Disney Converts Animation Assets Into High-Margin Park Model

迪士尼将动画资产转化为高利润乐园模式 该公司在动画领域的历史根基构建了一个永续的知识产权飞轮，其中的角色永不衰老，也无需分成，从而借助高利润的主题乐园和衍生商品稳定了整体业务。 本期节目按时间顺序详细回顾了华特·迪士尼时代的商业运作历程，追溯了他从早年对艺术的追求与破产经历，到凭借《威利号汽船》（Steamboat Willie）实现音画同步等重大技术突破的整个过程。内容深入拆解了知识产权飞轮的商业机制，阐明了周边衍生品授权、“迪士尼金库”（Disney Vault）以及早期电视协议如何为《白雪公主》（Snow White）和迪士尼乐园等重资本项目提供资金。最后，叙述还探讨了战后的困境、发行渠道的垂直整合野心、Epcot的最初规划，以及后来令公司面临华尔街企业掠夺者威胁的创意停滞期，直至其依托动画根基迎来了一场不可思议的复苏。 1928年因发行商查尔斯·明茨（Charles Mintz）夺走幸运兔奥斯华（Oswald the Lucky Rabbit）版权并挖走几乎全部画师，华特与洛伊·迪士尼蒙受巨大创伤，此后确立了必须100%掌控自有IP的铁律。 (35:01) 在推出前两部默片版米奇短片遭发行商拒绝后，迪士尼于1928年凭借《汽船威利号》（Steamboat Willie）实现同步有声动画的划时代技术突破，赋予角色声音直接源自银幕的震撼错觉。 (43:27) 米奇老鼠俱乐部与报纸连环画在1920年代末及1930年代初构筑起免费且持续的宣发生态，不仅让米奇深深植根于全球文化，也为其庞大商业化奠定了基础。 (61:21) 到1934年，由凯·卡门（Kay Kamen）打理的衍生品授权版税收入全面超越传统电影票房租金，构建起独特的IP飞轮第二资金支柱，抵消了华特高昂的制作成本。 (69:57) 华特豪赌公司命运投入150万美元打造首部动画长片《白雪公主与七个小矮人》，并在1944年资金困窘重映时意外发现“迪士尼宝库”价值——每隔七年便有全新一代儿童成长为观影客群。 (78:53)

Ben Gilbert and David Rosenthal argue that the Walt Disney Company built an unprecedented corporate empire by pioneering an integrated intellectual property flywheel, repeatedly risking insolvency to create enduring animated assets that could be cross-monetized across merchandise, television, and theme parks. The Economics of the Animated Flywheel (70:58) Walt Disney and his brother Roy discovered that intellectual property flywheels operate fundamentally better with animation than live action. Live-action studios face steep transfer pricing and margin decay as aging actors demand escalating compensation, whereas animated characters never age and "work for free." After losing the rights to Oswald the Lucky Rabbit in 1928, Walt insulated his studio by relentlessly branding releases under his own name. When co-creator Ub Iwerks departed in 1930, public loyalty remained anchored to the Walt Disney and Mickey Mouse brand rather than the individual animator. Disney further capitalized on this loyalty during the Great Depression through low-cost, high-frequency media. Partnering with the King Features Syndicate in 1930, Disney paid a single animator to draw a daily Mickey Mouse comic strip that reached over 100 million people across 20 countries. This daily exposure reinforced emotional bonds and drove licensing demand without relying on traditional advertising budgets. High-Stakes Capital Allocation and Continual Reinvestment (78:52) Disney's growth was driven by repeated, existential financial gambles where incoming cash flow was systematically poured into larger projects rather than accumulated. Producing Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs—labeled "Walt's Folly"—cost $1.5 million against typical short budgets of $15,000 to $30,000. Although it achieved a record $8 million in rentals, complex theatrical distribution structures meant the studio retained only 22% of box office dollars, with most earnings diverted to repay Bank of America loans. Rather than consolidating profits, Walt immediately committed $3 million to a new Burbank campus and greenlit three technically demanding features simultaneously: Pinocchio, Bambi, and Fantasia. By 1940, the studio faced $8 million in total debt and negative costs. Walt repeated this risk profile in the 1950s with Disneyland, establishing WED Enterprises independently and leveraging personal life insurance, real estate, and private capital when corporate directors refused to fund the park. Cross-Media Synergy and Physical Park Architecture (180:30) Disney pioneered modern multi-channel media synergy by utilizing broadcast television to de-risk physical real estate. The 1954 launch of the Disneyland television series on ABC functioned as a weekly preview that financed and promoted the Anaheim park, while an incidental three-part miniseries sparked a nationwide consumer craze for Davy Crockett coonskin caps. Despite opening day on July 17, 1955, suffering heatwaves, plumbing failures, and overcrowding, the live broadcast reached 83 million viewers, creating instant national demand. This interlocking model was formalized in a 1958 Wall Street Journal diagram illustrating how theatrical releases, TV, music, and merchandise systematically fed one another. Within the parks, Walt instituted "plusing"—perpetually iterating attractions based on real guest behavior—and incorporated elaborate structural engineering, such as street-level underground tunnels at Walt Disney World, to maintain narrative immersion. Labor Fractures and Forced Production Compromises (123:17) Walt Disney’s paternalistic studio culture fractured during the financial crisis of 1940. Facing mounting bank debts, management eliminated a newly created 20% equity bonus pool, raised pay for a select group of top animators, and froze salaries for the remaining workforce. These disparities triggered the May 1941 Screen Cartoonist Guild strike. While Roy Disney settled the dispute via federal mediation—cutting the lot's headcount from 1,200 to under 700—Walt became permanently embittered, maintaining personal blacklists and later alleging communist subversion before the House Un-American Activities Committee. The labor dispute and wartime losses on European distribution prompted severe operational compromises. To produce the 1950 hit Cinderella on a strict $2 million budget, Disney filmed the entire story in live action first and rotoscoped the footage. Although this process constrained artistic dynamism and alienated Walt, the film earned $8 million in initial rentals, rescuing the studio from insolvency. Classical Powers Versus Streaming Overextension (252:44) Analyzing pre-1984 Disney through Hamilton Helmer's Seven Powers framework, the hosts attribute its competitive moat to strong consumer branding, scale economies, and counterpositioning: conventional live-action studios could not match Disney's multi-year animation investments, which were cross-subsidized by Mickey Mouse licensing. Historically, Disney preserved franchise value through the "Disney Vault" strategy, strictly spacing out theatrical and home video reissues to protect canonical prestige. In contrast, the hosts argue that modern streaming models have destabilized this balance. By requiring an endless stream of original content to prevent subscriber churn on platforms like Disney+, the studio has overexploited franchises like Marvel. This approach conflates primary intellectual property development with secondary ancillary monetization, diluting character scarcity in pursuit of platform volume. Walt Disney passed away in 1966 with an equity market capitalization under $90 million, yet roughly 99.95% of Disney's modern market value was generated posthumously from his foundational IP flywheel. The hosts leave open the question of whether modern entertainment conglomerates can sustain the scarce, canonical storytelling required to fuel that engine under the relentless volume pressures of direct-to-consumer distribution.

播客节目《Acquired》指出，华特·迪士尼公司（The Walt Disney Company）的商业本质是基于动画角色所建立的高壁垒知识产权（IP）飞轮，通过将可跨世代流传的情感投射转化为长期变现资产；然而，这一帝国的确立并非按部就班的商业规划，而是源于华特·迪士尼多次濒临破产的技术豪赌、严苛的品牌专有权控制，以及对实体沉浸式体验的执念，并在现代面临内容过度开发与飞轮机制混淆的双重考验。 IP飞轮原型与动画经济学特权 (70:58) 主播分析指出，迪士尼早期确立的核心竞争壁垒在于对原创 IP 品牌所有权的绝对掌控。在经历早期角色奥斯瓦尔德（Oswald）版权被夺以及 1930 年核心画师 Ub Iwerks 被挖角后，华特·迪士尼汲取教训，将所有作品统一冠以个人品牌标签。由于受众忠诚于“华特·迪士尼”和“米老鼠（Mickey Mouse）”这一整体形象，核心画师的流失并未动摇公司根基，反而促成了基于角色的 IP 飞轮效应。例如 1930 年启动的《米老鼠》报纸连环画仅由一名 24 岁画师 Floyd Gotfredson 负责，却连续绘制了 45 年，每天在 20 个国家触达超过 1 亿读者，以极低的边际成本提供了持续的品牌曝光。 节目强调，该飞轮机制在动画领域的运作效果显著优于真人影视。真人角色受制于特定演员的生命周期与衰老，且顶级明星往往通过高昂片酬形成“批发转移定价”（Wholesale Transfer Pricing），拿走制片厂大部分利润；相比之下，“米老鼠永远免费工作”且不受年龄限制。华特与罗伊·迪士尼通过赋予动画角色深刻的情感连接，使受众建立起跨世代的情感认同，奠定了迪士尼 IP 持续变现的底层经济逻辑。 动画长片豪赌与高成本技术研发 (78:52) 为了突破短片动画的商业上限，华特在 1930 年代执意投入 150 万美元制作影史首部全长动画电影《白雪公主》（Snow White），这一举动被当时好莱坞同行普遍嘲讽为“迪士尼的愚蠢”（Disney's Folly）。为实现具有写实情感表现力的视觉效果，工作室自主研发了整套工业级制作流程：设立布局部门（Layout Department）进行合成镜头调度，将人物赛璐珞与长幅手绘背景分离，利用铅笔测试（Pencil Test）验证动态物理效果，并开发了高达 10 至 15 英尺的多层摄影机（Multiplane Camera）来呈现立体景深。 尽管《白雪公主》收获了 800 万美元的租赁收入并打破历史纪录，但好莱坞严苛的分账机制（影院留存 65%，发行商抽成 13%，制片厂仅分得 22%）使得巨额收入主要被用于偿还美国银行（Bank of America）的贷款。随后，华特并未选择稳妥复制成功，而是同时推进《木偶奇遇记》、《小鹿斑比》以及耗资研发全套多声道立体声技术（Fantasound）的《幻想曲》，叠加 300 万美元伯班克新园区的开支，导致公司在 1940 年代初负债高达 800 万美元。严峻的现金流危机迫使管理层取消员工利润分红池并冻结普通员工薪酬，最终在 1941 年爆发了长达数月的动画师大罢工，彻底终结了华特所追求的“乌托邦式家庭”企业文化。 实体乐园破局与全媒体生态协同 (160:47) 在经历战后传统动画的疲软与倦怠后，华特将精力转向微缩模型与蒸汽火车，并在个人居所投入 5 万美元修建私家庭院铁路（Carolwood Pacific）。当他向董事会提出打造实体游乐园的想法被拒后，华特于 1952 年自掏腰包成立私营实体 WED Enterprises，抽调骨干画师秘密设计主题乐园。这一跨界构想最终在加州阿纳海姆落地为迪士尼乐园（Disneyland）。为了控制上市公司风险，罗伊构建了隔离财务风险的合资架构，直至开园 27 年后的 1982 年，上市公司才真正完全拥有该乐园的全部权益。 迪士尼乐园的成功树立了媒体与实体商业高度协同的典范。1954 年与 ABC 合作的周播电视节目不仅成为乐园园区的直接广告，还带火了《大卫·克罗克特》（Davy Crockett）微型剧集，在全美掀起浣熊皮帽的狂热消费潮。尽管 1955 年 7 月 17 日开园当天因酷暑熔化沥青、供水瘫痪和假票泛滥被戏称为“黑色星期天”，但 ABC 动用 22 台摄像机的现场直播吸引了全美 8300 万观众，创造了电视转播史纪录，将乐园深植于大众文化心理之中。 飞轮神话辨析与现代开发困境 (210:49) 主播根据迪士尼档案澄清，商界广为流传的“华特在餐巾纸上画出迪士尼飞轮”实属现代神话，该示意图实为 1958 年《华尔街日报》头版报道迪士尼多元化商业模式时由工作室画师绘制的插图，文中甚至未曾使用“飞轮（Flywheel）”一词。从汉密尔顿·赫尔默的《七种力量》框架审视，早期迪士尼的核心壁垒在于真人制片厂不敢涉足高成本动画长片的“逆向定位”（Counterpositioning）、不可替代的品牌溢价，以及横跨影视、商品授权与乐园的规模经济。 然而，主播也对迪士尼现代战略提出了批判性反思。华特·迪士尼于 1966 年逝世时，公司市值不足 9000 万美元，其现代市值的 99.95% 均在华特死后创造，但随后的十余年间制片厂几乎停滞，乐园业务成为绝对支柱。主播指出，传统的 IP 飞轮严格区分“核心内容的主要发行渠道”与“后续附属盈利节点”，并通过“迪士尼金库”（Disney Vault）限量再发行策略维持内容的稀缺感；而在当代流媒体服务 Disney+ 的驱动下，迪士尼将两者的界限抹去，频繁上线衍生剧集以填补平台内容库，导致漫威等头部 IP 出现明显的稀释与过度开发迹象。 节目总结认为，华特·迪士尼通过对艺术与技术的极端执念创造了现代商业史上最持久的情感变现网络，但这一体系的可持续性高度依赖于对核心 IP 质量的节制与尊重。在流媒体时代与资本规模急剧扩大的背景下，如何在维持 IP 稀缺神圣感与满足全天候渠道分发需求之间取得平衡，仍是迪士尼在后华特时代面临的根本考题。

## Background 该内容由知名商业播客 Acquired 于 2026 年 6 月 23 日发布在 YouTube 平台。页面简介指出，本期节目深入剖析了华特迪士尼公司（The Walt Disney Company）在华特·迪士尼掌舵时期的发展历程，讲述迪士尼如何从一家屡屡押上公司身家性命进行疯狂“登月”豪赌的创意工坊，逐步将艺术、工程与商业深度融合，意外发明并构建出全球最成功的现代商业“飞轮”模型与童年怀旧变现帝国。 ## TL;DR 本期节目详尽复盘了华特·迪士尼与哥哥罗伊·迪士尼如何从堪萨斯城的穷困动画小作坊起步，历经 Laugh-O-gram 破产、痛失奥斯华兔子版权的绝境，最终凭借《威利号汽船》的声画同步突破与米老鼠 IP 逆风翻盘。随后，华特倾尽所有豪赌影史首部全彩手绘长片《白雪公主》，并在二战危机与动画师罢工的低谷后，开创性地拓展出迪士尼乐园、周播电视节目与自营博伟发行体系。节目深度拆解了迪士尼如何借助“自研动画 IP 不老不死且无需分润”的天然护城河，将大银幕经典、衍生周边授权与线下沉浸实体连成正反馈闭环，揭示了迪士尼飞轮不可复制的商业底层逻辑。 ## Atmosphere & style 整期节目洋溢着 Acquired 标志性的严谨考据与引人入胜的史诗叙事感，开场以米老鼠配音幽默切入，随后两位主播在对话中层层剥茧，既有对商业报表、资本结构与授权模式的冷峻解构，又充盈着对20世纪伟大艺术冒险的由衷敬意。听感上犹如一场高潮迭起、长达四小时的商业电影，听众既能切身体会到华特多次濒临破产边缘孤注一掷的窒息与豪迈，也能感受到罗伊在幕后精密守护资产负债表的现实张力，令人在浪漫怀旧与硬核商业逻辑的激烈碰撞中深受震撼。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=0s) 开场趣事：米老鼠与唐老鸭的模仿秀 节目在两位主持人轻松幽默的模仿秀中拉开帷幕。Ben 饶有兴致地问 David 是否听过自己的米老鼠模仿，David 调侃说此前只听过他的马里奥配音，两者听上去其实颇为神似。随后 Ben 捏起尖细的嗓音惟妙惟肖地来了一句米老鼠的经典台词：“Oh, boy. Will you look at that?” 这段模仿立刻得到了 David 的盛赞，直呼听起来就像华特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）本人在配音。事实上，在早期动画师的劝说下，华特·迪士尼曾亲自为米老鼠配音长达近 20 年。两人随即还比拼起唐老鸭那标志性的含糊嘎嘎声，并预告了后面将揭晓一个绝对令人意想不到的唐老鸭冷知识。 - 华特·迪士尼在米老鼠诞生之初并非亲自配音，后来在动画师的建议下披挂上阵，为米老鼠献声长达约 20 年。 - 两位主持人用轻松的经典角色声音致敬，开启了这期筹备已久的商业史诗长篇。 ### [01:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=71s) 百年巨头迪士尼：好莱坞异类与“飞轮效应”的起源 伴随着标志性的片头曲，主持人正式宣布 Acquired 开启 2026 年春季篇章，迎来了这期沉淀整整 11 年的重磅选题——华特迪士尼公司（The Walt Disney Company）。在过去 11 年的播客历程中，他们做过皮克斯（Pixar，甚至就是 Acquired 的第一期节目）、卢卡斯影业（Lucasfilm）、漫威（Marvel）和 ESPN，却唯独从未完整梳理过母体迪士尼与华特本人的故事。在两人看来，这不仅是一段严重的缺漏，更是商业史上最独树一帜的样本：好莱坞传统的长片制作往往是一门高波动、甚至平庸的生意，派拉蒙、环球、华纳兄弟等传统制片厂的财务表现均难以称得上卓越，唯独迪士尼凭借独步天下的商业模式，跨入了一个完全不同的盈利量级。 更让当今一代人惊讶的是，现代观众童年记忆里的大量经典，其实远比想象的更古老。比如《白雪公主》（Snow White）在二战爆发前就已经问世，《木偶奇遇记》（Pinocchio）和《小鹿斑比》（Bambi）则诞生于 20 世纪 30 至 40 年代，彼时美国家庭中甚至还没有普及电视机。从技术视角来看，迪士尼自始至终都是一家被艺术外壳包裹的“技术创新公司”：华特屡次赌上整座公司的身家性命，去押注同步有声动画、世界上第一部动画长片、多平面摄影机（multiplane camera），以及在阿纳海姆的橘子林里平地拔起前所未有的迪士尼乐园。这一系列的豪赌，无意间孕育出了日后商业界奉为圭臬的“飞轮效应”（Flywheel Effect）。 - **历史与体量对比**：迪士尼拥有超过百年的历史，其持续盈利能力和 IP 变现效率彻底拉开了与派拉蒙、环球、华纳兄弟等经典好莱坞制片厂的差距。 - **时代错位感**：80、90 年代孩子熟悉的动画巨作（如《白雪公主》《木偶奇遇记》《小鹿斑比》）实际创作于电视普及之前的 30、40 年代。 - **技术驱动的豪赌**：华特时代充斥着颠覆性试验——从同步有声画技术到多平面摄影系统，再到主题公园工程学（Imagineering），每次都近乎押上全部资产。 - **本集配套资料**：Acquired 团队制作了配套视觉图表 PDF，详解早期的商业结构与迪士尼飞轮雏形；本期核心史料与华特引述主要参考传记作家 Neal Gabler 的权威著作《Walt Disney: The Triumph of the American Imagination》。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼早期技术与商业飞轮架构 accDescr: 展示华特·迪士尼如何将技术创新、长片艺术与全渠道IP变现形成闭环飞轮 subgraph Tech["技术创新与豪赌"] T1["同步有声动画"] --> T2["多平面摄影机"] T2 --> T3["全彩长片动画工艺"] end subgraph Content["永恒 IP 资产库"] C1["米老鼠 / 经典短片"] --> C2["《白雪公主》等动画长片"] end subgraph Monetization["跨媒介商业变现"] M1["影院重映与全球发行"] M2["周边衍生品授权"] M3["阿纳海姆迪士尼乐园"] end Tech --> Content Content --> Monetization Monetization -->|"利润反哺再投资"| Tech ``` ### [06:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=363s) 芝加哥到马瑟林：华特·迪士尼的童年与艺术启蒙 故事正式倒回 1901 年 12 月的芝加哥，沃尔特·伊利亚斯·迪士尼（Walter Elias Disney）出生于此。根据家族传说，迪士尼家族的远祖可以追溯到法国诺曼底的“d'Isigny”家族，曾随征服者威廉于 1066 年征服英格兰。华特的父亲伊利亚斯·迪士尼（Elias Disney）是一位性格严苛且郁郁不得志的连续创业者，做过木匠、房东、农夫、报纸分销商，还曾投资过一家破产倒闭的果酱厂。相比之下，华特的叔叔罗伯特（Robert Disney）则是家族里精明的地产投机客，正是他在芝加哥和中西部的地产布局，吸引了伊利亚斯一家北上闯荡。 1906 年，当华特年仅四岁时，伊利亚斯为了远离芝加哥繁杂危险的都市环境，决定带着妻儿搬迁至密苏里州的一个田园小镇——马瑟林（Marceline）。马瑟林实际上是因为圣菲铁路（Santa Fe Railroad）设立机车调度分段点而凭空兴建的城镇，罗伯特叔叔看中潜力在此购买了大片土地。尽管华特日后在芝加哥和堪萨斯城生活的时间远比马瑟林漫长，但华特的妻子莉莲（Lillian Disney）后来曾感慨，马瑟林农场才是华特一生中最重要的精神策源地：那里有果园、水塘、牲畜与木屋，以及因铁路而生的精致城镇主街（Main Street），这直接成为了数十年后迪士尼乐园“美国小镇大街”（Main Street, U.S.A.）的情感原型。 - 华特·迪士尼于 1901 年 12 月生于芝加哥；父辈姓氏源自诺曼底法文姓氏“d'Isigny”。 - 父亲伊利亚斯创业屡屡受挫，性格严肃坚硬；叔叔罗伯特则是精明的土地投机商。 - 密苏里州马瑟林是因圣菲铁路的分段点规划而诞生的新兴小镇，也是塑造华特田园童年意象的终身精神地标。 ### [08:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=515s) 五美分与画笔：“艺术与商业”的初次交汇 在马瑟林农场生活的日子里，罗伯特叔叔的妻子麦吉婶婶（Aunt Maggie）每次前来视察地产投资时，总会给小华特带礼物。就在华特大约六七岁的那年，麦吉婶婶送给他一本 Big Chief 牌素描绘图本和一套铅笔。华特瞬间被绘画的世界深深俘获，开始废寝忘食地写生身旁能够看到的一切飞禽走兽。随后发生了一件改变他一生的逸事：镇上一位退休的邻居老人（舍伍德医生，Doc Sherwood）看到小华特展现出的天赋，便出资请华特为自己心爱的一匹马画一张肖像。小华特画完后，老人非常喜爱，当场掏出一枚 5 美分硬币（a nickel）作为报酬，并把画郑重其事地装进相框挂在自家的墙壁上。 这枚五美分硬币在小华特幼小的心灵中引发了天翻地覆的风暴，他当时惊叹道：“原来我的爱好、我的绘画艺术，是可以换来真正的金钱的！”无论这段传奇经历在后世流传中有多少修饰成分，毫无疑问的是，正是从马瑟林农场开始，年幼的华特在潜意识中将“艺术表达”与“商业回报”紧紧锚定在了一起。不过，主持人也特别指出，真实的农场生活绝非纯粹的童话——为了维持生计，全家孩子都必须承担繁重枯燥的体力农活，经济状况时刻处于紧绷状态。然而，华特成年后回忆起童年时，却本能地给这段清苦的日子蒙上了一层浪漫、宁静而美好的滤镜。这种将残酷现实重构成温暖田园梦境的能力，不仅成为了华特一生的心理机制，更预示了他未来把现实世界“迪士尼化”（Disneyfication）的非凡魔力。 - **艺术启蒙**：麦吉婶婶赠送的 Big Chief 绘画本与铅笔点燃了华特的创作执念。 - **第一桶金**：为邻居舍伍德医生画马赚得人生第一笔稿酬（5 美分硬币），确立了他对“艺术与商业能够完美共生”的最初信念。 - **现实与浪漫的滤镜**：虽然马瑟林的生活充斥着艰辛的农田劳作与生计压力，但在华特脑海中它永远是一座无忧无虑的田园乌托邦，这一心理投射日后演变为迪士尼帝国贩卖怀旧（nostalgia）与美好温情的底层密码。 ### [10:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=629s) 告别马瑟林：清晨四点的报童与最初的画笔 沃尔特·迪士尼在密苏里州马瑟林（Marceline）的田园生活其实非常短暂，大约只从四岁持续到八九岁。在真正被现实生活的重担压垮之前，小沃尔特在那里度过了一段宛如田园诗般的无忧童年。然而，对于这个家庭来说，谋生始终异常艰难。父亲埃利亚斯·迪士尼（Elias Disney）不得不将“务农”也列入他长长的商业失败清单中。在沃尔特九岁那年，全家被迫离开马瑟林，搬到了堪萨斯城。埃利亚斯买下了一条《堪萨斯城之星报》（Kansas City Star）的送报路线，开始让全家人没日没夜地送报纸。 这让人联想起商业史上诸多白手起家的商业巨头——比如先锋领航（Vanguard）的创始人杰克·博格尔（Jack Bogle），年轻时也曾当过送报童。沃尔特每天清晨四点就得起床送报，白天在课堂上常常累得打瞌睡，这与他在马瑟林的悠闲童年形成了惨烈反差。但即便如此，他从未放下手中的画笔，而且很早就展现出将艺术变现的嗅觉：他在堪萨斯城为当地的理发店画展示框，理发师每张画要么付给他五分钱（nickel），要么提供一次免费理发，这成了小沃尔特成长过程中最初的零花钱来源。 当沃尔特升入高中时，埃利亚斯又带着全家搬回了芝加哥，这次是投资一家果酱工厂（随后这家工厂也倒闭了）。在芝加哥，沃尔特成了高中校报的漫画创作者。然而高中生活并没有持续多久，随着第一次世界大战爆发，沃尔特退学加入了红十字会，被派往法国担任救护车驾驶员。正是在一战期间的法国，沃尔特染上了终生未戒的严重烟瘾，这也为他日后英年早逝埋下了悲剧的伏笔。 - **童年务工转折**：9岁移居堪萨斯城，负责清晨4点的报纸投递工作。 - **最初的商业变现**：为理发店绘制招贴，换取每次5分钱报酬或免费理发服务。 - **一战经历与健康隐患**：一战末期赴法国担任红十字会救护车司机，染上终生重度烟瘾。 --- ### [12:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=742s) 结识伊沃克斯：广告学徒与“伊沃克斯-迪士尼”的诞生 一战结束后不久，1919年秋天，沃尔特回到了堪萨斯城。当时比他年长八九岁的哥哥罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）正生活在那里。沃尔特下定决心，要以一名真正职业漫画家的身份去闯荡世界。通过罗伊的引荐，沃尔特进入了一家广告艺术工作室做学徒，主要为即将到来的圣诞假期赶制宣传传单。沃尔特在那里苦干了六个星期，然而圣诞节一过，他就被工作室毫不留情地解雇了。 这段短暂的打工经历虽然短暂，却为沃尔特带来了两样受用一生的收获：第一是一份职业资质——只要有人为你做的事情付过报酬，你就可以自称为专业艺术家；第二则是他收获了一位不可替代的联合创始人——工作室里的另一位年轻学徒伍布·伊沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）。 主播将伍布·伊沃克斯比作迪士尼帝国的史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克（Steve Wozniak），而沃尔特·迪士尼则是原初版的史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）。不过相比乔布斯，早期的沃尔特在技术和艺术上更为亲力亲为：他自己就是优秀的动画师、熟练的摄影机操作员，擅长用双手打造机械，深稔企业赖以生存的核心科技与艺术门道；而伊沃克斯则是在作画纯技术上更加登峰造极的天才。 被广告公司双双解雇后，沃尔特提议与其继续四处碰壁找工作，不如两人直接合伙开工作室。于是，他们创立了“伊沃克斯-迪士尼商业艺术家公司”（Iwerks-Disney Commercial Artists Incorporated）。之所以把伊沃克斯的名字排在前面，传闻是担心若叫“迪士尼-伊沃克斯”（Disney Eyeworks），听起来会像一家配眼镜的验光诊所。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: "Iwerks-Disney 创立与被吸收流程" accDescr: "展示沃尔特与伊沃克斯初次创业并迅速被堪萨斯城幻灯片公司全职吸收的历程" subgraph S1["学徒阶段"] A["广告艺术工作室<br/>（赶制圣诞传单）"] --> B["圣诞后被裁员<br/>（收获资质与搭档）"] end subgraph S2["初次创业"] B --> C["成立商业艺术公司<br/>'Iwerks-Disney'"] end subgraph S3["转向动画"] C --> D["拜访客户：<br/>堪萨斯城幻灯片公司"] D --> E["被整体收编为全职员工<br/>接触商业动画广告"] end ``` --- ### [14:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=884s) 堪萨斯城幻灯片公司：动画作为一种技术新物种 虽然招牌上伊沃克斯的名字排在第一位，但沃尔特才是整个业务真正的推动者与销售引擎。他奔走于堪萨斯城大街小巷，为新成立的公司四处拉赞助、推销服务。在拜访潜在客户的过程中，他敲开了一家迅速崛起的新兴企业的大门——堪萨斯城幻灯片公司（Kansas City Slide Company）。 这家公司当时已发展成为全美最大的影院广告幻灯片及电影放映前加播短片广告的制作商。随着全美电影院数量激增、电影市场爆发，幻灯片公司手头的业务多到应接不暇。看到沃尔特登门推销，对方不仅没有签约外包，反而拍板表示：“你们两个很有才华，别搞什么外包合同了，直接来我们公司全职上班吧！”于是，沃尔特和伊沃克斯的第一次创业匆匆画上句号，两人打包加入了幻灯片公司。 幻灯片公司之所以迫切需要他们，是因为公司刚刚开辟了一条全新业务线——制作在电影正片前放映的动画广告短片。沃尔特和伊沃克斯立刻被指派承担这一工作，并双双沉沦于动画这门全新的艺术形式中。对他们而言，动画包含了绘画的一切魅力，却又远超纯粹的美术——它是一门高度依赖摄影机、胶片与一系列机械发明的前沿科技产物。 在当时，动画作为一个产业仅诞生了大约二十年，其规模化生产完全依附于商用胶片摄影机与电影放映机的大规模普及。彼时动画极少作为独立娱乐内容存在，绝大部分局限在广告领域，少数几部独立动画短片也全都在纽约制作。而这恰恰激发了沃尔特的商业野心：油画艺术已有数千年历史，一个来自密苏里州堪萨斯城的穷小子不可能成为世界顶尖的油画家；但动画是一个刚刚起步、门槛极高的小众赛道，只要全力钻研，他完全有可能在短时间内成为全世界最顶尖的动画大师。 --- ### [17:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1068s) 从“欢笑卡通”到 Laugh-O-gram Films 的成立与危机 看准这门新兴技术潜力的沃尔特和伊沃克斯，开始在夜晚和周末借用幻灯片公司的摄影器材进行自主实验。沃尔特独自构思并绘制了几部短片动画，将其命名为“欢笑卡通”（Laugh-O-grams），并私下将它们卖给堪萨斯城当地的一家连锁电影院线，在正片放映前作为幕间短片放映。出乎意料的是，“欢笑卡通”在堪萨斯城大获成功，深得当地观众的欢心。 当时的动画形态极其粗糙简陋：没有配音，没有声音效果，没有色彩，甚至几乎没有任何背景绘制。在这些物理条件的严格限制下，创作者根本无法展开复杂的情节叙事，更谈不上塑造立体丰满的角色。观众无法像后来对待米老鼠、唐老鸭或高飞那样与这些早期动画角色建立长久的情感共鸣。 在缺少声音与故事的情况下，动画能调动的唯一情绪就是幽默，而幽默的唯一表达手法就是滑稽闹剧（slapstick gags）。屏幕上充斥着极度夸张的肢体动作——这与默片时代的电影巨星查理·卓别林（Charlie Chaplin）如出一辙，其核心看点纯粹是生理层面的滑稽，“一个人突然摔倒了，小孩子就会哈哈大笑”。 受本地市场热烈反响的鼓舞，1922年5月，年仅20岁的沃尔特下定决心再次跳槽创业。他创办了“欢笑卡通电影公司”（Laugh-O-gram Films, Inc.），并再次成功说服伍布·伊沃克斯辞职入伙，还从幻灯片公司挖来了另外几位动画师。然而，这次雄心勃勃的尝试很快迎头撞上了行业的逆风：到了1922至1923年间，全美观众对这种缺乏剧情的噱头动画逐渐产生了审美疲劳，动画作为一种新奇玩意的热度急剧降温，整个行业迅速陷入了阵痛期。 - ** Laugh-O-grams 商业模式**：业余时间自制，直接兜售给堪萨斯城本地影院作为正片放映前的加片。 - **早期动画的媒介局限**：无声、无色、无背景，角色塑造空白，完全依靠几秒一次的肢体滑稽噱头（gags）维系观众注意力。 - **1922年 Laugh-O-gram Films 成立**：沃尔特在20岁时拉上伊沃克斯及数名前同事全职创业，却恰逢全美影院对动画“新鲜感”消退的下行周期。 ### [21:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1263s) 20世纪20年代的观影习惯与 Laugh-O-gram 的破产 在电视尚未普及、连广播电台都处于萌芽阶段的1920年代，电影院是美国人获取新闻与大众娱乐的核心场所。据统计，当时普通美国人每年进影院的次数超过40次，这几乎是每周必选的消遣方式（相比之下，如今平均每人每年仅进影院约2次）。当时进影院体验的是一种“内容捆绑包”（Bundle）：除了正片（Feature）之外，还会搭配新闻短片（Newsreels）、杂耍短剧和带笑料的卡通短片（Gags）。 然而，当时针对影院经理的一项行业调查显示，仅有23%的受访者会在捆绑节目中放映卡通短片并表示观众喜欢，该比例在所有填充类备选内容中名列倒数第一。这直接导致沃尔特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）在堪萨斯城创办的 Laugh-O-gram 动画工作室除了在当地略有名气外，完全无法在外部市场打开销路。1923年，Laugh-O-gram 正式宣告破产倒闭。刚踏入社会的沃尔特不仅输光了向亲友借来的贷款本金，还成了一个“破产过一次半”的落魄创业者，步了他父亲商业失败的后尘。面对困境，富有的罗伯特叔叔（Uncle Robert）给了他一句在当时极其受用的建议：“换作是我，我就直接跑路离开这儿。”在信用体系依赖本地熟人社会、尚无跨区域联网追踪的年代，这无疑是最实用的脱困之策。 - 1920年代美国人年均进影院超过40次，当代仅约2次。 - 影院经理调查中，仅23%青睐卡通短片作为捆绑填充内容，市场接纳度极低。 - 1923年 Laugh-O-gram 破产，沃尔特背负亲友债务，在堪萨斯城陷入绝境。 --- ### [23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1385s) 怀揣导演梦闯荡好莱坞与环球影城“潜伏”记 碰巧的是，罗伯特叔叔和沃尔特的哥哥罗伊（Roy O. Disney）当时刚离开堪萨斯城西迁至洛杉矶。1923年夏天，年仅21岁、行李箱空空如也的沃尔特跳上了开往洛杉矶的圣菲铁路（Santa Fe）列车，前去投奔亲人并借住在叔叔家。令人难以置信的是，沃尔特最初来到好莱坞时其实彻底放弃了动画——他自认动画起步太晚，比不过纽约动画圈的水平，因此抱有一种盲目自大的野心：毫无长片导演经验的他，打算直接在好莱坞大制片厂谋得一份实景电影导演差事，成为下一个 D·W·格里菲斯（D.W. Griffith）。 为了混入制片厂，沃尔特印制了假名片，声称自己是“环球影业堪萨斯城代表处”的人员。由于远隔千里无人查证，他凭借假名片骗过前台保安，顺利溜进了环球影城片场。沃尔特在片场里闲逛观摩了整整一天，贪婪地吸收关于电影拍摄与制作流程的一切细节。接下来的几天，他试图以“我曾为环球工作且现已掌握经验”为由上门求职，但好莱坞各大制片厂对这个毛头小子毫不买账。在求职无门且口袋彻底掏空后，沃尔特只能感慨：“当一切看起来毫无希望时，我重新拿出了我的动画画具。” --- ### [25:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1536s) 《爱丽丝喜剧》：实景与动画结合的技术突破 重回动画行当的沃尔特环顾当时的动画市场，发现唯一具有统治力的大 IP 是由纽约的帕特·沙利文（Pat Sullivan）创作、先锋女发行商玛格丽特·温克勒（Margaret J. Winkler）负责发行的《菲力猫》（Felix the Cat）。 此时沃尔特手头仅存的资产，是他在离开堪萨斯城前制作的一部名为《爱丽丝的仙境》（*Alice's Wonderland*）的混笔样片。这开创了一种前所未有的开创性技术流程：摄制团队先拍摄真人小女孩演员的实景影像，再通过透明赛璐珞胶片将手绘动画覆绘在胶片上，让真人与卡通形象同台互动，形成独树一帜的《爱丽丝喜剧》（*Alice Comedies*）。这种模式还有一个违反直觉的商业优势：真人实景拍摄往往比全纯手工绘制动画更便宜、更快，镜头对着真实世界拍摄能免费获得大量背景细节，画师只需负责在前景中为少数动画角色逐帧绘制，大幅削减了背景画绘制的工时与成本。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 爱丽丝喜剧制作模式 accDescr: 展示爱丽丝喜剧如何将实景拍摄与动画合成并降低制作成本 subgraph LiveAction["实景拍摄"] A["真人小演员表演"] --> B["实拍背景与道具"] end subgraph Animation["手绘动画"] C["绘制动画角色"] --> D["透明胶片叠加合成"] end LiveAction --> E["《爱丽丝喜剧》胶片"] Animation --> E E --> F["相比全动画大幅降低成本与工时"] ``` --- ### [27:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1636s) 1923年合约与迪士尼兄弟卡通制片厂的诞生 沃尔特将样片寄给了纽约的玛格丽特·温克勒，后者看中其创意潜力，决定以每部1500至1800美元的价格向他订购12部《爱丽丝喜剧》短片。主播在探访伯班克迪士尼档案馆时亲自见证了这份关键原件：合同签订于1923年10月16日，甲方为发行方，乙方为居住在好莱坞金斯韦尔大道4406号（4406 Kingswell Avenue）的沃尔特·迪士尼，合同上沃尔特的签名远没有后来迪士尼花体 Logo 那般华丽。 收到好消息的沃尔特冲进医院病房，向正因患肺结核（TB）住院疗养的哥哥罗伊报喜，喊着“我们做成了！我们有生意了！”1500多美元在当时是一笔巨款。罗伊当场办手续出院，表示结核病已经抛到脑后，立刻投入工作。 1923年10月，两人正式合伙成立了“迪士尼兄弟卡通制片厂”（Disney Brothers Cartoon Studio），确立了两人日后的经典分工：罗伊统管商业运营与财务融资，沃尔特专攻创意制作。紧接着，沃尔特写信给留在堪萨斯城的艾布·艾沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）及其他画师伙伴，召唤他们西进加州。如今庞大的迪士尼娱乐帝国，最初正是由这群来自堪萨斯城的年轻人搭建而成。 - 合同签署日：1923年10月16日，订购12部《爱丽丝喜剧》，单价1500至1800美元。 - 公司创始实体：迪士尼兄弟卡通制片厂（Disney Brothers Cartoon Studio）。 - 合作模式：罗伊（财务与商业） + 沃尔特（创意制作）。 --- ### [29:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1794s) 查尔斯·明茨的委托与新角色的酝酿 在1923年至1927年间，迪士尼兄弟制片厂一共制作了57部《爱丽丝喜剧》，凭借“真人+动画”的新鲜感获得了稳定的商业回报。 转折出现在1927年。玛格丽特·温克勒的新婚丈夫查尔斯·明茨（Charles Mintz）逐步接管了发行公司的实际控制权。此时明茨与《菲力猫》的创作者帕特·沙利文关系恶化、矛盾重重。明茨暗中联络了纽约的电影发行巨头环球影业（Universal Pictures），准备背着沙利文秘密开发一个与《菲力猫》竞争的全新角色——正如当今科技界“一边采购英伟达芯片，一边秘密研发自研芯片”的操作。 明茨随即找上沃尔特·迪士尼，向他下达了新任务：打造一部风格类似《菲力猫》但又必须有所区隔的全新动画短片系列。为了避免被指责抄袭，“至少不能是一只猫”。沃尔特由此开始带领团队绞尽脑汁构思一个既能复刻《菲力猫》魅力、又具有辨识度的全新动物角色。 ### [31:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1891s) 幸运兔子奥斯华的诞生与迪士尼的动画风格变革 华特·迪士尼与天才画师乌布·伊沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）根据发行商的需求设计出了一个全新角色——幸运兔子奥斯华（Oswald the Lucky Rabbit）。它具备了当时黑白动画最容易绘制并被大众喜爱的特征：大量的白色毛皮、一条短尾巴和大耳朵。背靠环球影业（Universal Pictures）庞大的院线发行网络，奥斯华短片一经推出便大获成功，一举成为了环球影业、发行商明茨（Charles Mintz）与温克勒（Margaret J. Winkler），以及迪士尼兄弟卡通工作室（Disney Brothers Cartoon Studio）共同的摇钱树。 奥斯华之所以能迅速脱颖而出，根本原因在于华特与伊沃克斯为卡通注入了前所未有的艺术风格。正如鲍勃·托马斯（Bob Thomas）在传记《Walt Disney: An American Original》中所引述的那样： > “在迪士尼之前，动画片普遍粗制滥造：扁平的二维角色在简陋的背景前做出各种怪诞滑稽的动作。而迪士尼则坚持赋予角色饱满的圆形轮廓和人性化的特征。他希望幽默是从角色的性格中自然流露出来的，而不是单纯依靠离谱的肢体闹剧。” 伊沃克斯拥有不可思议的高产与精湛画技，而华特则具备无与伦比的审美眼光与艺术品位，懂得在何时何地激发这些创意的火花，两人的默契合作让卡通角色真正拥有了能够打动观众内心的灵魂。 --- ### [33:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=1981s) 迁址海伯利安大道：工作室更名与华特的角色转型 随着奥斯华的大火，迪士尼兄弟卡通工作室从当年坎萨斯城的那群草台班子迅速成长为一家拥有约 25 名员工的正规动画制片厂。他们搬到了洛杉矶银湖区（Silver Lake）的海伯利安大道（Hyperion Avenue），建起了一座真正的制片厂大楼。搬迁之际，华特和罗伊决定将原有的“迪士尼兄弟卡通工作室”正式更名为“华特迪士尼影业”（The Walt Disney Studio）。关于更名的原因，坊间流传着两种说法： - **罗伊的主动提议**：罗伊极具商业直觉，认为公司需要建立强大的个人品牌。让观众一眼看出是谁在制作奥斯华至关重要，而华特是无可争议的门面人物、愿景规划者与创意核心。 - **华特的霓虹灯梦想**：华特初到好莱坞时便梦想有朝一日能将自己的名字挂上闪烁的霓虹灯牌。随着新演播室落成，一座写着“The Walt Disney Studio”的标志性霓虹灯牌被高高竖立在海伯利安大道上方（如今该址已被拆除改建成商业街区）。 随着公司膨胀到拥有二十多位画师、创意人员与摄影师的规模，华特的角色也彻底发生转变：他不再亲自负责原画绘制和机位操控，而是升任整个工作室的掌控者。彼时公司的股权结构非常清晰：华特夫妇持有 60% 股份，罗伊夫妇持有 40% 股份。 --- ### [35:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2124s) 查尔斯·明茨的背叛：痛失奥斯华与商业至暗时刻 在纽约掌管发行事务的查尔斯·明茨（温克勒的丈夫）见奥斯华大赚，再度展现出了他在应对《菲力猫》时惯用的狡黠手腕。明茨判定华特如今已经变成了“多余的人”，他认为真正驱动动画产出的只是底层的动画画师。而且致命的是，当年粗心未读合同细则的迪士尼兄弟并未拥有奥斯华的版权——该 IP 的所有权完全属于环球影业。 1928 年初，华特携妻子莉莲（Lillian，此前曾是工作室墨线与上色部门的早期员工）乘火车前往纽约，试图向明茨申请提高每部奥斯华短片的制作酬劳。然而明茨在谈判桌上冷笑摊牌： > “给你涨薪？门都没有。我甚至根本不知道你现在在制片厂还有什么存在的意义。但我这人一向厚道，我愿意让你和你的小作坊继续做奥斯华，但每部片子我们要倒扣 500 美元制作费。” 这相当于直接剥夺了迪士尼工作室的所有利润空间，迫使他们按成本价甚至亏本代工。更狠的是，明茨早在此次会面之前就已经暗中联络了几乎所有画师并单独与他们签署了劳动合同。唯有乌布·伊沃克斯以及极少数两三位画师断然拒绝背叛，选择继续效忠华特与罗伊。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1928年奥斯华版权谈判破裂流程图 accDescr: 展示华特前往纽约谈判遭遇明茨暗中挖角与IP剥夺的毁灭性打击流程 subgraph Negotiate["纽约摊牌 (1928)"] A["华特赴纽约申请提高短片制作费"] --> B["明茨要求每部降价500美元（逼近成本线）"] end subgraph Betrayal["明茨的底牌"] B --> C["明茨暗中私下签约策反除伊沃克斯外的绝大部分画师"] C --> D["奥斯华版权归环球所有，华特手无寸铁"] end subgraph Crisis["迪士尼濒临覆灭"] D --> E["无IP、无核心员工、无客户合同"] E --> F["华特迪士尼影业企业价值归零"] end ``` 华特此时毫无谈判筹码——没有员工劳动合同限制他们跳槽，没有发行渠道，更没有奥斯华的知识产权所有权。几乎一夜之间，华特迪士尼影业的企业价值直接归零。明茨甚至逼迫华特必须先履行完上一份合同中剩余的几部奥斯华动画，华特被迫硬着头皮自掏腰包给这群已签下叛变协议的画师发放薪水，完成了极其屈辱的收尾工作。 - **归宿伏笔：2006 年传奇 IP 交易**：2006 年，刚刚接任迪士尼 CEO 的鲍勃·艾格（Bob Iger）完成了一项堪称体育与娱乐史经典的“球星交易”。当时奥斯华归 NBC 环球（Comcast）所有，而迪士尼手握 ABC 与 ESPN。艾格通过解除著名体育解说员阿尔·迈克尔斯（Al Michaels，周一橄榄球之夜主持解说）的合同并将其放行给 NBC，换回了尘封 78 年的奥斯华版权，让这只兔子重归迪士尼怀抱。 --- ### [40:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2407s) 火车上的灵光一现：米老鼠的构思与赞助商时间 在被明茨彻底洗劫一空之后，华特与莉莲登上了返回加州的漫长火车。面对从云端跌落到负数的破产绝境，华特将这次背叛深深烙印在记忆深处，这促成了日后迪士尼对知识产权所有权几乎偏执般的掌控哲学。 在这列横穿美国大陆的长途列车上，华特从绝望中激发出惊人的灵感，他在速写本上勾勒出了一个全新的卡通角色草图。这只即将诞生的角色不仅将扭转奥斯华带来的毁灭性危机，更将超越时代，成为整个人类文明历史上辨识度最高的文化符号——米奇老鼠（Mickey Mouse）。 随后节目切入当期赞助商摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）及其合作伙伴 BILL（原 Bill.com）的案例介绍。BILL 为超过 50 万家中小企业（即所谓的“Fortune 500 万”）提供现金流运营管理平台。针对企业员工使用 Divvy 企业卡遭遇限额、电汇还款需等待 2 至 3 天导致业务停滞的痛点，BILL 借助摩根大通的嵌入式支付 API 子账本方案，实现基于单个银行账户在各大平台上进行数百万笔实时清算。 ### [42:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2556s) 赞助商插播：J.P. Morgan 与 BILL 的企业支付创新 在深入米老鼠的诞生之前，节目收尾了本期的赞助商案例。J.P. Morgan 与金融自动化平台 BILL 展开深度合作，利用专属的虚拟账户体系（Virtual Account Number），让企业客户在收到付款的瞬间即可同步恢复信用额度，大幅简化了大规模资金接收与路由的处理链路。从实际业务数据来看，这套方案的效果立竿见影：付款入账时间从原先的 2 至 3 个工作日直接缩短至几秒钟，相关客服与查账咨询量骤降 83%，就连 BILL 内部的资金团队每周都能省下 20 个小时的人工对账时间。在过去几十年里，这种顶尖的金融基础设施往往是《财富》500 强企业的专属特权，而 BILL 与 J.P. Morgan 的合作将其下沉普及到了数以百万计的中小企业群体。两位主播随后提到，他们将在今年 9 月与 J.P. Morgan 一同登上在圣何塞举办的 WeAreDevelopers 开发者世界大会的舞台。 ### [43:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2607s) 奥斯华危机与米老鼠的诞生：神话与现实 当沃尔特·迪士尼在纽约遭遇查尔斯·明茨（Charles Mintz）的背叛、惨痛失去幸运兔奥斯华（Oswald the Lucky Rabbit）的版权与核心团队后，迪士尼工作室被逼入了生死绝境。在大众熟知的官方传奇版本中，1928 年 3 月，沃尔特与妻子莉莲（Lillian）坐在由纽约返回洛杉矶的长途火车上。沃尔特脑中突然划过一道灵感的闪电，构想出了一只追随当时飞行英雄查尔斯·林德伯格（Charles Lindbergh）尝试开飞机的勇敢小老鼠，这就是后来的短片《疯狂的飞机》（*Plane Crazy*）。沃尔特兴奋地把草图展示给妻子，并打算给它起名叫“莫蒂默”（Mortimer），但莉莲觉得这个名字过于古板傲慢，提议改叫“米奇”（Mickey），米老鼠便就此诞生。沃尔特后来还煞有介事地回忆，自己在堪萨斯城画画时就对老鼠情有独钟，因为总有小老鼠跳进他的垃圾桶。 然而正如 Neal Gabler 在传记中所揭示的那样，真实的商业幕后远没有这么浪漫。沃尔特当时满头大汗、心急如焚地回到洛杉矶，拉上哥哥罗伊（Roy）以及极少数留守的忠诚画师，躲在工作室里疯狂头脑风暴，拼命寻找能够替代奥斯华、挽救工作室命运的新形象。从造型上看，米奇的基因与奥斯华一脉相承：只要把奥斯华的长耳朵改短成两个圆耳朵，保留标志性的白脸与黑色外轮廓，就成了米老鼠。当年创造奥斯华的简报是“抄菲力猫（Felix the Cat）但做点不一样的”，而这次的简报则是“照着奥斯华画一个差不多的，但务必确保这次版权绝对握在我们自己手里”。实际上，真正亲手勾勒出第一张米老鼠形象并在此后担纲几乎整套初期米老鼠系列（包括《威利号汽船》）核心主力画师的，是沃尔特不可替代的挚友与动画天才乌布·伊沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）。 - **神话版本**：1928 年 3 月归途火车上的神来之笔，原名 Mortimer Mouse，由妻子莉莲建议改为 Mickey Mouse。 - **真实幕后**：工作室绝境之下的团队头脑风暴，造型本质上是对奥斯华形态的演进与改良，真正动笔确立形象的主力画师为乌布·伊沃克斯。 - **核心诉求**：彻底吸取失去奥斯华的惨痛教训——创作属于自己的新 IP，并且“必须誓死拥有其所有权”。 ### [45:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2740s) 商业困局与降维打击：从无声试映碰壁到“同步声音” 到了 1928 年夏天，迪士尼工作室完成了奥斯华合同的遗留工作，并秘密制作完成了最初的两部米奇无声短片：《疯狂的飞机》（*Plane Crazy*）与《飞奔的高乔人》（*The Gallopin' Gaucho*）。沃尔特满怀信心地带着成片拜访各大纽约发行商，当时迪士尼在业内已小有名气，他原以为这会是一个极具潜力的新 IP。然而，发行商们反应冷淡，无一表现出收购意愿。发行商的态度很现实：米奇看起来就像是换汤不换药的奥斯华，但它背后并没有奥斯华那成千上万现成的狂热观众，没有任何卖点能说服他们冒险发行。 正当团队陷入困境时，团队成员提到了前一年秋天引爆影坛的划时代电影——1927 年上映的影史第一部有声故事片《爵士歌手》（*The Jazz Singer*）。大家回忆起去影院观影时，正片前曾加映过一部动画短片。沃尔特敏锐的商业与艺术嗅觉瞬间被点燃，将“动画片”与“声音”两件事无缝结合在一起，高喊道：“就是这个！停下所有无声动画的制作，全面转向声音！”当时市场上并非没有人做过带音乐背景的动画，但那只是简单的声画附着；沃尔特所构想的是真正的**同步声音（Synchronized Sound）**——画面中的物理运动与声音产生严丝合缝的帧级对应，米奇撞上障碍物时，乐池里的木琴恰好在那个重拍上发声，让观众产生“声音是由画面中的动作所发出”的绝妙错觉。两位主播指出，这里蕴含着极其深刻的商业战略启示：当你作为后来者试图与占尽渠道、品牌与受众优势的存量霸主竞争时，仅仅做一个模仿品毫无胜算，你必须借助全新的技术或颠覆性的平台，以升维的姿态切入，才能完成弯道超车。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 从传统无声动画到同步声音的战略跃迁 accDescr: 展示迪士尼在米老鼠遭遇发行阻力后，通过引入同步声音技术实现产品形态与受众体验升维的决策过程。 subgraph Failure["存量竞争困局"] A["复制奥斯华模式<br/>《疯狂的飞机》等无声短片"] --> B["纽约发行商全面拒买<br/>缺少现有粉丝基础"] end subgraph Innovation["升维技术变革"] C["灵感碰撞：<br/>《爵士歌手》与动画同台"] --> D["革命性构想：<br/>同步声音（Synchronized Sound）"] D --> E["动作与节拍帧级绑定<br/>赋予纸上角色人格与灵魂"] end subgraph Breakthrough["市场突围"] E --> F["打破模仿者定位<br/>开创全新动画娱乐品类"] end B -.->|"被迫寻求根本创新"| C Innovation --> Breakthrough ``` - **市场现实**：若仅延续旧范式，没有现成发行渠道与品牌积淀的独立动画短片在各大发行商眼中不过是二流模仿品。 - **同步声音的定义**：不再是松散的背景配乐伴奏，而是画面动作与节拍音效的精准帧级匹配（例如打击动作对应音符敲击）。 - **核心商业启示**：颠覆在位者的唯一路径在于押注全新技术杠杆，通过正交或升维创新的产品形态重新定义行业标准。 ### [48:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=2913s) 秘密试验与《威利号汽船》的诞生阵痛 认准方向后，沃尔特迅速与独立电影先驱、开发了 Cinephone 有声录音系统的帕特·鲍尔斯（Pat Powers）取得联系，锁定了音频录制设备的支持。回到洛杉矶后，沃尔特与团队制作了一段带有声音同步的原型测试片段，并在工作室放映给他们的妻子和女友们观看。当看到画面动作与声音完美契合的瞬间，现场所有人都被深深震撼。乌布·伊沃克斯后来回忆道，他一生从未在观众席中见过如此强烈的震动，声音赋予了银幕画面破屏而出的生命力，沃尔特更是热泪盈眶地反复喊着：“就是它！我们抓住了！”事实证明，声音对于真人电影来说只是让能说话的人类开口表达，而对于二维手绘动画而言，声音则是赋予非现实形象真正人格（Personality）与情感共鸣的关键使能技术。 为了将这一革命性构想变成现实，迪士尼团队全力打造第三部米奇短片，同时也是影史第一部具备同步声音的动画片——《威利号汽船》（*Steamboat Willie*）。整个制作过程堪称一场残酷的运营梦魇与技术攻坚战。由于当时没有任何现成的声画同步制作工业标准，沃尔特不得不押上自己的全部身家，频繁往返于洛杉矶与纽约之间。为了给管弦乐队打节拍，他们在胶片上绘制了会随着音乐节奏跳动的小球作为视觉节拍器，但纽约傲慢的乐队指挥一开始根本不屑使用这套土办法，结果第一次录音由于节拍脱节全面崩盘，导致沃尔特损失惨重并只能从头再来。但无论过程多么煎熬痛苦，最终成品呈现出的视听冲击力都是无可挑剔的。 ### [51:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3085s) 殖民地戏院的一鸣惊人与保守发行商的短视 制作完成后，沃尔特带着《威利号汽船》满纽约寻找大发行商，然而这群保守的纽约商人依然犹豫不决。他们如同规避风险的风投机构一样，个个赞叹作品的新颖，但又谁都不愿当第一个吃螃蟹的人，坚持要先看到市场公映的测试反馈。沃尔特忍无可忍，决定绕过所有发行中介直接对接终端口碑：他亲自找到纽约著名的殖民地戏院（Colony Theatre）经理，自掏腰包支付了 1,000 美元，买下了让《威利号汽船》作为正片前贴片短片放映的机会。 1928 年 11 月 18 日，《威利号汽船》在殖民地戏院正式公映，作为黑帮剧情片《帮派战》（*Gang War*）的片头短片亮相。然而，正片很快被所有人抛之脑后，这部几分钟的米老鼠动画掀起了席卷全场的狂潮。观众与影评界无不为之沸腾，甚至出现了全场观众起立高呼“我们要再看一遍《威利号汽船》”、拒绝观看后续长片的轰动场面。然而令人哭笑不得的是，即便手握如此爆炸性的公映验证数据，纽约的发行商们依然顽固而短视，他们质疑一次现象级的爆红可能只是短暂的潮流（Fad），怀疑迪士尼能否持续复制这种同步声音的魔法，继续在谈判中犹疑推脱。 - **上映时间与地点**：1928 年 11 月 18 日，纽约殖民地戏院（Colony Theatre）。 - **贴片首映**：作为长片《帮派战》（*Gang War*）的前导短片，沃尔特支付了 1,000 美元包场测试。 - **市场反响**：彻底抢过正片风头，观众起立狂欢要求重播，标志着米奇一战封神与影史同步有声动画时代的正式来临。 - **发行商博弈**：即便现场效果空前，大公司依然视其为不可持续的短命潮流，迫使沃尔特继续在发行权与独立性之间艰难博弈。 ### [53:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3190s) 救生圈糖果的当头棒喝与 Pat Powers 的“甜蜜陷阱” 在纽约商谈米老鼠发行权时，一位发行商随手拿起一包 Lifesavers（救生圈水果硬糖）摔在华特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）面前，冷酷地讽刺道：“公众知道 Lifesavers 这个品牌，他们认识这是什么。但他们根本不知道谁是华特·迪士尼，更没人认得你那只破老鼠。” 这句刺耳的话狠狠刺痛了自负的华特，但他最强大的特质在于：他天生具备工程师般的钻研本能，极度渴望学习并理解事物运作的底层逻辑。哪怕对方态度再傲慢，只要指出了真理，华特也会全盘吸收。他深刻反思并记录下这一刻的顿悟——从今往后，观众只要喜欢一部动画，就必须牢牢记住“华特·迪士尼”这个名字。 为了打破僵局，华特找上了曾任环球影业高管、手握有声电影技术的合作伙伴帕特·鲍尔斯（Pat Powers）。鲍尔斯开出了一个看起来无法抗拒的“优惠条件”：担任迪士尼动画的独家发行代理，仅抽取总票房毛利的 10%。华特以为捡了大便宜，殊不知这只是鲍尔斯精心设计的甜蜜陷阱。就像当年挖走“幸运兔奥斯瓦尔德”的查尔斯·明茨（Charles Mintz）一样，鲍尔斯真正的野心根本不在发行佣金，而是夺取人才与技术。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Pat Powers' Strategy vs Disney's Defense accDescr: 帕特·鲍尔斯试图复制明茨策略挖角伍布·伊沃克斯，但迪士尼已建立起强大的品牌防御体系。 subgraph PowersScheme ["鲍尔斯的算盘"] A["提供 10% 低佣金发行协议"] --> B["掌握 Cinephone 有声技术"] B --> C["1930年成功挖走核心画师 伍布·伊沃克斯"] end subgraph WaltDefense ["华特的品牌护城河"] D["受 Lifesavers 启发"] --> E["片头片尾深植 Walt Disney 品牌"] E --> F["观众忠于米老鼠与迪士尼品牌，而非幕后个人"] end C -.->|"试图架空迪士尼"| G{"结局：计划彻底失败"} F ==>|"品牌认知已牢不可破"| G ``` ### [55:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3315s) 致命背叛的重演与迪士尼品牌的觉醒 1930年，鲍尔斯实施了致命一击：他成功策反并挖走了华特从创业之初最核心的王牌画师——伍布·伊沃克斯（Ub Iwerks），许诺出资为伊沃克斯建立独立工作室打造全新角色。明茨的背叛噩梦似乎全盘重演。 然而结局却发生了戏剧性的大反转。华特早就吸取了惨痛教训：在伊沃克斯离开前的这一年多里，迪士尼已经连续推出了十几部有声米老鼠短片。每一部片子的片头与片尾，都极其醒目地打着“华特·迪士尼动画”（A Walt Disney Comic）的厂牌。 全美观众早已爱上了这只老鼠和迪士尼的名字。即使灵魂画师被挖走，大众也毫不在意，市场上唯一的硬通货依然是米老鼠和迪士尼作品。华特硬生生将自己的名字打造成了动画界的“Lifesavers”。随后，迪士尼果断终止与鲍尔斯的合作，先转投哥伦比亚影业（Columbia Pictures）发行，后又携手联美公司（United Artists）。 ### [56:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3395s) 意外诞生的 IP 飞轮：米老鼠俱乐部狂潮 米老鼠的热度引发了一场席卷全美的狂潮，甚至纯属偶然地为迪士尼催生了一个颠覆性的商业模式雏形——知识产权飞轮（IP Flywheel）。这一切的起点，是加州海洋公园（Ocean Park）福克斯穹顶戏院（Fox Dome Theater）经理的一封来信。 1929年夏天，就在《威利号汽船》上映数月后，戏院经理找上华特表示：每周都有上千名孩子涌进戏院，只为一遍又一遍看米老鼠。他提议成立一个“米老鼠俱乐部”（Mickey Mouse Club），向家长收取入会费，把周末原本冷清或专属于儿童的日场（Matinee）改造成俱乐部专属观影会，既能帮家长托管孩子，又能向全国特许加盟。 华特立刻嗅到了商机，双方将该模式迅速推广至全美各地的影院： - **特许加盟费（Charter Fee）**：各加盟戏院向迪士尼支付 25 美元购买特许经营许可。 - **粉丝变现特权**：入会的儿童和家长获得购买独家周边商品的“特权”，包括定制帽子、徽章、横幅旗帜等。 - **利润分成**：戏院的加盟费与所有衍生品销售利润均与迪士尼按比例分成。 在没有互联网、没有有线电视甚至没有全国广播电视网络的时代，这种传播速度堪称神话：全美迅速建立了 800 家米老鼠俱乐部，会员总数突破 100 万人，规模一度超过了当时的美国童子军与女童军会员总和。影院盘活了垃圾时段，家长得到了清闲，而迪士尼不仅坐收特许费与衍生品收入，更在全美儿童心智中深深植入了米老鼠品牌。 ### [01:00:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3603s) 报纸连环画与 300 美元的衍生品契机 眼见米老鼠俱乐部的奇迹，迪士尼决定在企业层面向全媒介纵深扩张。1930年1月，迪士尼与金氏特稿辛迪加（King Features Syndicate）合作，推出了米老鼠每日报纸连环画。 这项合作的商业逻辑精妙绝伦： - **全球触达**：该漫画每天在美国 60 家主流报纸以及全球 20 个国家同步刊登，每天为迪士尼提供面向超过 1 亿读者的免曝光广告。 - **极致的投入产出比**：辛迪加甚至倒贴版权费给迪士尼。而迪士尼前期的全部成本，仅仅是雇佣一位年仅 24 岁的年轻漫画家弗洛伊德·戈特弗雷德森（Floyd Gottfredson）的薪水——而他这一画就是整整 45 年。 - **文化共鸣**：在大萧条（The Great Depression）笼罩美国的灰暗岁月里，米老鼠被塑造成了一个虽身处困境、面对庞然大敌却总能逢凶化吉的“平民弱者”（Underdog），这种顽强乐观的草根奋斗精神深深抚慰了美国民众。 这套免费的大众曝光机制为米老鼠衍生品帝国的建立铺平了道路。一天，华特走在纽约街头，一名商人拦住他，当场开出 300 美元现金，只为获得米老鼠形象授权，将其印在儿童描红练习册（Writing Tablets）上。当时正值大萧条前夕的工作室缺钱期，300 美元是一笔可观的巨款，华特欣然应允。 这本练习册上市后引发了疯狂抢购，销量惊人。但由于当时只凭口头协议拿了一次性买断费，迪士尼完全无法从暴涨的销量中分得一杯羹。痛定思痛的华特与哥哥罗伊（Roy O. Disney）意识到，衍生品市场蕴藏着金矿，必须寻找最顶尖的专业操盘手。他们将目光锁定在堪萨斯城一位深受华特敬佩的广告人凯·卡曼（Kay Kamen）身上，并在 1933 年与之达成独家授权代理协议，约定前 10 万美元的收入中，迪士尼分得 60%——现代消费品授权帝国的基石就此奠定。 ### [01:03:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=3834s) Kay Kamen 与迪士尼周边授权帝国的爆发 迪士尼与凯·卡门（Kay Kamen）达成的合约是：卡门首先保留通过授权迪士尼品牌和角色形象所赚取的前 10 万美元版税；在此之后，迪士尼与卡门对每一美元的授权收入进行五五平分（50/50）。当时没有人预料到，这 10 万美元门槛之后会涌进何等庞大的财富。两人在节目中强调，至少在商业运作层面，除了沃尔特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）、罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）以及动画师伍布·艾沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）之外，卡门完全称得上迪士尼前五十年历史上“第三重要的核心人物”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 凯·卡门带来的迪士尼商业变现飞轮结构 accDescr: 展现了高质量动画影片驱动周边商品授权，进而反哺动画高额制作费用的正向循环流程。 subgraph CoreIP ["核心 IP 创作与发行"] A["高品质音画同步动画短片<br/>(单片制作成本达 $30,000+)"] --> B["影院上映与联合艺术家发行<br/>(每部预付款 $15,000)"] end subgraph MerchMachine ["凯·卡门周边授权体系"] B --> C["米奇大众狂热与粉丝俱乐部"] C --> D["40+ 家顶级制造与消费品牌合作<br/>(批发价 5% 版税提成)"] D --> E["1935 年全球零售额达 $7,000 万<br/>(批发额 $3,500 万 / 版税 $175 万)"] end subgraph ProfitLoop ["利润分配与再投资"] E --> F["迪士尼与卡门 50/50 分成<br/>(迪士尼年入近 $100 万高毛利纯利)"] F -->|充当资金龙头| A end ``` 卡门接手前，迪士尼的授权业务只是零敲碎打的草台班子——靠沃尔特在街头随机遇到商人签下的几百美元零散协议。卡门介入仅 6 个月，就将周边商品的全球总零售额推到了 600 万美元；短短两年之内（到 1935 年），这一数字直接飙升至每年 7000 万美元，涵盖了全球 40 多家精选的顶级消费品制造伙伴。面对当时对米奇周边近乎饥渴的庞大市场需求，卡门凭借其专业素养、行业人脉与把控力，在极短时间内完成了遍布全球的制造与分销网络搭建。 - **授权利润结构**：7000 万美元为终端消费者的零售总额（Retail Sales）。按照零售端 100% 的加价率反推，批发端收入约为 3500 万美元。卡门签订的合同通常抽取批发价的 5% 作为版税，总版税池高达 175 万美元。由迪士尼与卡门对半平分后，迪士尼每年可净落袋近 100 万美元的几乎纯利润收入。 - **超越电影业务的时间线**：官方迪士尼家族博物馆曾记载“到 1930 年代末，周边版权收入超过电影租赁收入”，但实际上早在 1934 年，衍生品利润就已经在速度和规模上双双碾压了电影制作本身。 - **电影制作与周边的财务悬殊**：当时迪士尼与联合艺术家（United Artists）签订的发行协议中，米奇系列与《糊涂交响乐》（Silly Symphonies）单部短片仅能拿到 1.5 万美元的预付款。然而沃尔特不断追求极致品质，单片制作成本很快飙到了 3 万美元以上，单部影片本身甚至难以仅靠首轮上映回本；而卡门带来的则是每年近百万美元的稳定纯利润水龙头，直接让沃尔特可以不计成本地把钱重新砸回动画的技术创新中。 ### [01:08:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4110s) 英格索尔米奇手表与现代企业的商业新形态 在卡门促成的诸多传奇合作中，最著名的是 1933 年与英格索尔手表公司（Ingersoll Watch Company）的交易。大萧条期间濒临破产的英格索尔获得了米奇形象的手表制造权，那只用米奇双臂充当指针的手表在短短两年内狂卖了 250 万只，一举成为全美最畅销的手表，不仅彻底挽救了英格索尔，也成为商业授权史上的神话（当今 Apple Watch 上的米奇动态表盘正是对该款手表的直接致敬）。 至此，迪士尼演变成了一种前所未有的商业形态。它与同时代的好莱坞传统片厂截然不同：其他片厂专注于真人长片，而迪士尼专注制作高制作水准、音画同步的动画短片；其他动画公司制作粗制滥造的滑稽戏，而迪士尼不仅打造出了风靡全美的“米奇老鼠俱乐部”（Mickey Mouse Clubs），还将商业变现的大头放在了周边衍生品上。这标志着迪士尼商业飞轮的真正诞生。 ### [01:09:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4197s) 拆解“飞轮效应”：物理误读与 IP 飞轮的独特优势 讨论迪士尼的商业模式不可避免地会提及“飞轮（Flywheel）”一词。主播在此展开了一段严谨的技术科普：商业界（自亚马逊和迪士尼开始）口口相传的所谓“飞轮模型”，在物理学上其实是一个用词不当的误称（Misnomer）。在物理学中，飞轮本质上是一种原始的“机械电池”，其功能是储存动能以备后用（类似于机械手表里的发条发力机制）；而商业界真正想要表达的，是一个“具有正反馈闭环（Positive Feedback Loop）、系统某一部件的输入能够放大并为其他部件注入能量的集成系统”。尽管术语在物理层面并不严密，但“IP 飞轮”已成为指代这种闭环商业模式的最佳代名词。 迪士尼飞轮之所以能产生无与伦比的威力和持久生命力，核心在于其 IP 的底层逻辑： 1. **品质与情感纽带优先**：沃尔特早期所有的技术创新与冒险，根本目的都在于创造出极高品质、让观众产生极深情感连接的核心 IP。这一驱动力并非预先设计的商业算计，而是他对艺术品质的天然执念。 2. **动画角色超越真人角色的天然优势**： - **经济利益不会被演员瓜分（价值捕获层面）**：真人电影角色的价值与演员高度绑定，片厂需要支付天价片酬，大量利润被合作明星分走；动画角色（如米奇）则永远属于片厂本身，片厂只需支付动画师薪水。 - **无限的可用性与长青寿命（价值创造层面）**：真人演员会变老、会去世，且演出档期有限；动画角色不仅“永远有档期、永远不衰老”，更能永远生活在“现在进行时”中。相比《星球大战》依赖马克·哈米尔（Mark Hamill）和哈里森·福特（Harrison Ford）等真人演员、或者像真人爆款《大卫·克罗克特》（Davy Crockett）热潮退去后便迅速过时，动画角色能跨越时代、代代相传，避免了真人 IP 依靠不断换角（如《007》詹姆斯·邦德历经六七任演员重铸）来维持生命周期的巨大阻力。 ### [01:14:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4448s) 飞轮的第三个节点：次级媒介与稀缺性平衡 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼飞轮业务模型三步法 accDescr: 展示从核心顶级IP构建，到主力载体最大化发行，再到多媒介协同放大的飞轮机制 subgraph Core ["步骤 1：核心资产"] A["打造真正让受众爱上的顶级 IP"] end subgraph Primary ["步骤 2：主力载体最大化分发"] B["在影院全力铺开达到饱和<br/>不惜代价换取共享文化记忆"] end subgraph Ancillary ["步骤 3：次级衍生网络"] C1["报纸连环画 / 漫画"] C2["周边衍生商品"] C3["米老鼠俱乐部 / 刊物"] end A --> B B --> Ancillary C1 -.->|强化认同而不稀释| A C2 -.->|持续曝光沉淀利润| A C3 -.->|高频触达深化粉丝度| A ``` 在梳理迪士尼商业逻辑时，大卫与本总结出了飞轮运转的核心三部曲： 1. **核心根基**：必须拥有受众发自内心热爱的顶级核心 IP。 2. **最大化主媒介分发**：在核心载体（如影院大银幕）上不惜代价地将影片铺向尽可能多的影院，实现全球饱和式分发。这种策略建立在规模经济之上——既然前期投入巨资追求极致品质，就必须通过铺天盖地的发行将影响力彻底释放。对于迪士尼而言，即使在分发环节做出巨大财务让步也在所不惜，因为一旦某个角色或故事渗透至全美乃至整个英语世界，它就会沉淀为一代人的“共有文化记忆”（Shared cultural memory），进而在后续环节变现。 3. **衍生飞轮节点的协同放大**：将 IP 扩展至漫画、衍生商品、粉丝俱乐部、图书、杂志等次级载体。迪士尼的重要发现在于：次级媒介不仅不会蚕食或透支核心 IP 的价值，反而能持续强化角色认同。如果每天在大银幕上映一部米老鼠短片，观众很快会产生审美疲劳；但如果在报纸上刊登每日四格连环画，受众不仅乐于高频消费，反而深化了对角色的情感连接。 大卫指出，这就要求主媒介与次级媒介之间保持一种微妙的平衡：**核心媒介必须维持极高的品质门槛与稀缺性，而次级媒介则可以全面铺开、全天候触达**。反观当今好莱坞（包括漫威等超英电影）面临的疲态，正是因为在核心大银幕载体上以越来越快的节奏不断推出续集，最终导致观众彻底疲劳。单纯依赖票房的纯制片厂从来都不是一门好生意——制作周期长达数年，风险极高且利润率薄；而迪士尼通过衍生飞轮建立起持久的利润平台后，反倒可以从容地在主媒介上专注创新与品质追求，享受近乎永久性的长尾现金流。 - **衍生媒介的容错率**：两人探讨了“非核心媒介是否允许降低品质门槛”。大卫认为答案基本是肯定的——读者看报纸连环漫画或阅读非正史（Non-canon）的《星球大战》衍生小说时，并不会期望看到如《白雪公主》或正传电影般的传世杰作，这些边角内容即便质量参差不齐，也不会损毁母体 IP 的神圣性，反而会加深核心粉丝的忠诚度。 --- ### [01:18:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4732s) 豪赌新核心：从短片到首部长篇动画电影的疯狂构想 随着沃尔特逐步摸透这套飞轮模式的威力，他得出了一个顺理成章的战略结论：迪士尼必须倾尽全力，投入尽可能多的时间和金钱去打造全新的核心 IP。在此背景下，沃尔特脑海中酝酿出了一个在当时所有人看来都无比疯狂的构想——打造好莱坞历史上第一部全长彩色动画长片：《白雪公主》（*Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*）。 大卫从纯粹的商业资本逻辑分析，认为沃尔特是为了向飞轮中心注入更大的资本与品质杠杆，以便在下游衍生链条中获得爆发式收益。但本补充道，沃尔特身上始终有着纯粹艺术家的执念：随着动画短片的成功，沃尔特越来越频繁地与当时的主流纯艺术界（Fine artists）建立联系，他渴望打破卡通片只是“逗乐滑稽戏”（Slapstick comedy）的固有偏见，实现一场横跨技术与艺术的世纪飞跃。 彼时好莱坞普遍认为卡通角色只能逗人发笑，沃尔特却提出了一个颠覆性的命题：**动画能否做到足够逼真、角色能否塑造得足够深刻，以至于能让成年观众在影院里感动落泪？** 正是这种兼具商业野心与艺术狂想的冲动，催生了《白雪公主》这场孤注一掷的豪赌。 --- ### [01:20:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4853s) 赞助商播报：Vercel 的智能体架构与安全边界 在正式展开《白雪公主》的传奇幕后之前，节目插入了合作伙伴 Vercel 的赞助内容： - **AI 智能体基础设施**：随着软件工程迈入智能体（Agentic AI）时代，Notion、Brex 和 Neon 等公司纷纷采用 Vercel 的 Agent 堆栈向生产环境交付应用。 - **开源框架 Eve**：Vercel 在其年度 Ship 大会上发布了名为 Eve 的开源智能体框架。作为连接其整套 Agent 工具链的核心组件，Eve 被誉为“Agent 领域的 Next.js”，具备强设计规范（Opinionated）、开源且支持全环境运行的特点，将原本需要耗时数周构建的企业级 Agent 缩短至数分钟。 - **内部落地成效**：Vercel 内部全面运行 Eve，其 Data Agent 支持各部门根据权限按需调取分析数据；Sales Agent 让销售管线覆盖率近乎翻倍；其自主 AI 销售代表在年成本仅数千美元的情况下，业绩跻身人类销售排名前 10%。 - **企业私有云与权限管控**：针对各企业高管对数据外泄和 Agent 行为黑盒的担忧，Vercel 支持企业在自有私有云内运行 Agent 与应用程序，确保所有数据与执行动作牢牢锁在企业专属的安全边界之内。 --- ### [01:22:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=4968s) “迪士尼的愚蠢”：全行业嘲讽与两兄弟的财务博弈 在好莱坞历史上，《白雪公主》项目在立项之初就获得了一个著名的行业绰号——“迪士尼的愚蠢”（Disney's Folly，亦被称为“沃尔特的愚蠢”）。本和大卫调侃道，商业史上最伟大的创新往往在早期都被贴上“愚蠢”的标签，正如当年特里普·霍金斯（Trip Hawkins）做《麦登橄榄球》（*John Madden Football*）或是约翰·博格（Jack Bogle）开创先锋领航指数基金时被称为“博格的愚蠢”（Bogle's Folly）一样。 在 20 世纪 30 年代的大萧条阴影下，好莱坞普遍断言长篇动画绝无生路：不仅制作成本令人咂舌，而且业内深信没有哪个观众能在电影院连续看一个多小时闪烁跳动的画卷而不感到头痛或厌烦。 - **空前的财务悬殊**：当时迪士尼制作一部顶级米老鼠或“糊涂交响曲”短片的成本大约在 1.5 万至 3 万美元之间，而《白雪公主》的预算从最初设想的数十万美元一路飙升至数百万美元级别的巨额开销。 - **兄弟决裂的边缘**：主管公司财务的哥哥罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）竭力劝阻沃尔特放弃这一项目，他极其严肃地警告弟弟：这场孤注一掷的豪赌一旦失败，将直接导致整座工作室彻底破产清算。 - **沃尔特的绝地决心**：面对全行业的嘲弄与至亲的反对，沃尔特展现出了近乎偏执的果决。他后来说道，制作《白雪公主》只有一条路可以走，那就是不计代价做到极致，用无与伦比的技术和艺术力量证明全世界都是错的。 ### [01:23:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5033s) 孤注一掷的豪赌：动画长片的工艺解密 面对《白雪公主》前所未有的工程量，华特·迪士尼的选择是彻底孤注一掷（go for broke），倾尽所有资源。正如华特所言，团队在金钱、人才或时间上决不妥协；他们无法预知观众是否会为一部“长篇动画电影”买单，但无比确信观众绝对不会买账一部“平庸糟糕的动画电影”。这必须是一部无可挑剔的杰作，否则整个迪士尼工作室都将彻底崩溃。 制作一部全长手绘动画电影不仅成本极其高昂，更是一项浩大的技术奇迹。节目主持人在走访迪士尼工作室时曾亲身体验过描线与上色环节，深刻体会到了每一帧背后的庞大工作量。动画的本质是通过每秒 24 帧静止画面的快速切换来制造连续运动的幻觉。与真人电影“免费获取现实物理定律”（如物体的挤压与拉伸天然发生）不同，动画师必须凭空构筑所有物理运动规律与可信度，还要让角色充满打动人心的丰富情绪。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 经典手绘动画长片生产流程 accDescr: 展示从故事构思、声音与场景规划、角色建模与原画绘制到描线上色的完整动画生产链路。 subgraph PreProd["前期筹备与声画设计"] A["故事部门<br>(Story)"] -->|故事画板与草图卷轴| B["声音部门<br>(Sound)"] B -->|律表 / 曝光表匹配| C["布局部门<br>(Layout)"] end subgraph ParallelProd["并行美术与角色开发"] C --> D["背景绘制<br>(Backgrounds)"] C --> E["角色模型与实体雕像<br>(Model Sheets & Maquettes)"] end subgraph AnimationFlow["原画与动画工业化流水线"] E --> F["主动画师<br>(Key Frames 关键帧)"] F --> G["加间动画师<br>(Inbetweeners 补帧)"] G --> H["修型师<br>(Clean-up 提炼线条)"] H --> I["赛璐珞描线与上色<br>(Ink & Paint)"] end ``` ### [01:25:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5146s) 从故事板到声音律表：工业级声画同步的发明 整个流水线的起点是故事部门（Story Department）。艺术家们将一张张小草图钉在软木板上构思情节，在故事研讨会上手舞足蹈地表演角色动作、神态与对白。华特·迪士尼本人就是其中的顶级演员，他的现场演绎往往极具感染力。草图串联起来形成“故事卷轴”（story reel），此时整个故事还处于静态草图阶段，修改情节、调整镜头顺序或改动对白都极其容易。 紧接着介入的是声音部门。在配音演员进棚前，团队通常先录制临时配音（temp voice-over）供动画师参考，同时完成配乐的作曲与录制。为了将画面精确对准声音节拍，迪士尼规范了被称为“律表”（bar sheets 或 exposure sheets）的工具。电影被精细拆解到每一帧（frame）、每一个台词音节以及每一个音乐节拍。这种毫秒级的精确映射让动画师在下笔前就清楚角色在第几帧张嘴、何时落地，从而彻底解决了早在《威利号汽船》时期摸索出的声画同步难题。 - **故事部门的灵活性**：在进入原画绘制之前，故事卷轴是唯一能够以极低成本进行全盘删改、镜头重排的阶段。 - **律表（Exposure Sheets）**：打破传统画完再配音的做法，建立基于帧、音节、节拍的三维网格，成为全行业沿用数十年的技术标准。 ### [01:27:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5246s) 虚拟摄影与博物馆级背景绘制 与此同时，布局部门（Layout Department）承担起电影的虚拟舞台调度、镜头取景构图以及场景光影设计。尽管画面中没有实体的演员和摄影机，但布局师必须具备虚构世界的导演思维：想象光线从何处射入、角色在虚构三维空间中如何站位穿梭，并确定虚拟摄影机的运动轨迹。 随后流水线分化为两条平行主线：一边是背景绘制，另一边是角色动画。背景画家在画纸上绘制极具艺术造诣的水彩画，或者在特制的超宽玻璃板上绘制油画。为了支持摄影机跟随角色横向移动的推移镜头（panning shot），许多背景画的尺寸达到 4 英尺宽、8 英寸高。在迪士尼动画研究图书馆（Animation Research Library）中，保存着包含《白雪公主》和《仙履奇缘》在内的无数传世画作，其艺术水准堪比伦勃朗、毕加索或德加的名作： - **恒温恒湿储存库**：迪士尼设立了 11 间安装防紫外线装置、具备温湿度控制的专属档案库，如同现代数据中心般系统化归档每一幅原画。 - **超宽背景面板**：采用长条形特殊画幅，为多层摄影台横向摇移提供足够的视觉空间。 ### [01:29:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5363s) 角色建模与动画流水线的“福特化”分工 在角色动画端，部门首先会制定标准“角色模型表”（character model sheet），提供角色在各种角度下的体态透视，分发给负责同一角色的所有动画师以保证画风统一。模型部门还会雕刻约 8 英寸高的实体石膏雕像（maquette），动画师可以把玩旋转、在台灯下观察阴影受光，获得稳定的立体视觉参考。 动画师绘制时使用铅笔或炭笔在画纸上一帧一帧绘制，反复翻动纸张（flipping）检查动作的流畅度、弹性以及衣服摆动的物理合理性。以 24 帧每秒计算，通常每秒需 12 到 14 张独立画稿，一部 80 分钟的长片仅单图层就需要约 8 万张手稿；若多角色同台，图画量更是成倍激增。面对这种体量，迪士尼彻底重构了生产分工： - **从“连续画法”到“原画/加间法”**：从早期的单人一帧接一帧画完（straight ahead），转变为首席动画师只画核心姿势与关键帧（key frames），由加间动画师（inbetweeners）填补中间过渡帧。 - **修型师（Cleanup Artists）**：高级动画师为了捕捉动势往往快速勾勒出多重草线，修型师负责保留原作的情绪与弹性，用干净精炼的单根线条提炼线稿。 - **艺术生产的工业化转型**：动画制作告别了单打独斗的纯手工工坊模式，转变为类似亨利·福特流水线般的精密协作系统，确保顶尖画师的产能发挥在最核心的艺术刀刃上。 - **赛璐珞技术（Cel Animation）**：1914 年由厄尔·赫德（Earl Hurd）发明的技术，将线稿描至透明赛璐珞胶片正面上，开启了下阶段由墨水与涂料部门完成的复叠工序。 ### [01:33:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5607s) 赛璐珞工艺与流水线分工：描线、上色与“彩虹室” 在 1914 年赛璐珞（cel）技术发明之前，动画师每一帧都必须重画所有线条，不仅背景和角色会因手工微差而在银幕上疯狂抖动（"wiggle all over the place"），而且在经济上也完全不可行。赛璐珞彻底改变了这一点：背景画在一张静态底纸上保持不动，动画师只需重新绘制角色动作。然而到了 1930 年代，随着迪士尼规模的极速膨胀，这一流程演化出了一支庞大的分工军队——而在当时，这支队伍几乎全部由女性组成。 整个生产线分为严密的前后道工序： 1. **描线（Inking）**：观众在银幕上看到的角色轮廓，根本不是原画师铅笔线条的直接呈现，而是描线员极其细致的临摹成果。她们将透明赛璐珞胶片压在动画师的铅笔原稿上，用墨水精准描出每一根线条。这项工作难度极高，容错率极低。 2. **上色（Painting）**：描线完成后，胶片被翻转到反面交给上色师。色彩必须涂在赛璐珞的背面，这样正面的黑色墨水轮廓就能完美遮挡任何可能溢出边界的颜料（比如小矮人的衬衫或米奇的鞋子）。与描线相比，背面涂色相对“宽容”一些。 3. **彩虹室（The Rainbow Room）**：迪士尼专门设立了一个在片场自行调制、生产成千上万种独家颜料的实验室，当时被称为“彩虹室”。《白雪公主》、《仙履奇缘》、《彼得·潘》、《爱丽丝梦游仙境》中所有令人惊艳的经典色调，全都在这里手工诞生。 4. **特效层（Special Effects Layer）**：像小飞侠里奇妙仙子（Tinker Bell）半透明闪烁的翅膀，是用类似喷枪的微型喷漆工具喷涂出来的；小矮人的反光眼镜、魔法火花、荡漾的水波倒影，或是贴近镜头的前景树叶景深，都是由专门的特效层独立绘制完成。 在昂贵且极其耗时的描线和上色之前，制作组会进行**铅笔测试（Pencil Test）**：将纸上的铅笔草稿直接用摄像机逐张拍成粗剪胶片，供沃尔特·迪士尼和主创们检视动作的物理规律是否顺畅、角色的情绪与调性是否准确。这相当于一种高保真原型，能在进入全流程重度投入前及时剔除瑕疵。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 传统手工赛璐珞动画制作流水线 accDescr: 展示从铅笔草稿、铅笔测试到赛璐珞描线、背面涂色、特效添加及最终多层拍摄的完整流程。 subgraph Pre["前期验证与原画"] A["动画师铅笔纸稿"] --> B["铅笔测试 (Pencil Test)<br/>低成本验证动作物理与情感"] end subgraph CelWork["赛璐珞工序 (多为女性技师)"] B --> C["正面描线 (Inking)<br/>透明胶片上精准描墨"] C --> D["翻转至背面上色 (Painting)<br/>彩虹室独家手工调配颜料"] D --> E["特效层处理 (Special Effects)<br/>喷枪半透翅膀、水波、反光"] end subgraph Assembly["拍摄与合成"] E --> F["多平面摄像机 (Multiplane Camera)<br/>分层排布景深拍摄"] end ``` --- ### [01:36:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5788s) 多平面摄像机的工程奇迹：艺术、商业与工程的交汇 为了让动画彻底摆脱扁平感，迪士尼与比尔·加里蒂（Bill Garity）研发出了动画史上划时代的神器——**多平面摄像机（Multiplane Camera）**。多平面摄像机的概念此前已有雏形，伍布·伊沃克斯（Ub Iwerks）在 1933 年离开迪士尼自立门户期间，就曾用旧雪佛兰汽车的零件拼装出一台早期的多平面摄像机（后来沃尔特不计前嫌重新聘请伊沃克斯回公司主管工艺革新）。但迪士尼建造的这台，是影史上首台用于长篇动画电影的庞然巨物。 这台机器庞大到必须独占一整间挑高巨大的厂房，整机高达 10 到 15 英尺（约 3 至 4.5 米），操作员甚至必须爬梯子才能登顶： - **垂直俯拍结构**：一台单幅定格照相机（Still-frame Camera，而非连续走卷的电影摄影机）架设在最顶端，垂直朝下拍摄。 - **最多可达七层平面**：在相机镜头与地面之间，分布着多达 7 个水平滑轨平面。角色赛璐珞片通常放在最靠近相机的顶层，而下方各层则是由多块玻璃板和画纸分离开的背景元素。 - **视差与变焦模拟**：当镜头需要平移时，不同深度的背景板以不同速度滑移，形成逼真的视差滚动（Parallax Effect）；当镜头需要向主角推进时，技术人员会在拍摄每一帧之间，精确计算各层玻璃板向镜头靠近的不同比例速率，手动调整旋钮。 每一帧都需要整组技术人员手动调节所有刻度与图层位置，然后只拍一张照片。这种令人发指的物理精密工程证明，早期迪士尼从骨子里就不是单纯的“艺术与商业”结合，而是**艺术、商业与工程（Art, Commerce, and Engineering）的三位一体**。正是这种对机械物理极限的死磕，为日后迪士尼“幻想工程师”（Imagineers）的诞生埋下了最纯正的基因。全世界仅存的三台多平面摄像机中，一台位于伯班克的迪士尼档案库，另一台则陈列在旧金山要塞区的沃尔特·迪士尼家族博物馆（Walt Disney Family Museum）。 --- ### [01:39:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=5969s) 150 万美元的“白雪公主豪赌”：哥特式大教堂级的人力史诗 当《白雪公主与七个小矮人》（*Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*）在历经整整三年全天候制作最终收官时，总投入攀升到了不可思议的 **150 万美元**（经通胀调整后相当于当时的 3500 万美元，而当时行业内普通动画短片的预算仅约 2 万至 3 万美元）。在长篇动画这个品类甚至根本不存在的年代，开口要这样一笔天文数字，让哥哥罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）每天都在极度恐慌中担心整个工作室会彻底破产——从商业理性来看，罗伊的担忧完全合情合理。 为了维持制作，即便公司已有消费品授权和米老鼠俱乐部的飞轮现金流源源不断涌入，迪士尼仍不得不向美国银行（Bank of America）申请了一笔又一笔贷款。正如传记作家尼尔·盖布勒（Neal Gabler）在书中所比喻的那样，《白雪公主》的规模根本不是在拍电影，而是在用动画建造一座**中世纪的哥特式大教堂**： - **令人震撼的图纸数量**：全片耗费了超过 200 万张草图铅笔稿，最终制作了 250,000 张成品赛璐珞画片。 - **庞大的人员编制**：制片厂的艺术和技术人员一度扩招至 750 人，日夜兼程苦战三年。 - **全套真人参考拍摄**：这完全不同于画一只滑稽的卡通老鼠。为了让角色的动作举止充满真实人类的灵魂与物理重力，迪士尼聘请了全套真人演员身着完整戏服表演所有场景，拍成参考样片供画师反复观摩。饰演白雪公主的女演员甚至戴着特制的“头盔式假发”（Hair Helmet），以模拟动画中与真人比例截然不同的大头身比例。 这不仅是追求精益求精的商业冒险，更是沃尔特对艺术品质的近乎病态的执念（"An obsession with quality"）。最终，这部倾注一切的杰作于 1937 年 12 月 21 日在好莱坞盛大首映。它不仅征服了全球观众，成为影史最伟大的杰作之一，甚至让奥斯卡金像奖组委会为其打破常规，特设了一尊包含一大七小共八座小金人的专属特别奥斯卡奖。 ### [01:42:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6162s) 现象级空前成功：票房纪录、独特的奥斯卡奖杯与《时代》杂志的预言 《白雪公主与七个小矮人》上映后引发的轰动甚至超越了所有人的预期，它不仅是当年的票房冠军，更一举打破影史纪录，成为截至当时人类历史上票房最高的电影——无论是动画片还是真人电影，无出其右。在仅仅 150 万美元的制作成本下，该片首轮公映便斩获了高达 800 万美元的影片租金收入（Rental Revenue）。由于这部动画长片开创了一个前所未有的全新艺术与商业门类，学院在评选奥斯卡时甚至觉得它无法直接塞入既有的“最佳影片”提名，而是专门为华特·迪士尼特制了一座空前绝后的奥斯卡奖杯：一座标准尺寸的小金人雕像，旁边附带着由大到小排列的七座微型小金人。这座奖杯成为了影史绝响，而华特本人此后一生共斩获了 26 座奥斯卡奖，至今仍是史上获得奥斯卡奖最多的人（排在第二位的纪录仅有 13 座）。 不仅观众反响狂热，主流影评界也毫不吝惜赞美之词。《时代》（Time）杂志当时写下了一段极具预见性的著名评语，称《白雪公主》是一部真正的传世杰作，“即使在当今这批好莱坞明星、编剧和导演都已长眠于任何王子的亲吻都无法唤醒的幽冥之后，它仍将在影院中反复上映，深受一代又一代新观众的喜爱”。这番评价不仅完美预示了白雪公主跨越近一个世纪的持久生命力，也提前预告了日后迪士尼最具杀伤力的商业利器——“迪士尼金库”（Disney Vault）周期性重映制度的雏形。 ### [01:44:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6246s) 黑暗童话的改造艺术：性格化的小矮人与飞轮商业设计的雏形 对格林童话原著的解构与重塑，是《白雪公主》取得老少咸宜成功的关键。格林兄弟笔下的原始故事实际上相当阴暗残酷，而迪士尼早期的所有动画长片，无一例外都是将古老的经典童话或民间传说进行大刀阔斧的“迪士尼化”改编。事实上，《白雪公主》最初的定位并非一部纯粹的“儿童片”；相反，它的基调相当具有成人色彩与惊悚感。华特本人历来强调自己制作电影并不是专为儿童服务，但他必须确保儿童也能看得津津有味。 为了冲淡原著的黑暗阴郁氛围，华特团队做出了一个极其关键的创意决策：赋予原本面目模糊的七个小矮人各自鲜明、独特的性格与名字（如糊涂蛋 Dopey、爱生气 Grumpy 等）。这看似是纯粹的剧作手法，但在背后驱动这一决策的，正是已经深植于华特脑海中的商业“飞轮”（Flywheel）思维。如果每个小矮人都拥有迥异的人格特质，消费者与观众就会在角色身上找到投射，迪士尼便能顺理成章地针对不同角色开发并销售庞大的小矮人衍生品系列。直到今天，在迪士尼乐园里依然到处可见佩戴着不同小矮人徽章或服饰的狂热游客。 ### [01:45:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6321s) 好莱坞账目拆解：票房租金、分成链条与还清美洲银行贷款 坊间长期存在一个误解，认为《白雪公主》惊人的票房净利润直接全款资助了华特建造著名的伯班克（Burbank）新片场。但实际审视电影产业链复杂的分配机制与财务报表，事实并非如此单纯。电影从制作到放映横跨三大核心利益方：负责制作影片的制片厂（Studio，即迪士尼）、负责印制拷贝、宣发营销、影院销售和回款物流的发行商（Distributor，如联美或雷电华 RKO），以及终端的放映商（Exhibitor，即各大影院）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 1940年代好莱坞票房收入分配结构 accDescr: 展示电影院售出的每一美元票房在放映商、发行商和制片厂之间的拆分比例 subgraph BoxOffice["票房总收入 (100%)"] Cash["终端消费者购票支出<br/>(1.00 美元)"] end subgraph Split["产业链分成比例"] Exhibitor["放映商 / 影院<br/>(保留 65%)"] RentalPool["影片租金池 (Rental: 35%)<br/>发行商与制片厂按合约分成"] end subgraph RentalSplit["租金池二次分配"] Distributor["发行商 / RKO<br/>(分得 13%)"] Studio["制片厂 / 迪士尼<br/>(最终所得 22%)"] end Cash --> Exhibitor Cash --> RentalPool RentalPool --> Distributor RentalPool --> Studio ``` 在迪士尼档案馆一份极罕见的 1944 年员工版专用年报中，图解了影院票房每 1 美元的真实去向：影院保留 65%，发行商抽走 13%，而制片厂最终只能分到 22%。行业所谓“800 万美元的租金收入”（Rentals），实际上是指影院向制片方与发行方联合交付的 35% 份额，这意味着当时《白雪公主》在终端售出的实际总票房远比 800 万要高得多，甚至可能超过 2000 万美元。 - **制片方真实分得收入**：查阅迪士尼 1940 年极具法律效力的 IPO 招股书可以得知，在上映后的一年零九个月里，迪士尼作为制片厂实际入账的租金收入为 450 万美元。 - **偿还巨额制作负债**：此前为了完成电影，迪士尼向美洲银行（Bank of America）举借了 150 万美元的制作本金，加上累积利息，总债务高达约 230 万美元。 - **现金盈余空间**：在支付院线、发行商、偿还银行全部本息并扣除日常开支后，迪士尼账面剩余的纯利润实际上大约为 220 万美元。虽然在 1937 年这是一笔天文数字，但要支撑华特下一步建造超级新总部的野心，单靠票房依然捉襟见肘。 ### [01:49:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6572s) 飞轮效应狂飙：史上首张电影原声带与两千多个SKU的消费品狂潮 真正让迪士尼公司财务发生结构性跃升并产生滚滚现金流的，是来自飞轮边缘各节点的协同爆发。在《白雪公主》全美大规模公映前，迪士尼便创造了商业史上的一个重大里程碑——人类历史上第一张公开发售的电影原声带唱片（Original Soundtrack）。在当时，既没有家用录像带（VHS）、流媒体，也没有普及的家用电视机，观众一旦走出电影院，没有任何物理介质能将电影中的体验和记忆带回家。除了买个玩具人偶，原声带成为了当时世界上唯一一种能让观众在客厅中“重温整部电影声音体验”的商品，配合朗朗上口的经典旋律，唱片销量迎来空前爆炸。 与此同时，凯·卡曼（Kay Kamen）领导的消费品授权组织展现了令人咋舌的商业机器运转效率。全球市场上瞬间涌入了多达 2,183 种不同的《白雪公主》衍生品独立 SKU，从服装、玩偶到生活日用品应有尽有。《纽约时报》甚至在报道中惊呼：“《白雪公主》衍生产品的销售，或许是引领美国走出大萧条泥潭的一剂良药。”从纯粹的艺术突破、长篇动画电影形态的确立，再到原声带与消费品飞轮的全面闭环，这部电影在所有维度上取得了无可争辩的狂胜。 ### [01:52:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6721s) 伯班克造梦：1200人的动画乌托邦与“每年两部长片”的幻想 《白雪公主》的辉煌胜利赋予了华特·迪士尼狂热的信心，他立刻着手追求下一个宏大梦想：打造一座全行业最顶尖、专为动画艺术家量身定制的“动画师天堂”——迪士尼伯班克制片厂（Burbank Studio），这里至今依然是华特迪士尼公司的全球总部所在地。华特看到《白雪公主》的成功，内心笃定长篇动画具有取之不尽的商业价值，因此必须立刻兴建一套工业化的基础设施来支持超常规扩产。 - **团队规模激增**：在制作《白雪公主》之前，工作室仅有约 300 名员工；在制作高峰期团队迅速膨胀至约 750 人；而全新的伯班克园区规划容量直接设计为容纳 1,200 名以上的动画师与支持人员。 - **不切实际的产能规划**：制作一部《白雪公主》耗费了整整三年心血，但华特自信地认为，凭借新园区无可匹敌的技术基础设施、成熟流程与翻倍的人手，迪士尼能够以极高的工业效率，实现每半年推出一部全新长篇动画电影（即每年两部完整长片），同时还能兼顾大量动画短片的产出。 事实证明，这种每六个月交付一部高质量长篇动画的设想纯属不可逾越的幻想（Pipe dream），迪士尼在随后的历史中从未真正做到过。但华特对这座新园区的构想已然超越了普通的办公建筑，他开始将其视作一个充满理想主义情怀的、自给自足的动画乌托邦。 ### [01:53:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=6811s) 伯班克新园区：40年代的“Googleplex”与北向采光执念 迪士尼在伯班克（Burbank）建立的新制片厂园区，其整体氛围宛如一座大学校园。沃尔特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）自己甚至连高中都没能毕业，更别提上大学了，但他却精心挑选了伯班克这片当时属于洛杉矶郊外荒郊野岭的地块。他渴望远离纽约那些发行商老板们控制的传统电影制片厂体系，为迪士尼打造一片独一无二的世外桃源，把员工凝聚成一支“快活伙伴（band of merry men and women）”，以此挑战看似不可能完成的任务——比如一年制作两部动画长片。虽然沃尔特预想的是技术熟练后能像《白雪公主》一样流水线式快速产出，但他忽略了一个关键定律：未来的每一个新点子都会更具野心、成本更高、需要更多人手。即便只是维持每三年出一副作品的节奏，这座大型制片厂也是必不可少的。 1940年正式启用的伯班克制片厂占地达 51 英亩，设施极尽奢华：拥有运动场、专属餐厅、艺术进修班、按摩服务，顶楼俱乐部甚至还设有日光浴场。这种让人“根本无需迈出园区一步”的自足设计，被主持人形象地比作是“1940年代的 Googleplex”或是医疗巨头 Epic Systems 的园区雏形。 更惊人的是沃尔特在建筑细节上的极致偏执。从卫星地图上看，制片厂建筑与伯班克的城市街道网格呈奇异的角度错位倾斜。这是因为北半球的太阳是在南部天空运行，只有朝北的窗户才能提供最稳定、最柔和且无直射干扰的自然光源（“北向光才是真光源”）。为了给每一位核心动画师提供完美的画图光线，整栋建筑被设计成了类似“CPU散热片（heat sink）”的带鳍分支结构，最大化朝北窗户的面积；它不仅是南加州最早安装中央空调的现代化建筑之一，连百叶窗都是专门定制的，方便动画师毫厘级地微调间接光照。整个园区的规划全部围绕着这栋核心动画大楼展开，这也明确奠定了动画师在迪士尼的绝对核心地位——就像 Google 的工程师、Apple 的设计师或 Microsoft 的产品经理一样，是除沃尔特之外最被捧在手心的皇冠明珠。 然而这种乌托邦式的巨型园区也带来了副作用：相比狭小但紧密的旧 Hyperion 制片厂，新园区各部门被物理隔离，普通基层员工离顶层的沃尔特变得越来越遥远，沟通的隔阂开始悄然滋生。 ### [01:57:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=7031s) 800万美元资金黑洞与《木偶奇遇记》的票房折戟 打造如此庞大的帝国需要天量资本。仅伯班克园区的工程造价就高达 300 万美元，这直接超出了迪士尼偿还美洲银行（Bank of America）贷款后从《白雪公主》净收益中剩下的全部结余。硬件落成后，还需要为新园区招募并供养多达 1,200 名画师与员工（其中包括新增的 450 名动画制作人员）。 为了满足沃尔特同时推进多部电影的宏大野心，他一口气同时批准了三部动画长片上线制作：《木偶奇遇记》（*Pinocchio*）、《小鹿斑比》（*Bambi*）与《幻想曲》（*Fantasia*）。这三部作品风格截然相反： - 《白雪公主》带有传统的暗黑色彩； - 《幻想曲》是伴随古典交响乐的前卫实验艺术小品（vignette）； - 《小鹿斑比》则是追求极致自然的写实画风。 每一部作品都要求全新的技术、全新的团队技能，这意味着极高的研发与生产成本，是在打毫无参照体系的非连续性孤注一掷豪赌。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼1940年财务缺口与资金链危机 accDescr: 展示伯班克园区建设与三部新电影研发带来的800万美元总债务以及资金来源结构 subgraph EXP["资金支出压力（约 800 万美元）"] A["伯班克园区建造费用<br/>300 万美元"] B["三部影片制作前置成本<br/>（负片成本） 500 万美元<br/>Pinocchio / Bambi / Fantasia"] A --> TOT["总资金需求 / 负债：800 万美元"] B --> TOT end subgraph FUND["填补资金来源"] TOT --> D1["美洲银行追加贷款<br/>450 万美元"] TOT --> D2["1940年4月优先股发行（IPO）<br/>净到手约 350 万美元"] end ``` 到1940年初，园区建设加上三部影片累计约 500 万美元的“负片成本”（制作期垫资成本），迪士尼在尚未产生一分钱新收入前，账面就已经背负了 800 万美元的资金黑洞。他们向老债主美洲银行抵押贷款了 450 万美元，所有的回本希望全押在率先公映的《木偶奇遇记》身上。 然而命运开了一个残酷的玩笑。1940年初影片上映时，欧洲已被卷入第二次世界大战的战火。对于高度依赖规模经济的电影工业而言，失去了原本贡献半壁江山的海外国际票房，而庞大的固定制作成本又完全无法事后追溯压缩，其结果是灾难性的。《木偶奇遇记》单片亏损超过 100 万美元；不仅票房惨淡，受战火波及，飞轮效应中的衍生品和音乐周边的海外销售也几乎陷入瘫痪。 ### [02:00:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=7241s) 1940年被迫“IPO”与亨利·福特的诡异警告 在《木偶奇遇记》惨败之后，美洲银行坚决拒绝继续追加任何信用额度。走投无路的沃尔特与罗伊（Roy O. Disney）只能动用他们过去竭力避免的最后筹码：向外界出售公司股权。 1940年4月，迪士尼聘请了投资银行家，发行了总计 387.5 万美元的可转换优先股（convertible preferred stock）。该股票带有 6% 的累积股息条款（cumulative dividend），意味着投资者每年无论公司盈亏都预期能拿到 6% 的保底分红。虽然这笔交易未在全国性证券交易所正式挂牌，属于场外柜台交易（OTC），但这在法律与技术层面上构成了迪士尼事实上的“IPO”。扣除支付给投行的承销手续费后，迪士尼实际进账约 350 万美元，代价是让渡了整整 30% 的公司股权。 这一数学公式惊人地吻合： - 美洲银行贷款 450 万美元 + IPO 净融资 350 万美元 = 刚好填补了 800 万美元的前期赤字洞口。 迪士尼可以说是剥离了自己全部的当下与未来现金流，一次又一次地“押上整座农场”。就在那年夏天，沃尔特拜会了同为美国商业传奇的汽车大王亨利·福特（Henry Ford）。当沃尔特在闲聊中提到迪士尼刚刚做完了这笔公开募股售股时，福特冷冷地留下了一句充满不祥预兆的劝诫： > “沃尔特，如果你卖掉了其中的一部分，那你当初不如把整个公司全卖了。” 福特的警告切中了要害：随着这次优先股的发行，迪士尼历史上第一次被迫成立了正式的董事会，优先股股东在董事会中占据了席位。这意味着从此有了一位代表外部资本利益的董事进驻迪士尼——而这位局外人，显然绝不可能无条件容忍沃尔特那种不计成本、押注未来的狂人艺术执念。 - **伯班克新厂区造价**：300 万美元，占地 51 英亩。 - **员工编制扩张**：为满足生产需要，动画相关员工扩充至 1,200 人（新增 450 名画师）。 - **三部并行电影**：《木偶奇遇记》（*Pinocchio*）、《小鹿斑比》（*Bambi*）、《幻想曲》（*Fantasia*），合计前期制作成本约 500 万美元。 - **1940年IPO细节**：发行 387.5 万美元、附带 6% 累积股息的可转换优先股，让渡 30% 股权，扣除佣金后净入账约 350 万美元。 ### [02:03:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=7395s) 财务困境与等级分化：乌托邦的破灭 到了 1940 年底，尽管此前通过公开发行优先股募集了资金，迪士尼依然深陷严峻的现金流危机之中。在上市之前，华特·迪士尼曾设想过一种超前的“准员工持股制度”——将公司 20% 的股权收益留作年度员工分红池。然而，这项制度仅仅推行了数月，就在财务重压下被迫取消。更激化矛盾的是，面对紧缩的财务状况，管理层选择给极少数顶尖核心动画师涨薪，而伯班克园区其他绝大多数普通画师和员工的薪水则被冻结甚至遭到削减。这种极其悬殊的待遇落差，在动画制作团队内部迅速引发了巨大的怨恨与动荡。 这种局面正是华特“孤注一掷、不惜血本”（shoot the works）商业哲学的惨痛代价。当时迪士尼在《木偶奇遇记》（Pinocchio）上投入巨资，却因二战爆发失去欧洲市场而蒙受巨额亏损；与此同时，华特心中仍有庞大的创作野心，继续借债、融资并押上全部身家。繁荣表象下的债务压迫与管理层的阶层分化，最终彻底击碎了华特一手构建的“大家庭”神话，并将他推向了人生中最黑暗、也永远改变他与公司及动画行业关系的至暗时刻。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼 1940-1941 财务危机与罢工链条 accDescr: 展示了从高额制作成本与二战冲击，到减薪分化，最终引爆画师大罢工的因果流程。 subgraph S1["成本与市场危机"] A["高额制作投入<br/>(木偶奇遇记/幻想曲)"] --> B["二战爆发<br/>丢失欧洲票房市场"] B --> C["现金流极度告急"] end subgraph S2["管理决策失误"] C --> D["取消 20% 员工分红池"] D --> E["薪酬两极分化<br/>(顶尖少数加薪，大众减薪)"] E --> F["银行施压减支与裁员预期"] end subgraph S3["矛盾全面爆发"] F --> G["卡通画师工会 (SCG) 介入"] G --> H["1941 年动画师大罢工"] end ``` - **制作成本削减压力**：根据迈克尔·巴里尔（Michael Barrier）在《The Animated Man》中的记载，1941 年春，在美国银行（Bank of America）与优先股股东的严厉施压下，华特迪士尼制作公司被迫将每周制作预算压缩至 1.5 万美元左右。 - **单片预算腰斩**：华特本人透露，这意味着每部新长片的净成本必须严格控制在约 70 万美元以内，仅为《木偶奇遇记》或同期制作中的《幻想曲》（Fantasia）成本的三分之一。 - **裁员风暴逼近**：由于人工成本占迪士尼总成本的 85% 到 90%，实施如此严酷的紧缩政策，意味着公司必须裁撤超过一半的员工，极大的恐慌情绪在全员中蔓延。 --- ### [02:04:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=7488s) 1941 年动画师大罢工与华特的灾难性演说 1941 年 5 月 29 日，银幕卡通画家工会（Screen Cartoonist Guild，简称 SCG）正式在迪士尼发起行动。过去几年间，该工会已经成功组织了纽约和好莱坞的所有主要动画工作室，此前唯独没有对行业领头羊迪士尼动手。这很大程度上是因为华特此前的乌托邦愿景——高规格的伯班克园区、分红承诺和家庭氛围——曾经切实凝聚了人心；但在现金流枯竭与残酷减薪面前，这层滤镜荡然无存。数百名员工走上伯班克园区外筑起纠察线，高举标语整日游行，标语上写着“白雪公主与 700 个矮人”以及借用小木偶形象写着“我不再受牵线摆布”（no strings on me）。这场震动全行业的罢工持续了长达三个半月之久。 在工会筹备罢工的前夕，华特自负地认为只要自己亲自面向全员发表一场演讲，阐明公司面临的艰难处境与真实立场，所有人就会理解并重新团结在他身边。然而，这场长达近三个小时的训话演变成了一场彻底的灾难。华特在提前写好的讲稿中态度傲慢且严厉：“我对你们这群人的第一点建议是：先把你们自己的家务事打理好。整天干坐着等别人发号施令，你什么狗屁事都干不成。如果你没有取得应有的进步，与其发牢骚抱怨，不如自己做点实事。”他甚至直白地宣称：“别忘了，适者生存、弱者淘汰是宇宙的法则。我才不管你们炮制出什么理想主义的计划，什么都改变不了这一点。”这番话对于刚被降薪的基层员工无疑是火上浇油，以至于工会刊物事后嘲讽道：“华特·迪士尼的一场演讲，为卡通画师工会招募的成员比工会自己宣传整整一年还要多。” 更深层的悲剧在于华特的认知失调。他不愿承认员工的诉求源自公司真实的剥削与内部不平等，而是顽固地认为迪士尼的“家人们”绝不会背叛自己，整场风波完全是由极少数潜伏进公司的“共产主义煽动分子”挑拨离间所致。曾经在海波隆（Hyperion）时期融洽亲密的创作集体，在现代化的伯班克园区彻底退化成了资产阶级与无产阶级尖锐对立的“有产者与无产者”名利场。 --- ### [02:09:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=7756s) 出走拉美、罗伊收拾残局与不可逆的裂痕 罢工持续进行期间，数百名核心员工拒绝工作，在门外抗议，而公司内部还在硬撑着制作同样雄心勃勃的《小鹿斑比》（Bambi）。面对这一不可收拾的烂摊子，华特陷入了极度的抑郁、逃避与愤怒之中。1941 年 8 月，华特抓住契机，接受了纳尔逊·洛克菲勒（Nelson Rockefeller）主管的美洲事务协调办公室（OCIAA）的邀请，率团前往拉丁美洲展开长达 10 周的亲善访问。这次出访在日后催生了《致候吾友》（Saludos Amigos）与《三骑士》（The Three Caballeros）等动画长片，但华特私下里直言不讳地将这次差旅称为“上帝的恩赐”（godsend），因为这让他能够名正言顺地逃离伯班克那场“可怕至极的噩梦”，并将收拾残局的全部重担扔给了哥哥罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）。 在联邦调解机构的介入下，留守的罗伊最终妥协并平息了罢工。迪士尼正式承认了银幕卡通画家工会的合法地位，同意为留任员工加薪，但同时也达成了超过 500 名员工的协商裁员方案，将公司总员工规模从罢工前的 1,200 人大幅削减至 700 人以下。古典手绘动画时期的迪士尼工作室在此次事件后遭受重创，元气大伤。 更重要的是，华特与这家以他名字命名的公司之间的情感纽带被彻底切断了。迪士尼再也不像是他全心呵护的家庭，而变成了一个失控脱轨的庞大机构。据资深动画师唐·拉斯克（Don Lusk）回忆，华特事后亲手列了一份参加罢工的员工黑名单，并冷冷地表示“这份名单上的所有人都对迪士尼不忠，终有一天他们都得滚蛋”。 - **反共立场的激化**：大罢工直接塑造了华特余生极端的反共倾向。二战结束后，华特作为“友好证人”前往众议院非美活动调查委员会（HUAC）公开作证，在没有任何确凿证据的情况下，仅凭道听途说便在听证会上当众指控多名好莱坞人士为共产主义分子，全力推动了臭名昭著的好莱坞黑名单。 - **关于反犹指控的澄清**：由于当时美国及好莱坞的左翼与共产主义运动在犹太社区中有较多参与，华特日后曾附带遭受过“反犹主义”的指责。但传记作家尼尔·加布勒（Neal Gabler）在深度考证后证实，没有任何实证支持华特反犹；播客主理人在耗时近一年的调研中同样得出结论：华特是彻头彻尾的极端反共主义者，但并无反犹证据。 ### [02:13:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8008s) 《幻想曲》的豪赌、Fantasound 惨败与惊人反转 迪士尼在这一阶段接连遭遇了四记重创：首先是二战爆发前欧洲市场的崩溃，直接切断了海外发行收入；紧接着是动画师大罢工；而在内容制作上，华特对《幻想曲》（Fantasia）进行了一场近乎致命的技术豪赌。《幻想曲》不仅制作预算高达 230 万美元（比《白雪公主》整整高出 50%），迪士尼甚至还自主研发并资助了一套名为 Fantasound 的全新多声道立体声电影放映音响系统。然而，昂贵的设备改造成本让影院发行商望而却步，导致该片根本无法进行大规模正常首轮公映。1941 年上映的第一年里，这部耗资 230 万美元的巨作仅收回了 32.5 万美元票房，给本就脆弱的迪士尼财务带来了灾难性的亏损。 令人啼笑皆非的是，这部在当年让迪士尼元气大伤的“票房哑弹”，却在几十年后完成了影史罕见的大反转。到了 20 世纪 60 年代，嬉皮士运动与反主流文化群体重新发掘了《幻想曲》天马行空的交响画卷与迷幻视听体验，使它迅速翻红。如果按照通货膨胀调整后的全球票房计算，《幻想曲》如今高居好莱坞影史票房榜第 24 位。它超越了时代，凭借顶级交响乐录音和超前的声光动画制作，成为了跨越世代的殿堂级艺术杰作。 - **预算与票房惨案**：制作成本高达 230 万美元，首轮公映仅回收约 32.5 万美元。 - **技术先驱代价**：自研 Fantasound 立体声音响系统因放映设备改造成本过高而遭到各大院线抵制。 - **影史长尾奇迹**：经历数十年的反复重映，经通胀调整后的总票房位列好莱坞历史第 24 名。 ### [02:15:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8143s) 二战爆发：片场被征用与转为战时宣传机器 1941 年底，罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）刚勉强平息了画师罢工，珍珠港事件便轰然爆发，美国正式卷入第二次世界大战。与可口可乐、玛氏食品（Mars）或洛克希德（Lockheed）等在战争中迎来业务爆发的美国巨头不同，二战对迪士尼而言是一场彻底的灾难。战争击碎了迪士尼业务飞轮上的每一个节点，核心原创动画 IP 的产出陷入完全停滞。珍珠港遇袭后仅数日，美军便直接进驻并征用了迪士尼位于伯班克的制片厂。军方相中这里的隔音摄影棚来检修防空高炮的光学系统，更关键的原因在于，伯班克制片厂紧邻当时处于高度保密状态的洛克希德“臭鼬工厂”（Lockheed Skunk Works），军方进驻实际上是为保护这一战略要地建立屏障。 大批动画画师被征召入伍，加上《木偶奇遇记》、《幻想曲》以及随后的《小鹿斑比》连续遭遇商业挫败和欧洲市场封锁，迪士尼制作长篇动画长片的意愿彻底跌至冰点。公司在 1942 年被迫叫停了优先股股息发放，同时背负着向美国银行偿还贷款的沉重压力。为了维持运转，迪士尼接下了美国联邦政府的订单，全面转型为战时外包工厂，为政府制作税收宣传片、战争债券认购短片和军事培训材料。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼二战时期的生存与转型路径 accDescr: 展示迪士尼从商业动画停摆转为军工与政府宣传外包的业务变化 subgraph S1["战时外部冲击"] A["欧洲市场断绝"] B["伯班克片场被军方征用<br/>(邻近保护洛克希德臭鼬工厂)"] C["核心画师应征入伍"] end subgraph S2["核心业务停摆"] D["新IP长片研发中止<br/>(木偶奇遇记/幻想曲亏损)"] E["现金流濒临断裂<br/>(暂停股东分红)"] end subgraph S3["外包生存模式"] F["政府军需宣传片与训练教材"] G["启用唐老鸭IP配合征兵募债"] H["微薄但稳定的政府净现金流"] end A --> D B --> D C --> D D --> E E --> F F --> G G --> H ``` 在这批战争宣传片中，迪士尼破例允许政府使用旗下的经典角色，甚至出现了唐老鸭手持步枪作战的罕见画面。但在角色分配上，迪士尼有着严格的品牌红线：米老鼠被小心翼翼地保护起来，远离充满暴力的战场形象，继续维持其正统善良的主角人设；而脾气火爆、战斗欲旺盛且在故事设定中本就是水手的唐老鸭，则冲锋在前充当战时宣传的门面。尽管这些政府合同无法推动动画技术的革新，也无法扩充 IP 库，但政府支付的代工费用至少让公司在战火中获得了一笔微薄但可靠的净利润，勉强保住了企业血脉。 - **片场军用化**：伯班克摄影棚被改造成军用光学系统车间，同时承担洛克希德臭鼬工厂周边的防务重任。 - **角色形象策略**：保护核心形象米老鼠不受战争沾染，由水手设定的唐老鸭挑大梁出演战时宣传。 - **商业模式异化**：从创造长远价值的 IP 飞轮，骤降为依靠政府外包合同苟延残喘的工蜂制片厂。 ### [02:20:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8428s) 绝境中的神来之笔：迪士尼“金库”与七年重映周期 1944 年，战争带来的现金短缺将迪士尼逼入绝境，华特和罗伊不得不构思一个在当时看似不可思议的自救招数：将《白雪公主》重新搬上大银幕。在既没有家庭录像带（VHS）也没有家用电视的 1940 年代，一部电影下映后便会彻底从大众视野中消失，唯一留存的只有锁在迪士尼片库地下室（Vault）里的胶片母带。自 1937 年首映以来，公众已经整整 7 年没有在任何地方看到过《白雪公主》。 这次试水取得了震撼性的商业胜利。迪士尼几乎没有付出额外的制作成本，仅仅花费了几十万美元重新冲洗拷贝并派发给各大影院，1944 年的《白雪公主》重映便一口气斩获了 300 万美元的净票房收入。这次偶然的救急之举，不仅解除了公司的财务危机，更让迪士尼意外发现了长篇经典动画独一无二的生命周期规律：大约每隔 7 年，就会有整整一代完全没在影院看过这部电影的新儿童成长起来。重映不仅不会稀释 IP 的价值，反而能够周期性地向新一代观众完成记忆烙印。 华特在 1951 年《白雪公主》第二次重映时曾精辟地总结道："在过去的八年里，我们的潜在受众增加了 2500 万儿童，他们在 1944 年时要么还没出生，要么年纪太小根本进不了电影院。毕竟，你成为成年人的时间，远比你当小孩的时间要长得多。" 这种因战时财务危机而误打误撞发明的“金库锁闭-定期重映”（Disney Vault）模式，彻底奠定了迪士尼后半个世纪的商业基石。依托于永不过时的童话母题与动画形式，迪士尼构建出其他好莱坞真人电影制片厂无法复制的“时间复利机器”。 - **1944 重映财务奇迹**：边际成本仅数十万美元冲印费，换回超 300 万美元高毛利收入。 - **七年代际法则**：大约 7 年为一个儿童人口更替周期，构成了天然的新受众供给。 - **商业模式定型**：偶然发现的“迪士尼金库”模式，演变成了日后院线轮播与家庭录像带限时发售的核心 IP 变现法宝。 ### [02:23:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8595s) 迪士尼飞轮的第四块拼图：版权库封存与代际循环 在讨论现代迪士尼的节奏时，一个经典的模式清晰可见：2013 年推出《冰雪奇缘》（Frozen），2019 年推出《冰雪奇缘 2》，而《冰雪奇缘 3》定档于 2027 年——六到八年的间隔如同钟表一般精准。如今迪士尼甚至将这种节奏套用在了续集电影上。 至此，迪士尼商业飞轮的完整构架正式成型，包含四个核心支柱： 1. **创造内核 IP**：打造真正引人入胜、能让观众产生深刻共鸣的全新知识产权与角色； 2. **主要渠道最大化发行**：在核心分发载体（如院线）上实现覆盖面与影响力的极致化； 3. **多节点衍生变现**：将 IP 源源不断地输送至尽可能多的盈利衍生节点（商品、图书、音乐等）； 4. **版权库战略重映（The Vault）**：将经典作品存入“保险库”并战略性锁死，每隔大约七年重新公映一次。这种周期既能精准捕捉新成长起来的一代儿童，又不会因过度曝光而稀释品牌价值。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Flywheel with Vault Strategy accDescr: 迪士尼商业飞轮四要素及其运作闭环架构图 subgraph CoreEngine ["核心飞轮引擎"] IP["1. 打造强共鸣核心 IP\n(经典动画角色与故事)"] Dist["2. 主要分发载体极致化\n(院线首轮大规模发行)"] Ancillary["3. 多元衍生盈利节点\n(授权周边、唱片、图书)"] end subgraph VaultCycle ["时间复利机制"] Vault["4. 版权库封存 (The Vault)\n雪藏作品，制造市场稀缺感"] ReRelease["战略性重映 (每 6-8 年)\n捕获新一代儿童，焕活全盘衍生"] end IP --> Dist Dist --> Ancillary Dist --> Vault Vault --> ReRelease ReRelease --> Ancillary ReRelease -.->|资金反哺新创作| IP ``` 正如罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）多年后向《华尔街日报》总结的那样：“我们的产品几乎是永恒的（Our product is practically eternal）。”然而，尽管在战时偶然摸索出了重映这一天才机制，当 1945 年二战结束时，迪士尼公司的处境却堪称凄惨：战时来自军方的委托制作收入瞬间断流，公司飞轮几乎全面停摆；过去数年没有诞生任何具备长远价值的新 IP；最致命的是，沃尔特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）本人经历了罢工与战时管制的打击后，陷入了深深的幻灭与消沉。 --- ### [02:25:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8703s) 复杂系统背后的控制中枢：ServiceNow 赞助支持 两位主持人借由庞大系统的运转逻辑切入赞助商 ServiceNow：当今大型企业在各团队部署了大量的 AI 智能体、模型与 Copilot，但仅仅引入 AI 并不能自动带来结果，关键在于如何让 AI 接入真实的业务工作流、确保安全合规并能够采取实际行动。 就像从未去过迪士尼乐园的人也能想象的那样，乐园的魔力绝不仅仅来自某一个好玩的游乐项目，而是源于全局无缝的体验——精准卡点的花车巡游、精心设计的视线走廊、恰到好处出现的角色人偶。这种看似毫不费力的魔法，背后是控制中心在看不见的地方实时调度数以千计的运转节点。ServiceNow 过去二十余年正是扮演着这样的“企业 AI 控制塔”，为全球超过 85% 的财富 500 强企业提供数百亿工作流与万亿级交易的底层支撑。 --- ### [02:26:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8798s) 战后困境与低成本自救：合集短片、真人电影与外部强敌 战后的迪士尼亟需快速获得现金流以支撑运转，管理层制定的策略是：做成本极低、但可能博取高回报的尝试。他们在动画领域做出了多番挣扎： - **拼盘合集电影（Package Films）**：将多部动画短片打包拼接成一部长片上映，例如《为我谱上乐章》（Make Mine Music）和《米奇与魔豆》（Fun and Fancy Free）。这些拼凑之作反响平平，如今几乎已被大众遗忘。 - **重拾真人与动画混合模式**：效仿早期《爱丽丝喜剧》的做法，推出了《南方之歌》（Song of the South）。然而该片后来被公认充斥着严重的种族主义偏见，迪士尼不仅从未将其放入流媒体或发行家庭录像带，它也完全无法融入商业飞轮。 与此同时，迪士尼在动画领域数十年的垄断地位首次迎来了真正的市场竞争： - **华纳兄弟（Warner Bros.）**：战前便开始发力《乐一通》（Looney Tunes）系列，达菲鸭、猪小弟、猎人埃尔默相继登场；而讽刺的是，其超级巨星“兔八哥”（Bugs Bunny）最初的造型设计者查尔斯·索森（Charles Thorson），正是一位前迪士尼故事部门员工。 - **米高梅（MGM）与汉纳巴伯拉**：1940 年，威廉·汉纳（William Hanna）与约瑟夫·巴伯拉（Joseph Barbera）联手打造了《猫和老鼠》（Tom and Jerry），后来还推出了《摩登原始人》（The Flintstones）。各大好莱坞制片厂全面蚕食动画版图，在战后迎头赶上。 为了消化战后被冻结在欧洲而无法汇回美国的资金，迪士尼被迫在伦敦就地花钱，拍摄了第一部纯真人电影《金银岛》（Treasure Island）。虽然真人拍摄周期短、成本低且票房尚可，但它无法像经典动画那样持续产生衍生品价值，不能为飞轮提供长效动力。此外，工作室还涉足了自然纪录片（如在阿拉斯加拍摄的《海豹岛》），并密切调研新兴的电视媒介，但当时沃尔特认为时机未到，选择暂不涉足。 --- ### [02:29:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=8976s) 豪赌《灰姑娘》与沃尔特的艺术妥协 沃尔特的心始终留在能够挑战极限的长篇动画上，他渴望重回巅峰。然而，面对堆积如山的债务，负责财务的罗伊极力反对重回高风险的长片制作。沃尔特最终下了最后通牒：“如果不让我们重新做动画长片，不如干脆把公司卖掉，我们在这耗着还有什么意义？” 1950 年，罗伊被迫让步，公司额外筹资 200 万美元，立项启动了自 1942 年《小鹿斑比》以来整整八年未曾涉足的全新全长动画长片——《灰姑娘》（Cinderella）。 然而，此时迪士尼的制作哲学已经发生了极其被动且痛苦的妥协。由于严苛的预算限制，他们再也无法像 40 年代初制作《木偶奇遇记》或《小鹿斑比》那样不计代价地反复试错。传奇动画师弗兰克·托马斯（Frank Thomas）回忆道： > “我们比以往任何时候都更加谨慎地规划《灰姑娘》。我们在没有任何服装和布景的情况下，直接在摄影棚里把整部戏用真人先演了一遍，以此来判断镜头是否行得通。沃尔特当时说：‘我们承担不起画完动画再去修改的代价，这一次动画必须一遍就对。’” 这种流程彻底将真人参考颠覆为一种创作“拐杖”：画师们通过转描机技术（Rotoscoping）直接对照真人胶片进行描摹。这导致动画角色的动作显得较为僵硬机械；一旦实拍镜头确定，运镜视角就被死死锁住，画师失去了在纸上凭空创造丰富动态与奢华细节的自由。沃尔特对此感到索然无味，在立项推动后便很少深入参与一线制作。 但从商业角度看，《灰姑娘》取得了惊人的救命战绩： - **制作预算**：约 220 万美元； - **首年院线分成收入**：达到约 800 万美元，体量几乎追平当年的《白雪公主》； - **历史意义**：这是迪士尼自战前以来最大的单笔商业胜利，不仅让公司走出了整整十年的财务泥潭，重振了动画部门的元气，也为迪士尼日后真正的大腾飞铺平了道路。 ### [02:32:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9160s) 《爱丽丝梦游仙境》的预算失控与华特的精神抽离 虽然迪士尼凭借高质量作品稳住了基本盘，这些经典电影至今依然历久弥新，但随后的《爱丽丝梦游仙境》（Alice in Wonderland）却重蹈覆辙——预算严重超支且首轮上映未能收回成本。电影史学家分析，华特制作这部影片很大程度上源于对原著的极高敬意，觉得这是自己必须完成的作品，但他实际上从未真正想清楚该如何改编；原著中一系列互不相连的荒诞小故事极难缝合成一部紧凑连贯的电影，即便其艺术表现力极其惊艳。 在 1951 年的年度财报中，罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）对《爱丽丝梦游仙境》给出了非常值得玩味的评价。罗伊并未把问题全归咎于电影本身，而是将票房不如《仙履奇缘》（Cinderella）归因于大环境——当时电影院的整体上座率低迷。同时罗伊写道，由于该片是制片厂成本最高的长片，预计首轮上映无法实现盈利；但作为经典 IP 资产，它将在未来无限期地持续为公司创造价值。事实证明，罗伊的远见完全正确。然而在这段时期，华特在制片厂的实际参与度却在急剧下降。 --- ### [02:33:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9228s) 铁轨上的痴迷：微缩模型与卡洛伍德太平洋铁路 面对制片厂的重重烦心事，心生厌倦的华特开始把精力投入到全新的狂热爱好中：模型火车与微缩景观（如微缩家具、微缩房屋模型）。在经历了罢工和战争的动荡后，华特陷入了长达数年的精神寻觅期，原有的动画工作已无法带给他往日的热情，他开始本能地从童年记忆中汲取慰藉。华特的家乡密苏里州马瑟林（Marceline）正是因铁路而兴建，火车与美国小镇风情在他的精神世界中扎根极深。虽然华特对外坚称摆弄模型只是下班后放松神经、转移工作压力的消遣，但这项爱好很快演变成了极端的痴迷。 华特与资深动画师沃德·金博尔（Ward Kimball）等人一头扎进了 1/8 比例大型蒸汽火车的圈子——这种火车大到足以让人直接跨坐在车顶上行驶。他不仅赶赴 1948 年和 1949 年的芝加哥铁路展（Chicago Railroad Fair），还深度融入了这个拥有 600 万模型爱好者的庞大群体。在伯班克制片厂的机械车间（Machine Shop）里，华特开辟了自己的工作区，亲手打磨零件组装车厢。机械车间主管罗杰·布罗吉（Roger Broggie）与华特紧密配合，为他手工打造了极其精密的模型列车，罗杰也因此成为了日后迪士尼历史上公认的“第一位幻想工程师”（First Imagineer）。 1950 年，华特的狂热走向了极致：他投入了 5 万美元的巨额个人积蓄（这在当时是一笔天文数字），在自己位于卡洛伍德街（Carolwood Street）的新宅后院里铺设了一条半英里长的微缩铁路，命名为“卡洛伍德太平洋铁路”（Carolwood Pacific Railroad）。为了不破坏妻子的花园，他甚至硬生生挖出了一条长达 90 英尺的人工隧道，并将那台精巧的蒸汽机车命名为“莉莉贝尔号”（Lilly Belle，取自妻子 Lillian 的昵称）。PBS 纪录片中历史学家南希·科恩（Nancy Conn）一针见血地指出：华特当时既无法掌控外部大环境，也无法完全掌控员工和自己的公司，于是他亲手创造了一个微缩世界——在这里，每一个最小的细节都完全受他掌控，完全属于他，且绝对完美。 - **1/8 比例实景模型**：大型载人微缩火车，当时全美拥有约 600 万铁道模型爱好者。 - **50,000 美元个人投资**：华特动用巨额个人流动资金打造后院铁路系统，包含半英里铁轨和 90 英尺地下隧道。 - **迪士尼乐园机车命名传承**：现代迪士尼乐园中的蒸汽机车命名大多致敬了这段历史，包括“Lilly Belle 号”、“Ward Kimball 号”、“Roger Broggie 号”以及“Roy O. Disney 号”。 --- ### [02:38:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9528s) 从旋转木马到 16 英亩空地：迪士尼乐园的萌芽 尽管华特日后在接受采访时总会深情地讲述那个著名的起源故事——他坐在长椅上看着两个年幼的女儿玩旋转木马，思考为什么世界上没有一个能让父母和孩子一起开开心心玩乐的地方——但不可否认，他对铁道模型和实体空间的狂热才是真正的催化剂。 迪士尼乐园的初始设想规模非常小，最早曾被提议命名为“米奇老鼠村”（Mickey Mouse Village）。但华特很快将其更名为“迪士尼乐园”（Disneyland），因为这个构想的核心承载的是他对火车、传统美洲风情和微缩模型的挚爱，而非单一的米奇 IP。受限于地理条件，华特最初将目光锁定在伯班克制片厂园区与河流之间一块仅 16 英亩的狭长空地上。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼乐园起源与 WED Enterprises 孵化流程 accDescr: 展示华特从个人火车爱好受挫到创立独立公司 WED Enterprises 抽调制片厂人才的演变路径 subgraph Phase1["灵感与个人执念"] A["后院模型火车<br/>Carolwood Pacific"] --> B["16 英亩狭长空地规划<br/>初期预算 $1.5M"] end subgraph Phase2["公司阻力"] B --> C["华特要求追加可行性研究资金"] C --> D["制片厂董事会与罗伊·迪士尼拒绝拨款"] end subgraph Phase3["另起炉灶"] D --> E["1952 年成立个人公司<br/>WED Enterprises"] E --> F["从制片厂抽调顶级动画师与机械师"] F --> G["首批幻想工程师入驻伯班克后场<br/>启动实体主题乐园研发"] end ``` --- ### [02:40:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9606s) 董事会否决与 WED Enterprises 的秘密成立 1952 年 3 月，华特正式宣布计划在这块 16 英亩的土地上修建迪士尼乐园，初步预算为 150 万美元。节目主持人调侃道，这正好是“一个白雪公主单位”（与当年《白雪公主》的制作成本持平，若计入 15 年的通胀，实际比《白雪公主》还要便宜）。但随着概念草图逐渐展开——画面中不仅塞进了河流、铁轨，还塞满了各种设想中的复杂游乐设施——华特意识到这块狭小土地根本塞不下他的宏伟构想，于是向公司申请更多经费进行深入的扩展可行性研究。 刚刚从多年债务泥潭中勉强喘息过来的罗伊和董事会对此坚决反对。面对多年动荡的财务状况，华特却要拿钱去投资一个虚无缥缈、甚至无法用清晰商业语言描述的线下公园，这在董事会看来无异于一枚“铅气球”般沉重而荒谬的提议。 公款遇阻后，华特与罗伊商讨出了一条迂回方案：脱离制片厂上市公司（Walt Disney Productions）的束缚，由华特自掏腰包组建一家独立私人公司。1952 年底，这家以华特全名首字母命名的公司正式成立——**WED Enterprises**（Walter Elias Disney）。华特将其作为自己的私人实验室来承载一切“奇怪的个人实验”。随后在 1952 年间，华特开始从制片厂内部“挖人”，将半打顶尖的插画师、动画师和机械师调拨到伯班克园区后场的一栋独立建筑中。华特这种直接将平面艺术创作者拉去造实体乐园与大型火车的领导风格，直接孕育了后来闻名全球的“迪士尼幻想工程”（Walt Disney Imagineering）。 ### [02:42:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9738s) 成立 WED Enterprises：华特的“柯兹上校”时刻 华特·迪士尼在面对全新且未知的挑战时，向来毫不犹豫地把没有相关经验的人推向前线，坚信“他自己能搞清楚”。在 1950 年代初，华特已经享有极高的声誉，但他却因为沉迷微缩模型火车而催生出一个近乎疯狂的新念头——打造一个实体主题乐园。当迪士尼制片厂的董事会一口回绝了这个提案后，华特彻底展现出了类似《现代启示录》中柯兹上校（Colonel Kurtz）般决绝偏执的一面。他在迪士尼园区内成立了一家完全独立的私人公司（WED Enterprises，以其全名 Walter Elias Disney 命名），公开“挖”走制片厂最顶尖的动画师与艺术家，让他们停止绘制动画，转而跟着自己去画图纸、造游乐园。 这一举动在今天看来，极其类似于埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）在多项疯狂事业间的做法；但最大的区别在于，马斯克旗下的公司董事会几乎不会投票反对他，而华特当时面对的是一个真正投下反对票的上市公司董事会。华特成了“马斯克出现之前的马斯克”，宁可自起炉灶也要强推自己的愿景落地。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼乐园选址演变 accDescr: 展示华特迪士尼乐园从伯班克河畔方案被否决到通过SRI调研选址安纳海姆的过程。 subgraph Burbank["伯班克最初方案（失败）"] B1["伯班克制片厂对街狭长地皮"] --> B2["空间严重受限，构想不断膨胀"] B1 --> B3["伯班克市议会否决<br/>拒绝‘嘉年华式狂欢氛围’"] end subgraph SRI_Phase["SRI 斯坦福研究所介入"] S1["华特聘请 SRI 开展量化科研选址"] S2["综合考量：人口增速、高速规划、电视信号地形"] end subgraph Anaheim["最终选址：安纳海姆"] A1["160 英亩橙树林（原选址 10 倍大）"] A2["距离洛杉矶 25 英里<br/>紧邻在建圣安娜高速公路"] end Burbank --> SRI_Phase --> Anaheim ``` --- ### [02:43:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9804s) 伯班克的碰壁与斯坦福研究所（SRI）的神级选址 华特最初计划在伯班克制片厂对面的一小块土地上修建乐园，但很快遇到了两大无法逾越的难题： 1. **面积远远不够**：即使合作的建筑团队想尽各种办法提高空间利用率，华特对“迪士尼乐园”的宏大构想仍在疯狂膨胀，那块狭窄的地皮根本容纳不下。 2. **市政审批碰壁**：伯班克市议会最初给予了临时许可，但在深入了解项目后直接否决了方案，理由是他们绝不希望在河畔出现他们所定义的“嘉年华/杂耍大篷车式的氛围”（carnival-like atmosphere）。市议会显然完全没有理解华特的艺术与沉浸式愿景，但讽刺的是，乐园的真正魔力恰恰在于它彻底颠覆了低俗游乐场的传统形象。 为了解决选址难题，华特做出了一个极具前瞻性的决定：他找来了以承接非常规研究课题而闻名的**斯坦福研究所（SRI，Stanford Research Institute）**——这也是日后孕育出 Siri 的顶尖科研机构。1953 年 8 月，SRI 提交了一份令人惊叹的研究报告。他们不仅考量了未来的人口流动与增长趋势、高速公路建设规划，甚至连**地形对电视广播信号传输的影响**都精密测算在内，因为华特早就预判电视将成为推广和开发迪士尼乐园的核心武器。最终，SRI 将目光锁定在洛杉矶东南方向的奥兰治县（Orange County）安纳海姆（Anaheim）。 虽然安纳海姆当时只是一个连直通洛杉矶的高速公路都还在规划建设中的宁静农业小镇，放眼望去全是大片大片的橙树林，但 SRI 敲定的这块足足 160 英亩的土地（相当于最初设想的 10 倍大），被事实证明是一次无与伦比的完美选址。 --- ### [02:46:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=9978s) 苛刻的个人服务协议与对赌公司的狂人 地皮找好了，宏大的规划确立了，紧接着面临的核心危机就是资金缺口。面对如此庞大的投资，华特必须回过头来迫使迪士尼制片厂买单。哥哥罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）虽然被逼到了墙角，但为了兼顾保护上市公司与满足弟弟的野心，双方在 1953 年 4 月达成了一份极具争议的“个人服务协议”（Personal Services Contract）以及制片厂与私人公司 WED 之间的合作协议： - **成本加成合同（Cost-Plus Contract）**：制片厂委托 WED 设计并建造迪士尼乐园的各项游乐设施，采用成本加成的方式结算。这意味着华特和 WED 在开发环节几乎不承担下行财务风险，由上市公司兜底开销并支付利润差额，相当于拿到了一张“空白支票”。 - **自由人条款与高额薪酬**：华特在继续领取华特迪士尼制作公司 15.3 万美元高额年薪的同时，拥有开展外部独立项目的自由权利。 - **姓名权与周边抽成**：华特主张上市公司使用“华特·迪士尼”这一名字必须给予他个人补偿，最终合同赋予他**所有周边衍生品销售额 10% 的分成**。 - **真人电影的联合投资权**：华特获得了以个人身份与上市公司共同投资真人电影项目的权利，他日后在《欢乐满人间》（Mary Poppins）等影片中充分利用了这一条款获取巨额回报。 华特之所以在商业条款上锱铢必较、竭力积累个人现金，并非出于守财奴般的贪婪，而是因为他需要源源不断的真金白银去填补迪士尼乐园这个吞噬资金的无底洞。正如华特的妻子 Lillian Disney 在 1956 年所感慨的那样：“我一直在担惊受怕，从未感到过安全，从来没有。他总是对我们说我们有多富有、拥有多少财产，但实际上我们手里什么都没有。”华特所有的身家与借款，都被他反复抵押、重新押注到了迪士尼的各项事业之中。 --- ### [02:49:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10177s) 99.95% 的价值爆发与巴菲特的 1966 年神级抄底 从长远的历史维度来看，华特对主题乐园与长片动画商业生命力的直觉是完全正确的。从他 21 岁创立公司到 1966 年逝世，华特倾注了一生心血；然而令人震撼的商业事实是：**迪士尼当今市值的 99.95%，全都是在华特去世之后创造出来的。** 他的商业飞轮模式所蕴含的潜力与跑道，远超他有限的生命长度。 在华特去世前的 1966 年，沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）在运营巴菲特合伙基金（Buffett Partnership）期间发现了这个被市场极度低估的宝藏： - 当时历经迪士尼乐园的巨大成功后，迪士尼全公司的**总市值不到 9000 万美元**； - 公司的**税前利润高达 2100 万美元**，而且手头的现金储备大于全部债务； - 这不仅符合本杰明·格雷厄姆式的“捡烟蒂”深度价值标准，更完全符合查理·芒格所倡导的“以合理价格买入伟大企业”的典范，因为迪士尼已经拥有了独一无二、自我强化的 IP 飞轮效应。 而在 1953 年签约当下，华特的这一套极度倾斜的个人协议在制片厂内部引发了轩然大波。由于利益输送嫌疑与乐园风险过大，上市公司**三名董事愤而辞职**，甚至有股东直接提起诉讼（后因故未能继续推进）。罗伊顶住了巨大的法律与治理压力，用这套复杂的妥协架构，勉强让这艘巨轮在华特的狂轰滥炸下继续前行。 ### [02:51:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10314s) 迪士尼乐园的资金缺口与重返母公司 在迪士尼乐园（Disneyland）最初构想时，它完全不是为了成为日后所谓的商业“飞轮（Flywheel）”而设计出来的。当时迪士尼公司并不想被一个潜在的高风险失败项目套牢，因此最初是通过个人服务合同以及私人实体（WED Enterprises）来推进，基本不存在有意识的“将公司 IP 注入乐园以获取协同效应”的算盘。然而，随着斯坦福研究所（SRI）完成选址调研、项目最终选定在加州奥兰治县（Orange County）阿纳海姆的 160 英亩土地上，乐园的规模和预算开始急剧膨胀，私人资金彻底无法招架。 最初规划阿纳海姆迪士尼乐园时，他们预计需要约 500 万美元（后续实际花费远超该数字）。华特·迪士尼（Walt Disney）不得不重新回到母公司华特迪士尼制片厂（Walt Disney Productions）寻求统筹与绑定。但以母公司当时的财务实力，根本无力单独承担这一天文数字：在 1952 年开始规划时，迪士尼制片厂全年的净利润还不到 50 万美元，乐园 500 万美元的预算是公司年利润的十倍以上。公司最终妥协，愿意将乐园纳入公司体系并出资 50 万美元股权，但剩余的巨额资金必须从外部设法解决。为了避免重蹈以往因背负高额纯债务而举步维艰的覆辙，华特与罗伊·迪士尼（Roy O. Disney）决定寻找能够实现“1 + 1 = 5”的战略级合作伙伴，设立一家名为 Disneyland, Inc. 的合资公司。 - 1952 年迪士尼制片厂年净利润不足 50 万美元，完全无法直接现金兜底 500 万美元的建设成本。 - 公司同意以 50 万美元参股 Disneyland, Inc.，但必须为剩余 450 万美元寻找外部投资与信贷担保。 --- ### [02:53:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10433s) 好莱坞的电视恐慌与华特的“直面公众”战略 为了筹集建设乐园所需的大笔资金，华特做出了当时绝大多数好莱坞传统电影巨头视若水火的举动：全面拥抱电视，主动寻求与全国性电视广播网络合作。当时好莱坞普遍把电视视为抢夺院线观众的头号大敌，正如早期棒球界抵触电视直播一样（当时名言称“广播勾起现场看球的食欲，而电视直接满足并扼杀了这种食欲”）。好莱坞各大制片厂对电视的态度要么是封杀，要么是装作看不见，寄希望于电视热潮自行消退。 华特却在早前去纽约考察了一整周电视产业后得出了截然相反的结论。他敏锐地察觉到，电视不是威胁，而是迪士尼“绕过中间商（影院放映商）、直接进入公众家庭客厅”的最强渠道。此前华特曾为全国广播公司（NBC）制作过一次节日电视特别节目，反响极好，“和蔼可亲的华特叔叔（uncular Walt Disney）”形象深入千家万户。华特意识到电视节目不仅能直接宣传乐园，还能成为撬动电视网出资建园的绝佳杠杆。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼乐园资金与电视合作结构 accDescr: 展示华特迪士尼如何通过电视节目绑定乐园融资，与ABC达成一揽子合作协议 subgraph Capital ["Disneyland, Inc. 500 万美元融资构成"] WDP["华特迪士尼制片厂<br/>50万美元股权"] ABC_Equity["ABC 电视网<br/>50万美元股权"] Bank_Loan["银行贷款<br/>450万美元<br/>(ABC 提供全额担保)"] end subgraph NetworkDeal ["ABC 与迪士尼的一揽子协议"] Show["《Disneyland》电视节目<br/>每年500万美元制作费 (为期7年)"] Control["华特享有完全节目创意自主权"] Concessions["ABC 获得乐园前10年全部餐饮收益权"] Deadline["合同明确定下开业日:<br/>1955年7月17日"] end WDP --> Capital ABC_Equity --> Capital Bank_Loan --> Capital Capital --> NetworkDeal ``` --- ### [02:56:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10600s) 结盟第三名 ABC：破纪录的历史级大单 华特起初带着电视节目与乐园融资打包的方案接洽了实力更强、覆盖范围更广的 CBS 与 NBC。然而这两家收视霸主均拒绝了这种“捆绑销售”——他们乐意签约一部常规电视系列剧，却断然拒绝为华特修主题乐园承担数百万美元的债务风险。此时，排在第三位的美国广播公司（ABC）成了唯一的突破口。 ABC 当时是最新、覆盖加盟台最少、处境最窘迫的电视网络。1948 年至 1952 年间，美国联邦通信委员会（FCC）因技术与政策审查对全美新的电视牌照发放实施了长达四年的“冻结期”。这一冻结意外造就了现有三大广播网的寡头垄断，而与此同时，全美电视普及率从 1950 年的 9% 暴增至 1955 年的 65%。ABC 极度渴望拥有能一举打破 NBC 和 CBS 垄断局面的超级爆款节目。华特利用 ABC 的迫切需求，开出了极其苛刻但 ABC 无法拒绝的条件：要节目，就必须连同乐园一起做，且华特必须拥有绝对的节目内容决定权，合同不得干涉节目制作形式。 ABC 最终不仅同意入局，更签下了一揽子震撼行业的超级合约： - **股权投资与贷款担保**：ABC 向 Disneyland, Inc. 注资 50 万美元股权（与迪士尼制片厂金额及条件相同），并为另外 450 万美元的银行贷款提供全额信用担保，瞬间填补了乐园全部启动资金缺口。 - **创纪录的制作费**：ABC 同意向迪士尼制片厂每年支付 500 万美元的制作费，签署了为期 7 年的播映合同，成为当时电视史上金额最大的节目采购协议。 - **商业交换条款**：作为担保乐园的补偿，ABC 获得了迪士尼乐园开业前 10 年全部餐饮与特许商品零售（Food & Beverage）的利润分成权利。 - **锁定开业日期**：合同在法律层面上将迪士尼乐园的正式开园日期严格焊死在 1955 年 7 月 17 日。 --- ### [03:00:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10845s) 《Disneyland》电视节目引爆全美与飞轮成型 这笔交易最终达成了双赢的奇迹。1954 年秋天，电视系列剧《Disneyland》正式在 ABC 开播。华特将节目巧妙地划分为与乐园对应的主题板块（如明日世界 Tomorrowland、开拓荒野 Frontierland、冒险世界 Adventureland 等），本质上是利用每周黄金时段向全美家庭进行长达一整年的乐园开园“超长幕后预热广告”。 节目一经播出便迅速引爆收视，成为全美仅次于《我爱露西》（I Love Lucy）的第二大热门电视节目，也是 ABC 电视网历史上首个闯入全美收视排名前 25 位的现象级王牌节目。更重要的是，ABC 还允许迪士尼在节目中穿插播放其正在院线上映的最新电影预告片。至此，电视既成了宣传乐园的强力引擎，又成了推动院线电影票房的直接入口，迪士尼商业闭环中的“飞轮”节点以一种前所未有的方式完美嵌合到了一起。 ### [03:01:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=10913s) 电视媒介的飞轮效应与《戴维·克罗克特》的意外爆火 迪士尼以往依靠院线电影与消费者建立连接，频率极低——几年才有一部新长片上映，中间或许穿插几部短片。过去他们虽曾借力报纸连载漫画维持曝光，但电视的出现彻底改变了游戏规则：它以极高的频次直接进入千家万户，构建起前所未有的持续用户关系。1954 年秋季至 1955 年冬，在迪士尼乐园尚未开门迎客之际，迪士尼在 ABC 的同名电视节目《Disneyland》中迎来首个现象级病毒传播时刻。 1954 年 12 月，该节目开播了一部三集真人迷你剧《戴维·克罗克特》（Davy Crockett）。戴维·克罗克特本是 100 多年前在得克萨斯州阿拉莫之战中阵亡的美国历史传奇人物，迪士尼对其进行了高度艺术虚构。全美观众随即陷入疯狂，意外触发了一场威力惊人的商业飞轮： - **浣熊皮帽（Coonskin Cap）狂潮**：成为 1955 年全美儿童人手一顶的必备单品，仅在 1955 年一年就售出惊人的 1,000 万顶。 - **神曲霸榜**：主题曲《戴维·克罗克特之歌》（The Ballad of Davy Crockett）登上美国 Billboard 榜首，唱片狂销 700 万张。 - **周边商品总销售额**：戴维·克罗克特相关周边商品的全零售总额高达约 3 亿美元。 这笔衍生品收益对迪士尼的财务意义极为深远。迪士尼的衍生品特许经营代理人 Kay Kamen 于 1949 年不幸遭遇空难去世，此后迪士尼将所有消费品商业化业务全面收归自营（in-house）。按业内通常的 5% 版税提成、且假定零售价较批发价加价 100% 计算，这 3 亿美元的总销售额直接为迪士尼带来了大约 750 万美元的净版权收入。 更令人震撼的是财务对比：截至 1957 年，把迪士尼历史上所有首轮上映动画长片的正负损益全部汇总，其累计赚取的利润仅刚过 700 万美元。换言之，**仅靠卖浣熊皮帽子和唱片，迪士尼在极短时间内赚到的钱，就超过了公司历史上所有首轮公映动画长片的全部累计利润总和**。而且这一波泼天富贵，偏偏就在迪士尼乐园开业前夕精准砸中。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Davy Crockett Flywheel Impact accDescr: Diagram illustrating how the Davy Crockett TV miniseries drove massive merchandise sales and fueled Disneyland funding. subgraph TV["电视内容引擎 (1954年底)"] A["《Disneyland》节目播出<br/>三集《戴维·克罗克特》"] end subgraph Culture["大众文化狂热 (1955)"] B["浣熊皮帽热销 1,000 万顶"] C["主题曲登顶 Billboard<br/>唱片售出 700 万张"] end subgraph Financial["商业变现与飞轮结果"] D["周边零售总额约 3 亿美元<br/>(自营业务)"] E["迪士尼获 750 万美元分成<br/>(超所有历史动画长片首轮利润之和)"] F["为 1955 年 7 月<br/>迪士尼乐园开业注入强心剂"] end A --> B A --> C B --> D C --> D D --> E E --> F ``` --- ### [03:05:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11103s) 时代风口与合资搭建：Disneyland, Inc. 的资本结构 迪士尼全面押注电视的时机堪称神来之笔。数据显示，美国人去电影院的频次经历了断崖式下跌： - 1920 年代：美国人均每年进影院超过 40 次； - 1947 年：下降至人均约 32 次； - 1956 年（迪士尼乐园开业次年）：锐减至人均每年仅 14 次。 电影制片厂高管对电视的恐惧并非空穴来风，大众注意力正不可逆转地流向家庭电视屏幕。早在 1950 年的电视特别节目实验中，沃尔特·迪士尼便极具先见之明地指出： > “我将电视视为我们拓展全新电影受众的最重要渠道之一。数以百万计的电视观众从不进电影院，还有无数人极少踏足影院。在竞争激烈的今天，我们必须利用电视屏幕及所有其他推广媒介，来扩大我们的潜在观众群。” 沃尔特玩模型火车的个人执念，最终将公司推成了电视巨头，并促成了主题乐园的诞生。为了落实这一工程，多方组建了一家名为 **Disneyland, Inc.** 的合资公司，初始注资与资本结构如下： | 出资方 / 股东 | 初始注资金额 | 股权比例 | 角色与背景 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Walt Disney Productions** | $500,000 | 34% | 迪士尼核心上市公司 | | **ABC** | $500,000 | 34% | 广播电视网合作伙伴；另提供 450 万美元乐园贷款担保，并承诺在预算超支时认购额外 200 万美元 10 年期债券 | | **Walt Disney 个人** | $250,000 | 17% | 沃尔特个人真金白银出资 | | **Western Publishing** | $200,000 | 14% | 长期合作的迪士尼图书出版与分销商 | 在这一架构下，初始筹措的启动资金约为 600 万美元（加上 ABC 的 200 万备用债券，预算弹性最高可到 800 万美元），但整个项目最终实际耗资达到了 **1,700 万美元**。整个乐园的规划建设，则通过合同全权承包给由沃尔特个人 100% 拥有的创意公司 **WED Enterprises**（Imagineering 的前身）具体执行。所有这些棋局，都在为 1955 年 7 月 17 日那个彻底颠覆迪士尼命运与美国人度假方式的开业日做铺垫。 --- ### [03:08:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11288s) “不断精进”哲学与赫伯·莱曼的传奇手绘图 沃尔特在乐园运营上提出过一个著名的理念——“不断精进”（Plusing）。当时绝大多数传统游乐园在开门时便被视为完工定型，沃尔特却将迪士尼乐园视为一个永远处于未完成状态、必须永远持续迭代改进的生命体。他极度痴迷于观察游客在园区内的真实流动路线与行为习惯，强调唯有来自现实的真实行为反馈才是优化体验的根本依据，不能单凭会议室里的拍脑袋和预设立场。 乐园的概念设计在扑朔迷离的融资谈判与 ABC 媒体造势的同期紧锣密鼓地铺开。1953 年 9 月，罗伊·迪士尼即将动身前往纽约与各大电视网高管进行生死攸关的融资谈判，但他们手上连乐园究竟长什么样的一张直观视觉概念图都没有。 沃尔特情急之下，找到了此前曾供职于迪士尼但已离职的传奇插画师赫伯·莱曼（Herb Ryman）。在一个周末，沃尔特将赫伯拉进办公室： - 沃尔特直奔主题：“赫伯，你能在周末画出第一张迪士尼乐园的全景概念图吗？” - 赫伯一脸茫然：“迪士尼……什么玩意儿？” - 沃尔特说：“主题乐园，你得来跟我一起搞这个。” - 赫伯哭笑不得：“可我都不在这儿上班了，我以前在迪士尼干过，但现在已经离职了啊。” - 沃尔特不由分说：“对，但只有你能做这个！” 面对赫伯的追问，沃尔特半开玩笑地反锁了办公室大门，整个周末寸步不离地守在赫伯身边，口述自己脑海中勾勒的所有画面。经过两天的极限奋战，诞生了那幅名垂史册的迪士尼乐园全景手绘图（包含标志性的城堡、山峦、环园铁路、蜿蜒的河流），成为罗伊前往纽约说服 ABC 掏钱的核心销售武器。 与此同时，WED 的团队跑遍全美考察既有游乐园；沃尔特本人也带队前往欧洲，深入考察了哥本哈根的蒂沃利花园（Tivoli Gardens）等地。欧洲乐园优雅的绿植空间、舒适安全的气质深深启发了沃尔特，他下定决心摒弃美国本土传统游览摊位那种脏乱差、充满欺诈与江湖骗子气质的“嘉年华集市感”，打造一个干净、体面、老少咸宜的家庭乐园。随着电视协议锁定了乐园开业必须同步全美电视实况直播的死线，整个团队被推上了一场充满极限挑战的技术与运营狂飙。 ### [03:11:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11512s) 11个月的神速奇迹与沃尔特的“发烧梦境” 迪士尼乐园的工程进度堪称奇迹。尽管部分资料记载建园耗时 366 天，但若仅算实际物理施工时间，前后仅用了短短 11 个月——这仅仅是当年制作《白雪公主》耗时的三分之一。当节目的两位主播回顾整个设计时，直言这一切听起来就像是一场疯狂的“高烧梦境（fever dream）”：一条完美复刻沃尔特童年理想记忆的小镇大街（Main Street）；数条穿行着不同船只的人工河流；在丛林巡航（Jungle Cruise）中破水而出的机械仿生动物；一座宏伟的童话城堡；美洲原住民现场表演的原汁原味舞蹈；甚至还有让三岁孩童也能握住方向盘到处乱撞的驾驶乐园——驰车天地（Autopia）。 为了营造极其安全、宜人的沉浸氛围，团队从各地运来了海量的名贵绿化树木，从松树到棕榈树，景观设计无可挑剔。此外，乐园还平地铺设铁轨，从零打造了一列真正的蒸汽客运火车。这里构筑了一个理想化、极致纯洁、欢快明亮的美国缩影。乐园囊括了明日世界（Tomorrowland）的“未来”、探险世界（Adventureland）与边域世界（Frontierland）的“过去”，以及充满童话的幻想世界（Fantasyland），唯独没有当下（Present）的任何痕迹——让所有游客能够彻底切断现实生活的纷扰，完全沉浸在无忧无虑的美梦中。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼乐园时空与视线隔离体系 accDescr: 展示20英尺隔离土堤如何阻断外部现实，并将乐园内部划分为过去、未来与幻想的时空构造。 subgraph Boundary["外部屏障与边界控制"] Berm["20英尺高人工土堤 (Berm)"] Rail["环园蒸汽火车 (Disneyland Railroad)"] Berm --- Rail end subgraph Themes["乐园三大无现实时空"] Past["过去：小镇大街 / 边域世界"] Future["未来：明日世界"] Fantasy["幻想：幻想世界 / 探险世界"] end External["外部嘈杂世界：商业街区与现实烦恼"] -.->|彻底物理阻隔 / 视线管理| Berm Rail --> Themes ``` ### [03:13:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11614s) 20英尺土堤、视线管理与疯狂的异地制造 乐园施工的第一步，是堆筑一道高大 20 英尺的人工土堤（Berm），迪士尼环园铁路就环绕铺设在土堤之上。土堤的作用不仅是物理隔绝，更是打造了迪士尼 Imagineers（幻想工程师）最为引以为傲的“视线管理（Sightlines）”。即便在阿纳海姆那块相对紧凑的地皮上挤满了风格迥异的区域，游客目光所及之处，也永远只能看到设计师希望你看到的景象；主街的复古怀旧绝不会被隔壁的热带雨林干扰，更不会穿帮看到园区几英亩外现实世界里乱糟糟的汽车露天商业街。 当时阿纳海姆现场甚至连制造游乐设施的厂房都还没盖好，所有设备构件只能在 Burbank 的迪士尼制片厂制造，再装上大卡车千里迢迢运往现场。当时连高速公路都还在修建，卡车全靠走地面普通街道，单程在不堵车的情况下都要开 50 多分钟。施工中期更是意外频发：开挖“美洲之河（Rivers of America）”注水时，由于地质原因，河水瞬间全部渗透渗入地下泥土，几乎面临彻底瘫痪。整个项目的工程造价最终从最初预估的 500 万美元一路飙升到了 1700 万美元。 - **通胀对比**：1700 万美元换算到今天约为 2.1 亿美元。作为对比，2019 年迪士尼打造单一一个“星球大战：抵抗组织崛起（Rise of the Resistance）”游乐项目，据传造价就高达 2 亿至 4.5 亿美元；而当年 2.1 亿美元却建成了整座迪士尼乐园。 - **资金链救赎**：在预算失控飙升的节骨眼上，得益于戴维·克罗克特（Davy Crockett）浣熊皮帽周边的天量大卖，源源不断的现金流为乐园续上了命。 ### [03:15:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11724s) 商业飞轮的银河脑级扩展：65家企业赞助商 除了拼命举债，沃尔特在商业模式上又展现出了“银河脑（Galaxy Brain）”级别的神操作——将企业赞助（Corporate Sponsorships）深度嵌合进乐园的商业飞轮。在开园后的最初几年内，园区里居然涌入了 65 家大型企业赞助商： - **里奇菲尔德石油（Richfield Oil）**：赞助了“驰车天地（Autopia）”。 - **美国银行（Bank of America）**：作为迪士尼的关键金融后盾，赞助了“幻想世界”。 - **两乐并存**：可口可乐与百事可乐当时同在园区拥有赞助点（百事可乐赞助了边域世界的点位；可口可乐直到 1990 年才成为迪士尼独家软饮赞助商）。 - **各大行业巨头**：美国汽车公司（AMC）、圣菲铁路（Santa Fe Railway）、环球航空（TWA，赞助了登月火箭）、孟山都（Monsanto）、康乃馨牛奶（Carnation）、柯达（Kodak）等纷纷入驻。 - **最具传奇色彩的赞助**：全国步枪协会（NRA）。在边域世界的戴维·克罗克特博物馆内设有一个打靶射击馆，射击馆里提供的真实步枪均由 NRA 赞助提供。 ### [03:17:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=11825s) “黑色星期日”：灾难不断的开园日与8300万人的电视直播 1955 年 7 月 17 日，迪士尼乐园迎来了历史性的开园日（媒体与受邀嘉宾预览日），现场一片鸡飞狗跳。原定设施中只有不到一半能正常运转；就在开园前一天，沃尔特甚至还亲自戴上面具在现场给“海底两万里”展馆刷油漆。开园当天，南加州正值酷暑，气温逼近 100 华氏度（约 37.8 摄氏度）。刚铺设完成的沥青路面被高温烤化，不少身着盛装的女嘉宾高跟鞋深深陷入了沥青之中。园内的饮水机虽然安装完毕，但管道工程尚未完工无法出水，饥渴难耐的游客只能掏钱买百事可乐解渴；餐厅的食物很快被吃光；蛤蟆先生狂车记（Mr. Toad's Wild Ride）因电力负荷过大跳闸罢工；原本限载 250 人的“马克·吐温号”明轮蒸汽船被操作员一口气放上去了 500 人，导致船体当场发生倾斜下沉。 原本只发出了 15,000 张邀请函，但因假票泛滥，当天涌入了超过 30,000 人。尽管现场一片混乱，它在传播层面却获得了前所未有的空前成功。ABC 电视台动用了 22 台现场摄像机与庞大的转播团队，完成了当时人类历史上规模最大的一场电视现场直播。 - **惊人的收视奇迹**：全美有 8300 万人守在电视机前观看了这场长达 90 分钟的实况转播。这意味着接近一半的美国人口同时观看了这期宛如“超长广告”的开园秀。作为对比，哪怕是今天的超级碗赛事，也仅有约 40% 的美国家庭收看。 - **全明星主持阵容**：ABC 聘请的三位转播主持巨星分别是阿特·林克莱特（Art Linkletter）、鲍勃·康明斯（Bob Cummings），以及未来的美国总统罗纳德·里根（Ronald Reagan）。 ### [03:20:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12001s) 席卷全美的文化地标与早期的“门票兑换券”机制 过去一年迪士尼周播电视节目的高强度宣传造势，让全美民众认定这是 1955 年绝对不容错过的国家级文化事件。开园首周，乐园便迎来了 16 万名游客；开园仅仅两个月，第 100 万名游客入园；第一年接待游客量达到 360 万人次；到了运营的第二年，年客流量突破 400 万人次——其受欢迎程度一举超越了大峡谷和黄石国家公园，成为全美最热门的公园景观。截至录制时，迪士尼乐园累计接待游客已超过 9 亿人次。 早期的迪士尼乐园采用了一种极其复杂但有趣的商业模式：游客入园时需先支付 1 美元的入园基础门票，若要体验具体游乐项目，则必须额外购买成本的“游乐券票册（Ticket Booklets）”。不同刺激程度与制作规模的游乐项目被划分为不同等级（即后来的 A 到 E 票级），各自标价不同。尽管后来迪士尼彻底取消了这种复杂的票券机制，改用一票制并大幅提升了门票价格，但它在诞生之初便彻底奠定了基调：它彻底脱离了传统粗俗嘈杂的狂欢节嘉年华（Carnival）或露天市集，开创了现代主题乐园的崭新纪元。 ### [03:21:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12078s) 重构游乐园经济学：停留时间与惊人的利润飞轮 斯坦福研究所（SRI）负责迪士尼乐园选址与商业调研的主管哈里森·普莱斯（Harrison Price）曾指出，华特·迪士尼对美式传统游乐园的彻底重构，带来了立竿见影且极具震撼力的商业回报。传统的游乐场环境肮脏、设施杂乱，而迪士尼乐园却极其整洁、安全、令人愉悦。这种环境让游客驻足更久——普莱斯直言，因为华特将人们在园内的逗留时间延长了两倍，乐园的人均消费支出也随之翻了整整三倍。 在当下，这一逻辑被推向了极致：人们去加州迪士尼乐园一天往往待上整整14个小时，而去佛罗里达的迪士尼世界更是会安排一整周的度假行程。如今迪士尼乐园及游轮业务每年产生约360亿美元营收和100亿美元利润，利润率高达近30%。即便在实体游乐业态中，坐拥全球数座度假区和游轮船队的乐园业务，其贡献的净利润也达到了迪士尼影视娱乐部门的两倍之多。 从商业冒险的角度来看，迪士尼乐园在财务上并非一次单纯由华特迪士尼制作公司（Walt Disney Productions）“赌上公司身家”的举动，因为哥哥罗伊·迪士尼通过极其巧妙的法人隔离与合资架构，保护了上市主体不受乐园可能破产的致命冲击。然而，华特押上的却是他在全美公众心中的全部声誉，以及个人的全部身家。为了凑足乐园初期所承诺的25万美元个人出资，华特变卖了位于棕榈泉的度假别墅，抵押人寿保单借出10万美元，并背负了沉重的个人贷款。 - **停留时间即收入**：哈里森·普莱斯的调研揭示了“时间乘以三，人均花费翻三倍”的乐园核心公式。 - **现代乐园印钞机**：乐园与游轮部门年创收360亿美元、获利100亿美元，占公司整体利润的压倒性大头，且坐拥约30%的超高净利率。 - **华特的个人财务豪赌**：出售棕榈泉房产、质押保单并申请个人借款，以履行其在乐园项目中的初始出资承诺。 --- ### [03:24:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12258s) 长达27年的股权与关联交易拆解：从 WED 到 Retlaw 游客走进迪士尼乐园时往往以为园区里的一切自始至终都属于华特迪士尼公司，但事实是，直到开园27年后的1982年，上市公司才真正百分之百买断乐园内的全部资产和权益。乐园初创时由上市公司、ABC电视台、西部出版公司（Western Publishing）及华特个人联合持股。1958年开园三年后，上市公司行权买下了西部出版和华特的股份，持股达到66%；到了1960年，公司手头现金充裕，罗伊便以750万美元买断了ABC的股份，迪士尼制作公司才终于全资控股了迪士尼乐园运营实体（Disneyland, Inc.）。 然而，更大的利益冲突潜伏在承建乐园的承包商——华特独资持有的 WED Enterprises（即日后的迪士尼幻想工程 Imagineering）之中。在华特早期的个人服务合同条款下，WED 竟然直接拥有迪士尼乐园小火车铁路（Disneyland Railroad）和单轨电车（Monorail）的全部所有权，相当于华特把自己后院摆弄蒸汽火车的爱好搬进乐园后，按年金形式从每张乐园游乐票中抽水分成。不仅如此，WED 还全资拥有华特个人的姓名与肖像权，享有高达10%的商品销售版税。 到了1963年，随着乐园大获成功，罗伊愈发担忧公众股东会就如此严重的内部利益冲突提起诉讼。1965年，双方达成妥协，将 WED 拆分为两部分：负责建筑设计的工程部门（Imagineering）被上市公司收购归入体制内；剩余资产则更名为 Retlaw（即 Walter 倒过来的拼写）。在 Retlaw 旗下，华特个人家族依然持有乐园铁路、单轨电车以及10%的姓名版税。这场复杂的关联交易直到1982年华特去世多年后才彻底画上句号——上市公司最终支付了价值4300万美元的迪士尼股票，才从迪士尼家族手中彻底购回了姓名权、单轨电车与乐园小火车的全部所有权。在1953年至1981年间，上市公司仅为乐园小火车和单轨电车就向 WED 及 Retlaw 支付了高达7500万美元的运营款项，并额外支付了4600万美元的姓名版税。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney Land Assets Cleanup Flowchart accDescr: 展现迪士尼乐园资产与WED公司权益在1955年至1982年间逐步被上市公司收回并私有化清理的历程。 subgraph Phase1["1955-1960: Disneyland Inc. 股权回收"] A["1955年合资成立: 上市公司 / ABC / 西部出版 / 华特个人"] --> B["1958年: 收购西部出版与华特份额 (持股达66%)"] B --> C["1960年: 750万美元买断ABC份额 (全资控股乐园运营公司)"] end subgraph Phase2["1965: WED Enterprises 拆分"] D["华特个人公司 WED"] --> E["幻想工程 (Imagineering): 1965年由上市公司收编"] D --> F["Retlaw (华特倒拼): 华特家族保留小火车、单轨与10%版税"] end subgraph Phase3["1982: 彻底统一资产"] F --> G["1982年: 上市公司发行4300万美元股票买断Retlaw全部权益"] end ``` - **全资控股的漫长路径**：从1955年开园到1982年彻底买断，耗时长达27年。 - **独资占有核心游乐设施**：迪士尼乐园最著名的小火车和单轨电车在很长一段时间内属于华特个人，而非上市公司资产。 - **惊人的现金分红与版税**：在1953至1981年近30年间，华特的个人公司仅从小火车、单轨电车以及姓名版税中，就从上市公司收取了超过1.2亿美元的真金白银。 --- ### [03:28:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12505s) 飞轮的终极进化：主题乐园、电视与纽交所上市 电视周播节目与加州迪士尼乐园的双双引爆，使迪士尼的商业引擎全面升格，完成了飞轮模型的“第五个核心要素”。在此之前，迪士尼的飞轮由四大要素驱动：创造极具吸引力的顶级IP、通过大银幕实现最大化发行、衍生授权至所有辅助载体、以及通过“金库系统”进行周期的重映回血。而电视与乐园的加入，彻底改变了IP的流动方向： 电视不仅是极佳的宣发放大器，更为经典角色和新兴IP源源不断地注入全民热度；而主题乐园则是整个销售漏斗的最底端，为狂热粉丝提供沉浸式实体朝圣体验，并实现极高的变现转化。更有趣的是，主题乐园并不单单是IP价值的“变现终点”，它反向成长为原生IP的孵化温床——如后来的《加勒比海盗》原本只是园区内的一个游乐设施，却最终被搬上大银幕，开创了吸金数十亿美元的卖座电影系列。 1955年成为迪士尼百年基业的关键转折点。在乐园门票、电视制作费，以及《大卫·克罗克》（Davy Crockett）与《米老鼠俱乐部》（The Mickey Mouse Club）周边授权的共同助推下，公司的营收在1954至1955年间直接翻倍，摆脱了过去几十年受制于票房波动的单一电影制片厂模式，转型为一家多元化且现金流极为稳固的现代娱乐传媒巨头。在此势头下，1957年11月，迪士尼股票终于正式登陆纽约证券交易所（NYSE）。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Disney Five-Element Flywheel accDescr: 展示迪士尼经典的五要素闭环商业飞轮模型。 IP["1. 顶级核心IP\n(动画/故事)"] --> Theatrical["2. 院线核心发行\n(大银幕首映)"] Theatrical --> Ancillary["3. 衍生多元载体\n(玩具/图书/音乐)"] Ancillary --> Vault["4. 金库重映机制\n(定期循环发行)"] Vault --> Ecosystem["5. 电视与主题乐园\n(电视拓客 + 乐园终极变现)"] Ecosystem -->|反哺新生IP，如《加勒比海盗》| IP ``` - **飞轮闭环的升格**：电视负责大范围放大与用户触达，乐园负责高客单价沉浸式变现与粉丝忠诚度维系。 - **逆向IP孵化器**：乐园不仅消耗IP，还能由幻想工程师自创概念，反向为影视制作部门孵化如《加勒比海盗》等超级卖座IP。 - **1955关键拐点与纽交所挂牌**：公司营收从1954到1955年翻了一番；随后于1957年11月正式在纽约证券交易所（NYSE）上市挂牌交易。 ### [03:30:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12658s) 纽交所上市与华尔街日报的“飞轮”草图 迪士尼自 1940 年公开发行股票以来一直有公众持股，但直到 1957 年才正式在纽约证券交易所挂牌交易。上市之后，华特（Walt）和罗伊（Roy）依然对公司拥有绝对的实际控制权——迪士尼家族投票信托（Disney Voting Trust）掌握了 47% 的投票权，因此他们只需拉拢极少数股东便能轻松掌控董事会局面。尽管变成了一家上市公司，迪士尼在很长一段时间里骨子里仍是一家由两兄弟牢牢把控的家族企业（直到后来的几十年间其家族色彩才逐渐消退）。 挂牌上市后，华尔街和公众开始真正领略到迪士尼背后惊人的商业变现威力。1958 年初，《华尔街日报》（The Wall Street Journal）在头版刊登了一篇关于迪士尼独特商业模式的深度报道，标题名为《迪士尼乐园：华特的盈利法则——梦想、多元化且绝不错过任何商业角度》（Disney's land, Walt's profit formula, dream, diversify, and never miss an angle）。这篇报道正是那张闻名遐迩的“迪士尼飞轮图”（Disney Flywheel Diagram）的真正源头。Ben 在播客录制室里指着墙上裱起来的这张图解释道，外界一直流传着一个都市传说，以为这是华特本人随手画在餐巾纸上的涂鸦灵感，但事实上这完全是误传。迪士尼档案馆（Disney Archives）向主播们证实，这张图是当时迪士尼制片厂的一位内部插画师专门为配合《华尔街日报》的特稿报道绘制的插图；主播们甚至联系了《华尔街日报》档案馆调出了当年的原始报纸版面。 这张插图在当时极其超前地具象化了一个甚至在商业理论中都尚未成型的概念——“飞轮效应”（Flywheel）。尽管整篇报道中从未直接出现“Flywheel”这个词（这个术语是几十年后由管理学者提炼出来的），但《华尔街日报》希望迪士尼能用一张直观的图表向外界展示：迪士尼在传统媒体与娱乐行业中创造了一种前所未见的崭新商业模型。罗伊·迪士尼在文章中对此作出了极其精辟的总结： > “我们的多元化业务彼此紧密相连并相互补充，使我们能够在电影行业步履维艰的低迷期依然保持稳健的盈利。在这里，‘整合’（Integration）是核心关键词。在开展任何一条业务线时，我们绝不可能不去考虑它能为其他业务线带来怎样的潜在利润。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼 1958 年飞轮驱动模式 accDescr: 展示电影制作与乐园、电视、出版和衍生品之间的相互反哺循环 subgraph CreativeCore["创意核心 (Creative Engine)"] Films["长篇电影资产<br/>(例如：睡美人 / Sleeping Beauty)"] end subgraph IntegrationEngine["多渠道协同变现平台 (Integration Engine)"] Park["迪士尼乐园<br/>睡美人城堡、35美分动态透视景"] Merch["衍生授权商品<br/>奥罗拉公主玩偶、服饰周边"] Publishing["出版与唱片<br/>故事书、连环画、提前发售的原声黑胶"] TV["电视节目<br/>全彩制作的 Disneyland 周播电视特辑"] end Films -->|"IP 授权与场景体验"| Park Films -->|"形象授权与玩具制造"| Merch Films -->|"音乐出版与连环漫画"| Publishing Films -->|"幕后预热与内容宣发"| TV Park -->|"反哺品牌认知与门票收入"| Films Merch -->|"持续产生现金流"| Films Publishing -->|"加深故事普及度"| Films TV -->|"全美电视家庭提前预热"| Films ``` --- ### [03:33:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12823s) 《睡美人》超前协同与全彩电视的前瞻布局 为了印证这种全方位的业务整合，《华尔街日报》详细剖析了迪士尼如何为当时还有整整一年才上映的长篇动画巨作《睡美人》（Sleeping Beauty）展开前所未有的全飞轮预热。这个案例在商业史上令人叹为观止： - 1955 年加利福尼亚迪士尼乐园开园时，整个乐园的正中央地标正是“睡美人城堡”（Sleeping Beauty Castle）。当时电影甚至还在前期筹备阶段，由于动画尚未成型，乐园里的城堡实际上是根据早期德国古典城堡概念图建造的，整整提前了四年为电影做实体造势。 - 在乐园内部，迪士尼建造了《睡美人》的动态透视模型展馆（animated dioramas），并向游客单独收取 35 美分的门票。 - 电影尚未公映，迪士尼就已经全面量产并销售奥罗拉公主（Princess Aurora）的玩偶和服饰。 - 迪士尼同步紧锣密鼓地策划并出版由迪士尼改编的睡美人童话故事绘本。 - 在 ABC 播出的《Disneyland》电视黄金档节目中，迪士尼多次插播介绍《睡美人》制作花絮的特别片段。 - 原声黑胶唱片（Soundtrack Album）早在电影院线上映前就已经灌录完毕、铺货上架。 - 报纸连环画方面，作为迪士尼“经典故事宝库”（Disney Treasury of Classic Tales）联合辛迪加漫画专栏的一部分，奥罗拉公主的连环画也早早开始在全美报纸连载。 这篇报道还揭示了一个震撼的商业远见：在全美绝大部分家庭还只能收看黑白电视节目的年代，迪士尼竟然坚持全部使用彩色胶片来拍摄其电视节目。因为华特敏锐地意识到，电视全面彩色化只是时间问题，而他们所生产的核心 IP 必须在未来的数十年甚至上百年里始终具备高额商业价值。他们所做的一切，都是为了让这批永恒的内容资产源源不断地沉淀并永远流传。 --- ### [03:35:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=12940s) 自建发行博伟（Buena Vista）与商业底座重构 在这套成熟的飞轮体系背后，迪士尼还完成了一次关键的商业闭环——自建影片发行渠道。在迪士尼乐园开业前夕的 1953 年，迪士尼成立了博伟发行公司（Buena Vista Distribution），正式结束了与雷电华（RKO Radio Pictures）自 1936 年以来长达近 20 年的合作。当时雷电华被霍华德·休斯（Howard Hughes）收购后，随着休斯晚年精神失常和经营混乱，整个公司变成了一场管理灾难。华特不愿再卷入这种不可控的混乱之中，加之他已经将迪士尼定位于全产业链高度整合的娱乐帝国，而非一家任由中间商摆布的传统电影制片厂。 博伟发行最初通过自然纪录片《沙漠奇观》（The Living Desert）试水，随后迅速将《小姐与流浪汉》（Lady and the Tramp）和《海底两万里》（20,000 Leagues Under the Sea）的发行权全部收归己有。除了国际市场短期内仍需依赖当地代理商外，凭借每周在全美热播的电视节目和迪士尼乐园打下的超高国民知名度，迪士尼无需外部中间商就能够直接与各大院线对接。 长期以来，为什么迪士尼在《白雪公主》大获成功后没有立刻自建发行？核心障碍在于**营运资金（Working Capital）与现金流**：电影拷贝的制作、宣传和向各大影院铺发都需要垫付极其庞大的前期垫资，而票房分账却需要很长的结算周期。直到 1950 年代中期，迪士尼才终于拥有了足以支撑这笔营运资金的资产负债表。收回自建发行是一笔巨大的商业回报——过去他们需要将大约三分之一的院线租金分给第三方发行商，尤其在迪士尼频繁将经典影片“重新上映”（re-releases）进行多次变现时，自建发行的利润率更是惊人。 这一时期的迪士尼完成了一次关键的商业底层“再平台化”（replatforming）： - **平台重心的转移**：迪士尼过去的商业模式纯粹依赖单部电影的票房赌博；而如今，它的核心基本盘已经成功沉淀转移到了迪士尼乐园、电视节目、商品授权与自营发行的稳定平台之上。电影不再是唯一承担盈利重压的赌注，而是成为了向这个永续飞轮源源不断注入全新 IP 的创意来源。 - **走出长期负债**：1961 年，迪士尼制作公司（Walt Disney Productions）终于全额还清了欠美国银行（Bank of America）的最后一笔贷款，彻底终结了长达 22 年的沉重银行债务历史。 --- ### [03:39:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13143s) 《睡美人》票房滑铁卢与 1960 财年短暂亏损 然而，飞轮的强大并不能完全消除大制作电影本身的单点风险。《睡美人》于 1959 年正式公映，耗资高达 600 万美元，是当时迪士尼历史上制作成本最昂贵的动画电影。尽管后来几十年里通过多次重映、衍生品销售和家庭录像带创造了数亿美元的累计巨额利润，但在首轮院线上映时，《睡美人》的票房并没有收回其高昂的制作成本。这背后的原因一方面在于其极度繁复、奢华考究的手绘艺术风格推高了预算，另一方面也因为华特当时将绝大部分心力投入到了迪士尼乐园的扩建与运营上，没有像往常那样全程亲自深抓剧本故事的打磨。 这种单片票房窟窿直接反映在财报上。1959 年末至 1960 财年，原本一路高歌猛进、利润稳定的迪士尼突然在财报上由盈转亏，出现了短暂的净利润负值。除了《睡美人》巨额摊销造成的亏损缺口之外，另一个重要打击是 ABC 电视台相继取消了迪士尼负责制作的两档王牌电视节目——《佐罗》（Zorro）与《米老鼠俱乐部》（The Mickey Mouse Club）。这一波折直接牵扯到迪士尼制作公司与 ABC 围绕迪士尼乐园股权协议的进一步决裂与重组。 ### [03:40:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13236s) 财务稳固与华特的“再下重注”冲动 随着迪士尼乐园走向正轨，迪士尼与电视网 ABC 的关系出现微妙变化。迪士尼向 ABC 提出：“你们现在变得有点难共事了，我们想把你们在迪士尼乐园中的股份全部买断。”ABC 则回应称，若如此他们便不再为迪士尼电视节目支付巨额版权费，也不再提供免费宣传。双方合作至此暂告一段落。然而，这一转变的核心事实在于：迪士尼已经拥有极其坚实的财务基本盘，彻底告别了命悬一线的窘境。 上一次华特·迪士尼与公司在未见收益前大规模提前投入制作，还要追溯到 1940 年迁往伯班克制片厂（Burbank Studio），当时《木偶奇遇记》（Pinocchio）、《幻想曲》（Fantasia）和《小鹿斑比》（Bambi）同时上马，其中任何一部都险些拖垮公司。而有了周边衍生品授权的筑基，再加上迪士尼乐园这一稳固平台的腾飞，公司的盈利抗风险能力展现得淋漓尽致： - **1957 年**：净利润达到 360 万美元； - **1958 年与 1959 年**：分别实现净利润 390 万美元与 340 万美元； - **1960 年**：遭遇多重不利因素冲击，录得 130 万美元净亏损； - **1961 年及之后**：迅速强劲反弹，净利润依次飙升至 450 万美元、520 万美元、650 万美元、700 万美元、1100 万美元，乃至 1200 万美元。 然而，对华特而言，这种空前的稳定性反而让他坐立难安。他开始琢磨如何再玩一次更大的豪赌：“难道一座主题乐园或者几部动画电影就是我留给世界的终极遗产吗？我难道不该为世界做些真正有深远意义的事？” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 迪士尼盈利飞轮进化历程 accDescr: 展现从早期单片高风险到衍生品与乐园带来稳固现金流，进而支撑更大野心的演变路径。 subgraph EarlyStage["早期高风险阶段（1940年前后）"] A["高投入多片齐开<br/>木偶奇遇记 / 幻想曲 / 小鹿斑比"] --> B["负债累累与脆弱财务"] end subgraph StableStage["飞轮成型阶段（1955-1960年代）"] C["衍生品与授权业务<br/>学会'爬行'"] --> D["加州迪士尼乐园成功<br/>学会'跑跳'"] D --> E["稳固充沛的利润流<br/>年净利突破千万美元"] end subgraph MoonshotStage["终极宏图（1960年代中）"] E --> F["追求更大遗产：<br/>构建未来原型城市 EPCOT"] end ``` --- ### [03:42:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13341s) 乌托邦狂想：从主题乐园到未来城市 EPCOT 实体娱乐体验的成功让华特滋生了更加惊人的野心：如果下一次不仅建一座游乐园，而是建造一整座城市呢？这就是最初的“未来原型社区”（Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow，简称 EPCOT）。必须澄清的是，华特脑海中的 EPCOT 绝非今天奥兰多那个同名主题展馆乐园，而是一个真正让人们在其中居住、工作、通勤的活生生的未来科幻都市。 这一宏大愿景的精神根源可以追溯到伯班克制片厂罢工前的短暂黄金年代——当时制片厂是艺术与商业完美融合的乌托邦物理实体。迪士尼乐园的成功彻底唤醒了华特的这一宿愿。城市中央计划耸立一座壮丽的中心塔楼，穿梭着前沿的未来公共交通系统，各大顶尖美企的创新研发中心云集于此。华特将其称作“佛罗里达项目”（The Florida Project），这成为了他人生中最后、也是最庞大的未竟之梦。 --- ### [03:44:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13460s) 1964 年纽约世博会：前沿技术的试验场 为了将建设未来城市的愿景落地，华特巧妙利用了 1964 年纽约世界博览会作为秘密“试验场”。迪士尼借助加州乐园建立的声誉，联合美国工业巨头出资打造展馆，不仅能验证科技，还能在世博会结束后将游乐设施直接迁回加州迪士尼乐园。 迪士尼为该届世博会打造了四大经典展馆： 1. **小小世界（It's a Small World）**：由百事可乐（Pepsi）与联合国儿童基金会（UNICEF）赞助。展馆由著名现代主义设计师玛丽·布莱尔（Mary Blair）设计操刀，她此前曾奠定《爱丽丝梦游仙境》的美学风格，是 WED 幻想工程团队（Imagineers）最早的成员之一，也是迪士尼首位女性幻想工程师。该展馆成为世博会上最轰动的项目。 2. **进步之轮（Carousel of Progress）**：由通用电气（General Electric）赞助。 3. **魔幻空中轨道（Magic Skyway）**：由福特汽车（Ford）赞助。 4. **与林肯先生的伟大时刻（Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln）**：由伊利诺伊州政府赞助。 “林肯先生”展馆的诞生标志着迪士尼机械人偶（Audio-Animatronics）技术的重大技术突破。在 1950 年代末至 1960 年代初，迪士尼幻想工程实际上开辟了顶尖的机器人研发领域。在展后搬迁谈判中，华特开出条件：赞助商若要在项目中冠上华特之名需支付 100 万美元，但若同意世博会后将设施移至加州迪士尼乐园，该费用即可免除。通用电气等愉快接受，唯独福特汽车选择直接掏出 100 万美元，放弃了移机的长尾价值。最终，四大项目中有三项顺利落户加州乐园。 --- ### [03:47:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13662s) 佛罗里达项目图景与科技迭代的悖论 纽约世博会的成功彻底打消了华特的顾虑。此前他曾反复宣称不打算在东海岸复制迪士尼乐园，并担忧东海岸观众比西海岸更挑剔复杂，但这在很大程度上是他掩饰“害怕失败”的心理防御机制。世博会的狂热人气证明，东海岸对先进科技驱动的沉浸娱乐有着极度饥渴的需求。 佛罗里达因其终年温和的气候与极其廉价充沛的土地，成为新项目的最佳选址。然而华特的构想远远超越了游乐园范畴，其规划由四大核心板块组成： - **未来机场与宏伟入口区**：配备前卫的交通接驳与广阔的迎宾园区； - **神奇王国主题乐园（Magic Kingdom）**：规划面积达到加州迪士尼乐园的整整五倍； - **占地 1000 英亩的工业园区**：吸引福特、通用电气、百事可乐、孟山都（Monsanto）等世博会合作伙伴，将最精尖的研发团队驻扎于此； - **EPCOT 核心城**：整个项目的灵魂所在，一座展现美国自由企业制度创造力与想象力、供真实居民生活工作的科幻城市模型。 对此，播客主播们也指出了将未来概念实体化所固有的现实悖论：加州乐园 1955 年开园时“明日世界”（Tomorrowland）就因赶工无法完工，而科技演进的速度永远超越想象。华特自己就曾打趣说“明天总是比我们追赶的速度更快变成今天”。当巨额固定资产投资被永久浇筑在混凝土中时，昨日关于未来的幻想很快就会显得陈旧落伍。 ### [03:51:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13868s) 华特的未来之城：激进的辐射状巨蛋城市构想 华特·迪士尼心中构想的 EPCOT（未来社区实验原型）绝非普通的游乐园，而是一座具有激进辐射状规划的崭新未来城市。整座城市将如同车轮的辐条一般，从一个中央核心向外辐射展开。最令人难以置信的核心是一个占地整整 50 英亩（约 20 公顷）、全封闭且配备全套恒温气候控制的巨大穹顶市中心。地面上完全不设普通机动车道路，全由开阔的人行步道组成，所有机动交通仅限于单轨列车（Monorails）和全新的旅客自动输送系统（PeopleMovers）。而在地表之下，则规划了一个庞大多层的地下隧道网络，供日常汽车及工业与物流车辆自由通行。 紧邻巨蛋市中心边缘的是高密度公寓区；再往外环绕的是大片的公园与娱乐设施绿带；最外层则规划为低密度的单独家庭住宅社区。华特设想让两万名居民长期居住于此，配备自给自足的学校、公共服务设施与完整的市政基础设施。更夸张的是，这不是普通的郊区开发，而是一个在佛罗里达州境内由华特迪士尼公司通过专属特区合法完全自治的私营“理想国”。主播们打趣道，这个构想听上去既像乌托邦又充满反乌托邦电影的科幻色彩，甚至让人怀疑在当时的工程条件下究竟如何凭空建造一座 50 英亩的巨型玻璃穹顶。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: EPCOT 径向同心圆城市设计构想 accDescr: 展示华特·迪士尼最初设想的未来城市多层同心圆结构 subgraph Core ["核心层：中央控制枢纽"] Dome["50 英亩气候恒温穹顶<br/>（全步行街、单轨、PeopleMover）"] Subway["地下多层隧道网络<br/>（物流车辆与私家车通行）"] end subgraph Mid ["过渡层：高密度区与绿带"] HighDensity["高密度公寓住宅区"] GreenBelt["生态绿带与休闲公园设施"] end subgraph Outer ["外围层：居民社区与行政"] LowDensity["低密度独立住宅区<br/>（20,000 名常住居民）"] Governance["自主管辖基础设施<br/>（独立学校、警察与公共服务）"] end Dome --> HighDensity Subway -.-> HighDensity HighDensity --> GreenBelt GreenBelt --> LowDensity LowDensity --- Governance ``` ### [03:53:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=13989s) 秘密购地与“里迪溪”自治特区的破土 1965 年 11 月 15 日，华特·迪士尼携兄长罗伊·迪士尼以及时任佛罗里达州州长海登·伯恩斯（Hayden Burns）共同召开新闻发布会，正式宣布迪士尼一直在佛罗里达州中部秘密圈地，一项空前庞大的全新迪士尼计划即将落地。此前为了防止土地投机商哄抬地价，迪士尼动用了大量空壳子公司和隐蔽名义悄然购入了 27,000 英亩土地——整整 40 平方英里，面积相当于整个旧金山市，足足是曼哈顿岛的两倍大。 当时这片土地全是不宜居的荒凉沼泽。到了 1966 年 5 月，迪士尼顺利获得了政府批准，着手抽干沼泽、平整土地，为落实华特的宏大蓝图铺平道路。当年华特在阿纳海姆建造迪士尼乐园时，因资金拮据未能在周边买下足够缓冲区，结果乐园外围迅速充斥着各种俗气杂乱的汽车旅馆、快餐店和破旧商铺，这成了他心中挥之不去的遗憾。而在佛罗里达，他们一口气买下了广袤天地，决定彻底掌握每一寸土地的绝对主导权。 - **购地规模**：27,000 英亩（约 40 平方英里），面积相当于旧金山全境或两个曼哈顿。 - **保密策略**：通过多家空壳公司与虚构代号隐秘收购，避免地价被当地炒家哄抬。 - **政府批文**：1966 年 5 月正式获批排干沼泽并启动基础设施开发。 ### [03:54:25](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14065s) 最后的宣讲与华特的骤然离世 1966 年 10 月下旬，华特录制了一段长篇宣讲影片，首次向公众完整揭晓他的 EPCOT 宏大构想。这也是华特生前倒数第二次面对摄影机公开露面。影片结尾，华特目光坚定地宣告：“代表我自己以及整个迪士尼组织，我们现在已经准备好全面启航了（We're ready to go right now）。”然而，命运并没有给他实现这一狂想的时间。仅仅不到两个月后，华特骤然辞世。 华特的离世既突如其来，又像一场潜伏已久的慢动作灾难。从 17 岁在一战后的法国开救护车起，他就养成了无节制抽烟的习惯。在伯班克制片厂，标志性的剧烈咳嗽声几乎成了员工判断华特正朝走廊走来的信号。1966 年夏天，他开始感到全身疼痛，起初误以为是多重项目压力、早年打马球落下的旧伤或是慢性咳嗽复发。直到录完 EPCOT 宣传片后的 1966 年 11 月，他前往医院检查，医生在他的肺部发现了一个巨大的恶性肿瘤。虽然进行了紧急切除手术，制片厂对外也宣称华特正在顺利康复，但癌细胞已经全身扩散，医生坦言他只剩下数周或数月的生命。1966 年 12 月 15 日，在刚过完 65 岁生日仅 10 天后，华特·迪士尼与世长辞。 主播们感叹，这是一个巨大的“转折时刻”（sliding door moment）。华特的一生永远都在不断加码：从带同步声的米老鼠，到第一部动画长片《白雪公主》，再到耗资巨大的伯班克园区与迪士尼乐园，他永远在押上全部身家（betting the farm）。如果华特没有在这一刻倒下，而是在现实中硬造这座疯狂的未来城市，甚至未来再去月球建殖民地，他的神话或许会因工程与财务灾难而受损；在最宏伟的梦想巅峰戛然而止，反而从某种悲剧角度保全了他无可挑剔的传奇声誉。 ### [03:57:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14274s) 罗伊的坚守：无债建造神奇王国 华特逝世后，兄长罗伊·迪士尼做出了一个极其深情的决定：他主动推迟了原本的退休计划，将余生全部精力投入到佛罗里达项目中，并正式将项目更名为“华特迪士尼世界”（Walt Disney World）以纪念胞弟。1967 年 5 月，罗伊成功推动佛罗里达州议会通过法案，正式成立“里迪溪发展区”（Reedy Creek Development District），赋予迪士尼在该区域内享有前所未有的准政府自治权，在税收、建筑规范、消防及公用事业上几乎完全由迪士尼说了算。 但罗伊终究是罗伊，他不是华特，骨子里绝不具备华特那种不惜赌上整家公司的疯狂冒险基因。罗伊坚决拒绝为该项目让公司背负任何新增债务。他大刀阔斧地砍掉了华特的未来城市构想——没有巨蛋城市，没有常住人口居民区，没有工业园区，也没有独立商业机场，而是直接把经受过市场检验的成熟模板“复制粘贴”过来，打造纯粹的主题乐园“神奇王国”（Magic Kingdom）。罗伊以惊人的财务审慎，在完全不借外债的前提下，硬是靠公司自身积累砸下 4 亿美元，建成了包含两座豪华度假酒店在内的整座乐园。 新乐园吸收了加州迪士尼乐园的所有运营痛点，并进行了工程上的全面升级： - **地下通道网络（Utilidors）**：事实上，由于佛罗里达地下水位极高，所谓的“地下隧道”其实建在真正的地面一层，整座神奇王国乐园被抬高了一层地基建在隧道上方。这一设计彻底解决了加州的穿帮弊端——演职人员再也不必提着垃圾袋穿过游客人流，明日世界的宇航员也不会因为找不到专属通道而尴尬地穿行于边域世界。 - **从狂野牛仔到精密工程**：与当年在阿纳海姆捉襟见肘、边建边改的窘境不同，华特迪士尼世界是由真正的城市规划师、建筑大师与工程师团队，在极其充裕的预算下打造的一座高度精密、秩序井然的商业奇迹。 ### [04:01:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14468s) 罗伊逝世与转型的序幕 罗伊为弟弟兑现了承诺。然而，在 1971 年底华特迪士尼世界盛大开幕仅两个半月后，筋疲力尽的罗伊也随之与世长辞。两位灵魂人物的相继离开，宣告了迪士尼敢于“直冲云霄、不惜赌上一切”的狂野探索时代的终结。在接下来的整整 13 年里，失去了华特天马行空远见的迪士尼，不可逆转地退守为一家以主题乐园为核心支柱的稳健运营型公司。 而在电影大本营方面，华特生前深度参与指导的最后一部动画长片《森林王子》（The Jungle Book）于他去世后的 1967 年上映。这部倾注了华特最后心血的作品获得了巨大的商业成功，首轮公映便席卷了 2,300 万美元的票房佳绩，为迪士尼公司旗下的博伟发行（Buena Vista）带来了约 1,100 万美元的巨额纯收益，成为献给华特时代的一首凄美而璀璨的落幕序曲。 ### [04:02:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14529s) 乐园狂飙与电影停滞：核心业务的隐秘危机 虽然《欢乐满人间》（Mary Poppins）在 1964 年仅用 400 万美元预算就取得了空前成功，并在随后的二十年里稳坐迪士尼票房最高电影的宝座，但随后的十余年间，迪士尼的财务增长几乎全部依赖于主题乐园。1972 年迪士尼世界（Walt Disney World）开业的第一年，电影部门营收 7800 万美元，贡献了 4400 万美元的利润，依然是公司最赚钱的引擎；主题乐园营收高达 2.23 亿美元，利润为 3800 万美元；衍生品及飞轮其他业务营收 2700 万美元，利润 1300 万美元。此时，公司传统 IP 的变现能力仍然强劲，乐园与电影业务旗鼓相当。 然而到了 1984 年，两者对比发生了惊人的逆转。乐园与消费品部门在超过 10 亿美元的营收下，创造了高达 2.5 亿美元的营业利润；而曾经的核心支柱——电影和电视部门，营业利润仅剩可怜的 220 万美元，几乎只能勉强维持盈亏平衡。从合并财务报表上看，公司总营收从 1965 年的 1 亿美元飙升到 1984 年的 14 亿美元，净利润从 1100 万美元涨到 9700 万美元，表面上一派繁荣，但实际上迪士尼的核心正在枯烂。公司完全变成了依靠既有资产收割现金的乐园与衍生品公司，已经无法再生产出深受大众喜爱的全新文化资产。 - **1972 年部门财务表现（未计入公司总部公摊费用）**： - 电影业务：营收 7800 万美元，营业利润 4400 万美元 - 主题乐园：营收 2.23 亿美元，营业利润 3800 万美元 - 消费品与飞轮其他业务：营收 2700 万美元，营业利润 1300 万美元 - **1984 年部门财务对比**： - 乐园与消费品：营收超 10 亿美元，营业利润 2.5 亿美元 - 电影与电视业务：营业利润仅为 220 万美元 - **合并财务报表走势（1965 年 vs 1984 年）**： - 营业总收入：从 1 亿美元增长至 14 亿美元 - 净利润：从 1100 万美元增长至 9700 万美元 ### [04:05:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14724s) 神话让位与动画崩溃：十年灾难与真人电影 这种衰败的根本原因在于，属于美国大众的“造梦权”和神话叙事已经转移到了其他地方。20 世纪 70 年代至 80 年代初，乔治·卢卡斯推出了《星球大战》（Star Wars），史蒂芬·斯皮尔伯格拍出了《夺宝奇兵》（Indiana Jones）与《E.T. 外星人》（E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial），他们成为了新一代的美国故事大师，迪士尼动画早已退下神坛。伴随着影响力的衰退，迪士尼动画部门的员工规模从沃尔特·迪士尼去世时的约 500 人急剧萎缩至 80 年代初的区区 125 人。 在此期间制作的动画电影几乎都是灾难，其中最具代表性的惨案莫过于《黑神锅传奇》（The Black Cauldron）。该片在漫长且混乱的前期筹备与制作中耗费了整整 10 年，彻底锁死了制片厂的产能，最终在 1985 年上映时遭遇票房惨败。这部影片不仅基调极其灰暗诡异，更成为了迪士尼历史上第一部被定为 PG 级的动画长片。虽然迪士尼依靠试金石影业（Touchstone Pictures）和《美人鱼》（Splash）等真人项目赚到了钱，并在 60 至 70 年代推出了《万能金龟车》（Herbie the Love Bug）、《海底两万里》（20,000 Leagues Under the Sea）、《老黄狗》（Old Yeller）等家庭真人喜剧，但这些项目无法沉淀为持久的、能哺育未来的经典超级 IP。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Disney IP Engine Collapse (1960s-1980s) accDescr: 展现迪士尼从动画核心造血转向依靠主题乐园与零散真人电影变现的枯竭过程 subgraph CoreFailure["核心动画造血枯竭"] A["动画部门规模锐减<br/>（500人降至125人）"] --> B["《黑神锅传奇》历时10年难产<br/>暗黑风格致首部PG级惨败"] C["大众文化叙事权易主<br/>（卢卡斯星战 / 斯皮尔伯格E.T.）"] --> B end subgraph CashHarvest["外部收割与表象繁荣"] B -.无法反哺.-> D["长期超级 IP 匮乏"] E["乐园（迪士尼世界等）与衍生品<br/>贡献绝大部分营收与利润"] --> F["账面营收达14亿美元<br/>但核心严重空心化"] G["试金石真人电影《美人鱼》<br/>及《金龟车》系列短期获利"] --> F end ``` ### [04:07:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14848s) 门口的野蛮人与外来拯救者：预告第二部 到了 1984 年，不可避免的危机终于爆发。华尔街的企业掠夺者（Corporate Raiders）将目光对准了这块肥肉。迪士尼此时的市值仅为 20 亿美元左右，但账面上却有 15 亿美元的营收与近 1 亿美元的净利润，旗下还沉淀着巨额的硬资产——庞大的主题乐园土地储备、房产以及地下室片库中的传世经典影片。金融巨鳄索尔·斯坦伯格（Saul Steinberg）等人发起敌意收购，企图将迪士尼拆分变卖：把主题乐园剥离给第三方，将片库 IP 拍卖给其他好莱坞制片厂，借此赚取暴利。 这场危机并没有以迪士尼被肢解告终，而是戏剧性地迎来了三位与传统迪士尼毫不相干的“外来人”：迈克尔·艾斯纳（Michael Eisner）、弗兰克·威尔斯（Frank Wells）以及杰弗里·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）。这三个人由两名派拉蒙高管和一名律师出身的华纳兄弟高管组成，此前完全没有动画制作经验，不懂飞轮商业模式，更从未管理过乐园运营或衍生品授权。然而，正是这个看似天方夜谭的外来者组合，即将上演好莱坞乃至商业史上最壮观的传媒帝国复兴大戏。 - **1984 年遭遇门口野蛮人袭击的资本面**： - 公司总市值：约 20 亿美元 - 全年净利润：约 1 亿美元 - 核心资产优势：高额净利润现金流、迪士尼乐园及佛罗里达大量地皮、拥有深厚价值的地下室经典老片库 - **拆分威胁与掠夺者**：索尔·斯坦伯格（Saul Steinberg）等华尔街金融家试图通过杠杆收购后分拆出售各业务板块变现。 - **入局掌舵的三位好莱坞外来者**： - 迈克尔·艾斯纳（来自派拉蒙影业） - 弗兰克·威尔斯（律师背景，前华纳兄弟高管） - 杰弗里·卡森伯格（来自派拉蒙影业） ### [04:09:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=14984s) 深度解析：为何无人能复制迪士尼的 IP 飞轮？ 在回顾完这段历史后，讨论聚焦于一个终极商业命题：“为什么至今没有第二家公司能够建立起类似迪士尼的 IP 飞轮？”自 1958 年《华尔街日报》发表那篇著名的手绘飞轮模型分析以来，全世界都在众目睽睽之下研究了迪士尼近百年，但好莱坞其他各大传统片厂依然无法复制这种模式。单做电影制作本身是一个非常糟糕且高波动的劣质生意，环球影业（Universal）或许是走得最近的一家，但环球依然无法与迪士尼相提并论，其核心短板在于主题乐园规模较小，且关键头部 IP（如《哈利·波特》）并非自己独家全权拥有，必须向原作者和第三方分润。 迪士尼商业模式的真正基石在于它对“动画”的极致坚持。正如鲍勃·艾格在 2005 年接任 CEO 时的名言：“动画兴，则公司兴”（"As animation goes, so goes the company"）。动画 IP 具有真人电影无法比拟的四重绝对优势： 1. **永恒性（Timelessness）**：动画形象永远不会衰老，能够跨越时代持续触达不同世代的童年。 2. **明星永不退场且无额外分成**：米老鼠、巴斯光年或阿拉丁永远随时待命，公司无需在衍生品或票房后端向真人演员支付高昂的版税分成。 3. **更深的情感投射**：比起真人演员扮演的角色，观众与手绘或三维创造的动画角色更容易建立持久而纯粹的情感羁绊。 4. **全版权自研（100% In-house Ownership）**：迪士尼对自身创造的动画 IP（以及后来收购的皮克斯）享有彻底的所有权，飞轮产生的每一分利润都能无损回流至母体，构筑起了无坚不摧的商业护城河。 ### [04:12:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15147s) 绝不出售片库、长期复利与“迪士尼金库”策略 真正的垂直整合不仅体现在制作与分发上，更体现在对待资产的耐心上。在好莱坞长达数十年的起伏变迁中，迪士尼做出了一个极其关键且孤独的决策：永远不出售自己的内容片库（Back Catalog）。相比之下，许多老牌电影制片厂为了眼前的现金流纷纷变卖早期片库，其中大量无人问津的黑白真人电影最终沦为贬值资产；而迪士尼从不转让任何版权，他们拥有自己创造过的每一部作品。这一坚定立场的根源，正是早年华特·迪士尼痛失“幸运兔奥斯华”（Oswald the Lucky Rabbit）版权的惨痛教训。 这种长寿资产的复利效应，只有在真正拥抱飞轮商业模式并承受其代价时才会完全显现，其最典型的体现就是“金库”（The Vault）与周期性重映策略。核心的迪士尼动画工作室和皮克斯多年来一直保持着近乎严苛的克制：严格控制内容的投放频率与核心承载形式，绝不为了短期收益过度投放而稀释品牌价值。 ### [04:13:11](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15191s) 飞轮边界的模糊：流媒体时代的过度开采与代际长线博弈 对内容稀缺性的克制，反衬出了近年来《星球大战》与漫威在流媒体时代的困境。主播们指出，漫威在很长一段时间里表现惊艳，但随后为了让流媒体平台 Disney+ 持续有新鲜内容上线，陷入了“Disney+ 化”的内容过载；对《星球大战》的过度开采同样破坏了作品的神圣感。从飞轮理论来看，这实际上是把“飞轮第二步”（让核心 IP 的初始主要交付载体获得最大化分发）与“飞轮第三步”（将 IP 导入尽可能多的衍生盈利节点）混为一谈。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 经典飞轮与流媒体时代的界限混淆 accDescr: 对比经典模式下核心交付与衍生节点清晰分离，与流媒体时代两者界限模糊导致稀缺性稀释。 subgraph Classic["经典飞轮模型：清晰分层"] A["核心IP交付载体<br/>(院线长片/高标准首映)"] -->|"保持稀缺、正典感"| B["高价值文化共识"] B --> C["衍生变现节点<br/>(乐园、玩具、周边、电视重映)"] end subgraph Modern["流媒体误区：界限模糊"] D["流媒体 Disney+ 平台"] E["海量衍生剧集与内容"] F["核心正典作品"] E <-->|"全塞入同一平台"| D F <-->|"价值与稀缺性被摊薄"| D end ``` 当核心内容与衍生内容全被塞进同一个流媒体应用时，作品失去了原本专属的发展通道，观众不再觉得它稀缺、特别与具有“正典”感（canonical）。其他好莱坞制片厂之所以无法抗拒过度开采的诱惑，是因为它们的激励机制天然偏向于“一旦某个系列成功，就尽可能快地推出续集套现”。更根本的原因在于，迪士尼是在玩一场需要两到三十年才能完全释放复利效应的代际游戏；而其他制片厂通常每隔十年就更换一次控股股东或管理层，根本没有耐心和治理结构去打三十年的长期仗。这种不急于推出内容的从容，反过来赋能了创作端：主创团队可以不断打磨，直到作品真正达到卓越才推向市场。 ### [04:15:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15348s) 宇宙凝聚力与唯一同类：迪士尼与任天堂的飞轮共鸣 迪士尼在娱乐行业拥有一个无可比拟的独特性——宇宙凝聚力（Universe Cohesion）与工作室级别的品牌认同。主播们提出了一个耐人寻味的对比：试问谁能随口唱出派拉蒙（Paramount）或环球（Universal）的代表歌曲？大多数人大概只能勉强想起《壮志凌云》主题曲；但几乎任何人都能不假思索地报出一长串迪士尼经典歌曲的名字。迪士尼成功将人们对故事的所有爱、童年回忆、粉丝热情与宇宙互动，完全沉淀并映射到了“迪士尼”这家工作室品牌本身，它彻底成为了“动画界的救世主”。 放眼全球泛娱乐产业，唯一在气质与商业模式上能与迪士尼相提并论的只有任天堂（Nintendo）。富有历史戏剧性的是，现代任天堂的起步恰恰站在迪士尼的肩膀上——几十年前正是拿到迪士尼的卡通形象授权印制日本扑克牌，才拉开了任天堂现代娱乐帝国的序幕。两者拥有完全相同的企业信条和 IP 飞轮模型。但正因为两家公司都是极致垂直整合的控制型巨头，它们如今极少直接合作（任天堂在主题乐园领域选择了与环球合作）；甚至可以说，这两家公司未来若想深度融合，可能唯一的途径就是其中一家收购另一家。 ### [04:17:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15435s) 7 Powers 战略分析：逆向定位、网络规模与独占 IP 护城河 节目随后进入 Hamilton Helmer 的“7 Powers”（七种战略力量）分析框架，专门拆解 1984 年之前经典迪士尼的商业护城河： - **逆向定位（Counterpositioning）**：早期最辉煌的体现是倾尽所有制作影史首部动画长片《白雪公主》。当时不仅同行缺乏兼具才华与资金的制作能力，主流真人电影制片厂更是出于理性的商业考量，绝不可能耗时三年、斥资 150 万美元去冒险押注一部动画片，这种“非理性”反向构成了巨大的进入壁垒。 - **品牌（Branding）**：自米老鼠打响名气后，“华特迪士尼出品”（Walt Disney Production）迅速确立，观众愿意为迪士尼的名字支付更高的溢价。 - **过程力量（Process Power）**：并不算显著。历史上优秀画师与动画人经常在不同工作室之间流动，离开迪士尼创办竞品工作室的人同样能制作出高水准动画。 - **规模经济（Scale Economies）与网络经济（Network Economies）**：这是飞轮真正运转后的双核心。迪士尼敢于砸下数百万美元巨资制作一部电影，然后凭借覆盖全球的分发能力掀起长达一年的文化热潮，再通过周边衍生产品将收益成倍放大。网络经济则体现在其文化现象级的社交属性——孩子们会因为同伴买了《睡美人》爱洛公主（Aurora）的服装，而要求父母购买同款以便一起打扮扮演。规模经济提供了投资殿堂级 IP 的底气，而网络经济则在乐园、商品等各个飞轮节点之间产生共振。 - **独占资源（Cornered Resource）**：这是所有竞争对手高管最绝望的护城河。面对迪士尼积淀百年的海量 IP 资产，任何对手都深知不可能制定出一个在 5 到 10 年内击败迪士尼的战略。整座商业帝国的大厦，正是筑牢在华特·迪士尼一次次“押上整座农场”（bet the whole farm）并多次熬过绝境所积攒的独占 IP 资产之上。 ### [04:20:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15644s) 商业精髓（Quintessence）：超越爆款依赖的永恒情感宇宙 迪士尼的终极商业精髓（Quintessence）在于：他们打造的不仅仅是一组 IP 和变现飞轮，而是一个具备高度凝聚力、带有鲜明审美主张的宇宙。在这个宇宙中，每一个故事都围绕着具有永恒情感张力、普遍适用的故事弧线展开，彼此有机共存。这种特质赋予了内容抵御时间侵蚀的能力，使其能够在数十年甚至几代人之间持续产生情感共鸣并完成变现。 本质上电影制作依然是一门押注爆款的生意（hit-based business），任何制片厂都无法完全摆脱风险，但迪士尼通过这套体系，已经在物理极限内最大程度地远离了爆款周期的摆布。这套精髓总结同样一字不差地适用于任天堂——两家巨头凭借各自的飞轮，成为了全球娱乐商业史上最具持久力的殿堂级范本。 ### [04:21:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15692s) 迪士尼的精髓：艺术与商业的终极联姻 节目进入总结阶段，两位主持人探讨了迪士尼最核心的特质（Quintessence），并将这根主线一直回溯到华特·迪士尼幼年生活过的马塞林（Marceline）。华特从小就在脑海中把“艺术”与“商业”紧紧绑定在一起。当迪士尼处于巅峰状态时，它创造的绝不仅仅是某种纯粹的商业产品，而是一种位于更高精神维度的艺术；但与此同时，它又与一台不可思议的商业引擎精密咬合。迪士尼乐园（Disneyland）、迪士尼世界（Disney World）以及各大主题乐园，正是这一结合最完美的物理体现。 主持人感叹，迪士尼乐园在视线控制（sightlines）和园区营造上的造诣堪称奇迹。哪怕完全不坐任何游乐设施，光是在园区里闲逛散步本身，就是一种极具价值的沉浸式享受，而这种体验是世界上任何其他公司都无法复制的。任何带孩子去过迪士尼的父母，都能深刻体会到这种不可替代的魔力。 随后，主持人分享了一个没有进入正片叙事的小花絮：1934 年迪士尼推出唐老鸭（Donald Duck）时，雇用了广播剧演员克拉伦斯·纳什（Clarence Nash）为其配音。纳什最初在广播中模仿动物叫声成名，是因为担任了南加州阿多尔奶牛场（Adohr Milk Farms）的广播代言人——而阿多尔奶牛场恰好是 Trader Joe's 早期还叫 Pronto Markets 时的牛奶供应商（后来该奶牛场被 7-Eleven 收购）。更奇妙的是，Trader Joe's 品牌早期的热带风格在一定程度上正是受到了迪士尼乐园“神仙聚会热带鸟室”（Enchanted Tiki Room）的启发。华特当年甚至自掏腰包出资打造了 Tiki Room，该项目由 WED 拥有并单独售票（当时需另收 75 美分门票）。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 唐老鸭与Trader Joe's的奇妙渊源 accDescr: 展示配音演员克拉伦斯·纳什与南加州商业网络及迪士尼景点的历史交叉关联 subgraph AudioHeritage["声音传承与代言"] A["克拉伦斯·纳什"] --> B["阿多尔奶牛场广播代言"] A --> C["唐老鸭标志性配音 (1934)"] end subgraph BusinessCross["商业交叉与乐园启发"] B --> D["Pronto Markets 原料供应"] D --> E["演变为 Trader Joe's"] F["迪士尼 Tiki Room (1963)"] -.->|风格启发| E end ``` ### [04:23:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=15831s) 节目精选推荐（Carve Outs） 在节目惯例的 Carve Outs 环节中，两位主持人分享了近期的个人好物与内容发现： - **Brooks Vanguard 复古跑鞋**：延续上一期 Vanguard 专题节目的推荐，日常出街脚感极佳，但鞋底厚度不适合需要连续站立 9 小时的高强度录音日。 - **Defunctland（YouTube 频道）**：深度聚焦那些已停业（Defunct）或未曾建成的废弃主题乐园纪录片频道，详细解析了诸如新泽西州臭名昭著的行动乐园（Action Park）以及迪士尼未落地的佛罗里达规划项目等离奇历史。 - **Animagraffs（YouTube 频道）**：以极高精度的 3D 机械拆解与原理透视动效著称，主持人曾借其深入理解机械手表与 F1 赛车的精妙传动系统。 - **沃尔沃 EX30（Volvo EX30 电动汽车）**：基于吉利（Geely）纯电平台打造的小型 SUV，售价约 35,000 美元，尺寸紧凑、极度契合旧金山狭窄的街头停车环境，性价比突出。遗憾的是，受关税等政策因素影响，该车型在主持人提车不久后便宣布取消在美销售。 - **旧金山交响乐团（San Francisco Symphony）与新任音乐总监陈以琳（Elim Chan）**：这位 39 岁的新任华裔女性音乐总监在就职首秀中展现了澎湃的感染力。现场聆听古典交响乐时，主持人意识到包括自己在内的一整代人，童年对古典乐的启蒙其实大量来自于迪士尼动画、《乐一通》（Looney Tunes）和华纳兄弟的配乐。 ### [04:26:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=16015s) 合作伙伴致谢与研究幕后名单 主持人向本季度的四家核心赞助伙伴表达了感谢：提供可靠支付基础设施的 J.P. Morgan、现代 Web 与前端云平台 Vercel、企业级工作流与 AI 平台 ServiceNow，以及集成了特性开关与实验分析的产品平台 Statsig。 在预告今年秋季（8 月）即将推出的“迪士尼下篇（文艺复兴时代）”之前，主持人郑重感谢了为本集提供关键史料与研究支持的各界人士： - **阿尔文·纳瓦拉特南（Arvin Navaratnam，Worldly Partners）**：提供了有关战后电视机普及速度的详实数据、迪士尼早年公开发行股票的招股说明书（S-1 等文件）以及珍贵的历史年报。 - **杰弗瑞·卡森伯格（Jeffrey Katzenberg）**：在伯班克（Burbank）与主持人共进早餐，为迪士尼近代电影复兴提供了核心内部视角。 - **乔什·达马罗（Josh D'Amaro，华特迪士尼公司高管）**：抽出时间与团队交流并答疑解惑。 - **南希·李（Nancy Lee）及迪士尼档案馆（Archives）与动画研究图书馆（Animation Research Library）团队**：协助主持人在伯班克调研期间查阅历史原档。 - **迈克·米勒（Mike Miller，前《华尔街日报》资深编辑）**：长期为播客内容把关与润色。 - **听众 Graden**：一年前来信指出商业界对“飞轮（Flywheel）”一词的广泛滥用，成为本集深入拆解真正飞轮模型的契机。 - **本·科恩（Ben Cohen）与艾米莉·纳尔逊（Emily Nelson，《华尔街日报》）**：协助团队检索并调出了 1958 年那篇首次刊载华特·迪士尼飞轮草图的《华尔街日报》原始报道。 - **米奇·拉斯基（Mitch Lasky，前 Benchmark 合伙人）**：在飞轮动力机制的理论梳理上提供了深刻洞见。 - **瑞安·希尔（Ryan Scheer，华特·迪士尼曾外孙）**：旧金山华特·迪士尼家族博物馆（Walt Disney Family Museum）董事会成员。主持人高度推荐该博物馆对华特个人生平的真实刻画。 最后，节目指引听众在 Show Notes 中下载包含丰富图表、关键概念拆解的 Companion PDF，并推荐了往期关于 Vanguard、法拉利（Ferrari）、可口可乐（Coca-Cola）以及任天堂（Nintendo）两部曲的深度商业复盘节目。 ### [04:30:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA&t=16253s) 结语与预告：华尔街日报专栏与迪士尼下篇 节目在轻松愉快的收尾氛围中接近尾声。两位主持人 Ben 和 David 向听众提醒了他们与《华尔街日报》（The Wall Street Journal）的最新联动合作：只要是该报订阅用户，或者通过专有专属链接访问，就能够畅读他们为每一期播客特别撰写的深度专栏文章。如今每制作一期新节目，团队都会同步配套推出一篇高质量的文章分析。 在向所有陪伴了四个半小时漫长旅程的听众道别之际，他们正式向大家预告了重磅续集——迪士尼商业史的波澜壮阔才刚刚展开，今年秋季节目将如期回归，带来更加重磅的“迪士尼第二部分（Disney Part Two）”。随着标志性的片尾曲“Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now?”响起，这部记录华特·迪士尼时代艺术野心、财务赌注与商业飞轮崛起的长篇史诗正式画上句点。 - **专栏阅读渠道**：听众可通过特设页面获取与节目配套的商业深度剖析文章。 - **续集预告**：迪士尼商业帝国的后续历程（涵盖后华特时代、艾斯纳复兴、并购狂潮至流媒体之战等）将于今年秋季的第二部分继续深入拆解。 ## Video description The Walt Disney Company is the most successful enterprise ever created for monetizing human nostalgia. Today it's the king of global entertainment, holding the intellectual property rights to the childhood memories of billions of people (including, likely, all of you) and is a reliable, predictable profitable business. But it didn't start that way. During Walt's era, Disney operated like an unhinged moonshot factory, blowing its finances on one seemingly crazy project after another, like the very first feature-length animated film or a theme park inspired by Walt's fascination with model trains (spoiler: Disneyland). Walt's relentless ambition to bet the company over and over again not only created some of the most monumental artistic achievements of the 20th century (Snow White, Fantasia, Disney Imagineering), but also resulted in the accidental invention of the modern "flywheel" business model. In this episode, we tell the story of the ultimate marriage of art, commerce, and engineering — The Walt Disney Company: Walt's Era. *Sponsors:* Many thanks to our fantastic Spring '26 Season partners: - J.P. Morgan: https://bit.ly/acquiredJPMvanguardyt ⠀⠀- WeAreDevelopers event: http://wearedevelopers.com/acquired - Vercel: https://bit.ly/acquiredvercel26 - ServiceNow: https://bit.ly/acquiredservicenow26 - Statsig: https://bit.ly/acquiredstatsig26 *Links:* - Sign up for email updates, get our takeaways and research photos from each episode, and vote on future topics: https://www.acquired.fm/email - The Acquired Disney Companion PDF: https://library.acquired.fm/episodes/the-walt-disney-company.pdf - Our Disney column in WSJ: https://www.wsj.com/business/media/disney-flywheel-strategy-acquired-podcast-hosts-b08023da - The original 1958 WSJ “Flywheel” article": https://i.a.dj.com/pubedit/WSJ.Disney.1958%20(2).pdf - Walt Disney: The Triumph of the American Imagination by Neal Gabler: https://a.co/d/0763Q5H2 - The Animated Man by Michael Barrier: https://a.co/d/00ywFTR2 - Walt Disney: An American Original by Bob Thomas: https://a.co/d/0g9yzfaW - Building a Company: Roy O. Disney and the Creation of an Entertainment Empires by Bob Thomas: https://a.co/d/09Di5oAY - The Disney Version by Richard Schickel: https://a.co/d/075usfI0 - PBS American Experience: Walt Disney: https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/walt-disney/ - Disneyland Handcrafted: https://www.disneyplus.com/browse/entity-e23366be-f7a0-426e-9fbd-8911e7e528bb - Walt's 1966 EPCOT pitch video: https://youtu.be/z3pTvwPzlTg?si=tIl6ux5ZuEOZE9jV - Worldly Partners' Multi-Decade Disney Study: https://worldlypartners.com/businesshistory - The Walt Disney Family Museum: https://www.waltdisney.org/ - All episode sources: https://www.acquired.fm/episodes/the-walt-disney-company#sources *Carve Outs:* - Brooks Vanguard sneakers: https://bit.ly/acqbrooksvanguard - Defunctland YouTube Channel: @Defunctland - Animagraffs YouTube Channel: @animagraffs - Volvo EX30: https://www.volvocars.com/us/cars/ex30-electric/ - The San Francisco Symphony: https://www.sfsymphony.org/ *More Acquired:* - Get email updates and vote on future episodes! https://www.acquired.fm/email - Join the Slack http://acquired.fm/slack - Check out the latest swag in the ACQ Merch Store! https://www.acquired.fm/store 00:00 Start 01:10 Intro 06:03 Walt's Early Life & Artistic Calling (1901-1919) 12:22 From Commercial Art to Laugh-o-grams (1919-1923) 23:05 Hollywood, The Alice Comedies & Oswald's Loss (1923-1928) 43:27 Mickey Mouse & The Synchronized Sound Breakthrough (1928) 01:01:21 The IP Flywheel & Mickey Merch Explosion (1929-1933) 01:09:57 Flywheel Terminology Unpacked 01:18:53 Snow White: Walt's $1.5M Folly (1934-1937) 01:52:01 The Burbank Studio, Debt & Strike (1938-1941) 02:04:28 The Animators' Strike & Walt's Disillusionment (1941) 02:15:43 WWII, The Vault & Creative Slump (1941-1950) 02:24:27 Post-War Slump to Cinderella's Comeback (1945-1950) 02:33:48 Walt's Obsession: Model Trains to Disneyland (1950-1952) 02:38:44 Financing Disneyland: ABC, SRI & Davy Crockett (1953-1955) 03:17:05 Disneyland's Grand Opening & The Evolving Flywheel (1955-1958) 03:41:55 The Florida Project & Walt's Last Dream (1961-1966) 03:54:26 Walt's Untimely Death & Roy's Legacy (1966-1971) 03:57:57 Roy Finishes Walt Disney World (1966-1971) 04:01:09 The Post-Walt Slump & Corporate Raiders (1970s-1984) 04:09:44 Analysis: Why No Other Disney Flywheels? 04:17:15 7 Powers 04:20:45 Quintessence 04:23:50 Carve-Outs + Outro _Note: Acquired hosts and guests may hold assets discussed in this episode. This podcast is not investment advice, and is intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. You should do your own research and make your own independent decisions when considering any financial transactions._ [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EUVr0-V6DA)

[8:33] My hobby, my art, it can make me money. [20:25] Uncle Robert: You know, kid, best thing to do if I were you, I would just skip town. [25:07] Walt Disney: When things began to look hopeless, I got my cartoon things out again. Walt Disney: That's it. That's what we've got to do. Stop all these silent pictures. [78:52] Walt Disney: go for broke, shoot the works [99:21] Neal Gabler: gothic cathedral in animation [119:54] Henry Ford: Walt, if you sold any of it, you should have sold all of it. [180:30] Walt Disney: I regard television as one of our most important channels for the development of a new motion picture audience. [222:00] Roy O. Disney: Our diversified activities are related and tend to complement each other, helping us to do relatively fine business in the face of otherwise difficult times for the motion picture industry. Integration is the key word around here. [248:26] Bob Iger: as animation goes, so goes the company

