The fastest way to learn is to run two competing bets | Jay Parikh (EVP CoreAI, Microsoft)

The fastest way to learn is to run two competing bets | Jay Parikh (EVP CoreAI, Microsoft) — First Round

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Key ideas

  • Engineering leaders should resolve architectural deadlocks by funding parallel competing bets rather than debating forecasts, generating empirical performance benchmarks within 30 to 60 days. (44:10)
  • At scale, organizations must replace traditional org charts with operational 'work charts' composed of small squads led by Directly Responsible Individuals (DRIs) with a mandatory 24-hour escalation rule. (20:00)
  • Generative AI is shifting code from a human input into an automated computational output, creating a critical operational mismatch with human-speed go-to-market functions. (37:41)
  • Full-stack vertical integration across hardware, data centers, and network cables shields scaling tech firms from unaligned third-party vendor roadmaps and median yield curves. (47:35)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by First Round on August 27, 2026, as an episode of the Executive Function podcast hosted by Brett Berson, this conversation features Jay Parikh, Executive Vice President of CoreAI at Microsoft and former global head of engineering at Facebook and CEO of Lacework. The episode explores Parikh's five pillars of engineering leadership, the mechanics of scaling organizational culture, and why running parallel competing technical bets yields faster learning than predictive forecasting.

## TL;DR Drawing from his leadership tenures at Akamai, Facebook, Lacework, and Microsoft, Jay Parikh details how to maintain execution speed and cultural coherence through exponential growth. He outlines the five essential ingredients of engineering leadership, highlighting the need to actively combat operational toil, replace traditional org charts with DRI-led 'work charts,' and empower manager-free IC brain trusts. Parikh also demonstrates why executing parallel, competing technical bets unblocks deadlocks faster than endless forecasting and explains how vertical integration preserves organizational agility. Finally, he reflects on the crisis leadership forged during Akamai's post-dot-com restructuring, which prompted him to instill strict operational and infrastructure efficiency at Facebook from day one.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries a crisp, battle-tested, and pragmatically rigorous tone, functioning like an executive-level masterclass in organizational engineering. Brett Berson steers the dialogue with targeted, structural inquiries, allowing Parikh to articulate complex operational mechanics without falling into corporate platitudes or hollow management speak. The mood remains fast-paced and analytical, yet deepens into genuine gravitas when Parikh recounts steering Akamai through mass layoffs and the tragic loss of co-founder Danny Lewin on September 11. Throughout, Parikh exudes the calm, decisive clarity of an operator who has repeatedly navigated steep technical S-curves under immense external pressure.

## Bulletin - `44:10` Engineering leaders should resolve architectural deadlocks by funding parallel competing bets rather than debating forecasts, generating empirical performance benchmarks within 30 to 60 days. - `20:00` At scale, organizations must replace traditional org charts with operational 'work charts' composed of small squads led by Directly Responsible Individuals (DRIs) with a mandatory 24-hour escalation rule. - `37:41` Generative AI is shifting code from a human input into an automated computational output, creating a critical operational mismatch with human-speed go-to-market functions. - `47:35` Full-stack vertical integration across hardware, data centers, and network cables shields scaling tech firms from unaligned third-party vendor roadmaps and median yield curves.

## Key takeaways - `02:21` Great engineering leadership rests on five foundational ingredients: team composition, strategic abstraction around core business metrics, operational drumbeat, combating toil, and intentional culture building. - `05:00` Operational toil is often a symptom of learned helplessness at the leadership level, such as assuming deployment friction is an immutable law or requiring headcount to solve every problem. - `10:00` Organizational scaling acts like an expanding circle where completing a single learning revolution takes longer as headcount increases, requiring continuous recursion back into small squads. - `12:05` To systematically combat operational drag, engineering leadership must instrument developer friction and focus time with telemetry rather than issuing arbitrary speed decrees. - `18:57` Small squads unburdened by legacy technical debt and equipped with generative AI tools can prototype, debug, and ship software multiple times per day. - `22:44` Cross-functional teams should adopt a Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE) mindset; isolating infrastructure engineers from customer reality leads to churn and coordination breakdowns. - `26:20` Leaders must insulate engineering organizations from wild swings in public perception by recognizing that internal criticism often reflects deep employee care rather than hostility. - `30:00` Steep inflection points on an S-curve ruthlessly expose talent gaps, requiring proactive multi-year talent acquisition rather than relying on current benches. - `33:58` Executive onboarding requires an initial period of operating as an individual contributor without direct reports to embed in the culture and diagnose architecture without triggering rejection. - `35:00` Creating manager-free 'brain trusts' of senior individual contributors unlocks unfiltered technical debates and prevents frontline engineers from deferring to managerial consensus. - `40:00` Meaningful 'big bets' must deliver order-of-magnitude discontinuous improvements across multiple teams rather than 10% to 30% incremental optimizations. - `44:10` Running competing technical paths in parallel preserves option value, allowing teams to gather empirical results in two months rather than losing four months to sequential evaluation. - `47:35` Vertical integration down to custom silicon and data center design becomes essential at hyperscale because third-party vendors design hardware for median enterprise customers. - `51:46` Experience as a startup CEO highlights that technological innovation must be tightly paired with go-to-market mechanics, sales incentives, and pricing models. - `01:01:26` Instilling an efficiency and frugality mindset early is vital because retrofitting fiscal and architectural discipline into a bloated engineering organization is nearly impossible.

## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` Viewing Engineering as a Whole System

Looking back across major technology shifts over the last 30 years—from the early commercial Internet through mobile, the cloud, and now AI—engineering leadership cannot be cleanly split between people management on one side and technology strategy on the other. Outside observers often look at generational tech successes like Facebook and assume everything was cleanly architected from day one. In reality, scaling through those early steep curves was dominated by brute force behind the scenes. As Jay Parikh puts it: “It’s never as clean in the inside as it looks from the outside. Yeah, I was like, I always joke about, you know, from... Everybody thinks it's like, oh, you built Facebook. I was like... Trust me, the first few years, you didn't want to look at the curtain.”

The core failure mode for many engineering executives is treating people, product, and business functions as isolated silos. Effective leaders view the entire enterprise as a single interconnected system whose sole objective is delivering value to end users. That perspective stems directly from wearing multiple cross-functional hats early on: - At Akamai, Jay’s first role was stepping into technical sales simply because the company had no one else to do it, helping the team close customer deals directly. - He was then pulled into business development to negotiate and build out the physical server network across data centers. - Later, he transitioned back into engineering and product, rotating through roles as an engineer, product manager, product marketer, director, and VP before ultimately leading all of engineering at Facebook.

`02:21` The Five Ingredients of Great Engineering Leadership

Excellence in engineering leadership breaks down into five foundational ingredients that must work in tandem rather than in isolation:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Five Ingredients of Engineering Leadership accDescr: A visual representation of the five interdependent components that define engineering leadership excellence.

subgraph Foundation["1. Organization & Strategy"] T["High-Performing Team<br/>• Composition & Balance<br/>• ICs, Specialists, Generalists"] S["Strategic North Star<br/>• Right Abstraction Level<br/>• Avoid Top-Down Micromanagement"] end

subgraph Operation["2. Operating Rhythm"] D["Drumbeat of Execution<br/>• Week-over-Week Progress<br/>• Relentless Tempo"] H["Fighting Headwinds & Toil<br/>• Squish Operational Drag<br/>• Combat Learned Helplessness"] end

subgraph Catalyst["3. Cultural Engine"] C["Intentional Culture<br/>• Prescriptive Behaviors<br/>• Fast Learning Loops"] end

Foundation --> Operation Operation --> Catalyst C -.->|"Enables & Rate-Limits"| Foundation ```

1. **Building a high-performing team:** Recruiting top talent is only the starting point; leaders must intentionally design the structural composition of the organization. This requires deciding the exact ratio of early-career talent to senior individual contributors (ICs), balancing deep domain specialists against versatile generalists, and positioning high-leverage technical leads throughout the ranks. 2. **Setting strategy and vision at the right abstraction level:** If an engineering leader sets a North Star that is too abstract or high-level, it becomes completely opaque and teams do not know what to execute on Monday morning. Conversely, if a leader dictates all 1,051 individual OKRs, the team stops thinking autonomously. The leader's job is to define the right layer of abstraction—centering on core metrics such as revenue, active users, or retention—so teams are empowered to solve the problems themselves. 3. **Establishing a relentless drumbeat of execution:** Executives often believe their job is merely to delegate, but senior leadership must set the operational tempo. Even for massive architectural overhauls or multi-year product initiatives that take two years to materialize, teams must demonstrate concrete, quantifiable, week-over-week progress (or day-over-day during critical sprints) across efficiency gains, user growth, or product delivery. 4. **Combating toil and operational headwinds:** As systems scale and run for years, operational drag compounds. Especially in the modern AI era, where iteration speeds are unprecedented, organizations must possess an active intolerance for toil. Without a dedicated effort to squish this drag down, systems accumulate friction and execution spirals downward. 5. **Intentional culture building:** Culture has recently been unfairly downplayed or viewed as uncool to discuss, but it remains the foundational baseline that dictates execution speed.

`05:00` Toil, Learned Helplessness, and Real Culture

The relative weighting of these five ingredients shifts depending on the maturity of the organization. While early-stage startups focus heavily on team assembly and strategy, mature enterprises spend an enormous amount of energy battling toil. Crucially, toil is merely an effect; the root cause is frequently an underlying leadership mindset of learned helplessness.

When organizations stagnate, leaders and teams start offering reflexive excuses: - Claiming an issue cannot be resolved without incremental headcount. - Treating security reviews, compliance roadblocks, or deployment hurdles as unchangeable laws of nature. - Accepting extreme friction to push code into production as simply "the way things are."

Jay explains how this defeats an engineering organization from the inside out: “The cause actually is having built an organization and a leadership that has an ethos of maybe learned helplessness, where, hey, I can't do that, or hey, we would fix that if we had more people, or I could do this if we could, you know, like, there's a lot of that, there could be a lot of that learned helplessness that then outputs this toil, which just people feel defeated by, right?”

To reverse that decline, leadership must recognize that culture is not about superficial workplace perks: - It is not free snacks, branded swag, lifestyle jobs, or "warm and fuzzies." - Culture is highly prescriptive: it is defined by how people communicate, how decisions are made, the behaviors rewarded under pressure, and how values are actively expressed hour by hour and minute by minute. - A company can print slogans like "Move Fast" or "Customer Obsession" on posters, but they are hollow unless mirrored in operational reality. - Ultimately, culture acts as the rate-limiter for everything else: an organization with a broken, passive culture will fail at hiring, vision, execution, and eliminating toil. - The true engine of an enduring organization is its internal "learning loop"—the speed at which individuals and teams share insights, adapt to rapid technological shifts, and execute on feedback across expanding headcounts.

`10:00` The Geometry of Scale and the Learning Loop

Jay Parikh describes organizational scaling through the metaphor of an expanding circle where every single revolution represents exactly one unit of learning. When a startup is tiny, that circle has a small diameter, meaning the team traverses it rapidly and learns at high frequency. As a company finds success, hires more people, and launches more products, the diameter expands relentlessly. Not only does the physical distance required to complete one full revolution grow vastly longer, but the organization also moves through that circumference far slower. Everything in organizational physics begins working against speed. Jay explains that his primary obsession as an engineering executive is figuring out how to actively fight that expansion and systemic slowness.

Fighting that drag requires constantly recursing operating models back into the system rather than letting legacy habits calcify. A meeting cadence that was essential a year prior when eight people were in the room stops functioning when the attendee list balloons to forty people; leadership must actively dismantle those forums and reset them back to small, eight-person working groups with clear Directly Responsible Individuals (DRIs) and prescriptive goals. While many engineers are allergic to process, Jay emphasizes that while process for process’s sake is terrible, organizations require the right relevant structure so individuals can do their best work. Furthermore, building a resilient culture means treating production outages, churned customers, and technical missteps not as catastrophic surprises, but as raw fuel for improvement. As Jay Parikh puts it:

> “And if you have an organization that's not surprised by the failure and not thrown off by the failure, then I think you really kind of galvanize people and that culture really starts to help you accelerate.”

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Scale and Learning Loop Tension accDescr: Contrasting the small, rapid learning cycle of early-stage startups against the wide, sluggish learning loop of scaled organizations.

subgraph Startup["Small Startup Loop"] direction TB A1["Idea / Hypothesis"] --> B1["Rapid Build & Ship"] B1 --> C1["Direct Feedback"] C1 -->|"Fast revolution\nSmall circumference"| A1 end

subgraph Scaled["Scaled Enterprise Loop"] direction TB A2["Idea / Hypothesis"] --> D2["Cross-Team Reviews"] D2 --> B2["Extended Build Cycle"] B2 --> E2["Staged Releases"] E2 --> C2["Customer Churn / Outage Data"] C2 -->|"Slow revolution\nExpanding circumference"| A2 end ```

`12:05` Speed as an Unforgiving Competitive Advantage

When Brett Berson asks why company building seems governed by an inescapable law where everything decelerates over time, Jay responds that maintaining velocity is neither optional nor a cosmetic "nice to have"—it is an existential competitive edge. If a team can establish a cadence that lets them learn two, five, or ten times faster than their rivals, their probability of winning in the fullness of time approaches certainty.

When stepping into an established, sluggish engineering organization as a new leader, demanding speed without empirical evidence fails. When Jay helped establish the CoreAI team at Microsoft, the leadership team initiated a comprehensive audit collecting both qualitative sentiment and quantitative telemetry on developer friction: - **Qualitative headwinds:** Gathering candid subjective anecdotes directly from builders about the daily bureaucratic and technical detractors impeding their work. - **Quantitative time tracking:** Categorizing engineering hours into productive work versus administrative overhead, establishing a core metric known as "focus time." - **Focus time visibility:** Implementing real-time dashboards so engineering leaders across the organization could observe the exact percentage of uninterrupted focus time their teams actually possessed.

`15:00` Mindset Shifts, Socratic Pushes, and the Evolution of Deployment Cadence

Addressing the role of executive impatience, Brett asks whether an engineering leader simply demanding an August 15th release instead of a planned September 30th date actually accelerates an organization. Jay cautions that arbitrary management decrees might brute-force an early delivery once or twice, but they fail to produce durable behavioral shifts. Leaders must first understand the foundational assumptions and historical constraints baked into why the team chose September 30th in the first place. Using a Socratic approach—asking what subset of scope could ship by August 20th, or what friction points could be deferred until post-launch—uncovers hidden toil and lets leadership challenge assumptions collaboratively.

