernova and Eaton—is tied to the AI buildout narrative, making it the single dominant trade. - [41:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2462s) The housing market faces its most severe affordability freeze since 2008, driven by cumulative 50% increases in total ownership costs over five years, which will likely require gradual price declines to clear. - [44:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2685s) Current Wall Street commentators aggressively attempting to predict the next 'Big Short' overlook the reality that the banking system today lacks the 40-to-1 systemic leverage of 2008.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) The AI Moat Illusion, Open-Weight Models, and Regulatory Capture

The conversation opens with Steve Eisman deconstructing the current hysteria around artificial intelligence and large language models (LLMs). He bluntly rejects the notion that these systems pose an existential risk to humanity, emphasizing that they possess zero sentience and simply predict the next token in a sequence:

> “What's an LLM? It's just a fancy word retrieval system. It predicts the next word in the chain. And it's great. I'm not saying it's – but that's not thinking.” — Steve Eisman

Eisman argues that the recent panic among top AI executives—specifically citing Dario Amodei of Anthropic and Sam Altman of OpenAI—is driven not by fears of artificial general intelligence destroying the planet, but by raw commercial terror. The era of "tokenmaxxing," in which corporate software leaders mandated round-the-clock enterprise AI usage regardless of cost, has collapsed after companies experienced massive bill shocks. As an example, Eisman points out that Uber burned through its entire annual AI budget within just three months in the spring.

With enterprise budgets tightening, hyperscalers face competition from cheap open-weight models that cost a tenth of the price. While open-weight options might not match frontier proprietary models in every benchmark, enterprise clients do not need a "Mercedes Benz for every road trip." In response, proprietary labs are attempting regulatory capture under the guise of AI safety. By pushing governments to intervene, they hope to construct barriers to entry, keep out cheap Chinese open-weight models, and lock in a profitable duopoly:

> “The statement that some of these guys have made that LLMs are going to destroy planet Earth is a lie.” — Steve Eisman

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The AI Regulatory Capture Dynamic accDescr: How enterprise cost cutting drives frontier labs toward regulatory capture

subgraph EnterprisePressure["Budget Pressures"] A["Tokenmaxxing Era: Enterprise Mandates"] --> B["Uber Burns AI Budget in 3 Months"] B --> C["Demand Shifts to Open-Weight Models at 1/10th Cost"] end

subgraph LabReaction["Frontier Lab Strategy"] C --> D["Price Wars & Margin Compression"] D --> E["Founders Claim AI Will Destroy the World"] E --> F["Lobby for Strict Government Regulations"] F --> G["Lock Out Chinese & Open-Source Competition to Secure Duopoly"] end ```

The underlying vulnerability of the sector is that foundational models lack defensible consumer or enterprise stickiness. While Google enjoyed a monopoly where users could not even conceive of switching search engines, AI users routinely hop between Claude, Gemini, and ChatGPT. When Josh Brown suggests that Ritholtz Wealth Management adopted Claude Enterprise because enterprise workflows might quietly build a lasting habit, Eisman counters that cost discipline will always override convenience. Once open-weight alternatives deliver 90% of the capability at 10% of the cost, proprietary providers like Claude will inevitably be forced into brutal price cuts.

- Tokenmaxxing defined: Enterprise mandates forcing 24/7 AI utilization irrespective of run-rate costs. - Budget blowouts: Uber exhausted its entire corporate AI budget in three months. - Open-weight alternatives: Available at roughly one-tenth the cost of top-tier proprietary models. - Enterprise moats: Foundational model switching costs remain near zero despite hundreds of billions in annual capital investment.

---

[05:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=342s) Live at the University of Miami: Eisman's Track Record and The Real Eisman Playbook

Following a brief sponsorship note for VanEck's Real Assets ETF (RAAX), Josh Brown and Michael Batnick officially introduce the episode live before a student audience at the University of Miami. Brown highlights Eisman’s rapid success with his new media venture:

> “Completely shocked.” — Steve Eisman

Brown details Eisman's career arc, starting from his famous subprime short while heading Frontpoint Partners (immortalized by Michael Lewis in *The Big Short*), through his founding of Emrys Partners in 2012, to his tenure as a managing director and portfolio manager at Neuberger Berman starting in 2014.

The hosts and Eisman trade banter about the University of Miami campus setting, complete with its outdoor pool in the center of the campus. Eisman jokes about his daughter studying art history at Miami while reflecting on his and his wife Valerie's choice to attend the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia:

> “We're idiots. Like we went to the school in the middle of Philadelphia where we froze our butts off. We could have been in Miami.” — Steve Eisman

- Guest: Steve Eisman, host of *The Real Eisman Playbook* (launched in 2025), portfolio manager at Neuberger Berman. - Venue: University of Miami live taping. - Historical context: Shorted the subprime mortgage market via credit default swaps at Frontpoint Partners ahead of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis.

---

[07:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=466s) CoreWeave, NeoCloud Debt Spreads, and Systemic Risk Parallels

Josh Brown shifts the conversation to the central macro debate hanging over the equity and credit markets: whether the debt-heavy funding model underpinning AI infrastructure is about to crack. Brown points to distressed price action in CoreWeave, a prominent "NeoCloud" provider that builds and operates specialized GPU data centers without the lucrative advertising cash flows enjoyed by traditional hyperscalers like Alphabet.

CoreWeave's secondary debt yields have spiked toward 15%, while its equity value has suffered an estimated 60% drawdown. Brown emphasizes the precariousness of capital-intensive data center builds: once construction begins on massive computational footprints, sponsors cannot simply halt operations halfway through without facing insolvency.

Brown asks Eisman whether this blowout in NeoCloud spreads represents the early innings of a 2008-style credit contagion event. Eisman begins his framework by separating standard corporate defaults from systemic banking collapses. If an industrial corporation—such as General Motors—goes bankrupt, the fallout involves severe layoffs, vendor insolvencies, and equity destruction, but it does not inherently threaten the solvency of the global banking system.

> “Well, look, if you want to draw parallels to the great financial crisis, there's a big difference...” — Steve Eisman

- Market indicator: CoreWeave debt yields surged to approximately 15% as credit spreads blew out. - Equity performance: Secondary pricing for CoreWeave shares reflects a drawdown of around 60%. - Business model vulnerability: NeoClouds operate high-capex infrastructure without the massive high-margin cash engines (e.g., search ads) that subsidize hyperscalers. - Macro debate: Assessing whether NeoCloud debt stress is an isolated corporate restructuring cycle or the spark for systemic financial contagion.

[10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) Systemic Risk: The AI Concentration Problem

The conversation shifts to contrasting the current AI boom with past crises like the 2008 Great Financial Crisis. Steve Eisman points out that while a banking collapse like JPMorgan Chase causes "planet Earth burns" and requires immediate government bailouts because depositors cannot access their cash, the current AI infrastructure dilemma is closer to the General Motors bankruptcy: painful and disruptive, but fundamentally non-lethal to the financial system. The banks remain sound. However, Eisman startles the hosts by asserting that if OpenAI were to go bankrupt tomorrow, it would drag the entire US economy straight into a recession.

Michael Batnick pushes back, asking how a private startup valued at $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion could become systemically dangerous in only three years. Eisman argues that OpenAI and Anthropic have created massive concentration risk throughout the entire tech supply chain by signing staggering commitments with nearly every counterparty willing to accept them.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI Tech Supply Chain Concentration accDescr: Flowchart illustrating concentration risk down the tech stack from Nvidia to frontier model labs. subgraph Hardware ["Hardware Layer"] NVDA["Nvidia<br/>(70% of AR from 5 clients)"] end subgraph Cloud ["Cloud & Infrastructure Layer"] HS["Hyperscalers<br/>(Cloud Providers)"] ORCL["Oracle<br/>(50% of backlog from OpenAI)"] end subgraph Frontier ["Frontier AI Labs"] AI["OpenAI & Anthropic<br/>(70% of Hyperscaler AI revenue)"] end NVDA --> HS NVDA --> ORCL HS --> AI ORCL --> AI ```

Eisman traces this risk down the corporate food chain: - **Nvidia:** In its most recent quarter, the largest company in the world grew revenue over 100%. Yet its 10-Q filing reveals that 70% of its accounts receivable—a direct proxy for revenue—originates from just five primary customers. Eisman recalls his time at Oppenheimer in the 1990s, when a top software analyst flatly refused to take a fast-growing software company public because it depended on only two clients. - **Hyperscalers:** The five big customers buying chips are primarily the cloud hyperscalers. Within those hyperscalers, roughly 70% of their dedicated AI revenue (accounting for 25% to 30% of total cloud revenue) is generated by Anthropic and OpenAI. - **Oracle:** The vulnerability is even more pronounced for Oracle, where OpenAI single-handedly represents half of its entire backlog. Oracle and others are aggressively building out data centers solely because OpenAI and Anthropic are demanding tenfold capacity expansions.

As Eisman summarizes the chain reaction: “The problem with the AI story is a concentration problem.”

[13:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=831s) Market Rout, "The Big Short" Syndrome, and CoreWeave's Debt

Market stress is already surfacing. Hot inflation prints arrived on consecutive mornings, yet bond yields dropped sharply—a telltale flight to safety showing investor anxiety. Meanwhile, specialized GPU cloud provider CoreWeave is buckling under heavy borrowing costs, shelling out $640 million solely to service its debt pile against uncertain cash flow. Over the preceding seven trading days, the SOX semiconductor index shed an eye-watering $2.1 trillion in market value.

Josh Brown asks whether this sudden collapse signals the AI bubble popping or just another routine dip, noting a widespread eagerness across Wall Street to call the next cataclysm. Eisman laughs, diagnosing this obsession as a psychological ailment:

> “I said, you know, you know what the problem with all these people is they all want to be me. And I have news for them: the role of Steve Eisman is taken.”

Everyone craves the fame of predicting the next historic bust, but Eisman clarifies that he does not need the glory again and does not believe CoreWeave alone is large enough to sink the AI complex. Instead, the real vulnerability rests squarely on Anthropic and OpenAI. Eisman points out strange financial discrepancies: OpenAI reported its annualized revenue at $50 billion at the end of September, despite having claimed $70 billion just one month earlier, begging the question of where $20 billion in projected run-rate disappeared. Furthermore, while quarterly revenue rose 43% to $16.8 billion, that represents a steep drop from the second quarter's 140% growth rate.

- CoreWeave is spending roughly $640 million annually just on debt service. - The semiconductor index (SOX) lost $2.1 trillion in market cap over a single seven-day span. - OpenAI's revenue growth decelerated from 140% in Q2 down to 43% in Q3.

[16:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1005s) The End of Tokenmaxxing and Physical Limits to Compute

Eisman attributes this revenue slowdown to the death of "tokenmaxxing"—an initial phase where corporate customers spent unrestrained budgets on experimentation before finance departments stepped in and curtailed exorbitant AI bills. While rising interest rates make financing new data centers far more expensive to underwrite, high physical resistance is also mounting in municipalities nationwide. Building massive data centers has become intensely unpopular among local communities across America, which Eisman quips are "maybe less popular than the Dodgers."

This localized backlash threatens to choke the physical footprint of future compute expansion. Josh Brown and Eisman debate the investment consequences: - If new data center projects stall, tech firms cannot purchase additional compute clusters because there are no physical facilities ready to house them. - However, existing, operational compute capacity may command higher scarcity value and pricing power.

Josh Brown argues that structural demand itself is not deteriorating. University students visiting Wall Street investment banks continue to observe that enterprise budgets for AI staffing and implementation will be substantially larger in 2027 than in 2026 or 2025. Consumer adoption is equally sticky across tools like ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and emerging agentic software, meaning users will not revert to workflows from 2022. The real bottleneck is not consumer or corporate desire, but the pricing dynamics and capital constraints dictating who can afford to build out the capacity. If debt-dependent operators like CoreWeave or Nebius are locked out of cheap financing, the supply side of the market will undergo a painful reckoning.

[20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1200s) Hyperscalers, Usage-Based Pricing, and the AI Price War Bear Case

The discussion opens on the shifting balance of power in tech, with Josh Brown pointing out that the ball seems to have bounced straight back into the court of the hyperscalers—Amazon, Alphabet, and Microsoft. With debt getting more expensive and the broader appetite for corporate bonds waning compared to a year prior, these cash-rich giants find themselves in an even more dominant position. Steve Eisman agrees that the hyperscalers' standing has strengthened, but he immediately highlights a structural vulnerability: the entire AI ecosystem is dangerously concentrated around just two private labs, OpenAI and Anthropic. If a severe price war breaks out between them, the hyperscalers' strength will not shield the market from an inevitable, severe correction.

Michael Batnick notes that the commercial model for software has shifted dramatically over the past fifteen years. Instead of the classic enterprise SaaS model—where a vendor like Salesforce charges a predictable flat fee of roughly $80 per head across a 1,000-employee enterprise—AI services are selling on a pay-as-you-go, usage-based consumption model. While Batnick suggests this structure feels more flexible and sustainable for customers, Eisman counters that running real-time AI workloads is far more expensive. As enterprise budgets pinch, corporate management will become intensely cost-conscious, forcing employees onto cheaper open-weight or discounted models. That behavior, Eisman argues, will spark a destructive pricing race to the bottom between OpenAI and Anthropic. When Josh asks how this spills over into an economy-wide recession, Eisman lays out the exact domino effect:

> “This business is so concentrated from Anthropic and OpenAI that if there's a price war, none of that matters. The whole thing will correct.” — Steve Eisman

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI Price War Transmission Mechanism accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how price competition between OpenAI and Anthropic ripples into revenue collapse, funding freezes, and tech stock unwinds.

subgraph PricingPressure ["Enterprise Cost Cuts"] A["Enterprises mandate cheaper AI models"] --> B["OpenAI & Anthropic enter full-blown price war"] end

subgraph DirectImpact ["AI Labs Squeezed"] B --> C["Anthropic & OpenAI revenue growth turns negative"] C --> D["Venture & debt funding markets freeze"] end

subgraph MarketSpillover ["Ecosystem Contagion"] D --> E["Labs slash computing commitments"] E --> F["Oracle backlog collapses ($300B+ OpenAI exposure)"] F --> G["Broader tech selloff & economic recession"] end ```

Eisman illustrates this fragility by examining Oracle. Around the third quarter of the prior year, Oracle was trading at $230 per share before reporting earnings. On the call, management announced that its remaining performance backlog had surged by an astonishing $300 billion in a single quarter, climbing toward $400 billion. The stock erupted in an unprecedented two-day surge, jumping 100 points from $230 to $330. Shortly after, DA Davidson analyst Gil Luria published research revealing that essentially the entire $300 billion backlog spike was tied to a single customer: OpenAI. The market panicked at the realization that Oracle’s corporate destiny was tethered to an unprofitable entity burning billions in cash. Oracle subsequently collapsed from $330 back to $230, and ultimately slid all the way down to $130.

- Enterprise SaaS traditionally monetized headcount at stable rates like $80 per seat. - Usage-based token pricing makes enterprise bills volatile, incentivizing companies to downgrade to cheaper inference alternatives. - Oracle stock rocketed 100 points (from $230 to $330) within two days on backlog expansion before crashing back down to $130 as the OpenAI concentration risk became clear.

[23:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1424s) Hot Inflation Prints, the Semi Wipeout, and Hyperliquid's Anthropic Signal

The conversation shifts to a brutal stretch across financial markets triggered by back-to-back hot inflation reports. Hot Consumer Price Index (CPI) numbers were immediately followed by equally troubling Producer Price Index (PPI) data, extinguishing hopes for immediate monetary easing. The fallout hit the high-flying semiconductor and memory names hardest. Josh highlights a staggering statistic: Western Digital had tumbled into a severe 54% drawdown from its peak, yet incredibly remained up 100% year-to-date. As Eisman remarks, having a stock get cut clean in half while still sitting on a 100% annual gain perfectly encapsulates the market's speculative fever, though Batnick dryly observes that the statistic offers zero comfort to anyone who bought at the all-time high.