[0:00] Have I ever shown you my Mickey Mouse [0:03] impression? [0:05] >> You've done your uh Mario impression for [0:07] me in the past, but I'm not. [0:08] >> They're a little similar. [0:10] >> All right. All right. Give me Give me [0:12] Mickey. Give me Mickey. [0:13] >> Oh, boy. Will you look at that? [0:17] >> That is really good. You sound like Walt [0:19] himself doing Mickey, [0:20] >> right? Didn't he do Mickey for like 20 [0:22] years? [0:23] >> Yep. Yep. Yep. He didn't at the very [0:25] first and then one of the animators [0:27] convinced him to do it and then yeah, he [0:29] did it for 20 years. [0:30] >> Have I ever given you my Donald Duck [0:32] impression? [0:33] >> Oh wow. Okay. Well, now I I do I need to [0:35] sit down for this one? [0:36] >> You you might need to. All right. Here [0:37] we go. [0:42] That's about right. That's about right. [0:43] I have a great Donald Durbia for you [0:46] coming up. Save it. [0:48] >> All right. Save it. Save it. [0:49] >> You're going to be blown away. I'm [0:50] pretty sure you didn't find it. [0:51] >> Great. All right. On to the episode. [0:53] Let's do it. [0:54] >> Who got the truth? [0:57] Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got [1:00] the truth now? [1:02] Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Sit me [1:05] down. Say it straight. Another story on [1:08] the way. [1:11] >> Welcome to the spring 2026 season of [1:13] Acquired, the podcast about great [1:15] companies and the stories and playbooks [1:17] behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. [1:19] >> I'm David Rosenthal. [1:20] >> And we are your hosts today. listeners, [1:23] we finally tell the story of the Walt [1:25] Disney Company. Unbelievably, in 11 [1:29] years of doing Acquired, we have never [1:32] told Walt's story and uh it's been a [1:35] glaring omission. It is the [1:37] entertainment company different than all [1:38] the rest. It's over a hundred years old [1:41] and it has played a prominent role in [1:44] almost all of your childhoods and if [1:46] you're a parent, likely your parenting [1:48] journey, too. [1:49] >> Oh, yes. [1:50] >> I'm looking at you, David Rosenthal. Oh [1:51] yes, and it has played a prominent role [1:53] in acquired history too. Our very first [1:56] episode, Pixar, done Lucasfilm, we've [1:59] done Marvel, done ESPN, although those [2:02] are a whole different version of [2:04] Acquired, we may need to decanonize [2:06] those and and redo them uh the proper [2:09] way [2:09] >> as part of this. [2:10] >> Listeners, since there are tons of [2:12] biographies and documentaries and places [2:14] analyzing Walt's psyche, we're going to [2:16] focus today on Acquired Sweet Spot, [2:19] which is the business. What is it that [2:21] Walt's merry band did from the 1920s [2:24] onward that made them succeed uniquely [2:27] well in Hollywood? And when you look at [2:29] Disney's profits today, it is in a whole [2:32] different league than Paramount or [2:34] Universal or Warner Brothers or any of [2:36] the other sort of classic Hollywood [2:37] studios. The business of feature film [2:40] production is a mediocre one, especially [2:43] by the standards of uh what we study on [2:46] this show here with Acquired, except for [2:48] Disney. [2:48] >> Yes, exactly. And I will say I am a huge [2:51] Disney fan. I grew up on Aladdin and the [2:53] Lion King. My first movie in theaters [2:56] was Beauty and the Beast. I'm a huge [2:58] Star Wars nerd and my wall was plastered [3:00] with Toy Story posters growing up. But [3:03] somehow I knew nothing about the [3:04] company's early history before starting [3:07] this research. Nor did I. For example, [3:10] it started in Kansas City. there was a [3:13] character that was supposed to be Mickey [3:15] Mouse before Mickey Mouse but was lost [3:18] in a contract dispute or that many of [3:20] the movies I watched in my childhood are [3:22] actually from 50 years before I was even [3:25] born. Snow White was produced before [3:29] World War II. Pinocchio, Bambi, these [3:32] films are from the 30s and 40s. They [3:35] even predate the existence of [3:37] televisions in people's homes. Yep. And [3:40] importantly for Acquired's roots, this [3:42] really is a technology story. Giant [3:44] innovations that often bet the whole [3:46] company on things like synchronized [3:48] sound or the crazy idea of a [3:50] featurelength animated movie at all or [3:53] the multiplane camera to photograph the [3:56] whole thing and turn it into a movie. [3:58] And of course, building a giant theme [4:00] park in Anaheim when nothing else like [4:02] it existed. And they really did invent [4:05] the entire concept of the flywheel [4:08] business model that so many [4:10] entrepreneurs are trying to copy. [4:12] >> Oh yes. [4:12] >> So today listeners is the Walt Disney [4:15] Company part one Walt's era. Woo. [4:19] >> Well, big news from here at Acquired HQ. [4:22] This episode has a companion PDF with [4:24] visuals, charts, tables, and [4:26] illustrations of key concepts, including [4:29] Acquired's version of the Disney [4:31] flywheel. We did a pilot of the idea [4:33] after our Vanguard episode and we got [4:35] such overwhelming positive response that [4:37] we are doing it again. So, you can get [4:39] access and follow along by clicking the [4:41] link in the show notes. [4:42] >> You might say we're uh building out our [4:44] own flywheel here. [4:45] >> We are [4:45] >> eating our own episode cooking [4:47] >> and we're we're taking this timeless IP [4:49] that we are developing and figuring out [4:51] even more things to do with it. [4:53] >> That's right. [4:54] >> All right. So, you can join the acquired [4:55] email list at acquired.fm/e. [4:58] That's where we'll send our big [5:00] takeaways from each episode, past [5:02] episode corrections, exclusive [5:03] behind-the-scenes photos that we found [5:05] at our research, and it's where you can [5:07] vote on future episode topics. Plus, we [5:09] will give away a little hint each time [5:11] about the next episode topic. That's [5:13] acquired.fm/e. [5:15] Come talk about this episode with us in [5:17] the Slack. That's acquired.fm/slack. [5:19] And before we dive in, we want to thank [5:21] our presenting partner JP Morgan. Yes, [5:24] just like how we say every company has a [5:26] story, every company's story is powered [5:28] by payments and JP Morgan is a part of [5:30] so many of their journeys from seed to [5:32] IPO and beyond. So with that, the show [5:34] is not investment advice. David and I [5:36] may have investments in the companies we [5:37] discuss and this show is forformational [5:40] and entertainment purposes only. David, [5:43] take us in. Well, first a thank you to [5:46] my main source for facts and Walt quotes [5:49] on this episode. Neil Gabler's [5:50] biography, Walt Disney, the triumph of [5:54] the American imagination. Gabler, I [5:56] think, was the only author who had full [5:58] access to the Disney archives and all [6:00] the research he did for that book is [6:01] just incredible. [6:02] >> Yes. Well, with that, we start in [6:05] Chicago in December 1901 where Walter [6:10] Elias Disney is born. And the family [6:13] lore is that the Disneys are descended [6:16] from the French Disneys of Normandy. [6:19] >> How do you spell that? [6:21] >> D apostrophe I si G nys of Normandy who [6:26] came over to England with William the [6:27] Conqueror in 1066. [6:30] That's family lore. unverifiable. [6:33] >> Yes. At this point, lost to history. [6:35] >> Yes. So, Walt's father, Elias, was sort [6:39] of a frustrated entrepreneur. He was [6:42] variously a carpenter, landlord, farmer, [6:46] newspaper route owner, and eventually a [6:49] failed jelly factory investor. [6:53] But Elias's younger brother, Robert, [6:55] Walt's uncle Robert, was the successful [6:58] one in the family. He was a real estate [7:00] speculator among other things and that [7:03] is what brought the family to Chicago at [7:07] the turn of the century. He had invested [7:08] in a bunch of real estate in Chicago and [7:10] the Midwest and so Elias came also to [7:12] seek his fortune there. Now, when Walt [7:15] is four, Elias moves the family out of [7:19] Chicago to an idyllic farm town, also in [7:23] the Midwest, where Robert had just [7:25] purchased another tract of real estate, [7:27] Marceline, Missouri. And Lily and [7:30] Disney, Walt's future wife, would say [7:32] about Marceline, "It was the most [7:34] important part of Walt's life. He didn't [7:36] live there very long. He lived in [7:38] Chicago and Kansas City much longer. But [7:40] there was something about the farm that [7:42] was very important to him. [7:44] >> And Elias moved the family because it [7:46] was kind of like let's get out of the [7:47] dangerous city of Chicago and raise the [7:50] kids, right? So sort of somewhere small [7:52] town. I think Marceline was actually [7:54] created because they needed somewhere [7:57] for the Santa Fe Railroads division [8:00] point. [8:01] >> Yes. Yes. [8:02] >> Like when it was going to maybe Chicago [8:04] and Kansas City and they were like and [8:06] this place on the map looks good and [8:07] they started the town of Marceline. [8:09] Exactly. Exactly. And Robert, the uncle [8:11] had bought real estate there, kind of [8:13] speculating again that this is [8:14] Marceline's gonna grow. [8:16] >> So Marceline was like basically a Disney [8:20] movie. There's orchards and ponds and [8:23] animals and farmhouses. There's also [8:25] this charming little town that the [8:27] railroad had created with a main street, [8:30] a main street USA, you might say. But [8:33] that's getting ahead of ourselves. So, [8:35] while the family's living there, Uncle [8:36] Robert's wife, Walt's aunt Maggie, every [8:40] time that they would come visit [8:41] Marceline to check up on their real [8:43] estate investments, she would bring Walt [8:45] gifts. And one year when Walt is [8:48] probably six or seven years old, Aunt [8:50] Maggie brings him a big chief drawing [8:53] tablet and pencil set. And Walt is [8:57] enraptured. He starts sketching all the [9:00] time, drawing, sketching everything he [9:02] can see. And as the legend goes, one day [9:06] Walt's retired neighbor asks the young [9:08] boy to draw him a picture of his [9:10] favorite horse. And the neighbor loves [9:13] what Walt draws so much that he pays him [9:16] a nickel for it. And he hangs it in a [9:18] frame in his house. And Walt, his mind [9:21] is blown, young Walt. He's like, "My my [9:24] hobby, my my art, it can make me money." [9:30] Now, whatever the exact truth of that [9:32] story is, there is no doubt that [9:34] somewhere in Marceline, in prepubescent [9:38] Walt's mind, a connection is forged [9:41] between these two great forces, art and [9:44] commerce. And that would go on to drive [9:47] not only the rest of his life, but the [9:50] company, the studio, the movies. I mean, [9:53] change America. [9:55] >> Absolutely. The thing about Marceline [9:56] though, you said it's idyllic and like [9:58] it's out of a Disney movie. The reality [10:01] of living in Marceline and life on the [10:03] farm is that it was very hard. All the [10:06] kids are involved. There's not, you [10:08] know, magical economic prosperity [10:10] everywhere. It's sort of a tough life. [10:12] Even though he can sort of remember it [10:15] as an idyllic childhood, which I also [10:17] think is quite the foreshadow of kind of [10:20] the Disney versionification of things in [10:22] the future, it is both remembered as [10:24] idyllic but also was hard as the real [10:27] world is. Yes. And I think it's because [10:29] of the age wall was when he was there. [10:32] So they lived in Marceline only from [10:34] when he was like 4 to 8 or nine years [10:37] old before he gets really put to work. [10:40] So he gets to just enjoy, you know, all [10:42] this bliss around him. Yeah. The reality [10:43] is it's pretty tough for the family to [10:46] make a living. And in fact, they can't. [10:50] So Elias adds farming to his list of [10:54] entrepreneurial failures. And when Walt [10:57] is 9 years old, they have to move the [11:00] family again out of Marceline to Kansas [11:04] City where Elias decides he's going to [11:06] purchase a paper delivery route for the [11:08] Kansas City Star newspaper and he's [11:11] going to put the family to work [11:14] delivering papers. [11:15] >> There are so many protagonists that we [11:17] study unacquired who started their [11:18] career as newspaper boys. I was going to [11:20] say just like Jack Bogle from Vanguard [11:22] delivering papers in his youth and [11:24] having to get up at 4 in the morning and [11:27] falling asleep at school because he has [11:28] to work so hard. Like this is quite the [11:30] reversal here for Walt from Marceline. [11:33] But he never stops drawing and he never [11:37] stops making money from it. In Kansas [11:39] City, he would draw frames for the local [11:42] barber shop who would pay him either a [11:44] nickel or a free haircut for each. And [11:47] that would, you know, be Walt's spending [11:48] money growing up that he would earn from [11:50] his art. [11:50] >> Yep. So later when Walt enters high [11:53] school, Elias moves the family back to [11:55] Chicago again, this time for the Jelly [11:58] Factory, which ends up failing, where [12:00] Walt becomes the cartoonist for his high [12:02] school newspaper. But he's not there [12:04] long before he leaves high school to go [12:06] join the Red Cross and get shipped off [12:09] to France as an ambulance driver during [12:11] World War I where unfortunately he would [12:15] acquire a chain smoking habit that he [12:18] would keep up for the rest of his life [12:19] and eventually would kill him way too [12:21] young. Yep. But Walt's not in France for [12:24] long before the war ends. And in the [12:27] fall of 1919, he lands back in Kansas [12:29] City where Roy Disney, his older [12:32] brother, who is, I think, eight years [12:34] his senior. [12:34] >> Nine years, maybe. [12:35] >> Eight, nine years older. [12:36] >> Yeah. Much older. [12:37] >> Yep. Is living. And Walt has a plan that [12:40] he's going to seek his fortune finally [12:42] as a true professional cartoonist. So, [12:46] through Roy, he gets introduced to an [12:48] advertising art shop that's looking for [12:50] apprentices to help draw like flyers for [12:53] the upcoming holiday rush. And Walt [12:55] works there for six weeks through [12:58] Christmas time and then gets [13:00] unceremoniously laid off. But he gets [13:02] two things out of this brief experience [13:05] as an employee. One, he gets a [13:07] credential. He can now say that he is a [13:09] professional artist. [13:10] >> All you have to do is get paid to do [13:11] something and then you become a [13:13] professional. [13:13] >> Exactly. Exactly. And you get something [13:16] else, a co-founder, [13:19] another young apprentice from the art [13:22] shop named Eyeworks. [13:25] >> I sort of think of as the Steve Waznjak [13:28] of Disney. [13:29] >> Yes, absolutely. Walt is like the [13:32] original Steve Jobs. And I think you can [13:34] definitely make the case that is the [13:36] Steve Waznjak. [13:37] >> Although I think Walt was more hands-on. [13:41] Yes, Walt was also an animator. was just [13:43] a better animator and Walt was a camera [13:46] operator and Walt was building stuff, [13:49] doing things with his hand and he was in [13:51] the primary technology and artistic [13:55] trade that his business was in. So after [13:58] the two of them get laid off, Walt [13:59] suggests that rather than go look for [14:01] jobs again, they should just start their [14:03] own studio together. I mean, hey, [14:04] they're professional artists. Like, why [14:06] not? So, they create I works Disney [14:10] Commercial Artists Incorporated. [14:13] supposedly in that naming order so that [14:15] it didn't sound like a optometrist shop [14:17] like Disney Eyeworks. [14:18] >> How amazing is this? In the first [14:20] Eyeworks and Disney partnership, in Walt [14:22] Disney's first business, he was not the [14:25] main name on the door. At least he was [14:27] not the first one. [14:28] >> Yes. Not the main name on the door, but [14:30] he is the driving force behind the [14:33] business. So he goes out to pitch [14:36] prospective clients around Kansas City [14:38] for the uh services of this new I works [14:41] Disney commercial artist firm and one of [14:44] the clients that he goes to pitch is a [14:47] upandcoming company called the Kansas [14:49] City Slide Company which happens to have [14:52] become the country's largest producer of [14:56] advertising slides and short commercials [14:59] that would get shown in movie theaters [15:03] feature films and the slide has so much [15:07] work at this point in time as films and [15:09] movie theaters are are taking off around [15:11] the country that they say hey you guys [15:14] seem talented we don't want to just [15:16] contract with you why don't you come [15:17] work here full-time so Walt and first [15:21] entrepreneurial venture quickly comes to [15:23] an end and they go join the slide [15:25] company now the reason that they [15:28] specifically wanted Walt and is that [15:32] they have a relatively new business line [15:34] at the slide co which is producing [15:37] animated commercials to run in movie [15:41] theaters before films and this is what [15:43] Walt and end up getting put to work [15:45] doing and they both just fall in love [15:49] with this new art form of animation. [15:52] It's like everything that Walt and Obubu [15:55] loves about drawing but it's more than [15:58] just art. It's technology. You know, you [16:01] need cameras, you need film, you need [16:02] all these new inventions to make [16:04] animation happen. [16:06] >> Yep. And at this point, animation was [16:09] really primarily used in advertising, [16:11] right? There wasn't really a successful [16:14] thriving industry yet as entertainment [16:17] of its own based on animation. It was [16:20] like very very early and to the extent [16:23] that it did exist as entertainment and [16:26] shorts, short films, cartoons on its [16:29] own, it was all based in New York, like [16:31] not in Kansas City, [16:32] >> right? [16:32] >> But the whole industry is only like [16:35] barely 20 years old at this point in [16:37] time because you couldn't produce [16:38] animation on any sort of scale until you [16:41] had widespread commercially available [16:44] film cameras and film projectors. Like [16:46] this whole art form is brand new. It [16:48] couldn't exist before the technological [16:51] innovation of film. [16:52] >> Yep. It's exactly right. [16:54] >> So, part of the reason that cartoons are [16:57] working well in advertising right now [16:59] for the slide co is that it's this [17:02] novelty, you know, almost gimmick. It [17:04] captures people's attention. [17:06] >> Yep. [17:07] >> Even though they have no color, no [17:08] sound, no story, it's just a series of [17:11] like visual novelties. [17:12] >> It's something they never seen before. [17:14] Of course, it's interesting. [17:15] >> Yep. And in Walt's mind, who really is [17:18] always thinking about how can I, you [17:20] know, make a business out a career out [17:21] of this, this is also what makes it [17:24] super attractive to him, because the [17:26] whole industry is so new of animation, [17:28] he figures that he can quickly become as [17:30] good or better than anyone else in the [17:33] world at it. Unlike if he's going to try [17:34] and be the best commercial artist in the [17:36] world, you know, good luck, young Walt [17:38] Disney in Kansas City, Missouri. [17:40] >> Oil painting is thousands of years old. [17:41] >> Right. Right. Right. But becoming the [17:43] best cartoon animator, [17:44] >> small pool. Yeah, he and might have a [17:46] shot here. [17:47] >> Yep. [17:48] >> So, Walt and start experimenting on [17:51] nights and weekends with their own work, [17:54] just trying out creating their own [17:56] animations using the Slide Co. equipment [17:59] and cameras. And Walt puts together a [18:02] few short cartoons that he creates all [18:05] himself. He brands them as quote [18:07] laughogs [18:09] and he ends up selling them on the side [18:11] to a local movie theater chain to run [18:14] before features and the laughs become a [18:17] hit in Kansas City. Audiences love them. [18:19] >> I love that the thing that led to the [18:22] Walt Disney Company is called Laugh Oog. [18:26] It reminds me of uh what was the Rolex [18:28] watch? The Turnograph. [18:29] >> Oh yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That's such a like [18:31] hokey name for, you know, what ends up [18:34] becoming [18:34] >> well, this doesn't become Disney, but [18:36] the spirit of which becomes Disney here. [18:38] >> And the thing that they're doing, [18:39] they're so primitive. There's no sound, [18:42] there's no voices, there's no color, [18:44] there's barely backgrounds. [18:46] >> Yeah. It's so different from what you're [18:48] used to today. Because of those [18:50] limitations, you can't create a story or [18:53] a real sense of character for any of the [18:55] characters that are in there. Like you [18:56] can't build a relationship with the [18:59] cartoons that are being made at this [19:01] time like you can with Mickey Mouse or [19:02] Donald or Goofy or Minnie. [19:04] >> The only emotion you can invoke is [19:07] humor. And the only real way to do humor [19:10] is slapstick. So it's just these like [19:12] super exaggerated, they call them gags, [19:15] like things that a character does that [19:17] isn't necessarily consistent with [19:19] anything else that they've done within a [19:21] few minutes of starting gag happening [19:23] and ending or or or sometimes even a few [19:25] seconds. Yep. And honestly, that's [19:28] actually not that different than film [19:31] itself overall at this point in time. [19:33] Like Charlie Chaplan is the big star in [19:36] America and around the world, the big [19:38] movie star right now in the silent era. [19:40] >> And most of his movies are exactly what [19:43] you described, Ben. [19:44] >> Honestly, it's all physical comedy, sort [19:46] of slapstick. It's the stuff that my [19:48] toddler laughs at. You could resummarize [19:50] every scene of every comic and most [19:52] movies by going, "Oh, he fell down. [19:55] Exactly. [19:57] Ah, so in May of 1922 at 20 years old, [20:02] Walt decides that these laughs that he's [20:05] making are having enough success that [20:07] he's ready to leave the slide company, [20:09] go out on his own again and he founds [20:13] Laugh Films, Inc. And once again, he [20:16] convinces a bi works to quit and come [20:19] along too along with a few other [20:21] animators from the slide company. And [20:25] it's another failure because despite the [20:28] laugh's local popularity there in Kansas [20:31] City, by the time we get into 22, 1923, [20:36] animation and cartoons in general around [20:38] the country are starting to lose their [20:41] appeal. The novelty is wearing off. the [20:43] fad is dying down. There's actually a [20:46] survey of theater managers right around [20:49] this time in like 1922 or 1923 where one [20:52] of the questions is what filler options [20:55] do your audiences like to see around the [20:58] feature film that you're showing because [20:59] it also would be news reels or live [21:01] comedies or short serals. Remember, [21:03] there's no television. There's not even [21:05] really radio at this point in time. If [21:06] you want to get news or any kind of [21:08] entertainment, you go to the movie [21:09] theater. [21:10] >> All right, I got a stat on this. In the [21:12] 1920s, the average American went over 40 [21:15] times per year to the theater. [21:17] >> Wow. [21:18] >> This is what you did every week for [21:20] entertainment. [21:21] >> Wow. Yeah. Compare that to today where [21:23] like maybe you go once a year. [21:26] >> It's two the American the average [21:28] American goes to a movie theater twice a [21:30] year now. [21:31] >> Yeah. I mean, back then it was like you [21:32] could go to the movie theater or you [21:34] could go see a live show, ballet or [21:36] opera or or like a sporting event like a [21:38] baseball game or you go to the movie [21:40] theater. That's it. And when you go to [21:41] the theater, it was a bundle. I mean, [21:43] yeah, you were there for a production, [21:44] but I think the point you're trying to [21:46] make is there were also these cartoons [21:48] with gags. There were news reels. There [21:50] was the feature you're there to see, but [21:52] it's sort of this like bundle of all [21:54] right, let's see what the theater has in [21:55] store for me today. [21:56] >> Yeah, exactly. So, this survey of [21:57] theater managers, only 23% of [22:00] respondents say that they show cartoons [22:03] as part of the bundle and that their [22:05] audiences like it, which is by far the [22:06] lowest of any of the other filler [22:08] options. So, Laugh can't really find a [22:12] market outside of their local popularity [22:14] in Kansas City. And in 1923, the company [22:17] goes bankrupt and shuts down. And Walt [22:21] is now this sort of 1.5 times disgraced [22:25] entrepreneur here in Kansas City. [22:28] >> Right in his dad's footsteps. [22:29] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. [22:30] >> And he raised money from people in [22:32] Kansas City, friends, family. He he went [22:34] and lost people's loan capital that they [22:37] gave him. [22:38] >> Yep. So Walt goes to rich uncle Robert [22:41] for advice on what to do given his [22:43] failure. And Robert says, "You know, [22:46] kid, best thing to do if I were you, I [22:49] would just skip town. Get out of there." [22:53] Which actually is really sound advice [22:55] for back then. You know, people's [22:56] reputations did not travel with them. [22:58] >> Nope. Your credit was the credit locally [23:00] that you had with the people in your [23:02] town and no other way to find you [23:04] otherwise. Now, it just so happens that [23:07] both Robert and Walt's older brother, [23:10] Roy, have just also skipped town from [23:14] Kansas City and moved out west to Los [23:17] Angeles. So, Walt packs his belongings, [23:20] which is basically nothing at this point [23:22] in time, hops aboard the Santa Fe train [23:25] bound for LA, and joins them in [23:29] Hollywood. And when he arrives there in [23:31] the summer of 1923, he's 21 years old. [23:34] He stays with Uncle Robert and [23:37] initially, you really can't make this [23:40] up. I I couldn't believe this when I [23:41] read it. Wall at first thinks that he's [23:46] come to Hollywood. He's going to get a a [23:49] directing job in Hollywood at one of the [23:51] studios there. [23:52] >> Well, yeah, he has abandoned the idea of [23:54] animation. He basically thinks he's too [23:56] late. He's seen some of the stuff that [23:57] comes out of the New York cartooning [24:00] scene and he's like, "Well, I'll never [24:01] be as good as them, so I need to go [24:03] start over something completely new, [24:06] right?" Which is sort of, you know, [24:07] silly and wrong in of its own. But also [24:08] like the hubris that he thinks that he [24:10] could just show up in Hollywood with no [24:13] directorial experience and become the [24:15] next DW Griffith. That is Walt for you. [24:18] >> Do you know the story of the Universal [24:19] Lot? [24:20] >> No. No. No. So, he rolls up to the [24:22] Universal lot after getting there, [24:24] having no job, no money, borrowing a [24:25] bed, and he goes and has fake business [24:30] cards made that says he is with [24:33] Universal. He's just the Kansas City [24:34] representative, so no one at Universal [24:36] would really know who he is. And he [24:38] gives it to the receptionist on the [24:41] Universal lot. And he walks in. And so [24:44] he spends at least a day from what I [24:46] could tell roaming around and learning [24:48] as much as he could about film [24:50] production and like internalizes a lot [24:53] of those lessons. And then he tries to [24:54] come back in future days and say like, [24:56] "Oh yeah, I'm sort of like with [24:57] Universal and now I have experience and [24:59] can you give me a job?" And he ends up [25:01] running out of money and doesn't get a [25:03] job. [25:03] >> That is amazing. I didn't know that [25:04] story. [25:07] So once he inevitably gets rejected at [25:10] all the major Hollywood studios, he says [25:13] later, "When things began to look [25:15] hopeless, I got my cartoon things out [25:19] again." And he sets up shop animating [25:22] again. He's like, "Well, as you said, [25:24] Ben, this is the one thing I know how to [25:25] do. I should try that." And at this [25:27] point, pretty much the only popular [25:31] cartoon left in the industry is Felix [25:35] the Cat. [25:36] >> Yep. [25:37] >> Which is created by Pat Sullivan out of [25:39] New York and distributed by the [25:41] pioneering Margaret Winkler, also in New [25:44] York. So Walt has one thing, one asset [25:50] left over from his failed laugh days, [25:54] which is a real of a hybrid liveaction [26:00] cartoon short that he had created with [26:04] right before he left Kansas City called [26:06] Alice's Wonderland about a real life [26:10] little girl who interacts on screen with [26:13] cartoons that they've drawn over the [26:15] film. which is like completely [26:16] pioneering technology. The the other [26:18] people who were doing animation at this [26:20] time were just doing cartoons. These [26:22] Alice comedies as they came to be called [26:25] were a new process by which you could go [26:28] and film a real life actor and then have [26:31] them interact on screen with cartoon [26:33] characters and put them in the cartoon. [26:35] >> Yes. Very cool. and also had the unique [26:37] property of being cheaper to produce [26:40] than full animation because you only had [26:42] to animate the characters, not all the [26:43] backgrounds and everything. [26:44] >> Right. [26:44] >> Right. Yeah. There is this funny [26:46] counterintuitive thing that live [26:48] production is much faster and cheaper [26:51] than animation. You just have a film [26:53] camera and you point it at something in [26:54] the world that exists and you kind of [26:56] get everything that you're pointing it [26:57] at for free. like the interring [27:12] around you and you taking these [27:14] exposures in a video camera. [27:15] >> Yep. [27:16] >> So, Walt sends Alice's Wonderland off to [27:18] Winkler and she likes it. So, she [27:21] commisss Walt to create 12 more Alice [27:25] comedies for like 15 to $1,800 each. [27:29] >> She does. And David, did you know we [27:32] have seen this contract? [27:35] >> Was this in the documents that we saw in [27:37] the Disney archives? [27:38] >> Yes. So, listeners, for this episode, [27:40] David and I went and spent a few days [27:41] down in Burbank looking through the [27:43] corporate archives. And one of the [27:45] things that the archavist pulled for us [27:47] was this contract. And I have a photo of [27:49] it. I'm looking at it right now. [27:50] agreement entered into this 16th day of [27:52] October 1923 between Walt Disney of 4406 [27:55] Kingswell Avenue, Hollywood, California, [27:57] blah blah blah blah blah. And yeah, [27:58] you're exactly right for 12 negatives of [28:01] subject series and then in all caps [28:03] Alice comedies and [28:05] >> amazing [28:06] >> this we I also have a picture of this on [28:08] the last page of this contract cuz this [28:10] is effectively the contract that puts [28:12] Disney in business. I mean this becomes [28:14] the Walt Disney Company. [28:15] >> Yeah, this is the moment. This is the [28:17] beginning of Disney. You can see his [28:19] signature which is much less flowery [28:21] than the version that you see in the the [28:23] Disney logo. He would sort of evolve it [28:25] over time. [28:26] >> But yeah, this is the moment. Disney [28:30] Walt is in business. It's his first [28:33] actual commercial big-time deal. [28:36] >> Yes. And I think when Walt sort of gets [28:38] word from Margaret, he runs into his [28:40] brother's room. His brother Roy actually [28:42] has tuberculosis at this time. It is in [28:44] like a hospital ward. and he sort of [28:46] runs in, shows him the contract, and [28:48] says, "We got it. We got it. We got it. [28:49] We're in business. We're doing it." And, [28:50] you know, $15 to $1,800 a film is a lot [28:52] of money at this time. And Roy talks [28:54] through with him, and says, "Okay, let's [28:56] get right to work." And he literally [28:57] stands up and leaves the hospital ward. [28:59] He's like, "All right, my tuberculosis [29:01] is behind me." [29:02] >> And the two of them found the Disney [29:05] Brothers cartoon studio right there in [29:08] October 1923. [29:11] as a true partnership between the [29:13] brothers. Roy manages the business and [29:15] the finance. Walt manages the creative [29:19] and they get to work. [29:21] >> Yep. [29:21] >> So Walt of course writes I works back in [29:26] Kansas City and several of the other [29:28] talented animators that they knew there [29:30] and says, "All right, guys. [29:32] I I got it this time. Come on out to [29:35] California. We finally got a deal. We're [29:38] going to build a real company and a real [29:40] animation studio. [29:41] >> And they do. The behemoth we know as [29:44] Disney today is the Disney Brothers [29:47] cartoon studio and a whole bunch of [29:50] Kansas City guys that moved out to join [29:52] Walt to start cranking away. [29:54] >> Yep. And the Alice comedies become a [29:58] moderate success in the marketplace. [30:00] Again, I think the novelty of cartoons [30:03] plus live animation. and audiences are [30:05] entertained for a few years. Ultimately, [30:08] the Disney Brothers Studio produces 57 [30:11] of the Alice comedies from 1923 to 1927. [30:16] And then in 1927, [30:18] Winkler's relatively new husband, [30:21] Charles Mintz, who actually got to start [30:23] working for her in the business. By this [30:26] point in time, he has taken over as sort [30:28] of head of the business. He is no longer [30:32] getting along with Pat Sullivan, the [30:34] creator of Felix the Cat. [30:37] >> Big opportunity. [30:38] >> Big opportunity. And And he has brokered [30:42] a little arrangement with Universal [30:45] Pictures, the big New York film [30:47] distributor, to on the Sly create a new [30:50] character to rival Felix. Now, now mind [30:54] you, he and Winkler are still the [30:56] distributor for Felix, for Sullivan, and [30:59] they're creating a new character to [31:01] compete with him on the side. [31:02] >> Sort of like they're building their own [31:03] chips while still buying Nvidia. [31:05] >> Yeah. Uh, and so he turns around and [31:10] haps Disney says, "Hey, Walt, can you [31:13] make us a new series and a new [31:15] character? You know, like Felix, but but [31:18] not Felix. Like like maybe not a cat, [31:20] >> right? We needed to be plausibly [31:22] different while still having everything [31:24] that made Felix successful. [31:26] >> Yes. So, Walt and cast about what can we [31:29] come up with that's like a cat but maybe [31:31] shares a lot of the same recognizable [31:33] attributes like, you know, a lot of [31:34] white fur, a tail, some big ears, easy [31:38] to draw in black and white. And they [31:41] come up not with Mickey Mouse, but with [31:44] Oswald the Lucky Rabbit. [31:48] And Oswald is a big hit. It's got the [31:51] backing of Universal distribution behind [31:53] it. It's a big hit for Universal, a big [31:56] hit for Winkler and Mintz, and a big hit [31:59] for the Disney Brothers cartoon studio. [32:02] And it's not surprising because if you [32:04] give the creative brief to Walt and take [32:08] something that's kind of working, but [32:10] apply your style. Their style was great. [32:13] I mean, they were emotional animators. [32:15] There's a great quote in the book Walt [32:17] Disney and American Original by Bob [32:19] Thomas that says, "Before Disney, [32:21] cartoons were slapdash. Two-dimensional [32:24] characters in bizarre movement before [32:26] elemental backgrounds. Disney insisted [32:28] on rounded humanized figures. He wanted [32:31] the humor to come out of the character, [32:33] not the outrageous action." So, it's [32:35] sort of like, hey, here's the template, [32:38] but dnify it or I workify it in a way [32:41] that really can speak to people. Well, I [32:43] think it really was the partnership of [32:45] the two of them. I think I works had [32:48] like immense artistic talent as an [32:51] animator and was able to do that and [32:54] Walt had taste like he recognized it and [32:58] he knew when and where to apply it. [33:01] >> Yep. So on the back of the Oswald [33:03] success, the Disney Brothers cartoon [33:05] studio grows pretty quickly from this [33:08] ragtag group from Kansas City to like a [33:11] real operation, like a real, you know, [33:14] at this point bordering on major [33:16] animation studio. They hire about 25 [33:20] employees and start turnurning out [33:22] Oswald cartoons. Yep. They move into a [33:24] real studio building on Hyperion Avenue [33:26] in the Silver Lake neighborhood of Los [33:29] Angeles. And when they move there, Walt [33:32] and Roy decide at a unclear which [33:36] brothers instigation that they need to [33:39] rename the company and the studio from [33:42] the Disney Brothers Cartoon Studio to [33:45] the Walt Disney Studio. So, there's two [33:49] stories about this. [33:50] >> I was going to say I've seen both. [33:51] >> One is that it was actually Royy's idea. [33:53] >> Yes. [33:54] because he's like, "Hey, you know, we [33:56] need to start building a brand and like [33:57] people need to know who is making these [33:59] Oswalds and it should be the Walt Disney [34:01] Studio [34:02] >> and you're very clearly the frontman. [34:04] You know, you're selling. You're the [34:05] visionary. You're the sort of creative [34:07] talent and this is a creative company. [34:08] Of course, it should be you." [34:10] >> Yep. The other story is that Waltz [34:12] always had a dream since he got to [34:14] Hollywood of having his name up on a [34:17] neon sign. now that they have their own [34:20] real studio. He wants a neon sign [34:22] constructed that says the Walt Disney [34:24] Studio, which I think does happen. [34:27] >> Yes, we'll put the photo in the email. [34:28] The Hyperion Avenue studio has this [34:30] really cool sign or did for a long time [34:33] before it got knocked down and I think [34:34] it's a strip mall or something today. [34:36] And in that vein, now that the studio [34:39] has become a real operation, Walt moves [34:42] from actually doing a lot of the [34:45] animation and camera work mostly to [34:48] overseeing the studio, which you have to [34:50] with an operation of 25 artists and [34:53] creative people and camera folks. You [34:56] need someone who has an overall vision [34:59] and taste to drive everything. Yep. [35:02] >> Now, as Walt is transitioning from, you [35:07] know, sort of doer to really studio head [35:11] >> and worth knowing, the ownership of Walt [35:13] Disney Studios that would become Walt [35:15] Disney Productions that would become the [35:17] Walt Disney Company was at this point [35:19] 60% owned by Walt and his wife and 40% [35:23] owned by Roy and his wife. [35:24] >> Yep. So Mintz, the husband of Winkler [35:28] back in New York, who has, you know, [35:30] sort of already proved his stripes by [35:32] his dealings with Felix the Cat and Pat [35:34] Sullivan, he senses another opportunity. [35:39] He thinks that Walt has become [35:43] superfluous and that it's actually just [35:47] the animators who really matter. And [35:50] because the Walt Disney Studio doesn't [35:53] actually own the IP of Oswald the Lucky [35:57] Rabbit, Universal does, [35:59] >> although the Walt Disney Studio was was [36:01] acting like this was sort of their [36:03] creation that they owned. [36:04] >> Yeah. I don't think Walt uh or Roy [36:08] really read the fine print on the [36:09] contracts here. So, in early 1928, [36:13] Walt and his wife Lillian, who Lillian [36:15] also was an early studio employee [36:18] >> in the Ink and Paint Department. That's [36:20] right. [36:20] >> We'll get to that. [36:21] >> They make a fateful trip as a couple to [36:24] New York, where one of the items on the [36:25] agenda is for Walt to go meet with Mintz [36:29] and ask for a raise in the amount that [36:33] the studio is getting paid per Oswald [36:36] Short. So Walt sits down with Mintz and [36:38] Mintz is like, "Well, [36:41] I don't know about paying you more. I [36:42] don't think I like that idea. In fact, [36:44] I'm not even really sure, Walt, what you [36:47] are doing around here any longer. But I [36:50] tell you what, I'm a nice guy. I'm [36:52] willing to let you and your little [36:54] studio stay involved here and keep [36:57] making the Oswalds, but we're going to [36:58] have to pay you less, not more. like [37:01] $500 per cartoon [37:04] less, [37:05] >> which my understanding is that basically [37:07] wiped out the margin and they were [37:09] saying we'll pay you cost to make these [37:12] Oswald cartoons. [37:13] >> Yeah, I think Mintz had basically [37:14] calculated, okay, if Walt takes this, [37:16] then I'm willing to let his studio keep [37:18] making it, and if he doesn't take it, [37:20] then it's all equal to me. I'm just [37:22] going to steal his animators and go make [37:24] it myself. And crucially, before this [37:28] meeting even happens, [37:29] >> he's already stolen the animators. [37:31] >> Mint has an ace in the hole. He has, I [37:33] think, signed contracts with nearly all [37:36] the animators except Eyeworks. He has [37:39] sort of through an act of subtrafuge [37:41] gotten in touch with each of them [37:43] individually and brought them over. [37:45] >> Yeah. only and and I think maybe two or [37:48] three other animators refused to sign [37:50] these secret deals with Mintz and stayed [37:53] loyal to to Walt and to Roy. Once Walt [37:56] realizes this, there's nothing he can [37:59] do. Like, it's a free country. He can't [38:02] force his animators to stay. He doesn't [38:04] have employment contracts with them. And [38:07] he also doesn't have any control or [38:10] rights to the actual Oswald IP. So, he [38:14] has no leverage. He's got nothing. He's [38:16] got no customer contract. He's got no [38:17] employees. He's got no intellectual [38:19] properties. Suddenly, the enterprise [38:22] value, so that the the entire value of [38:25] Walt Disney Studios is effectively zero. [38:27] Yep. It is a extremely bitter lesson for [38:31] Walt and for Roy. And it is one that you [38:33] can bet they never forget for the rest [38:37] of their lives. And really like [38:40] everything in Disney's history and all [38:42] of the enterprise value that Disney has [38:44] built that we will see all across the [38:46] rest of this episode traces back to this [38:48] moment. [38:49] >> It's a hard reaction to this lesson. [38:52] >> Totally. I have a fun bit of trivia for [38:54] you, Ben. [38:55] >> Oo. [38:55] >> So, as I think you know, Disney [38:58] eventually does get the rights to Oswald [39:02] back. [39:02] >> This is gonna be my trivia for you, [39:05] >> right? Actually, ask your question. We [39:06] might have different takes on it. Disney [39:08] eventually does get the rights to Oswald [39:12] back in 2006. [39:15] >> Bob Iger, one of his first acts as CEO, [39:17] did the deal. [39:18] >> Yes. Do you know how Bob got Oswald back [39:22] for Disney? [39:23] >> So, let's see. By this point, Disney had [39:25] acquired ABC. [39:26] >> Yep. [39:27] >> And had acquired ESPN. [39:29] >> And who owned Oswald at this point? It [39:32] was Universal, which was owned by NBC, [39:34] which is now owned by Comcast. [39:36] >> Correct. So, there's a ABC asset that [39:40] Bob effectively trades in exchange for [39:43] Oswald. And I think that ABC ESPN Monday [39:48] Night Football asset is Al Michaels. [39:51] >> Al Michaels, the Monday Night Football [39:53] commentator, like a sports team trade to [39:57] NBC in exchange for the IP rights to [40:00] Oswald the Rabbit. [40:01] >> And Oswald is repatriated and NBC gets [40:04] Al Michaels and all is right in the [40:05] world. Amazing. [40:07] So, back to 1928. Walt and Roy are [40:11] basically back at square one here. They [40:14] have not really just nothing. They [40:17] actually have less than nothing because [40:20] Mintz ever the uh well really just kind [40:23] of weasel is the right word. [40:25] >> Yeah. [40:26] He makes Walt and Walt Disney Studios [40:30] finish out the current Oswald contract, [40:34] which still had a few cartoons left to [40:37] animate on it, and pay all of the [40:40] animators who had all betrayed him and [40:42] were all about to defect. Mince is like, [40:44] "No, no, you've got a contract. You're [40:46] going to keep paying these folks while [40:47] they finish up the last couple shorts on [40:50] this brutal contract." Just brutal. [40:53] absolutely [40:55] humiliating for Walt. And so then, as [40:59] legend has it, on the long, long train [41:02] ride back home from New York, Walt is [41:08] struck by a bolt of inspiration. And he [41:12] scribbles a sketch for a new cartoon [41:14] character right there on his drawing pad [41:17] on the train trip. a character that [41:20] wouldn't just reverse all the woes of [41:23] the Oswalds and turn around the [41:25] company's fortune, but would maybe [41:27] become [41:29] one of, if not the most recognized [41:31] figure in all of human history. But [41:33] before we tell the story of Mickey [41:34] Mouse, now is a great time to thank our [41:37] friends at JP Morgan. [41:39] >> Yes, our presenting partner. So today we [41:42] are sharing a story from one of JP [41:44] Morgan's partners and a company that you [41:46] may know, Bill, which is formerly [41:48] Bill.com. Right. Bill is the financial [41:51] operations platform for half a million [41:54] small and midsize businesses, what they [41:56] call the Fortune 5 million. They help [41:58] manage and maximize cash flow for SMB [42:00] companies. And Bill's Divvyard product [42:03] is what employees at those businesses [42:04] use to fund their operations day-to-day. [42:06] So, uh, here's a scenario that many [42:08] listeners may have experienced. Someone [42:10] on your team maxes out the credit line [42:12] on their corporate card with an [42:14] unexpected purchase. You send a wire to [42:16] pay off the card so you can continue [42:17] using it, but it takes 2 to 3 days to [42:20] clear. Meanwhile, your team can't [42:22] transact. Yeah, Bill solved that for its [42:24] half a million customers using an [42:26] embedded payment solution from JP [42:28] Morgan. With API based subleddgering, [42:30] they can manage millions of payments in [42:32] real time on any platform, all with one [42:34] bank account. Every bill customer gets a [42:36] unique virtual account