Jay highlights that shifting engineering cadence requires bringing the voice of the customer directly into conversations about learning speed, storytelling around culture rather than micromanaging individual dates, and adopting a deliberate "crawl, walk, run" progression. He illustrates this journey with Facebook's deployment transformation: - **Daily deployments:** When Jay originally joined Facebook, shipping the core codebase once per day to 300 million users worldwide was considered industry-leading, yet it required a daily Herculean effort that periodically broke down. - **Three times a day:** As once-per-day releases became a bottleneck for developer iteration, the company re-architected internal processes to push code three times daily. - **Continuous deployment:** By the end of Jay's decade-long tenure, massive sustained investments in internal infrastructure, testing automation, and toil reduction enabled continuous deployment, pushing code seamlessly throughout the day.

`18:57` The Velocity of Small Teams and Modern AI Tooling

Reflecting on the fastest teams he has ever witnessed, Jay notes that peak velocity rarely comes from massive divisions; it emerges from tiny, unencumbered groups tackling targeted problems. Within the CoreAI teams he supports at Microsoft, certain small units ship software daily and even multiple times per day. Because these squads build newer products, they are not anchored down by decades of technical debt or legacy infrastructure.

Crucially, these ultra-fast pods combine extreme product taste and direct intimacy with customer needs with modern AI-assisted workflows. By utilizing generative AI tooling, engineers can crank out functional prototypes, iterate on designs, and diagnose and fix bugs at a pace previously impossible for legacy engineering groups.

`20:00` Small Teams, the "Work Chart," and Fast Escalations

Jay emphasizes that organizations and teams move rapidly when they are structured into tightly knit units, pointing out that scale and customer type dictate execution velocity. Having led teams at Facebook and other organizations, he remains skeptical of massive groups: "Like large teams don't move fast. It's just like not possible to me, right?" To counter this dynamic, he disregards conventional organizational structures in favor of operational ones:

> "So it's all about how do you get, if you have a large team, how do you get this broken down into what you know, I call, we call the work chart, not the org chart. Just get rid of that nonsense around the org chart. Have this thing and emphasize this thing called the work chart."

Whether these are labeled B-teams, squads, or pods, the model requires very small units staffed with the right talent and led by a clearly designated Directly Responsible Individual (DRI) who possesses full context and agency. Jay stresses that leadership must genuinely trust these squads to do their jobs while holding them accountable through regular updates, check-ins, and clear metrics.

Critically, organizational roadblocks must be dismantled by removing the stigma around elevating issues. Parikh insists that "escalation is not a bad word in this world." Rather than letting friction linger through intermediate layers of management, he implements a direct rule:

> "It's like I've told teams and like, listen, if you get stuck for more than 24 hours in anything that you're doing, you call me, right? Because I don't want this to be like, oh, we have to talk to our manager who talks to their manager who then comes to me two weeks later."

When disagreements occur or decisions stall, the team must route the problem immediately to someone who can decide so everyone can move on. Maintaining this speed hinges on high talent density, full context, clearing away distractions, and candid evaluations: if a chosen DRI turns out to be ill-suited for the role, leadership must replace them quickly.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Work Chart Operating Model accDescr: Diagram illustrating how high talent density squads operate under the work chart model with direct escalation.

subgraph OrgModel["Structure: Work Chart vs Org Chart"] Squad["Small Dedicated Squad"] DRI["Clear DRI / Leader<br/>(Context & Agency)"] Metrics["Guided by Concrete Metrics"] Squad --- DRI Squad --- Metrics end

subgraph Execution["Execution & Speed"] Action["Autonomous Daily Execution"] Stuck{"Blocked > 24 Hours?"} DirectEsc["Direct Escalation to Leadership<br/>(Bypass Multi-Week Management Ladders)"] Resolution["Immediate Decision & Unblock"] end

DRI --> Action Action --> Stuck Stuck -- "Yes" --> DirectEsc DirectEsc --> Resolution Resolution --> Action ```

---

`22:44` Shared Fate and Fostering an "FDE Mindset"

Addressing the prolific infrastructure stack he oversaw at Facebook, Brett asks whether infrastructure teams must view internal software engineers as customers whom they need to delight. Jay explains that at Facebook, the infrastructure organization was not just responsible for hardware; it owned all the software and went far up the stack to end-user consumption, including running much of the mobile engineering stack. He enforced an organizational ethos where every engineer had to be close to the customer, warning that if the infrastructure layer performed but the final product failed, the entire initiative failed:

> "So those teams had to be fused together and sort of a shared fate. I had no tolerance for this like, hey, just because you're in infra, you don't need to care about the customer. I had zero tolerance for that."

When asked why so many companies lack this customer obsession, Parikh attributes it to deficits in vision, strategy, and organizational culture. Understanding customer requests requires judgment and intuition, recognizing that users sometimes ask for one thing while actually needing something entirely different.

At Microsoft, Jay instills a similar philosophy across his CoreAI organization, telling his engineers that everyone needs to adopt the mindset of a Forward Deployed Engineer (FDE). While they are not literally deployed on site as FDEs, they must deeply connect their work to how Fortune 500 enterprises actually deploy and interact with the platform. He expects engineers to actively join briefings, ride along in customer calls, review interviews, and read direct user feedback.

Connecting every layer directly to customer reality yields two major benefits: - **Durable sense of purpose:** It galvanizes the team by showing how their code creates real value and emotion for end users, rather than simply moving internal metrics, which aids in attracting and retaining top talent. - **Organizational responsiveness:** In loosely layered companies where only executives connect to customers, the top layer recognizes market shifts while downstream engineering, infrastructure, and operations remain isolated, causing massive coordination delays. Parikh notes that in today's landscape, the penalties in lost market share and customer churn from these slow reaction times have grown devastatingly high.

---

`26:20` Navigating Wild Swings in Public Perception

Brett observes that over his career, Jay has navigated dramatic swings in external sentiment—moving from being praised as the most brilliant team on earth to being dismissed as completely irrelevant, sometimes over the span of three months or three years. Jay explains that navigating these vibe shifts requires emotional modulation:

> "Either way, like you're never as good as people say you are. At least you shouldn't feel that way. And you're probably never as bad as like what people say externally. Right. So to me, you have to modulate some of this."

Rather than tuning out external noise entirely, Jay welcomes criticism and praise alike as a byproduct of working on consequential, meaningful things at massive scale: "If you're going to work on something that is of meaning in the world, and at a very large scale, you're not going to make everybody happy, right?" The critical leadership discipline is separating people's literal words from their underlying intent.

He recalls moments during internal controversies at Facebook when employees voiced strong frustration or disagreement. By sitting down with them and listening deeply, he discovered that harsh words often masked constructive intent from people who genuinely cared and were trying to help the company navigate problems.

Parikh highlights that maintaining and refining a grounding narrative is an unrelenting leadership responsibility. When a company is riding high and appears to do no wrong, leaders must remind teams that good times are often partly driven by luck; headwinds and serious challenges will inevitably hit.

---

`29:07` Leading Through the Steepest Part of the S-Curve

Turning to broader technological epochs—from the dawn of the commercial internet through mobile, cloud, and now AI—Brett asks Jay what distinguishes building technology and teams during the steepest inflection points of the S-curve compared to when a technology asymptotes and becomes predictable.

Looking back at his experiences at Akamai and Facebook, Jay points out that the steep part of the S-curve is defined by hyper-rapid learning, constant adaptation, and unrelenting external churn. Because everyone becomes completely consumed by building and shipping technology under extreme velocity, leaders must make deliberate space to learn and absorb changes as they happen, rather than letting the sheer volume of daily tasks obscure what is unfolding.

`30:00` Scaling the Stack: Facebook’s Shift to Mobile and Infrastructure In-Sourcing

When an organization hits the steepest climb of an S-curve, the sheer momentum ruthlessly exposes every vulnerability in its talent bench. Leaders suddenly discover whether they have the right managers or the specialized technical depth required across each individual layer of the architecture. Reflecting on his arrival at Facebook in 2009, Jay recalls stepping into an engineering organization of just a few hundred people where the overall technology footprint was conceptually straightforward. The entire company operated around the web at Facebook.com. Mobile was an afterthought relegated to a tiny outpost: roughly five people huddled in the corner of a basement hacking on an iOS application that barely anyone touched. The real mobile shockwave did not strike until the run-up to the IPO and the years immediately following—spanning roughly 2011 through 2014—forcing the engineering organization to reinvent itself under immense pressure.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Facebook Technical Stack Evolution accDescr: The progression from off-the-shelf software to fully insourced vertical infrastructure.

subgraph Early["Early Facebook (2009)"] A["All Web Architecture<br/>(Facebook.com)"] B["5 Engineers in Basement<br/>(Early iOS App)"] C["Off-the-Shelf Commercial<br/>Servers & Data Centers"] end

subgraph Transition["Scaling Pressure (2011-2014)"] D["Massive User Scale<br/>(Hundreds of Millions)"] E["Mobile Inflection Point<br/>(IPO Era Pivot)"] F["Commercial Price-Performance<br/>Limits Reached"] end

subgraph Insourced["Vertical Integration"] G["Custom Data Center Design"] H["Bespoke Server Hardware"] I["Global Subsea Fiber Cables"] end

Early --> Transition Transition --> Insourced ```

At that scale, commercial off-the-shelf infrastructure could no longer satisfy Facebook's aggressive price-performance and capacity targets. Instead of reacting when systems broke, leadership had to map out multi-year talent acquisition plans to systematically take ownership of every layer of the underlying stack. Facebook evolved from renting colocation space and buying standard rack servers to designing its own data centers, inventing custom server hardware, and laying intercontinental subsea cables. Jay notes that such massive technological pivots cannot be executed on the fly; they require anticipating gaps years in advance and recruiting specialists from radically different corporate backgrounds and engineering cultures. As Jay explains:

> “In terms of like, we need to become experts in this layer of the stack, where we need to build this part of the technology in such a way to give us this scale or this price performance or this security or whatever it might be.”

---

`33:58` Onboarding with "Go Slow to Go Fast" and Meeting Customers Where They Live

Integrating senior talent from outside cultures is notoriously fraught with danger, and Jay warns against the common executive blunder of instantly burdening new hires with massive scope. Companies routinely invest immense effort and capital to recruit top-tier leaders, only to drop them into a division of hundreds of engineers on their very first day, triggering immediate organizational rejection. To counter this, Jay adheres strictly to a guiding philosophy: go slow to go fast. Both when he joined Facebook and when he later stepped into Microsoft, he spent his opening one to two months operating essentially as an individual contributor. That buffer allowed him to embed within the teams, learn the institutional landscape, listen directly to engineers, and understand the company's authentic strengths before architecting CoreAI.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Customer Horizon Framework accDescr: Segregation of customer archetypes across technology inflection curves.

subgraph CustPast["Living in the Past"] P1["Legacy Systems"] P2["Need Guidance into Present"] end

subgraph EngTeam["Engineering Organization"] E1["Differentiated Engagement"] E2["Value Beyond Dollar Spend"] end

subgraph CustFut["Living in the Future"] F1["Pioneering Edge Tech"] F2["Co-Innovation Partners"] end

CustPast -->|"Help Modernize"| EngTeam EngTeam -->|"Move Fast & Co-Build"| CustFut ```

That same patience and calibration must extend to understanding customers during steep platform inflections. While tech organizations often pay lip service to being customer-obsessed, Jay points out that many engineering teams fail to recognize that customer maturity falls along a wide spectrum that cannot simply be measured by annual contract value. Some customers are functionally stuck in the past and depend on the vendor merely to drag them into the present day, whereas pioneering customers already live in the future and require a completely different, high-velocity co-development posture to help push the state of the art forward. Jay emphasizes that organizational endurance depends directly on mastering these deliberate transitions:

> “But onboarding, I think, is a really big part of how you build a durable organization over time.”

- **The Executive Onboarding Trap:** Handing a new leader hundreds of direct and indirect reports on day one frequently causes severe "organ rejection" within the existing engineering culture. - **The IC Immersion Period:** Spending 30 to 60 days without managerial reports gives senior leaders the freedom to diagnose architecture and culture authentically before making structural changes. - **Customer Maturity Segmentation:** Valuing accounts strictly by dollar volume blinds teams to the true technological split between legacy clients needing modernization and forward-leaning clients accelerating platform capabilities.

---

`35:00` Cultivating an IC-Led Culture: Manager-Free "Brain Trusts"

To maintain velocity through aggressive technology cycles, Jay believes organizations must counteract the gravitational pull of managerial bureaucracy by deliberately elevating individual contributors. While management provides essential scaffolding—handling cross-team dependencies, personnel development, and performance reviews—it is the frontline ICs who possess the deepest comprehension of emerging platform inflections like mobile or AI. Over-indexing on hierarchical, top-down directives invariably stalls development because technical decision-making slows to the pace of managerial consensus. High-performing engineering cultures intentionally protect senior ICs, hold them directly accountable for technical vision, and treat engineering and management as parallel career tracks of equal status rather than treating management as the sole path to promotion.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Management vs Brain Trust Organizational Model accDescr: Comparison of administrative management functions versus technical brain trust dynamics.

subgraph Administrative["Managerial Scaffolding"] M1["Cross-Team Dependencies"] M2["People & Career Development"] M3["Performance Management"] end

subgraph Technical["IC Brain Trusts (Zero Managers)"] B1["6 to 8 Senior & Mid-Level ICs"] B2["Deep Technical Stack Debate"] B3["Customer & Inflection Forecasting"] end

Administrative -.-|"Parallel Peer Tracks"| Technical ```

At Microsoft, Jay puts this conviction into practice across the CoreAI division by operating specialized forums known as brain trusts. Each brain trust focuses on a distinct slice of the technology stack and consists of six to eight senior and mid-level individual contributors—with zero managers permitted in the room. This boundary creates an uninhibited space where technical leaders can argue aggressively, test hypotheses, and dissect shifts in technology and customer behavior without diplomatic posturing. By isolating technical debate from administrative hierarchy, the organization stays tethered to ground truth. As Jay explains:

> “And not have this like culture where they defer or they report into managers because everything just gets slow at that point, right?”

---

`37:41` The Inversion of Software Development and the Disappearing Multi-Year Bet

Addressing the modern artificial intelligence wave, Jay challenges the conventional wisdom that current shifts simply mirror historical platform cycles like the shift to client-server, the web, or mobile. In this era, foundational software development assumptions have been turned inside out: writing code is no longer the bottleneck or the long pole in the tent. Code has transitioned from being an explicit human input to an automated computational output, causing the half-life of traditional software development and product development lifecycles to collapse dramatically. However, this creates a stark operational friction point: while technical code generation has accelerated toward zero latency, the downstream business machinery—sales enablement, marketing campaigns, pricing, packaging, and partner channel distribution—still operates at human speed.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The AI Development Mismatch accDescr: The velocity mismatch between automated AI code generation and human downstream operations.

subgraph HighVelocity["Near-Zero Latency (AI-First)"] C1["Code as an Output"] C2["Compressed Feature Lifecycles"] end

subgraph Bottleneck["Human Latency Gate"] H1["Pricing & Packaging"] H2["Sales Enablement & Marketing"] H3["Partner Ecosystems"] end

HighVelocity -->|"Rapid Production"| Bottleneck Bottleneck -->|"Execution Lag"| R1["Customer Adoption & Revenue"] ```

This structural compression fundamentally reshapes how leaders formulate technical vision and evaluate risk. While physical infrastructure—the "atoms" layer of data centers, power, and specialized hardware—still demands multi-year planning horizons, committing to multi-year software roadmaps has become an obsolete practice. With cutting-edge developer tooling, projects that previously took an entire engineering team a full calendar year to write can now be realized in fractions of that time, making lengthy roadmap commitments counterproductive. Jay emphasizes the radical nature of this transformation:

> “Because we're not typing code and writing code is not the long pole in the tent anymore. Code is an output now. It's not an input.”