With treasury yields spiking, the turmoil filtered directly into AI valuations. While Anthropic is a private company without a public listing, participants track its implied market value via synthetic perpetual contracts on Hyperliquid, a decentralized blockchain-based trading platform that handled $17.6 million in Anthropic volume over a 24-hour window (and had previously served as a real-time price discovery venue for the SpaceX IPO). When Anthropic's private revenue numbers leaked after the closing bell, the contract puked, causing after-hours semiconductor futures to plunge and turning social media sentiment pitch black.

> “Yields are coming way down and the stocks that are ripping today are the biggest pieces of shit in the market.” — Michael Batnick

By the following morning, the mood had inverted. Anthropic’s synthetic contract rebounded 5.5%, bond yields retreated sharply, and the day's biggest stock gainers were beaten-down, rate-sensitive cyclicals—with homebuilder Lennar leading the rally. Batnick marvels at how rapidly sentiment whipsaws: just days earlier, equities ignored higher rates under an "unbeatable" AI banner, yet it took bad economic news and a scare in tech to finally put a temporary ceiling on yields.

The yield reversal offers a crucial revelation about macro market dynamics. Josh and Eisman discuss how bond market bears had spent months claiming that surging treasury yields were driven by structural "fiscal irresponsibility" and ballooning federal deficits. However, the sudden drop in the 10-year yield from 5.4% down to 5.1% the moment the AI trade wobbled proved otherwise. The real marginal driver pushing yields higher was not deficit doom-mongering, but the relentless issuance of corporate and private credit required to fund the multi-hundred-billion-dollar AI infrastructure buildout.

- Producer Price Index (PPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI) data both printed hotter than expected. - Western Digital suffered a 54% peak-to-trough collapse while maintaining a 100% year-to-date gain. - Hyperliquid facilitated $17.6 million in 24-hour trading volume for Anthropic synthetic contracts. - The 10-year Treasury yield dropped rapidly from 5.4% to 5.1% as tech infrastructure spending concerns cooled bond issuance expectations.

[27:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1641s) CoreWeave Insider Sales, Insurance Capital, and the Next Big Short

The scrutiny turns squarely to CoreWeave, the private cloud computing provider at the center of the AI infrastructure boom. CoreWeave’s chief executive officer has offloaded $682 million worth of company stock over the trailing year. While Batnick acknowledges the sales were executed under pre-scheduled Rule 10b5-1 trading plans and likely served in part to satisfy massive tax obligations on equity vestings, the sheer optics remain problematic. For a business facing relentless skepticism over its aggressive leverage, heavy debt facilities, and equipment depreciation schedules, insider liquidity of that scale raises serious red flags for outside investors.

Adding fuel to the fire, the *Financial Times* published an exposé detailing CoreWeave’s strategic push to tap what it termed "unlimited insurance money" to finance its ongoing data center and GPU buildout. Josh notes the sheer audacity of pitching private insurance reserves as an endless pool of cheap liquidity to underwrite depreciating hardware.

> “This is part of the areas of the market that people—to the extent that people want to call the next big short, this is an area where people are planting their flag.” — Josh Brown

Eisman enthusiastically concurs, noting that alternative asset managers tapping life insurance float to fund speculative or illiquid holdings represents one of the most perilous corners of modern finance. The hosts compare this dynamic to Mark Walter and Guggenheim Partners, joking about a hypothetical scenario where Walter sells the Los Angeles Dodgers back into his captive life insurance company to reinvest the proceeds into AI compute. Eisman, who recently recorded a podcast examining Walter's maneuvers, details how Walter utilized insurance balance sheets to orchestrate acquisitions of elite sports franchises like the Dodgers and Los Angeles Lakers (the latter bought at an eye-popping $2 billion valuation) through complex inter-entity lending arrangements. While Walter’s asset purchases ultimately appreciated significantly, Eisman emphasizes that using life insurance policyholder float to mask aggressive financial engineering and asset speculation creates systemic risks that could turn into the market's next major scandal.

- CoreWeave’s CEO sold $682 million in company equity via planned stock dispositions. - The *Financial Times* reported that CoreWeave is actively targeting insurance company balance sheets for financing. - The use of life insurance reserves by private equity and specialty finance firms to fund illiquid assets mirrors the financial tactics used in multi-billion-dollar professional sports franchise acquisitions.

[30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1800s) Insurance Regulators and AI Data Center Contagion Risk

The conversation dives into the financial maneuvers surrounding Mark Walter’s insurance entities and their exposure to private credit and AI infrastructure like CoreWeave. The hosts debate whether the financing scheme constitutes a crime if the underlying collateral appreciates in value. While some argue the transaction is practically victimless as long as asset prices climb, the counterargument is clear: policyholders buying annuities expecting safe, conservative investments are unwittingly funding high-risk, private AI contracts. A policyholder who knew their capital was backing speculative tech debt would never have agreed to accept a modest 3% return when the real risk profile demands 12%. Steve Eisman adds some levity to the regulatory oversight by highlighting a quirky piece of trivia regarding Mark Walter’s Delaware-domiciled insurance empire. When Eisman asks the room to guess the prior profession of the Delaware state insurance regulator, someone guesses finance and another jokingly guesses podcaster, before Eisman reveals the punchline: he was previously a county sheriff.

The discussion then turns to the flurry of warnings appearing across financial Substack newsletters, where commentators draw ominous lines between life insurance companies, policyholder funds, and speculative AI data centers. Josh Brown asks Eisman directly whether everyday retail policyholders face genuine systemic risk from this financial engineering or whether newsletter doom-mongers are exaggerating the danger. Eisman quickly brushes off the apocalyptic theories, refusing to buy into the panic over insurance balance sheets being dragged down by data center loans. When pressed point-blank if he is worried about systemic insurance contagion spreading from AI financing, Steve Eisman bluntly dismisses the concern: “I'm not worried about it as a matter of answer.”

- **The yield mismatch**: Traditional fixed annuities offering a conservative ~3% yield are being deployed behind the scenes into aggressive tech infrastructure debt that should command yields around 12% to compensate for actual credit risk. - **The regulatory hurdle**: Oversight of these complex, billion-dollar private investment vehicles in Delaware falls under an insurance commissioner whose background was in law enforcement as a sheriff rather than structured finance.

---

[31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) AI Regulation and the Illusion of Executive Liability

Josh Brown pivots to the broader political and legal backlash facing artificial intelligence. Reflecting on recent White House proposals and UN discussions regarding frontier AI risks, Brown questions how emerging regulations plan to assign legal liability when autonomous systems inevitably malfunction or commit cybercrime. Under the framework being discussed, an industry-led commission would set standards, holding firms accountable for catastrophic harms caused by their models. Brown questions whether accountability will merely mean corporate fines paid by passive venture capital investors or whether company executives will face personal criminal consequences. When asked how AI regulation should actually function, Eisman acknowledges that while corporate liability is straightforward, holding individual tech leadership personally accountable is pure fantasy.

Eisman roots his cynicism in the historical precedent of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis, noting that Wall Street executives walked away completely untouched after blowing up the global economy. Recalling an appearance on another podcast where the host pleaded with him about how to hold fraudulent CEOs accountable, Eisman reiterated that our legal apparatus simply does not punish corporate elites after the fact. Steve Eisman sums up the reality: “Well nothing happened to anyone personally. Nothing happened to any executive even though they committed the worst fraud in human history.” He concludes that “if nobody went to jail for 2008, they ain't going to jail for hacking,” asserting that meaningful regulation only ever arrives retroactively in the wreckage of an undeniable disaster: “I think we have to have a crisis and then in the aftermath, maybe there will be some rules.” When asked about the government taking equity stakes in AI labs or picking winners, Eisman recoils at the suggestion, warning: “No, because then everybody would assume that they'd be too big to fail and they'd get bailed out. I don't want the government involved.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Regulatory and Crisis Cycle accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how corporate harm occurs without executive accountability until a full-blown crisis forces reactive regulation.

subgraph CorporateAction ["Corporate Incentives"] A["Frontier AI Deployment & Risk-Taking"] --> B["System Malfunction or Rogue Damage"] end

subgraph LegalPrecedent ["Legal & Regulatory Response"] B --> C["Corporate-Level Fines & Civil Liability"] C -.->|"Zero Personal Accountability"| D["Executives Shielded (2008 Precedent)"] end

subgraph EventualOutcome ["Crisis Trigger"] D --> E["Systemic Crisis / Industry Meltdown"] E --> F["Reactive Government Regulation Imposed"] end ```

---

[35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) Hyperscaler Limits, Anthropic’s Rush to IPO, and the Dominant Narrative

The panel examines whether hyperscalers like Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Meta can breach $10 trillion market caps or if they are approaching natural limits to growth. Eisman sees no physical ceiling to their corporate scale, comparing the AI buildout to the early days of the commercial internet. He recalls sitting across the hall from tech analyst Henry Blodget at Oppenheimer in the late 1990s: “He got out on the sales floor and he said that dynastic levels of wealth are about to be created and the internet's going to conquer the world.” While Blodget was entirely right about the macro thesis, he picked the wrong cohort; first-generation darlings like AOL, Netscape, Yahoo, and Excite washed out, while second-generation companies built on top of the initial infrastructure reaped the ultimate rewards.

The hosts turn to private model builders Anthropic and OpenAI. While the market anticipates an impending Anthropic IPO, Brown theorizes Anthropic desperately needs to tap the public equity markets before third-quarter results reveal how crashing token prices have squeezed their unit economics. When asked whether Anthropic should go public this year, Steve Eisman agrees with urgency: “They better.” Yet when asked if he would actually purchase the offering, Eisman shoots back: “No way.” Brown contrasts this with the mega-cap SpaceX IPO, where doom-laden social media predictions about index disruption and insider unlock selling ultimately proved wrong, with the stock trading like an ordinary tech security. Ultimately, Eisman dismisses conventional valuation metrics like forward P/E compression, asserting that equity markets are entirely steered by a single force: “It is pure narrative and there is only one narrative that matters right now and that's AI. So you tell me what happens to the AI narrative and I'll tell you what happens to the stock market, period.”

- **The Dot-Com parallel**: The rails built by the first generation of web companies largely ended up enriching the subsequent generation; Amazon stands as the rare first-generation survivor to dominate the modern tech landscape. - **Anthropic vs. OpenAI listing timing**: Anthropic faces severe pressure to go public while sentiment remains elevated, as commoditized inference and model price wars threaten to deteriorate reported financial metrics ahead of Q3 reporting. - **SpaceX precedent**: Despite warnings on financial social media that a massive direct listing or IPO would destabilize passive index funds and tank under insider selling, market liquidity absorbed the listing without breaking down.

[40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2400s) The Economy Is the AI Trade and the Frozen Housing Market

The discussion continues on the deep interlock between the broader economy and the stock market. Looking at the composition of the S&P 500, roughly 40% consists of big tech giants like Google and Amazon. Factoring in investment banks, plus industrials and infrastructure providers like GE Vernova, Quanta Services, Eaton, and Rockwell Automation, the concentration reaches roughly 65% of the index. Everything is effectively tied into a singular structural thesis. As Steve Eisman summarizes:

> “The industrials are it’s all one trade. It’s AI, period, end of discussion.”

So long as end-user demand persists and institutions remain eager to finance the buildout, the momentum can endure. That dynamic has acted as an economic shield, keeping broader metrics buoyant even as major sectors suffer.

The conversation then turns to the housing market, which is experiencing its worst stretch since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). While the systemic plumbing is not broken in the same way it was in 2008, roughly one-third of the domestic economy is dealing with depression-level activity, yet overall sentiment remains buoyant because AI carries the index. In 2022, public homebuilders saw a strange boom: existing homeowners were locked into historically low mortgage rates, causing total resale inventory to freeze. With buyers unable to find existing homes, large-scale builders like Lennar, PulteGroup, and KB Home feasted by offering mortgage rate buydowns and concessions. However, that builder frenzy has lost steam. While buyers are gradually accepting higher mortgage rates as the new normal, homebuilder stocks have taken a beating.

Eisman points out that housing is in an affordability crisis worse than almost any period in modern history. The issue extends far beyond mortgage rates alone: - **Comprehensive Ownership Inflation:** Insurance premiums have skyrocketed, utility bills have climbed, and property taxes have surged alongside elevated purchase prices. Rolling all monthly housing costs together, buying a home today costs an estimated 50% more each month than it did five years ago. - **How the Stalemate Breaks:** Eisman believes the deadlock will resolve through falling home prices. Despite intense demographic demand from roughly 70 million individuals of homebuying age, buyers are simply priced out unless prices reset downward. - **Emerging Supply Channels:** Inventory will gradually increase as older Baby Boomers pass away and property foreclosures rise from historically depressed baselines. - **Pace of Adjustment:** Falling home prices will not serve as a rapid economic stimulus because the price-discovery process takes years to play out across local markets.

---

[44:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2685s) The Rush to Call the Next "Big Short" and the Reality of 2008

The conversation wraps up by exploring the cottage industry of commentators, newsletter writers, and social media personalities competing to become the next Steve Eisman by anticipating the next financial collapse. Many commentators spend their days putting out hyper-bearish research notes or amplifying bad economic news, eager to claim credit as the prophet who called the crisis in advance. Michael Batnick notes a crucial distinction between this commentary culture and the original crisis: Eisman and his team took enormous financial risk and made fortunes on a real trade, whereas modern doomers are merely chasing reputational clout online.

When asked what it was really like to be on the winning side of the 2008 financial crash, Eisman pushes back on the romanticized depiction of the event:

> “It wasn’t so awesome. It was — let me tell you. It was a lot of aggravation and tremendous anxiety.”

Public sentiment was hostile, with critics accusing short-sellers of actively destroying the global economy and blaming them for the fallout. Eisman stresses that he has no desire to ever live through an episode like that again.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Comparison of 2008 GFC and the Modern AI Cycle accDescr: Structural differences between the 2008 banking crisis and potential downside risks in the AI infrastructure buildout.

subgraph GFC ["2008 Financial Crisis"] A["Financial Institutions Levered 40-to-1"] --> B["Systemic Solvency Collapse"] B --> C["Catastrophic Global Meltdown"] end

subgraph AI ["Current Market Setup"] D["AI Infrastructure Concentration (~65% of S&P)"] --> E["Downside: Severe Tech/Capex Recession"] E --> F["Not Systemically Levered 40:1"] end ```

Addressing whether a similar disaster could unfold today, Eisman highlights that systemic bank leverage is nowhere near the 40-to-1 ratios that characterized 2008. If the current artificial intelligence cycle unravels, it could easily trigger a severe recession, but it will not be on the same catastrophic order of magnitude as the Great Financial Crisis.

Josh Brown and Michael Batnick conclude the show by thanking the University of Miami students who made up the impromptu live studio audience, wishing them success in their future careers before closing out the episode.