number. So the [42:38] moment a payment is received, the credit [42:40] line is restored. The result is a way [42:42] simpler way to receive and route [42:44] payments at scale. And the actual [42:46] numbers are awesome. Payment posting [42:48] went from 2 to 3 days to seconds. [42:51] Inquiries dropped 83%. Even Bill's own [42:54] Treasury team reclaimed 20 hours a week [42:57] from manual reconciliation. For decades, [43:00] these were Fortune 500 only [43:02] capabilities. But Bill and JP Morgan [43:04] figured out how to deliver that same [43:06] infrastructure to the Fortune 5 million [43:08] while also improving Bill's internal [43:10] operations. You can read the full case [43:12] study as always at [43:13] jpmorggan.com/acquired. [43:16] And something else, if you want to join [43:18] us and JP Morgan in person, we'll be on [43:20] stage at the We Are Developers World [43:22] Congress in San Jose this September. [43:24] Click the link in the show notes to [43:26] learn more. [43:27] >> Okay, so David, how does this Oswald [43:29] catastrophe lead to Mickey Mouse? All [43:32] right. So, here's the story of Mickey [43:34] Mouse, as Walt would tell it. It's March [43:37] 1928. He and Lillian are on the long [43:40] train ride back home to LA from New [43:42] York. He's struck by the bolt of [43:44] inspiration for a new cartoon scenario [43:47] about a pluckucky mouse named Mortimer [43:50] who is attempting to fly an airplane [43:52] just like his hero Charles Lindberg. And [43:55] this would go on to become the Mickey [43:56] cartoon Plane Crazy. So Walt shows his [44:00] sketches that he's making to Lillian and [44:02] Lillian says, "I like it, but Mortimer, [44:07] that's too a name. How about [44:08] Mickey?" And thus Mickey Mouse is born. [44:14] Now, the real story is more likely that [44:17] Walt and Lillian get back to LA and Walt [44:21] is like sweating. So he and Roy and the [44:24] couple other animators who stayed loyal [44:26] to them hole up and they start [44:28] brainstorming ideas for some kind of new [44:31] idea or new character that they can [44:33] create to replace Oswald and turn around [44:35] the studios fortunes. [44:37] >> And also when you see Mickey and you see [44:39] Oswald, it's not hard to imagine where [44:42] Mickey Mouse came from. It's like kind [44:44] of like shorten the ears, make them [44:45] circles, you know, they both kind of [44:47] have this white face and the black [44:48] outline. [44:49] >> I mean, it's really just the same brief [44:50] that created Oswald. It was like, "Hey, [44:52] take Felix and [44:54] >> do something like Felix." Except this [44:55] time it's [44:56] >> take Oswald and do something like Oswald [44:59] >> and make damn sure we own it. [45:01] >> Yes. Exactly. So, they land on the idea [45:03] of a mouse. [45:04] >> And didn't Walt claim that he sort of [45:05] like always had a fondness for mice cuz [45:07] there were mice that would like jump in [45:09] his trash can in Kansas City while he [45:11] was animating. And [45:12] >> sure, whatever. [45:15] >> You know, it's all it's all just part of [45:16] the Walt myth. [45:17] >> Yes. And at least according to the Neil [45:21] Gabler book, most likely [45:25] is the one who first draws Mickey, not [45:27] Walt on the Train. But [45:30] >> either way, [45:32] definitely was the primary animator of [45:35] the first Mickey's for the whole first [45:37] series of Mickey's, including Steamboat [45:40] Willie. So, by the summer of 1928, we've [45:44] finished out the Oswald contract and [45:46] Walt and the small little merry crew [45:50] have gotten two Mickey shorts ready for [45:53] production. Plain crazy and the Gallop [45:55] and Gala show. And Walt takes them [45:58] around to distributors. You know, the [46:00] Walt Disney Studio is well known at this [46:02] point. This seems like it would be [46:03] promising new IP. [46:05] And none of the major distributors are [46:08] interested. They're like, "Yeah, I don't [46:11] know. This is Mickey. It's like Oswald, [46:14] but [46:14] >> without all the, you know, thousands or [46:17] hundreds of thousands of raving fans for [46:18] it." So, [46:19] >> Exactly. Exactly. [46:21] And then comes the Eureka Breakthrough [46:26] idea. One of the gang recalls that the [46:30] Jazz Singer, the famous first popular [46:33] talky, you know, movie with dialogue and [46:35] sound that had just come out the [46:37] previous fall, when they went to see it, [46:40] that there was a cartoon screened [46:43] alongside it. And Walt, when he hears [46:45] this, puts the two ideas together in his [46:48] mind of a cartoon and sound. And [46:50] supposedly he says, "That's it. That's [46:52] it. That's what we've got to do. Stop [46:55] all these silent pictures. Now, at this [46:58] point, people had made cartoons with [47:02] sound, but nobody had ever made a [47:05] cartoon with sound like the jazz singer [47:07] had sound. [47:08] >> Synchronized sound. [47:09] >> Synchronized. Yes. Exactly. Where what [47:12] was happening in real time in the [47:14] cartoon was then played in sound. [47:18] Exactly. Synchronized in the movie [47:20] theater. [47:21] >> Yeah. The concept before was there's [47:23] music that plays, but it's only loosely [47:26] attached. And this is to the frame and [47:28] to the beat of the music. Like if you [47:30] see Mickey on screen bop into something, [47:34] then you might hear a xylophone on the [47:36] exact same downbeat play a note. [47:38] >> Yeah. It's not just that like there's [47:40] some music accompanying this cartoon [47:41] that you're watching. It's that what is [47:43] happening in the cartoon feels like it [47:46] is producing the sound. [47:47] >> Yes. There's a great business model [47:49] lesson in this, which is with the first [47:51] two Mickey's flopping, if you just do [47:54] the same thing as an existing competitor [47:58] who already has distribution, brand, [48:00] customers, it's not enough. You need to [48:03] go do something leveraging a new piece [48:06] of technology or a new platform. You got [48:08] to come at it from an orthogonal way in [48:10] order to leaprog and make people pay [48:12] attention to you. Otherwise, you're just [48:14] a like smaller, worse, also ran. [48:16] >> Totally. And and that could be anything. [48:17] I mean, the only reason that the Oswalds [48:19] worked, even though they were a ripoff [48:21] of Felix was because they came built in [48:24] with the Universal distribution, but [48:26] yeah, Walt taking out the Mickey's [48:28] before bringing sound. Like, he's got [48:30] nothing to bring to the table here. [48:32] >> Yep. [48:33] >> So, Walt lines up access to the [48:36] Cinnaphhone sound recording system from [48:39] a character named Pat Powers, who had [48:42] actually helped create Universal, you [48:44] know, some number of decades earlier. [48:46] and then had gone on to become a sound [48:50] accolade and entrepreneur developing a [48:52] sound system for this new movie [48:54] technology. And so Walt and crew animate [48:58] a test sequence of a Mickey with sound [49:02] and they screen it for all their wives [49:04] and girlfriends and writes later of what [49:07] happened next when they screen the [49:09] synchronized sound Mickey for the first [49:11] time. I never saw such a reaction in an [49:14] audience in my life. The scheme worked [49:16] perfectly. The sound itself gave the [49:19] illusion of something emanating directly [49:20] from the screen. Walt kept crying, "This [49:23] is it. This is it. We've got it." It [49:27] turned out that sound was the critical [49:30] enabling technology for animation to go [49:33] beyond a novelty and allow the [49:35] characters that are on screen to [49:38] actually have personality that audiences [49:39] connect with. [49:40] >> So interesting. And it's not obvious [49:44] at first. It's obvious in retrospect, [49:47] but you can totally see how when Walt [49:50] had this insight and then they made the [49:51] investment cuz doing a test animation [49:53] and synchronizing the sound, like even [49:54] to show a little screener must have been [49:56] really hard at the time cuz none of the [49:57] tools existed. They sort of had to [49:59] invent the way to synchronize the [50:01] drawings with the music and the systems. [50:04] It's sort of a big bet even to try and [50:06] see if that creates personality. [50:08] >> Right. Right. And sound did the same [50:10] thing for liveaction movies, but it's [50:15] not that big a leap to have humans [50:18] talking. Like humans talk, you know, [50:20] sound just made it way better. Sound for [50:23] cartoons was this giant leap. These [50:26] characters, this art can now be actual [50:28] characters with personalities. [50:30] >> Yeah. [50:31] >> In a way that they couldn't before. [50:32] >> Non-obvious at the time, completely [50:34] obvious in retrospect. [50:35] >> Yep. So, they make Steamboat Willie as [50:39] the third Mickey, but the first with [50:41] synchronized sound, [50:43] >> which we're going to skip over the whole [50:45] headache nightmare of creating this [50:46] thing. But it was like Walt constantly [50:50] going back and forth to New York, [50:51] betting every last dollar that he had, [50:53] inventing all these new processes, [50:56] trying different ways to get an [50:57] orchestra synced to the sound. [50:59] >> Oh, yeah. They like animated a little [51:01] ball on the screen that would sync to [51:03] the orchestra as they were playing. [51:05] >> Yes. and he couldn't get the original [51:06] conductor of the orchestra to actually [51:08] use his method. The orchestra guy was [51:10] like, "Ah, trust me." And then it was [51:11] all out of sync with the screen. The the [51:14] net of it is it's a giant painful [51:18] operational struggle to get this thing [51:20] out, but my god does it hit. [51:23] >> Yes. Well, [51:25] you know, this is the nature of the New [51:26] York distributors. They get it made. [51:29] Walt takes it and shops it around all [51:32] the big folks in New York. And they're [51:34] so conservative. They're like, "Well, [51:38] this is cool, but um I don't know how [51:40] audiences are going to react to this. We [51:42] kind of want to see a test first." [51:44] >> I don't want to be first in line. [51:45] >> Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. kind of like VCs [51:47] like [51:50] so Walt decides that he's going to take [51:52] matters into his own hands and he goes [51:54] directly to the manager of the Colony [51:56] Theater in New York City and cuts a deal [51:59] for $1,000 [52:01] to run Steamboat Willie before the [52:04] features that they're showing in the [52:06] Colony Theater. So going around [52:08] distributors just to get this in one [52:10] theater as a test. [52:12] >> Yep. And so Steamboat Willie premieres [52:15] in New York City on November 18th, 1928 [52:19] before the film Gang War. Nobody really [52:22] remembers Gang War because Steamboat [52:25] Willie is a revolution. Critics love it. [52:28] Audiences love it. [52:29] >> Yeah. Isn't there some famous story of [52:32] people sort of standing up and [52:34] screaming, "We want Steamboat Willie [52:35] again instead of playing the the main [52:37] feature." [52:38] >> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. But still, [52:40] you know, Disney now needs to find a [52:43] distributor. And now he's got the proof [52:45] point. [52:47] These New York distributors, they're [52:48] still so conservative. They're like, [52:50] "Well, you had one hit. I don't know [52:53] that like we can really trust that this [52:55] isn't just a fad that the future sounds [52:59] are also going to be a hit and that you [53:01] can repeat the magic." And famously, one [53:04] distributor while Walt is meeting with [53:06] him here and he's trying to explain to [53:08] Walt why he's going to pass again on the [53:10] Mickey deal picks up a package of [53:13] Lifesavers candy. And he says to Walt, [53:16] "The public knows the Lifesavers brand. [53:19] They know what these are. They don't [53:21] know Walt Disney and they don't know [53:23] your mouse." [53:26] >> I I can only imagine Walt sitting here [53:28] just seething. [53:29] >> Yeah. But this makes a huge impression [53:32] on him. I think this is an important [53:33] thing about Walt. He definitely has a [53:35] huge ego, right? But he is very willing [53:38] to learn even from pretty obnoxious [53:41] people. He's like, "You know what? [53:43] You're right." [53:44] >> Oh, I think he's motivated by learning. [53:45] He's motivated. [53:46] >> I think he's an engineer. I think he's [53:48] uh he loves picking things apart and [53:49] learning the way they work. I think he's [53:51] motivated to make the best art he can in [53:54] addition to making the best business he [53:55] can. So, if someone's going to offer him [53:57] >> a lesson, [53:57] >> a way to learn something. Yeah. [53:59] >> Yeah. He'll take it. he'll take it even [54:00] if he might be mad at the person. So he [54:03] writes about this moment later. From now [54:06] on, the audience was going to know if [54:08] they like the picture, they were going [54:11] to know Walt Disney's name. Ultimately, [54:14] what Walt does is he turns to Pat [54:17] Powers, his partner in the sound [54:19] technology, who had been one of the, you [54:21] know, original Universal executives, and [54:24] they cut a deal where Powers will be [54:27] Disney's direct distribution agent in [54:29] return for just 10% of the gross revenue [54:33] on the Mickey's, which seems like a [54:35] pretty good deal. [54:36] >> Yeah. And indeed, it was kind of a too [54:40] good to be true deal because Powers, [54:43] like all these New York guys, [54:46] was basically plotting to do the exact [54:49] same thing as Mintz to Disney. He wanted [54:53] to start working with Walt, give him a [54:55] sweetheart deal, and then lure away the [54:59] animation talent because Powers, [55:01] remember, has the sound technology that [55:03] he's given to Walt. So he's thinking, if [55:05] I get the animators, right, [55:07] >> what do we need Walt for? [55:08] >> So this explains the sweetheart deal on [55:10] distribution because that wasn't the [55:11] real prize he was after. [55:13] >> And [55:15] just a year later in 1930, Powers does [55:20] the unthinkable. [55:22] He convinces Eyeworks to quit and leave [55:26] Disney. He says, "U, we're going to get [55:29] you set up with your own studio. You're [55:31] going to work with me. we were to create [55:32] new characters. It's the exact same [55:35] thing that Mintz did to Disney last [55:39] time. [55:39] >> Absolutely brutal. [55:41] >> Except it plays out the exact opposite [55:44] way. [55:44] >> Cuz Walt's learned his lesson. [55:46] >> Walt has learned his lesson. By the time [55:48] this happens, over a dozen Mickey shorts [55:50] with sound have come out. Every single [55:53] one of them branded prominently up front [55:55] and at the end a Walt Disney comic. And [55:59] they had become huge hits. So even [56:02] though Power Steals Eye Works away, [56:04] nobody cares. Everybody still wants the [56:07] Mickey's. Everybody still wants Walt [56:09] Disney Comics. Disney has made himself [56:12] the lifesavers of animation. [56:15] >> Disney first switches to Columbia for [56:17] distribution and then to United Artists. [56:19] And audiences just keep loving Mickey. [56:24] In fact, they love him so much that it [56:27] leads to the discovery of a whole new [56:30] business model for Disney and the [56:32] company, the intellectual property [56:35] flywheel. And it starts with the Mickey [56:38] Mouse Club. This is wild. I had no idea [56:41] about the origins of the Mickey Mouse [56:43] Club. [56:44] >> Basically discovered by Disney by [56:46] accident, right? [56:46] >> Totally by accident. [56:49] So, in the summer of 1929, [56:52] just a few months after Steamboat Willie [56:55] and the first sort of nationally [56:56] distributed Mickeyy's, the manager of [56:59] the Fox Dome Theater in Ocean Park, [57:02] California, contacts Walt with an idea. [57:06] Why don't we partner to start a Mickey [57:09] Mouse club for kids? I've got like a [57:12] thousand kids who keep showing up here [57:15] at the theater every weekend and all [57:18] they want to do is watch the Mickey's [57:20] again and again and again. I think we [57:23] should capitalize on this. We can create [57:26] a club like a kids club and we can [57:29] charge parents a membership fee. The [57:32] kids will love it. The parents will get [57:34] them out of the house every weekend. [57:37] It'll be great. and we can pilot it here [57:40] at the Foxdome Theater and then if it [57:42] works I think we can franchise this [57:45] nationally. And so this is exactly what [57:49] Walt and this theater manager do. The [57:52] way it works when they take it national [57:54] is that theaters would buy a quote [57:56] Mickey Mouse Club charter from the [57:59] company from the Walt Disney Studio. [58:01] >> It's like a franchise. [58:02] >> Yeah, like a franchise right [58:04] >> for $25. And then as part of the club, [58:08] the kids and their parents would gain [58:10] the right to buy exclusive Mickey [58:14] merchandise. [58:15] >> I mean, it's kind of amazing, right? Pay [58:18] to become a member of a club to dedicate [58:20] yourself to fandom. So, you have the [58:22] right to buy more things. [58:23] >> The right to buy more things. Yes. So, [58:25] like hats, buttons, banners, etc. And [58:29] all of this revenue is getting split [58:32] back with Disney. the $25 club charter [58:35] and then all the merchandise revenue. [58:38] >> Pretty quickly, there are 800 [58:42] Mickey Mouse clubs across the country [58:45] with more than 1 million total members. [58:49] That is more members than the Boy and [58:52] Girl Scouts of America combined at this [58:55] point in time. [58:56] >> That's insane scale and insane speed of [58:59] adoption pre- internet. [59:01] >> Right. Right. pre- internet, pre-cable, [59:03] pre-bro TV, the ability to get a million [59:06] Americans doing something within a few [59:09] years is uh like how did that even work? [59:12] I mean, I'm trying to think how word [59:13] could even spread that quickly. I guess [59:15] through theaters, Disney's distributors [59:18] >> to the theaters. [59:19] >> Well, this is like a no-brainer [59:21] proposition for a movie theater [59:24] operator. You're going to take your [59:26] Saturday or Sunday afternoons, which are [59:29] probably reserved mostly for kids [59:31] anyway. all your matinea showings, [59:33] right? You're going to convert it into a [59:34] Mickey Mouse club. [59:36] >> Kids are going to love it. They're going [59:38] to buy a bunch of stuff that you [59:41] otherwise wouldn't have the opportunity [59:42] to sell to them. Parents are going to [59:45] love it because they get rid of the [59:46] kids. And then for Disney, they're just [59:49] getting this turbocharged distribution [59:51] and brand recognition of Disney the [59:53] company and Mickey Mouse the character. [59:55] >> Yeah, it's amazing. Okay, so they take [59:58] the learnings from the Mickey Mouse [59:59] Club, right? And they kind of lean into [60:01] Mickey in a in a big way at the [60:02] corporate level. [60:03] >> Totally. So just a few months after the [60:06] Mickey Mouse Club kicks off in January [60:08] 1930, they launch a daily Mickey comic [60:12] strip with King Features Syndicate in [60:16] newspapers around the country. It gets [60:18] published daily in 60 US newspapers and [60:23] then also internationally in 20 more [60:26] countries around the world. So Disney is [60:29] getting paid [60:31] to produce a Mickey comic strip, which [60:34] only cost them the salary of the one [60:36] animator that they have making it every [60:39] day, a 24-year-old named Floyd [60:42] Gotfredson, who would do it every day [60:44] for 45 years. [60:47] >> Wow. Wild. So, not only are they getting [60:50] revenue for this, they're getting free [60:53] daily advertising and IP exposure to [60:58] probably a 100 million plus people [61:01] through this newspaper comic [61:03] distribution every single day. [61:06] >> And even if they weren't getting paid [61:07] for it, the marketing on that so that [61:09] people go see Mickey films. [61:11] >> Exactly. Yeah. It never becomes a huge [61:12] revenue or profit driver for them, but [61:15] like that free daily marketing in most [61:18] major newspapers around the country is [61:19] incredible. [61:20] >> Yep. Interesting to know Oswald actually [61:23] was on a candy bar back in the day, but [61:25] when Walt, who at the time saw he owned [61:27] Oswald, had the opportunity to monetize [61:30] it, he was like, I I didn't even [61:31] consider it. It it doesn't need to be an [61:34] additional revenue stream. It's just [61:35] really good for me if Oswald is on the [61:37] candy bar. Right. So, that's sort of uh [61:40] they're getting the seeds of like, okay, [61:41] we're making some money on the comics, [61:43] but it it it really is like a massive [61:46] marketing engine. [61:47] >> Well, uh you're teeing up the big one [61:49] here, which is merch and consumer [61:52] products. [61:53] >> Yep. So pretty quickly after Steamboat [61:55] Willie, Walt is walking the street in [61:58] New York and a man comes up to him, like [62:01] comes up to Walt Disney on the street [62:03] and offers Walt $300 [62:07] to license the Mickey character to put [62:10] it on a series of children's writing [62:13] workbooks that he's producing there in [62:16] New York. And this is like really early [62:18] days. Mickey's just starting to work. [62:20] The studio still needs money. So Walt's [62:22] like, "Uh, sure. Yeah, I'll take 300 [62:25] bucks. Why not?" [62:26] >> And 300 bucks in 1929, it's a lot of [62:28] money. I mean, this is the beginning of [62:30] the Great Depression. [62:31] >> Yes. Yes. Mi Mickey takes off during the [62:33] depression. In fact, he sort of becomes [62:35] like a national champion. It's part of [62:37] his success that people view Plucky [62:39] Mickey's success as a mouse, as the [62:42] underdog, as like something that [62:44] >> Americans can identify with through the [62:46] depression. [62:47] >> And life is hard. I mean, having a sort [62:49] of way to disassociate a little bit and [62:51] then just enjoy a like funloving, [62:53] problemfree cartoon. I don't think [62:55] people know this. Mickey's role in these [62:57] early comics is exactly what you're [62:58] saying, the underdog. He's getting [63:00] himself into these tricky situations by [63:02] someone that seems bigger and stronger [63:03] and he's able to figure it out and [63:05] emerge. It's the American spirit. [63:07] >> Yep. Yep. Yep. So, back to the writing [63:09] tablets, [63:11] they take off and do huge, huge sales. [63:13] Disney doesn't even know how much sales [63:15] because all they have is 300 a handshake [63:18] from this guy. So, Walt and Roy figure, [63:21] "All right, we need to get smarter about [63:23] merch." So, they contact an adman in [63:28] Kansas City that Walt admired named K. [63:31] Cayman who had owned an advertising firm [63:34] and they agree to do a deal where Kay [63:38] becomes the exclusive [63:40] commercial products agent for all Disney [63:43] merchandise licensing beginning in 1933. [63:47] And the deal they do is that Disney [63:50] would get 60% of the first $100,000 in [63:54] royalties that Kay is able to generate [63:56] from licensing Disney brands and [63:58] mascots. And then after the first 100k, [64:02] they would split every dollar of [64:04] licensing revenue 5050 [64:06] >> and there would be a lot of dollars [64:09] after the first 100k. This is a huge [64:14] moment. I mean there there is a real [64:16] case to be made that besides Walt and [64:19] Roy and and of I works too, but at least [64:22] on the business side besides Walt and [64:24] Roy K. Cayman was the third most [64:27] important person in the first, you know, [64:29] half century of Disney. [64:31] >> All right. So, make your case. What what [64:32] what goes on to happen here? [64:34] >> So, within 6 months, Kay takes Disney [64:38] merchandising from this hodgepodge of [64:42] random licenses of guys that Walt met on [64:44] the street [64:45] >> and many of which were a lot more than [64:46] $300. [64:47] >> Yes. Yes. to a real professional [64:50] operation [64:51] doing $6 million [64:54] of gross merchandise sales within six [64:57] months. That then grows over the next [65:01] two years to $70 million annually of [65:06] gross merchandise sales all around the [65:09] globe from over 40 separate super high [65:13] quality consumer product partners. So [65:17] the most successful and famous example [65:21] of this is the deal that Kay does in [65:25] 1933 right after he takes over with the [65:27] Ingresol Watt company. This is crazy [65:30] that within just a few years they can be [65:33] at a $70 million level in 1935 [65:38] of merch. I mean, there's so much pent [65:40] up demand to buy Mickey Mouse stuff that [65:44] you can sort of explode out of the gate. [65:46] I don't even really understand how Kay [65:48] lined up 40 merchants and got all this [65:51] stuff manufactured and distributed in [65:52] such a short period of time. [65:54] >> Well, I think part of it though is that [65:55] he's like a real professional and well [65:58] respected in the industry with contacts. [66:00] But yeah, to your point, Ben, there's [66:03] just so much demand for Disney merch. So [66:06] the $70 million is a like gross sales to [66:10] the end consumer number. So most deals [66:14] that K would do would be for 5% [66:19] royalties on the wholesale price of the [66:22] goods and the $70 million was retail. So [66:25] if you assume 100% retail markup, that's [66:28] $35 million in wholesale revenue. Y [66:32] >> Disney and Cayman are splitting 5% of [66:35] that number between them, but even that [66:38] is $1.75 million [66:42] split 50/50 between Disney and K. This [66:47] is like an astronomical number and it is [66:49] a way way bigger and better business [66:54] than the cartoons themselves at this [66:56] point in time. [66:56] >> It's funny. I I found the comment on the [66:59] Disney Family Museum site that by the [67:01] late 1930s, royalty income from [67:03] merchandise had exceeded revenue from [67:06] film rentals. But [67:08] >> it wasn't even by the late 1930s, it was [67:10] 1934. [67:11] >> It was quick and it was by a lot. [67:13] >> Yes. Yes. So, just to illustrate the [67:15] difference, the distribution deal that [67:17] Disney does with United Artists for the [67:19] Mickey films and for the Silly [67:20] Symphonies, which is the second cartoon [67:22] series that Disney starts in the 30s, [67:24] Disney gets an advance of $15,000 per [67:28] film, but Walt is always investing [67:33] ever more and more in the production of [67:36] the cartoons themselves. [67:38] By this point in time in the mid30s, [67:41] he's investing like $30,000 plus per [67:44] cartoon. He's only getting a $15,000 [67:47] advance. So, it's not even guaranteed [67:50] that each individual cartoon would be [67:52] profitable. Usually, they were, but they [67:54] would have to earn out on the back end. [67:57] Compare that to, you know, half of [67:59] basically $2 million in pure margin, [68:03] almost pure margin revenue coming in [68:05] from K every year. It doesn't even [68:08] matter that Walt is investing everything [68:10] back into the cartoons. He's got this [68:11] money spiggot coming in. [68:13] >> Right. So, summarizing that, films are [68:15] tens or low hundreds of thousands of [68:17] dollars of profit coming in and the [68:19] merch is on the order of a million [68:21] dollars. [68:22] >> Yep. And film profitability is highly [68:25] dependent on a film by film basis. It's [68:28] got to play out in theaters, etc., etc. [68:30] >> All right. So, I cut you off on the [68:32] Ingresol watch company. [68:33] >> Yeah. Just as one example of like the [68:35] deals that Kay is doing, in 1933, right [68:39] after he takes over, he does a deal with [68:41] the Ingresol Watch Company to [68:44] manufacture the famous Mickey Mouse [68:47] watch. That watch would sell 2 and a [68:51] half million units [68:53] over the next two years. The Ingresol [68:56] Watch Company was about to go bankrupt [68:58] during the depression. It saves the [69:00] company. Hm. And wasn't it the most [69:02] popular watch in America? [69:04] >> I think that's right. At least for some [69:05] point in time during the 30s. [69:07] >> It's fascinating. And of course, the the [69:09] modern Apple Watch Mickey watch face is [69:12] a reference to this cuz he's using his [69:14] arms to point to the the times on that [69:16] original Incorolaw watch. [69:18] >> This is a whole different shape of a [69:20] business than has ever existed before. I [69:23] mean, it's funny. We started the episode [69:24] comparing Disney to other Hollywood [69:27] studios, but this is not a Hollywood [69:29] studio. They're not shooting liveaction [69:31] films. They're making these cartoons. [69:34] The rest of the industry is is kind of [69:36] doing slap dash ones. They're doing like [69:38] really high production value sound [69:40] synchronized cartoons and they're [69:43] actually making more of their money from [69:45] merchandise. They've got these Mickey [69:47] Mouse clubs. [69:48] >> Like this is a new thing that no one [69:51] else is doing. [69:52] >> Yep. This is the birth of the Disney [69:54] flywheel and nobody else has it. So, is [69:57] this a point where David I could make my [69:59] pedantic aside that I've been telling [70:00] you about? [70:01] >> Yes. Yes. Yes. Go for it. [70:03] >> We had a great email from a listener a [70:06] couple months ago about how flywheel, [70:09] this term that everybody uses in [70:11] business is actually completely the [70:13] wrong term for what you're want to [70:15] describe. [70:15] >> So, Disney is famous for this concept, [70:19] as is Amazon, and it inspired a zillion [70:21] other founders to try and articulate [70:23] their own flywheel and and draw it out. [70:26] But hilariously, David, as you say, it [70:27] is a misnomer. It describes the wrong [70:30] physics phenomenon. People are trying to [70:32] describe a system that has a positive [70:34] feedback loop where inputs into one [70:37] element of the system are amplified and [70:39] add energy to other parts of the system. [70:41] But that is not actually what a flywheel [70:43] is. A flywheel is a primitive battery. [70:47] It it is a way to store energy to be [70:49] deployed later. [70:50] >> Yeah. It's like a version of the same [70:52] mechanism that a spring serves in a [70:54] mechanical watch. [70:55] >> Right. Exactly. But in reality, there's [70:58] not really a better shorthand for system [71:01] of integrated components that creates [71:03] positive feedback loops. So uh we will [71:06] continue alas to use the phrase [71:08] flywheel. But uh the important thing [71:10] here is that Walt really did sort of [71:12] either discover or invent this business [71:15] model of the intellectual property [71:16] flywheel that we see replicated all over [71:18] the place today. I mean, I think it [71:19] really revealed itself to him and Roy in [71:23] these early years of Mickey. And it's [71:26] probably worth taking a moment to talk [71:27] about why this works so well. So the [71:29] most important thing, and I don't think [71:31] this was premeditated in any way by [71:33] Walt, but it was just something he [71:35] innately cared so deeply about, is to [71:39] make the highest quality, [71:42] genuinely most compelling new IP as [71:46] possible that audiences can build a deep [71:49] relationship with. This is like what [71:51] Walt was building to and too through all [71:54] of his early years in animation. all the [71:56] technical innovations, every step was [71:58] getting to a character that audiences [72:01] can fall in love with. [72:02] >> Yeah. [72:02] >> Now, critically for Disney, and again, I [72:05] think completely accidentally discovered [72:08] by Walt, the IP that works best for [72:13] Flywheel Dynamics almost has to be [72:16] animated, i.e. not live action. Because [72:21] with live action characters, the [72:23] characters are too bound up in the [72:25] actors that play them. And that creates [72:28] all sorts of problems. Like one, [72:30] especially today, it makes your [72:32] economics as a studio just like way [72:34] worse because you got to pay the stars [72:37] so much, [72:38] >> right? There's wholesale transfer [72:39] pricing. A huge amount of the margin you [72:42] could get ends up getting paid out to [72:44] effectively your partner in creating the [72:46] character, the actual actor. [72:47] >> Whereas Mickey works for free. No, like [72:50] you you got to like pay the animators [72:52] and they get paid very well to animate [72:54] them. It's [72:54] >> that's on the value capture side, but on [72:56] the value creation side, which I think [72:58] is the more important thing, Mickey is [72:59] always available to work. [73:01] >> Yes. Yes. [73:02] >> And Mickey doesn't age. [73:04] >> Yes. Exactly. You can create a eternal [73:07] character through animation in a way [73:09] that you just can't when you're using [73:11] real people. I mean, Star Wars, as great [73:13] as Star Wars is, and we'll talk about it [73:15] later in the episode, is going to have a [73:18] problem when Mark Hamill and Harrison [73:20] Ford die. I mean, I guess unless AI gets [73:22] really good. [73:23] >> And live action is sort of dated to a [73:27] time and place in a way that cartoons [73:30] can sort of transcend. Like Mickey can [73:32] always exist in the present [73:35] >> in a way that we're going to talk about [73:36] Davy Crockett later, but at some point [73:38] it became completely uninteresting to [73:40] watch Davy Crockett. Even though he was [73:43] like a complete heartthrob obsession [73:46] that was great IP for the moment, it [73:47] just wasn't as durable. [73:49] >> Yeah. Live action IP with very few [73:52] exceptions tends not to have the staying [73:54] power over decades and generations that [73:57] animation does. [73:58] >> Yeah. few exceptions being like James [74:00] Bond, but god have they tried to do all [74:02] sorts of crazy stuff in order to let [74:04] that IP keep living. I mean, like [74:05] there's been six, seven James Bonds, you [74:08] know, and they have to keep rebooting [74:09] the story over and over. [74:10] >> Exactly. Okay, so that's step one. [74:13] Genuinely great IP that audiences fall [74:15] in love with has to be at the core. [74:18] Then step two, you need to maximize the [74:23] distribution for that IP as wide and as [74:26] far as possible in its primary delivery [74:29] vehicle. So like Mickey in those films, [74:33] get those films into as many theaters as [74:35] possible to just completely saturate the [74:38] world. It's sort of a scale economies [74:40] thing. If you're going to invest a whole [74:41] bunch in making it the very best you [74:43] can, then you need to distribute it [74:45] everywhere in order to maximize the [74:47] impact from that huge upfront [74:48] investment. [74:49] >> Which of course applies to any film and [74:51] any IP. But for Disney in the flywheel [74:54] business model, they're willing to make [74:56] every sacrifice possible to maximize [74:59] distribution because they know that [75:02] they're going to monetize through the [75:04] flywheel in a way that nobody else can. [75:06] If they saturate all of America or all [75:09] of the English speaking world with a [75:10] character, then that character, that [75:13] movie can become a shared cultural [75:15] memory. [75:16] >> So then that leads right into the third [75:18] thing, which is the ancillary nodes of [75:21] the flywheel itself. Once you've got the [75:24] great IP, once you've distributed it as [75:27] widely as possible, then you want to get [75:29] that IP into as many other arenas as [75:34] possible. And this is exactly what [75:36] Disney was doing, [75:37] >> right? Other mediums, [75:38] >> merch, clubs, comics, books, magazines. [75:42] The beauty here and the discovery that [75:45] Disney makes is that when you put the IP [75:49] into these other ancillary nodes, it [75:52] doesn't cannibalize the core IP. Like [75:54] you're not going to oversaturate Mickey [75:57] by having a Mickey comic strip and daily [76:00] exposure in the way that if you released [76:02] a new Mickey film every single day, [76:04] people would get tired of Mickey's. [76:06] >> If you structure the nodes of the [76:07] flywheel, right, [76:09] >> the additional exposure reinforces the [76:12] core IP. That's really interesting. So [76:16] you do need some scarcity of the [76:18] character in its main medium where you [76:21] need like a really high quality bar and [76:23] not oversaturate there but in your [76:26] secondary mediums then you can cover the [76:28] earth and be like everywhere all the [76:30] time. [76:31] >> Exactly. And so then if you flash [76:32] forward to today and like the problems [76:35] that Hollywood and most other studios [76:38] have and Disney too, especially with [76:40] Marvel, if you come out with sequels all [76:43] the time at this like everinccreasing [76:45] cadence of the core IP and the core [76:47] delivery vehicle, people get tired of [76:50] it. [76:52] >> That's super interesting. [76:53] >> But the flywheel lets you get that [76:55] constant exposure without oversaturating [76:57] the core IP. It's like absolutely [76:59] brilliant. Not to mention releasing [77:01] films is actually not and never has been [77:04] a great business model. It's just not [77:07] that high margin. It's not that [77:09] repeatable or predictable in its [77:11] success. So you kind of [77:12] >> you have to invest years ahead in [77:14] production before you get any payout. [77:16] >> Right. Right. That and any studio that [77:18] is purely a studio is in for a rough go. [77:21] But if you're you're trying to basically [77:24] create this like durable platform of [77:26] profit with all of these ancillary [77:28] businesses, then you can focus on [77:31] scarcity, quality, innovation in the [77:35] kind of primary medium. [77:36] >> Yep. Because you know you're going to [77:37] drive revenue basically in perpetuity [77:41] out of it through the flywheel. [77:42] >> Do you think I'm thinking about this as [77:45] it pertains to acquired, we're so [77:47] obsessed with quality and just being in [77:49] one medium. Do you think that it is okay [77:53] to lower the quality bar outside the [77:56] primary medium? Like, can Disney throw [77:59] Mickey Mouse on all sorts of crap [78:02] without diminishing the brand of Mickey [78:05] Mouse as long as the primary medium of [78:07] film stays really high quality. [78:09] >> Basically, I think the answer to that is [78:11] yes. [78:12] >> Huh. [78:12] >> At least for Disney. I don't know about [78:14] acquired. [78:15] >> Yeah. I don't I don't know if it applies [78:16] to premium brands or luxury brands, but [78:19] >> you got to be really careful about what [78:20] the mediums are. This is why comics is [78:23] so perfect for the flywheel because [78:26] people are used to consuming a daily bit [78:30] of content in a comic strip and they [78:32] don't have expectations that it's going [78:35] to be, you know, a great masterpiece [78:37] like Snow White or Steamboat Willie each [78:39] time. [78:40] >> Right. And when you read the noncanon [78:43] Star Wars books, [78:45] >> Yes. it doesn't detract from the canon. [78:48] >> That's exactly right. But it does deepen [78:50] your fandom. [78:50] >> Yes. Exactly. Exactly. [78:52] >> Huh. So all of this as Walt starts to [78:55] understand the business model power of [78:58] what they've created leads him right to [79:02] the natural conclusion that Disney [79:05] should basically always invest as much [79:10] time and money as possible in the [79:13] creation of new core IP. And Walt is [79:16] starting to get a crazy idea of how he [79:18] might be able to do that, which is to [79:21] create Hollywood's first fulllength [79:26] animated [79:27] feature film, [79:30] Snow White. Yeah. And David, you put it [79:34] in such a capitalist way there that it's [79:36] it's to maximize the amount of of [79:40] dollars that you sink into making the [79:42] quality so that it federates onto this [79:44] flywheel. [79:45] I'm sure there was an element of that. [79:47] There also is an artist with Walt where [79:50] he's been creating these cartoons. He's [79:53] starting to like really identify with [79:55] the artistic community, with the fine [79:58] artists of the time, build a lot of [80:00] those relationships. and he wants to [80:03] create something that is sort of seen as [80:07] not only a technology breakthrough but [80:09] like an art breakthrough. Can can he [80:12] create a masterpiece in this new medium [80:15] >> and can he play with your emotions? I [80:17] mean, we we know that cartoon characters [80:19] in a slapstick way can make you laugh, [80:21] but there is this like total open [80:23] question in the world of can you create [80:26] animation so realistic and characters so [80:29] compelling that you can make audiences [80:31] cry. [80:32] >> Yeah, [80:32] >> that's the other side of the ludicrously [80:34] capitalist big investment into Snow [80:37] White. [80:37] >> You're totally right. I'm looking at it [80:39] through like a business model, [80:42] capitalist lens. And uh I I don't think [80:45] Walt was thinking about it that way [80:46] specifically. [80:47] >> He did want to build the most successful [80:49] company that he possibly could that [80:51] could take bigger and bigger swings. [80:53] >> Yes. [80:53] >> So listeners, before we tell you the [80:57] story of Snow White and how it came to [80:58] be, now is a great time to tell you [81:00] about one of our favorite companies, [81:03] Versel. So building software in the [81:06] agentic AI era demands a completely [81:08] different kind of infrastructure. So [81:10] that's exactly what Verscell has been [81:12] building. Their tools in their agent [81:14] stack have been huge for companies like [81:16] Notion, Brex, and Neon for shipping [81:19] agents to production. And they just made [81:22] some really big announcements on stage [81:23] at their annual conference called Ship, [81:25] which uh David and I actually spoke at [81:27] last year. Yes. One of the biggest [81:29] announcements is Eve, Verscell's open- [81:32] source agent framework. [81:34] >> Yep. Eve is the glue that ties their [81:36] agent stack together. Building an [81:38] enterprisegrade agent used to take [81:40] weeks. With Eve, it now just takes [81:42] minutes. Think of it as like the next.js [81:45] for agents, opinionated, open- source, [81:48] and it runs everywhere. And Verscell [81:50] uses it for their whole business. Their [81:52] data agent gives the whole company [81:54] ondemand analytics scoped to each [81:56] person's permissions. their sales agent [81:59] nearly doubled pipeline coverage and [82:01] their autonomous AI sales rep platforms [82:03] is in the top 10% of their human reps uh [82:06] you know for only a few thousand dollars [82:07] a year. They also rolled out new support [82:09] for enterprise apps and agents because [82:12] here's what every executive is realizing [82:14] once everyone can build an agent. The [82:16] hard part is knowing who can access what [82:18] and what every agent is actually doing. [82:20] Wouldn't it be nice to run your agents [82:22] and apps inside your own cloud so that [82:24] everything you build stays within your [82:26] own security boundary? Verscell does [82:28] exactly that. [82:29] >> Versel's your one-stop shop for the [82:30] Agentic era. Tools, frameworks, [82:32] infrastructure, all engineered to work [82:34] together and built for enterprises. And [82:36] one last cool thing, their ship [82:38] conference is hitting more cities [82:39] worldwide. So you can find out more at [82:41] verscell.com/acquired. [82:43] That's verel.com/acquired. [82:46] And just tell them that Ben and David [82:48] sent you. All right. So, David, before [82:51] we tell the story of how Snow White came [82:54] to be, we got to tell the nickname of [82:58] Snow White, the project that was going [83:00] around Hollywood. Do you know what that [83:01] was? [83:02] >> Disney's folly. [83:03] >> Yes. Yes. I think it was maybe Walt's [83:05] folly, but either way, it's the exact [83:07] same thing that people said about Trip [83:08] Hawkins when he was working on Madden, [83:11] about Jack Bogle with Bogle's folly with [83:13] creating the Vanguard index funds. We [83:15] got to like start a a folly tracker here [83:16] on tracker. [83:18] >> But yeah, I mean even for Walt Disney, [83:21] as successful as he and the studio have [83:23] become, the idea of a featurelength [83:26] animated film was crazy in 1930s [83:30] Hollywood. [83:30] >> And it had never been tried before. [83:32] >> I mean, Roy tried to persuade him not to [83:34] do it. He argues that it's going to [83:35] bankrupt the studio. [83:37] >> Yeah, this is a multi-million dollar [83:39] undertaking. When David, as you were [83:40] talking about before, the shorts were [83:42] like $15,000, $30,000 undertakings. [83:46] >> Yep. Walt would say later about Snow [83:47] White, we had decided there was only one [83:50] way we could successfully do Snow White, [83:53] and that was to go for broke, shoot the [83:55] works. There would be no compromise on [83:57] money, talent, or time. We did not know [84:00] whether the public would go for a [84:01] cartoon feature, but we were darn sure [84:03] that audiences would not buy a bad [84:06] cartoon feature. [84:08] So good. It had to be a masterpiece or [84:11] the whole thing was going to fall apart. [84:12] >> Okay. So, why was this so expensive? Why [84:15] was such a giant undertaking to create a [84:18] animated feature fulllength film? [84:21] Listeners, I thought it'd be fun on this [84:22] episode to dive into the process and [84:24] give everyone a little primer on what [84:27] are the steps to create an animated [84:29] film. [84:30] >> Yes, it's a true technical wonder and [84:34] you and I got to actually do it when we [84:36] went to visit the Disney studio. It was [84:38] so fun. [84:39] >> Well, one part of one frame of it. Yes. [84:41] >> One tiny part of inking and painting. [84:44] >> Listeners, we'll include some behind the [84:45] scenes ink and paint photos of David and [84:48] I in the email. So, let's start with the [84:52] goal. The goal is to create the illusion [84:56] of motion with a series of still frames. [85:00] Like a ton of still frames, 24 still [85:04] frames per second. [85:07] So that requires a lot of clever tricks [85:11] to make it economically possible, to [85:14] make it consistent, and to make it [85:16] enjoyable. And if you really do your [85:18] job, to make it emotional for the [85:21] viewer. [85:22] >> And to be clear, liveaction film is the [85:25] same thing. It's an illusion, but as we [85:27] talked about earlier, it doesn't cost [85:29] anything to animate the humans, [85:31] >> and you get physics for free. So [85:33] believability comes for free. You don't [85:35] have to do clever things like figure out [85:37] how do things stretch and squish when [85:40] someone bounces on the ground. It all [85:43] just sort of happens because you're [85:44] shooting it in the real world. Yep. [85:46] >> So, where does it all start? It starts [85:48] with a good story. So, there's something [85:50] called the story department that kicks [85:52] off the process with little sketches [85:54] that are sort of pinned to corkboards. [85:57] And so, these story meetings are great. [85:58] You have people acting out alongside the [86:01] drawings to illustrate their idea, how [86:04] the characters move and interact and [86:06] talk. And Walt was famously amazing to [86:09] watch when he did this acting. So this [86:12] then gets put into a story reel of [86:15] static sketches just kind of [86:17] illustrating the main flow of the story. [86:18] At this point, it is super easy to edit, [86:21] reorder, change dialogue, anything. [86:25] >> I see where you're going with this. at [86:27] this point. [86:28] >> at this point. So then the sound [86:29] department gets involved and that's both [86:33] music and voice. So first you'll have [86:36] oftentimes a temp voice over so the [86:38] animators have something to animate to [86:40] if you don't have the real actors laying [86:42] down the vocal track yet. You also have [86:45] the music scored and recorded at this [86:47] phase. And the way that animation and [86:50] sound are synced at this point is [86:52] through something called bar sheets or [86:54] exposure sheets where the entire film, [86:56] this is going to sound insane, is broken [86:59] down by frame, by syllable of dialogue [87:02] and by beat of the music and these are [87:05] mapped together. So this way the [87:07] animator can do their drawings exactly [87:10] to the music and dialogue. Now you can [87:12] kind of understand the insanity of what [87:15] Steamboat Willie was trying to do and [87:17] why that was so difficult. The the [87:19] Disney studio kind of had to invent this [87:21] process. [87:22] >> Yeah. And that was what 7 8 minutes [87:25] long. [87:26] >> Yes. Meanwhile, you have the layout [87:28] department who is doing the staging, the [87:31] camera framing, the composition of these [87:34] shots, the lighting for every scene. [87:37] Now, when I say things like staging, [87:39] there's there's no stage. camera [87:41] framing. There is a camera, but that's [87:43] not even the camera this is referring [87:44] to. This is where the synthetic camera [87:46] is aiming in the synthetic action [87:48] composition, lighting. This isn't like [87:51] lighting the way you think of lighting. [87:52] This is this very abstract art of [87:55] imagining what it would look like if [87:58] these characters were real and there [88:00] were real lights and figuring out how to [88:03] draw that scene. [88:05] Then this gets forked into two parallel [88:07] processes where background painters are [88:10] doing their work on these gorgeous [88:12] watercolors on paper and oil paintings [88:14] on these super wide panes of glass to [88:17] allow for the panning across the scene. [88:20] Whenever you go into the Disney [88:21] archives, you can see these I don't know [88:24] 4 foot wide by something like 8 in tall [88:27] backgrounds because the camera has to [88:29] pan around as the characters move around [88:31] against the background. And then the [88:33] other side of the fork is the animators [88:35] who are doing their work on the [88:37] characters themselves. [88:38] >> Yep. Yeah. The backgrounds are just [88:40] beautiful when you see them in person. [88:42] That was my favorite part about the [88:44] archive to get to see the backgrounds of [88:47] Snow White or Cinderella or the other [88:50] great Disney classics. You just look at [88:51] them and think, "Oh my god, these are [88:54] right up there with Rembrandt or [88:56] Picassos or Da. They should be in a [88:59] museum." [89:00] >> And they are basically in a museum. [89:02] Disney has 11 rooms in the animation [89:06] research library which are temperature [89:08] controlled and humidity controlled. And [89:11] they've got all these UV filters all [89:12] over everything. And there's these [89:14] drawers and drawers and drawers inside. [89:16] It almost looks like data centers where [89:18] they have all of these old background [89:21] paintings and all the drawings we're [89:22] about to talk about. [89:23] >> Yep. So, the animation department then [89:25] develops what's called a character model [89:27] sheet that shows the character from [89:29] several different angles and positions [89:31] they're likely to be in throughout the [89:32] film. This is distributed to each [89:34] animator who works on that character cuz [89:37] often and by necessity there