- **The Output Shift:** AI inverts the software paradigm; programming is no longer the primary human input that gates product delivery. - **The Human Bottleneck:** Rapidly generating functional software creates an organizational mismatch if sales, marketing, and channel partners cannot digest and monetize features at the same pace. - **Shrinking Time Horizons:** With code creation compressed by modern tooling, multi-year roadmaps in the software layer are obsolete, even while physical atoms-level infrastructure continues to require long-range planning.

`40:00` Compressing Timelines and Defining What Makes a Big Bet

With modern prototyping capabilities and rapid iteration cycles, long-running research efforts can be compressed dramatically. Instead of locking up a team of engineers on a twelve-month bet just to observe two or three intermediate milestones, teams can now deliver durable prototypes under load within two months, setting check-ins every two to three weeks or on a monthly cadence. Jay points out that shrinking these cycles allows an organization to expand its shots on goal without increasing head count: rather than committing a single team to one high-stakes bet over a whole year, leadership can launch four or five distinct bets across that same span.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Big Bet Architecture accDescr: Diagram contrasting isolated local optimization with cross-functional big bets targeting global maxima.

subgraph AntiPattern["Fragmented Local Maxima"] T1["Team 1: Local Optimization"] T2["Team 2: Local Optimization"] T3["Team 3: Local Optimization"] end

subgraph BigBet["Cross-Functional Big Bet"] CF["Unified Initiative (3-5 Teams)"] Discontinuous["Discontinuous Step-Function Impact"] GlobalMax["New Global Maxima"] CF --> Discontinuous --> GlobalMax end ```

For Jay, a genuine big bet cannot be defined by modest ten, twenty, or thirty percent efficiency gains. It must deliver discontinuous, step-function impact across the enterprise. At Facebook, he curated and maintained an active portfolio of these multi-year initiatives, evaluating them against strict structural criteria:

- **Discontinuous impact:** The initiative must produce an order-of-magnitude step change rather than an incremental linear improvement. - **Cross-functional footprint:** A big bet should span three to five distinct teams. When isolated groups build in a silo, they inevitably optimize for their own local maxima while closing off the broader organization's global maximum. - **Continuous environmental sensing:** Teams must never disappear into a three-year vacuum. The burden rests on them to maintain context with internal shifts and external market dynamics, adjusting and pivoting whenever the landscape zigs while they zag. - **Acceptance of failure and derivative value:** Jay does not expect every initiative to succeed. A portfolio of five big bets where two take off, one ends up mediocre, and two fail represents a strong batting average. Even failed efforts generate valuable architectural derivatives, code, and insights that accrue to other parts of the business.

Safeguarding these ambitious initiatives serves as a critical defense against organizational decay. As companies expand and rack up commercial wins, an insidious reversion to the mean sets in. Jay emphasizes how quickly that slide occurs: “Because you have to fight, as we talked about earlier, as the organization gets bigger, you get more successful. This reversion to the mean happens, right? And you get complacent, that complacency breeds mediocrity, and then people don't want to take risks, and we know the rest.”

---

`44:10` Parallel Bets and Learning Velocity

Inside Facebook, these discontinuous bets reshaped every layer of the technology stack. When the company initially chose to design its own server hardware, it started small with a single custom server design before taking an aggressive leap to overhaul the full lineup of storage, database, and networking SKUs in rapid succession. At the storage layer, teams pursued massive architectural changes aimed at delivering a 10x improvement in cost, performance, and scaling limits. Higher up the stack, major product transformations—such as completely rethinking video delivery and messaging infrastructure—demanded sweeping, simultaneous modifications across the entire platform.

When engineering teams reached an impasse between two competing technical architectures, Jay frequently broke the deadlock by running both paths in parallel instead of wasting time debating forecasts:

- **Bypassing endless debate:** When faced with two viable paths with roughly equal probabilities of success, teams often burn months in committee trying to forecast an uncertain outcome. - **Preserving option value:** Launching both architectures simultaneously preserves flexibility and generates real-world empirical data on performance within 30 to 60 days. - **Halving time to insight:** Running parallel bets for two months reveals the winning strategy far faster than pursuing a single path for two months, failing, and then spending another two months trying the alternative.

Jay summarizes his operational bias toward parallel execution: “And back to this learning point, it's like if I can do both and learn faster versus do one, fail at it, and then do something else after that, then that takes me four months to figure that out versus doing two in parallel. And I learn in two months what I would have done in four. That is like a trade I'll make all day long.”

---

`47:35` Why Vertical Integration Wins at Scale

While classical economic doctrine favors specialization and buying modular components from third-party vendors who amortize R&D across thousands of customers, elite technology companies almost always vertically integrate as they scale. At Facebook, this dynamic drove the transition away from off-the-shelf components toward fully custom hardware, networking equipment, and purpose-built data centers. Jay explains that this decision is primarily governed by extreme scale and operational efficiency across the infrastructure stack.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Vertical Integration Trade-Off accDescr: Comparison of third-party vendor limitations versus in-house vertical integration at extreme scale.

subgraph VendorRoute["Third-Party Vendor Path"] V1["Vendor Core Stack"] --> V2["Built for Average Customer"] V2 --> V3["Margin Markup & Unaligned QA Yield"] end

subgraph VerticalRoute["Vertically Integrated Path"] VI1["In-House Architecture"] --> VI2["Engineered for N of 1 Workloads"] VI2 --> VI3["Maximum Efficiency & Destiny Control"] end ```

Early in a startup's lifecycle, building proprietary data centers or custom silicon is impossible due to capital and staffing constraints. As an organization scales into an industry giant, however, the math shifts:

- **Margin recapture and stack-wide efficiency:** Outsourcing core infrastructure layers leaves financial margin on the table at every tier of the vendor ecosystem. Vertically integrating allows the organization to optimize end-to-end performance and eliminate compounding third-party markups. - **Escaping average-customer design compromises:** Standard vendors inevitably design, QA, and regression-test their products to satisfy the median customer profile, not an organization operating at unprecedented scale. - **Eliminating edge-case friction:** When operating as an *N-of-1* enterprise, the company consistently hits the bleeding edge of a vendor's operational capabilities, leaving the team stranded on an unfavorable portion of the vendor's yield curve and slowing development velocity.

Jay makes the ultimate case for controlling the underlying stack: “Back to there's a speed, there's a control your own destiny argument that I always felt. Because when you take some layer of your kind of core stack and it's like outsourced to this vendor and vendor, you know, could be great. But when I was at these companies that were kind of N of 1 in terms of what they were doing scale-wise, they weren't making a product for us. They were making a product for the normal customer.”

`50:00` The Power of Vertical Integration: Speed, Control, and Product Agility

Jay Parikh details the operational payoff of full-stack vertical integration at Facebook, showing how controlling every component avoided the friction of vendor dependency. In a fragmented vendor architecture, teams constantly wait on third parties to implement updates or fix bugs, which grinds momentum to a halt. In contrast, when Facebook decided to launch fundamentally new product experiences—such as live video or rich messaging features—the rollout demanded sweeping alterations across every tier of the technical infrastructure: client code on mobile devices, caching logic across the edge network, application server compute, and backend storage architectures.

Because Facebook owned and engineered its entire stack in-house, these massive cross-layer overhauls could be coordinated and deployed to hundreds of millions or billions of users in a matter of weeks rather than years. Cross-functional alignment happened organically because every person touching the stack worked directly for the company. Parikh distills the core rationale for vertical integration into three foundational pillars: driving down unit costs, maintaining total control over the company's technical destiny, and sustaining blinding execution speed.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Full-Stack Vertical Integration for Rapid Feature Delivery accDescr: Diagram illustrating how Facebook's vertically integrated stack enabled rapid cross-layer updates for experiences like live video.

subgraph ClientAndEdge["Edge & Client Layer"] A["Mobile Client"] B["Edge Network & Caching"] end

subgraph CoreInfra["Compute & Storage Layer"] C["Application Servers"] D["Custom Backend Storage"] end

A <--> B B <--> C C <--> D

subgraph Outcomes["Strategic Benefits"] E["Radical Delivery Speed<br/>(2-8 weeks to billions)"] F["Dramatic CapEx & Unit Cost Reductions"] G["Total Control Over Product Destiny"] end

ClientAndEdge -.-> Outcomes CoreInfra -.-> Outcomes ```

- Parikh summarizes the organizational agility of vertical integration: “And everybody that built that was employees, engineers on our team. So you could just say... This is what we're doing, you know, two weeks, three weeks, one month, two months, whatever. And the whole thing is done.” - Vertical integration provided Facebook with three distinct advantages: structural cost efficiency, autonomy without reliance on third-party roadmaps, and unmatched product velocity.

---

`51:46` How the Startup CEO Experience Reshaped Jay's Leadership

Reflecting on his tenure as CEO of Lacework before joining Microsoft as Executive Vice President of CoreAI, Parikh explains how running a standalone venture fundamentally expanded his executive vocabulary and operational intuition. Stepping outside the purely engineering realm forced him to build and master the mechanics of go-to-market (GTM) execution, sales compensation, enterprise sales metrics, and pipeline machinery. Rather than viewing sales as an abstract downstream function, he experienced firsthand the rigor required to operate a high-performing go-to-market engine.

This CEO perspective became particularly acute as Lacework executed a strategic pivot from a down-market offering to an enterprise-grade platform targeting the Global 2000. That evolution touched every corner of the business: overhauling product architecture, reconstructing pricing and packaging, refining the sales pitch, hiring a different profile of account executives, reimagining enterprise support, and cultivating an ecosystem of channel partners. Having navigated these systemic transitions as chief executive, Parikh returned to enterprise leadership at Microsoft with an intuitive, firsthand empathy for GTM challenges.

- Parikh reflects on the depth of learning gained from holding the top seat: “Now I understand that stuff at a much more intuitive level, right? It's not foreign to me. So that was like a deeper appreciation being a CEO where you had to put all of that together, understanding the go-to-market.” - Moving upmarket required transforming seven core systems in lockstep: the core product capabilities, pricing and packaging models, enterprise pitch narratives, sales organization composition, ongoing support delivery, partner networks, and customer retention mechanisms.

---

`53:40` Hunting for Steep S-Curves and the Crucible of Early Akamai

When Brett asks Parikh to pinpoint the single most transformative growth phase of his multi-decade career, Parikh points to his first four to five years at Akamai Technologies. Parikh frames his entire career philosophy around an intentional hunger for difficult, uncomfortable problems, describing himself as almost addicted to seeking out hardship. He visualizes professional development strictly through the lens of S-curves: his objective is always to spend the maximum amount of time on the steepest part of the learning curve, deliberately moving to new challenges the moment that trajectory begins to bend or flatten out.

Parikh arrived at Akamai in 1999 when the startup had only a few dozen employees. Long before the term “unicorn” entered Silicon Valley parlance, Akamai generated an electric buzz as a generational tech phenomenon. The company was packed with brilliant academic PhDs who had cracked the code on novel, complex algorithms capable of routing and scaling the massive traffic explosion hitting the early internet. Despite having no formal background in enterprise sales engineering, Parikh joined as an individual contributor in sales because the company urgently needed someone who could translate deep computer science algorithms into tangible business value for customers, later cycling through business development, product management, and product marketing before returning to engineering leadership.

- Parikh articulates his framework for career progression: “So for me, it's like maximizing my professional time and being on that steep part of the S-curve is what I always think about, right? And when I feel like it's starting to curve or arc, bend over, like flattened, then I'm always trying to find the next thing, right?” - Parikh describes the mythos surrounding Akamai's early algorithmic culture: “And there was this buzz, there was this meme, there was this energy about this company that had all of these PhDs cracking this code with these sophisticated algorithms to scale massive traffic explosion on the internet.”

---

`55:38` Leading Through Layoffs, the Dot-Com Crash, and the Tragedy of 9/11

Akamai’s public debut was an extraordinary financial event—marking the fourth-largest tech IPO in history at that time—fueled by the dizzying heights of the dot-com boom. But when the bubble burst, the company was plunged into an existential crisis. Parikh found himself operating as a first-time line manager navigating traumatic corporate realities for which traditional education offers no preparation. He had to lead his team through successive, grinding rounds of layoffs, facing the emotional toll of having close friends and respected colleagues sitting beside him one day and laid off the next.

The crisis reached its darkest moment on September 11, 2001, when Akamai co-founder Danny Lewin was murdered aboard American Airlines Flight 11. Lewin had been the vibrant soul and driving force of the entire organization; losing him dealt an unexplainable psychological blow to the company's early team. Parikh and the management team had to lead through profound grief while operating without a roadmap, holding team meetings hour by hour, maintaining radical transparency, and supporting shattered employees. Throughout this crucible, Parikh closely observed and learned from senior executives—CEO George Conrades, Paul Sagan, and Tom Leighton—discovering how authentic leaders navigate compounding crises, make agonizing trade-offs, and ensure an indispensable infrastructure company survives.

- Parikh highlights the sudden shock of going from industry darling to fighting for survival: “And not having been through that before, there's just countless learnings every day in terms of the one-on-one interactions I'm having, the team meetings. I'm watching, you know, the other execs lead, you know, the CEO and George and Paul and Tom lead through this and learning and learning, like observing them, right, because here I am as a first-time manager learning from them.” - Describing the devastating void left by co-founder Danny Lewin's death on 9/11, Parikh notes: “And, you know, Danny was a force of nature for us as like people that were early in the company and got to work with him closely, losing him was sort of unexplainable in terms of what it did to shift the way we all thought about the mission of the company, what we had to go do.”

---

`59:22` Pivoting to the Enterprise and the Survival Mindset of Efficiency

Following the dot-com crash, Akamai faced an immediate commercial crisis: the dot-com startups that made up its customer base were going bankrupt en masse. Parikh describes the sudden, harsh realization that Akamai had virtually no foundation for surviving in a normalized corporate economy. The company possessed no enterprise-grade product features, no enterprise sales force, no pricing or packaging tailored to traditional corporations, no systems integration partners, and no enterprise support organization capable of serving the Global 2000.