## Notable quotes > [35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) It is pure narrative and there is only one narrative that matters right now and that's AI. So you tell me what happens to the AI narrative and I'll tell you what happens to the stock market, period. — Steve Eisman

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) The statement that some of these guys have made that LLMs are going to destroy planet Earth is a lie. — Steve Eisman

> [31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) I think we have to have a crisis and then in the aftermath, maybe there will be some rules. — Steve Eisman

## Mentioned Steve Eisman, Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, OpenAI, Anthropic, Nvidia, CoreWeave, Oracle, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, Google, Uber, Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Mark Walter, Guggenheim Partners, Frontpoint Partners, Neuberger Berman, Emrys Partners, VanEck, Western Digital, Hyperliquid, Lennar, PulteGroup, KB Home, GE Vernova, Quanta Services, Eaton, Rockwell Automation, SpaceX, Henry Blodget, Gil Luria, DA Davidson, The Big Short, The Real Eisman Playbook, Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, University of Miami

## Video description On episode 264 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and Michael Batnick are joined by Steve Eisman to discuss in front of a live audience of University of Miami students: why AI labs are asking to be regulated, the end of tokenmaxxing and the rise of cheap open-weight models, whether any AI company has a moat, CoreWeave's debt and whether AI funding is about to break, why this is not 2008, how OpenAI and Anthropic became systemically important, Nvidia's customer concentration, the chip selloff and the rush to call the next Big Short, the AI price war bear case and Oracle's OpenAI backlog, hot inflation and what the bond market revealed about the AI trade, the Anthropic IPO, the worst housing market since the financial crisis, and what it was really like to be right in 2008.

This episode is sponsored by VanEck. To learn more about RAAX, visit: https://www.vaneck.com/RAAXCompound

►00:00 - Cold Open ►05:42 - Steve Eisman Joins Live ►07:46 - CoreWeave Debt and AI Concentration Risk ►13:51 - Chip Selloff and OpenAI's Missing $20 Billion ►21:53 - AI Price War Bear Case and Oracle ►27:21 - CoreWeave, Insurers and Mark Walter ►31:58 - AI Regulation: Will Anyone Be Held Liable? ►35:04 - Hyperscalers, Anthropic IPO and SpaceX ►41:02 - Housing Market: Worst Since the GFC ►44:45 - Who Will Call the Next Big Short?

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4)

中文简报

Eisman警告:OpenAI若崩溃将把美国经济拖入衰退 Nvidia、Oracle和超大规模云服务商极端的收入集中度意味着,AI实验室的价格战或倒闭将引发全经济范围的低迷。 Steve Eisman剖析了围绕人工智能的商业炒作,认为前沿实验室发出的生存风险警告只是试图进行监管俘获,以便在企业“狂刷Token(tokenmaxxing)”时代终结后,保护自身免受廉价开放权重模型的冲击。他解释说,从Nvidia向下贯穿超大规模云服务商、再延伸至Anthropic和OpenAI的极高客户集中度造成了经济瓶颈;即便不会像2008年那样威胁全球银行体系的偿付能力,实验室的倒闭或激进的价格战仍可能将更广泛的经济拖入衰退。该小组还审视了CoreWeave激进的债务负担及其利用保险浮存金的做法、通过Hyperliquid合成合约进行的私募估值追踪,以及不断加深的住房负担能力僵局。在回顾自身职业生涯时,Eisman驳斥了华尔街评论员试图炮制下一场“大空头”的做法,强调做空系统性危机背后残酷的现实与巨大的焦虑。 Steve Eisman认为,鉴于极端的供应链集中度,OpenAI若破产将直接把美国拖入衰退:Nvidia应收账款的70%仅来自五家客户,而OpenAI占Oracle未交货订单的一半,且与Anthropic合计占超大规模云服务商专用AI收入的70%。 (10:00) 在企业遭遇账单冲击(例如Uber在三个月内烧光全年AI预算)后,“狂刷Token”的时代已经结束,推动企业需求转向开放权重模型,后者以10%的成本提供了前沿模型90%的性能。 (0:00) 新型云提供商CoreWeave面临日益增加的财务压力,其二级市场债务收益率达到15%,股权价值预计回撤60%,年度偿债支出达6.4亿美元,并有报道称其试图通过保险浮存金为基础设施提供资金。 (7:46) 在科技股震荡期间,10年期美债收益率从5.4%降至5.1%,表明此前收益率上升是由为AI基础设施建设发行的大量企业债和私人信贷推动的,而非不断膨胀的联邦赤字。 (23:44)

Reading summary

Steve Eisman argues that the artificial intelligence trade has concentrated systemic vulnerability across the tech supply chain into private labs like OpenAI and Anthropic. A failure or severe price war among these labs could trigger a US recession, though well-capitalized banks distinguish the threat from the 2008 financial crisis. The Illusion of Moats and Cost Pressures (0:00) Eisman contends that large language models are sophisticated token-prediction systems rather than sentient intelligences, and he dismisses executive claims of existential risk as regulatory capture intended to block cheaper open-weight competitors. Following an initial 'tokenmaxxing' period where corporate experimentation ignored costs—such as Uber spending its entire annual AI budget within three months—enterprises are facing bill shock and seeking cheaper alternatives. Because foundational models possess negligible switching costs, proprietary labs face intense margin compression from open-weight software offering 90% of the capability at roughly a tenth of the price. Supply Chain Vulnerability and Revenue Concentration (10:00) The broader technology sector has tied its balance sheets to frontier model builders. Nvidia generated over 100% year-over-year revenue growth, but its filings reveal that 70% of accounts receivable stems from just five customers, primarily cloud hyperscalers. Within those hyperscalers, OpenAI and Anthropic drive an estimated 70% of dedicated AI revenue, which accounts for 25% to 30% of total cloud revenue. Oracle's remaining performance backlog expanded by $300 billion in a single quarter largely due to OpenAI commitments, and its share price plunged from a high of $330 back down to $130 once investors grasped the extent of this counterparty concentration. NeoCloud Debt Strains and Financing Frictions (7:46) Specialized infrastructure operators face growing balance sheet pressure without the high-margin non-AI cash flows that protect traditional hyperscalers. CoreWeave pays roughly $640 million annually just to service its debt, its secondary debt yields have climbed toward 15%, and its equity has experienced an estimated 60% drawdown. Meanwhile, its chief executive sold $682 million in company stock under 10b5-1 plans. The Financial Times reported that CoreWeave sought capital from life insurance balance sheets, raising alarms over deploying conservative policyholder reserves yielding roughly 3% into high-risk tech infrastructure debt that typically demands 12%. However, Eisman dismisses fears that this will trigger an insurance-wide crisis. Macroeconomic Transmission and 2008 Disconnects (23:44) The AI infrastructure buildout now shapes broader market dynamics, directly affecting fixed income and economic benchmarks. Rising 10-year Treasury yields eased from 5.4% to 5.1% when tech capital expenditure expectations paused, demonstrating that corporate debt issuance to build compute, rather than fiscal deficits alone, drove marginal yields. Accounting for technology, investment banking, and capital-goods beneficiaries like GE Vernova and Eaton, roughly 65% of the S&P 500 effectively trades on the AI narrative. This massive capital cycle has masked weakness elsewhere in the economy, notably a frozen housing market where total monthly ownership costs have climbed an estimated 50% over five years. While Eisman warns that an OpenAI bankruptcy or a model price war could cause a severe economic recession, he stresses that modern banks lack the 40-to-1 systemic leverage that devastated markets in 2008. The ultimate durability of the cycle depends on whether corporate end-demand can bridge the capital-spending gap before private funding freezes or physical and municipal bottlenecks halt further data center expansion.