are [89:39] multiple since that character is going [89:41] to exist on film for you know 80 90 100 [89:45] minutes. There's a lot of drawing to do. [89:47] Then there's the model department who [89:49] makes something called a mckette. The [89:52] animators who are drawing a character [89:54] hundreds and hundreds or thousands of [89:55] times or tens of thousands of times need [89:58] a consistent physical reference that [90:00] they can hold and rotate and examined [90:03] under a lamp. So these are, you know, 8 [90:05] in tall versions of the characters that [90:08] are [90:08] >> little statues, [90:09] >> right? They're perfect so that you can [90:11] kind of say how would they look from [90:12] that angle? How would they look if I [90:14] stood 8 ft away? Then you have animation [90:16] itself. So, it starts with sketching on [90:20] paper with a pencil or with charcoal, [90:23] and they're literally sketching one [90:25] frame at a time. And they are flipping [90:28] pages on their pad of paper back and [90:30] forth, back and forth, over and over [90:31] again to get a feel for how the emotion [90:34] of the drawing is coming through frame [90:36] to frame. Does this character move like [90:39] I think they should move? Are they [90:42] consistent in their motion? Is their [90:44] clothing sort of twirling the right way [90:46] when they turn left? It's an insane art. [90:49] >> Are their mouths speaking correctly? [90:51] Yeah. [90:52] >> Right. As the character drifts closer to [90:54] the synthetic camera, are they getting [90:56] big in a way that feels consistent with [90:58] the laws of physics? My mind is so blown [91:00] by the skill and talent of these people. [91:02] So 24 frames per second means 12 to 14 [91:06] drawings per second. So think a,000ish [91:09] per minute. That's around 80,000 in a [91:11] featurelength film of this era. And of [91:13] course that's if there's only one [91:15] character doing one thing on one layer. [91:18] >> Yes. There's usually about what? Double [91:21] that. [91:22] >> Triple quadruple. Yeah. [91:24] >> So there's two ways that this can [91:26] happen. One is the most clean and [91:28] obvious one straight ahead which is [91:30] where an animator draws every frame in [91:32] order. Or there's something called [91:34] inbetweeners where lead animators draw [91:37] the key frames with the essential poses [91:40] or major character movements and then [91:42] the assistants or the inbetweeners go to [91:45] the drawings and they sort of bridge [91:48] between those frames and the goal of [91:50] doing this is to make the most efficient [91:52] use of the skilled artists time on the [91:55] film. Now, over a time, a division of [91:57] labor started to emerge where, which [92:00] kind of makes sense, a super skilled [92:02] animator would do work kind of fast and [92:03] loose with sketches that had little [92:05] extra lines hanging off everywhere. [92:06] There'd be like revisions on top of [92:08] their original drawing without actually [92:10] cleaning up the the the mistakes [92:12] underneath. And then it was handed over [92:13] to a cleanup artist to trace their [92:16] drawings with a single line versus the [92:19] hairy mess to kind of get it ready for [92:21] the next stage. But again preserving the [92:23] same correct emotion, flow, bounciness, [92:28] shape, form of the lines. Both the [92:31] inbetweeners and the cleanup artists [92:34] were kind of a result of the [92:35] industrialization of the animation [92:37] process versus the early days in the [92:39] early Mickey ones of a kind of a single [92:41] artist animating the entire thing. [92:43] >> Yeah. By this point, as they're heading [92:45] into Snow White, this had become a real [92:48] scale production process. I mean, it [92:50] wasn't quite like an assembly line. This [92:53] is still art here, but it's a lot closer [92:56] to Henry Ford than it is to Picasso in [92:59] his studio, [93:00] >> right? At least you do need to sort of [93:02] synchronize and coordinate teams and [93:05] make the highest use of the most [93:07] valuable scarce resources, stuff like [93:09] that. [93:09] >> Yep. [93:10] >> So, then there's ink and paint. So, [93:11] let's talk about inkers. Back in 1914, [93:14] Earl Herd had invented a concept known [93:16] as cell animation, CEL, where you would [93:20] draw with ink on the front of a piece of [93:22] transparent plastic or cell in the [93:24] business, short for celluloid. And that [93:27] way you could keep redrawing just the [93:30] character in each frame and the [93:31] background could stay static. That [93:34] essentially made animation possible at [93:36] all. In 1914, you could imagine if you [93:38] had to just redraw every line on every [93:40] frame every time. One, it would look [93:42] crappy because things would sort of [93:44] wiggle all over the place when the film [93:47] was actually playing, but two, it just [93:50] was economically infeasible to draw [93:52] every line every time. [93:53] >> Yeah. It was not scalable. So it had [93:55] evolved since then where there were now [93:56] armies of people who were almost [93:58] exclusively women at this point in [93:59] history who would literally duplicate [94:02] every line that the animators drew on [94:05] paper with pencil and they would trace [94:07] over their entire drawing with ink on [94:10] cell every single frame. [94:12] >> Yes. So, what you would see on screen is [94:15] in a film is actually not the direct [94:17] work of an animator, but it's the [94:18] painstaking work of an inker who traces [94:21] over the animator's line on the [94:22] transparent celluloid instead of on [94:24] paper. [94:24] >> Yep. And then the inkers would flip the [94:29] cells over and pass them off to the [94:32] painters. [94:33] >> Yes. So, this is how they get color in. [94:36] You want your outlines on the front so [94:39] it it masks any colors that sort of [94:41] overflow out of, you know, the dwarf's [94:44] shirt or Mickey's shoe. And then on the [94:47] back, that's where you do your painting. [94:48] You put all the colors on. Uh, and [94:51] David, what you were referring to is is [94:52] you and I uh did did some painting on a [94:55] pre-inked Mickey Mouse. [94:57] >> Hey, we did a little bit of inking on [94:59] the first. [94:59] >> We did a little bit inking. Ink inking [95:00] is hard. [95:00] >> Inking is harder than painting. [95:02] >> Painting is forgiving. [95:03] >> Yeah. But Disney has this room with [95:06] thousands and thousands of colors of [95:08] handmade on-site paint that is a [95:13] production facility for paint color and [95:15] applying that color to animation cells. [95:16] >> It used to be called the Rainbow Room. [95:19] Those colors, that paint went into Snow [95:22] White, Cinderella, Peter Pan, Alice in [95:25] Wonderland. [95:26] >> Thousands of people each making [95:27] thousands of drawings. It multiplies [95:29] fast. So then you've got your special [95:31] effects layer. So like Tinkerbell's [95:33] wings use effectively spray paint like a [95:36] a little paint gun so it can be [95:38] partially translucent or the dwarf's [95:41] glasses or sparkles or another thing in [95:44] special effects is like water effects. [95:46] What if you want to make it look like [95:48] there's a little bit of a ripple in the [95:50] water or some depth of field on some [95:53] leaves that are closer to the camera? So [95:56] before any of this inking and painting [95:58] which was super expensive and [95:59] timeconuming they would do something [96:00] called a pencil test where they would [96:02] take the pencil sketch drawings on paper [96:04] and put them all through the camera so [96:07] the animators in Walt could look at the [96:09] rough action and see if it felt right. [96:11] See if it had the right physics [96:12] correctly represented each character's [96:14] tone and emotions. It's almost like a [96:17] higher fidelity prototype than the one [96:20] that we first talked about that came out [96:22] of the story meetings. It was a way to [96:24] catch things that weren't working before [96:26] you got all the way to full fidelity. [96:28] Then camera. This is like the coolest [96:31] part of the whole thing. [96:32] >> The multiplane. This is incredible. [96:34] >> So Disney and Bill Gity took the idea of [96:37] a multiplane camera that had existed [96:40] before Disney. Eyeworks actually built [96:42] one of the first advanced multiplane [96:45] cameras back in 33 while he was away [96:48] from the company doing his own thing [96:49] using parts from an old Chevy. [96:52] >> Yes. Yes. And then Walt rehired I works [96:56] later to come back and lead within [96:59] Disney. [96:59] >> Yep. Like process improvement for how we [97:01] do animation. So Disney created the [97:04] first one to be used in a feature film. [97:05] It is unbelievably cool. It has an [97:08] entire massive room to itself. There's a [97:11] team of operators to make it work. You [97:13] had to climb a ladder to get all the way [97:15] to the top. So here's how it works. [97:17] There's a stillframe photo camera [97:20] mounted on the top of this thing pointed [97:22] straight down. [97:23] >> Yeah, it's like what? Probably 15t tall. [97:25] >> That feels high. 10, 12, yeah, but [97:27] something like that. There were up to [97:29] seven planes that you could use. So, [97:31] you've got these horizontal planes [97:33] between the floor and where the camera [97:35] is mounted, you know, up 12 ft in the [97:37] air. Typically, with the character on [97:39] the celluloid almost all the way close [97:41] to the top of the camera, unless you had [97:43] like special effects or some foreground [97:44] obscuring the character or something [97:45] like that. And then all the elements of [97:47] the background at various sort of [97:50] different depths away from the character [97:52] are painted on panes of glass and paper [97:55] below that. And you'd want the [97:57] background broken out onto multiple [97:59] panes. So you could do things like a [98:00] parallax effect if they were sort of [98:02] panning by. Or if you wanted to do like [98:04] an establishing shot to zoom in on a [98:07] subject from far away, you could [98:09] progressively in every single photo that [98:11] the camera took every frame bring the [98:14] panes of glass closer to the camera at [98:16] different calculated rates. So the [98:18] distance between the planes could be [98:20] adjusted to really sell the the [98:22] animation. David, you and I saw one of [98:24] these in the corporate archives in [98:26] Burbank. You've actually seen two of the [98:28] three that exist, right? [98:30] >> Yes. Yes. One of the other ones is at [98:32] the Walt Disney Family Museum in the [98:34] Prescidio in San Francisco, which is an [98:36] incredible museum and resource that [98:38] informed a lot of this episode. [98:39] >> Worth calling out, this is a photo [98:42] camera, not a movie camera. So, it would [98:44] just photograph one frame at a time, and [98:46] then all the technicians would adjust [98:48] all the knobs and layer placements for [98:49] the next frame. So when you look at the [98:51] level of invention required to create a [98:53] multiplane camera and operate it, you [98:55] kind of start to understand how these [98:58] guys in the animation department could [98:59] evolve into Imagineers. [99:01] >> Yes. [99:02] >> Like this. There's a lot of physicality [99:05] involved in animation that I don't think [99:06] I really understood until diving into [99:09] this process. [99:10] >> You know what? What's happening at [99:12] Disney isn't just the intersection of [99:14] art and commerce. It's the three-way [99:17] intersection of art and commerce and [99:19] engineering. and always has been. [99:21] >> Yep, I think that's right. All right, so [99:23] that's the animation process. That is [99:25] why this is such a giant difficult [99:27] undertaking to create something like [99:28] Snow White. [99:29] >> Absolutely enormous undertaking. So when [99:31] all is said and done, it takes $1.5 [99:35] million [99:37] of investment over three years of studio [99:41] work to create Snow White. Remember, [99:44] this is at the same time as Disney is [99:48] making short cartoons for like, I don't [99:50] know, 20 $30,000. And even that is way [99:54] above what anybody else in the industry [99:57] is spending. This is $35 million [99:59] inflation adjusted. And yeah, movies are [100:02] like $300 million budgets today, but [100:04] imagine nobody's doing that. And you [100:06] have the first idea to create an [100:08] animated movie and you're like, I'd like [100:10] $35 million of budget to make that, [100:13] >> right? When Roy said that he was worried [100:14] it was going to bankrupt the studio, [100:16] like Roy was being the rational one [100:18] here. [100:20] >> They have to take out a whole series of [100:23] loans from Bank of America in order to [100:25] finance production. Even with all the [100:28] money they have coming in from the [100:29] Flywheel and Consumer Products and the [100:31] Mickey Mouse Club, etc. Ben, as you were [100:33] saying, all the art and the work that [100:35] goes into it, 2 million sketches and [100:39] 250,000 [100:42] finished drawings and cells go into Snow [100:46] White. This is at a scale so beyond what [100:49] anybody else in the entire entertainment [100:51] industry is doing. Gabler in his book [100:53] uses the analogy of it was like a gothic [100:56] cathedral in animation. That is like the [100:58] only kind of analogy that makes sense [101:00] here. They staffed up to 750 studio [101:04] artists and did three years of non-stop [101:06] work on production. [101:08] >> Yeah. Incredible. [101:09] >> They actually went so far as to hire [101:10] actors to play each of the roles and put [101:14] them in full costumes so they could film [101:17] them for inspiration just so the [101:19] animators could watch and see the [101:20] natural motion so it would look as [101:22] lifelike as possible to sell the [101:24] illusion. This is so much different than [101:27] animating a cartoon mouse. the massive [101:30] investment in all the little details [101:31] just to make the viewer buy in [101:33] emotionally to these characters. My [101:35] favorite one of these little tidbits is [101:37] that the actress who played Snow White [101:39] even wore a hair helmet since the drawn [101:42] character's proportions were actually [101:44] pretty different than a real life woman [101:46] so that they could kind of get a sense [101:48] from watching the test footage how the [101:51] character moved around in the world. [101:53] >> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, you made the point a [101:54] few minutes ago, Ben, that Walt Disney [101:56] wasn't doing this because he was some [101:58] capitalist. I think he really did [102:00] recognize the incredible [102:04] flywheel business model that he had sort [102:06] of accidentally created and leaned into [102:08] it. But like that's not going to [102:10] motivate him to film a whole liveaction [102:13] version in costume just so that they can [102:15] make sure they get the spirit right. [102:17] Like this is art that they're creating. [102:19] >> An obsession with quality. [102:20] >> Absolutely. So, the movie finally [102:23] premieres in Hollywood on December 21st, [102:26] 1937. [102:28] And I mean, it's one of the greatest [102:30] films ever made. The Academy Awards [102:33] creates a special Oscar for Snow White, [102:37] a special award. [102:38] >> Yeah, cuz they didn't think it could be [102:39] eligible for best picture. This movie, I [102:42] don't want to bury the lead. It was the [102:43] highest grossing film, not only of the [102:45] year, but ever. It did $8 million of [102:49] rental revenue on a $1.5 million [102:52] production cost. And like the category [102:55] was so new and different that they were [102:57] like, uh, instead of being eligible to [102:59] be nominated for best picture, let's [103:00] just create a special new category for [103:02] >> So the the the Oscar statue that they [103:05] give Walt and Disney for Snow White is [103:08] the only one that's ever been made. It [103:09] is a large Oscar. It is Snow White and [103:12] then seven little Oscars below it. [103:15] Walt personally would go on to win more [103:18] Academy Awards than anyone in history. [103:21] Walt has 26 Academy Awards. The next [103:24] highest is 13. Yes. I mean, the audience [103:26] reception was incredible. Like you said, [103:28] Ben, it was the highest grossing film [103:31] ever made of of any kind, animated or [103:33] otherwise, in history to that point. The [103:35] critics's reception is equally glowing. [103:37] Time magazine writes prophetically that [103:41] Snow White is an authentic masterpiece [103:44] to be shown in theaters and beloved by [103:48] new generations long after the current [103:50] crop of Hollywood stars, writers, and [103:52] directors are sleeping where no prince's [103:54] kiss can wake them. Of course, [103:57] foreshadowing the Disney vault. [104:00] Snow White is alive and well today, as [104:03] my two young daughters will attest. [104:06] Yeah. The uh an interesting thing about [104:08] this story, I'm curious since you have [104:09] daughters who watch it, David, is it's [104:12] kind of dark and Walt did meaningfully [104:15] change the Brothers Grimm stories that [104:18] he sort of adapted it from. It's very [104:20] interesting that all of these early [104:21] Disney's cartoon movies animations are [104:25] adapted fairy tales or adapted existing [104:28] lore that Disney sort of changes. The [104:31] film was not really made as a children's [104:34] movie. No. [104:35] >> Yes, it was animated, but it's dark. [104:38] >> No. And in fact, a lot of those [104:39] decisions, like giving each of the seven [104:42] dwarves personalities, [104:44] in part were motivated to soften the [104:47] darkness of the fairy tale. And Walt [104:50] would always say that he didn't make [104:51] movies for children, but of course, he [104:53] wanted children to be able to watch [104:54] them, too. But some of the decisions [104:57] were actually made with the flywheel in [105:01] mind. And the dwarves personalities is [105:03] one of these. [105:04] >> They wanted to sell a lot of seven [105:07] dwarves merchandise. [105:09] And what better way to do that than to [105:12] give them all distinct personalities. [105:15] >> It's true. When you go to Disneyland, [105:16] there's a lot of people walking around [105:17] with like dopey and grumpy. [105:19] >> Exactly. Exactly. So, as we said, the [105:21] movie itself extremely profitable. It [105:24] does $8 million in film rental revenue [105:27] against the $1.5 million production cost [105:31] just in its first theatrical run, [105:34] >> which dramatically changes the studio's [105:37] financial position. [105:38] >> Yes. Yes. Now, it is a bit of a [105:40] misconception that the profits from Snow [105:43] White, the film itself, [105:46] would end up paying for the new Burbank [105:50] studio that well, it's about to [105:51] construct. That's not entirely true. I [105:54] think most of the film profits from Snow [105:57] White went to repay all the loans to [105:59] Bank of America. Yes. So listeners, it's [106:02] worth diving into a little bit of the [106:03] complexity of how each of the parties in [106:06] the value chain of making and [106:08] distributing movies work. There's the [106:10] studio like Disney who makes the actual [106:12] movie. There's a distributor like United [106:14] Artists or RKO who does a lot of stuff. [106:18] They take the finished film. They create [106:20] all the prints that'll go to theaters. [106:21] They have the salesforce that sells the [106:23] film to theaters. They plan the film's [106:25] marketing. They also ship the films and [106:27] handle all of the billing and payments. [106:29] And then of course there's the theater [106:31] or the exhibitor as they're called. And [106:33] so Disney has this 1944 annual report [106:36] for employees that David actually found [106:38] when we were in the archives. We were [106:39] flipping through annual reports and you [106:41] were like, "What is this? There there's [106:43] two reports for 1944. What's going on [106:45] here?" And they actually did a different [106:46] one for employees than for shareholders. [106:49] The annual report for employees has this [106:51] great graphic that says where does the [106:54] money come from and has a breakdown of [106:56] if for a dollar getting spent at the box [106:58] office, what are the splits? And so 65% [107:03] actually gets retained at the exhibitor [107:06] or the theater, 13% goes to the [107:08] distributor, and 22% goes to the studio. [107:13] And so when we've been saying rentals, [107:15] here's the interesting thing about that. [107:18] The distributor and the studio come [107:21] together and they actually rent their [107:24] collectively owned film. Yes. [107:26] >> To the exhibitor. So this $8 million is [107:30] actually even higher than you think it [107:31] is. The gross box office would be [107:34] significantly higher than $8 million, [107:36] like 2.5x or something. And that 8 [107:40] million is the 13% plus the 22%. [107:44] >> Right. It's the share of Disney the [107:46] studio plus their distributor. [107:48] >> That's exactly right. And so then I know [107:50] I'm doing some financial gymnastics [107:52] here. [107:53] >> Well, hey, all of this Hollywood [107:54] accounting, even through to this very [107:56] day, is so obscure and arcane. I think [107:59] on purpose so that neophites to the [108:02] business don't really understand the [108:03] deals that they're making. If you go [108:06] look at what is really the source of [108:07] truth here, the 1940 IPO prospectus, [108:12] which we are going to get to, you can [108:15] very clearly see that over a oneyear and [108:18] 9-month period, they make $4.5 million [108:23] in film rental income, the producers [108:26] share, so this is just Disney's from [108:28] Snow White and the Seven Dwarfves. So [108:30] that's our real source of truth that we [108:32] know, $4.5 million. Now, they had about [108:36] $2.3 million of debt from the $1.5 [108:40] million of production costs plus the [108:43] interest that they owed Bank of America. [108:45] >> Yep. So, a huge portion of the net that [108:50] they're taking home just from the box [108:53] office of Snow White is going to repay [108:56] the debt, let alone operating expenses [108:58] for the studio, etc., etc. So yes, it's [109:00] like great for the company, but it's not [109:04] quite as transformative from the box [109:06] office alone as people would think, [109:10] >> right? So they they effectively have [109:11] $2.2 million left over after paying the [109:15] theater, paying the distributor, paying [109:17] back the principal on the loan, and [109:19] paying the interest. Okay. $2.2 million [109:22] in 1937. Still a lot of money, [109:25] >> but uh they want to go build a gigantic [109:28] campus. Yes, but Ben, of course, Disney [109:32] isn't just making $2.2 million in [109:36] profits from Snow White. There's all [109:39] that good good Flywheel revenue to come [109:42] along with it. So, you know, if Walt [109:44] thought that the flywheel worked well [109:46] for Mickey Mouse, Snow White is like a [109:50] whole another level. So before the film [109:55] is even widely released around the [109:59] country, they have their next major [110:04] flywheel node, their next business model [110:06] innovation already in market, [110:10] the movie soundtrack. I couldn't believe [110:13] this when I learned it. Snow White was [110:17] the very first movie soundtrack ever [110:22] created and sold to the public. It all [110:24] started with Snow White. There were no [110:26] sound movie soundtrack albums before [110:28] then and it is a huge hit both because [110:32] you know it's a great soundtrack but [110:34] like before this album there was never [110:39] anything that audiences could take home [110:42] actually of the picture that they saw in [110:46] theaters. There's no home video, right? [110:47] There's no streaming. There's no [110:49] television. You go to see something in [110:51] the movie theater. Sure, you could buy a [110:53] piece of merch like a doll or a costume [110:55] and there were a lot of those out there [110:56] for Snow White, but you couldn't take [110:58] home the movie except in the form of the [111:02] soundtrack [111:02] >> and the songs are are quite catchy [111:04] whistle. [111:07] So, the soundtrack is huge. Beyond that, [111:10] there supposedly [111:12] I read are 2,183 [111:17] separate SKUs of Snow White merchandise [111:21] that get pumped into the global markets [111:24] by KKman's consumer products [111:27] organization. Unreal. The New York Times [111:30] actually writes this that quote, "Sales [111:33] of Snow White products might be [111:36] America's path out of the depression." [111:40] >> Wow. [111:40] >> That's how successful it was. I mean, [111:43] this movie was such a grand success [111:46] artistically for Walt filmwise, for the [111:50] studio, for the whole medium of [111:52] animation and legitimizing it right [111:55] alongside live action [111:57] and for the flywheel business model of [112:00] Disney. So, all of this enables Walt to [112:03] pursue his next dream, which is that he [112:06] wants to build a brand new [112:09] state-of-the-art [112:10] animators paradise. Ben, as you alluded [112:13] to, the new Disney Burbank animation [112:16] studio, still the uh corporate [112:18] headquarters of the company to this very [112:20] day, [112:21] >> right? He basically sees the success of [112:23] Snow White and thinks, "Oh, yeah. We're [112:26] going to do a lot lot more of these. [112:28] Let's let's build all the infrastructure [112:30] to like really do that, right? [112:32] >> Yes. So, Walt's goal with the new [112:34] Burbank studio was to be able to house [112:37] 1,200 plus animators and staff up from [112:42] call it 300 before Snow White and then [112:45] Ben, what did you say 750 that the ranks [112:47] had swellled to during Snow White? Yep. [112:49] >> And he thinks that with this new campus, [112:52] everything that they're going to install [112:54] there, and all the additional staff, [112:57] that Disney will now be able to produce [112:59] two new feature animated releases every [113:04] single year, plus shorts. So, like, it [113:06] took three years to make Snow White. [113:09] With all the learning from that, all the [113:11] innovations of the new campus, all the [113:13] new staff, he thinks they're now going [113:14] to be able to pump out great new feature [113:17] films every six months, [113:19] >> which was a complete pipe dream and they [113:21] never were able to do. [113:23] >> Walt also in his mind think comes to see [113:26] this Burbank campus as really a utopian [113:31] like place kind of almost like a college [113:33] campus. I mean, Walt didn't even [113:35] graduate high school, let alone go to [113:36] college, but he intentionally places it [113:38] in Burbank, which back then was like the [113:40] sticks outside of LA. [113:43] >> He wanted the Disney lot, the Disney [113:46] studio to be this special place kind of [113:48] away from all these other studios [113:51] controlled by their distributor bosses [113:53] back in New York. And he kind of I think [113:56] really wanted to create this band of [113:59] merry men and women type feeling where [114:01] they could achieve the impossible like [114:03] producing two feature animated films a [114:05] year. [114:05] >> Well, the thing he sort of didn't factor [114:07] in is that you might be able to make [114:09] Snow White faster in the future, but [114:11] every idea that you have is going to be [114:13] a different new idea that's going to be [114:14] more ambitious and have more cost and [114:16] require more people. And so this Burbank [114:19] studio was necessary even to keep the [114:23] same [114:23] >> producing films every 3 years. [114:25] >> Yes. [114:26] >> But the the the lot itself is [114:27] unbelievable. It's 51 acres. There are [114:29] sports fields, a cafeteria. There's art [114:32] classes. There's massages available. [114:34] There's sunbathing in the penthouse [114:36] club. In many ways, this is like the [114:38] Google Plex before the Google Plex. [114:40] >> Yeah. This is 1940 when they opened [114:42] this. [114:42] >> Yes. And you're right. It's it's kind of [114:44] designed to keep you there. Why would [114:46] you need to go anywhere else? And really [114:47] there's nowhere else to go around here. [114:49] It reminds me a little bit of uh Epic [114:51] Systems, too. [114:51] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Very similar. [114:54] Very similar. [114:54] >> So, here's an example of the lengths [114:56] that they went to on this campus. [114:58] >> So, I was looking at Google Maps [115:00] planning our visit, David, and it looks [115:02] weird. It's it's offset from the Burbank [115:05] Street grid at an angle. And we asked [115:08] the person who were showing David and I [115:10] around listeners uh why this is. And he [115:14] said that it was Walt's priority when [115:16] they were building it to offer the exact [115:18] perfect conditions for lighting to [115:21] animators, which of course, David, you [115:23] know the the spoiler here. [115:25] >> Yes. To have offices that face north [115:26] because northern light is true light. [115:29] >> Do you know why northern light is [115:31] preferable? [115:31] >> No, I just know that that's what our our [115:33] very kind tour guide told us. [115:35] >> So if you are in the northern [115:37] hemisphere, the sun moves across the [115:40] south sky. So if you're north facing [115:43] windows, your window offers the most [115:45] consistent and nondirect light. And so [115:49] every animator got a window and they [115:51] built the building shape so that there's [115:54] a whole ton of north facing sides. Like [115:57] the whole thing almost looks like a CPU [116:00] heat sink. It's like got fins so that [116:02] it's got all these north facing windows. [116:03] It's for the time it's an architectural [116:05] marvel. It's one of the first buildings [116:07] with air conditioning in Southern [116:08] California. The windows had customuilt [116:11] sort of slats that were adjustable so [116:13] the animator could let in the exact [116:15] right amount of sunlight, indirect [116:17] sunlight that they wanted into that [116:19] room. And once they sort of got this [116:21] building architecturally laid out on the [116:23] campus, they're like, "Yeah, let's build [116:24] the entire campus around this." And to [116:27] me, it really symbolizes that [116:30] >> animators are the crown of Disney in [116:34] this era. in the way that at Google it's [116:36] engineers and at Apple it's designers [116:37] and at at Microsoft it's PMs. Uh the the [116:41] animators to the extent that anyone but [116:44] Walt has the power the animators are [116:46] sort of the most valuable resource. [116:48] >> Yes. Yes. It's an animationdriven [116:50] company. [116:51] >> Yes. So it's got this like utopian vibe [116:54] but there were trade-offs. I mean this [116:56] was huge compared to the old Hyperion [116:58] site. People are more sectioned off to [117:00] do their specific work. You had less [117:02] access to Walt to know exactly what was [117:04] going on upstairs if you were the rank [117:07] and file. But to achieve all this, Walt [117:10] does need capital. [117:11] >> Yes. Oh, yes, he does. [117:12] >> He doesn't want to give up any control, [117:14] but eventually he and Roy decide, we've [117:17] only ever taken on bank loans. Maybe we [117:19] need another source of capital. [117:21] >> Yep. I've got the numbers on all of [117:22] this. So, the Burbank campus [117:24] construction costs alone were $3 [117:27] million. So that's more than the money [117:30] they had left over from Snow White [117:33] proceeds after they repaid the Bank of [117:35] America debt. But obviously they had all [117:37] the, you know, the revenue from the [117:38] soundtrack and the consumer products and [117:40] all the flywheel revenue coming. [117:42] >> But still, they're they're planning to [117:43] do Pinocchio. They're planning to do [117:45] Fantasia, [117:46] >> right? So the 3 million is just to build [117:50] the facility. Then they got to staff it [117:53] with 1,200 animators. So that's an extra [117:58] 450 [118:00] new animation staff they need to hire. [118:03] And to feed Walt's vision of having [118:07] multiple films in production at the same [118:09] time, he greenlights production on [118:12] Pinocchio, Bambi, and Fantasia all at [118:16] the same time. [118:16] >> And all of these were completely [118:18] different animation styles. Yes. And [118:20] completely different from Snow White. If [118:22] you look at these films, we sort of have [118:24] this notion today of like, oh, it's the [118:25] Disney style that is not really [118:29] reflective in the darkness of Snow White [118:32] in Fantasia's really experimental [118:35] artistic vignette style set to classical [118:40] music. And Bambi is again another [118:43] completely different take of a very [118:45] naturalist film. These are wildly [118:48] different skill sets and bigger and [118:51] bigger investments using completely new [118:54] techniques. So you're not really just [118:57] like making more snow whites. [118:59] >> You're doing like discontinuous unknown [119:02] high-risisk bets. [119:03] >> Walt can't help himself. [119:04] >> Yes. So in total between the $3 million [119:07] for the campus and then these three [119:09] movies that they all have in production [119:11] which collectively cost about $5 million [119:15] in so-called negative costs before they [119:17] get released. So before they earn a [119:19] dollar of revenue by early 1940 Disney's [119:23] yeah in this new campus and set up for [119:25] this next phase of the company, but [119:27] they're $8 million in the hole. So, Bank [119:30] of America had loaned them another $4 [119:33] and a half million dollars. [119:35] >> They just keep going to Bank of America [119:37] over and over again, just reorggaging [119:39] the company. [119:40] >> And then the hope was that Pinocchio, [119:43] the first of the new films to come out, [119:45] would be a hit and earn profits quickly. [119:48] Unfortunately, World War II had started [119:51] in Europe by early 1940 when Pinocchio [119:54] gets released. So international box [119:56] office is basically zero and Pinocchio [119:58] ends up losing money like a lot of money [120:01] over a million dollars in losses on [120:03] Pinocchio alone. [120:04] >> Yeah. In a scale economy's business if [120:06] you lose out on potential eyeballs and [120:10] potential revenue but your fixed costs [120:12] stay the same. That's super super bad [120:15] news. I mean you you there's no ability [120:17] to retroactively scale back how [120:20] ambitious you're being with investing in [120:22] a film. you know, you've already spent [120:24] all the money to create it and now you [120:26] find out that you can't distribute it to [120:27] half of your audience. [120:30] >> Yeah. Not good. [120:30] >> Yeah. Not to mention the impact on all [120:33] the rest of the flywheel businesses. [120:35] Like not a lot of Pinocchio merch [120:37] getting sold in Europe in summer of [120:39] 1940. [120:40] >> No. [120:41] >> So after Pinocchio is a flop, Walt and [120:43] Roy decide they basically only have one [120:47] recourse at this point because Bank of [120:49] America is not going to loan them any [120:51] more money. They need to sell equity in [120:55] the company for the first time. So in [120:58] April 1940, Disney retains investment [121:02] bankers and sells 3.875 [121:07] million of convertible preferred stock [121:10] with a 6% dividend, which technically is [121:14] Disney's IPO. Is it technically? It [121:17] doesn't go on a stock exchange. It's [121:18] just over the counter. It's a public [121:20] offering, I guess, but it's a pretty [121:22] small group of the public. [121:24] >> Exactly. Exactly. It is a non-exchangeed [121:27] public offering, [121:28] >> and it's got this 6% cumulative dividend [121:31] attached to it. So, the expectation when [121:34] you're investing is this company is [121:35] going to pay me 6% of my investment back [121:37] every year. Yep. [121:38] >> So, it's it's actually a pretty sweet [121:41] deal for the investors. They sell 30% of [121:44] the company to do this to raise that. [121:47] It's funny you said 3.875 875. A little [121:49] bit of that went to the bankers. There [121:51] was some transaction fees. So, they only [121:53] raise about $3.5 million directly to [121:56] their balance sheet, but they give up [121:58] 30% of the company to do that. And it [122:00] comes with that 6% cumulative dividend [122:03] to those shareholders. [122:04] >> Wow. So, this means they're flying even [122:06] closer to the sun than I realize cuz [122:08] they've got the $8 million in sort of [122:10] investments that they need to fund and [122:13] they have $4.5 million from Bank of [122:15] America and then if they're only getting [122:17] three.5 million in proceeds from the [122:20] IPO, that's exactly $8 million. [122:23] >> They are shaving off every piece of [122:26] their current self and future cash flows [122:29] to rebet the farm. That is the the way [122:32] to think about this. So that summer in [122:35] 1940, Walt has a rather ominous get [122:38] together with Henry Ford of the Ford [122:41] Motor Company. Uh just sort of as like a [122:44] friendly meeting of these two American [122:46] business titans. And while they're [122:48] together, Walt mentions to Henry about [122:52] uh the IPO that they just did. And [122:55] reportedly Ford tells him, "Walt, if you [122:58] sold any of it, you should have sold all [123:01] of it." Ominous. Ominous. A real board [123:05] of directors gets established for the [123:06] first time as part of this and the [123:08] preferred get a director on the board. [123:10] So an outside voice in the company who [123:14] certainly is not going to share Walt's [123:15] vision here. So by the end of the year [123:17] in 1940, despite the capital raised from [123:19] the stock offering, Disney's in a cash [123:22] crunch. Uh Walt before the IPO had even [123:25] set up a kind of like proto employee [123:28] ownership system where they set aside [123:31] 20% of the company's equity and used [123:34] that stake's profit distribution to fund [123:37] an annual employee bonus pool. They have [123:40] to eliminate that like months basically [123:42] after Walt institutes it. And what they [123:45] end up doing as a result is they raise [123:48] salaries of the few top animators in the [123:51] firm and then they keep the same or they [123:54] lower salaries for everybody else in the [123:58] Burbank lot. And this causes huge [124:01] resentment and unrest in the animation [124:04] workforce. [124:05] >> Yeah. I I mean I bet that's going to [124:06] make no one happy. But this is the like [124:08] literal trade-off. This is we spent a [124:11] bunch of money on Pinocchio. Yep. We [124:13] didn't have Europe, so we lost a bunch [124:15] of money on that. We still have big [124:17] ambitions. [124:19] And like this is Walt's implicit choice [124:23] here with going out and raising all this [124:26] debt, raising all this equity, betting [124:27] the farm again. [124:28] >> Yep. This is the downside of Walt's uh [124:30] always go for broke and shoot the works [124:33] philosophy. [124:34] >> Yep. [124:34] >> And it leads probably to the darkest [124:38] moment of Walt's life [124:39] >> that would change his relationship with [124:41] the company forever. forever and [124:43] irreparably [124:45] his relationship with Disney animation. [124:48] The strike. So on May 29th, 1941, the [124:53] Screen Cartoonist Guild, which is a [124:55] union that had unionized every other [124:58] major animation studio in Hollywood and [125:01] New York over the couple years leading [125:03] up to this, [125:04] >> which there were several of at this [125:05] point in time. We've been sort of very [125:07] Disneycentric, but there is an industry [125:08] around this. [125:09] >> Yep. decides finally to target Disney [125:13] employees. Now, there's a reason why the [125:16] Screen Cartoonist Guild had stayed away [125:18] from Disney despite it obviously being [125:21] the leader in animation up until this [125:24] point, which is I think Walt's utopian [125:28] dream more or less was true or at least [125:32] true enough. Like, he established the [125:34] bonus pool for animation. He constructed [125:36] this campus. everything you were talking [125:38] about earlier, Ben, but here with the [125:40] cash crunch, that all comes crashing [125:43] down. [125:44] >> Yeah. There's a great excerpt from the [125:46] book The Animated Man by Michael [125:48] Barrier. In the spring of 1941, under [125:51] pressure from the Bank of America and [125:52] holders of preferred stock, Walt Disney [125:54] Productions agreed to scale back its [125:56] production cost to about $15,000 a week. [125:58] According to Walt Disney himself, that [126:00] meant he had to hold the negative cost [126:02] of new features to about $700,000 or [126:05] onethird the cost of Pinocchio or [126:07] Fantasia, which was also in development [126:09] at the time. Since labor costs made up [126:11] 85 to 90% of Disney's total costs, [126:14] implementing such severe economies would [126:16] mean laying off more than half the [126:17] staff. [126:18] >> O, so you've got cost reduction in some [126:21] of the people sticking around. And [126:22] you've got big layoffs because Pinocchio [126:25] didn't pay back. [126:26] >> Yeah. Well, layoffs coming. they haven't [126:28] happened yet and this is part of why the [126:30] organization and the strike happens. So [126:33] hundreds of employees end up striking. [126:37] They pick it the Burbank campus. They [126:40] march all day. They carry signs with [126:43] slogans like Snow White and the 700 [126:46] dwarves or uh what is a drawing of [126:49] Pinocchio with the caption no strings on [126:51] me. The strike lasts for three and a [126:55] half months and it's a completely [126:59] shattering event for Walt personally and [127:02] for the company. As the union is [127:05] organizing the employee base in the days [127:08] and weeks leading up to the strike, Walt [127:10] decides that he's going to make a speech [127:12] and address the entire company, which he [127:15] thinks, well, he will explain his [127:17] position and the challenging state that [127:19] the company's in and it will resolve [127:21] everything and the employees will rally [127:24] around him and the company. [127:26] Unfortunately, it has the opposite [127:27] effect. It is a complete disaster. He [127:30] lectures the entire company for nearly 3 [127:32] hours. Some of his lines from the [127:34] speech, which he had written out ahead [127:36] of time, so it's preserved, are, "My [127:39] first recommendation to the lot of you [127:41] is this. Put your own house in order. [127:43] You can't accomplish a damn thing by [127:45] sitting around and waiting to be told [127:47] everything. If you're not progressing as [127:49] you should, instead of grumbling and [127:50] growling, do something about it." And [127:52] then don't forget this. It's the law of [127:55] the universe that the strong shall [127:57] survive and the weak must fall by the [127:59] way. And I don't give a damn what [128:01] idealistic plan is cooked up. Nothing [128:03] can change that. [128:05] Probably not what you want to tell your [128:08] employee base after you just slash their [128:10] salaries. Yeah. Yeah. A labor magazine [128:14] would write afterwards, "Walt Disney's [128:17] speech recruited more members for the [128:19] Screen Cartoonist Guild than a year of [128:21] campaigning. [128:25] Yeah, about the worst reaction that you [128:28] could possibly have. And Walt, I don't [128:30] know if you found this in your research, [128:32] but it seems like he's kind of deluded [128:35] here into thinking, well, it's not [128:37] actually my employees that are doing [128:40] this. It's these communist, very few [128:44] communist agitators who have undercover [128:48] become my employees and they're riing up [128:51] the rest of them. and Walt's like kind [128:54] of removed himself and he's in denial [128:57] that this is actually what his workforce [129:00] wants. The the the family atmosphere [129:02] that we had at Hyperion is now a like [129:05] real corporate, you know, have and have [129:07] knots here on Burbank campus. [129:09] >> Yeah. [129:10] >> Yeah. Yeah. It's a mess. And then it [129:13] gets worse. So in the middle of the [129:16] strike, which again lasts for three and [129:18] a half months, that hundreds of [129:19] employees are gone from their jobs that [129:22] are not working and marching and [129:24] protesting outside the company [129:25] >> while they're trying to make Bambi, [129:26] which is equally ambitious, [129:28] >> right? Walt is just so depressed and in [129:33] denial and upset about the whole thing [129:35] that in August of 1941, he agrees to go [129:39] on a goodwill trip to Latin America with [129:43] Nelson Rockefeller's office of the [129:46] coordinator of interamerican affairs. [129:48] This is the trip that ultimately results [129:51] in the Disney films Saludos amigos and [129:53] the three cabayeros. If you've seen [129:55] those or been to the three cabarios ride [129:57] in Disney World in Epcot, it's actually [129:59] great. [130:00] >> It also results in Roy having to resolve [130:02] the strike because Walt is uninterested [130:04] in dealing with it. [130:05] >> Yeah. The real reason Walt goes on this [130:07] trip and he would write about he would [130:08] call it a quote godsend and say that it [130:11] gives him a chance to get away from this [130:13] god-awful nightmare in Burbank. [130:17] Yeah. He basically just leaves the [130:19] country and walks out on the whole thing [130:21] and tells Roy to settle it. I'm leaving [130:23] for 10 weeks. Do your best. [130:26] >> Yep. So, while Walt is gone in Latin [130:28] America, Roy does settle the strike [130:30] after federal mediation. Disney ends up [130:34] recognizing the Screen Cartoonist Guild [130:36] union. They raise salaries for the [130:41] remaining employees and they agree to a [130:44] negotiated layoff of over 500 [130:48] employees. So, taking total headcount [130:51] before the strike down from 1,200 to [130:54] under 700. These are the layoffs, Ben, [130:57] that you referred to. [131:00] >> The studio would never fully recover [131:04] from this. Certainly not under Walt and [131:07] not for many, many years afterwards. [131:11] Really, not at all in the period of [131:13] classical animation before computer [131:14] animation comes along. And sort of [131:17] equally as importantly, Walt would never [131:20] recover from this as it pertains to his [131:23] relationship with the company Walt [131:25] Disney Productions. Yes. [131:26] >> It no longer feels like his family. It [131:30] feels like a creation he's made that has [131:32] sort of run away from his control. [131:34] >> Yep. He ultimately does decide that the [131:38] company Disney and he Walt Disney have a [131:42] creative and business future. But yeah, [131:44] he never has the same relationship to [131:46] the studio or animation after this. [131:49] >> Yep. He apparently according to Don [131:51] Lusk, who was an animator there, made a [131:53] list of everyone who went out on strike [131:56] and said that uh everyone on this list [131:59] isn't true to Disney and one day will [132:02] not be here. [132:03] >> Yeah. So Ben, you mentioned uh Walt's [132:06] sort of anti-communist streak that comes [132:08] out of this. Yeah. For the rest of his [132:09] life, he would blame all of this on [132:13] communist influences in Hollywood. He [132:16] would actually testify after World War [132:18] II in front of the House on American [132:21] Activities Committee, you know, Huak as [132:23] a friendly witness corroborating [132:25] communist infiltration in Hollywood. He [132:28] named names of people who he said were [132:30] communists based on things he had heard [132:33] about them like no even proof. And [132:35] you've got like a major figurehead of a [132:38] big US corporation testifying. There's [132:40] all this video of it of him saying I [132:42] believe so and so is a communist. [132:43] >> Yeah. And of course this would lead to [132:44] the famous Hollywood blacklist and you [132:46] know all the terrible stuff that comes [132:48] out of that. One thing later sort of by [132:51] association with this uh people would [132:54] accuse Walt of being anti-Semitic since [132:56] much of the communist movement in in the [132:58] US and especially in Hollywood was in [133:00] the Jewish community. Gabler [133:02] investigates this pretty thoroughly in [133:04] his book and concludes that there's not [133:07] any evidence that Wald ever really was [133:09] anti-Semitic. I turned over every stone [133:11] I possibly could on this company and we [133:13] spent I don't know the better part of [133:16] the year so far researching this and I [133:18] found zero evidence of that. [133:19] >> Yeah, same definitely anti-communist for [133:22] sure. Uh yep, [133:23] >> but um anyway, so speaking of the war, [133:28] >> by the way, this is like four giant [133:30] blows to the company in a row. You've [133:32] got Europe dropping even before the US [133:34] enters the war. You've got the the [133:36] European distribution falling off. [133:37] There's a thing we didn't talk about [133:39] which was Fantasia tried to make this [133:41] giant bet in a new type of sound for [133:44] movies called Santa sound. [133:46] >> This alone almost killed the company. [133:49] The budget for Fantasia was 50% bigger [133:51] than Snow White. [133:53] >> And in the first run at the box office, [133:56] they tried to use Fanta Sound, this new [133:59] sound technology they had invented, and [134:02] distributors didn't pick it up to do [134:04] like a real first run. And so out of the [134:06] $2.3 million budget in that first year [134:09] it came out in 1941 they recouped [134:11] 325,000. [134:13] >> Wow. That is a giant loss on Fantasia. I [134:17] think Disney was also funding the [134:20] development and and distribution of [134:21] Fantasound. So you've got those two then [134:24] the strike. Now the US enters the war. [134:27] >> Yeah. One more note on Fantasia though. [134:29] Uh before we talk about the impact of [134:31] the US entering the war, do you know [134:33] what ultimately ended up happening with [134:36] Fantasia? [134:37] >> They made Fantasia 2000, 60 years later? [134:40] No. [134:41] >> Yes, that is true, but that is not what [134:44] I was getting at. So yeah, the initial [134:46] release of Fantasia, as you said, was a [134:49] total flop. They couldn't exhibit it [134:51] anywhere, lost tons and tons of money. [134:54] Later, it has this huge resurgence. I [134:57] mean, I remember when I was growing up [134:58] as a kid, my parents loved Fantasia. [135:01] >> Yeah. I actually thought Fantasia was a [135:02] modern movie. It's crazy to me that it [135:04] was Disney's second. [135:05] >> Right. Right. Right. I think it was like [135:06] the 60s and the hippies that thought [135:08] like, "Oh, this is like the coolest [135:09] thing." So, Fantasia, if you look today [135:13] at the list of inflationadjusted [135:16] top films in history by box office [135:19] gross, inflation adjusted, Fantasia is [135:22] the 24th highest grossing film in [135:26] Hollywood history. [135:29] >> Unbelievable. [135:30] >> So, it has all [135:32] >> and kind of timeless. [135:33] >> Totally. It's an amazing amazing [135:36] production. I mean, the music, the [135:38] symphonies, the sound, it's go