The company had to pull off a desperate, high-velocity transformation over a two- to three-year span while hemorrhaging cash. With its burn rate threatening solvency, the leadership team had to bring its P&L into balance through severe operational efficiency. Parikh explains that this intense focus on efficiency often came at the direct expense of pure product innovation, but it was the only path to survival. Through sheer hustle, intense teamwork, and cultural evolution, Akamai rebuilt its business model from scratch, turning itself into the foundational enterprise infrastructure company it remains today.

| Operational Dimension | Pre-Crash Akamai (Dot-Com Bubble) | Post-Crash Turnaround (Enterprise Pivot) | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Customer Base** | High-flying dot-com startups | Global 2000 multinational enterprises | | **GTM & Sales Motion** | Inbound-driven, hype-fueled selling | Structured, consultative enterprise sales force | | **Pricing & Packaging** | Ad-hoc, high-valuation boom pricing | Rigorous enterprise tiering and SLA-backed contracts | | **Support Infrastructure**| Informal, startup-tier response | 24/7/365 mission-critical enterprise support | | **Financial Philosophy** | High cash burn chasing raw top-line growth | Extreme operational efficiency and P&L discipline |

- Parikh recalls the stark vulnerability the company confronted: “And like, wait, you don't have a product, you don't have a sales team, you don't have pricing and packaging, you don't have partner ecosystem, you don't have solutions. You don't have support that can service the Global 2000. And we had to hustle in figuring that out.” - He emphasizes the painful operational trade-offs forced by survival: “So we had to go build product and grow the top line, but we also had to, you know, do a ton of efficiency work. And so, you know, that efficiency work came at potentially at the expense of innovation, but that was survival to us.”

---

`01:01:26` Overruling Zuckerberg: Inceptionizing Efficiency at Facebook

The psychological scars and operational wisdom Parikh acquired during the Akamai near-death experience became the foundation of his technical leadership when he joined Facebook. At the time, Facebook was experiencing explosive top-line growth and had abundant cash reserves. Parikh recounts a pivotal early confrontation with CEO Mark Zuckerberg, who argued that because the company was flush with cash, engineering should direct 100% of its resources toward building consumer-facing product features while ignoring infrastructure efficiency.

Parikh explicitly rejected Zuckerberg's approach. Having survived the dot-com bust, Parikh knew that reckless infrastructure spending is catastrophic when business conditions shift, and attempting to retrofit discipline into a bloated engineering culture later is nearly impossible. Parikh told Zuckerberg: “Cool, but I'm going to work on efficiency because I'm not going to go through that journey that we all went through at Akamai, and so we're going to be efficient.”

Parikh embedded an uncompromising culture of data-driven frugality, custom infrastructure engineering, and CapEx optimization from the earliest days. This deliberate focus led directly to Facebook's radical vertical integration—including custom servers, data center designs, and networking hardware. By systematically squeezing waste out of the compute and storage footprint early on, Parikh preserved billions of dollars in free cash flow, giving Facebook immense capital allocation optionality and strategic resilience for decades to come.

- Parikh recounts the debate with Zuckerberg: “I remember talking to Mark and Mark was like, we have money, so we should just build features and we should put all the engineers working on product. And I said, cool, but I'm going to work on efficiency because I'm not going to go through that journey that we all went through at Akamai, and so we're going to be efficient.” - Parikh explains the strategic dividend of establishing engineering discipline early: “Because we weren't wasteful from the early, early days. We didn't have to fix it later. We inceptionized that culture early, because I was not going to have the nightmare that we lived through as we grew up as leaders at Akamai.”

## Notable quotes > `37:41` Code is an output now. It's not an input. — Jay Parikh

## Mentioned Akamai, Akamai Technologies, American Airlines Flight 11, AWS, Brett Berson, CoreAI, Danny Lewin, Facebook, Facebook.com, First Round, First Round Capital, Fortinet, George Conrades, Global 2000, iOS, Jay Parikh, Lacework, Mark Zuckerberg, Microsoft, Paul Sagan, Tom Leighton

## Video description In the latest episode of Executive Function, Brett sits down with Jay Parikh, Executive Vice President of CoreAI at Microsoft. Before joining Microsoft, Jay spent over a decade as Facebook's global head of engineering, scaling the company from a few hundred engineers to billions of users, then ran the cybersecurity company Lacework as CEO through its acquisition by Fortinet. In this conversation, he breaks down the five ingredients of great engineering leadership, discusses why he'd rather run two competing bets in parallel than forecast a winner, and explains why company culture remains more important than ever for teams to get right.

In today's episode, we discuss:

The five ingredients that separate excellent engineering leadership from the rest

How to protect your team from large shifts in public perception

The mindset shift organizations need to maintain speed at scale

How every layer of the organization needs to stay connected to the customer

Why Jay runs "brain trusts" of senior ICs with zero managers in the room

References

Akamai: https://www.akamai.com/

AWS: https://aws.amazon.com/

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/

George Conrades: https://www.linkedin.com/in/georgeconrades/

Mark Zuckerberg: https://x.com/finkd

Microsoft: https://www.microsoft.com/

Paul Sagan: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-sagan-59654a1/

Tom Leighton: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tleighton/

Where to find Jay

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jayparikh/

Twitter/X: https://x.com/jayparikh

Where to find Brett

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/brett-berson-9986094/

Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/brettberson

Where to find First Round Capital

Website: https://firstround.com/

First Round Review: https://review.firstround.com/

Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/firstround

YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@FirstRoundCapital

This podcast on all platforms: https://review.firstround.com/podcast

Timestamps

00:00 Introduction

00:36 How leadership changes through exponential growth

02:21 The five ingredients that define excellent engineering leadership

07:51 What actually drives culture at a company as it scales

12:05 The physics behind why everything slows down at scale

18:57 The fastest team of Jay's career, and why size mattered

22:44 Why every team should think like an FDE

26:20 Managing a team through wild swings in public perception

29:07 What's different about leading through the steepest S-curve moments

33:58 Why onboarding well means going slow to go fast

37:41 Is AI actually new, or is history just repeating?

41:35 What actually counts as a "big bet" worth taking

45:01 The concrete big bets that reshaped Facebook's entire technology stack

47:35 Why vertical integration keeps being the right call as companies scale

51:46 How being a startup CEO reshaped Jay as a leader

1:01:26 Why Jay overruled Zuckerberg's instinct to skip efficiency

[Source](https://traffic.megaphone.fm/FRCH6497933461.mp3)

中文简报

最快的学习方法是同时推进两项竞争性押注 | Jay Parikh(微软 CoreAI 执行副总裁) 结合在 Akamai、Facebook、Lacework 和微软的领导任职经历,Jay Parikh 详细阐述了如何在指数级增长中保持执行速度与文化凝聚力。他概述了工程领导力的五个核心要素,强调需要积极对抗运维琐事,用直接责任人(DRI)主导的“工作图谱”取代传统组织架构图,并赋能无需管理者介入的独立贡献者(IC)智囊团。Parikh 还论证了为何开展并行的竞争性技术押注能比无休止的预测更快化解僵局,并解释了垂直整合如何保持组织的敏捷性。最后,他回顾了在 Akamai 经历互联网泡沫破裂后重组期间磨砺出的危机领导力,正是这段经历促使他从第一天起就在 Facebook 灌输严格的运维与基础设施效率意识。 工程管理者应通过资助并行的竞争性押注来化解架构僵局,而非争论预测数据,从而在 30 到 60 天内得出基于实证的性能基准。 (44:10) 随着规模扩大,组织必须用由直接责任人(DRI)领导、并实行强制性 24 小时上报机制的小型工作分队所组成的运维“工作图谱”,来取代传统的组织架构图。 (20:00) 生成式 AI 正在将代码从人工输入转变为自动化计算输出,这与仍处于人类运作速度的市场拓展职能之间产生了关键的运维错配。 (37:41) 涵盖硬件、数据中心和网络光缆的全栈垂直整合,可保护扩张中的科技公司免受目标不一致的第三方供应商路线图及平庸良品率曲线的影响。 (47:35)

Reading summary

Jay Parikh, EVP of CoreAI at Microsoft and former engineering leader at Facebook and Akamai, argues that engineering velocity depends on treating the enterprise as a unified learning system rather than isolated functional silos. Sustaining execution speed at scale requires combating operational toil, organizing around small autonomous squads, running parallel technical bets, and pursuing vertical integration. Combatting Scale Drag and Learned Helplessness (5:00) As organizations expand, the distance and time required to complete a single cycle of learning naturally widen. Parikh argues that operational drag compounds over time, often driven by an underlying culture of learned helplessness where teams reflexively cite headcount shortages or compliance roadblocks as insurmountable friction. He emphasizes that culture is not perks or slogans, but the prescriptive day-to-day behaviors, decision-making processes, and feedback mechanisms that set an organization's learning velocity. To counter calcification, leadership must continuously dismantle bloated processes. When meetings swell from eight to forty people, Parikh resets them into small working groups with dedicated Directly Responsible Individuals (DRIs). Rather than relying on executive mandates to force early delivery dates, leaders must identify the root causes of friction. At Microsoft's CoreAI group, this involved tracking telemetry on 'focus time' and surveying qualitative developer friction to empirically uncover and eliminate toil. The Work Chart and Rapid Escalation (20:00) Parikh rejects relying on traditional organizational hierarchies for execution, arguing that large teams inherently fail to move fast. Instead, he advocates structuring work around tightly knit squads guided by the 'work chart' rather than the formal org chart. Each pod is led by an empowered DRI with deep context and agency, held accountable through clear operational metrics rather than bureaucratic oversight. To prevent execution from stalling, Parikh removes the stigma surrounding escalations. If an initiative is blocked for more than 24 hours, teams are instructed to bypass intermediate management layers and elevate the issue directly to leadership for immediate resolution. Additionally, Parikh advocates isolating technical strategy from administrative hierarchy through forums like Microsoft CoreAI's manager-free 'brain trusts'—groups of six to eight individual contributors who debate architecture and market shifts without managerial diplomacy. Parallel Bets and Shrinking Software Horizons (40:00) In the modern AI era, writing code has shifted from an input to an automated output, rendering multi-year software roadmaps obsolete while infrastructure planning remains long-range. Rather than committing an engineering team to a single high-stakes bet over twelve months, modern prototyping allows teams to deliver working prototypes under load within two months, opening up more frequent shots on goal without increasing headcount. When teams hit an architectural impasse, Parikh resolves deadlocks by running two competing bets in parallel rather than debating forecasts. While conventional planning assumes parallel execution is wasteful, Parikh notes that running two paths for two months uncovers the winning approach in half the time required by a sequential four-month cycle of trying one, failing, and pivoting. Meaningful bets must target discontinuous step-function improvements across multiple teams rather than isolated, incremental gains. Vertical Integration and Early Operational Discipline (47:35) While standard business theory favors buying off-the-shelf components, Parikh contends that elite tech companies operating at unique scale must vertically integrate. At Facebook, relying on commercial hardware suppliers forced the company to accept average-customer compromises and vendor margins. By designing bespoke servers, custom data centers, and global networking, Facebook gained unit cost efficiencies and the agility to roll out major cross-layer features like live video across the entire stack in weeks rather than years. This operational stance stemmed from Parikh's earlier experience surviving the dot-com crash at Akamai, where the loss of startup clients forced a painful pivot to enterprise-grade rigor and severe P&L discipline. When Mark Zuckerberg initially suggested that cash-rich Facebook focus entirely on product features rather than infrastructure efficiency, Parikh pushed back to embed frugality early. Designing custom infrastructure from the outset preserved billions in capital and avoided the systemic crisis of retrofitting discipline into an undisciplined culture later. While AI tooling compresses software creation toward zero latency, downstream business functions such as enterprise pricing, marketing, and sales channels continue to operate at human speed. Bridging this structural gap requires engineering leaders to instill forward-deployed customer empathy across all technical layers, ensuring that infrastructure efficiency matches external market adoption.