精炼阅读摘要

知名投资人Steve Eisman指出,人工智能并不存在生存级安全威胁,当前AI投资潮也不会引发2008年式的银行系统性崩溃;但整个科技供应链对OpenAI和Anthropic两家初创公司的过度依赖,意味着一旦下游遭遇激烈的模型价格战或商业暴雷,极易将美国经济直接拖入衰退。 大模型护城河缺失与监管俘获 (0:00) Eisman直言大语言模型(LLM)本质上只是“高级词汇检索与下一词预测系统”,并无真正意识与思考能力。他认为OpenAI首席执行官Sam Altman及Anthropic首席执行官Dario Amodei等人渲染“AI毁灭人类”的末日论,实则是对商业竞争的极度恐慌。企业此前无视成本全面推广AI的“Token最大化”(tokenmaxxing)时代已经终结,高额账单倒逼预算紧缩,例如Uber在春季仅用三个月便耗尽了全年的AI预算。 随着客户精打细算,专有模型正遭遇成本仅为其十分之一的开源权重模型的冲击,而多数商用场景并不需要顶配性能。由于用户在不同模型间切换毫无壁垒,专有大模型缺乏传统网络垄断效应。Eisman指出,闭源实验室正企图以“AI安全”为由推动政府监管,通过设置准入门槛将廉价开源模型及中国竞争者排挤在外,以锁定双寡头利润。 科技供应链集中度与衰退传导 (10:00) Eisman认为,OpenAI如果破产,其性质类似于通用汽车倒闭的产业阵痛,虽不致命于银行体系,却足以让美国经济步入衰退。AI产业链正面临惊人的单点依赖风险:英伟达单季营收翻倍,但最新10-Q财报披露其70%的应收账款仅来自五大客户(主要是超大规模云服务商);在这些云厂商内部,约70%的AI收入单一依赖Anthropic和OpenAI;而在甲骨文(Oracle),OpenAI一家就占据了其全部在手订单积压的近半数。此前甲骨文因订单积压暴增3000亿美元推动股价跳涨至330美元,但在市场获悉该增量全赖OpenAI一家后,股价一路重挫至130美元。 企业采购从固定席位费转向按用量付费,刺激客户改用廉价开源替代品。这极可能引发OpenAI与Anthropic之间的价格恶性竞争。目前OpenAI季度收入增速已从第二季度的140%放缓至第三季度的43%。一旦价格战侵蚀其收入现金流并冻结融资,算力采购订单的大面积削减将沿着供应链向上反噬云巨头与芯片厂商,引发大范围科技资产抛售并触发宏观衰退。 算力债务膨胀与险资融资异动 (7:46) 在借贷成本飙升与地方社区抵制数据中心建设的双重压力下,重资产的专业GPU云服务商(NeoCloud)经营脆弱性凸显。缺乏传统广告业务现金流补贴的CoreWeave,其二级市场债券收益率已飙升至约15%,股权价值回撤约60%,每年仅债务利息支出就高达6.4亿美元。与此同时,其首席执行官在过去一年通过预定交易计划减持了6.82亿美元公司股票,加剧了市场对其高杠杆经营模式的担忧。 此外,《金融时报》报道CoreWeave正试图引入人寿保险资金为数据中心建设输血。Eisman指出,另类资产管理机构动用寿险浮存金承接高风险或非流动性资产已成为现代金融的灰色地带:原本仅追求约3%微薄收益的年金投保人,其资金在毫不知情下被注入理应承担12%风险溢价的高风险科技信贷。尽管Eisman不认为险资爆雷会演变成广泛的系统性传染,但费城半导体指数(SOX)七天内蒸发2.1万亿美元市值,表明算力债务与资本链条已极度紧绷。 标普AI单一叙事与实体结构失衡 (40:00) Eisman分析指出,标普500指数中除占比约40%的科技巨头外,若计入电网设备商(如GE Vernova、Eaton)、工业基建(Quanta Services)及投资银行,约65%的成分股实际上都被整合为同一笔“AI资本开支交易”。整个美股由单一AI叙事主导,但这一繁荣掩盖了实体经济的结构性困境:美国房地产正遭遇2008年以来最严峻的可负担性危机,叠加飙升的保险费与房产税,购房者当前月均总持有成本比五年前高出约50%,导致存量房与新房交易几近冻结。 Eisman强调,当前AI狂潮与2008年次贷危机存在本质区别。2008年金融机构普遍背负40倍杠杆,触发的是危及支付体系的偿付崩溃;而当前银行资本充裕,AI泡沫破裂的后果属于严重的科技产能与产业资本衰退,而非系统性金融灾难。这更类似于1990年代末的互联网泡沫:变革世界的叙事方向正确,但第一代领头羊如AOL、Netscape多数被历史洗牌,真正的经济回报最终落入下一代建设者手中。 Eisman的分析表明,市场无需恐慌于科幻式的AI生存威胁或2008年式的银行系统性崩溃,但必须警惕由OpenAI和Anthropic引发的过度产业链集中度风险。悬而未决的关键问题在于:在企业缩减Token预算与廉价开源模型竞争的双重挤压下,闭源专有模型厂商能否在资本融资受阻前建立真实的盈利护城河;当支撑美股半壁江山的AI投资叙事出现动摇时,宏观经济能否避免一场自科技硬件自下而上传导的资本支出型衰退。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期视频由 YouTube 频道 The Compound 于 2026 年 10 月 16 日发布。节目由 Downtown Josh Brown 和 Michael Batnick 主持,并在迈阿密大学现场邀请到传奇投资人 Steve Eisman,围绕 AI 监管游说背后的恐惧、CoreWeave 债务危机、OpenAI 与 Anthropic 的系统重要性风险、科技股高度集中度以及房贷市场现状等话题展开深度探讨。 ## TL;DR 节目核心探讨了过度消耗 Token(Tokenmaxxing)狂热终结后,企业转向开权重与开源模型对闭源 AI 巨头商业模式造成的剧烈冲击。Steve Eisman 指出当前美股本质上是一笔高度押注 AI 的单一交易,英伟达与各大云厂商的营收严重依赖 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 等少数几家疯狂失血的公司,一旦爆发价格战或下游融资断裂,其负反馈完全足以拖累美国整体经济陷入衰退。同时,嘉宾对比了 2008 年次贷危机与当下的本质不同,剖析了 CoreWeave 引入寿险资金运作基建的潜在风险,并指出了全美房地产市场在高持有成本挤压下的严峻困境。 ## Atmosphere & style 现场录制于迈阿密大学的露天氛围中,充满了大学生听众的青春活力与华尔街老将辛辣犀利风格的奇妙碰撞。Steve Eisman 保持了标志性的直言不讳与黑色幽默,一边毫不留情地戳破互联网上争当“下一个大空头”的投机癔症,一边用疲惫而真实的语气回忆 2008 年一战成名背后所承受的巨大心理折磨。整场对话在轻松风趣的校园调侃与极其严肃硬核的宏观流动性推演之间切换自如,既有对技术巨头商业软肋的无情解剖,也有历经周期沧桑后的从容与清醒。 ## Bulletin - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) Steve Eisman 警告称,英伟达 70% 的应收账款仅来自 5 家超大规模云厂商,而这些云厂商 70% 的 AI 业务收入又集中在 OpenAI 和 Anthropic 两家,下游集中度过高使 OpenAI 一旦暴雷可能直接引发美国经济衰退。 - [21:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1313s) 甲骨文单季度激增的 3000 亿美元订单积压中,绝大部分仅来自严重失血的 OpenAI 一家,依赖单一烧钱客户的风险暴露导致甲骨文股价从 330 美元高点重挫至 130 美元。 - [07:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=466s) AI 算力出租独角兽 CoreWeave 二级市场债务收益率飙升至约 15%,且 CEO 在一年内通过预设交易计划套现约 6.82 亿美元,引发市场对寿险资金盲目接入高风险 AI 基建的做空审视。 - [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2400s) Steve Eisman 指出当前标普 500 指数已有约 65% 的权重(涵盖科技巨头、投行及电气化工业配套企业)深度捆绑在“AI 单一交易”上,一旦终端需求或基建融资链断裂,美股将面临剧烈重定价。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) AI 实验室鼓吹的“AI 灭世威胁论”实际上是公关烟雾弹,核心诉求是通过推动政府监管构筑行业壁垒,阻击中国开源模型并巩固本土两强垄断。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) 企业端“Tokenmaxxing”(代币最大化消耗)热潮正在终结,高昂的算力账单正迫使企业缩减预算并转向开销仅有十分之一的开源或开权重模型。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) 大语言模型(LLM)之间缺乏网络效应与商业护城河,随着企业要求降价,头部闭源模型正被迫陷入价格战。 - [07:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=466s) 当前 AI 资本开支危机类似于通用汽车破产的制造业供应链冲击,而非 2008 年次贷危机式的全球银行系统性偿付灾难。 - [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) 英伟达与超大规模云厂商的营收高度依赖 Anthropic 和 OpenAI,极端的客户集中度使得这两家初创企业具备了系统重要性。 - [13:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=831s) OpenAI 在一个月内年化营收预期数据从 700 亿美元骤降至 500 亿美元,透露出过度消耗 Token 的投机狂热正在落幕。 - [16:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1008s) 债务融资成本高企与全美各地社区抵制加剧,导致新建数据中心投建速度断崖式放缓,但现存通电可用的算力资产稀缺溢价反而走高。 - [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1200s) AI 软件收费模式从传统 SaaS 按人头付费转向按使用量计费,企业高昂的算力开支倒逼其转向平替,进一步将降价压力转嫁给头部 AI 实验室。 - [26:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1590s) 美债收益率在恶性通胀数据下不升反降,暴露出华尔街此前为 AI 资本开支筹资而大举抛售国债的行为随 AI 行情降温而踩下刹车。 - [27:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1641s) CoreWeave 企图引入受监管的“无上限”寿险沉淀资金建设数据中心,高杠杆与自融模式被部分空头视为寻找“下一场大空头”的核心标的。 - [31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) Steve Eisman 认为即便 AI 出现严重事故导致灾难,历史惯性表明高管绝不会因此承担刑事责任,监管往往只会在全面危机爆发后亡羊补牢。 - [35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) Anthropic 迫于开源平替与财务数据恶化风险,极具在今年内抢先 IPO 套现的紧迫性,但 Eisman 明确表态即便上市也绝不会买入。 - [41:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2462s) 房屋保险、税费与公用事业等隐形成本飙升使得住房综合月度持有成本 5 年内暴涨约 50%,Steve Eisman 断言高房价终将通过均值回归而下跌解局。 - [44:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2685s) 网络上争相寻找“下一个 Steve Eisman”的狂欢充斥着浮躁虚荣,Eisman 回顾 2008 年做空获胜的经历伴随着极大的心理折磨与焦虑,绝非值得羡慕。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=0s) 破除大模型神话:Tokenmaxxing 的终结与监管诉求背后的恐惧 在节目开场的冷启动对谈中,嘉宾一针见血地指出,所谓的大语言模型(LLM)从本质上讲“只是一个高级的词语检索系统,其功能仅仅是预测序列中的下一个词”。它根本没有产生真正的“思考”,更不是具有自我意识的生命体,因此外界鼓吹的“AI 毁灭人类”论调纯属无稽之谈。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI labs regulation strategy accDescr: Flowchart illustrating the collapse of tokenmaxxing, enterprise price resistance, and AI labs' push for defensive regulation. subgraph CostCrisis["企业端成本失控"] A["高管盲目推行 Tokenmaxxing"] --> B["Uber 3个月耗尽全年AI预算"] B --> C["企业缩减开支 / 转向开权重模型"] end subgraph MarketDynamics["竞争格局异变"] C --> D["开源/开权重模型成本仅需 1/10"] D --> E["模型间缺乏护城河,价格战全面爆发"] end subgraph RegulatoryMoat["实验室监管公关战"] E --> F["Dario Amodei & Sam Altman 陷入极度恐慌"] F --> G["贩卖‘灭世风险’游说政府监管"] G --> H["构筑监管壁垒,阻击中国开源并形成双头垄断"] end ``` 这种“灭世威胁论”实际上是顶级 AI 实验室的公关烟雾弹。Anthropic 的 Dario Amodei 和 OpenAI 的 Sam Altman 之所以如此恐慌,核心原因在于“Tokenmaxxing”(代币最大化消耗)狂热期的终结。此前,许多企业高管不计成本地下令全员全天候接入 AI,导致使用成本急剧飙升——典型的例子是 Uber 在短短三个月内就烧光了全年的 AI 预算。随着账单失控,企业纷纷踩下刹车,转而拥抱成本仅为前沿闭源模型十分之一的开源/开权重(Open-weight)模型。尽管开权重模型性能略逊一筹,但并非所有日常任务都需要“开着梅赛德斯-奔驰(Mercedes-Benz)去公路旅行”。 - **商业缺乏护城河**:大语言模型之间不存在类似 Google 时代的深度粘性与网络效应。用户今天用 Claude,明天不爽就换 Gemini,后天转去 ChatGPT;各家底层架构大同小异,缺乏持久的竞争壁垒。 - **降价与双头垄断企图**:企业级标准化(例如全公司采购 Claude Enterprise)往往会被廉价的开权重方案击穿,迫使顶流模型降价打价格战。实验室高层在主流媒体甚至《周六夜现场》(Saturday Night Live)中制造恐慌、大喊“求求政府监管我们”,根本目的是利用法规抬高门槛,排挤国外(特别是中国)廉价模型,从而在本土稳固两强垄断。正如嘉宾毫不留情地直言:“LLMs are going to destroy planet Earth is a lie.” --- ### [05:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=300s) 迈阿密大学现场:传奇空头 Steve Eisman 亮相 赞助商环节后,播客《The Compound and Friends》在迈阿密大学(University of Miami)现场正式开讲,现场聚集了大量年轻的大学生听众。主持人 Josh Brown 与 Michael Batnick 热烈迎来了本期重磅嘉宾——华尔街著名投资人 Steve Eisman。Eisman 曾在 2008 年金融危机前夕掌管 Frontpoint Partners,因精准做空次级抵押贷款市场而声名大噪,其真实经历被迈克尔·刘易斯(Michael Lewis)写入传世之作《大空头》(The Big Short)。此后他于 2012 年创立 Emerus Partners,并于 2014 年加入纽伯格伯曼(Neuberger Berman)担任董事总经理及投资组合经理;他于 2025 年推出的播客《The Real Eisman Playbook》在 YouTube 上取得了现象级播放量。 现场气氛轻松热烈,三人打趣起迈阿密大学优越的校园环境与标志性的中庭露天泳池。Steve 坦言自己完全没想到新播客能如此迅速走红;聊到学校时,他幽默地回忆起自己的女儿曾在这里攻读艺术史,并感叹自己和妻子当年都在费城的宾夕法尼亚大学(Penn)被冻得瑟瑟发抖,“我们俩简直就是蠢货,明明当年可以直接来迈阿密上学”。 - **现场播客热度**:Steve Eisman 的播客节目播放表现优异,连他本人都对上线后的巨大反响感到意外。 - **学术与生活环境**:主客一致盛赞迈阿密大学宜人的气候与校园设施,为严肃的市场分析奠定了充满活力的基调。 --- ### [07:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=466s) CoreWeave 债券异动:AI 算力融资会发生系统性断裂吗? 寒暄过后,Josh 将话题瞬间拉入当下拉扯市场的核心焦点:驱动整轮 AI 基础设施建设的庞大融资机制,是否正在走向破裂?这一讨论的直接导火索是前一天市场对 CoreWeave 债务危机的剧烈反应。作为典型的“新型云服务商”(NeoCloud),CoreWeave 专门运营算力数据中心,但与拥有巨额数字广告净现金流支撑的 Alphabet(Google 母公司)截然不同,这类新型数据中心完全依赖外部发债和股权融资。 市场数据显示,CoreWeave 的二级市场债务收益率已经飙升至大约 15%,利差出现灾难性走阔(Blowout),其股票隐含估值更是遭遇了高达 60% 的惨烈回撤。对于这种必须持续投入巨额资本的硬核基础设施工程而言,工程一旦开建就绝不可能中途停工——半途废弃不仅意味着血本无归,更会直接引发破产。 面对外界疯狂将其与 2008 年次贷危机相提并论的舆论,Josh 向亲历次贷海啸并全力下注的 Steve 求解,追问债券市场的这一警报是否预示着 AI 资本开支周期大崩塌。Steve 明确表示,公众不应生搬硬套次贷危机,两者在底层逻辑上存在本质差异。为了阐述这一观点,他以通用汽车(General Motors)假定破产的传导链条为类比,指出一般制造业暴雷会引发供应商破产和裁员潮,但并不会自动演变为 2008 年那种冻结全球金融命脉的系统性偿付灾难。 > “Well, look, if you want to draw parallels to the great financial crisis, there's a big difference, which is – I mean, let's just hypothetically say General Motors goes bankrupt.” —— Steve Eisman ### [10:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=600s) 系统性风险:为什么 OpenAI 暴雷会引发美国经济衰退 讨论从 2008 年金融危机与当前 AI 热潮的对比展开。在金融危机中,如果摩根大通(JPMorgan)倒闭,整个地球都会陷入火海,因为当普通民众无法从银行取出存款时,政府就别无选择,必须全力兜底救市。当前的 AI 危机更类似于通用汽车(General Motors)的破产情景——即便算力芯片无法从数据中心交付,对个体或公司是灾难,但尚不至于演变成银行挤兑式的末日灾难。 然而,Steve Eisman 抛出了一个极为大胆的论断:“显然我们还会深入讨论 AI 的故事,但如果举例来说,OpenAI 明天破产了——我并不是在做这个预测,但假设它真的破产了——我认为美国经济将陷入衰退。”现场听众和主持人都感到震惊:一家尚未上市、估值在私有市场达到一万亿甚至一万五千亿美元的创业公司,凭什么能在短短三年内变得具有如此不可动摇的系统重要性? ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 产业链的高度客户集中度风险传导链条 accDescr: 展示从 OpenAI 与 Anthropic 的激进承诺,经由云服务商与甲骨文,最终高度汇聚到英伟达的供应链集中度风险。 