watch [135:40] Fantasia if you've never seen it. It is [135:42] well worth your time. [135:43] >> And now a hard cut over to World War II, [135:45] right? [135:47] Okay, so back to 1941. [135:51] No sooner does Roy settle the strike [135:54] than Pearl Harbor happens and the US now [135:58] enters World War II. And unlike many of [136:01] the other great American companies of [136:04] that era that we've covered on this show [136:06] before where World War II was great for [136:10] their business like Coca-Cola or Mars or [136:13] Lockheed, [136:14] World War II is a disaster for Disney. [136:18] Nothing of value gets built for Disney [136:22] during the war. It basically breaks [136:24] every single node in the flywheel. And [136:28] on top of the strike, it just completely [136:30] grinds to a halt. All new core IP [136:33] production for the studio. [136:36] >> Yeah. So, the first thing that happens [136:37] is within hours and then days of Pearl [136:41] Harbor getting bombed, the US military [136:44] moves into the studio. They look at [136:45] Burbank and they think, "This is a great [136:47] asset." And so hundreds of troops, there [136:51] are two reasons that set up shop using [136:53] the sound stages to work on all the [136:55] optical systems for anti-aircraft. Sound [136:58] systems are awesome. There's no windows. [137:00] It's a giant room. I mean, like it's [137:03] it's the the thing you would want for [137:05] stuff like this. The second reason that [137:07] I suspect you're hinting at, David, is [137:09] it is real close to Lockheed. [137:12] >> Yes. real close specifically to Lockheed [137:15] Skunkworks department [137:17] >> which is in Burbank. The secret Lockheed [137:20] Skunk Works [137:21] >> airplane hangers and and department was [137:24] in Burbank because Burbank was the [137:27] sticks back then and Disney is right [137:30] next door. So that's probably the bigger [137:33] reason why the military requisitions the [137:35] Disney lot is to protect Skunk Works. [137:39] >> Fascinating. Yeah. [137:40] >> So you've got that happening. You've got [137:42] a whole bunch of the animators getting [137:44] drafted. [137:45] >> Yep. [137:45] >> I mean, so you're you're you're down [137:47] manpower. You're just coming out of the [137:48] strike. You have these huge failures in [137:50] Pinocchio, Fantasia. And also Bambi. [137:53] Again, you've lost European [137:54] distribution. [137:55] >> Yep. [137:56] >> And so the appetite for [137:58] making more things like those three [138:01] movies drops to like zero. I mean, at [138:03] this point, there's a financial reality [138:05] that Disney owes a dividend to these uh [138:08] shareholders, which interestingly [138:09] enough, it actually suspended in 1942. [138:12] They actually didn't pay out the [138:13] dividend, but they do have to pay Bank [138:14] of America. The films aren't going to be [138:16] the thing doing it. And conveniently, [138:18] they've got the US government saying, [138:20] "Can you help us with some propaganda [138:22] films? Can you help us encourage people [138:24] to pay their taxes and buy war bonds and [138:28] support the troops?" And so Disney kind [138:30] of looks at everything, how it's all [138:32] playing out, and says, "Yeah, that's [138:34] what we're going to be doing for the [138:35] war." [138:36] >> So all of the studio production work [138:37] during the US's time as an active [138:40] participant in World War II. Yeah. [138:43] Basically just gets repurposed to [138:45] propaganda and training materials for [138:48] the government. [138:49] >> And insanely they do use Disney IP. like [138:53] you see all these crazy old posters with [138:55] like you know Donald Duck holding a gun [138:59] and I mean the stuff you sort of would [139:01] never see with these characters today [139:03] but not only did Disney say we're work [139:05] for hire they said we can use the Disney [139:08] IP but interestingly David do you know [139:11] about Mickey Mouse's role [139:13] >> no [139:13] >> they really did not employ Mickey Mouse [139:17] >> they protected Mickey Mouse from the war [139:20] image and Donald Duck sort of led the [139:23] charge. [139:23] >> Interesting. [139:24] >> On all the the the war films. [139:26] >> Well, part of this was because uh [139:27] canonically Donald Duck is a sailor, [139:29] right? [139:30] >> Oh, okay. That makes sense. [139:31] >> Yeah. Yeah. But then it makes sense to [139:33] protect Mickey, too. [139:35] >> And Donald's also the more like fighter [139:37] of a character. [139:38] >> Yeah. Mickey started off as this [139:40] troublemaker, but then kind of became [139:41] the like nice protagonist. [139:43] >> Yeah. The goody two shoes. And then [139:44] Donald was the foil. [139:45] >> Yeah. [139:46] >> Yeah. So all of this though to our point [139:49] earlier does nothing either for the [139:50] flywheel model or for generating new IP [139:54] to feed it [139:55] >> or pushing the envelope of technology or [139:58] pushing the bounds of creativity like [139:59] all the things that contribute to [140:01] Disney's core that they they are [140:03] financially floated though by the war. I [140:05] mean the way that they make it through [140:07] this period is they actually are [140:10] generating net income reliably not a lot [140:12] but [140:13] >> from the government work. [140:14] >> Exactly. And there's one other big [140:17] innovation, an actual bright spot that [140:19] comes out of this back against the wall [140:22] moment during the war that the company's [140:24] in financially. Do you know what that [140:25] is? [140:26] >> Ooh. [140:28] Uh oh. The Disney vault. [140:30] >> The vaults. Yes. [140:31] >> Yes. So in 1944, the company is so [140:34] cashstrapped that they come up with the [140:38] again at the time crazy seeming idea to [140:42] re-release Snow White in theaters [140:46] because hey, we can't make new stuff, [140:48] but people sure like that old movie. [140:50] Let's just put it in theaters and see [140:52] what happens. [140:53] >> And the thing you got to remember is [140:54] with no home video and no TV, no one had [140:57] seen Snow White in seven years. [140:59] >> Exactly. It truly vanished off the face [141:01] of the earth except for the copies of [141:03] the film that were held in the Disney [141:05] vault. [141:06] >> In the Disney vault. Yes. So in 1944 [141:09] they re-release Snow White in theaters [141:13] and it brings in $3 million [141:17] in revenue to Disney on just a like a [141:21] few hundred,000 in cost. They basically [141:23] just got to print a few new copies of [141:25] the film and then distributed it out to [141:27] theaters. [141:28] >> Right. The theaters get their normal [141:29] cut, the distributor gets their normal [141:30] cut, but Disney's cost to develop the [141:32] film is like zero. [141:34] >> Yeah, they've already developed it. It's [141:36] already done. This is an enormous boost [141:39] for the company. And Ben, to your point [141:41] about the 7-year gap since the initial [141:44] release, it turns out conveniently that [141:48] 7 years is just about the right amount [141:50] of time for a new generation of children [141:53] to come along and reach an age uh where [141:57] they would be interested in consuming [141:58] Snow White that haven't seen it before [142:01] and they discover it for the first time [142:04] and yet it's infrequent enough that it [142:06] doesn't dilute the IP. So Walt's got an [142:09] amazing quote on this actually from the [142:11] second re-release in 1951 of Snow White. [142:14] In the 8 years since then, our first [142:17] re-release, our potential audience has [142:19] been increased by 25 million children [142:21] who either were not born or were too [142:23] young to attend a motion picture theater [142:25] in 1944. You're an adult much longer [142:28] than you're a kid. [142:29] >> It's so amazing. And they totally [142:31] stumble into the seven-year thing. Like [142:32] it's not like they intended when they [142:34] made Snow White to say, "Okay, we're [142:36] going to put it in the vault and then [142:37] seven years from now we're going to take [142:38] it out." It just happened that seven [142:40] years later they had a big cash crunch. [142:42] They needed some easy profits and they [142:44] put Snow White back in theaters. And 7 [142:46] years, you know, give or take a couple [142:48] years basically becomes the core Disney [142:52] IP cadence to this very day. And Disney [142:55] could uniquely do it versus other [142:57] studios because their IP was more [142:59] timeless. It's animated and it's based [143:01] on these timeless sort of lessons and [143:05] these fairy tales of old. Like there [143:08] there are these [143:10] simple but resonant stories and it [143:13] carries through right to today. What is [143:15] the cadence between Disney's Frozen [143:17] movies today? [143:19] >> Frozen 1 comes out 2013. [143:21] >> Frozen 2 comes out 2019. [143:24] >> Frozen 3 slated for release next year [143:27] 2027. [143:29] six to eight years like clockwork. [143:32] >> It's interesting they've applied it to [143:33] sequels now, too. [143:34] >> Yep. [143:34] >> All right. So, now we've got four [143:36] components to the flywheel business. [143:37] Your original three, genuinely [143:39] compelling new intellectual property [143:41] with characters that you resonate with. [143:43] Two, maximize distribution of each [143:46] element in the primary delivery vehicle. [143:49] You've got three, feed that IP into as [143:52] many ancillary profitable flywheel nodes [143:54] as possible. And now we've got four. [143:56] Yep. [143:56] >> The vault, the re-releases. [143:58] >> Strategically re-release it every seven [144:02] or so years. Frequently enough to [144:04] capture each new generation of children, [144:06] but not too frequently lest you dilute [144:09] its impact [144:11] >> with effectively evergreen content. [144:13] >> Yep. Roy has a great quote that he would [144:17] tell the Wall Street Journal many years [144:19] later. Our product is practically [144:22] eternal. [144:25] And it's so true. [144:26] >> Yep. [144:27] >> So despite this genuine innovation of [144:29] adding the vault concept to the [144:31] flywheel, by the time the war ends in [144:34] 1945, [144:36] Disney is not in a good place. The [144:39] flywheel is basically completely broken. [144:43] There hasn't been any compelling IP [144:46] generated for the past several years. [144:48] And worst of all, Walt himself is [144:52] disengaged and disillusioned. [144:55] >> Yeah. But clearly something happened [144:58] because the Disney we know today is [144:59] quite successful. [145:01] >> Yes. But before we continue the story. [145:03] >> Yes. Listeners, this is a great time to [145:06] thank our friends at Service Now, [145:08] longtime friends of the show. So if you [145:11] are managing a large enterprise today, [145:12] you've got AI everywhere. You've got [145:14] co-pilots and models and agents all [145:16] running across every team. And the [145:18] promise was simple. Add AI and the [145:20] results will follow. But enterprises are [145:22] now realizing that the hard part was [145:24] never adding AI. It's making it work, [145:27] >> right? It's got to have the right [145:28] context and connect to the workflows [145:30] that matter. Plus, it's got to be [145:33] secure, stay governable, and still be [145:35] able to take real actions. You get all [145:37] that working together, and that's when [145:38] magic happens. [145:39] >> Yes. And for those like two of you out [145:42] there who've never been to Disneyland, [145:44] the magic isn't just from one great [145:46] ride. It's from the whole experience [145:48] being seamless. The daily parades, the [145:50] sightelines, the characters appearing [145:52] exactly at the right moment. It looks [145:54] effortless, but behind the scenes, [145:56] thousands of moving parts are being [145:57] coordinated in real time from a control [145:59] center that nobody ever sees. And that's [146:02] what Service Now has been building for [146:04] over 20 years. The foundation AI needs [146:06] to succeed. And they've done it at [146:08] scale. Over a 100red billion workflows, [146:10] trillions of transactions, and the [146:12] operational knowledge of how work [146:14] actually gets done. That's why more than [146:16] 85% of the Fortune 500 work with Service [146:19] Now. [146:19] >> And as the AI control tower, they're [146:22] giving companies a single place to [146:23] manage all of it. Not just agents, but [146:25] every AI system across your business. So [146:28] listeners, if you are wrangling AI [146:29] across your company, go check out [146:31] service.com/acquired [146:33] and just tell them that Ben and David [146:34] sent you. All right, so we're coming out [146:38] of the war. There's sort of a few moving [146:41] parts here at Disney right now. So the [146:43] revenue from the government has dried [146:46] up. So that the thing that was putting [146:47] them on sound financial footing is not [146:49] there for the sort of quick revenue [146:51] hits. The long-term stuff other than the [146:54] re-releases, they haven't stoked the [146:55] fire in a while. [146:56] >> So the strategy over these next few [146:58] years is to sort of kickstart to try to [147:00] do stuff that doesn't cost a lot of [147:02] money but might have a lot of return. [147:04] >> And so they try a bunch of stuff on the [147:07] animation side. They do packages where [147:10] they take a bunch of shorts and they [147:12] package them together as feature films. [147:14] These are movies that you almost [147:17] assuredly have never seen called like [147:19] Make Mine Music or Fun and Fancyfree. [147:22] Not big successes. The other thing they [147:24] try in animation is to go back to the [147:26] original Alice's idea of combining [147:30] animation and live action. The result of [147:32] that is the movie Song of the South. [147:36] Yeah. which historians look back on as [147:40] racist and deeply problematic. And uh [147:43] Disney has never released on home video [147:46] or streaming. So uh not a big success [147:49] for the flywheel there either. And for [147:51] the first time in animation, there's now [147:54] actually real competition in the [147:57] marketplace. So before the war, Warner [147:59] Brothers had started Looney Tunes, you [148:01] know, with like Daffy Duck and Porky Pig [148:04] and then Elmer Fud and of course [148:06] >> Bugs Bunny. [148:07] >> Ironically, it's a former Disney story [148:11] department employee, Charles Thorson, [148:13] that does the initial designs for Bugs [148:16] Bunny. [148:16] >> And then in 1940, you know, same year it [148:18] all started to fall apart for Disney, [148:20] Joseph Barbara and William Hannah start [148:23] working together. They produce Tom and [148:25] Jerry for MGM. So the other major [148:27] studios [148:28] >> and the Flintstones. [148:29] >> Yeah. The Flintstones, of course. Yeah. [148:31] The other major studios are starting to [148:33] creep in on the animation game. And so [148:35] by this post-war period, these other [148:38] studios had grown in popularity and were [148:41] really starting to rival Disney. [148:43] Meanwhile, Disney, they go the other way [148:46] and they get into live action. [148:48] >> Yeah. They somehow had a bunch of cash [148:50] tied up in Europe that they couldn't [148:52] repatriate, so they needed to spend it [148:54] in London. So, they went and shot a [148:56] liveaction film, Treasure Island, in [148:59] London, which did well for them. Live [149:01] action is far less expensive to create. [149:03] You can do it fast, and they needed to [149:05] do something with this cash. But, you [149:06] know, you're not buying a lot of [149:07] Treasure Island merch today. It's not [149:09] durable like the the animated stuff. [149:11] >> As we talked about earlier, live action [149:14] doesn't feed the flywheel, at least for [149:16] Disney, in quite the same way. [149:17] >> Yep. They started doing nature [149:19] documentaries. They did one called Seal [149:21] Island shot in Alaska. They also started [149:24] studying the emerging TV medium to see [149:27] if they should do something here, but at [149:30] this point in time decide, nah, [149:31] basically not. But we'll watch it and [149:34] see. We're very interested. But Walt [149:36] Hart really was in animation. He wanted [149:38] to get back to making animated feature [149:40] films that push the envelope. Roy, [149:43] meanwhile, hates this idea since the [149:45] studio is not on good financial footing. [149:47] It has lots of debt. Walt ultimately has [149:50] to give an ultimatum that if we don't [149:52] get back to this, then we should just [149:53] sell the company. Like, what are we even [149:55] doing here? [149:56] >> In 1950, Roy capitulates and the company [149:59] went and raised another $2 million to [150:02] finance their next film, which was [150:04] Cinderella. [150:06] >> The first bright spot in a long time [150:09] >> and their first fulllength feature film [150:11] in eight years since Bambi in 1942. [150:14] >> And the way they made Cinderella was [150:17] quite different, right? Yeah. So Walt [150:21] pounds the table to make this thing and [150:22] then he kind of realizes the way they [150:24] are going to make it feels compromised [150:26] to him because the budget just can't be [150:29] what they were blowing before in those [150:31] early 40s to try to really push the [150:33] envelope. [150:34] >> Yeah. There's a great quote from the [150:36] animator Frank Thomas who worked on [150:37] Cinderella. We planned Cinderella more [150:40] carefully and shot it all in live action [150:42] first so we could judge it. This was [150:44] without costumes or a set. just go on a [150:47] sound stage and see whether that scene's [150:48] going to work. Walt said, "We can't [150:50] afford to animate it and then change it. [150:52] The animation has to be right the first [150:54] time." Yeah. Not the mindset that they [150:57] took into Snow White. [150:58] >> And this basically flips the like [151:00] liveaction animation thing from a source [151:02] of inspiration and study to a crutch. So [151:05] they were filming every scene and then [151:07] rotoscoping effectively like tracing the [151:10] liveaction footage out of the camera to [151:13] make it animated which can lead to this [151:15] much more rigid feeling animation. Also [151:19] once you film it you are completely [151:21] locked into that view. It's not like you [151:22] can move the theoretical camera because [151:24] you haven't really built the muscle to [151:27] animate in that style for the film. So [151:29] you're kind of stuck with this like how [151:31] it looked in the camera is how we trace [151:34] it on paper. It just had less of the [151:36] like lavish detail that they put into [151:38] Pinocchio and Bambi. All this ultimately [151:41] leads to like Walt's hard is just not in [151:44] it. He he kind of helps kickstart the [151:47] whole thing but then is not engaged [151:48] during the production of this film. It [151:50] does end up being a critical and [151:52] commercial huge success though. Yes. [151:55] >> I believe it makes basically the same [151:58] amount of money as Snow White. I think [152:01] it does $8 million in film rentals in [152:03] the first year. [152:04] >> Yep. On a cost of 2.2 million. [152:05] >> Yep. [152:06] >> So really, this is the first big [152:07] financial success for the company since [152:09] before the war. It's the biggest success [152:11] since Snow White. It got the company [152:14] back on sound footing after a pretty [152:16] gnarly uh time. [152:18] >> Gnarly decade there. Yeah. But yeah, so [152:20] Cinderella is is a huge bright spot. It [152:23] was a onetime financial boost to the [152:25] studio that didn't solve all the [152:27] company's problems, but it did get [152:30] animation back on the right foot [152:33] creatively. Even though Walt was no [152:35] longer, you know, as deeply involved as [152:37] he was in the Snow White era, it did [152:40] turn things around enough that like at [152:42] least they were making quality work [152:44] again. And like obviously those films [152:45] still hold up today. Over the next few [152:47] years, they then released Alice in [152:50] Wonderland, which surprise ballooned [152:52] over budget and did not pay back. That [152:55] is in part because a lot of historians [152:57] say it's a film that Walt felt like he [152:59] should do because of his reverence for [153:01] the source material. [153:02] >> Yep. [153:03] >> But never quite had a clear idea on [153:05] exactly what to do with it. So, it's [153:07] it's hard to put together these sort of [153:09] disjoint vignettes into one cohesive [153:11] film, but artistically beautiful. So, [153:15] put a pin in that. We'll come back to [153:16] it. But interesting comment on Alice [153:20] from the 1951 annual report from Roy. [153:24] >> Alice has not performed as well at the [153:26] box office as Cinderella. Because of [153:28] these circumstances, which were [153:29] generally poor attendance at theaters, [153:31] he actually blames the macro, which is [153:33] interesting. And because Alice in [153:35] Wonderland is our highest cost feature, [153:37] it is not expected to produce a profit [153:39] from its first release. However, it is a [153:42] classic property which should be a [153:44] valuable asset to the company [153:45] indefinitely. [153:46] >> And hey, he was right. [153:48] >> Yep. [153:48] >> All right. So, we've talked about Walt [153:51] being disengaged here. What is he doing? [153:56] >> So, Walt [153:58] is playing with trains. [154:03] >> I mean, [154:04] >> yes, he is. That's about the best way [154:06] that I can frame this is he's getting [154:08] really into trains and really into [154:10] miniatures. [154:11] >> Yes. Trains, specifically model trains [154:15] and miniatures like miniature furniture [154:18] and like rooms in homes in miniatures. [154:23] >> Yeah. I mean, gosh, I said we weren't [154:25] going to dive into Walt's psyche on this [154:27] episode, but I kind of think about this. [154:29] This is me editorializing [154:31] as [154:32] this like soulsearching half decade [154:35] where he's just looking for what is he [154:38] going to get passionate about next cuz [154:40] he's sort of bored like animation isn't [154:43] doing it for him the way that it used to [154:45] and he's like reaching back into his [154:48] childhood for inspiration. [154:50] >> And the way Walt would frame this is [154:52] that he was developing these hobbies to [154:54] keep his mind off of the problems at the [154:57] studio. That's what he would always say, [154:58] >> right? That these were nice things to do [155:00] after a hard day at work. [155:01] >> Y [155:02] >> but they became obsessions. [155:04] >> Yes. [155:04] >> When I said reaching back into his [155:06] childhood, there was a train that ran [155:08] through Marceline, which is why [155:10] Marceline existed. And there's this like [155:13] deep-seated psyche around trains and [155:15] small town America. He and some of the [155:16] other senior animators developed this [155:18] interest in largecale model trains, [155:21] which are 1/8 the scale of an actual [155:25] railroad train. So like big like ones [155:28] you could ride around sitting on top of. [155:30] There's amazing old footage of of Walt [155:32] like riding around on these these 1/8 [155:35] scale trains. [155:35] >> Yep. So Walt took this extremely [155:37] seriously. He ends up traveling to the [155:39] 1948 and 1949 Chicago train fair and he [155:44] kind of dove into this community of [155:46] fellow train enthusiasts. I was thinking [155:49] this was strange. Like I kept reading [155:50] about this and I was like this is wild. [155:53] There were six million train [155:55] enthusiasts, like model train [155:57] enthusiasts at the time. This was [155:58] actually like a pretty big thing. [156:00] >> Yeah. This isn't like billionaire [156:02] hobbies today. This is like a Wald [156:04] hanging out with other enthusiasts kind [156:07] of man of the people style. [156:08] >> Yes. And it was something that was [156:10] really tangible for him to do with his [156:12] hands. I mean, he was building some of [156:14] the train cars himself. He he actually [156:16] had a workspace in the machine shop in [156:18] Burbank where he was building with the [156:21] machine shop staff. There was a guy [156:23] Roger Broki who sort of led the machine [156:25] shop team who would go on to build a [156:28] serious serious model train for Walt. [156:31] Roger would also become just to [156:33] foreshadow here the first Imagineer. [156:35] >> Yes. Yes. Yes. Well, just to foreshadow [156:38] even more all of this would lead to [156:41] Imagineering. [156:42] >> Yes. So, this team in the machine shop [156:45] uh and Walt end up building this train [156:49] and and David, you were saying like man [156:51] of the people style in a very not man of [156:54] the people style thing. He ends up [156:55] sinking $50,000 [156:57] which is like a giant amount of money at [156:59] the time and a huge amount of his [157:01] personal liquidity in 1950 into building [157:04] a train in his backyard. There was a [157:07] half mile of track that went through a [157:10] tunnel. That tunnel that which he dug [157:13] under his wife's garden on its own was [157:16] 90 ft long. [157:17] >> Yes. When Walt gets obsessed with [157:19] something, he he goes to un unreasonable [157:23] extremes. [157:24] >> When he and his wife were looking at [157:26] houses to figure out where what property [157:28] they were going to buy and then build a [157:29] house on, a major consideration was, is [157:32] there room for a giant train to be laid [157:35] out? He ends up, it's on Carolwood [157:37] Avenue, I believe, Carolwood Street, and [157:39] he ends up naming it the Carolwood [157:41] Pacific. The uh steam engine is named [157:43] the Lily Bell after his wife. It's a [157:46] whole thing. [157:47] >> Yep. And if you go to Disneyland or [157:49] Disney World today, most of the steam [157:52] engines of the railroads are named in [157:55] callbacks to this period and this [157:57] inspiration in Walt's life. So, there's [158:00] the Lily Bell engine at Walt Disney [158:02] World. There's the Ward Kimble who is [158:04] the original animator that gets him into [158:06] this hobby. There's the Roger Broie as [158:08] you're saying and uh then there's also [158:10] the Roy Disney. [158:11] >> Oh, nice. I did not know that. So, this [158:15] is great quote in a PBS American [158:18] Experience documentary by historian [158:20] Nancy Conn where she's reflecting on [158:23] Walt in this moment and her quote is, "I [158:25] can't control my employees. Turns out I [158:28] can't control the larger stage right [158:29] now. I can't even completely control my [158:31] company. So, here's a world I can [158:33] recreate down to the smallest detail [158:35] that is mine and perfect. [158:38] >> And it would become something much [158:40] bigger that would also be his and also [158:43] be perfect. [158:44] >> Yes. So, out of this stew comes [158:48] Disneyland. [158:48] >> Yes. Which is so funny because Walt [158:52] would insist in interviews until his [158:54] dying day that quote, "The idea for [158:57] Disneyland came about when my daughters [158:59] were very young. And as I'd sit there [159:02] while they rode the merry-goround, I [159:04] felt that there should be something [159:05] built where parents and children could [159:07] have fun together. So that's how [159:09] Disneyland started. It all started from [159:11] a daddy with two daughters wondering [159:13] where he could take them where he could [159:15] have a little fun with them, too. [159:18] >> It's also that, [159:19] >> you know, I'm sure that's part of it. [159:20] >> Yeah, [159:21] >> some of both, but really the trains. [159:24] >> Okay, so how did Disneyland happen? [159:27] Well, the initial thing was actually [159:28] pretty small. [159:29] >> Yep. the initial idea. [159:30] >> Yes, there was a name floated Mickey [159:33] Mouse Village that sort of quickly [159:35] changed to Disneyland since uh it was [159:37] much more about his new passions, [159:40] trains, Americana, and miniatures than [159:42] it was about Mickey Mouse. And he [159:45] started working with artists to sketch [159:47] out what it would be. And the constraint [159:50] that he had was we've got this 16 acre [159:52] plot of land that's adjacent to the [159:55] Burbank studio lot between that and the [159:57] river. So that's sort of what we're [159:59] working with here. [160:00] >> Yeah. And that's the natural place you [160:02] would put this. [160:03] >> Of course. Of course. So in March of [160:06] 1952, Walt announces it Disneyland to be [160:10] constructed on that little strip of land [160:13] >> for a cost of $1.5 million. [160:17] >> A Snow White. [160:18] >> A Snow White. Yeah, we should speak in [160:20] units of Snow White. It's actually [160:22] cheaper than a Snow White given the [160:23] inflation. [160:24] >> Right. Right. Right. Much cheaper than a [160:25] Snow White. It's now been uh 15 years. [160:28] So, he decides, I'd actually like to [160:30] spend some money on a larger study for [160:32] this because I've got a couple of like [160:34] artist renderings here that include cool [160:36] little river and a train that runs on [160:39] this and we're going to figure out, you [160:41] know, attractions that that go in this [160:43] thing, but we really got to jam a lot in [160:46] here. So, I'd like more money. [160:47] >> Roy and the board are none too enthused [160:50] about this. [160:51] >> Yeah. Think about everything that we [160:53] have said over the last, I don't know, [160:54] hour about the state of the company. And [160:58] Walt is saying, "Hey, I found a thing [161:00] I'm interested in. Can I have some money [161:02] to explore building this kind of like [161:05] inarticulatable idea?" Yeah. Right next [161:08] to the studio lot. [161:09] >> Yeah. It kind of goes over like a lead [161:11] balloon. [161:12] >> Yes. So, the Walt Disney Company at this [161:15] time called Walt Disney Productions does [161:17] not free up the purse strings for this. [161:19] So, what does Walt do? He kind of talks [161:21] to Roy about it and they they they [161:23] figure out a path forward. He's going to [161:24] start his own company that would get [161:26] formalized later in the year in 1952 [161:29] that ends up being called Wed [161:31] Enterprises. We wed Walter Elias Disney. [161:34] His personal company that he can do [161:37] >> weird personal stuff with. [161:41] >> Yes. So over the course of 1952, [161:45] Walt starts poaching people from Disney [161:48] to work on this thing. [161:50] >> And at first it's just like a halfozen [161:52] people and they're set up in a building [161:55] on the back lot at Burbank. These would [161:57] become the first Imagineers. [162:00] >> Yes. [162:00] >> And the interesting thing is the people [162:02] he's poaching, these are artists and [162:05] they're animators. that are being hired [162:08] to build a theme park and like big [162:12] physical trains. This gives you a sense [162:14] of Walt's leadership style. He would [162:15] take a talented, creative person and [162:18] he'd be perfectly willing to assign them [162:19] to things that they've never done before [162:20] and say, "Yeah, he'll figure it out." [162:22] >> We also just got to pause here for a [162:24] minute and really underline what's [162:26] happening here. This is Walt Disney. [162:30] >> Yes. By this point in history, he is the [162:31] Walt Disney. He is the Walt Disney who [162:35] has come up with a crazy new idea based [162:39] on his obsessive hobby with model trains [162:42] that the board of Disney Studios has [162:44] basically rejected. And so he has gone [162:47] full crackpot like Colonel Kurtz style [162:50] and started his own separate company on [162:54] the Disney campus where he is poaching [162:57] and recruiting some of the best Disney [163:00] animators and artists to come over and [163:04] stop doing animation and start working [163:07] with him building a theme park. That is [163:10] what is happening here. I was about to [163:12] make the comment, "Oh, this sounds a lot [163:14] like Elon Musk." But none of Elon's [163:16] companies have a board that would vote [163:17] against him. And so that's really the [163:20] only difference here is kind of the like [163:22] Elon before Elon. [163:23] >> Yes. [163:24] >> So there ends up being two problems with [163:26] this plan. One is Walt and the [163:28] architecture company that he hired kind [163:30] of come to the conclusion that this plot [163:32] of land, it's just too small. Even with [163:34] all the clever ideas to be space [163:36] efficient, there's just too much that he [163:38] wants to do with this Disneyland [163:39] concept. It keeps growing in scope to [163:41] accomplish all of it in that little [163:43] strip of land. The second problem is [163:46] after provisional approval, the Burbank [163:49] City Council starts to learn more and [163:51] they decline the proposal since they do [163:53] not want a quote carnival-like [163:55] atmosphere right there on the side of [163:57] the river. [163:58] >> You could describe Disneyland as lots of [164:00] things, but carnival-like atmosphere. [164:03] Clearly, they did not get the vision, [164:05] >> right? The the magic is that it isn't. [164:07] It very easily could have been. So, they [164:10] need to find a bigger plot of land and [164:13] they need to uh work with a team that is [164:17] really good at odd research-based tasks. [164:21] And you're never going to guess, [164:24] listeners, where he goes for this. It is [164:26] like a a crazy nugget of history. He [164:30] goes to SRRI, the Stanford Research [164:34] Institute. If you've heard SRRI before, [164:37] it is one letter off from Siri, which [164:40] was a spinout of SRRI. Yes, that SRRI [164:44] >> that it was I was just going to say that [164:47] you you just triggered like, you know, [164:49] probably two million phones, [164:51] >> some of which are running uh the betas, [164:53] so they'll have the new Siri AI. [164:55] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Uh, yes. SRS SRRI is [165:00] the research firm that Walt hires to go [165:05] identify what ultimately becomes [165:08] Anaheim. The perfect spot. They [165:10] absolutely knock it out of the park. But [165:12] when you describe it, the site sounds [165:15] completely nuts. 10 times bigger than [165:17] the original site, a full 160 acres. [165:20] >> Yep. [165:21] >> 25 miles away from Los Angeles. It is [165:25] currently just some orange groves. [165:27] Anaheim itself was a small farming town. [165:31] There wasn't even a highway connecting [165:33] it to Los Angeles. [165:34] >> There was a planned highway. [165:37] >> Yes. So, there's a quote from the [165:39] animated man by Michael Barrier. The [165:42] SRRI analysis from August 1953 took into [165:45] account a large number of factors [165:47] including likely population growth, [165:49] freeway construction, and the effect of [165:51] terrain on television transmission. [165:53] Since the idea was that TV will play an [165:56] important part in the promotion and [165:58] development of Disneyland, the study [166:00] pointed toward a location southeast of [166:02] Los Angeles in Anaheim in Orange County, [166:05] just off the Santa Ana Freeway. That [166:07] freeway was then under construction, but [166:08] most of it between downtown Los Angeles [166:10] and Orange County was scheduled for [166:12] completion. The foresight of all the [166:15] factors that they considered there, [166:16] >> just incredible. [166:18] >> So, uh, there is one problem though, [166:20] which is great. We found the perfect [166:21] site. It's 160 acres and we're going to [166:23] do this much bigger and better than we [166:25] were before. We're going to need some [166:27] money. [166:27] >> We're going to need a lot of money. So, [166:30] Walt goes back to the company. [166:33] >> Yes. And remember, they had no interest [166:35] in pursuing this, which is why he had to [166:37] set up Wed in the first place. It's [166:39] becoming clear that this is happening. I [166:41] mean, Walt Disney is a force of nature [166:43] and Roy becomes supportive or at least [166:46] as supportive as [166:47] >> strong armed into supporting this, [166:49] >> right? While still trying to protect the [166:50] company. And so in 1953 in April, Walt [166:54] Disney Productions board of directors, [166:56] this is a public company, agreed to a [166:58] personal services contract with Walt and [167:01] contracts with WED to design and build [167:03] the Disneyland Park attractions. This is [167:06] done as a cost plus contract. So Wed and [167:09] Walt personally don't have to take any [167:12] risk at least in in this part of it. It [167:15] is just like we will pay you whatever it [167:18] is plus your profit margin to go build [167:21] stuff and you know it's kind of a blank [167:23] check. There are some pretty wild other [167:26] terms in this personal services contract [167:29] according to a 1990 article decades [167:31] later in the LA Times. Walt is allowed [167:34] to pursue outside projects which [167:37] effectively gives him all the benefits [167:38] of being a free agent while still [167:40] drawing his $153,000 [167:42] salary from Walt Disney Productions. [167:44] Okay, another point. Walt argues that he [167:48] should be compensated for the use of his [167:50] name. He ends up getting it again, [167:53] worked into this deal, and the contract [167:55] awards him 10% of all merchandise sold. [167:58] >> Wow, I actually didn't find this. This [168:01] is wild. So, here's the next bullet [168:02] point. He will now get the right to [168:04] invest alongside Walt Disney Productions [168:07] in each liveaction film project, which [168:09] he would later do on Mary Poppins and [168:11] other films. So, why did he negotiate [168:14] for this? I mean, my feeling about Wald [168:17] after doing all this research is that he [168:19] didn't actually really care that much [168:21] personally about money. Was he trying to [168:24] accumulate cash so that he could fund [168:27] Disneyland? [168:28] >> Exactly. [168:29] >> Exactly. There's also some like personal [168:32] stuff tied up in here, his relationship [168:34] with the company where he's like, "It's [168:35] not really mine anymore, so I kind of [168:37] want more out of it." That's sort of the [168:39] less generous take on it. But he and Roy [168:42] definitely kind of came to this [168:43] understanding of, well, if Walt is going [168:46] to have to fund a lot of this, then we [168:47] need to figure out a way for Walt to get [168:49] more cash so that he can do [168:51] >> I see this is happening no matter what. [168:54] So, we can do it the easy way or we can [168:56] do it the hard way. [168:57] >> It is interesting on his relationship [168:59] with money. He was interested in money [169:02] but for the sake of deploying it. I [169:04] mean, hoarding money was never his [169:06] thing. Like, he did live extravagantly [169:08] compared to most people. hit that train [169:10] and you know a vacation house in Palm [169:12] Springs and all that, but it's not what [169:14] the other big Hollywood moguls were [169:16] doing. Lillian Disney has a comment in [169:18] 1956. She said, "I've always been [169:20] worried. I have never felt secure. [169:23] Never. [169:24] >> He's always telling us how wealthy we [169:25] are, how much we've got, and we haven't [169:27] got anything." [169:29] >> And she's kind of right [169:30] >> because he's always putting it back in. [169:32] >> Yes. And it's all tied up in the [169:33] enterprise value of Disney, which he [169:35] keeps sort of reorggaging and rebetting [169:37] the farm. [169:37] >> Yes. So there's that angle. He also [169:39] always believed in the park just like he [169:41] always believed that animation feature [169:44] animation had a long runway ahead of it. [169:47] And I I was trying to think of the best [169:48] way to contextualize this. So to [169:50] validate him there, this is a crazy stat [169:53] and just how right he was about all of [169:55] this. Walt built this company over his [169:58] entire lifetime from age 21 until he [170:01] died in 1966. [170:03] And if you look at the company's market [170:05] cap today compared to where it was in [170:07] 1966, [170:09] 99.95% [170:11] of the value was created after Walt [170:14] Disney died. [170:15] >> Yep. [170:16] >> There was just so much more running room [170:18] with his concept than he had time on [170:20] this earth to execute. [170:21] >> Yep. [170:22] >> Do you know how I know the 1966 market [170:25] cap? Is this ringing any bells for you, [170:27] David? [170:28] >> No. So during the Buffett partnerships, [170:34] Warren Buffett saw that Disney was an [170:36] underpriced asset in 1966, [170:39] right before Walt died. So Buffett [170:43] bought a bunch of the stock in ' 66 [170:45] since it had a market cap under $90 [170:48] million at the time. [170:49] >> Under $90 million. [170:51] >> The company was doing 21 million in [170:53] pre-tax earnings. And at this point, cuz [170:55] this is after Disneyland, this after a [170:57] bunch of stuff, it had more cash than [171:00] debt. [171:00] >> Wow. This is like Ben Graham bargain [171:03] investing [171:04] >> and even more so like Charlie Mer [171:05] investing cuz it was a great business at [171:08] a great price. [171:09] >> Yeah. Wow. [171:10] >> A $90 million company doing 21 million [171:12] in pre-tax that has Disney's flywheel. [171:15] This is the buying opportunity of a [171:16] lifetime when Buffett bought it. [171:18] >> That's why he's the goat. [171:19] >> He did, of course, sell it. So, right. [171:23] >> Well, that was the right move after [171:24] Walt's death, as we will see in a few [171:27] minutes. [171:27] >> Anyway, that's sort of how I would [171:29] characterize Walt's relationship with [171:30] wealth and sort of what his his goal was [171:33] in this personal services contract. This [171:35] whole thing ultimately becomes so [171:37] contentious that three board directors [171:39] actually resign from the public company. [171:42] There's also a shareholder lawsuit that [171:44] gets brought and for sort of strange [171:46] reasons, it doesn't end up going [171:47] through, but the remaining board members [171:50] end up approving it. Essentially, it was [171:52] Royy's way of saying, "Okay, the company [171:54] doesn't want to be too tied up in this [171:56] project if it fails, but we will provide [171:57] you a way to get more cash flows from [172:00] the company so you can figure out how to [172:02] do more of the funding of this thing [172:04] yourself." [172:05] >> Wow. Fascinating. [172:07] >> So, like just to reflect to to this [172:09] point in history, this is something I [172:10] really never realized. The origin of [172:12] Disneyland is, at least so far in the [172:15] story, not about the company [172:16] intentionally looking for more places to [172:19] put its intellectual property. [172:20] >> No, it's very intentionally not the [172:22] flywheel in the beginning. [172:23] >> Right. There are essentially zero [172:25] synergies as conceptualized so far for [172:29] Disneyland. [172:30] >> Yep. But all of that's about to change [172:32] because Disneyland, [172:35] even post all of the budget expansion [172:38] after SRRI and moving to Orange County [172:40] and 160 acres, is getting so out of hand [172:45] in its budget that it needs to actually [172:49] come back to the company. [172:50] >> Sort of. [172:51] >> Sort of. [172:52] >> So, here's the corporate structure. [172:54] Originally, they thought they would need [172:55] about $5 million for the Anaheim [172:57] Disneyland. spoiler, they would go way, [173:00] way over that. But because they thought [173:02] it was going to be this expensive, Walt [173:04] went back to the company again and said, [173:06] "Look, I know we did this personal [173:07] services contract thing, but like I [173:09] think it's better if this is actually a [173:11] Disney thing, and let's figure out a way [173:13] to really tie it all together here." At [173:15] a $5 million price tag, the company [173:18] cannot afford to fund this. If you look [173:20] at 1952 when planning began, Walt Disney [173:23] Productions made less than half a [173:25] million dollars in net income. So 10 [173:28] times that for the park's budget is is [173:29] is not going to fly. There's not cash [173:31] for it. But at this point, the company [173:34] is kind of like, all right, the [173:35] proverbial train is moving forward here. [173:37] There is actually a good plan to [173:39] integrate a whole bunch of Disney stuff [173:41] into the park. This can be a a Walt [173:43] Disney Productions thing in one way or [173:45] another. We're good for $500,000, [173:48] but we need to go find the bulk of the [173:50] $5 million somewhere else. Y [173:53] >> what can we do? So, in order to go get [173:56] the bulk of the financing for the park, [173:59] Walt comes back fully into the fold at [174:02] the Disney studio and does something [174:05] that no other movie executive is willing [174:10] to do at this point in time. He embraces [174:14] television. He goes to the TV networks [174:17] for money. Yeah. And the fascinating [174:20] thing is it's in part because they don't [174:23] really want a pure financial partner [174:27] for the park. Like they don't want to [174:28] just go raise a bunch of debt that [174:30] they'll then have to pay back. This has [174:32] hamstrung them so many times. They're [174:34] trying to think creatively of how can we [174:36] do like a 1 + 1 equals 5 thing here [174:38] where we have this Disneyland Inc. joint [174:42] venture and someone else is, you know, [174:45] building this thing and funding it. So [174:47] yeah, at the time the prevailing [174:49] sentiment in Hollywood was that TV was a [174:52] threat. That if Hollywood movie studios [174:54] started putting their content on TV, it [174:57] would steal audiences away from the [174:59] theaters. It's just like in our NFL [175:02] episode where baseball was deathly [175:04] afraid of television. I think the quote [175:06] was, "Radio wetss the appetite for [175:09] attending baseball games live and TV [175:11] satiates it." [175:12] >> Yes. But Walt realizes just like the NFL [175:15] did that TV actually was a huge new [175:18] opportunity. Walt says, "When television [175:22] first hit, I went back to New York and I [175:24] spent a week in New York just to study [175:26] television. I had the feeling then that [175:28] it was important and that we ought to [175:30] get in it." The feeling of the motion [175:32] picture business was that television was [175:33] something we should fight or we should [175:35] ignore it and maybe it would go away or [175:37] some darn thing. I said television is [175:39] going to be my way of going direct to [175:41] the public, bypassing the middleman. I [175:44] said, Roy, this television thing can be [175:47] the greatest thing because we will be [175:49] going direct to the public. [175:52] And he also thinks it might be his [175:54] ticket to financing the park. So ABC had [175:57] been wanting to do something with Walt. [175:59] I mean, lobbying over and over and over [176:01] again. Uh because Walt did this one [176:04] special a few years before. I think it [176:06] was on NBC, not ABC. And it it was [176:11] great. Like there is something very [176:13] compelling about Walt Disney and Disney [176:16] stuff in a television special. [176:18] >> Yes. Yes. AUNCular Walt Disney [176:23] beaming into living rooms around [176:24] America. [176:25] >> But ABC is the third place network. They [176:30] don't have as many affiliates. They [176:31] don't have as much reach. If you're [176:33] going to get a partner for something [176:34] that you really want to take advantage [176:36] of the full reach of a television [176:37] network, it's not ABC. [176:40] >> You really want CBS or NBC. [176:43] >> Yes. And so Walt actually goes to CBS at [176:46] NBC with this pitch. I think it might be [176:48] Roy actually flying to New York and [176:49] doing this, but they're not interested [176:52] at least for the whole package that Walt [176:54] is proposing. [176:55] >> Yes. They both say, "Hey, Walt, we would [176:58] gladly do a regular television series [177:00] with you, but uh I don't know about this [177:03] park thing. [177:04] >> You're asking for the better part of $5 [177:06] million so that we can build a theme [177:09] park with you and that's a bundled deal [177:12] with a doing a TV show. This is really [177:14] weird." [177:14] >> Yep. ABC though, Ben, as you were [177:17] saying, they're the newest of the [177:19] networks and they're struggling to catch [177:22] on. They need something like Disney and [177:25] Disneyland to break out. So they say, [177:28] "Yes, Walt's line on this was that ABC [177:31] needed the show so badly that they [177:33] bought the amusement park with it." [177:37] Do you know the structural thing with [177:40] the television industry that was going [177:41] on in 1952? [177:43] >> No. So, back in 1948, and I promise this [177:46] is related, back in 1948, the FCC paused [177:49] the ability to get a new broadcast [177:51] license while the FCC was sorting out [177:54] some technical and policy problems. It [177:56] was supposed to last like 6 to 12 [177:58] months, but it ended up lasting 4 years [178:01] until 1952, a freeze on the ability to [178:04] get a new broadcast license. So, the [178:07] existing big four networks, which are [178:08] about to be three, NBC, CBS, and ABC, [178:11] became pretty entrenched. Meanwhile, the [178:14] number of households with TVs was [178:16] absolutely exploding. It went from 9% of [178:19] households in 1950 to 65% [178:22] just 5 years later in 1955. [178:25] >> Yeah. So, all these networks now have a [178:28] basically governmentprotected oligopoly [178:31] >> accidentally [178:31] >> in this massive new market. [178:33] >> Yes. So if ABC could put on a hit show, [178:38] like there's not that many choices of [178:40] stuff to watch at any given time because [178:42] of this supply demand mismatch on on [178:44] content. Suddenly a giant swath of [178:46] Americans could pay attention instantly. [178:48] So they're like really hungry for super [178:51] compelling content. So Walt goes to ABC [178:56] kind of knowing this and knowing they're [178:58] in third place and says, "Okay, I will [178:59] make this show for you, but a you're [179:02] doing the park with me, and b I have [179:05] complete say on what happens during the [179:08] program, and I can change my mind [179:10] anytime, and there's no part of the [179:11] contract about what I'm making for you." [179:14] And ABC says, "Yes, absolutely. That [179:16] sounds fine, Mr. Disney." [179:18] >> Yes. So ABC ends up investing $500,000 [179:22] in equity in Disneyland Inc. same terms [179:26] and amount as Disney Productions. In [179:29] addition though, they also guarantee [179:32] $4.5 million in bank loans. So boom, [179:36] there's the rest of the financing that [179:38] they think they need to get Disneyland [179:41] off the ground in debt guaranteed by [179:44] ABC. and they would televise the TV [179:46] show, but Walt Disney Productions would [179:48] have to produce it. But they're actually [179:50] buying a pretty expensive TV show also. [179:52] So in addition to this 500,000 and the [179:54] 4.5 million, ABC is also going to pay $5 [179:57] million per year to Walt Disney [179:59] Productions to make the show that [180:02] they're going to put on the air. And it [180:03] was ABC's to air for 7 years, which made [180:06] it the largest TV programming contract [180:08] in history. [180:10] >> Yes, this is an absolutely [180:12] over-the-top