精炼阅读摘要

微软CoreAI执行副总裁Jay Parikh指出,工程领导力的本质并非孤立的人员管理或技术战略,而是构建一个对抗组织规模膨胀阻力的高速学习系统;在面对不确定的技术路径时,同时并行两项竞争性押注能够以最高速度获取经验认知并实现全局最优突破。 工程领导力的五项要素与习得性无助 (2:21) Jay Parikh认为工程领导力的卓越表现由五大互为支撑的支柱构成:搭建结构合理的高绩效团队(精准平衡资深IC、初级员工、领域专家与通才的比例)、在适当抽象层级设定战略愿景、建立不间断的执行节奏、主动消除繁重杂务与运营阻力,以及构建目标明确的文化。企业在初创期侧重于团队与战略,而在成熟期则耗费巨大精力对抗运营损耗。Parikh指出,繁重杂务(toil)只是表象,其根源往往是管理层与团队中蔓延的“习得性无助”——例如将合规阻碍或发布摩擦视为不可改变的自然法则,或者盲目认为唯有增加人手才能解决问题。真正的文化绝非免费零食或福利,而是由沟通方式、决策机制、高压下奖励的行为以及组织内部“学习循环”的速度来严格界定。 对抗规模阻力与“工作图谱”运作模型 (10:00) 随着公司规模扩大、人员增加,组织学习的周长不断拉长,每一次认知的旋转周期也会大幅变缓。为打破这种物理层面的减速定律,Parikh主张打破传统的汇报层级(Org Chart),全面推行基于业务阵地的“工作图谱”(Work Chart)。该模式主张将庞大团队拆分为高度聚焦、高人才密度的敏捷小团队或Pod,并由具备完整业务上下文与自主权的直接责任人(DRI)领导。同时,组织必须消除向上升级(Escalation)的污名化标签:Parikh在团队中推行24小时阻塞直报原则,任何团队若卡顿超过24小时即可直接找最高负责人决策,严禁问题在中间管理层停滞数周。此外,他在微软CoreAI推行无管理者参与的“智囊团”(Brain Trust),由6至8名中高级IC直接辩论技术架构与趋势,以防决策被管理层共识稀释。 软件开发范式倒置与并行押注策略 (37:41) 在现代AI浪潮下,底层软件开发的假设发生了根本性倒置:代码不再是需要人类逐行输入的稀缺瓶颈,而变成了计算生成的自动化输出,这导致传统长周期的软件开发路线图直接失效。针对重大技术创新,Parikh主张通过原型快速验证将为期一年的赌注压缩至两个月内,并在该周期内同时开启4至5项跨越3到5个团队的非连续性“大押注”(Big Bet)。当团队在两条看似势均力敌的技术架构间陷入无休止的争论时,Parikh往往选择让两条技术路径并行开发30至60天。尽管并行开发表面上消耗双倍资源,但它能在两个月内提供真实运行数据并得出结论,避免了单线尝试失败后再换方向耗费四个月的滞后,从而将获取认知的时间减半并保留期权价值。 极端规模下的全栈垂直整合优势 (47:35) 尽管传统经济学推崇采购第三方通用组件以摊销研发成本,但当科技平台发展到极端规模(N-of-1)时,垂直整合便成为必然选择。以Facebook为例,从最初几百人仅维护网页端和几名工程师编写iOS应用,逐步演进为自主设计定制服务器硬件、数据中心乃至铺设洲际海底光缆。Parikh解释道,第三方供应商的产品必然是为“平庸的中间客户”设计与质检,无法承载前沿工作负载,导致核心系统持续受制于外部路线图并支付层层利润溢价。通过将移动端、边缘缓存、应用计算与后端存储全部自研闭环,Facebook不仅大幅压低了单位资本支出,还能在短短两到四周内将直播视频等全新复杂体验推向数十亿用户,实现极高的产品敏捷度与自主命运掌控力。 从Akamai危机到逆向植入效率文化 (53:40) Parikh在职业生涯早期的关键转折点源于1999年加入Akamai。在经历互联网泡沫破裂、客户大面积倒闭、接连裁员以及“9·11”事件中联合创始人Danny Lewin遇难的沉重打击后,Akamai不得不从零构建面向Global 2000的企业级销售、定价、SLA支持与解决方案体系,在现金流枯竭边缘依靠极度苛刻的运营效率扭亏为盈。这段在生存线上挣扎的创伤性经历,促使Parikh后来在加入现金充裕、正处于高增长期的Facebook时,明确拒绝了Mark Zuckerberg将100%工程资源投入消费级产品功能的初期主张。Parikh坚持自创立早期就“逆向植入”严格的数据驱动型基础设施效率与资本支出优化,这种前瞻性的工程纪律为Facebook在后续数十年里释放了数百亿美元的自由现金流与极大的战略配置弹性。 Parikh的工程体系核心在于保持组织处于S曲线最陡峭的爬坡阶段,通过小团队、去官僚化的IC智囊团、并行竞争实验以及全栈自主掌控来持续对抗规模惰性。然而,该策略高度依赖极高的人才密度、强力且有担当的DRI以及能够承受并行试错成本的组织资本,在资源受限或容错率极低的初创环境中能否完全复刻仍存挑战。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该内容由 First Round 于 2026 年 8 月 27 日在其播客节目《Executive Function》中发布,由 Brett Berson 主持。节目邀请了微软 CoreAI 执行副总裁、前 Facebook 全球工程负责人及 Lacework 前 CEO Jay Parikh,围绕优秀工程领导力的五大要素、对抗组织规模化减速、并行实验策略以及企业文化塑造等核心话题展开深入探讨。 ## TL;DR Jay Parikh 结合自己在 Akamai、Facebook、Lacework 及微软的实战经历,系统拆解了卓越工程领导力的五大核心支柱,指出管理者必须将人、流程与技术视作统一系统。他阐述了组织规模扩张导致学习变慢的底层逻辑,提出推行小团队“工作架构图”、24 小时卡壳快速升级以及全员具备客户敏锐度的“FDE 心态”来破除官僚主义。在技术战略上,他强调利用“双轨并行对赌”加速认知闭环,并在规模拐点果断推行垂直整合以掌控命运。此外,他回顾了在早期 Akamai 经历泡沫破裂与 9·11 事件的淬炼,解释了为何当年在 Facebook 执意违背扎克伯格的直觉、强推系统能效与成本控制。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈务实、深刻且极具工业一线的厚重感,完全摒弃了泛泛而谈的管理学套话。Brett 的提问层层递进、直击工程落地的摩擦力,而 Jay 的回应则坦诚犀利、充满思辨,经常用充满画面感的内部幕后故事撕开外界对大厂光鲜外表的幻想。对话在冷静拆解工程架构与深情回忆至暗时刻之间切换,既有高管运筹帷幄的理性决断,又带有技术老兵穿越数轮残酷周期后的沉静与定力。 ## Bulletin - `02:21` Jay Parikh 总结了卓越工程领导力的五大核心要素:精确搭建高绩效团队结构、设定适度抽象的战略与北极星指标、推行周/日级别的不可妥协执行节拍、主动踩碎技术苦工(Toil),以及极具定力地塑造组织文化。 - `45:00` 面对高不确定性的技术方案抉择,Jay 提倡通过双轨并行对赌(run two competing bets)替代无休止的预测争论,通过付出短期开发成本将数月的认知周期压缩至几周。 - `37:41` 在 AI 时代,代码编写已从研发的关键瓶颈演变为“产出物(output)”,开发生命周期急剧压缩,但下游的销售、定价和人类流程正成为新的系统性转化瓶颈。 - `59:16` 借鉴早年在 Akamai 亲历泡沫破裂与创始人遇难的危机经验,Jay 在 Facebook 早期顶住扎克伯格全仓投入功能的直觉偏好,强行推行系统能效与底层垂直整合,奠定了数十亿美元的基础设施成本优势与长期自由现金流。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` 工程领导力绝非孤立的管人或管技术,而是一个将人员、流程与系统技术深度联动的全局统一体系。 - `05:00` 组织老化和效率低下的根源是管理层弥漫的“习得性无助”,繁琐流程与技术苦工只是其输出的结果,若不重塑文化激励便无法打破平庸循环。 - `10:00` 组织的规模扩张会物理性地放大“学习闭环”的直径,拖慢单次认知速率,管理者必须动态砍掉过时会议并重设敏捷小队以主动对抗减速。 - `12:05` 微软 CoreAI 团队通过看板公开工程师的“聚焦时间”占比,用定量与定性手段识别系统阻碍,避免单纯依靠行政命令施压推进度。 - `20:00` 大团队无法保持高速推进,组织应当摒弃科层制的“组织架构图(Org Chart)”,转向由高人才密度单一责任人主导的“工作架构图(Work Chart)”,并推行卡壳超 24 小时即升级的求助机制。 - `22:44` 基础设施团队不能远离业务,全员必须秉持“前向部署工程师(FDE)”思维与前端形成命运共同体,深入真实客户场景消除上下游脱节。 - `26:20` 穿越舆论的大起大落要求领导者建立客观锚点,穿透员工或外界尖锐措辞背后的真实意图(intent),在不同周期动态重构组织叙事。 - `30:00` Facebook 经历从单一 Web 端向移动端与全栈自研的演进,印证了在技术 S 曲线陡峭期必须具备预见性的人才储备与底层能力内包规划。 - `33:58` 高端人才整合应遵循“以慢打快(go slow to go fast)”哲学,初期先作为独立贡献者(IC)深入业务,避免空降带大团队引发组织排异反应。 - `35:00` 通过设立严禁任何管理者入场、仅由 6 至 8 位资深 IC 组成的“智囊团(Brain Trusts)”,确保底层技术拐点与关键决策始终由最懂行的一线专家驱动。 - `40:00` 真正的“重大赌注(Big Bets)”追求的是跨职能协同带来的非连续性阶跃影响与全局最优解,而非单点团队 10% 到 30% 的局部渐进式改良。 - `45:00` 当方案成功概率各半时,与其耗费数月进行主观论证,不如并行双轨推进,用可运行代码与真实反馈快速换取认知和保留期权价值。 - `47:35` 超级巨头走向垂直整合并非违反分工逻辑,而是为了消除第三方供应商服务大众客户所带来的性能折损,彻底掌控自身演进命运并释放极致利润率与敏捷度。 - `51:46` 初创企业 CEO 的经历让工程高管深刻理解 GTM 运转体系及向企业级市场迁移的全局重构要求,打通了研发与商业化落地的认知盲区。 - `01:01:26` 在早期资金与业务顺风顺水时坚决推进系统能效与资本开支控制,能为企业在未来的技术周期转换中储备充裕的自由现金流与容错空间。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` 技术领导力不仅是管人:从全系统视角看工程架构 对话由技术演进的历史背景展开。主持人 Brett 指出,过去 30 年间经历了互联网、移动端、云计算直至当前 AI 的数轮 S 曲线周期,技术领导者往往身兼数职,既要掌管团队与组织人脉,又要制定技术战略,而在外界看来光鲜亮丽的成就,内部现实往往截然不同。Jay Parikh 赞同这一点并笑称:“外界总觉得‘噢,你一手搭建了 Facebook’,但相信我,头几年你绝对不会想掀开帘子看里面的惨状”,早期的技术推进完全依赖极其原始的暴力破解(brute force)。 针对“管理人还是管技术”的分工,Jay 提出了一个根本性的认知转向:绝不能把团队管理和技术战略割裂开来。他强调:“我不认为这仅仅关乎人,我把所有这一切视为一个统一的系统(one system)。”许多技术人员、管理者容易误入歧途,正是因为把二者机械切分。回顾自己的职业生涯,Jay 的经验跨越了工程、产品设计、CEO、GTM(去市场销售)甚至业务拓展(Biz Dev): - 在 Akamai 早期,由于公司缺人,他的第一份工作竟然是做技术销售(Technical Sales),奔走前线协助团队签单关闭交易。 - 随后他被调去负责业务拓展以搭建网络基础设施,之后才重返工程与产品领域,先后担任工程师、产品经理、产品营销、总监乃至副总裁。 - 这段杂食性的跨界履历塑造了他的领导哲学:工程的核心使命最终是向终端用户交付价值;尤其在掌舵 Facebook 全球工程团队时,必须从全局“系统级”视角去理解人、流程与技术的联动。 ### `02:21` 优秀工程领导力的五大核心要素 当被问及如何定义卓越的工程领导力时,Jay 将其系统性地拆解为五大关键支柱: ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 卓越工程领导力的五大要素 accDescr: 展示从团队组建、战略设定、执行节奏、消灭技术苦工到构建敏捷文化等五个相互依存的工程领导力要素。 subgraph CorePillars["工程领导力五大核心要素"] direction TB P1["1. 高绩效团队组建<br/>(人员结构配比、专家/通才平衡)"] P2["2. 适度抽象的战略与北极星<br/>(不搞微观千条OKR,也不空洞宏大)"] P3["3. 周级别执行节拍 (Drumbeat)<br/>(量化进展、不可妥协的落地节奏)"] P4["4. 对技术苦工 (Toil) 保持警惕<br/>(主动粉碎阻力,破除习得性无助)"] end Culture["5. 极具定力与意图的文化建设<br/>(行为准则与学习闭环,制约前四项成效)"] P1 --> Culture P2 --> Culture P3 --> Culture P4 --> Culture ``` 1. **打造高绩效团队(Building a High-Performing Team)**:不仅是招揽顶尖人才,更要精确设计团队的成分结构(composition)。团队中早期职业(early career)新人占多少?专业型专家(specialists)与通才(generalists)如何搭配?资深 Tech Lead 和高阶 IC(Individual Contributor,独立贡献者)的比例如何设定?这些结构直接决定了团队的作战韧性。 2. **设定适度抽象的战略与愿景(Strategy and Vision at the Right Level)**:领导者必须指明北极星指标,但抽象程度必须拿捏精准。若战略飘在云端,团队会因信息不透明而无所适从;若领导者越俎代庖,直接替团队定死多达上千条微观的 OKR,团队就会丧失独立思考与决策能力。领导者应聚焦于高阶业务目标(如营收、用户量)并留出落地空间。 3. **不可妥协的执行节拍(Drumbeat of Execution)**:高管绝不能借口“充分授权”而放任节奏失控。Jay 长期推行“周级别进展(week-over-week progress)”机制。即使是需要一至两年才能落地的宏大项目,也必须拆解出每周客观、可量化的成果输出——无论体现在资源效率优化、营收增长还是用户留存提升上。在极限攻坚阶段,这种节奏甚至要收紧到“日级别(day-over-day)”。 4. **向技术苦工与前进阻力宣战(Squishing the Toil and Headwinds)**:随着服务运行时间变长、组织规模膨胀,各类内部阻力与重复低效的技术苦工(toil)会不断堆积。在 AI 驱动高速迭代的当下,这种堆积更是呈指数级上升。优秀团队必须具备对技术苦工“极度过敏”并主动将其彻底踩碎的文化,否则系统必将陷入停滞与失控循环。 5. **极具定力且有意识地塑造文化(Intentional Culture Building)**:近年来技术界似乎不再热衷于谈论组织文化,甚至将其视为陈词滥调。但文化绝非免费零食、文化衫或舒适安逸的“生活方式工作(lifestyle job)”,而是关于工作方式、核心价值观,以及面对外部环境每 24 小时巨变时能否快速自适应的行为模式。 ### `05:00` 习得性无助与技术苦工的恶性循环 这五大要素并非在所有发展阶段都均等重要。初创团队往往聚焦于前三项的敏捷开拓,而成熟或老化组织中最致命的瓶颈通常是第四项——沉重的“技术苦工”。 Jay 深刻指出,工程苦工的堆积只是一种“结果(effect)”,其深层根源(cause)在于组织和管理层内部弥漫的“习得性无助(learned helplessness)”。在这种风气下,团队习惯于找借口:“我们做不了”、“如果给我们加人我们就能修好”、“要是环境允许我早就做了”。这种无力感反过来滋生了更多流程阻力与苦工:发布上线举步维艰、安全审查旷日持久、招聘流程层层卡顿。 针对这种组织退化,Jay 警告道: > “那种习得性无助随后输出了这些技术苦工,让所有人深感挫败。……这种文化在某种程度上已经蜕化成了平庸。” 由于大家默认“对此我无能为力”,第五项(文化建设)便构成了其他四项的上限;如果无法通过重塑领导层激励机制与文化来破除习得性无助,组织就永远无法重构健康的执行力。 ### `07:51` 文化不是挂在墙上的标语,而是分钟级的微观互动 关于企业文化的真正驱动要素,Brett 抛出疑问:输入变量究竟是基层员工、CEO/创始人,还是各层级的工程总监与经理?假设一个工程师 10 年前在 Facebook 为 Jay 工作,如今又在微软为他效力,两支团队的文化会高度相似还是天差地别? Jay 拆解了文化的实质输入逻辑: - **人才招募与人才培养闭环**:招揽胜任力达标的人才只是第一步,更重要的是在组织内提供持续的晋升与转型轨道,无论是应届生向资深 IC 进阶,还是技术向管理转型。 - **由价值观驱动的执行与交互细节**:战略和路线图可以做到极致工整,价值观(如“客户至上”或“快速行动 Move Fast”)也可以印在墙面上,但这些往往流于表面。文化的真实载体并非宣传标语,而是落实到每一分钟、每一小时中人与人之间真实的协作方式和行为抉择。 - **组织学习闭环(Learning Loop)**:文化的终极归宿是推动执行并赋能敏捷学习。组织扩张时,核心是要建立一个不断旋转的“学习闭环”系统,让庞大的组织机体能够在试错与反馈中自发进化,而非随着人数增加而逐步僵化迟钝。 ### `10:00` 规模扩张的物理法则与对抗“学习变慢” 随着一家公司越来越成功,组织在学习与迭代上面临着近乎物理层面的阻力。Jay Parikh 将组织学习比作一个闭环:成功的副产品是这个圆环的直径不断变大,走完一整圈所需的时间变得越来越长,而环绕一圈仅仅代表着“一个单位的学习”(one unit of learning)。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 组织规模扩张对学习循环的影响 accDescr: 对比小型组织的高速学习循环与大型组织直径变大且速度变慢的学习循环 subgraph SmallOrg["小型初创组织"] S1["假设 / 尝试"] --> S2["快速交付"] S2 --> S3["反馈与复盘"] S3 --> S1 end subgraph LargeOrg["规模化后的大型组织"] L1["庞大流程与对齐"] --> L2["长周期研发"] L2 --> L3["迟缓的落地反馈"] L3 --> L1 end ``` 规模、人数和业务成果都在客观上拖慢每一次学习的速率。Jay Parikh 强调,管理者的核心使命就是主动对抗这种扩张与减速: - **动态清理过时机制**:一年前仅有 8 个人开的会议高效管用,等组织膨胀到 40 人时原模式便彻底失效,必须主动重构组织结构,砍掉臃肿会议,重设 DRI(直接责任人,Directly Responsible Individual)或重新划分为精悍敏捷的小队。 - **杜绝为了流程而设立流程**:“大家普遍对‘流程’过敏,我也认为‘为了流程而流程’极其糟糕。但关键在于,什么是能让人们发挥最佳水平的相关且正确的架构?” - **将故障与流失视为好奇心的源泉**:组织无法永远顺风顺水。卓越文化的核心在于当停机事件、故障或客户流失发生时,团队不会感到惊慌失措或被击垮,而是以极大的好奇心去复盘,将其当作一次学习闭环。 --- ### `12:05` 量化工程效能:微软 CoreAI 团队的“聚焦时间”实践 当 Brett 问及为何万物随组织成熟都会减速、以及领导者该如何实质性提升步调时,Jay Parikh 明确表示,追求极致速度并非可有可无的加分项,而是他职业信条的核心底色: > “速度确实至关重要,因为我认为它是一种竞争优势。回到我刚才谈到的学习闭环,如果我在长远来看能比竞争对手快上 2 倍、5 倍甚至 10 倍去学习,那我对自己的胜算非常有信心。” 面对数十人、数百人甚至数千人的庞大团队,新任工程或产品高管若想破局,第一步绝非盲目施压,而是摸清真实底细。Jay Parikh 在微软组建 CoreAI 团队时,便双管齐下采集了定性与定量数据: - **定性洞察**:收集来自基层研发人员的真实个案与阻碍(detractors / headwinds),明确到底是什么在拖慢工程师的脚步。 - **定量指标与“聚焦时间”(Focus Time)**:统计产品人员、架构师和工程师的工时分布,将他们的时间清晰划分为杂务损耗与“聚焦时间”(或称高产时间)。 - **指标公开与看板化管理**:建立全透明的仪表盘,让每一位工程管理者都能直观看到各自团队的聚焦时间占比,进而集中资源压低不必要的沟通与流程琐事(toil)。 --- ### `15:00` 告别盲目死磕:苏格拉底式提问与 Facebook 的发布演进 面对落后于预期的发布节点(例如工程主管坚持要到 9 月 30 日才能上线,而领导层期望提速至 8 月 15 日),单纯下达死命令只会适得其反。Jay Parikh 指出,领导者不能靠行政命令解决文化与步调问题: > “如果你直接下令‘8 月 15 日必须全部做完’,用这种行政指令或许能逼出一两次成果,但这绝不会成为一种持久的行为习惯,也不会让团队文化随着时间推移变得更强大。” 要打破这种思维定势,需要系统性的推演与渐进式重塑: - **苏格拉底式提问**:顺着原定日期反推其背后的预设立场,询问“如果必须在 8 月 20 日交付,我们当下能交付什么?”以及“请带我走一遍 9 月 30 日这个日期背后的所有前置条件和假设”。 - **引入真实客户声音**:不要让工程师深陷内部排期争论,而是把客户直接引入关于“迭代与学习速度”的对话中。 - **区分非核心工作与剔除繁重事务(Toil)**:工程人员渴望将影响力落地,领导者需协助他们识别哪些步骤能放到上线之后处理,哪些环节纯属画蛇添足。 - **“爬、走、跑”渐进式提速(Facebook 的真实蜕变)**: - 缩短周期是一个不断递进的过程:从提前两周发布,到每两周发布,再到每周交付。 - Jay 加入 Facebook 早期,全站核心代码每天部署一次,在当时面向全球 3 亿用户而言已是惊人的工程壮举,但每次上线仍如同一场“赫拉克勒斯般的苦役”(Herculean effort)。 - 团队随后攻坚至每天发布 3 次;而在 Jay 离职时,Facebook 已经彻底进化至“持续部署”(Continual Deployments)。这背后既依赖不屈服于现状的文化,也依赖对内部基础设施和自动化工具的巨额研发投入。 --- ### `18:57` 微软 CoreAI 的最快战队:超小规模与 AI 生产力 被问及数十年职业生涯中最快的团队时,Jay Parikh 指出,当前在微软 CoreAI 团队中负责部分前沿项目的微型团队展现出了前所未见的迭代效率。 这些小团队之所以能实现每日甚至每天多次交付,关键在于三大要素: - **极小的团队规模**:避开了大团队随之而来的对齐摩擦与沟通半径。 - **极低的包袱**:由于探索的是崭新产品,团队几乎没有历史技术债务的拖累。 - **极高的设计品味与 AI 杠杆**:团队能深刻洞察客户需求,具备敏锐的设计嗅觉,并且充分利用 AI 工具进行代码编写、调试与快速修复,极大压缩了从想法到实际上线验证的周期。 ### `20:00` 破除层级迷思:从“组织架构图”转向“工作架构图”与快速升级机制 在谈及团队规模与推进节奏时,Jay Parikh 态度极其明确:大团队根本快不起来。“就我而言,这毫无意义。大团队根本无法快速行动,在我看来这根本不可能。”他指出,无论是过去在 Facebook 还是在其他公司,保持敏捷的唯一解法就是彻底抛弃传统的科层制束缚,把大组织拆解开来。他强调:“管它叫什么 B 组(B-team)还是跨职能小分队(squads),名号无所谓,关键是要扔掉围绕组织架构图(org chart)的那些废话,转而强调所谓的‘工作架构图’(work chart)。”所谓工作架构图,就是由极少数合适的人组成的高人才密度紧凑团队,配备拥有完整业务上下文(context)与自主决策权(agency)的明确单一责任人(DRI, Directly Responsible Individual)。管理者给予他们充分的信任和核心指标指引,让他们放手去干。 为了确保小团队不被官僚流程拖垮,Jay Parikh 推行了一套激进的“升级”(Escalation)文化。在很多企业里,向下属求助或越级反映问题往往被贴上负面标签,但 Jay Parikh 彻底颠覆了这种认知。他告诫团队:如果遇到了阻碍,24 小时内无法解决,就必须直接联系他。他直言: > “听着,如果你在做任何事情时卡住超过 24 小时,你就给我打电话,因为我可不想看到‘我们得向经理汇报,经理再去向经理的经理汇报,两周后才辗转传到我这里’这种事。” 这种极致追求执行速度的文化要求管理者时刻扫清障碍。同时,管理者也必须具备极强的鉴别力与决断力——小团队的 DRI 或技术负责人不可能永远押对人选,一旦发现某个人不适合当下的领导角色,必须迅速换人,绝不能优柔寡断。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Org Chart vs Work Chart Escalation Flow accDescr: 对比传统组织架构图的多层级冗长汇报通道与工作架构图的扁平快速升级机制。 subgraph Traditional["传统组织架构 (Org Chart)"] direction TB A["一线工程师遇阻"] -->|"沟通延迟"| B["直属经理"] B -->|"层层汇报"| C["中层总监"] C -->|"辗转耗时 2 周"| D["高层管理者"] end subgraph Modern["工作架构 (Work Chart)"] direction TB E["小团队 DRI 遇阻"] -->|"卡壳超 24 小时即升级"| F["核心决策人 (Jay Parikh)"] F -->|"快速决策 / 扫清障碍"| E end ``` --- ### `22:44` “命运共同体”与全员 FDE 心态:基础设施团队为什么不能远离客户 当 Brett Berson 问及当年 Facebook 底层技术基建团队是否应当将内部软件工程师视作“必须取悦的客户”时,Jay Parikh 纠正了一个常见误区:在 Facebook,基础设施团队承担的职责远不止服务器硬件,而是涵盖了整个底层软件系统,甚至一直向上延伸到移动端应用栈(mobile stack)。Jay Parikh 从一开始就树立了极其严苛的文化红线——无论团队负责的是底层的基础设施还是前台的产品功能,所有人都必须无限贴近终端客户。 Jay Parikh 强调,团队之间必须是一种“命运共同体”(shared fate)。他打比方说,哪怕基础设施部分运行得天衣无缝,但只要前端的产品交付砸了,那整个团队依然是失败的。他掷地有声地指出: > “那种认为‘嘿,正因为你是做底层基建的,你就不需要关心客户’的说辞,在我这里零容忍;我认为所有人必须理解自己的工作是如何层层向上支撑全局的。” 针对行业内绝大多数公司普遍缺乏这种客户痴迷(customer obsession)的现状,Jay Parikh 解释称,这关乎愿景、战略以及团队的直觉与判断力——因为客户嘴上说的需求往往未必是他们真正的痛点。如今在微软执掌 CoreAI 团队时,他正在大力推行一种全员“前向部署工程师”(FDE, Forward Deployed Engineer)的思维方式。这并非要求每个工程师的工种头衔都变成 FDE,而是要求每个人在思想上保持对客户现场的敏锐好奇: - **深度感知使用场景**:深入理解自己编写的代码或搭建的平台是如何在《财富》500 强企业的真实业务中运转的。 - **参与一线接触**:直接参加客户简报会(briefings),在销售或服务团队与客户开会时跟车旁听(ride along),观看真实用户的访谈录像,仔细研读原始反馈数据。 - **强化使命感与组织韧性**:让工程师清晰看到每行代码如何在指标之外为客户创造情绪价值与商业价值,唯有这样才能凝聚顶尖人才,打造经得起考验的持久组织。 - **消除层级脱节带来的惩罚**:如果只有公司最高层了解客户,当外界趋势突变时,即便高层迅速转身,信号层层传递到前端、后端、基建和运维团队也会产生严重的滞后,而在当下的激烈竞争中,这种组织响应延迟会导致极其惨痛的市场份额代价。 --- ### `26:20` 穿越舆论过山车:如何管理团队的公众形象波动与内部摩擦 在 Jay Parikh 的职业生涯中,他所经历的企业往往在舆论场上经历冰火两重天的洗礼:几个月前可能还是“无可匹敌、地表最强团队、天下第一好公司”,短短时间后外部舆论就会突然反转成“这帮人完全不知所云、彻底错失技术浪潮、注定走向平庸淘汰”,随后又可能再次逆风翻盘。面对这种公众情绪(vibe)的大幅摆动,领导者该如何稳住团队? Jay Parikh 给出的核心法则是建立清晰的认知锚点。他指出:“归根结底,你永远没有别人吹捧的那么伟大——至少你自己不该这么觉得;同时你也绝没有外界痛骂的那么不堪。”只要你选择投身于对世界具有重大影响力、极大规模的事业,就注定不可能让所有人满意,因此外界的赞美与批判都值得坦然接纳。但关键在于,领导者必须穿透情绪化、尖锐的措辞,去理解其背后的**真实意图**(intent)。 > “面对外界反馈,你不能简单地充耳不闻,而是必须学会理解反馈背后的意图,而不是仅仅抓着字面上的字眼不放。” 这种穿透字面看意图的能力在处理内部矛盾时同样至关重要。Jay Parikh 回忆在 Facebook 期间,每当公司推行某些重大举措时,内部员工往往也会产生激烈分歧,有人会用极其严厉甚至是充满挫败感的词汇表达抗议。在那种时刻,他会花大量时间与这些员工面对面深入沟通。他发现,强烈的措辞背后,员工的初衷往往是希望公司变得更好,只是沮丧的情绪掩盖了他们极具价值的建议。因此,领导者必须成为极具同理心的倾听者,同时承担起日复一日重构与调整组织叙事(narrative)的重任——在顺风顺水、业绩节节攀升时提醒团队其中包含了运气的成分,因为风暴与逆境终究会来临。 --- ### `29:07` 技术 S 曲线最陡峭之处的领导力命题 在讨论从互联网黎明期、移动互联网、云计算一路走入当下的人工智能浪潮时,Brett Berson 提出了一个极具深度的问题:在技术范式处于 S 曲线最陡峭的爆发增长期打造团队和技术,与在技术趋于成熟、渐进平缓、高度清晰(more legible)的阶段相比,究竟有何本质区别? Jay Parikh 回顾了自己在 Akamai 和 Facebook 的切身经历。