subgraph Frontline ["模型层激进扩张"] A["OpenAI 与 Anthropic"] -- "向所有能签约的伙伴做出庞大算力承诺" --> B["Oracle 等云服务商"] A -- "贡献了 70% 的 AI 业务收入" --> C["头部超大规模云厂商<br>(Hyperscalers)"] end subgraph Infrastructure ["云基础设施层"] B -- "积压订单 (Backlog) 中有 50% 仅来自 OpenAI" --> D["疯狂投建数据中心"] C -- "AI 收入占其总云收入的 25%~30%" --> D end subgraph Hardware ["芯片硬件垄断层"] D -- "采购巨量算力芯片" --> E["NVIDIA (英伟达)"] E -. "70% 的应收账款仅来自 5 家核心客户".-> Warning["高度集中度风险:一旦下游一家崩塌即发生踩踏"] end ``` Steve Eisman 直截了当地指出,AI 叙事的核心死穴在于极其危险的“客户集中度问题”(Concentration Problem): - **英伟达的脆弱顶层**:英伟达在最近一个季度营收同比增长超过 100%,对于一家全球体量最大的上市公司而言堪称神迹;然而,其 10-Q 季度财报中白纸黑字写着:**英伟达 70% 的应收账款(营收的核心替代指标)仅仅来自 5 家客户**。 - **历史前车之鉴**:Eisman 回忆起 1990 年代他在奥本海默(Oppenheimer)工作时的经历。当时公司一位才华出众的软件分析师断然拒绝为一家营收飞速增长的软件公司做 IPO,原因很简单:该公司只有 2 家客户,一旦其中一家离开,整个公司立刻灰飞烟灭。 - **层层倒挂的依赖链条**:英伟达的这 5 家核心大客户正是各大超大规模云服务商(Hyperscalers)。表面上超大规模云厂商拥有数亿个人与企业客户,但其 **70% 的 AI 业务收入完全来自于 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 两家公司**(占总云收入的 25% 至 30%)。甲骨文(Oracle)的处境更为极端,**甲骨文积压的云业务订单(Backlog)中整整有一半全部来自 OpenAI 一家**。OpenAI 不断向甲骨文许诺承接庞大算力,甚至要求扩充十倍,逼迫下游疯狂借债建设数据中心。 --- ### [13:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=831s) “人人都想当大空头”与 OpenAI 离奇蒸发的 200 亿美元 宏观与行业层面的裂痕正在迅速扩大。前一天与当天早晨连续公布了超出预期的火热通胀数据,但美债收益率不升反降,暴露出市场对经济和信贷断裂的极度恐慌。与此同时,AI 算力出租独角兽 CoreWeave 债台高筑,每年仅支付债务利息就高达 6.4 亿美元,在其现金流面前显得脆弱不堪;费城半导体指数(SOX)在短短 7 个交易日内蒸发了整整 2.1 万亿美元市值,惨烈程度在正常市场中极为罕见。 面对现场关于“这是泡沫破裂还是又一次绝佳抄底机会”的提问,主持人和 Eisman 谈及了华尔街当下泛滥的“大空头情结”: - **急于封神的群体癔症**:市场上充斥着争当“下一个 Steve Eisman”的狂热,人人都想复制 2008 年一战成名的神话。 - Eisman 辛辣地回忆起自己在 CNBC 节目《Fast Money》上的经历。当时 Melissa Lee 就雷·达里奥(Ray Dalio)再次因巨额财政赤字预言世界末日向他提问,Eisman 在镜头前直言:“你知道这帮人的问题在哪儿吗?他们全都想变成我。但我有个坏消息告诉他们:Steve Eisman 这个角色已经有人演了,名额已满。” - Eisman 坦言追求这种预测灾难的虚荣就像一种疾病:“他们想要那种荣耀。但你知道吗?我已经拥有过那份荣耀了,我不需要再来一次。” 在谈及这轮调整的真正推手时,Eisman 认为 CoreWeave 体量尚不足以击沉 AI 叙事,真正的核心震源依然是 OpenAI 和 Anthropic。他指出了 OpenAI 近期公布的数据中存在的巨大裂缝: - **消失的 200 亿美元**:OpenAI 在 9 月底公布的年化营收数据为 500 亿美元,然而仅仅在一个月之前,官方口径对外宣称的数字还是 700 亿美元。短短一个月内,凭空蒸发了 200 亿美元的年化收入预期。 - **代币拉满(Tokenmaxxing)的终结**:尽管相关核心厂商三个月内的营收跃升了 43%(达到 168 亿美元),但相较于第二季度 140% 的爆炸式增速已大幅失速。这证实了过度消耗 Token 的投机狂热正在落幕,企业终于开始审视 IT 预算,意识到无法再以这种不可持续的速度烧钱。 --- ### [16:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1008s) 算力供需的撕裂:本地阻力、融资枯竭与刚性需求 在基础设施层面,AI 行业正遭遇现实物理世界与资金市场的双重阻击: - **数据中心建设全面遇阻**:随着利率居高不下,新建数据中心的债务融资成本与审批门槛急剧升高。不仅如此,全美各地社区对数据中心落地产生的噪音、耗电和土地占用爆发了空前激烈的反对浪潮,其受欢迎程度被现场嘉宾戏谑为“可能也就比洛杉矶道奇队稍微好一点”。数据中心的投建速度正在断崖式放缓。 - **算力资产的供需悖论**:Eisman 指出,建不成数据中心就意味着买来的芯片算力无处安放,这势必会倒逼上游芯片订单减少;但硬币的另一面是,现存真正通电可用、投入运行的算力设施,其稀缺溢价反而会被进一步推高。 然而,企业与消费端对 AI 的真实需求却表现出了惊人的刚性黏性: - **企业预算锁定增长**:现场旁听的迈阿密大学学生刚刚完成了对华尔街各大投资银行的调研参访。事实证明,每一家投行在 2027 年为 AI 及相关研发雇佣设立的预算,都将显著高于 2026 年和 2025 年。企业级落地探索并没有撤退。 - **消费者不可逆的使用习惯**:日常个人层面对 ChatGPT、Gemini 以及各类智能体(如 Muse)的使用已经沉淀。用户不可能在习惯了自动化工具后退回 2022 年的手工状态。 - **市场终局的重塑**:债券市场动荡和发债融资困难根本不会扼杀下游的真实需求,真正被颠覆的是**供给侧的行业格局**——即究竟由谁来出资承建算力。一旦 CoreWeave 或 Nebius 这一类高杠杆的第三方算力云厂商无法继续廉价发债、丧失扩张算力的能力,整个 AI 算力供应链将迎来彻底的利益重组。 ### [20:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1200s) 超大规模云厂商的集中度风险与 AI 价格战隐忧 讨论首先聚焦于大型超大规模云服务商(Hyperscalers)当前的绝对优势地位。无论资本市场发生什么变化,最终的话语权似乎都会重新回到亚马逊(Amazon)、谷歌(Alphabet)和微软(Microsoft)等巨头手中。相比一年前债务融资成本更低、债券市场胃口更盛的环境,这些巨头的资产负债表与抗风险能力显得愈发强大。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI 价格战引发经济衰退的传导链条 accDescr: 展示从企业削减算力支出到 AI 独角兽收入下滑、云厂商积压订单蒸发并最终冲击整体经济的过程 subgraph CostPressure["企业端与定价机制转变"] A["SaaS 按人头付费"] -->|"转向"| B["按使用量计费 (更高昂)"] B --> C["企业注重成本控费,转向廉价模型"] end subgraph AICrisis["AI 核心独角兽受压"] C --> D["迫使 Anthropic 与 OpenAI 大幅降价"] D --> E["营收增长转负,外部融资断裂"] end subgraph MarketSpillover["市场多米诺骨牌效应"] E --> F["削减基础设施开支与算力承诺"] F --> G["Oracle 4000亿积压订单面临破灭"] G --> H["科技股崩盘与整体经济衰退"] end ``` 然而,对这种看似坚不可摧的垄断地位存在着极大的隐患:当前整个 AI 基础设施的终端需求高度依赖于少数几家公司。正如嘉宾明确指出的那样:“This business is so concentrated from Anthropic and OpenAI that if there's a price war, none of that matters. The whole thing will correct.”如果这件事发生在三到四年后,由于会有大量其他企业消化这些算力,冲击或许有限;但眼下市场集中度过高,全产业链的繁荣完全维系在 Anthropic 和 OpenAI 这两家公司的良好表现之上。 与此同时,AI 软件的商业模式正在从过去 15 年经典的“按人头计费”(SaaS,例如 Salesforce 按每个员工每月 80 美元收费)转变为“按使用量计费”(pay-what-you-use)。表面上看按量付费更具弹性,但实质上对于企业客户而言,算力账单正变得极其昂贵。因此,企业必将更加注重成本控制,促使其员工转向更便宜的开源或小模型,这直接把降价压力甩给了 Anthropic 和 OpenAI。 - 整个 AI 算力供应链面临空前的集中度风险,核心需求直接挂钩 OpenAI 与 Anthropic。 - 软件收费模式从传统 SaaS 按人头付费转向按量付费,企业端算力开支急剧膨胀,倒逼企业寻找平替方案。 - 一旦爆发全面的价格战,高昂的训练与推理成本将直接吞噬 AI 实验室的现金流。 ### [21:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1313s) 衰退传导链:Oracle 的 4000 亿积压订单悬案 在推演 AI 风险如何扩散至全美经济衰退的传导机制时,讨论勾勒出了一个极其悲观的逻辑闭环。如果价格战全面爆发,Anthropic 和 OpenAI 的营收增长转为负数,在极度烧钱的背景下一旦外部一级市场融资断绝,它们将被迫大幅削减资本承诺和基础设施租赁合同。首当其冲遭遇灭顶之灾的正是甲骨文(Oracle)。 Oracle 的股价此前经历了极为戏剧性的暴涨暴跌。在去年第三季度财报发布前,Oracle 股价徘徊在 230 美元左右。随后管理层公布其订单积压(backlog)飙升至惊人的 3000 亿到 4000 亿美元区间,仅单季度就增加了 3000 亿美元。资本市场瞬间陷入狂热,推动这家万亿级权重的科技巨头在短短两天内从 230 美元暴拉 100 点至 330 美元。 然而狂欢转瞬即逝。券商 D.A. Davidson 的分析师 Gil Luria 随即发布重磅报告,揭露那 3000 亿美元新增积压订单几乎全数来自 OpenAI 一家公司。市场信心瞬间坍塌,投资者猛然意识到 Oracle 将公司的整个未来押注在一处无法自负盈亏的客户身上。正如席间犀利的抨击:“Your entire future, you've hinged your future on a company that bleeds cash like a lunatic.” 缺乏造血能力的客户根本无法支撑起数千亿美元的长期合同,最终 Oracle 股价一路崩跌,从 330 美元跌回 230 美元,随后更是重挫至 130 美元。 - Oracle 曾凭借单季增加 3000 亿美元、总量突破 4000 亿美元的积压订单,在两天内股价暴涨 100 点(230 美元涨至 330 美元)。 - 华尔街分析师揭露其庞大积压订单核心来源仅为持续严重失血的 OpenAI。 - 市场对依赖烧钱客户的质疑导致 Oracle 股价腰斩,一路跌落至 130 美元附近。 ### [23:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1425s) 通胀逆风、存储芯片跳水与 Hyperliquid 链上盘前波动 资本市场同时遭遇着宏观与微观基本面的双重冲击。刚刚出炉的 CPI 消费者通胀数据表现过热,随后出炉的 PPI 生产者物价指数同样居高不下,粉碎了市场关于通胀平息的乐观预期。在此背景下,此前作为 AI 板块“掌上明珠”的存储芯片板块遭到无情抛售。以西部数据(Western Digital)为例,其股价遭遇了高达 54% 的剧烈回撤;但荒诞的是,即便腰斩,该股年内涨幅依然达到 100%,这也侧面印证了此前整个 AI 交易的狂热程度。 债券收益率随即急剧飙升,给科技股带来沉重压力。而对于未上市的 AI 巨头 Anthropic,去中心化永续合约交易所 Hyperliquid 成了观察其估值情绪的前哨站。该平台通过衍生品为未上市公司股权提供二级流动性(此前在 SpaceX 上也表现活跃),在过去 24 小时内,Anthropic 相关的交易量达到了 1760 万美元。 盘后 Anthropic 的收入数据流出,表现不及预期,导致相关衍生品价格惨烈跳水,半导体板块在盘后全线崩盘。当晚的社交媒体 Twitter/X 笼罩在一片漆黑的绝望氛围中。然而市场的走势却极具讽刺意味:隔天早盘情绪戏剧性反转,Anthropic 盘前拉升 5.5%,美债收益率显著回落,此前受利率重创的烂股反倒带头暴涨,房屋建筑商 Lennar 更是成为标普 500 指数中表现最好的个股之一。市场前一周还在叫嚣“谁在乎利率”,转眼间却又在坏消息出尽的恐慌低点形成了暴力反弹。 - 宏观层面 CPI 与 PPI 连续超预期过热,直接推升美债收益率并引发科技股踩踏。 - 存储龙头 Western Digital 遭遇 54% 深度回调,但年初至今累计涨幅依然高达 100%。 - 去中心化平台 Hyperliquid 在 24 小时内录得 1760 万美元的 Anthropic 股权合约交易,盘后数据暴跌后隔日早盘反弹 5.5%。 ### [26:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1590s) 揭穿美债真相:AI 算力融资才是推动利率的关键力量 美债收益率在极度恶劣的通胀数据面前快速回落,让很多人感到困惑。主流舆论过去几个月一直充斥着对美国联邦财政赤字的道德抨击与债务担忧,但债券市场的最新动向揭穿了真相:推动国债抛售的核心驱动力并非财政问题,而是 AI。 当 AI 交易出现疲软与裂痕迹象的瞬间,美国 10 年期国债收益率在极短时间内直接从 5.4% 断崖式跌落至 5.1%。这一现象揭示了庞大的底层流动性逻辑:此前华尔街各路机构为了给庞大的 AI 资本开支筹集流动性,进行了大规模的抛售国债套现操作。一旦 AI 资本叙事遇阻,疯狂减持国债以支持 AI 算力基建的浪潮戛然而止,抛压骤减的美债市场立刻获得了喘息之机。正如席间结论:“Yesterday we found out, is it the fiscal irresponsibility of our governments around the world? Is it like, who, no, it's AI.” - 市场关于财政赤字失控的指责大多流于表面,AI 资产负债表的扩张才是债券抛售的主战场。 - 10 年期美债收益率在 AI 交易出现裂缝后,迅速从 5.4% 骤降至 5.1%。 - 机构为了筹措 AI 算力投资资金而抛售国债的行为随着 AI 行情降温而踩下刹车。 ### [27:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1641s) CoreWeave 高管天量套现与寿险资金的危险潜行 讨论的最后一个重磅焦点落在了新晋算力巨头 CoreWeave 及其潜在的资金链隐患上。尽管公司身处监管与舆论的高度审视之下,CoreWeave 的 CEO 在过去一年中却在按计划疯狂套现。 | 机构 / 实体 | 涉足操作 | 潜在风险与争议特征 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **CoreWeave 管理层** | CEO 累计套现约 6.82 亿美元股票 | 虽辩称系预设税务筹划,但在高度审视期坚持大额提现打击市场信心 | | **寿险资本 (Insurance)** | 瞄准“无上限”保险池资金资助 AI 建设 | 负债端结构极其敏感,承接高风险流动性差资产可能引发系统性崩塌 | | **Mark Walter / Guggenheim** | 挪用保险资金借贷给关联实体收购球队 | 掩盖资金来源,通过自融操盘数十亿体育资产(道奇队、湖人队) | 即便该类抛售属于预设的 10b5-1 减持计划且可能涉及行权税务支出,但在外界普遍质疑 CoreWeave 债务杠杆过高的关口,管理层累计套现高达 6.82 亿美元,且未展现出任何暂停套现以提振股东信心的意图。更令人生疑的是,《金融时报》(Financial Times)近期披露 CoreWeave 正在将融资触角伸向“无上限的保险资金”(unlimited insurance money),试图利用传统人寿保险公司的沉淀资金来填补 AI 数据中心建设的无底洞。 华尔街做空力量敏锐地察觉到了保险资金介入高风险 AI 资产的毁灭性风险,并将其视作寻找“下一场大空头(The Next Big Short)”的核心阵地。席间引述了古根海姆合伙人(Guggenheim Partners)首席执行官 Mark Walter 的资本运作手法作为类比:他利用旗下寿险公司的资金通过多层关联实体向自己控制的公司放贷,在未经充分披露的情况下个人拿下了洛杉矶道奇队(LA Dodgers)和洛杉矶湖人队(LA Lakers)等顶级体育资产。这种模糊资金来源、将受保人资产置于高杠杆投机之中的运作模式极为危险。而如今这套游走在灰色地带的寿险资金杠杆,正在被生搬硬套进风险更加巨大的 AI 基建狂潮之中。 - CoreWeave 首席执行官在一年内通过预设交易计划累计套现 6.82 亿美元。 - 《金融时报》爆料 CoreWeave 企图引入受监管的寿险资金为激进的 AI 数据中心建设提供资金支持。 - 寿险资金的自融与暗箱运作被指与 Mark Walter 运作道奇队和湖人队的资本套路如出一辙,被多方视为下一个潜在的次贷级做空标的。 ### [30:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1800s) 保险资金建数据中心:特拉华监管与系统性风险争议 现场讨论起保险资金介入 AI 基础设施的潜在风险。如果保单持有人(例如买年金养老的老人)知道自己的钱被拿去投资高风险的算力中心合同,根本不会按 3% 的低回报买入,这种资金在公开市场上本应支付高达 12% 的资金成本。 谈到监管环境时,现场抛出一个令人啼笑皆非的冷知识:马克·沃尔特(Mark Walter)旗下的保险公司注册在特拉华州,而特拉华州现任的保险监管官员在就任前根本没有任何金融背景,其上一份职业竟然是一名“警长(Sheriff)”。这引发了主持人和全场的调侃——尽管保家卫国的警长值得尊敬,但让警长去监管极其复杂的保险衍生金融业务,几乎起不到专业把关的作用。 针对 Substack 等独立财经写作平台上对“险资涌入 AI 数据中心将给普通投保人带来系统性风险”的警告,主持人询问史蒂夫·艾斯曼(Steve Eisman)是否认同这种恐慌。艾斯曼给出了极为干脆的否定回答:“我不担心这个,完全不担心(I'm not worried about it as a matter of answer)。”在他看来,虽然表面上资金链条看起来错综复杂,但这并不构成导致金融体系崩塌的系统性危机。 --- ### [31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) 监管悖论与历史重演:从 2008 年次贷危机看 AI 高管追责 话题转向 AI 行业面临的政治反弹与白宫的监管路线图。当前的监管构想似乎倾向于由行业内部人士组成委员会,并规定如果研发出的系统造成破坏,企业必须承担法律责任。但主持人提出质疑:这种责任究竟由谁承担?是让背后的投资者开支票赔钱,还是让明知故犯的技术高管个人承担法律后果? 艾斯曼对此持极度悲观和犬儒的态度。他直言,如果一家公司的 AI 造成了黑客攻击或严重损害,公司在法律上必定逃脱不了民事责任;但若问高管明知存在风险却放任发生、是否会有人被追究刑事责任甚至坐牢,答案是“绝不可能”。他借用 2008 年金融危机的教训指出: > “2008 年什么事都没发生,没有任何高管个人被问责,即便他们犯下了人类历史上最严重的欺诈罪行。”——史蒂夫·艾斯曼 艾斯曼分享道,曾有一位研究企业欺诈的播客同行在采访中焦急地向他求助,询问面对这种情况到底能做些什么,他给出的答复是“什么都做不了(Nothing, because nothing will be done unfortunately)”。