deal. There is one other [180:14] deal point which is uh ABC negotiated to [180:17] have the right to all the profits from [180:19] Disneyland's food and beverage for the [180:21] first decade. [180:23] >> They're like, "Hey, we need something [180:24] else out of this." [180:25] >> Yes. [180:25] >> Yes. But a part of this contract that is [180:28] completely set in stone is the opening [180:30] date, July 17th, 1955. Interesting. I [180:35] didn't realize that the opening date was [180:36] set in this contract with ABC. Either [180:39] way, they do get the television show and [180:42] it works out to be a great deal for [180:45] everybody involved because Ben, to your [180:47] point about supply and demand, it [180:50] becomes a huge hit, like instantaneously [180:53] when it launches in the fall of 1954. [180:56] >> The content is basically a [180:58] behind-the-scenes look at all the [180:59] different lands and content for each. [181:01] So, Tomorrowland, Frontier Land, [181:03] Adventure Land, etc. [181:05] >> Yep. So, pretty quickly, Disneyland, [181:08] because of course they name the TV show [181:10] the same as the park. [181:11] >> Sure. I mean, if Walt gets to control [181:13] all the programming, like why not just [181:14] make it the most perfectly aligned [181:16] advertisement every week for a whole [181:19] year to get ready? [181:20] >> Yes. So, it quickly becomes the second [181:22] most popular show on television after I [181:26] Love Lucy, and it's the first ABC [181:30] program to crack the top 25 shows ever. [181:34] Like it was all NBC and CBS until [181:37] Disneyland. [181:37] >> Unbelievable. Also, ABC lets Disney run [181:40] trailers inside each episode for their [181:43] current theatrical release. So, it both [181:45] promotes Disneyland and the current [181:47] movie slate. [181:48] >> It it becomes a whole another no to the [181:50] flywheel. [181:51] >> Yes. And for the first time, they get [181:53] repeat exposure. I mean, Disney only [181:55] gets a touch point once every few years [181:57] with a consumer with a movie. And maybe [181:59] you watch their shorts. But with TV, [182:02] it's this way to build a repeated [182:04] relationship. [182:05] >> They had this in a certain way with the [182:07] comic strip before, but this is like [182:09] that on steroids. [182:10] >> Yes. [182:11] >> So, in that same fall and winter of 1954 [182:15] into 1955, [182:18] the show has its first big like viral [182:24] moment even before the park opens. So, [182:27] in December of 1954, [182:30] Disney begins a threepart liveaction [182:34] miniseries on the show about the story [182:38] of Davy Crockett. Davy Crockett. [182:40] >> Oh, that's right. [182:41] >> And America goes nuts for Davy Crockett. [182:47] For listeners who don't know, Davy [182:48] Crockett is like a historical American [182:51] figure that fought and died in the [182:53] Battle of the Alamo in Texas, over a [182:56] century before this, [182:58] >> which Disney highly fictionalizes the [183:00] character. [183:00] >> Yes, totally. But this miniseries [183:03] becomes a massive flywheel moment for [183:08] Disney. Totally unintentionally. Davy [183:10] Crockett Coonkin caps become the [183:13] musthave kids product of 1955. They sell [183:18] 10 million caps in 1955. [183:22] >> Unreal. [183:23] >> Even better, the theme song, The Ballad [183:25] of Davy Crockett, you know, King of the [183:27] Wild Frontier, reaches number one on the [183:30] Billboard charts in America and sells 7 [183:34] million records. In total, Disney would [183:37] go on to do around $300 million of gross [183:41] sales of Davy Crockett merchandise, [183:43] which at this point they fully in-housed [183:46] commercial products. K. Cayman had [183:48] tragically passed away in a airplane [183:50] crash in 1949, after which they in-house [183:53] all of this within Disney. So, if all [183:55] that happened with the same splits we [183:57] mentioned before at 5% royalties on that [183:59] $300 million, assuming again 100% retail [184:03] markup from wholesale, that's $7.5 [184:06] million [184:07] to Disney, [184:10] which uh you know, I think is more in [184:13] actual [184:15] revenue to Disney than they had earned [184:18] from any film at that point in history. [184:23] And David, this is really going to blow [184:25] your mind. That is actually more than [184:28] the amount of income they had received [184:32] ever cumulatively from firstr run [184:35] animated features. [184:37] >> If you add up all the pluses and all the [184:39] minuses, by 1957, [184:42] >> the money they had made ever in profit [184:45] dollars from their first release films [184:47] was a hair over $7 million. [184:50] And they made by your estimates seven [184:52] and a half million. [184:53] >> They made more from skin caps and [184:55] record sales than [184:58] incredible. And what timing? Right [185:00] before Disneyland opens. [185:01] >> Insane. [185:02] >> Amazing. [185:03] >> Disney absolutely crushed the timing on [185:07] switching their horse to TV or sort of [185:09] embracing TV and embracing it in this [185:11] huge way. And not just with programming, [185:13] but directing all this attention at [185:15] Disneyland. We gave that stat earlier [185:17] all the way in the the 20s that the [185:19] average American went to theaters over [185:21] 40 times. By 1947, that number was down [185:24] to about 32 times. And by 1956, the year [185:28] after Disneyland opened, it was down to [185:30] 14 times per year. Thanks to our friend [185:32] Arvin at Worldly Partners for gathering [185:34] all this data. [185:35] >> So movie executives really had good [185:38] cause to be concerned about TV. [185:40] >> Absolutely. attention was shifting to [185:42] television and right as it was shifting [185:44] in droves, boom, that is right where [185:47] Disney showed up in this like [185:50] multiplicative way, you know. [185:52] >> Yeah, man. Incredible timing. [185:55] >> And Walt, as ever, had a quote on this. [185:56] This is from the special that he did [185:58] back in 1950 as an experiment. He said, [186:00] "I regard television as one of our most [186:02] important channels for the development [186:04] of a new motion picture audience. [186:06] Millions of tele viewers never go to a [186:09] picture theater and countless others [186:11] infrequently. In these highly [186:13] competitive days, we must use the [186:14] television screen along with every other [186:16] promotional medium to increase our [186:18] potential audience. [186:20] >> Man, was he right. [186:22] >> Man, was he right. [186:23] >> And it's just so incredible that because [186:25] he started playing with trains, [186:28] Disney became a major force in [186:30] television [186:32] and of course opened the park. [186:33] >> Yes. Okay. Okay. So, how does this all [186:35] come together? We've got this like joint [186:37] venture called Disneyland, Inc. It's got [186:40] $500,000 from Walt Disney Productions. [186:42] It's got $500,000 from ABC. It's got [186:45] $200,000 from Western Publishing, who [186:48] distributed their books. And then Walt [186:50] himself put in $250,000. [186:54] >> That's right. I did see that. [186:55] >> Yes. [186:55] >> And then they've got the $4.5 million of [186:58] debt guaranteed by ABC. [187:01] >> Exactly. So, there's a total of $6ish [187:03] million that they have to spend to build [187:06] the thing. Plus, there was actually [187:07] another 2 million of 10-year bonds that [187:09] ABC was committed to if they really [187:11] really needed an extra $2 million to [187:14] flex from a budget of six to a budget of [187:16] eight. [187:16] >> So, Ben, I've read a bunch of places [187:18] this ended up costing $17 million. [187:22] >> Yes, that is correct. So the cap table [187:24] is uh Walt Disney Productions and ABC [187:27] each own 34%, Western Publishing owns [187:29] 14% and Walt himself personally owns 17% [187:33] and there's a contract between [187:34] Disneyland Inc. and Wed Enterprises [187:38] which Walt owns 100% of to actually [187:42] build it all. So all of this leads up to [187:45] July 17th, 1955, [187:48] the opening of Disneyland that would [187:51] change the company forever. that would [187:53] change American vacations forever. Yeah. [187:56] >> That would lay out a giant part of [187:58] Disney's business model going forward, [188:00] the opening of Disneyland. [188:03] >> Yes. But before we do that, now is a [188:05] great time to thank our friends at [188:07] Statsake. [188:08] >> Yes. So, Walt Disney had this idea that [188:11] he would often talk about plusing. Most [188:14] amusement parks would be effectively [188:16] complete at opening and then they'd call [188:18] it finished. But not Disneyland. Walt [188:20] treated the park as something that you [188:22] have to keep improving forever and he [188:24] constantly looked at how guests move [188:26] through it. [188:26] >> Yep. This idea though only works if you [188:29] can see what's happening. You can't [188:31] improve an experience on a hunch. What [188:34] mattered was how guests really behaved, [188:36] not what anyone assumed in a meeting, [188:37] which is largely the same problem that [188:39] product teams have today, just at speed [188:41] and scale. You can ship faster than ever [188:43] now, but the hard part becomes knowing [188:45] which changes actually improve the [188:47] product. And now coding with AI only [188:49] raises those stakes because LLMs are [188:52] non-deterministic, meaning that the same [188:54] input doesn't always produce the same [188:56] output. So a small change to a prompt or [188:58] model can have surprisingly large [189:00] downstream effects. Offline evals will [189:02] really only get you so far and you need [189:04] to be getting signals from real users [189:06] and making decisions on that. [189:08] >> And that's where stats comes in. They [189:10] offer product teams experimentation, [189:12] feature flags, and product analytics all [189:14] in one place. You can ship quickly, roll [189:16] out changes safely, and measure how [189:18] those changes impact users, making your [189:20] product actually better instead of just [189:22] guessing. Yes. So, just like Walt [189:24] continuously was plusing Disneyland [189:27] still today, Statig is how you improve [189:30] your product after you've shipped it. [189:31] You can learn more at [189:32] statsig.com/acquired [189:34] and just tell them that Ben and David [189:36] sent you. All right. So, the development [189:39] of the park, the team at WED had been [189:42] getting inspiration and sort of [189:44] concepting and iterating while all the [189:47] ABC stuff is happening, while all the [189:48] hype building around America is [189:50] happening, and of course, while the [189:52] financial negotiations are are [189:54] happening. So, in September of 1953, as [189:58] legend goes, Roy is about to walk into [190:02] meetings with television executives, and [190:03] Walt famously locks himself in a room [190:05] with Herb Ryman for an entire weekend [190:08] and says, "Herb, can you draw the first [190:10] full drawing of Disneyland?" And Herb [190:13] looks at him and he's like, "Dis what?" [190:16] The first time hearing of this and he's [190:17] like, "The theme park, you're going to [190:20] come work on that with me." And he's [190:21] like, "I don't even work here. I I used [190:23] to work at Disney, but I I don't work [190:25] here now. And Walt was like, "Yeah, but [190:26] you're the guy to do this." And so Herb [190:29] kind of looks at him. He says, "Can you [190:31] tell me a little bit more about this [190:32] theme park?" Walt, [190:34] this is metaphorical, kind of locks the [190:36] door. [190:37] >> Yeah. He's like, "Great. I will stay [190:39] here all weekend with you and tell you [190:40] about the theme park." [190:42] >> And out of the weekend emerges this [190:46] beautiful drawing that we will send out [190:48] in the email acquire.fm/e FM/AL that [190:51] they can use as a sales tool for the [190:53] first meeting with ABC. You've got a [190:55] castle, you've got mountains, you've got [190:58] the railroad, you've got the river. The [191:00] bones are all there. [191:01] >> The core vision of what Disneyland is. [191:04] >> Yes. Yes. Other Wed employees, [191:07] meanwhile, start traveling all over the [191:08] US looking at the best existing theme [191:10] parks. Walt and others travel overseas [191:12] to places like Tivoli Gardens and [191:14] Copenhagen to get sort of a a completely [191:17] different take on how they could do a [191:19] park with green space, much more [191:21] pleasant, less carnival-like, safer, [191:24] kind of a less seedy experience than you [191:27] are getting in theme parks in the US. [191:29] That is the goal. So, this year leading [191:31] up to the park, what we were about to [191:33] describe is completely insane. Remember [191:35] I said that the date was fixed in the [191:37] television deal in part because the TV [191:40] show was going to culminate in a live [191:42] broadcast of the actual park opening and [191:46] there was all sorts of like brand new [191:48] technology and logistics and operations [191:50] that ABC was going to bring to bear for [191:52] that. So they were they were planning [191:54] around that [191:55] >> and there are some sources that say that [191:58] it was 366 days to build the park. If [192:01] you actually look at physical [192:02] construction, it was less than that. 11 [192:05] months. Wow. So, they end up building [192:09] Disneyland in onethird the time that it [192:12] took to make Snow White. Incredible. [192:14] This whole thing sounds like a fever [192:15] dream when you describe it. A main [192:17] street reflecting how Walt pictured the [192:19] ideal small town from his childhood. [192:21] Multiple rivers with different types of [192:23] boats. There's going to be multiple [192:25] rivers. Robotic animals coming out of [192:28] the water on the Jungle Cruise. a [192:30] castle. American Indians performing live [192:33] shows of dances. Cars that kids, like [192:37] three-year-old kids, can drive around [192:40] and crash into stuff. [192:41] >> Still my favorite part of Disneyland. [192:43] >> Yes. Autotopia. [192:44] >> An intense amount of greenery and trees [192:46] that all had to be brought in. I mean, [192:48] they're doing pine trees and they're [192:50] doing palm trees. Absolutely exquisite [192:53] landscaping to reinforce how pleasant [192:54] and safe of a place that it was. A [192:56] passenger train built from scratch on [192:58] real railroad ties that had to be laid [193:00] down. This thing is like Walt's [193:03] feverdream reflection of America all in [193:06] the most idealized, safe, clean, cheery [193:08] way possible. They've got the past, [193:11] they've got the future with Tomorrowland [193:13] and Frontier Land and Adventure Land, [193:16] but no sign of the present. So, you can [193:18] be completely immersed and disconnected [193:20] from your day-to-day troubles. [193:21] >> You know what? I actually never realized [193:23] that that Disneyland is 100% about the [193:26] past and the future and 0% about the [193:29] present [193:30] >> and about the fantasy. You can go to [193:31] fantasy land. That's your other option [193:33] if you don't want the past or the [193:34] future. [193:34] >> So, the first part of construction is [193:37] the 20 foot high burm insulating all of [193:40] Disneyland from the outside world with [193:42] the Disneyland Railroad sitting right at [193:45] top it. To this day, I think the most [193:48] impressive thing about Disneyland is the [193:49] sightelines. Yeah. Despite several very [193:53] very different environments on a [193:54] relatively small plot of land, I mean [193:56] from Star Wars today to Frontier Land, [194:00] Adventure Land, Tomorrowland, Main [194:02] Street, you really only ever see what [194:05] the imagineers want you to. And it [194:07] creates that unique experience where [194:09] Main Street can feel nostalgic and [194:11] wholly different than the jungle over at [194:13] Adventureland and very, very different [194:15] than the strip mall mania happening just [194:18] a few acres away on any side of you. [194:20] >> Yep. I'll just keep going on the [194:22] insanity of building this thing. There [194:23] wasn't yet any on-site buildings to [194:26] fabricate the rides. So, they did [194:28] construction at Burbank. [194:30] >> That's right. And they trucked it all [194:31] down. [194:32] >> That's a 50minute drive if you don't hit [194:34] traffic. And the highway was still being [194:36] built. So, it's all on surface streets. [194:38] It's crazy. Think of the scale of the [194:40] stuff that they were building. [194:41] >> Yep. [194:41] >> Halfway through construction, they [194:43] discover that Rivers of America almost [194:45] doesn't work at all. when they filled it [194:47] with water, the water just drained into [194:49] the dirt underneath. And David, as you [194:51] mentioned, cost ballooned from the [194:53] original 5 million to a total of 17 [194:55] million. But that's actually pretty [194:58] cheap. [194:58] >> Totally. [194:59] >> I I did the inflation math. That's $210 [195:02] million today. You absolutely could not [195:04] build anything remotely close to [195:05] Disneyland today for $200 million or in [195:08] a single year. It [195:09] >> is astounding how it all got built. Also [195:12] very very convenient for Disney that [195:14] they sold a lot of Coonkin caps as the [195:16] budget was ballooning. [195:18] >> Yes. And found sponsors to sponsor lands [195:21] and rides and drew on every ounce of [195:23] debt they could. [195:24] >> Yes. This is the other just like [195:26] absolute galaxy brain Walt addition to [195:29] the flywheel that he brings in with the [195:31] parks. Corporate sponsorships. [195:33] >> Yes. [195:34] >> There were 65 corporate sponsors in [195:38] Disneyland within the first few years of [195:39] it opening. So, at opening there was [195:42] Richfield Auto for Autotopia, Bank of [195:44] America, of course they had to be there, [195:46] a sponsor of Fantasy Land, Coca-Cola as [195:48] well. [195:49] >> You won't believe this. In addition to [195:50] Coca-Cola, Pepsi, they had a sponsorship [195:53] in Frontier Land. Coke actually didn't [195:55] become the exclusive uh supplier sponsor [195:58] until 1990. [195:59] >> Yeah, that's right. [196:00] >> American Motors, Santa Fe Railway, TWWA [196:03] for the rocket to the moon, Monsanto was [196:06] actually a sponsor. [196:07] >> That's right. Carnation, Kodak, the list [196:10] goes on. But I I do have one favorite, [196:12] David. [196:13] >> The National Rifle Association. [196:16] >> Wow. Frontier Land. [196:19] >> Yes. Inside the Davy Crockett Museum, [196:21] there was a shooting gallery. There you [196:23] go. [196:23] >> And it's unclear from the historical [196:25] records if it is technically a [196:26] sponsorship, but the rifles were [196:28] provided by the NRA. Like real rifles. [196:31] >> There you go. Flywheel in action. [196:33] >> Yes. [196:34] So, I was trying to do some comparison [196:37] on this 17 million inflation adjusted to [196:40] 210 million. The Rise of the Resistance [196:43] Star Wars ride that they built in 2019, [196:46] which is excellent if you've never been [196:48] on it, was rumored to cost anywhere from [196:50] 200 million to$450 million for just one [196:53] ride. [196:54] >> Right. And they built the whole park for [196:57] less than that. [196:58] >> Yes, man. The things you could do back [197:00] then. [197:01] >> Yes. Right. I mean, uh, permitting was [197:03] pretty light back then. So, we get to [197:05] opening day. How's it go? Well, less [197:09] than half of the planned rides were [197:11] open. And, uh, just to give you a sense [197:13] of how down to the wire it came, Walt [197:16] personally put on a mask and was helping [197:18] to paint the 20,000 Leagues Under the [197:20] Sea exhibit the day before it opened. [197:23] Opening day comes, it's nearly 100° in [197:26] the middle of July in Southern [197:27] California. that created issues with the [197:31] newly poured asphalt and there are [197:34] legends of women's high heels sinking [197:35] into the asphalt because of that. There [197:38] are water fountains, [197:40] but they don't yet have the plumbing [197:42] finished to turn on. So, if you want [197:45] something to drink in this 100° heat, [197:47] you can go buy a Pepsi. [197:48] >> Exactly. [197:48] >> The restaurants ran out of food. Rides [197:51] were breaking down. Mr. Toad's Wild Ride [197:53] went down because it was too much for [197:55] the power grid. and the Mark Twain [197:58] riverboat began to sink since the [198:00] operator let 500 people onto it, which [198:02] was double the 250 that he was supposed [198:06] to. But despite all of this, it is a [198:09] giant giant hit. That first day that was [198:13] technically a preview day for press and [198:15] invited guests, 15,000 people were [198:18] invited, but it is believed that 30,000 [198:20] attended. [198:21] >> And then that was in person. [198:23] >> Yes. [198:23] >> Then there's the TV show. So ABC rolls [198:26] in with 22 live TV cameras and a giant [198:30] crew to operate it all with 1955 [198:33] technology. The viewership numbers are [198:36] astonishing. It was the world's largest [198:39] live telecast ever. 83 million people [198:43] tuned in to watch from home, which means [198:46] that nearly half of America watched this [198:49] broadcast, [198:50] >> watched this 90minute commercial, [198:53] >> right? Yes. [198:54] >> And it's it's crazy, right? It's live [198:56] coverage of this like Wackadoo amusement [198:58] park opening. On the one hand, why would [199:00] you want to watch that? On the other [199:01] hand, you've been conditioned over the [199:04] last year by one of the most popular [199:06] televisions programs in America that [199:07] this is going to be a giant deal, so you [199:09] better be watching when it happens. [199:11] >> Do you know I'm sure you do, but do you [199:13] know who the three anchors were that ABC [199:17] hired to do the opening? [199:19] >> One was Ronald Reagan, right? [199:21] >> Ronald Reagan is the big one. Art [199:22] Linklator, Bob Cummings, and future [199:25] president of the United States of [199:26] America, Ronald Reagan. [199:28] >> It's crazy that the TV strategy just [199:30] absolutely knocked it out of the park. [199:32] What does half of America tune into [199:35] anymore? I mean, ever. [199:36] >> Yeah. I mean, even the Super Bowl today, [199:38] which is the biggest television event in [199:40] America, only gets about 40% of US [199:44] households tuning in. And this was just [199:47] to watch guys talk about what's going on [199:50] behind them in an amusement park. [199:52] >> No, I think it was that America had been [199:54] primed via the TV show for the whole [199:57] past year that this was going to be the [199:59] event of 1955. [200:01] >> Yeah. So cool. By the end of the first [200:04] week, there was 160,000 visitors. Two [200:07] months after opening, the millionth [200:09] visitor walked in. And in the first [200:12] year, there had been 3.6 6 million [200:15] visitors. [200:15] >> You have in the second year of the [200:17] park's operation, it does over 4 million [200:19] visitors, which makes it more popular [200:22] than both the Grand Canyon and [200:23] Yellowstone National Park. It's like the [200:26] most popular park in America is now [200:28] Disneyland. [200:29] >> And today, the park has over 900 million [200:32] visitors since opening day. [200:34] >> My favorite little bit of trivia about [200:36] Disneyland was learning about the [200:37] original business model. So, you used to [200:40] have to pay to get on the rides. [200:43] >> You would pay, I think it was a dollar [200:45] for admission to the park, [200:46] >> and then you could buy booklets of [200:50] tickets that would get you admission to [200:53] the various rides and attractions and [200:55] different rides and attractions would [200:57] have different ticket grades and would [200:59] be priced differently. It was this whole [201:01] complicated business model that they [201:03] obviously have drastically simplified [201:04] since and raised prices astronomically. [201:08] Yes, absolutely. And I mean the the [201:12] biggest sort of success of the whole [201:13] thing is it just couldn't be farther [201:15] from a carnival or fairground. And that [201:18] turned out to be a great great business. [201:21] Yes. Harrison Price, who led the [201:23] research at SRRI for Disneyland, said [201:26] Disney's rethinking of the American [201:27] amusement park had striking and [201:29] immediate business consequences. Because [201:31] his park was such a pleasant place, [201:34] people stayed there longer, and because [201:35] they stayed longer, they spent more [201:37] time. Basically, Price said he tripled [201:40] per capita expenditures because he [201:42] tripled time. [201:43] >> And then, of course, you know, fast [201:44] forward to today at Disneyland or Disney [201:47] World. [201:47] >> You go for like 14 hours. [201:49] >> Yeah. Right. Per day. I mean, you you're [201:51] not going there for just a day. You're [201:52] going there for multiple days, right? [201:53] >> You're making a whole trip out of it. [201:54] >> And if you're going to Disney World, [201:55] then you're there a whole week. [201:57] >> Y [201:58] >> So, I I promise we won't do too much [202:00] part two foreshadowing on this episode, [202:02] but this is just one point I got to [202:04] drive home. Disney parks and cruises [202:06] today does $ 36 billion in revenue and [202:10] $10 billion in profit per year. That is [202:14] twice the amount of profit that their [202:16] entertainment division produces. [202:18] >> Yeah. Also just wild to think about [202:21] physical amusement parks having [202:24] essentially a 30% net income margin. [202:28] >> What other physical park operator is [202:30] going to operate with those kind of [202:31] margins? And the fact that it's a bigger [202:33] business for Disney than their movies. [202:35] Yes. Like twice as big of a business. [202:37] And this is, you know, there's 160 acres [202:40] in California. There's a big swath of [202:42] land in Florida. There's five or six of [202:44] them around the world. There's some [202:45] cruise ships. And that spits off more [202:48] profit, twice as much profit than all of [202:51] the other Disney things you can [202:54] experience anywhere, anytime. [202:55] >> Well, we're gonna get into this in a [202:58] minute here. Really, the impressive [202:59] thing is that Disney films are now great [203:02] again, and still the parks do more [203:04] revenue. We're about to hit a period [203:06] where the parks do a lot more net income [203:08] than the films because the films suck. [203:10] Now, reflecting on all this, Disneyland [203:13] actually was not a bet the company move [203:15] for Walt Disney Productions financially. [203:19] It was cleverly structured by Roy to not [203:22] be, [203:23] >> but reputationally it absolutely was. I [203:27] mean, people were willing to take these [203:28] giant leaps on Walt because of who he [203:31] was and what he had accomplished the [203:33] same way that they do with Elon or Steve [203:35] Jobs or Warren Buffett getting deals [203:37] that no one else could get. So Roy was [203:39] like great at making sure it wouldn't [203:41] financially bankrupt the company. But [203:42] Walt was sort of betting that reputation [203:45] extremely publicly to half the [203:47] households in the US. So not only was he [203:49] betting the company, he was betting his [203:51] own personal fortune, too. Remember that [203:53] $250,000 that he put in? He sold his [203:56] vacation house in Palm Springs. He [203:58] borrowed $100,000 against his life [204:01] insurance and he took on a personal loan [204:04] to fund that obligation. [204:05] >> Yep. All true and all necessary because [204:07] of how they had always operated the [204:09] company. He wasn't taking lots of cash [204:12] out of the company [204:13] >> until the sort of renegotiation of his [204:17] employment contract. [204:18] >> Yep. [204:18] >> So, there is a fascinating kod to all [204:21] this crazy corporate stuff on how the [204:23] park was formed. You might be wondering, [204:26] well, wait, doesn't the Walt Disney [204:28] Company own the park outright now? I [204:30] mean, when you visit Disneyland, don't [204:32] you assume, hey, wait, this is just part [204:35] of Disney. What about that weird joint [204:36] venture thing and ABC and Walt [204:38] personally? So, here's how it all goes [204:39] down. The headline is the Walt Disney [204:42] Company would not actually own the park [204:45] and everything within its borders for a [204:47] full 27 years after opening in 1982. [204:52] So here's the the full story of who sold [204:54] what and when. Pretty quickly, Walt [204:57] Disney Productions exercised their right [204:59] to buy out Western Publishing and Walt [205:01] personally. So by 1958, 3 years after [205:03] opening, they owned 66%. [205:06] But the buyout right to ABC stake, that [205:08] wasn't pre-negotiated. M [205:10] >> so in 1960 when the company actually had [205:13] enough cash to do it that's when Roy [205:16] negotiated hey we'll pay you $7.5 [205:19] million to buy out your your stake so by [205:22] 1960 the publicly traded company Walt [205:24] Disney Productions did own all of [205:26] Disneyland Inc. But that leaves Wed [205:29] Enterprises which had been hired as a [205:31] contractor to build all the stuff. [205:33] >> Yes. And Wed Enterprises is Imagineering [205:36] today. Disney Imagineering. [205:37] >> Yes. But Wed Enterprises, the entity at [205:41] this point in time, also owned rights to [205:44] some elements in the park, [205:46] >> right? And it wasn't consolidated into [205:51] Disney, the company yet, right? It was [205:52] still this separate thing owned by Walt, [205:54] >> right? So Wed, which Walt is the 100% [205:59] shareholder of, actually owned the [206:01] railroad outright. It had been [206:04] negotiated. [206:04] >> Of course, he did [206:05] >> as a part of the personal services [206:07] contract because it was like, hey, I was [206:09] already doing this side project and now [206:11] I'm just putting it on Disneyland. [206:14] >> It all comes back to trains. [206:16] >> So, he got ticket revenue from it as an [206:18] annuity basically. [206:20] >> Right. Cuz all the rides cost money. So, [206:22] the the railroad at Disneyland, [206:24] >> yes, [206:25] >> was Walts. [206:26] >> Same thing with the Montreal. These were [206:28] not owned by Disneyland Inc., they were [206:30] owned by Wed. [206:31] >> Amazing. We also mentioned since Wed was [206:33] Walt's personal company, it owned Walt's [206:35] name and likeness, which led to that 10% [206:37] royalty on merchandise. [206:39] >> In 1963, 8 years after the park opened, [206:42] Roy was getting very nervous that the [206:44] public shareholders would sue over this [206:47] admittedly very tenuous structure. So, [206:50] they reached a deal. Wed would get [206:52] sliced into two pieces. Imagineering, [206:54] the architectural engineering [206:56] department, and everything else. Disney [206:58] Productions would buy the half of Wed [207:01] that was Imagineering. So they finally [207:04] in-house Imagineering in 1965. The rest [207:07] of the holdings would be renamed Rhett [207:09] Law, which is Walter backwards. [207:11] >> Right. Right. [207:12] >> And inside of Rhettaw, Walt would get to [207:15] keep the trains, the Montreal, and his [207:18] 10% royalty. This is in 1965. [207:22] that would actually last all the way [207:24] until 1982, nearly three decades after [207:27] the opening, where the company says [207:29] enough is enough. Goes to Walt's family, [207:31] cuz this was after he passed away, and [207:32] they bought out the name rights, the [207:34] Montreal, and the railroad in exchange [207:37] for $43 million of Disney stock. [207:40] Insanely Wed Enterprises, which would [207:43] later be Rhett Law, got a total of $75 [207:47] million in checks from Walt Disney [207:49] Productions for the Disneyland Railroad [207:51] and for the Montreal between 1953 and [207:54] 1981 and another 46 million for name [207:58] royalties. [208:00] >> Wow. So, I guess the question as a [208:02] Disney shareholder would have been, was [208:04] it worth it, [208:06] >> right? [208:06] >> And the obvious answer is yes. I mean, [208:09] there's all these conflicts of interest [208:11] everywhere, and this would never fly [208:13] today with sort of modern shareholder [208:15] and SEC and securities laws, but in [208:19] practice, if you were a Disneyland [208:20] shareholder then and you held through [208:22] all of this, that worked out great for [208:24] you. [208:25] >> Well, speaking of how great it would [208:28] have worked out for you after the launch [208:31] of the TV show, the park, the company is [208:34] just firing on all cylinders again. and [208:38] Disneyland. The combination of the [208:40] television show and the park have really [208:44] added a fifth element to the flywheel [208:46] business model. That's right. You've got [208:48] one, compelling great IP. Two, maximize [208:52] distribution in the core vehicle. Three, [208:55] feed the IP into as many ancillary [208:58] vehicles as possible. Four, you've got [209:00] the re-releases in the vault. And now [209:02] five, parks and television. This is uh [209:05] television to amplify interest in all of [209:09] the characters. You've got parks to do [209:11] almost like the extreme bottom of [209:13] funnel. The way to experience the most [209:15] Disney thing you possibly could [209:16] experience every once in a while, but a [209:18] huge monetization event. And of course, [209:21] you do that. I I mean, I just got back [209:23] from Disneyland. Guess what? We're [209:24] watching a lot of Toy Story this week at [209:26] my house. It's a refresher on your [209:28] fandom. Thinking about it more now, [209:31] television was adding another node to [209:34] the flywheel for sure. The parks are [209:37] almost this like hybrid flywheel plus IP [209:43] because all the core Disney IP of course [209:46] goes into the parks. I mean, you've got [209:47] the Peter Pan ride, you've got the Star [209:49] Wars rides today, but the parks are also [209:52] not just a destination, [209:53] >> right? They're a source of IP [209:55] development, not just a a sync of IP [209:58] development. [209:58] >> And I mean, this would literally become [210:00] true with Pirates of the Caribbean much [210:02] later. [210:03] >> I mean, that's got to have grossed [210:04] billions after all these sequels. [210:06] >> You actually have new IP generation [210:08] coming out of Imagineering and the [210:10] parks, [210:11] >> right? A lot of stuff hasn't done as [210:13] well. Like Haunted Mansion has never [210:15] really worked as Jungle Cruise. But [210:18] yeah, that that is a great point that [210:20] the parks serve as a way to feed the [210:23] rest of the flywheel, not just be a sink [210:25] of it. So this year 1955 with the park [210:28] with TB revenue from Davy Crockett, [210:29] Mickey Mouse Club, this is basically the [210:31] inflection point for the company. [210:33] Revenue doubled from 54 to 55 and it [210:36] would just keep on climbing for decades [210:39] from this point forward. Disney [210:41] effectively stops being a movie studio [210:43] and it becomes this new form of [210:46] diversified [210:47] stable entertainment company. [210:49] >> Yes. In November of 1957, Disney finally [210:54] lists its stock on the New York Stock [210:56] Exchange. Stock had obviously been held [210:58] by the public ever since the 1940 stock [211:01] offering, but it wasn't listed and [211:03] traded on the New York Stock Exchange [211:04] until 1957. Interestingly, post IPO, [211:07] Walt and Roy do still effectively [211:09] control the company. 47% of the voting [211:13] power of the company is held by the [211:15] Disney Voting Trust. [211:17] >> And so, you just don't need that many [211:19] other shareholders for your votes to [211:20] carry the day. Y [211:21] >> So, even as a public company, it was [211:23] still their sort of family company. [211:25] >> Y [211:25] >> for a little bit, that would sort of [211:26] wayne over the decades from here. [211:28] >> Yep. Once the company's listed publicly [211:30] and people start to realize the [211:32] incredible power of the business behind [211:34] Disney, in early 1958, the Wall Street [211:38] Journal runs a front page story about [211:42] Disney's unique business model. And this [211:45] was one of the most fun things to [211:49] discover in our research. So the [211:52] article's title is Disney's land, Walt's [211:56] profit formula, dream, diversify, and [211:59] never miss an angle. And this article in [212:03] the Wall Street Journal is where the [212:06] famous Disney flywheel illustration [212:10] comes from that Ben, you are holding up [212:12] live that you have framed in your [212:15] studio. [212:15] >> This has been on the wall of my office [212:17] for years. So, the legend that's out [212:20] there that everybody believes is that [212:21] this was a napkin sketch that Walt [212:24] himself drew. No, it was actually [212:26] created by a Disney studio artist as an [212:30] illustration for this Wall Street [212:32] Journal piece. Disney confirmed this for [212:35] us when we were visiting them in the [212:38] archives. And then we asked the Wall [212:40] Street Journal to pull the original [212:42] piece out of their archives. We'll link [212:44] to it in the show notes. So cool that [212:47] this is the origin of where it all came [212:48] from. [212:49] >> Yeah, it it serves as an illustration [212:50] for something that at the time was [212:52] actually a pretty difficult to [212:53] articulate concept of a business [212:55] flywheel. I will say the word flywheel [212:57] never appears in the Wall Street Journal [212:59] article. [212:59] >> No, that nomenclature would get added [213:01] later, [213:01] >> but it was like the journal saying, "Hey [213:03] Disney, help us with some kind of [213:05] illustration that makes this point that [213:07] you have a wholly unique new business [213:10] model in the media landscape." [213:12] >> And it's a beautiful, beautiful diagram. [213:15] The whole article is great. Roy has [213:18] these amazing quotes within it. He says, [213:21] "Our diversified activities are related [213:24] and tend to complement each other, [213:26] helping us to do relatively fine [213:28] business in the face of otherwise [213:30] difficult times for the motion picture [213:32] industry. Integration is the key word [213:35] around here. We don't do anything in one [213:37] line without giving a thought to its [213:39] likely profitability in our other [213:42] lines." [213:43] so spot-on. And then they walk through [213:45] the steps of the company's flywheel with [213:48] their plans for their upcoming feature [213:51] film release of Sleeping Beauty, which [213:53] was still a year away from release at [213:56] the time of the article. In 1958, how [213:58] crazy is this? At Disneyland, which [214:00] opens in 1955, there is the centerpiece [214:03] of the whole thing is Sleeping Beauty [214:05] Castle. That movie wouldn't come out for [214:07] another four years, right? They were [214:09] building hype for a movie that was [214:11] basically in pre-production at this [214:13] point. [214:14] >> In fact, it was based on concept art [214:15] that was effectively a German castle cuz [214:18] it was so far from the film. [214:19] >> Yes. Incredible. So, the article walks [214:22] through at Disneyland, they've installed [214:24] animated diaramas as an attraction that [214:28] they're charging a 35 cent admission fee [214:30] for. These are animated diaramas of [214:33] Sleeping Beauty, the upcoming movie. [214:35] Next, Disney is producing and selling [214:38] Princess Aurora dolls and costumes. [214:40] They're working on producing and [214:42] publishing books of the Disney version [214:45] of the fable that will be told in the [214:48] movie. Of course, they are. And of [214:49] course, there are segments in the [214:51] Disneyland TV show about Sleeping [214:54] Beauty. They're already preparing the [214:57] soundtrack album to go on sale before [215:00] the movie's released. And then finally, [215:04] comics of Aurora and The Sleeping Beauty [215:07] Story are already starting to come out [215:10] as part of the Disney Treasury of [215:12] Classic Tales syndicated comic strip. [215:16] >> Fascinating. [215:16] >> Just amazing. [215:17] >> The other thing this article reveals is [215:19] that Disney was intentionally making its [215:21] TV shows in color even when TVs were [215:23] still black and white because they [215:25] thought it was likely TVs would go color [215:27] soon and they knew that the IP they were [215:29] making would stay valuable for decades. [215:32] I mean the foresight they are so bought [215:34] in on we just dumping valuable IP onto [215:37] the pile and we want it to live forever. [215:40] >> Yep. Now there is one other thing we [215:41] haven't talked about which is that [215:43] Disney in-housed their own film [215:45] distribution right before the launch of [215:48] Disneyland. [215:49] >> Yes. Yeah. And this actually comes up in [215:51] that journal article too. [215:52] >> Yep. They create something called Buena [215:55] Vista Distribution and they left RKO [215:58] Radio Pictures who had been their [216:00] distributor since I think 1936. [216:03] Howard Hughes ended up owning it and it [216:06] had been kind of a train wreck as he [216:08] spiraled out of control toward the end [216:10] of his life. Disney didn't really want [216:11] to be a part of that chaos. And at the [216:14] same time, Walt had really started [216:15] thinking about Disney as vertically [216:17] integrated entertainment, not just a [216:19] film studio who would rely on others for [216:22] distribution. So in 53, 2 years before [216:25] Disneyland opened, they incorporated [216:28] Buenav Vista, The Living Desert was [216:30] their first films, one of these nature [216:33] documentaries. [216:34] >> Mhm. Then quickly thereafter, they did [216:37] Lady in the and 20,000 Leagues [216:39] Under the Seas distribution through [216:41] Buenav Vista instead of through an [216:44] outside distributor. It was kind of like [216:46] a test like can we pull this off? [216:49] >> They got pretty good at it pretty fast [216:52] with the exception of international [216:54] where they then had to rely on [216:56] subdistributors for a long time. But [216:58] Disney had become such a household name, [217:00] especially because of that weekly ABC [217:02] show and because of Disneyland, where [217:04] they were pretty uniquely well suited to [217:06] actually self-distribute without a [217:09] middleman. I mean, this is like Walt's [217:11] dream from the early cartooning days. [217:14] >> It's kind of surprising that they didn't [217:16] start doing it after Snow White. I mean, [217:19] who's going to turn down a Disney [217:20] picture? [217:21] >> All right, you te me right up cuz I was [217:23] wondering the same thing. Cash flow. [217:26] >> M. You can't distribute [217:37] them before you actually get paid by the [217:40] theaters when tickets. [217:42] >> So Disney didn't have the working [217:44] capital to pull this off until their [217:47] real strength in the mid-50s. [217:49] >> That's such a good point. I always had [217:51] wondered why more studios didn't [217:54] vertically integrate and own their own [217:56] distribution. And that makes sense. You [217:59] need a lot of working capital to do so. [218:01] It's exactly right. In the long run, [218:03] it's a pretty amazing strategy since [218:06] they'd been paying I don't know what is [218:07] it about a third of the total rentals to [218:10] another distributor. And especially with [218:12] these re-releases. [218:13] >> Yeah, it's an absolute no-brainer with [218:15] the re-releases. At this point, [218:17] Disneyland plus the merchant licensing [218:19] provides this really stable foundation. [218:21] They almost like replatformed the [218:24] business is what one way you could put [218:25] it where it's the same like spiritual [218:28] entity, but instead of the business [218:30] being in the films, they now have the [218:33] business in this stable foundation and [218:36] they do the films to like add new stuff [218:37] to the pile, but the platform itself is [218:40] Disneyland, TV, and merch and and [218:43] licensing. So then a few years later in [218:45] 1961, Walt Disney Productions after 22 [218:48] years of being in debt to Bank of [218:50] America finally paid off their last [218:52] loan. [218:54] >> Roy must have been so happy on that day [218:58] and Walt was already scheming how to [219:02] blow some more money. [219:03] >> Yes. So one thing we foreshadowed is is [219:06] Sleeping Beauty. We talked about [219:07] Sleeping Beauty Castle. You might be [219:09] wondering what ended up happening with [219:11] the film. This, like many of the other [219:13] films we talked about, did not recoup [219:16] costs. I mean, since then, it's done [219:18] phenomenally well and made probably [219:20] hundreds of millions of dollars in [219:21] cumulative profit for Disney, but did [219:25] not pay back at the box office. [219:26] >> Mhm. Part of that was it had a really [219:29] high production cost, right? After all [219:31] the success of Disneyland and all the [219:34] bihooing about the flywheel and [219:36] everything in the Wall Street Journal [219:37] article, I mean, they're building around [219:38] it. [219:39] >> Whole hog on this one. [219:40] >> Yeah. They spent $6 million making it. [219:43] It was the most expensive to produce to [219:45] date. [219:45] >> Yep. [219:46] >> But yeah, I mean, Walt was pretty [219:47] distracted with Disneyland, so he wasn't [219:48] that kind of authoritative voice to help [219:50] the team find the great story in there. [219:53] But yeah, if if it wasn't such an [219:55] extravagantly detailed animation piece, [219:57] then it probably would have been [219:58] profitable. [219:59] >> And hey, given the company's business [220:00] model, they're happy to play the long [220:02] game, [220:03] >> right? So the weird thing is the [220:05] financial blip that happens in this year [220:07] 1959. Everything is true about this [220:09] really stable platform. But if you look [220:11] at that year, the financial year 1960, [220:14] the company actually shows a loss. Like [220:17] they flip briefly from looking [220:19] increasingly profitable to suddenly net [220:22] income negative because Sleeping Beauty [220:25] had that hole. [220:26] >> Mhm. [220:27] >> ABC canceled Zoro and Mickey Mouse Club, [220:29] which were both TV shows that Disney was [220:32] making, which was related to Walt Disney [220:34] Productions blowing up the Disneyland [220:36] deal. and saying, "You guys are kind of [220:39] difficult to work with now. We want to [220:40] buy you out of Disneyland." And ABC's [220:42] like, "All right, then we're gonna stop [220:43] paying you huge sums for your TV shows [220:46] and giving you all this free marketing." [220:48] So that relationship ended there, at [220:50] least for [220:50] >> for the moment. ABC would come back in [220:53] the beginning. [220:54] >> Yes. But the takeaway is the company is [220:56] actually financially stable now. That [220:57] this is okay. [220:59] >> Yeah. The last time that Walt and the [221:01] company bet big on investing in [221:04] production ahead of revenues was 1940 [221:06] with the move to Burbank and having [221:08] Pinocchio and Fantasia and Bambi in [221:10] production all at once. [221:11] >> Any one of those almost killed the [221:12] company on their own. [221:13] >> Yeah. Now though, post Disneyland, [221:16] they've got this stable base that they [221:17] can take these big swings. [221:19] >> Yeah. Merchant licensing taught them to [221:21] crawl and then they they walked and ran [221:23] with Disneyland in terms of that that [221:25] stable platform. Just to illustrate this [221:27] bounceback point, here's the trend. [221:29] 1957, they do $3.6 million in net [221:32] income. Then the next year, 3.9. Then [221:35] the next year, 3.4. Then, ah, 1960 [221:38] happens. That perfect storm of badness, [221:40] $1.3 million loss. Then they bop right [221:44] back. 1961, 4.5, then 5.2, then 6.5, [221:48] then 7, then 11, then 12. I mean, they [221:51] just stability. [221:53] >> Mhm. [221:54] And then Walt decided that it was too [221:59] stable [222:01] and he needed to blow it all up again or [222:05] at least he wanted to. So he starts [222:07] wondering how can I bet it all again and [222:10] in a bigger way, right? Is Disney land [222:12] like is a theme park going to really be [222:14] my legacy? Are these animated films [222:16] really going to be my legacy? I [222:18] shouldn't I do something actually [222:20] meaningful to the world? [222:21] >> Yes. I mean, this this idea of a [222:23] physical Disney location [222:25] worked really well. But what if we don't [222:28] stop at an amusement park, what if the [222:31] next time we build an entire city? [222:37] Maybe like an experimental [222:42] prototype community of tomorrow, you [222:46] know, Epcot. [222:48] And if you think you know what we're [222:50] talking about because you've been to [222:51] Epcot, that's not it. [222:53] >> That's not what we're talking about. [222:54] >> That's a theme park named Epcot. But [222:58] Walt had this insane insane vision that [223:01] never got built, but got pretty far [223:04] along in the process for [223:07] again a fever dream. Not just of a place [223:10] that you go for a day, but a place where [223:13] you live and you work and you are [223:17] transported and futuristic transport [223:20] mechanisms and all the most innovative [223:22] companies locate their innovation [223:25] centers all in in one place together and [223:29] there's this beautiful tower in the [223:31] center of it. I mean, this is the ideal [223:35] future. So this was Walt's final [223:39] project, the Florida project that never [223:42] got built as you say. And I think [223:46] it all kind of stems back to Burbank [223:51] >> and that brief moment before the strike [223:55] when the studio at Burbank really was [223:59] this utopian physical place that was the [224:02] perfect marriage of art and commerce. I [224:06] really think that that's what Walt [224:08] always wanted to realize in the world. [224:12] And now after the success of Disneyland, [224:15] his ambition is restored [224:17] and he wants to build it in this city. [224:20] >> To my mind, the most interesting part [224:21] about this is how far it got. [224:23] >> Yes. Yes. Yes. So the way that Walt [224:26] starts working towards realizing this [224:29] vision is the 1964 World's Fair in New [224:33] York. So Walt gets this great idea [224:36] leading up to the fair that Disney on [224:39] the success that they have at Disneyland [224:42] can partner with other big American [224:46] companies and institutions [224:48] to create Disney sponsored pavilions and [224:52] exhibitions at the fair that they can [224:56] then transfer into Disneyland. But even [225:00] more than that, the New York World's [225:02] Fair can serve as this sort of [225:03] undercover test bed for this big idea of [225:07] an East Coast city that will be a [225:10] partnership between American industry, [225:14] Disney, and the public. So, the four [225:17] exhibitions that they create for the [225:19] 1964 World's Fair, many of which should [225:22] probably sound familiar to you, It's a [225:24] Small World, sponsored by Pepsi and [225:28] UNICEF, which is actually designed by [225:31] Mary Blair, who's this famous designer. [225:33] She brought modernism to Disney. She's [225:35] the one that basically