他指出,当你身处 S 曲线最为陡峭的区间时,最大的特征是学习与适应的速度快得令人窒息,外部环境与技术要求每时每刻都在发生剧烈变化。身处其中的团队往往会瞬间被海量的研发工作淹没,每个人都会变得极度忙碌。在这样一种高度动态的极限状态下,如何既保持技术攻坚的加速度,又不在眼花缭乱的事务中迷失方向,成为技术领袖面临的最严峻考验。 ### `30:00` 技术栈扩张与预见性人才布局 在技术 S 曲线最陡峭的攀升阶段,组织内部的人才短板会被无情放大。领导者必须清晰洞察团队是否存在管理断层,或者在技术栈的某一特定层级是否缺乏核心技术专家。这种人才建设不能是被动的应急响应,而必须具备极强的前瞻性。 Jay Parikh 回顾了自己在 2009 年加入 Facebook 时的情景。当时团队只有几百名工程师,虽然要支撑数亿用户的庞大规模,但整体技术栈相对单一,业务完全建立在网页端(Facebook.com)之上。彼时初代 iPhone 刚发布不久,全公司只有大约五名工程师蜷缩在地下室的角落开发 iOS 应用,几乎没人使用。真正的移动化巨浪是在 2011 至 2014 年(IPO 前后)席卷而来的,给团队带来了巨大挑战。 当时 Facebook 既没有自建的数据中心和硬件设备,也没有铺设海底光缆。但随着业务规模的指数级膨胀,市面上的现成方案(off-the-shelf offerings)在性价比和扩展性上均无法满足需求。为了支撑极高的迭代速度,团队必须在漫长周期内主动规划人才储备,将技术栈的每一层逐步内包(insource),自主掌控底层技术。正是在规模、性价比与安全等多重考量的驱动下,Facebook 提前引入具有完全不同背景和文化的专家,奠定了后来全栈自主研发的技术根基。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Facebook技术栈演进与人才内包策略 accDescr: 展示Facebook从单一Web端架构到全栈自研技术架构的转变历程。 subgraph EarlyStage["2009年:早期单一阶段"] A["纯Web端架构 (Facebook.com)"] B["地下室5人小团队开发iOS"] C["依赖市售现成基础设施与硬件"] end subgraph ScaleInflection["规模爆发与技术挑战"] D["数亿用户规模扩展"] E["移动化转型浪潮 (2011-2014)"] F["市售方案性价比与性能遇瓶颈"] end subgraph StrategicInsource["预见性人才引进与技术内包"] G["自研数据中心硬件"] H["铺设全球海底光缆"] I["掌控全技术栈核心能力"] end EarlyStage --> ScaleInflection ScaleInflection --> StrategicInsource ``` --- ### `33:58` 慢即是快的新人落地与客户分层认知 对于跨界引入的高端人才,入职整合(onboarding)直接决定了组织的韧性。Jay Parikh 提倡“以慢打快(go slow to go fast)”的入职哲学。许多企业耗费大量时间和资金招揽顶尖人才,却在第一天就塞给对方一个几百人的大团队放任其野蛮生长,往往导致严重的组织排异反应(organ rejection)。 Jay Parikh 在加入 Facebook 以及后来进入微软时,都身体力行地践行了这一原则: - 在最初的一到两个月里,他完全以独立贡献者(IC, Individual Contributor)的身份沉浸在业务中。 - 在微软的前两个月,他作为 IC 走访团队、学习各项技术与机制,最终沉淀出了构建如今 CoreAI 团队的核心构想。 在技术急剧变化的 S 曲线阶段,理解客户同样不可流于表面。所谓“以客户为中心”不仅是看客户贡献了多少收入,而是要理解客户所处的技术成熟度阶段。Jay Parikh 指出,客户存在巨大的代际分层:“有些客户在我看来活在过去,他们指望你带他们走向现在;而有些与你合作的客户则活在未来,你需要以截然不同的方式与他们协作,从而更快地迈向未来。”许多工程团队误以为客户价值全由合同金额决定,从而错失了与“活在未来”的前沿客户共同加速迭代的契机。 --- ### `35:00` 赋权 IC、破除官僚主义与“智囊团”机制 为了在技术剧烈拐点中保持极致敏捷,工程管理体系必须打破以管理者为中心的层级制度。Jay Parikh 强调,在技术转型的关键期,最懂技术细节的永远是一线 IC。管理者固然能提供流程结构、协调跨团队依赖、负责人员成长与绩效考核,但如果凡事都自上而下层层汇报,决策速度必然骤降。 在微软 CoreAI,Jay Parikh 积极推进以 IC 为核心的文化重塑: - 推动 IC 与管理线建立平行的职业晋升通道,明确确立“转做管理者绝不是晋升”。 - 为一线专家提供保护伞,要求他们承担更大责任,而非盲目顺从管理层的指令。 - 在不同的技术栈领域设立专属“智囊团(Brain Trusts)”。每个智囊团仅由 6 到 8 位资深及中层 IC 组成,严禁任何管理者入场。 在没有任何管理层干预的闭门智囊团会议中,核心工程师能够针对客户需求变化与底层技术拐点展开最坦诚、激烈的辩论与交锋,确保技术决策始终由最懂行的人驱动。 --- ### `37:41` AI 时代研发周期的缩短与长期押注的演变 探讨当下 AI 浪潮与以往技术周期的异同,Jay Parikh 明确表示,有一种强有力的观点认为“一切都已彻底不同”。最根本的变化在于编写代码的性质变了:编写代码不再是项目中最耗时、卡脖子的关键路径(long pole in the tent),“如今代码是产出物,不再是输入物(code is an output now, it's not an input)”。 如果一家组织真正转型为“AI 原生”,传统软件与产品开发生命周期(SDLC / PDLC)的半衰期将被急剧压缩。但这也暴露出了新的系统性瓶颈:虽然利用 AI 能以前所未有的速度生成酷炫的技术与功能,但后续的销售、市场推广、定价打包以及生态伙伴集成依然严重依赖于人类流程。如果下游无法高效消化前台的高速产出,很多技术创新可能根本无法转化为商业价值。 在底层使能技术日新月异的背景下,技术愿景的规划周期也被迫重构。Jay Parikh 坦言: - 涉及原子物理层面的重型基础设施(Atoms-level infrastructure)仍需较长时间建设,维持多年周期的规划。 - 在软件与产品层面,眼下已经极难做出长达数年的大赌注。 由于当前开发者可调用的先进工具极为强大,“在我的职业生涯中,曾经需要一个软件团队花上一整年才能写出来的东西”,如今在极短时间内就能被颠覆或实现,迫使工程领导者在产品与软件架构上采用更为敏捷、快速验证的决策模型。 ### `40:00` 缩短验证周期与定义“重大赌注”(Big Bets) 现代技术和工具让交付原型的速度大幅提升。Jay Parikh 指出,过去需要团队锁定资源投入整整 12 个月、期间只能看到两三个里程碑的重大赌注,现在通过两到三周一次的快照或月度里程碑,在两个月内就能以极高的确定性落地。这种时间周期的压缩直接改变了组织的实验频率:在同样的一年时间里、使用同样的人力规模,团队可以从原来只能押注 1 次,跃升为能够尝试 4 到 5 次。Brett Berson 总结道,这意味着那些本质上属于长期维度的赌注,如今能够以更短期的形态来具象化和执行。这种“射门次数”(shots on goal)的增加,对构建一支优秀团队至关重要。 谈及究竟什么才算真正值得投入的“重大赌注”,Jay Parikh 明确澄清,那些只能带来 10%、20% 或 30% 渐进式改良的项目根本不算赌注;真正的重大赌注必须带来阶梯式的跃迁(step function)和对业务的“非连续性影响”(discontinuous impact)。在 Facebook 任职期间,他专门维护并追踪一份大型赌注清单。此类项目具备几个鲜明的特征:首先,必须具备全局性影响;其次,必须高度跨职能(cross-functional)。如果一个单点团队在自己的局部领域追求飞跃,往往只会困在“局部最优解”(local maxima),甚至无意中封死了组织的“全局最优解”(global maximum)。因此,Facebook 的许多重大赌注往往需要三到五个团队紧密协同,共同去敲开一个全新的全局上限。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 定义重大赌注的评估逻辑 accDescr: 区分渐进式改良与真正的重大赌注,强调跨职能协同与对失败的容忍度。 subgraph Evaluation["赌注筛选标准"] A["预期产出评估"] --> B{"提升幅度?"} B -->|"10% - 30% 渐进提升"| C["常规迭代项目\n(非重大赌注)"] B -->|"非连续性飞跃 / 阶跃影响"| D{"组织跨度?"} D -->|"单团队孤立探索"| E["容易陷入局部最优解\n(Local Maxima)"] D -->|"多团队联合攻坚"| F["重大赌注\n(追求全局最优解 Global Maxima)"] end subgraph Culture["执行与文化支撑"] F --> G["定期对齐市场与业务上下文\n动态调整与转向"] F --> H["包容失败\n沉淀衍生技术与团队认知"] H --> I["打破组织成功带来的平庸与自满"] end ``` 这种探索必须配以极具包容性的文化。Jay Parikh 强调,团队不能扎进深洞里闭门造车三年才交出一个已经脱节的产物,而是必须时刻保持对内外部市场环境的敏锐度,一旦发现风向变化就要及时转向;与此同时,领导层必须能够容忍失败: > “许多重大赌注就算失败了也是完全可以接受的;我从不认为也不规定所有这些项目都必须成功,其中一部分注定会失败。”(Jay Parikh) 在 Facebook,失败项目的衍生技术往往会落地在其他产品中,所沉淀的学习认知也会回流到组织的下一次行动里。在 Jay Parikh 看来,如果手中推进的 5 个重大赌注里有 2 个真正腾飞、1 个表现平平、另外 2 个彻底失败,这就已经是非常出色的命中率(batting average)。领导者勇于承担风险的姿态,能有效防止组织因规模扩张和早期成功而走向平庸、自满与风险厌恶。 --- ### `45:00` 并行对赌:与其无休止争论,不如用双轨实验加速认知 在 Facebook 期间,重大赌注几乎贯穿了整个技术栈的每一层。最初 Facebook 并不自行构建硬件,后来团队下定决心自研硬件,起步时只做单一类型的服务器,但很快便孤注一掷,在极短时间内全面覆盖了存储、数据库以及网络等常规 SKU 硬件的自研。在存储系统上,他们持续押注能够带来成本、性能或规模上“整整 10 倍(10x)提升”的颠覆性架构;在产品层面上,与视频团队、消息团队的深度协同,则需要跨越整套技术栈做全局联动,耗时常在一整年甚至更久。 在面对高不确定性的架构选择时,Jay Parikh 往往采用“双轨并行对赌”的策略: > “与其我们其中任何一个人在那里瞎猜,反正大家谁都拿不准,那干脆两头一起做;过一两个月我们再坐下来看进展,到那个时候也许就没必要同时推进两套了,又或者会有全新的方案冒出来。”(Jay Parikh) 面对团队内部就 A 方案还是 B 方案展开的长篇累牍的争论,Jay Parikh 的第一反应通常是“两个都做”。工程师们往往会下意识抱怨这让事情变得难上加难,但从决策概率学的角度来看,当 X 和 Y 成功的概率各占 50% 时,承认自己无法精准预测才是理性的态度。与其先花两个月试错 A,失败后再花两个月去启动 B(总共耗时四个月才得出结论),不如在两个月内双轨并行推进。哪怕付出双倍开发成本,只要能将认知周期从四个月压缩到两个月,保留期权价值并快速换取认知,就是一笔极其划算的买卖。 - **多团队技术栈联动**:视频与消息等产品的突破,无法单靠业务层改造完成,必须由业务、系统架构、存储与网络多层协同,往往被列为“绝不能失败”的关键战役。 - **并行实验消除无效争论**:当团队陷入 A 与 B 的预测拉锯时,最快速打破僵局的手段是用可运行的代码进行并行灰度,让真实反馈替代主观预测。 --- ### `47:35` 规模拐点下的垂直整合逻辑:效率、毛利与掌控自身命运 针对特大型科技公司为何往往放弃现成的分工体系而走向高度“垂直整合”(Vertical Integration)的现象,Brett Berson 提出了疑问:商业常理认为专业化分工能通过规模经济让供应链供应商服务成千上万个客户,从而提供最优零部件,但 Facebook 等巨头最终却选择绕开公有云(如 AWS)自建整个数据中心与硬件体系。 Jay Parikh 分析指出,这一决策本质上是由规模驱动的,核心原因包含两点: 1. **财务收益与全栈效率的极致优化**:在公司初创阶段,由于缺乏充裕的资本和工程人力,向第三方供应商支付溢价是必然的选择;但当业务扩张到极其庞大的体量时,外包采购意味着在技术栈自顶向下的每一个环节都在向外部供应商拱手让出利润。当体量跨过临界点后,自建所节省的边际成本便是一个极其惊人的天文数字。 2. **掌控自身命运与消除“非最优收益曲线”的拖累**:对于 Facebook 或 Akamai 这类处于“N of 1”(独一无二规模)的领军企业而言,外部供应商的产品从来都不是为巨头的极端体量而定制的,供应商服务的始终是市场上大多数的普通客户。 > “他们并不是在为我们打造产品,他们打造的产品是面向普通客户的;因此在他们的服务能力、为我们的规模提供回归测试与 QA 质检方面,我们永远处在他们能力边界的最前沿,处于其产出曲线上一个极其不理想的位置,这反过来又会严重拖慢我们的速度。”(Jay Parikh) 当巨头被迫处于供应商技术能力的未测边界(bleeding edge)时,任何故障排查、规模扩容与测试验证都会变成瓶颈。垂直整合表面上增加了系统复杂度,但从全生命周期来看,它夺回了迭代的主动权与控制权,使企业不必受制于外部商业软件的路线图,从而在速度与自研效率上彻底拉开与竞争对手的差距。 ### `50:00` 垂直整合为何能在规模化期带来不可替代的掌控力与速度 Jay Parikh 继续剖析为何大体量科技公司最终必须走向垂直整合(Vertical Integration)。当底层架构依赖第三方供应商时,不仅要被迫等待对方排期修复 Bug,整个团队的前进步调也会被硬生生拖慢。更深层的挑战在于全新产品形态的孵化:无论构思实时视频(Live Video)、点播视频,还是在即时通讯(Messaging)中上线前所未有的交互,底层都需要跨越全栈的协同改造——涵盖移动端、边缘网络(Edge Network)、应用服务器(App Server)再到存储系统。如果整套系统不是端到端垂直打通的,跨组织协调将耗时漫长,根本无法推进。 正因 Facebook 的整套体系完全自研,所有代码与架构均由内部工程师亲自搭建,技术团队才能在短短两三周或一两个月内完成全栈改造,将全新的产品体验推向数亿乃至数十亿用户。这彻底锁定了垂直整合的三大核心支柱:成本控制、掌控自身命运(Controlling Your Own Destiny)以及极致的迭代速度。 随后,Brett 探讨了担任初创公司 CEO 的经历对 Jay Parikh 作为工程领袖的重塑。在离开 Lacework、加入微软担任 CoreAI 执行副总裁之前,这段 CEO 生涯补齐了他在业务底层机制上的关键认知拼图: - **直觉级理解 GTM 运转体系**:对销售组织(Sales)、销售术语、Pipeline 指标以及优秀销售团队的运转齿轮形成了肌肉记忆般的敏锐度,让他在微软与大型 GTM 团队对接时能够顺畅同频。 - **带领业务从中下层市场(Down Market)切入企业级市场(Up Market/Enterprise)**:这一跨越意味着整个系统的重构,必须同步颠覆底层产品、定价与打包模式(Pricing & Packaging)、客户宣讲方案(Pitch)、销售打法、客户支持体系以及生态合作伙伴网络。 ### `52:48` 追逐 S 曲线的陡峭段:Akamai 早期与 9·11 创伤下的领导力淬炼 回顾过去二十余年的职业生涯,被问及哪一段经历最具蜕变意义时,Jay Parikh 坦言自己总像个“自讨苦吃的受虐狂”(Glutton for punishment),天生痴迷于追逐最艰巨的难题。他把职业生涯描绘为一系列连续的 S 曲线(S-curves):目标永远是将精力最大化地压在曲线最陡峭的高速增长期;一旦感觉到曲线开始弯曲、弧度走平,他就会主动寻找下一个破局点。无论是在同一家公司内部探索新业务,还是彻底换轨,他绝不愿在平缓停滞的区间耗费生命。 在整个职业履历中,让他在领导力层面实现真正“成人礼”的,正是早年在 Akamai 经历的头四至五年。当时他作为几十名早期员工之一入职,虽然那时行业还没有发明“独角兽(Unicorn)”这个词,但 Akamai 顶着麻省理工学院(MIT)顶尖计算机博士的光环,凭借突破性算法破解全球互联网爆发性流量瓶颈的宏大愿景,在行业内掀起了巨大的关注狂潮。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Akamai 极速扩张与周期危机演进 accDescr: 展示 Akamai 从极速 IPO、经历互联网泡沫破裂与 9·11 危机,再到全面艰难转型的全过程。 subgraph Phase1 ["资本狂欢期"] A["高光加入<br/>(数十人规模)"] --> B["第四大科技 IPO<br/>(市值狂飙)"] end subgraph Phase2 ["双重极端危机"] B --> C["Dot-com 泡沫破裂<br/>(接连多轮裁员)"] C --> D["9·11 联合创始人遇难<br/>(精神支柱坍塌)"] end subgraph Phase3 ["业务重塑期"] D --> E["向 Enterprise 艰难转型<br/>(重构 GTM 与 P&L)"] end ``` 作为初级 IC(独立贡献者),Parikh 先后轮岗过技术销售、业务拓展(BizDev)、产品经理(PM)、产品营销,最终重回工程管理。那段时期,Akamai 实现了当时科技行业历史第四大规模的 IPO,市值一路狂飙;但紧接着,dot-com 泡沫轰然破裂,公司坠入谷底,迎面而来的是他此前从未面对过的残酷现实: - **直面裁员沟通风暴**:作为一名初任一线管理人员(Line Manager),他必须硬着头皮向团队通报接二连三的裁员,昨天还在并肩作战的同事与好友,今天工位就已经空空如也。 - **9·11 事件痛失创始人**:联合创始人丹尼·莱温(Danny Lewin)在 9·11 恐怖袭击中遇难。对早期团队而言,Danny 是如同自然之力般强大的图腾人物。失去他所带来的剧烈心理震荡,彻底颠覆了团队对使命的理解,逼迫管理层在毫无范本可循的情况下,学习如何在极度透明、真实的沟通中稳定军心,带领团队穿透至暗时刻。 面对危机,Jay Parikh 密切观察 George Conrades、Paul Sagan 以及 Tom Leighton 等高管的一举一动,在每一次一对一谈话和团队例会中边学边练:“这就是没有人会提前训练你的事情,对吧?刚出校门时,你身处一家看似不会犯任何错误的公司,人人抢着买你们的产品,股价涨得一眼望不到头,随后世界骤然剧变,你瞬间被抛到了悬崖的背面。” ### `59:16` 从泡沫破裂中死里逃生:如何在 Facebook 顶住压力力推系统能效 大崩溃过后,Akamai 面临着根本性的生死存亡问题:公司最初的客户全都是在泡沫中灰飞烟灭的互联网创业公司(Dot-coms)。面对残酷现实,管理团队惊觉自己根本没有可供 Global 2000 强企业采购的产品、没有懂企业级销售的团队、没有定价与打包体系、没有合作伙伴生态,更没有能承接大型企业严苛服务保障(SLA)的技术支持队伍。 在随后长达两三年的绝地求生中,全员以极限强度协作重塑组织文化,不仅要拼死保住营收流水,更要把失血严重的损益表(P&L)扭亏为盈。那段被迫砍掉部分创新、优先抢救现金流与成本效率的惨痛岁月,在 Jay Parikh 骨子里烙下了对“工程能效”的极高敬畏。 正因在 Akamai 亲身历经险些倾覆的生存危机,当 Parikh 后来加盟 Facebook 并出任工程负责人时,面对营收井喷、现金充裕的狂热局面,他作出了一个与扎克伯格(Mark Zuckerberg)直觉背道而驰的决定。马克当时倾向于把所有工程师和充裕资金一股脑砸向新功能研发,但 Parikh 明确予以反驳: > “马克当时觉得,我们手头有的是钱,所以应该把全部工程师都压去搞产品、做功能。我对他说:‘行,但我也要抓能效,因为我绝不想再经历一次我们在 Akamai 经历过的那种地狱模式。我们要把产品做好,但绝不能因为只顾着做产品就无视系统能效。’” Parikh 在 Facebook 极早期就强硬植入了严谨的数据文化与效率基因: - **将能效提升(Efficiency Work)列为核心战略支柱**:绝不等到规模不可收拾时再亡羊补牢,而是在第一天就深植节约意识,建立严密监控系统资源消耗的数据体系。 - **极致控制资本开支(CapEx)利用率**:通过端到端的定制化垂直整合压低单位计算与存储成本,杜绝任何工程浪费。 - **释放长期资本配置灵活性**:早期的系统节能不仅为公司节省下数以十亿美元计的基础设施支出,更让管理层在多年后拥有充足的自由现金流与资本冗余,去放手下注更大维度的技术变革。 ## Notable quotes > `20:00` 大团队根本无法快速行动,在我看来这根本不可能。 — Jay Parikh > `12:05` 如果我在长远来看能比竞争对手快上 2 倍、5 倍甚至 10 倍去学习,那我对自己的胜算非常有信心。 — Jay Parikh > `45:00` 与其我们其中任何一个人在那里瞎猜,反正大家谁都拿不准,那干脆两头一起做;过一两个月我们再坐下来看进展,到那个时候也许就没必要同时推进两套了,又或者会有全新的方案冒出来。 — Jay Parikh > `22:44` 那种认为‘嘿,正因为你是做底层基建的,你就不需要关心客户’的说辞,在我这里零容忍;我认为所有人必须理解自己的工作是如何层层向上支撑全局的。 — Jay Parikh > `15:00` 如果你直接下令‘8 月 15 日必须全部做完’,用这种行政指令或许能逼出一两次成果,但这绝不会成为一种持久的行为习惯,也不会让团队文化随着时间推移变得更强大。 — Jay Parikh > `20:00` 如果你在做任何事情时卡住超过 24 小时,你就给我打电话,因为我可不想看到‘我们得向经理汇报,经理再去向经理的经理汇报,两周后才辗转传到我这里’这种事。 — Jay Parikh > `40:00` 许多重大赌注就算失败了也是完全可以接受的;我从不认为也不规定所有这些项目都必须成功,其中一部分注定会失败。 — Jay Parikh > `26:20` 面对外界反馈,你不能简单地充耳不闻,而是必须学会理解反馈背后的意图,而不是仅仅抓着字面上的字眼不放。 — Jay Parikh ## Mentioned Jay Parikh, Brett Berson, Mark Zuckerberg, Danny Lewin, George Conrades, Paul Sagan, Tom Leighton, Microsoft, CoreAI, Facebook, Akamai, Lacework, Fortinet, AWS ## Video description In the latest episode of Executive Function, Brett sits down with Jay Parikh, Executive Vice President of CoreAI at Microsoft. Before joining Microsoft, Jay spent over a decade as Facebook's global head of engineering, scaling the company from a few hundred engineers to billions of users, then ran the cybersecurity company Lacework as CEO through its acquisition by Fortinet. In this conversation, he breaks down the five ingredients of great engineering leadership, discusses why he'd rather run two competing bets in parallel than forecast a winner, and explains why company culture remains more important than ever for teams to get right. In today's episode, we discuss: The five ingredients that separate excellent engineering leadership from the rest How to protect your team from large shifts in public perception The mindset shift organizations need to maintain speed at scale How every layer of the organization needs to stay connected to the customer Why Jay runs "brain trusts" of senior ICs with zero managers in the room References Akamai: https://www.akamai.com/ AWS: https://aws.amazon.com/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ George Conrades: https://www.linkedin.com/in/georgeconrades/ Mark Zuckerberg: https://x.com/finkd Microsoft: https://www.microsoft.com/ Paul Sagan: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-sagan-59654a1/ Tom Leighton: https://www.linkedin.com/in/tleighton/ Where to find Jay LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jayparikh/ Twitter/X: https://x.com/jayparikh Where to find Brett LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/brett-berson-9986094/ Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/brettberson Where to find First Round Capital Website: https://firstround.com/ First Round Review: https://review.firstround.com/ Twitter/X: https://twitter.com/firstround YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@FirstRoundCapital This podcast on all platforms: https://review.firstround.com/podcast Timestamps 00:00 Introduction 00:36 How leadership changes through exponential growth 02:21 The five ingredients that define excellent engineering leadership 07:51 What actually drives culture at a company as it scales 12:05 The physics behind why everything slows down at scale 18:57 The fastest team of Jay's career, and why size mattered 22:44 Why every team should think like an FDE 26:20 Managing a team through wild swings in public perception 29:07 What's different about leading through the steepest S-curve moments 33:58 Why onboarding well means going slow to go fast 37:41 Is AI actually new, or is history just repeating? 41:35 What actually counts as a "big bet" worth taking 45:01 The concrete big bets that reshaped Facebook's entire technology stack 47:35 Why vertical integration keeps being the right call as companies scale 51:46 How being a startup CEO reshaped Jay as a leader 1:01:26 Why Jay overruled Zuckerberg's instinct to skip efficiency [Source](https://traffic.megaphone.fm/FRCH6497933461.mp3)