他认定体制的惯性就是如此:“如果 2008 年都没人去坐牢,现在他们更不会因为黑客或 AI 失控去坐牢。”唯有等到真正的灾难级危机全面爆发,监管部门才会在一片废墟后亡羊补牢地出台规定。此外,针对政府入股 AI 实验室以“挑选赢家”的构想,艾斯曼明确反对,认为一旦国家资本介入,市场就会认定这些企业“大而不倒(Too big to fail)”并必然获得兜底救助,这只会扭曲风险机制。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI Regulation and Accountability Cycle accDescr: Diagram showing how lack of individual executive accountability leads to crises before regulation is enacted. subgraph Governance ["监管与追责困境"] A["AI 出现失控 / 违规黑客行为"] --> B["公司层面承担民事赔偿责任"] A -.->|"历史惯性: 缺乏个人刑责"| C["高管免于刑事追究 (如2008年次贷)"] end subgraph CrisisCycle ["危机循环"] C --> D["风险持续累积与过度投机"] D --> E["全面危机爆发 (Crisis)"] E --> F["事后象征性立法规制 (Post-crisis Rules)"] end ``` --- ### [35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) 科技巨头规模上限、Anthropic IPO 与纯叙事驱动的市场 讨论转向科技巨头(Hyperscalers)的前景以及科技周期的代际更迭。当前标普 500 前七大公司(除苹果和特斯拉外)都在重注 AI 基础设施算力(甚至包括原本自建数据中心、未来或将算力对外出租的 Meta)。对于这些巨头在未来 5 到 10 年市值能否迈向 10 万亿美元、还是正在撞上规模的自然物理极限,艾斯曼认为规模没有绝对上限,但当前的格局很像互联网早期的演变: 当年艾斯曼在奥本海默(Oppenheimer)任职时,著名互联网分析师亨利·布洛吉特(Henry Blodget)就在他对面的办公室。布洛吉特曾在交易大厅高呼“家族传承级别的巨额财富即将诞生,互联网将统治世界”。布洛吉特的宏观判断 100% 正确,但他看好的第一代互联网企业(如 AOL、Netscape、Yahoo、Excite 等)除亚马逊外几乎全军覆没,真正享受荣光并建立霸权的反而是借助一代企业所搭建的基础设施成长起来的“第二代公司”。现在的 AI 格局亦可能面临同样的宿命。 随后,现场探讨了顶级未上市 AI 企业的资本化进程与上市窗口期: - **Anthropic 上市迫在眉睫**:艾斯曼与主持人一致认为 Anthropic 必须在今年内赶快 IPO。因为在低成本开源模型崛起与“Token 狂欢(Tokenmaxxing)”走向终结的背景下,其财务数据可能会急剧恶化,必须趁热打铁。主持人的“阴谋论”观点甚至认为,Anthropic 必须在三季度财报披露前抢先完成上市。 - **OpenAI 节奏反差**:相比之下 OpenAI 并未表现出同等的上市紧迫性,现场推测其背后的业绩表现与运营考量可能各有隐情。 - **SpaceX 先例与新股接盘**:即便以史上最大规模 IPO 挂牌的 SpaceX,在前期遭受了推特上铺天盖地的悲观质疑(如指数基金被抽水、解禁期员工砸盘、股价恐从 135 美元腰斩至 50 美元等),最终依然走出了正常科技股的平稳震荡走势。但当被问及若 Anthropic 上市自己是否会买入时,艾斯曼干脆利落地拒绝:“绝无可能(No way)。” 对于标普 500 指数成分股今年利润增长达 30%、但远期市盈率(Forward P/E)却遭大幅压缩的估值分化现象,艾斯曼直言自己对单纯的估值倍数并不敏感,当前市场的底层逻辑已经高度抽象为由单一主线操控: > “这就是纯粹的叙事。这是纯粹的叙事,而且眼下只有一种叙事真正起作用,那就是 AI。所以你告诉我 AI 叙事走向何方,我就能告诉你股票市场会发生什么,仅此而已。”——史蒂夫·艾斯曼 主持人对此深表认同,并总结道:过去人们常说“股市并不等于实体经济”,但在当前,整个美股市场的超额回报几乎全部来自 AI 交易的各层衍生链条;几家尚未上市的 AI 公司的一举一动,甚至已经具备了引发美国整体经济衰退的系统性外溢力量。 ### [40:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2400s) 美股高度集中于“AI单一交易”与宏观经济捆绑 现场讨论首先围绕美股对整体经济的主导地位展开。主持人指出,当前市场出现了一种宏观经济几乎彻底被股市代表的奇特现象,发债能力完全绑定在现行收益率水平上,甚至令人担忧如果股市不在高位维持、发生灾难性下跌,是否会迅速形成恶性经济反馈循环。对此,Steve Eisman 给出了直截了当的定性:当前市场本质上就是一笔高度集中的单一交易。他剖析了标普 500 指数的权重构成,指出科技股(如 Alphabet、Amazon 等)已经占到 40%,再加上投资银行以及为电气化和数据中心配套的工业巨头(如 GE Vernova、Quanta Services、Eaton、Rockwell Automation),整体占比轻松达到 65%。“工业股也是如此,这一切就是一笔单一交易。那就是 AI,完事,无需争论(The industrials are it's all one trade. It's AI, period, end of discussion.)。”在 Steve Eisman 看来,这套繁荣逻辑的底层命题非常简单:只要下游终端需求没有垮掉,并且持续有人愿意为这些庞大的基础设施建设提供资金,市场就能维持运转。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: AI单一交易的指数构成逻辑 accDescr: 展示标普500指数中科技巨头、投行与电力工业配套企业如何共同绑定在AI基建交易上。 subgraph Index["标普 500 指数核心敞口 (约 65%)"] Tech["核心科技巨头 (~40%)<br/>Alphabet / Amazon 等"] Finance["大型投资银行"] Industrials["AI 电力与电网配套工业巨头<br/>GE Vernova / Quanta / Eaton / Rockwell"] end Tech --> SingleTrade["单一核心交易驱动:AI 叙事"] Finance --> SingleTrade Industrials --> SingleTrade SingleTrade --> Conditions{"持续维持的前提条件"} Conditions --> Cond1["终端应用与算力需求不发生崩塌"] Conditions --> Cond2["资本市场持续有人愿意为基建提供融资"] ``` ### [41:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2462s) 房贷冻结、隐形成本飙升与高房价破局之谜 随后话题转向 Steve Eisman 的成名领域——房地产市场。主持人和嘉宾一致认为,当前的房地产环境是自 2008 年大衰退(GFC)以来最糟糕的时期。全美三分之一的经济体量陷入近乎萧条的冻结状态,但由于 AI 带动股市狂欢,市场对此视而不见。回顾 2022 年以来的异象,当时房屋建筑商股票(如 Lennar、PulteGroup、KB Home)在交易冻结期逆势暴涨,根本原因在于绝大多数存量房业主由于死锁在低息房贷中根本无法挂牌,市场上毫无二手房流动性,导致买家只能涌向新房市场,建筑商通过各种补贴大肆收割。然而,如今这一红利期已然终结,消费者逐渐认清高利率是长期现实,而 Lennar 等建商股近期也遭遇重挫。 谈及当下买不起房的深层原因,Steve Eisman 强调,这不仅是名义房贷利率的问题,更是一场全方位的可负担性灾难: - **全方位持有成本爆炸**:房屋保险费用暴涨、水电公用事业费用激增、地方房产税大幅提升。 - **综合月供负担测算**:综合各项硬性支出后,目前购买一套住房的月度持有成本相比 5 年前暴涨了约 50%。 - **房价终将下行的解局逻辑**:由于整体拥有成本过于苛刻,潜在购房者并非没有刚性需求,而是彻底买不起。Steve Eisman 明确断言:“我认为房价终将下跌。这就是最终的结局(I think housing prices are going to come down. That's how this ends.)。”他解释道,婴儿潮一代(Boomers)离世将带来存量房集中释放,加之长期低迷后法拍屋数量正以肉眼可见的速度大幅抬升,供给回升将倒逼高企的房价回落。不过,这一均值回归将是一个长达数年的缓慢过程,降息本身并无法立即化解保险与税费居高不下的结构性死结。 ### [44:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2685s) “寻找下一个大空头”的网络狂欢与真实的 2008 年创伤 节目的最后,话题转向金融圈与互联网上争相寻找“下一个 Steve Eisman”的狂热现象。现在形成了一种独特的“末日预言产业”,分析师、Substack 独立写手以及 X(Twitter)大V们整天转发悲观数据、比赛看谁喊出的崩盘预测最耸人听闻,只求一旦大祸临头能够抢占“最早预见灾难之人”的话语权与声誉资产。对此,主持人指出两者存在根本不同:当年 Steve Eisman 是顶着巨大真金白银的头寸做空,而现在绝大多数人不过是在网上发帖博眼球。 面对这群急切期盼危机来临以求名声的做空博主,Steve Eisman 展现了极为清醒甚至厌烦的态度。他坦言,被现实证明判断错误、世界没有崩溃,大家其实应该感到庆幸。谈及在 2008 年危机中一战成名后的真实生活,他直言那绝不是值得羡慕的经历,现实中充满极大的精神折磨与巨大焦虑:“让我告诉你吧,那段经历伴随着极大的折磨和巨大的焦虑(It was a lot of aggravation and tremendous anxiety.)。”成千上万的人把全球金融崩溃的愤怒转嫁到做空者头上,指责正是由于他们的做空搞垮了世界,他绝不想再重来一次。 在对比当下与 2008 年时,Steve Eisman 给出了明确的定心丸:当年华尔街金融机构背负着 40 倍的高额杠杆,如今金融体系已不可同日而语,系统性崩溃的基础并不存在。但他同时敲响了警钟:如果 AI 叙事与资本投入全面崩塌,美国完全可能迎来一场严重的经济衰退,只是其破坏力并不会达到次贷危机时的量级。录制最后,在全场迈阿密大学(University of Miami)学生的掌声中,主持人向现场观众表达感谢,并祝愿即将毕业走入金融职场的学生们前程似锦。 ## Notable quotes > [35:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=2104s) 这就是纯粹的叙事。这是纯粹的叙事,而且眼下只有一种叙事真正起作用,那就是 AI。所以你告诉我 AI 叙事走向何方,我就能告诉你股票市场会发生什么,仅此而已。 — 史蒂夫·艾斯曼 > [31:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4&t=1918s) 2008 年什么事都没发生,没有任何高管个人被问责,即便他们犯下了人类历史上最严重的欺诈罪行。 — 史蒂夫·艾斯曼 ## Mentioned Downtown Josh Brown, Michael Batnick, Steve Eisman, Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Henry Blodget, Melissa Lee, Ray Dalio, Mark Walter, Gil Luria, Michael Lewis, OpenAI, Anthropic, Nvidia, CoreWeave, Oracle, Amazon, Alphabet, Google, Microsoft, Meta, Apple, Tesla, SpaceX, Uber, Western Digital, Lennar, PulteGroup, KB Home, GE Vernova, Quanta Services, Eaton, Rockwell Automation, JPMorgan, General Motors, Guggenheim Partners, Frontpoint Partners, Emerus Partners, Neuberger Berman, Oppenheimer, D.A. Davidson, Hyperliquid, Salesforce, VanEck, University of Miami, University of Pennsylvania, ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, Muse, The Big Short, Saturday Night Live, The Real Eisman Playbook, The Compound and Friends, Fast Money, Financial Times ## Video description On episode 264 of The Compound and Friends, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Downtown Josh Brown⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ and Michael Batnick are joined by Steve Eisman to discuss in front of a live audience of University of Miami students: why AI labs are asking to be regulated, the end of tokenmaxxing and the rise of cheap open-weight models, whether any AI company has a moat, CoreWeave's debt and whether AI funding is about to break, why this is not 2008, how OpenAI and Anthropic became systemically important, Nvidia's customer concentration, the chip selloff and the rush to call the next Big Short, the AI price war bear case and Oracle's OpenAI backlog, hot inflation and what the bond market revealed about the AI trade, the Anthropic IPO, the worst housing market since the financial crisis, and what it was really like to be right in 2008. This episode is sponsored by VanEck. To learn more about RAAX, visit: https://www.vaneck.com/RAAXCompound ►00:00 - Cold Open ►05:42 - Steve Eisman Joins Live ►07:46 - CoreWeave Debt and AI Concentration Risk ►13:51 - Chip Selloff and OpenAI's Missing $20 Billion ►21:53 - AI Price War Bear Case and Oracle ►27:21 - CoreWeave, Insurers and Mark Walter ►31:58 - AI Regulation: Will Anyone Be Held Liable? ►35:04 - Hyperscalers, Anthropic IPO and SpaceX ►41:02 - Housing Market: Worst Since the GFC ►44:45 - Who Will Call the Next Big Short? 👕 Check out The Compound shop: https://www.idontshop.com 🎙️Listen to our podcasts: TCAF: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/TCAF/ Animal Spirits: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/animalspirits/ Ask The Compound: https://podcasts.thecompoundnews.com/show/ATC/ The Compound Newsletter: https://www.thecompoundnews.com/subscribe Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-compound-media/ Instagram: https://instagram.com/thecompoundnews Twitter: https://twitter.com/thecompoundnews Tik Tok: https://www.tiktok.com/@thecompoundnews Investing involves the risk of loss. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be or regarded as personalized investment advice or relied upon for investment decisions. Josh Brown and Michael Batnick are employees of Ritholtz Wealth Management and may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this video. All opinions expressed by them are solely their own opinion and do not reflect the opinion of Ritholtz Wealth Management. See our disclosures here: https://ritholtzwealth.com/podcast-youtube-disclosures/ The Compound Media, Incorporated, an affiliate of Ritholtz Wealth Management, receives payment from various entities for advertisements in affiliated podcasts, blogs and emails. Inclusion of such advertisements does not constitute or imply endorsement, sponsorship or recommendation thereof, or any affiliation therewith, by the Content Creator or by Ritholtz Wealth Management or any of its employees. For additional advertisement disclaimers see here https://ritholtzwealth.com/advertising-disclaimers. #thecompound #investing #stockmarket #stocks [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og-sV0vbLg4)