did all the [225:37] concept art for Alice in Wonderland, [225:40] which is why it looks the way that it [225:42] does. She's kind of responsible for that [225:44] aesthetic. And she was one of the [225:47] original team members of Imagineers that [225:49] came over from Wed and I believe the [225:51] first female Imagineer. [225:53] >> That's right. That's right. And then [225:54] she's the one who does Small World. [225:56] >> Yep. By far the most successful pavilion [225:59] at the fair that makes its way to [226:00] Disneyland. So that's one. Two, the [226:02] Carousel of Progress sponsored by [226:05] General Electric. Three, the Magic [226:08] Skyway sponsored by Ford. And then four, [226:11] Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln sponsored [226:14] by the state of Illinois and that last [226:17] one of which [226:17] >> catch that [226:18] >> is how Disney Imagineering develops [226:21] audio animatronics [226:22] >> for Abraham Lincoln. [226:24] >> Yes. This whole thing is this amazing [226:26] test bed for audio animatronics which [226:28] Disney kind of invents and then [226:30] popularizes in Disneyland and then in [226:32] Disney World. [226:33] >> Yeah. And because it's Disney and part [226:35] of Disneyland, we think, oh yeah, audio [226:37] animatronics like Disneyland like these [226:39] are robots, [226:40] >> right? that Disney Imagineering is [226:42] inventing in the late 50s, early 60s. [226:46] >> Well, David, you you and I have had the [226:48] privilege of being at some pretty cool [226:49] robotics conferences and you meet these [226:51] like PhD researchers who are sort of in [226:54] and out of Disney. Like that is still [226:56] where a lot of cutting edge robotics [226:58] happens. [226:58] >> Yes. So, all four of those rides after [227:00] the fair get ported right over to [227:02] Disneyland because of course [227:04] >> three of the four [227:06] >> the Ford one does not. The part of the [227:08] deal is that Walt says, "You have to pay [227:11] a million dollars to use my name as a [227:13] part of your attraction." Of course, in [227:16] addition to footing the bill for [227:18] building it, but I'll forgive that [227:20] million dollars if you let us put it in [227:22] Disneyland afterwards because we want to [227:24] get some value of it out after the fair. [227:26] And Ford says, "We'll just pay the [227:27] million." [227:31] >> Poor decision on Ford's part. [227:33] >> I know. [227:34] >> Okay. So, three of the four get ported [227:35] over to Disneyland, but all of it leads [227:38] right into planning for the Florida [227:41] Project. [227:42] >> And I think while the Florida Project [227:44] initially is not a theme park, and Walt [227:47] very much is uninterested in building an [227:50] East Coast Disneyland, he says it [227:51] explicitly over and over again. He does [227:55] have a nagging concern that an east [227:58] coast audience is more sophisticated [228:00] than a west coast audience and there [228:02] isn't demand for a theme park like [228:06] Disneyland in Florida. And I always [228:08] think he uses that as kind of his like [228:11] emotional defense mechanism air cover [228:13] for why he's like, "Oh, I don't want to [228:15] just do the same thing again." I think [228:16] it's like I'm afraid it'll fail. And one [228:19] of the big takeaways from the World's [228:20] Fair is no, people would absolutely love [228:24] a Disneyland type thing, especially with [228:27] audio animatronics and all this cool new [228:29] technology you're developing for the [228:30] World's Fair. [228:31] >> Well, obviously if Disney is going to do [228:35] anything on the East Coast, it should be [228:38] in Florida. I mean, it has the warmest [228:40] yearround weather and even more [228:42] important, [228:43] >> abundant cheap land. [228:44] >> Abundant cheap land all throughout the [228:46] state. [228:47] >> Yep. So, Walt though, like you said, had [228:49] no interest in just building another [228:51] Disneyland. So, what is this Florida [228:53] project? I had heard about this lore and [228:56] legend over the years before doing the [228:58] research, but diving in, it blew my [229:01] mind, and it will blow yours, too, [229:02] hearing about what Walt's vision for it [229:04] was, [229:04] >> the ambition. So, one, it starts with a [229:08] brand new airport of the future paired [229:12] together with a vast entrance complex [229:17] and park. Two, there will of course be a [229:22] theme park, a new Disney World Magic [229:25] Kingdom theme park that was initially [229:28] intended to be five times the size of [229:31] Disneyland just for just for the theme [229:33] park. Three, a 1,000 acre industrial [229:38] park intended to house satellite R&D [229:42] offices for America's greatest [229:45] companies. Think everybody that Walt is [229:47] partnering with at the World's Fair. [229:49] Ford, GE, Pepsi, all the companies that [229:52] are corporate sponsors back at [229:54] Disneyland. He wants them [229:56] >> Yeah, Monsanto m move their most [229:59] advanced R&D teams to this new city in [230:02] Florida. And then four, most important, [230:05] the heart of the whole project is Epcot. [230:09] But again, not the Epcot you know today. [230:11] So Walt Epcot was going to be in his own [230:15] words a living blueprint of the future [230:18] where people actually live a life they [230:21] can't find anywhere else in the world. A [230:23] showcase to the world for the ingenuity [230:26] and imagination of American free [230:28] enterprise. And basically [230:32] it is a sci-fi city. [230:34] >> Meanwhile, I gotta say they couldn't [230:37] open most of Tomorrowland for 1955 when [230:40] they opened Disneyland and they're [230:42] having a really hard time keeping up [230:44] with the pace of technology. I walk [230:46] through Tomorrowland even today and I'm [230:47] like this all feels really dated and [230:49] nothing like tomorrow. I think Walt [230:51] himself has a famous quip on this which [230:53] is tomorrow comes a lot faster into [230:55] today than we can kind of keep up with. [230:57] So you could imagine if they actually [230:58] built this thing, it it very quickly [231:00] would would not feel like the future. I [231:02] mean, you plow a bunch of capex into [231:04] concrete and futuristic concepts. New [231:06] stuff gets invented real fast and then [231:08] it's ugly and old. [231:10] >> That's a good point. But perhaps you [231:12] haven't heard the vision for what this [231:14] city is yet. [231:15] >> Please, please lay it on me. [231:17] >> Okay. It will have a radical radial [231:21] design plan. So, the city itself is [231:25] going to fan out like spokes on a wheel [231:27] from a domed central downtown hub. Yes, [231:32] you did hear that right. A 50 acre [231:36] enclosed climate controlled [231:40] fully domed central downtown city [231:45] that will have no surface streets, fully [231:49] pedestrian walkways, [231:51] >> Montreals. Well, yeah. Yes. The the only [231:54] motorized forms of transportation will [231:56] be Montreals and this new concept of [231:59] people movers. And then below ground, [232:02] there will be a vast network of tunnels, [232:05] a multi-layered tunnels underneath the [232:08] ground for cars and industrial vehicles [232:11] to circulate throughout the city. On the [232:14] edge of this downtown dome, there'll be [232:17] highdensity apartment buildings. [232:20] Surrounding that, there is a vast green [232:23] belt of parks and recreation facilities. [232:26] And then finally, in the outer ring of [232:28] the city is lowdensity single family [232:32] home neighborhoods. And the plan is that [232:35] 20,000 people will live here in this [232:38] city with full self-governing [232:40] infrastructure. So, schools, public [232:42] services, everything. And it is all [232:45] going to be founded as a new city in the [232:48] state of Florida. This is unreal. [232:52] >> Self-governing, [232:54] but in a special district carved out and [232:57] controlled [232:58] lawfully by the Walt Disney Company. [233:01] >> I mean, it sort of sounds like a I don't [233:04] know if it's a utopian or a dystopian [233:06] film or both. [233:09] Yeah, it's definitely ambitious. So on [233:13] November 15th, 1965, [233:16] Walt along with Roy and the then [233:19] governor of Florida, Hayden Burns, hold [233:22] a press conference where they announced [233:25] that Disney has been buying land in [233:29] Central Florida [233:30] >> under various uh subsidiaries and [233:32] obscured names so no one would catch on [233:34] to what they're doing. [233:35] >> Yep. and that a very large new Disney [233:38] project will be coming to the state. [233:42] That planning has already begun and they [233:44] will be seeking public approvals. [233:47] >> They bought 27,000 acres. That is the [233:51] size of San Francisco. [233:53] >> Yes. Yes. Twice the size of Manhattan. [233:56] Uh it's almost 40 square miles that they [233:59] have purchased in the middle of Florida. [234:02] and it's all swamp land right now. It's [234:06] uninhabitable. And so in May of 1966, so [234:10] a few months later, they get government [234:13] approval to drain the swamp and prepare [234:18] to build Walt's vision. Let's go. [234:25] If only. So, in late October of 1966, [234:32] Walt records a film of a pitch, the full [234:37] reveal for the Epcot Vision. We'll link [234:39] to it in the show notes. You should [234:41] absolutely go watch this movie. It is [234:44] the second to last recorded appearance [234:47] that Walt makes in his life, and he has [234:51] no idea. The last one, I think, is a day [234:53] or two later. and he ends the video [234:56] with, "Speaking for myself and for the [234:59] entire Disney organization, we're ready [235:02] to go right now." Unfortunately, [235:06] he dies [235:08] about 2 months later. His death is both [235:11] incredibly fast, incredibly unexpected, [235:15] and of course kind of a slow motion [235:20] disaster that's been brewing his whole [235:22] life ever since he started chain smoking [235:25] in France when he was 17 years old. [235:27] >> I mean, he was notorious for his hacking [235:29] cough. That is how people knew that he [235:31] was approaching if you were in a [235:33] building on the Burbank campus. [235:34] >> Yeah. You'd hear him hacking. So that [235:37] summer in 1966, Walt had started [235:40] experiencing pains in his body. He [235:42] assumes that it's all the stress from, [235:44] you know, all these new projects that [235:46] he's working on, or maybe it's old polo [235:48] injuries that he has, or maybe it's this [235:51] nagging cough, but obviously it's cancer [235:55] eating away at him. Finally, in November [235:58] of 1966, so right after recording the [236:01] Epcot pitch video, he checks himself [236:03] into the hospital where doctors find a [236:07] pretty massive tumor in his lungs. They [236:10] do emergency surgery to remove it. He [236:12] comes back to the studio afterwards and [236:15] the company announces publicly that Walt [236:17] is back. They say he's going to recover, [236:20] but the cancer is metastasized and the [236:24] doctors tell him, "Hey, you probably [236:26] only have a couple weeks or months to [236:28] live." His health goes downhill quickly. [236:30] And on December 15th, 1966, [236:33] just 10 days after his 65th birthday, [236:35] Walt Disney passes away right in the [236:38] middle of this Epcot thing. I mean, what [236:42] a sliding door moment. [236:44] He was always escalating bigger and [236:48] bigger and bigger. It would have always [236:50] been right in the middle of the biggest [236:52] thing he's ever done. That's such a good [236:54] point. [236:55] >> Mickey with Synchronized Sound, Snow [236:57] White with the first animated feature [236:58] film, the Burbank Campus, plowing cash [237:01] into all the expensive failures after [237:02] Snow White, Disneyland. Every point in [237:04] his life, he was betting the farm over [237:06] and over and over again, and he always [237:07] pushed all his chips in. It would have [237:09] always felt like this. [237:10] >> That's such a good point. If they had [237:12] pulled off the Florida project, what [237:13] would he have done next? [237:14] >> Right. Like a colony on the moon. Like [237:16] >> Yeah. I gotta be honest though. I will [237:18] say I don't have the faith after [237:21] watching a lot of videos and [237:23] documentaries and reading about the [237:25] Florida project. It just doesn't make [237:27] sense to me. [237:28] >> And it may have protected his legacy [237:33] that he didn't live another 10 or 20 [237:35] years to see this through. [237:38] >> Yep. I mean, even just building a domed [237:40] city, like, how would you actually do [237:43] that? [237:44] >> And look, I could be completely wrong. [237:45] They invented, you know, amazing thing [237:47] after amazing thing, but this one felt [237:51] nuts. [237:54] >> I mean, it was I think it's a totally [237:56] fair point. So, immediately after Walt's [237:58] death, Roy renames the whole Florida [238:01] project Walt Disney World in his honor. [238:05] And Roy postpones his own retirement to [238:09] dedicate himself to finishing this [238:11] project. And in fact, just a couple [238:13] months later, in May of 1967, Roy gets [238:18] full approval from the Florida State [238:20] Legislature to build Epcot, to build [238:25] Walt Disney World, and importantly to [238:28] carve out the Reedy Creek Development [238:31] District, which gave the company a lot [238:34] more autonomy over the area containing [238:37] the land that they purchased than they [238:39] ever had in Anaheim. And famously, Walt [238:43] was very regretful that they didn't buy [238:45] up all the land around Disneyland, too, [238:46] because he just hated all of the, you [238:49] know, hotels and restaurants and crummy [238:52] stuff around there. And, uh, they run [238:54] the show there in Florida [238:55] >> that they do. But Roy is not Walt and [239:01] he's not willing to bet the company like [239:03] Walt was. So he does see Walt Disney [239:08] World through, but he dramatically [239:12] scales it back mostly because he doesn't [239:16] want to take on any additional debt for [239:18] the company. So he sets a goal that he's [239:20] going to get this thing constructed [239:22] without raising debt for the company, [239:25] >> which is unbelievable. They built the [239:27] Magic Kingdom, the Walt Disney World, [239:29] >> the theme park, [239:30] >> copy paste of Disneyland in Florida for [239:34] $400 million with two hotels and no [239:37] debt. [239:37] >> Yes. That is an incredible achievement. [239:40] Yes. And it is absolutely not what Walt [239:42] would have done. [239:43] >> Nope. [239:43] >> So, it's just the Magic Kingdom. There's [239:45] no city. There's no Epcot. There's no [239:47] airport. There's no industrial park. [239:49] It's more or less like, hey, we've got [239:51] all this land and we're extremely [239:53] confident that Disneyland is going to [239:55] work here, so we'll build it. [239:56] >> And it was extremely successful. [239:59] >> Yep. [240:00] >> But it's not betting the company. And [240:03] it's not blazing a new trail. I mean, [240:06] look, like, how could you say Disney [240:08] World isn't a success? Like, it's an [240:09] incredible success. [240:10] >> And there's like so much cool innovation [240:12] there. The underground tunnels, they [240:14] took everything about Disneyland and and [240:16] made it better. Okay, now we don't have [240:17] to have people wandering around carrying [240:19] trash bags. Okay, we don't have to have [240:21] characters appearing in the wrong land [240:23] because the only way for them to, you [240:24] know, come quote unquote on stage is [240:26] through a door that's inconveniently [240:28] placed. We've got this network of [240:30] underground tunnels where we can all do [240:31] it exactly the way that we would have [240:33] wanted to. I'm pretty sure the [240:35] underground tunnels are actually street [240:36] level and all of Disney World is up one [240:39] story. It's this like whole insane [240:42] concept of what if we could do [240:43] Disneyland over again, but not as [240:46] cowboys, as as real planners and [240:48] builders and engineers and a much bigger [240:50] budget. [240:51] >> Which may actually be, to your point, [240:53] it's probably just as likely, if not [240:56] more likely, that Walt Disney's death [240:59] when it came preserved his reputation [241:02] and that this this might have actually [241:04] been the better path for the Florida [241:07] project. [241:08] >> May have been. Regardless though, what [241:11] it is not is shooting for the stars. And [241:15] after Walt's death, the company [241:17] basically stops doing that and every [241:20] dimension. Roy himself tragically dies 2 [241:24] and a half months after opening Disney [241:28] World at the end of 1971. [241:30] >> It's kind of poetic. It seems like he he [241:32] said he was going to see this thing [241:34] through and he did. [241:34] >> And he did for his brother. Yeah. [241:37] And then what follows is basically kind [241:40] of 13 years of Disney becoming a parks [241:45] company. [241:46] >> Yeah. I mean, if you look over at the [241:47] film side of things, the last film that [241:50] Walt worked on was Jungle Book, which [241:52] ended up coming out after his death in [241:54] 1967. He was deeply involved in this [241:57] one. It was a smash hit, grossing $23 [242:00] million. 23 million in its first box [242:04] office run, which implies a cut of about [242:06] $11 million for Disney and Buen a Vista [242:09] on a budget of just $4 million. This [242:12] though would be Disney's most successful [242:14] film for the next two decades. [242:16] >> Yeah. Yeah. That's bigger than [242:19] Cinderella, certainly bigger than [242:21] Sleeping Beauty, 101 Dalmatians, [242:24] any of the other movies around that era. [242:26] >> Yep. So the financials of the company [242:28] keep growing, but really it's all [242:31] because of the parks. And you can see it [242:33] when you look at the numbers. So in [242:35] 1972, the first year of Disney World, [242:38] films do 78 million in revenue and 44 [242:42] million in profit. Parks do a whopping [242:46] 223 [242:48] million in revenue and 38 million in [242:51] profit. And then all the rest of the [242:53] flywheel, consumer merchandising, etc. [242:56] does 27 million in revenue and 13 [242:58] million in profit. [242:59] >> This is before the corporate expenses. [243:01] >> Yes, before the corporate expenses. [243:03] >> Okay. So, what are the three profit [243:04] numbers for each of those again? [243:05] >> So, you've got in 1972 [243:08] 44 million in profit from films. [243:11] >> Yep. [243:12] >> Biggest profit engine. [243:12] >> It's actually a lot. [243:13] >> The IP of the company is still in good [243:15] shape here in 1972. Parks do 38 million [243:19] in profit and other flywheel businesses [243:22] do 13 million in profit. [243:24] >> Okay. So parks and movies are pretty [243:27] comparable then. [243:28] >> Yes. Pretty comparable right after [243:30] Disney World opens. [243:32] >> Yep. [243:32] >> But then 12 years later, by the end of [243:35] this period in 1984, [243:38] parks and consumer products generate [243:41] $250 million of operating income on over [243:45] a billion dollars in revenue, while film [243:48] and TV [243:49] barely breaks even with only $2.2 $2 [243:53] million in operating [243:55] >> income. So yeah, by the end of this [243:58] period here, [243:59] >> basically IPwise, the company is [244:03] creatively bankrupt and they're running [244:05] a parks and merch business. [244:08] >> No way. Okay, give me the profit numbers [244:10] from 1984 again. [244:11] >> So together, parks and consumer products [244:15] >> generate 250 million in operating [244:17] income. So4 billion dollars from the [244:20] parks and consumer products. and film [244:23] and TV is 2.2 million. [244:26] >> Unbelievable. [244:27] >> It really illustrates what happens to [244:28] the company during this period. [244:30] >> It's funny because I only have the [244:31] topline numbers from all the annual [244:32] reports that we took photographs of when [244:35] we were in the archives. Revenue goes [244:37] from 100 million in 1965 [244:42] to [244:43] 1.4 billion in 1984. And then over on [244:48] the net income after all the corporate [244:50] expenses in 1965 goes from 11 million [244:53] all the way up to 97 million in 1984. So [244:58] if you just look at the whole business [245:00] >> yeah the consolidated financials [245:01] >> looks great but what you're sort of [245:04] illustrating is the core is rotting. [245:07] Yes. That they're not contributing new [245:09] IP onto the pile that consumers love. [245:12] Otherwise we'd be seeing that in the the [245:14] films division. Name a Disney film from [245:17] the 70s that you can even think of [245:21] today. [245:21] >> They're just harvesting over in the [245:23] parks. [245:24] >> Yes. So really the the biggest problem [245:28] what this comes down to is that American [245:31] mythmaking [245:33] moved on. It moved elsewhere. So this is [245:37] the era when George Lucas makes Star [245:39] Wars and Stephen Spielberg makes Indiana [245:42] Jones and ET and these guys become the [245:47] new American storytellers, not Disney [245:50] and not Disney animation. Disney [245:53] animation during this decade goes from a [245:56] staff of roughly 500 at the time of [245:59] Walt's death all the way down to just [246:02] 125 by the early8s. There's all sorts of [246:06] problems. The films they do make are [246:09] disasters. The worst example of this is [246:12] The Black Cauldron. Did you read about [246:13] this? [246:14] >> Yeah. Wasn't it like 10 years in [246:16] development? [246:16] >> 10 years in development and production. [246:18] Ties up the studio forever. And then [246:21] when they eventually do release it in [246:23] 1985, it's a total flop. [246:25] >> And it's super dark, right? It's like a [246:27] scary kids movie. [246:28] >> Yeah. It's a PG rated Disney, [246:30] >> right? It was the first one ever rated [246:32] PG. [246:32] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. [246:33] >> They do have some success with live [246:36] action since 1964 with the massive [246:38] success of Mary Poppins, which won five [246:40] Oscars. They kind of leaned into that [246:42] side of the house. [246:44] >> Yep. They start Touchstone Pictures and [246:46] that has a couple, you know, big hits [246:47] like Splash is a big hit for them. But [246:50] animation, the core of the company is [246:53] dying. And of course, Mary Poppins was [246:55] made [246:55] >> during Walt's life [246:56] >> with Walt's involvement before his [246:57] death. [246:58] >> But to your point all episode, you know, [247:00] great, they started Touchtone Pictures. [247:02] Great. They made 20,000 Leagues Under [247:04] the Sea and Old Yeller and The [247:06] Absent-minded Professor and [247:08] >> they made a bunch of Herby the Love Bug [247:10] liveaction movies in [247:12] >> right [247:13] >> the 60s and 70s. [247:14] >> And that's not to hate on any of these [247:16] things on their own. Like my parents [247:18] loved Herby. I I remember them talking [247:19] about it. They showed it to me when I [247:20] was a kid. Is that durable IP that feeds [247:25] >> the future of Disney? No. [247:26] >> No. No. [247:28] >> So then in 1984, [247:31] basically the inevitable happens. Wall [247:34] Street corporate raiders come gunning [247:37] for Disney. I mean, it's an easy target, [247:40] right? The financials look great. [247:42] There's a lot of net income here. And [247:44] there's also a lot of hard assets [247:46] between the parks, the real estate, the [247:48] old films in the vault. This is like [247:51] easy pickings to come in, take over the [247:54] >> super undervalued, right? [247:55] >> Yeah. I mean, the market cap of this [247:57] company is only like $2 billion despite [248:00] 1.5 billion in topline revenue and call [248:04] it a hundred million in net income. But [248:07] this would be super easy to break up [248:09] Disney, sell off the theme parks, sell [248:12] off the IP to other movie studios. You [248:14] could come in and make a killing doing [248:15] this. [248:16] >> And that's what Saul Steinberg tries to [248:18] do. Come in, raid the company, break it [248:20] up for parts. But, uh, David, I I think [248:24] you're getting ahead of yourself. [248:26] >> I'm pretty sure this should be how we [248:29] start part two. [248:30] Yes, this is the story for next time, [248:34] but just know for now as a little teaser [248:37] that this period of the company ends [248:40] improbably [248:42] not with Disney being broken up, but [248:44] with three complete outsiders [248:48] coming in to run the company, none of [248:51] whom have any history in animation, any [248:54] familiarity with the flywheel business [248:56] model, or any experience or demonstrated [248:59] ability ility to operate anything [249:02] outside film and television. So like [249:04] running parks, nope. Doing merch? Nope. [249:06] Nothing. None of that. [249:09] And those three men, Michael Eisner, [249:12] Frank Wells, and Jeffrey Katzenberg, [249:16] would pull off probably the greatest [249:20] media company comeback in history. So [249:24] that's what two Paramount executives and [249:27] a lawyer turned Warner Brothers exec. [249:29] >> Yep, that's right. [249:30] >> It's like the other Hollywood Studios [249:34] executives are going to team up and come [249:35] in and save Disney. [249:37] >> Doesn't sound like it's going to work, [249:38] but we'll have to story on part two [249:41] because boy did it ever. [249:44] >> All right. Well, should we do some [249:47] analysis? [249:47] >> Yes, absolutely. Do you still like the [249:50] thing that we did on Vanguard which is [249:51] have one big question that we we try to [249:54] answer? [249:54] >> And I think the question should be why [249:57] has nobody else built an IP flywheel [249:59] like Disney? [250:01] >> Is it as simple as Disney was the first [250:04] IP flywheel company and so they've been [250:07] the biggest? I mean that no that's not [250:09] it. But it is interesting they are the [250:10] first and they're like the biggest best [250:14] IP flywheel company at that point in [250:16] history. 1984. [250:17] >> Yeah. And I mean really like even to [250:20] today, I don't think any of the other [250:24] movie studios out there, any of the [250:26] other major studios are anywhere near as [250:29] good a business. [250:30] >> No, they're all terrible businesses. [250:31] >> Yeah. Despite having at this point going [250:34] on a hundred years of watching Disney [250:38] operate and seeing exactly how the [250:40] flywheel business model works. I mean, [250:42] the Wall Street Journal wrote that [250:43] article in 1958. Why has nobody else [250:46] copied them successfully? [250:47] >> To be fair, okay, the terrible business [250:49] thing is not fair. The business of movie [250:51] production on its own is a terrible [250:53] business, but the other studios, like, [250:56] you got to give Universal a ton of [250:58] credit. [250:58] >> And I guess that's my point. Universal [251:00] is probably the closest, but even then, [251:02] it's not Disney. I mean, isn't Universal [251:06] running effectively the the same [251:09] playbook but with less valuable IP or IP [251:13] that they don't own? So, they have to [251:14] sort of share it. Think like Harry [251:16] Potter. [251:16] >> Yep. [251:17] >> Or just at smaller scale. [251:19] >> Yeah. Still, nobody else is Disney. And [251:21] and to me, I think it all comes back to [251:25] when we first talked about the flywheel [251:27] all the way in the beginning of the [251:28] episode. I think animation is super [251:32] super key. I mean Bob Iger when he took [251:35] over the company in 2005 had that famous [251:37] quote of as animation goes so goes the [251:40] company. Yep. [251:40] >> There really is something unique about [251:42] animated IP in its timelessness, in the [251:46] ever availability of its stars, in the [251:49] better economics of not having to share [251:50] too much on the back end or in [251:52] merchandising fees, etc. with stars. And [251:55] then I think really just like the [251:57] ability of people to form deep lasting [252:00] relationships with the characters versus [252:03] live action. And because Disney's always [252:06] had animation at its core, that's what [252:09] creates all this special IP. [252:11] >> And it's all created in house. You know, [252:14] it's funny. I threw out Harry Potter. [252:15] Universal doesn't own all of the rights [252:18] to everything Harry Potter, but Disney [252:20] for sure does own all the rights to [252:22] everything Buzz Lightyear now that they [252:24] own Pixar or Aladdin or Mickey Mouse. [252:27] Like, this is true vertical integration. [252:29] >> Yes. Yes. There's also Disney, for all [252:33] its ups and downs, made the decision to [252:36] never sell its catalog, so they could [252:39] compound longer than everyone else. A [252:41] lot of these other studios have sold [252:44] their back catalogs, and some of them [252:46] are are worthless since it's live action [252:48] films and black and white that no one's [252:49] ever going to watch, but Disney hasn't. [252:51] They own everything they've ever made, [252:53] and that ties to Walt's Oswald [252:55] experience. [252:56] >> Yep. And I think there's something else [252:58] too that only comes when you really [253:02] fully embrace the flywheel business [253:05] model and the trade-offs that it [253:06] involves. And it's the vault and the [253:09] reissue strategy. [253:10] >> Yeah. [253:11] >> Disney. Let's put Marvel aside for a [253:14] minute. Uh with the exception of Marvel, [253:17] >> you got to put Star Wars in that pile, [253:18] too, because I know where you're going [253:20] with this. And I the way you feel about [253:21] Marvel, I feel about the um [253:23] overexloitation of Star Wars. [253:24] >> Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Great. Okay. All [253:25] right. Let's Let's put Star Wars aside [253:28] of the pile, too. Core Disney and Disney [253:30] animation and Pixar have been so [253:33] disciplined over the years about [253:36] metering out their content and the core [253:38] delivery of that content on an [253:41] infrequent enough basis that it doesn't [253:44] dilute it. And Marvel, ironically, I [253:46] think really is the counter example [253:48] here. Yeah, it was on a great great run, [253:50] but honestly, it feels like the Disney [253:52] plusification of Marvel. We'll get to [253:54] this in the next episode, but that my [253:56] gripe would be that the developing a lot [253:58] of content to always have something [254:00] fresh there. [254:01] >> Maybe what the issue that we're both [254:03] describing is actually a blurring of [254:06] flywheel point. 2 and Flywheel 3. Point [254:10] 2 was maximized distribution of each [254:12] core IP's [254:14] primary initial delivery vehicle. And [254:16] your point three was feed IP into as [254:19] many ancillary profitable flywheel nodes [254:21] as possible. Kind of feels like with [254:24] direct consumer Disney Plus, those two [254:27] things got confused. Yeah. [254:30] >> And like ah what's the difference [254:31] between ancillary content and primary [254:33] content it all ends up in the same [254:34] place. And that's kind of how I feel [254:36] when I watch some of the overexploited [254:38] IP now. M mhm. Mhm. [254:41] >> It goes back all the way back to the [254:42] point you made, I don't know, 6 hours [254:43] ago or whatever, that you you have to be [254:45] really clear about giving a nice lane [254:49] around your primary medium and delivery [254:52] vehicle. So that stuff still feels [254:54] scarce, special, and canonical. [254:56] >> Yep. Yep. Yep. But I think for every [254:59] other studio out there, their incentives [255:02] have always been and are always going to [255:04] be release as much content as quickly as [255:07] possible. Yeah. especially once they [255:09] have a franchise that's working, get the [255:11] sequels out as fast as possible and get [255:14] the sure profits from them. [255:16] >> And Disney is playing a many decade [255:19] compounding game which can take three [255:21] decades to really kick in. And all these [255:23] other studios change ownership every [255:25] decade. And so there's really not the [255:28] right like ownership incentive structure [255:31] to play a three decade game. [255:33] >> Yep. And I think this impacts the [255:36] creative decisions too because when you [255:39] don't need to release content, [255:42] you can keep working on the content and [255:45] make sure that you only release it once [255:47] it's truly great. [255:48] >> Yeah. There's one other point on this [255:50] though that we haven't really touched [255:52] on, which is universe cohesion. [255:55] >> Here's my favorite way to make the [255:56] point. What's your favorite Paramount [255:58] song? [256:00] >> Right. Yeah. No idea. The Top Gun theme [256:02] song. What's your favorite Universal [256:04] song? [256:05] >> Right. Yeah. [256:06] >> But like everyone's got a litany of [256:09] answers to what's your favorite Disney [256:10] song. Yes. [256:11] >> They actually managed to associate all [256:14] of this love and heritage and fandom and [256:17] universe interaction with the studio [256:20] itself. [256:20] >> It's back to becoming the lifesavers of [256:22] animation. [256:23] >> Yep. [256:23] >> So, okay, as I was thinking about this, [256:25] I was trying to ask myself, are there [256:27] any other companies in the broader [256:31] >> entertainment landscape? Ah, you got it. [256:34] That do this. I thought I was going to [256:35] get you. [256:36] Which is so great because Nintendo and [256:39] Disney, you know, Nintendo started on [256:42] the back of Disney, right? As we talked [256:43] about on our Nintendo episodes, right? [256:45] It was the Disney license for the [256:46] playing cards in Japan that kicked off [256:48] modern Nintendo. [256:49] >> Yep. [256:50] >> Yes. But yes, they have the exact same [256:53] ethos [256:54] >> and flywheel. [256:55] >> But interestingly, they sort of don't [256:56] play together now. I mean, that's the [256:58] thing about vertically integrated [256:59] companies is they don't really work [257:02] together, [257:02] >> right? And Nintendo has partnered with [257:04] Universal now for their perks. I kind of [257:06] suspect the way that a relationship [257:08] between Disney and Nintendo, [257:10] the only way it could work would be if [257:12] one of them buys the other, [257:14] >> right? [257:14] >> Yep. [257:15] >> Yep. [257:15] >> Great. Seven powers. [257:17] >> Great. So listeners, this is the part of [257:19] the show where we walk through Hamilton [257:21] Helmer's seven powers framework that [257:24] effectively helps analyze why does a [257:26] business get to be more profitable than [257:28] its nearest competitor and do so [257:30] sustainably. And those seven are scale [257:32] economies, network economies, [257:34] counterpositioning, switching costs, [257:36] branding, cornered resource, and process [257:39] power. And I think we're just analyzing [257:42] this for pre984 Disney. [257:45] >> Yep. Well, easy one to start with. [257:47] Counterpositioning for days. Being [257:50] willing to invest in a featurelength [257:52] animated picture. I mean, that was the [257:54] peak of this relative to anybody else [257:56] doing animation leading up to Snow [257:58] White, [257:59] >> right? Cuz their competitive set would [258:01] have needed to be people who have the [258:03] talent of their animation staff, which [258:05] is not zero people, but few people, and [258:08] who had all the cash from Mickey and the [258:10] Mickey merch, which would have been [258:11] almost no one. I don't know, actually. [258:14] That's almost like capital as a moat to [258:16] go pursue Snow White cuz they weren't [258:18] there was no one else who really could [258:20] have done it. [258:20] >> Mhm. You know what? You're right. Versus [258:24] the other animation studios, but Disney [258:27] was counterpositioned, I think, versus [258:29] the big liveaction studios because they [258:32] never would have made a three-year $1.5 [258:35] million investment in a film when it was [258:38] >> nor they have the capability though. [258:40] >> Yep. [258:40] >> So, let's see. early on. I mean, [258:43] branding pretty quickly played a role as [258:46] soon as Mickey Mouse was established. [258:47] >> Walt Disney production. Absolutely. [258:49] >> Yeah. Yeah. You'd pay more for a Walt [258:51] Disney production than than others. [258:52] >> It was brand for Disney itself. [258:54] >> I wonder if there was process power. [258:56] Reading in some of the old recollections [258:58] of animators, it seems like there were [258:59] people that kind of traded between [259:01] studios and left and started rival [259:02] studios and they were able to produce [259:05] great work. So, maybe there's not [259:06] process power. M [259:08] >> I mean the the big two once it started [259:10] to really kick in are scale economies [259:12] and network economies. The flywheel is [259:14] sort of all about that. The these films [259:17] are all scale economies. It's can I go [259:19] plop down $6 million and then get the [259:22] entire world to care about my movie for [259:24] a year and make as much as possible on [259:26] that and then expand it out into the [259:28] flywheel and take advantage of all those [259:30] ancillary streams. And then of course [259:32] the network economies of if you have a [259:34] big enough release, it is a cultural [259:37] moment. Yeah. It matters to the world, [259:40] >> right? Gosh, I see it with my girls now [259:42] today buying, you know, the Aurora [259:44] costume that their friends also have so [259:46] that they can dress up and play [259:48] together. Yeah. The flywheel is built on [259:50] network economies. It's like a [259:52] combination of scale economies and [259:53] network economies. Scale economies to [259:55] enable the investment in the IP and then [259:57] network economies across all of the [259:59] nodes. But the whole thing, if you were [260:01] to go ask that question of why isn't [260:03] another company able to replicate the [260:06] success of Disney to any of the very [260:08] smart executives and their great teams [260:11] that work at competitive companies, they [260:14] would say, "Oh, cuz Disney has the [260:16] cornered resource of all that IP." And [260:17] like, what do you want me to do? I can't [260:19] devise a strategy that's going to work [260:20] in the next 5 to 10 years to suddenly [260:22] beat Disney when they have a hundred [260:25] years of heritage and the world caring [260:28] about their IP. The entire thing is [260:30] predicated on that. [260:31] >> Yep. Yep. Which really comes down to [260:33] Walt always playing the long game and [260:35] always being willing [260:36] >> to bet the whole farm. [260:38] >> Yep. [260:38] >> And being right enough times and [260:40] managing to survive through the times [260:42] where he was wrong that it worked. [260:44] >> Yep. All right, Quintessence. [260:47] >> Yes. So mine is Disney managed to take [260:50] not only a set of IP and build their [260:52] flywheel, but a cohesive set of IP, an [260:56] opinionated universe of timeless stories [260:59] about durable, emotional story arcs that [261:01] are universally applicable that work [261:03] together as one. And that is something [261:05] that can stay relevant and of course [261:08] monetize for a very long time across [261:11] generations. They can't fully avoid [261:14] being a hitbased business. They are a [261:16] movie studio, but they've gotten about [261:18] as far away from it as they possibly [261:20] can. [261:22] >> It's funny listening to you say that. I [261:24] think that entire passage could equally [261:28] apply to Nintendo. [261:29] >> Yeah. [261:30] >> Which really just shows how the [261:31] companies, they are the two flywheel [261:32] companies. They are the two intellectual [261:35] property flywheel companies out there. [261:36] >> Yeah. [261:37] >> Okay. Okay, so my quintessence goes all [261:39] the way back to the beginning of the [261:40] episode and Marceline. [261:42] >> Of course it does. [261:43] >> Art and commerce. Those two things got [261:46] married in Walt's head when he was a [261:48] little kid. And that is Disney. It [261:52] really is art. When Disney is at its [261:54] best, what they make is not just a [261:58] commercial product. It exists at a [261:59] higher level than that. [262:02] And it is married to this incredible [262:04] commerce engine that is in of itself [262:07] beautiful and like Disneyland and Disney [262:09] World and all the parks are the most [262:11] perfect expression of that [262:13] >> in it sounds exactly right. The [262:16] sightelines man the the I I like going [262:19] to Disneyland just to walk around. It's [262:22] the craziest thing. I the rides are free [262:25] and I have just as much fun not going on [262:27] them even though I've already paid for [262:28] them. Any parent who's been to Disney [262:30] with their kids knows exactly what I'm [262:32] talking about. And it is like [262:34] irreplicable at any other company or [262:36] place in the world. All right, before we [262:39] do carveouts, I've got one fun little [262:42] thing that didn't make the narrative. [262:43] So, when Disney launched Donald Duck in [262:47] 1934, they hired radio actor Clarence [262:52] Nash to do his voice. Do you know how [262:55] Clarence Nash got his start doing Animal [262:59] Voices on the radio? [263:02] You won't guess it, but it's an awesome [263:04] acquired crossover. [263:07] >> He was the radio spokesperson for Ador [263:11] Dairy Farms. Whoa. [263:12] >> In Southern California. [263:14] >> Trader Joe's. [263:15] >> Trader Joe's. [263:17] >> That's awesome. [263:18] >> Crossover. Trader Joe's. Donald Duck. [263:20] There you go. Trader Joe's original milk [263:22] supplier before they got bought by [263:24] Trader Joe's competitor 7-Eleven. [263:26] >> Yep, that's right. And of course, Trader [263:28] Joe's itself was in part inspired by the [263:30] Enchanted Tiki Room at Disneyland. [263:33] >> That's right. Which we didn't talk [263:34] about, but Walt also owned that [263:36] personally. It opened in ' 63. He put up [263:39] the capital for it. I think Wed owned [263:41] it. And it was ticketed separately. I [263:43] think it was like an extra 75 cents or [263:45] something to go to Walt Disney's [263:47] personal tiki room, which is why it's [263:48] named [263:49] >> the Tiki Room. That's right. All right. [263:51] Carveouts, what you got? [263:52] >> All right. Followup to yours from the [263:54] Vanguard episode. The shoes, Brooks [263:57] Vanguards are indeed great. I ordered a [264:00] pair. They're excellent. Uh I'm not [264:02] wearing them today because they're not [264:04] squishy enough to stand for whatever [264:06] we're at 9 hours. [264:08] >> Yes. But they are great shoes. I got two [264:09] pairs. [264:10] >> I wear them around the neighborhood. [264:11] They're awesome. I have two YouTube [264:13] channels. [264:14] >> Oo, nice. [264:15] >> One is Defunct Land. [264:17] >> I used to watch this channel all the [264:19] time. I forgot about it for a while and [264:20] then I rediscovered it while we were [264:22] doing research. It is the stories of [264:24] either defunct or neverbuilt theme parks [264:27] and it walks you through the insanity of [264:30] action park in where is that? New [264:33] Jersey. [264:33] >> Yep, I think that's right. [264:34] >> Tons of great Disney ones, Disney parks [264:36] that were never built. There's a great [264:38] one on the the Florida project. So, I [264:40] highly recommend defunct Land. My second [264:42] one is Animagraphs. [264:44] >> There's not a lot of videos on this [264:45] channel, but they're all so cool. It is [264:49] 3D models explained by a narrator of how [264:54] really interesting pieces of machinery [264:56] work. I've used it for at least two [264:59] episodes that I can think of off the top [265:00] of my head. One, how a mechanical watch [265:02] works and two, how a Formula 1 car [265:05] works. I highly recommend the channel, [265:07] Animagraphs. It is awesome. [265:09] >> I also have two carveouts. My first one [265:12] is we got a new car, [265:15] >> a Volvo EX30. [265:18] >> The little guy. [265:19] >> The little guy. A, it is awesome. It's [265:23] like the perfect car for San Francisco. [265:25] It fits in tight parking spaces, but it [265:27] can hold my whole family, hold a bunch [265:29] of gear. B, oh my god, Chinese EVs are [265:32] incredible. So Volvo is owned by Giley, [265:36] which is a Chinese company, and the EX30 [265:39] is a Gily [265:42] platform EV with Volvo branding, unlike [265:45] the other Volvo cars. I [265:47] >> mean, this thing is crazy. It only costs [265:49] like $35,000. And it's awesome. [265:52] Unfortunately, that leads to C, which is [265:55] Volvo just canceled it in the US right [265:57] after I got it. Yeah, I think because of [265:59] tariffs. Yeah. [266:00] >> Oh, [266:01] >> it is an amazing car. You can no longer [266:03] buy it in the US, but you can [266:04] internationally. [266:05] >> It was a short window. [266:06] >> And like, man, I get Chinese EVs now. [266:08] This is a really, really good car for [266:11] not a lot of money. Okay, my second [266:13] carve out is the San Francisco Symphony. [266:17] Jenny and I went the other night. They [266:19] have a new music director coming in, [266:22] Ellen Chan, and this was her first [266:24] performance since being named music [266:27] director. She's awesome. She's 39 years [266:29] old. She's so much fun and so much [266:32] energy. And going to the symphony, which [266:34] I hadn't been in forever, made me [266:36] realize that actually through classical [266:40] animation, I got a ton of exposure to [266:42] classical music growing up. I think more [266:44] than anything else, like through Disney [266:46] films and Looney Tunes and Warner [266:48] Brothers, I was just sitting there like, [266:50] man, I feel like I should be watching [266:52] some animation right now. [266:55] >> Awesome. All right. Well, we have got [266:57] some thank yous to people who helped us [266:59] with our research. But first, to our [267:01] partners this season. JP Morgan, [267:02] trusted, reliable payments [267:04] infrastructure for your business, no [267:05] matter the scale. JPorggan.com/acquired [267:09] to Verscell, the developer tools and [267:11] cloud infrastructure to build and scale [267:13] fast, secure applications on the web. [267:15] Verscell.com/acquired [267:16] to Service Now, the platform that puts [267:19] AI to work for people. Service [267:21] Now.com/acquired. and Statsig, bringing [267:23] experimentation, feature flags, and [267:25] product analytics into one unified [267:27] system for product teams. [267:28] statsig.com/acquired. [267:30] Thanks to all four of these companies [267:32] for being awesome partners with us this [267:33] season as we wrap here with this finale [267:36] and leave you with a cliffhanger here [267:37] over the summer when we'll be back for [267:40] our fall season in August. [267:42] >> Disney part two. [267:44] >> Yes, [267:44] >> the Renaissance. [267:45] >> Ben and David will return. [267:47] >> Yes. As always, thank you to all of our [267:50] sources, the books that we read for this [267:52] episode. They're all linked in the show [267:54] notes, and a special thank you to Arvin [267:57] Navaratnam at Worldly Partners for his [267:59] great write up on Disney, linked in the [268:01] show notes. Arvin, for folks that don't [268:03] know, is at Worldly Partners, which is a [268:06] long-term investment firm focused on [268:08] multi-deade compounding businesses. Very [268:11] sympatico here with Acquired. Learn more [268:13] at worldlypartners.com. [268:15] He provided us with the data on the rise [268:17] of televisions. Actually, some annual [268:19] reports that we were missing even from [268:20] our time in the Disney archives for the [268:23] original offering document for Disney [268:25] selling shares to the public. All sorts [268:27] of awesome stuff. Personally, thank you [268:28] to Jeffrey Katzenberg. We had a great [268:30] breakfast when I was down in Burbank and [268:32] helped us out a lot with research and [268:35] you'll hear a lot more about him on part [268:37] two. to Josh Dearo, the new CEO of the [268:41] Walt Disney Company, for his time [268:43] chatting through some stuff that we were [268:45] wrestling with and helping us with [268:46] research. Also to Nancy Lee and all the [268:50] Disney folks in the archives, animation [268:52] research library and all the other great [268:54] folks in Burbank we met with on our [268:56] research trip. [268:57] >> That really was incredible. Thank you to [268:59] all of you. [268:59] >> To Mike Miller, former Wall Street [269:01] Journal editor and now frequently [269:03] helping us with acquired episodes. Mike, [269:05] you are awesome. to Graden who [269:08] emailed us last year with the [269:10] observation that the entire business [269:12] community misuses the phrase flywheel. [269:15] >> Yes. [269:15] >> Appreciate your your help, Graden. [269:17] >> Glad we finally found the perfect [269:19] episode to bring this up. [269:20] >> Yes. Well, speaking of the Wall Street [269:22] Journal, thank you to Ben Cohen and [269:24] Emily Nelson over there who helped us [269:26] track down the original Flywheel [269:29] article. We will link to that in the [269:31] show notes. Can't wait to share it with [269:33] all of you. to Mitch Laskkey, our friend [269:35] Mitch Laskkey, former partner at [269:37] Benchmark, who helped me think through a [269:40] whole bunch of the flywheel dynamics. To [269:42] Ryan Shear, who is Walt's greatgrandson [269:46] and is on the board of the Walt Disney [269:48] Family Museum here in San Francisco, [269:50] which really is a excellent museum, and [269:52] it's done by the family. It's about [269:54] Walt, the person. Highly recommend going [269:56] to see it next time you are in San [269:59] Francisco. If you like this episode, go [270:01] check out our recent episodes on [270:03] Vanguard, Ferrari, and Coca-Cola. And [270:05] back in the archives, our two-part [270:07] series on Nintendo. I think a lot of [270:09] that is going to rhyme with Disney. [270:12] >> Indeed. [270:12] >> You can click the show notes to get [270:14] access to the PDF companion with [270:16] visuals, charts, tables, and [270:18] illustrations of key concepts. You can [270:19] also get it by joining our email list, [270:21] acquired.fm/e. [270:23] It's where we send out our takeaways [270:25] from each episode, past episode [270:26] corrections, behind the scenes photos, [270:28] and it's where you can vote on future [270:30] episode topics. Plus, we give away a [270:32] little hint each time. acquire.fm/e. [270:36] And we are writing in the Wall Street [270:39] Journal. You can get access to read the [270:41] columns at acquire.fm/wsj. [270:45] And if you sign up there, we will email [270:47] you every time the column comes out and [270:49] we will make sure that you get an [270:51] unpaywalled link. So whether or not you [270:53] were a journal subscriber, if you were [270:55] on that list, acquire.fm/wsj, [270:58] you can always be able to read our [270:59] article. [271:00] >> Every time we make an episode, we write [271:02] an article now. [271:03] >> And with that, listeners, we'll see you [271:04] next time. [271:05] >> We'll see you back here this fall for [271:07] Disney part two. [271:08] >> Yes. [271:09] >> Who got the truth? [271:12] Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got [271:15] the truth now? Huh?