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[20:00] Jay Parikh: 大团队根本无法快速行动,在我看来这根本不可能。 [12:05] Jay Parikh: 如果我在长远来看能比竞争对手快上 2 倍、5 倍甚至 10 倍去学习,那我对自己的胜算非常有信心。 [45:00] Jay Parikh: 与其我们其中任何一个人在那里瞎猜,反正大家谁都拿不准,那干脆两头一起做;过一两个月我们再坐下来看进展,到那个时候也许就没必要同时推进两套了,又或者会有全新的方案冒出来。 [22:44] Jay Parikh: 那种认为‘嘿,正因为你是做底层基建的,你就不需要关心客户’的说辞,在我这里零容忍;我认为所有人必须理解自己的工作是如何层层向上支撑全局的。 [15:00] Jay Parikh: 如果你直接下令‘8 月 15 日必须全部做完’,用这种行政指令或许能逼出一两次成果,但这绝不会成为一种持久的行为习惯,也不会让团队文化随着时间推移变得更强大。 [20:00] Jay Parikh: 如果你在做任何事情时卡住超过 24 小时,你就给我打电话,因为我可不想看到‘我们得向经理汇报,经理再去向经理的经理汇报,两周后才辗转传到我这里’这种事。 [40:00] Jay Parikh: 许多重大赌注就算失败了也是完全可以接受的;我从不认为也不规定所有这些项目都必须成功,其中一部分注定会失败。 [26:20] Jay Parikh: 面对外界反馈,你不能简单地充耳不闻,而是必须学会理解反馈背后的意图,而不是仅仅抓着字面上的字眼不放。