Source quotes

[35:04] 史蒂夫·艾斯曼: 这就是纯粹的叙事。这是纯粹的叙事,而且眼下只有一种叙事真正起作用,那就是 AI。所以你告诉我 AI 叙事走向何方,我就能告诉你股票市场会发生什么,仅此而已。 [31:58] 史蒂夫·艾斯曼: 2008 年什么事都没发生,没有任何高管个人被问责,即便他们犯下了人类历史上最严重的欺诈罪行。

Source quotes

[35:04] Steve Eisman: It is pure narrative and there is only one narrative that matters right now and that's AI. So you tell me what happens to the AI narrative and I'll tell you what happens to the stock market, period. [0:00] Steve Eisman: The statement that some of these guys have made that LLMs are going to destroy planet Earth is a lie. [31:58] Steve Eisman: I think we have to have a crisis and then in the aftermath, maybe there will be some rules.

Original transcript

[0:00] What's an LLM? It's just a fancy word retrieval system. It predicts the next word in the chain. And it's great. I'm not saying it's – but that's not thinking. Yeah, why is it going to kill us? Well, it has to be sentient. It's not sentient. It doesn't think. It just retrieves words or creates software, which is another form of words. My thesis as to why they've done this is that... Darry Amodi and Sam Waltman right now are petrified. They are petrified because... Thank you. Token maxing is done. So for those of you who don't know, token maxing was basically... People who run software and enterprises were ordered by their companies to use AI 24-7. To hell with the cost. And then the price went up. AND, Uber went through its entire... AI budget in three months. Right. So now-- Was that this year or last year? I can't remember. It was just-- Was it this year? It was in the spring. So token maxing is done. You've got open weight models. that are a tenth the price. They're not as good as the models, but you don't need a Mercedes Benz for every road trip. So they're losing market share. There's pretty good evidence that a price wars is starting. and They're petrified. And so they created this, the world's going to end unless you regulate us, because they think if they get regulated, they can manipulate the regulation. or they could stop the open-weight models from taking too much share. They could manipulate the regulation to keep the Chinese open-weight models out and so they could have a duopoly. The basic problem with the entire AI enterprise is that there are no moats. None. Absolutely none. One model is good one day and then people switch to the next. It's not like Google. Everybody was on Google. Forever. You were on Google forever so much, the concept of not being on Google, you couldn't even think that. Today, you use Claude, Claude one day, you don't like that, you go to Gemini, you don't like – you use that for a while, you go to ChatGPT. There are no modes. People are spending a trillion dollars a year on business. There are no modes. Are you surprised by that, how easy it is for people to switch from one to another? I'm not surprised or surprised. It is what it is. OK, because I always thought the one that would win was was the one that remembers the most. It doesn't remember. Or the one that could recall the most about you every time you use it? But they're all like that. They could all do that. They all do that. Which one – what's your favorite LLM for the work that you do? I don't have – for my purposes, it's just research. They're all fine. They're off, okay. You don't have one that you're – so we standardized on Claude Enterprise for the firm. And what ends up happening – is like everything I used to do in ChatGPT, now I just do it in Claude because – We're paying for it anyway and you just get used to it. I sort of think the enterprise LLM is a sneaky way to build a moat because you get all the workers of the Fortune 500 accustomed to using it and then why would they go use another? Well, they'll use another if it's a lot cheaper. If an openweight model can do the same – more or less the same thing for one-tenth the price. They'll use the open-weight model. That's the point. It's not that they won't use Cod. It's just I think that Cod is going to have to cut its price. I'm already hearing that it is cutting its price. OK, so then so then the founders of these AI labs. are coming out and they're saying, "Please regulate us." I mean they did a skit on Saturday Night Live, so it's now like – In the mainstream that this is a thing. Right. And you're saying like. Yeah, because they don't want any competition. Right. So once you're big enough, you basically write the rules. The statement that some of these guys have made that LLMs are going to destroy planet Earth. is a lie. Yeah, plain and simple. It's just a lie. Okay. Let's start the show. John, let's go. We ready? We're going to start it. All right. This podcast is brought to you by VanEck. Look, we're in an era of rising debt, deglobalization, and a massive physical build out to power the AI economy. No, you look, that means more demand for energy, raw materials, and infrastructure. Historically, that's been a really strong backdrop for real assets. And VanEck has an ETF for that. It's called RACS. [5:00] - Anak Real Assets ETF. - It's actively managed and shifts exposure across gold, energy, infrastructure, and natural resources, based on what the macro environment is actually doing, Not just what it's done in the past. Rax is your one-stop shop for real assets. Head over to VanEck.com slash R-A-A-X compound to learn more. That's VanEck.com slash R-A-A-X compound. Thank you, John. All right, guys, welcome to the compound and friends. We are one of the best podcasts in the country. We're so happy to be able to tell you that our guest today also runs one of the best investing podcasts. your episodes of premiums. I might have to, I think I have to pay for those. You may have to pay for it. By the way, it's called The Real Eisman Playbook, just so we get that out there. The real – well, I mean it seems like you don't need much help. The numbers that you – YouTube are huge. They're nice. Are you shocked by the success of the show so soon after launching? It's a big show. Completely shocked. Okay. But it's – I mean it's cool. It's cool. Yeah, it's really cool. All right, guys. Steve is an investor and the host of The Real Eisman Playbook. a weekly podcast he launched in 2025. Steve has gained fame for betting against the subprime mortgage market ahead of the 2008 financial crisis while running Frontpoint Partners, a trade that was chronicled in Michael Lewis's The Big Short. He later founded Emerus Partners in 2012 and joined Neuberger Berman in 2014. as a managing director and portfolio manager. Live audience, Miami U, round of applause for Steve Eisman. They love you already. They love you already. I like it. University of Miami is a really nice school. Yes. And as a pool in the middle school, which is which is kind of nice. I know that's so that's that's why my son, my son looked around because your son is no fool. No fool. You know what? I remember visiting my daughter, University of Miami. Yeah. And so what a wonderful time she had both educationally and just being there. I said to my wife, Valerie, because Valerie and I both went to Penn. I said, We're idiots. Yeah. Like we went to the school in the middle of Philadelphia where we froze our butts off. We could have been in Miami. What did she study at Miami? My wife. No, my daughter's got art history. Art history. OK. All right. I want to ask you the question that I think is the only question that matters right now for the market. And, you know, We, you know, we've had you we've had this plan to have you on for a while, so we didn't time it, but it's almost perfect timing. Um, Is the funding mechanism for AI products available? going to break or not. We had this event in the market yesterday with CoreWeave. So for people that don't know, CoreWeave is one of these things that's called the NeoCloud. And it's basically a data center not owned. They run data centers. Right. Not owned by a hyperscaler. It doesn't have the cash flows coming from advertising like Alphabet, for example. Right. Thank you. Um, The debt has shot up to I think it's a 15 percent yield right now. Um... The stock price is... I'm going to say in a 60 percent drawdown. It's bad. It's bad. All right. So what you're looking at here are spreads and yields blowing out on on core. We've just just sort of like as a as emblematic of all of these companies that need to sell debt in order to fund these projects, projects that you can't half build and then just leave them. Like you've got to. Well, you could, but you'd be bankrupt. You could, but it would be a bad idea. I'd love to – as somebody that – on a firsthand basis was in the midst of the great financial crisis and – You had seen it coming. You had bet on it. I guess you bet everything on it at one point. To me, this doesn't look like that, but I'd love to get your take on like the discourse around what's happening with bond yields and whether or not these projects can go forward. Well, look, if you want to draw parallels to the great financial crisis, there's a big difference, which is – I mean, let's just hypothetically say – General Motors goes bankrupt. So what happens? So people get laid off. All the suppliers to General Motors, some of them go bankrupt, a lot of [10:00] People lose their jobs. Almost certainly there's a recession in that part of the country. Maybe if there's contagion, there's a recession in the rest of the country. And that's what happens. Thank you. When JP Morgan goes down, planet Earth burns. Right. That's the end. If you can't – it's the end. Yeah. So the reason why the government had to bail everybody out was you couldn't have a situation where people can't get their money out of the bank. Right. So, yeah. This is more like the General Motors story. I mean it's a very big story. What if you can't get your trips out of the data center? Then what? Well, that's bad for you. Yeah. But it's not the end of the world. Um, I mean, Obviously, we'll go more into the AI story, but if just for example, OpenAI went bankrupt tomorrow – and I'm not making that prediction, but let's just say that it did – I think the US economy would go into a recession. You do. Sam? I do. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. It's not the same thing as a great financial crisis. The banks are fine. How do they become so systemically important? This is a non-public company. I know in the private market, the valuation is – A trillion, a trillion and a half, whatever it is. How did they become so systemically important in three years now? to the point where they could send the entire US economy into a recession. They went out and made they and anthropic both went out and made commitments to. basically everybody who would take their pen. And so if you want to think about – the problem with the AI story – I'll give you the short version of it. The problem with the AI story is a concentration problem. Which is – which is just started NVIDIA. Top of the chain. So NVIDIA... grew revenue this most recent quarter by over 100%. That's an astonishing statement. The largest company on planet Earth grew revenue by over 100 percent is awe-inspiring. But in the 10Q, there's a sentence that says that 70 percent of NVIDIA's accounts receivable, which is a proxy for revenue, is from five customers. Why is that bad? You don't want such concentration. What happens if one of those customers goes down? You just lost a whole bunch of your business. Yeah, of course. No, I'm sort of asking a dumb question. I'm just curious to hear your thoughts. I'll give you an example. In the 90s when I was at Oppenheimer, We had a software analyst. She was very talented. And I remember having a conversation with her where she said that Oppenheimer wanted to bring public a software company. that had rapid, rapid growth, but it only had two customers. And she said no. And the reason why she said no is if one of those customers goes away. That's the end of the company. So NVIDIA is five customers is basically Now, those are probably the hyperscalers. Which themselves have hundreds of millions of customers. Yes, but if you go to the hyperscalers, 70 percent – of their AI revenue is from Anthropic and OpenAI. Right. And then if that number is something like 25 to 30 percent of their total cloud revenue. Right. So. And then Oracle is much worse because half of Oracle's backlog is just open AI. Right. These are the commitments. So OpenAI says to Oracle – We're going to utilize your cloud server. We're going to utilize the compute. Go build it. That you're making available. And by the way, we need 10 times more. go build all these data centers. - So all this building is really, because Anthropoc and OpenAI have gone crazy. - So we learned a few things yesterday. Number one, we had another hot inflation print. - Yep, and we had one this morning. - And we had another one this morning. And yet, interestingly, we'll talk about later, rates are down a lot, which tells you where the pressure is. - Because people are scared. - Tells you where the pressure is coming from. But yesterday felt like a moment. Corweave's debt through the roof. They're now spending $640 million just to service the debt, which is extremely problematic, given their cash flow situation. We had $2.1 trillion come out of the socks over the past seven days. Yesterday, did yesterday feel like the bubble popping or is this another moment to buy that we're going to look back on and say, well, stupid sons of bitches. So so eager before you answer, take a look at this is 2.1 trillion lost in the socks over seven days. And you can see how extreme that is on the screen right there. Like that does not happen in a normal market. It's a lot. Do you think that people are too eager? to and at this point there's a sea of people so it's too many but to become the next devise man to be the hero for calling the next big short like I feel like you know I gotta tell you it's a bit of a disease yeah because I said this on [15:00] On CNBC once, I'll say it again because it's such a good line that I really like it, which was – it was a day when Ray Dalio, who I respect greatly, was basically predicting the end of the world because of the deficit. Was this 2015? Yeah. He hit it in 2015 and he's doing it again. Still not to think so. So I was on the five o'clock show and Melissa Lee asked me what I thought. And I said, you know, you know what the problem with all these people is they all want to be me. and I have news for them the role of Steve Eisenman is taken and it's funny but the point is that that People want to be known as the person who predicted the next calamity. They want the glory. They want that glory. You know what? I had that glory. I don't need it again. So I don't know if this is the, I honestly don't know. I don't think... I don't think that core weave is important enough. to sync the AI story. I think anthropic and open AI are important. Now, the one interesting couple of data points that were interesting about them is last week, OpenAI came out and said that their annualized revenue at the end of September was $50 billion. A month ago they said 70. What happened to 20? Where did the 20 go? It disappeared. that its revenue, I'll be off by a little bit. - I got the numbers. It's jumped 50%. - 43%. - To 16.8 billion for the coin. - So it jumped 43% in three months. But that's down from a growth rate in the second quarter of 140%. Well, that's not sustainable, of course. Well, yeah, but the point is I think the end of token maxing is starting to have an impact. So they were making more money. as a result of token maxing, then they reasonably could have made on an ongoing basis. Yes. Once companies looked at their budgets and said, we obviously can't spend at this rate on AI as great as the technology is. Correct. So one interesting ripple is that with rates where they are, the supply of financing for new data centers is obviously not going to be harder to come by, absolutely harder to justify. The demand side of it though, even though it might be changing a little bit with the open-weight model, there are still supply constraints all over the place. So if the supply gets limited and the demand continues to increase, That could make for an interesting dynamic marketplace. It could. I mean, part of the problem right now is that there's a lot of pushback on data centers all over the country. It's hard to very hard to quantify it. What's less popular? I was about to make a bad tasteful joke. Maybe the Dodgers. Yeah, fine. Yeah. But there's so much pushback that all this build out of data centers seems to be it's going to slow by a lot. Which would be bullish for people that sell compute? Less data centers. I don't know if it would be bullish because it would mean you're going to buy less compute. Because... You can't build the data center. If you can't build a data center, you've got no place to put your compute. But what compute exists becomes more in demand. That's probably the case. OK. So I actually wanted to ask you about that because I think that's – part of the story. I don't think the demand changes for AI. I think like this group in front of us, they've just spent a couple of days. I agree. It's the price. It's the price of the AI that matters. So like this idea – So this group in front of us has just spent two days going into all the investment banks on Wall Street. Every one of them is going to have a substantially larger budget for AI and AI-related projects and AI-related hiring in 27 than they had in 26 than they had in 25. That part of it at the enterprise level is not going to change. The other thing that probably won't change is consumer demand, which I think is mostly chat GPT. And now Muse on the agentic side and Gemini, every Google search is now an AI de facto. So that's not going away either. Nobody that's using this technology is going to say – You know what? I don't really need this or I haven't made this a part of my life and I'm just going to go back to the way I was doing things in 2022. Like I don't think any of that's really going to happen. So, The price of the bonds, the difficulty in selling debt – is not going to really change the demand side. I think what changes is Who gets to build the capacity? to serve that demand. And arguably, if the core weaves and the neviuses of the world are not able to sell debt and supply as much computers they want to – [20:00] The ball just goes back into the court of the hyperscalers. And. Amazon Alphabet, Google. Um, Microsoft, they were in an even stronger position than they were in a year ago when maybe debt was cheaper or there was a bigger appetite for bonds. What do you think about that idea from an investing standpoint? The hyperscaler's position just strengthens. I agree that the hyperscaler position has strengthened. What I'm most focused on is – This business is so concentrated from Anthropic and OpenAI that if there's a price war, none of that matters. The whole thing will correct. Now, if Three, four years from now, that happens. It probably won't matter because there will be a lot of other companies to take the compute. But right now, it's so concentrated that you better hope that those two companies do well. It seems that the pricing is based on usage now more so than – The last 15 years, the way enterprise software was sold was SaaS. You pay us per head. So such and such company has a thousand employees. Salesforce is going to take $80 per employee, and that's the SaaS contract. Now it's migrated more toward a pay-what-you-use model. That feels more sustainable to me. than the way we thought they were going to sell these services? Well, it's also a lot more expensive. Yes, but I think that companies have more control over those – or maybe it's not that way. Well, I think it's more expensive, and so companies are going to be more – cost conscious and they're going to get their employees to use the cheaper models much more. which is going to put pressure on anthropic and open AI to cut price. OK. That's your bear case. OK. And you think that's something that we're witnessing the beginning? I think we're seeing the I think it's potentially that we're seeing the beginning of it. OK, what's the transmission mechanism by which OpenAI has a problem? Things happen. And then we're in an economic recession, like economy-wide recession. So let's imagine. that there's a full bone price war. Okay. Let's assume it. Okay. I don't know if it's going to happen, but let's just say that it does. In tropics, revenue growth turns negative. Nobody's going to fund them. They got to cut back on their commitments. Oracle goes right down the toilet because half of Oracle's backlog is just from OpenAI. By the way, it's stock prices trading like … Like it's in the toilet. Yes. So just for those of you who don't know, last year … like around the third quarter before Oracle reported the stock was 230. And then they reported and they showed that their backlog had gone to like, 300 or 400 – I think 400 billion. It was up 300 billion in three months. Everybody went nuts and the stock went from 230 to 330 like – you remember this, like in two days. I never saw a stock go up 100 points like that. One of the biggest stocks in the market. Huge, in two days. Then I don't know who came out. It might have been Gil Luria from Davidson put out a report to say that – The entire 300 billion was just open AI. And everybody just freaked out. Yeah, I was the top. And then the stock went from 330 to 230, and now it's at 130. Because people don't trust. They don't trust that you can't rely on a company that loses money. Your entire future, you've hinged your future on a company that bleeds cash like a lunatic. This has been a very interesting couple of days in the stock market. I agree. as i said yesterday a hot inflation print and it really felt like people were like oh shit like this is it's not it was it was hot it was bad it's not this morning was hot it's not getting better we saw producer prices today yesterday was consumer today was the producer prices, Also not good. Yesterday you had the memory stocks, which were the bell of the ball, killed. Fun fact, Western Digital, it's in a 54% drawdown. 54%? 54. Wow. And Steve, it's still up 100% year to date. Right. Just to show you how crazy the moment was. I've never heard of that. A stock getting cut in half and still being up 100%. It's unbelievable. Right. So you had yield spike immediately yesterday. By the way, the person who bought it at the peak, that sentence doesn't help them. Yeah. Doesn't help that it's still 100%. You had yield spike and Anthropic. Obviously, it's not a publicly listed stock, but there is this blockchain-based company called Hyperliquid that does – a lot of volume. Over the last 24 hours, Anthropica has traded $17.6 million worth of stock. And this thing, it's a market, and it works pretty well. It worked very well for the SpaceX IPO. - So this is anthropic trading. - So this is anthropic on hyperliquid. - I see. [25:00] Anthropic was doing bad yesterday. Obviously, and then the numbers came out after the bell of what their revenue was. It puked. Semis puked in the after hours. People are freaking out. Last night, Twitter was black. like jet black people are freaking out. And this morning – I wasn't freaking out. You were very calm. I saw it. This morning, very interestingly, I think, Anthropic is up 5.5%. Yields are coming way down and the stocks that are ripping today are the biggest pieces of shit in the market. Like Lenore is I think the best performing stock in the USP today. So anything even remotely rates related. And it's so funny how the narrative of the market changes like that. Last week it was the fund, who cares about the interest rates? I guess it can't contract this. I guess it can't touch this. And then also the market says, "Fregout," and ironically, That's the tab. And it's so funny how that works in the stock market. We end the top in interest rates, and you need, I guess, we need bad news for the stock market at the bottom. Because it's just one day, Anthropoc is ripping off the lows, S&P and the Equal Weight are ripping off the lows, It is the best game on the planet. Are you surprised by how quickly rates came down? I'm actually quite surprised. I mean the inflation numbers were very bad. I guess there's such panic. People were just buying treasuries. But here's what we learned. Here's what we learned. The question or the debate over the last couple of months – and I love what you said last time about the deficit worries being a lot of virtue signaling and I agree. It was a question. I said that? When did I say that? Well, with us. Oh, last time. That's a good line. That was very popular. It's a hard ball of yarn to untangle. with the market it's like why is it because of this or that we don't always know But some days we find out what's driving the trade. And yesterday we found out, is it the fiscal irresponsibility of our governments around the world? Is it like, who, no, it's AI. It was AI driving the trade because the moment we saw a hint of weakness or softness in that trade. The tenure went from 5-4 down to 5-1 like that. - Yeah. - So it's all AI. - So we didn't all of a sudden get more comfortable in physical I don't think so. No. What happened was people said, okay – I guess all the bond selling to fuel the AI trade is going to slow down. because the investor. So by Treasury, they are so right. So Treasury's got some breathing room and came in. Right. All right. This is this is Interesting. So, Over the last year, The CEO of CoreWeave has been selling a ton of stock. In his defense... So we've got a chart showing the price, the sales, and where he sold in the dollar. It's $682 million worth of stock. In his defense, he's not like waking up one day and saying, I don't like the stock anymore. This is all planned in advance. And again, I'm sure a lot of this is to pay the taxes for some of the stocks that is granted. Nevertheless, Nevertheless, you would think at some point with a company that is under such scrutiny, that he would say to his shareholders, all right, I'm actually going to pull the, I'm not selling. This doesn't make sense anymore. I believe in the company. He has not done that. And yesterday, I don't know if adding insult to injury is the right word, but Steve, I'd be curious to hear your take on this. The Financial Times wrote a story. Core Weave. targets, quote, unlimited insurance money to fund the AI build out because that is a big part of the story. Could you imagine posing like that and say, this is the time that I think I should make my pitch for my insurance contracts. So, J88 Mark Rolto should sell the LA Dodgers? back to his own insurance company for which he bought it and use those proceeds to invest in probie. Wow. That would be a collision of two potential scandals into one big story. Oh, you got a big enough wall. Let's compound this. Steve, this is part of the areas of the market that people – to the extent that people want to call the next big short, this is Oh, area where people are planting their flag. I totally agree. I mean, life insurance. is They're dangerous. Just let's come back to Mark Bolter. I just did a podcast about it. At He bought the LA Dodgers. He bought the Los Angeles Lakers. He bought a bunch of other sports teams. And he didn't disclose it. He just bought them. Listen, I'd like to own the LA Dodgers too. But I like the money. So he had the insurance company lend money to another entity, which he also owns. But it obscures the fact that He is going to use that money to personally take control of the – And it'll work out. Yeah, it did work out. The price went up. The Lakers, the Lakers, $2 billion, quick money. So I don't know if he said this or they said it. I saw the words, I think Matt Levine wrote about this. Somebody referred to this as a to the extent [30:00] There is a crime. It's victimless. At this point, it is. Because the value of good. The value of what he won up. The counterpoint would be, wait a minute. You're not supposed to do this. Well, of course, it's illegal. But if grandma knew that she was investing in a contract. She would not have bought that contract. Exactly. And you wouldn't have gotten the money at 3%. You would have had to pay 12%. That's after that. So, by the way, here's a fun fact. So Mark Walters insurance companies are based in Delaware and there is a Delaware insurance regulator. So question, what do you think the current Delaware insurance regulator did before he was an insurance regulator? Take a guess. What was his job? What was his job? What did he do for a living? Take a guess. Was it something in finance? No. Oh, I think it's a podcaster. He was a sheriff. Oh, that makes perfect sense. Yeah. And he's the insurance. Okay. That makes perfect sense. So the guy look I have nothing against sheriffs God bless You know they protect us but there no worth of on insurance All right so here the question A lot of people writing on Substack are drawing these connections between insurance companies that are now investing in AI data centers. I guess the question to you is how risky is that for the people that hold insurance policies and are these people that are writing about this going to be proven correct that there is more systemic risk for regular people who are not speculators they're literally holding policies is this an area that people okay do you you know you're not particularly worried about it i'm not worried about it as a matter of answer yeah all right steve there's two more things that we want to do with you before we wrap up um i want to ask you about something that you mentioned, the political backlash, not just over the building of data centers, but just broadly speaking. I listened to a recent episode you did with someone who actually spoke at the UN about the risks of AI. And I feel like this has now gotten to a point where we have sort of a four plan from the White House about how AI will be regulated and what it sort of sounded like was it every man for himself but there be a commission The commission will be made up of people that work in the AI industry. And basically the guidance is like you have the liability if something you invent goes crazy and causes damage. And like my perspective is, yeah, I like that. But liability for who? Liability for the investors in one of these companies to write a check or liability that somebody created something really harmful and they're an executive and they personally will have to face the consequences? I guess I'd love to know what your opinion is of the current state of that sort of regulation is going to work. What should it be if you have an alternate suggestion? So I think that if you run an AI company and your AI company goes out and hacks somebody or does something bad, your company is liable. It's just liable. Now, the more interesting question is I'm the CEO of that company and I knew this was going to happen and I didn't care and it happened anyway. Will anybody actually go after me What happened in 2008 That was my next statement Well nothing happened to anyone personally Nothing happened to any executive even though they committed the worst fraud in human history So I had a podcast where I was interviewing a fellow podcaster and she does a lot of stuff on corporate fraud. And so we were talking about fraud and like that CEO should be held accountable. And she says – she's like pleading. She says, Steve, what can be done? And I said nothing, nothing because nothing will be done unfortunately. Well, by now, certainly not. So if nobody went to jail for 2008, they ain't going to jail for hacking. OK. So is the current state of regulation really going to stop anything or – I'm very cynical. I think we have to have a crisis and then in the aftermath, maybe there will be some rules. That's 100 percent the way I think. That's how it always goes, right? That's how it always is. What do you think about the government taking stakes, picking winners? You must love that. I think that would be awful. You don't like the idea of the government taking stakes in any of the AI labs or projects? No, because then everybody would assume that they'd be too big to fail and they'd get bailed out. I don't want the government involved. [35:00] Okay. Do you – Do you think that – the way the hyperscalers work, are currently set up. that they... We look at the stocks now. We look at Amazon now. Alphabet, with the exception of Apple and Tesla. Of the top seven companies, we call them the mag seven on Wall Street. Of the top seven companies, they're all pretty much in this business. including now Meta, who has built data centers for their own use, but they could turn them outward and have other people rent compute from them if they wanted to. Do you think that over the next five to 10 years, we will see these companies become $10 trillion? Or are we pretty much butting up against like what the natural limit on their size is? I don't think there's a natural limit on their size. But I mean to me, the – The intellectual question is, does this sort of play out like the internet where – When I was at Oppenheimer, Henry Blodgett was literally across the hall from me because he was at Oppenheimer. He got out on the sales. floor and he said that dynastic levels of wealth are about to be created and the internet's going to conquer the world. And he was 100 percent correct. He just wasn't correct about the first generation of Internet companies. It was the second generation of Internet companies that used the rails that were created by the first generation to go on to glory. Maybe something like that happens here. So like AOL, Netscape, Yahoo, Excite, none of those companies ended up – Matt, the only first gen I can think of is Amazon. I'm not saying that this is better or worse. It's different in the sense that back then there were so many companies coming public that had no business doing so. That's fair. And now we have two companies that are – Everything. Yes, that is fair. Do you think? Do you think Anthropic will come public this year? They better. OK. I agree. Because I think they actually need to go public right now because the whole token maxing is going to make their numbers start to look really bad. Like they have to strike while the iron is still hot. They need to. My conspiracy theory is that Anthropoc needs to go public before they report third quarter. Why do you think OpenAI doesn't seem to be in as much of a rush? I would guess that they're in similar – I would think they would be. I don't understand it. Okay. Do you think the IPO – Other than they're just not doing nearly as well. You think the IPO will be well received? Let me frame it this way. SpaceX is the largest IPO we've ever seen. There was a lot of pessimism on Twitter where pessimism usually lives. all of the predictions about it would screw up the index funds. It would take money away from all these other stocks so that they could support the size of it. All of the things that we are, the insider selling would crush the shareholders. It would open at 135 and collapse to 50 once insiders were unlocked and able to sell. There were so many reasons why people said this is going to be a disaster, either for the stock itself or for everyone. And none of that happened. It opened up. It fell. Then it went up again. Then it fell back. But it's acting like a normal stock, a normal technology stock. You think – Something like Anthropic, which will be roughly the same size. Will be similarly received. And just. Will gradually get. Will quickly get used to it being in existence. I have no idea. Okay. All right. Let me ask you a question. You know, Mr. Could I buy it? Would you be a buyer? No way. No way. Let me ask you a question that you might answer. Okay. I'm taking a shot. Go ahead. All right. So earnings have grown 30% this year. Investors are saying... Don't think it's sustainable. The forward PE we're willing to pay has come down dramatically. Does that make you – Does that make you – Bullish, bearish? Do you not care? What do you think about that dynamic? I am not – Thank you. I'm not valuation sensitive in that way. But what's the market telling you? It is pure narrative. It is pure narrative and there is only one narrative that matters right now and that's AI. So you tell me what happens to the AI narrative and I'll tell you what happens to the stock market, period. All that matters. So I think that's true. You know, a lot of people say like the stock market is not the economy. I think right now it kind of is. Like I think – We're talking about companies that aren't even public yet having the ability to cause a recession. So the companies that are public – I really think all of the performance in the market is coming from some derivative of the AI trade. Now, the bond market, we learned this, Michael said, we learned yesterday how important [40:00] to prevailing yields, the ability to sell debt. Like, I really think this is one of those situations where the economy did become the stock market. And it may not last forever, but like right in this in this moment, I think it's more true than ever. If that's the case. How important is it that this market remain near highs or – not have some sort of calamitous event. It almost feels like the feedback. I don't think of it that way. Again, I go back to my original point. I mean, if you look at the S&P, 40% is tech. And Google, Amazon, blah, blah, blah. You get the 50 percent at the investment banks and G.G. Vinova and Quanta and Eaton and Rockwell. And you're 65 percent of the S&P. The industrials are it's all one trade. It's AI, period, end of discussion. Okay. So long as the demand holds up and somebody is willing to finance the build. It's fine. All right. It's fine. Another area that you know something about, the housing market. Okay. This is the worst episode. Housing environment since the GFC. No, obviously it's obviously not nearly the same thing, but it is bad and And I find it unbelievable that a third of the economy can be – Depression level and yet – And nobody cares. Nobody cares. Things are good because of AI, right? Thank God. Thank God for AI, for the stock market and the economy's purpose for right now. Right. 2022 was a very weird year for the home builders. because they were on fire and home building stocks should not be on fire in a housing freeze. The thing that happened was everybody that – owns a house, is stuck. Nobody could sell it because rates are too high. There's no buyers. There's no sellers. What do you have? Amazing new housing. And Lenar and all the others, Pulte and KB, they feasted. They were given concessions. It was a frenzy, a free-for-all. And that dynamic is over. I think people are getting used to the fact that okay, I guess this is just like what interest rates are. This is just what a mortgage is now. And Slowly but surely, they are starting to come to market. and the housing stocks are getting better. destroyed. Lenar, I think, I mean, it's straight down every single day. Now, monster bounce today. Good. Hopefully it lasts. But what do you think about the housing market? Let me take a step back. The housing market is locked because of rates. housing has... probably never been more affordable than, in our lifetimes. So it's not just... You mean unaffordable? Unaffordable. Sorry. It has not been this unaffordable. Maybe like – Ever. Relative to incomes and the cost to borrow. Exactly. It's a disaster. It's not just – mortgage rates. That's part of the problem. It's that – The cost to insure your home has exploded. The cost to pay utilities has exploded. The cost of your taxes has exploded. The down payment. Prices haven't come down. No, they haven't come down. One estimate I got was that if you roll in. all of the monthly costs to buy a house today. versus let's say five years ago, it's 50% higher. Yeah, I'd believe that. As a homeowner, I would believe that. I think – housing prices are going to come down. That's how this ends? Yes, that's how this ends. They're already starting to come down. They come down because the economy – No, because you've got boomers dying, and so that supply is going to come online, and you've got – The foreclosures are actually going up for the first time in a long time, and they're up quite a lot. So that supply is going to come online. But there's still so much demand. There's 70 million people around my age. Not all of them need a house, but a lot of them do. They can't afford it. Yeah. They can't afford it unless the price goes down. Yeah. If the price came down, they could afford it. So I think housing prices are going to go down. You think that'll be the net result is they will come – but it just feels so gradual. The way that you get there, lower housing prices. Yeah, it takes time. It takes years. Can that weirdly stimulate the economy, a falling housing market? It's too slow. And you don't think weights alone could do this? Or rates falling if they – Well, rates falling would help. We got a long way to go from here. But I think the problem that I outlined, which the insurance costs, the utility costs, the tax costs, they've become really prohibitive. Yeah. Really prohibitive. So to close out, you said everyone's trying to be the next Steve Eisman. So you obviously became very – I don't want to be the next Steve Eisman. You already did that. So – Thank you. There is a cottage industry and people [45:00] crises. Yes. Not necessarily betting on them with money, but almost more like reputation, like they'll write a really negative research note or sub stack post or they'll spend every waking hour on Twitter retweeting bad news. I feel that I feel that ultimately, if and when something bad does happen, we're going to find somebody who said all the right things before it happened and that person fairly or unfairly, they will be looked at as this is the man or the woman who saw it coming. There's hundreds of them. There's so many. But there's so many of them. Do you think that that's – you think that that will be the outcome in the wake of some crisis like we'll find the person who quote unquote got it right or is this thing that you were able to do probably not replicable in the next crisis because of how loud – He made a lot of money. He wasn't just tweeting. That's the difference. I think that's obviously right. But like what do you think when you see all these people out there in a race to say the most negative thing possible to sort of become associated with whatever happens next? I mean you should be happy that you're wrong. Yeah. That's what I want to say. Well, I'm happy that they're wrong and that they've been wrong. Look, eventually one day there will be a correction. What that is, I don't know. Is it a be careful what you wish for? Like was it awesome being you in the aftermath of this? It wasn't so awesome. It was – let me tell you. It was a lot of aggravation and tremendous anxiety. People were probably really mad at you. Oh, congrats. You f***ing ruined the world. It ruined the world and it was your fault and it was a lot of anxiety You got people saying it was your fault I don want to go through it again Now, like I said, whatever does happen, it's not going to be a great financial crisis. You were talking about institutions level 40 to 1. It's not like that anymore. But could we have a bad recession if AI really falls apart? You bet. But it's on the same order of magnitude. Well, I think that's a good place to end. And I think that makes people who are reading all this stuff and all this commentary and all this opinion, not that you're the final authority. But I think it's helpful perspective from someone who has seen much worse and doesn't think that this has to necessarily resolve in that way. And I really appreciate you saying it. And thank you so much for being here on the show. Thank you. Steve Eiseman, ladies and gentlemen. I thought we'd end by having everyone individually talk to you about their resume that'd be great guys on behalf of the compound and friends I want to thank you for coming and being our impromptu live studio audience I hope you had fun thank you so much for being here and Steve, Michael and I wish you all the best as you graduate U Miami and launch into your future careers. So give yourselves a round of applause. Thank you, guys. Okay.