Source quotes

[37:41] Jay Parikh: Code is an output now. It's not an input.

Original transcript

[0:00] . I think you have such an interesting, given your set of experiences, likely have an interesting point of view. on Twitter. building teams and technology through sort of these different points in the last 30 years. Like if you think about the role as there's, the people and direction you're setting is like one hat and there are many hats but let's say one hat is is all the people stuff of running an engineering organization and then you have all the technology strategy pieces and like those two sit next to each other. I'm really curious when you think about engineering leadership in the Internet. Mobile, cloud, AI. what does it mean on sort of any part of those S curves to be like leading, managing, setting direction? particularly over the last few years where it feels like, Or it's never been harder to orient in technology. It's never as clean in the inside as it looks from the outside. Yeah, I was like, I always joke about, you know, from... Everybody thinks it's like, oh, you built Facebook. I was like... Trust me, the first few years, you didn't want to look at the curtain. Right, exactly. Just the brute force. Exactly. we had there. But, you know, again, it comes back to the, you know, people, it's like, I don't think of it just as people. I think about all of this is like one system, right? And I think that's where people, technologists, our managers and others kind of get this wrong. And I think with me, I've always straddled this kind of not just, you know, yes, I've done a lot in engineering, but... product design you know being a ceo go to market sales in fact my first role at Akamai, believe it or not, was to help them out with technical sales because they didn't have anybody else. I got, I'll do that. You know, And, So I was out there trying to help the team close deals for a while, and then they pulled me into doing... Biz Dev to help us build out the network. And then I went back into engineering and product, but I wore multiple hats there in terms of engineer, PM, product marketer, engineering leader, director, VP, etc. So I've always thought about it not just as like, oh, engineering, like to me, ultimately, you've got to get value to your end users. We all play different roles, you know, and Facebook, I had different roles and especially running and like being the head of all of engineering. I had to think differently about the whole system. So, I mean, maybe building on that, how do you define excellence in engineering leadership? Yeah, so for me, there's like five things maybe that come together. One is you have to build a high performing team. So that is all about how do you recruit the top people, you know, and then thinking about like the composition of the team, right? Because you need to think about... Do you want how many early career folks do you want? How many specialists do you want? How many generalists do you want? How many senior tech lead type of people do you want? Senior ICs, etc.? Second, then, is in some ways setting that strategy, setting that vision. Where is that North Star going? But it's got to be at the right level, because if it's too high level, then it's too opaque. People don't know what to do with it. If you're, as an engineering leader, dictating all of the 1051 OKRs for the team, then the team doesn't think on its own. So you've got to come with the right level of that abstraction of the strategy division and the North Star or maybe the... higher level, metrics or goals that you have, whether it be revenue or users or whatever it might be. Then thirdly is that in my world, it's really important to have this cadence, this drumbeat of execution. And people get lost in this, I think, because, you know, you're an executive, you delegate this stuff. But you really have to set the tempo of the organization that you want it to. So for me... For a long time, Brett, I really focus on this week over week progress. And you can have big type of products or projects that may take a year or two to actually materialize, but you need to demonstrate week over week progress, right? And that is going to be something that is objective quantifiable that you're looking at how you're doing, whether it be doing efficiency work, doing stuff that accrues revenue or grows users or retention, whatever it might be. But that drumbeat has to be... just everywhere in the organization where there is this like week over week Sometimes day over day, if you're in a really intense period, But that's like number three. Number four is as an organization scales, as you're running a service for longer and longer, you need to have this like moment or this thing in your culture that cares about the toil and about the headwinds that are created and everything. knows how to go and collect that stuff and squish it down or get rid of it, right? Because this stuff, especially now with AI, we're building, we're growing, we're iterating, we're experimenting way faster than we ever have. And if you [5:00] don't go back and have a culture where you are, in some ways, like fighting allergic, recognizing that this toil exists. can't just infinitely keep accruing or kind of piling up for you, then that just is going to slow you down and all sorts of things spiral. And then the fifth thing is being convicted and also being intentional about building a great culture, right? And I think in some ways, My view on this is even just in recent times, maybe in the last year or two, the airtime that we give as leaders to the importance of building a great culture, is totally seems to be like minimized or maybe not even cool to talk about these days, right? And I don't mean culture in terms of like swag and snacks and like a lifestyle job and warm and fuzzies and those types of things. Like for me, culture is like very prescriptive around like the ways you work, the values that you have, the behaviors that you want the team to like embody because it aligns with the mission and sort of what we're trying to do. And you want this organization, especially now with everything changing, every 24 hours on us. You want it to be able to adapt faster and faster, right? Do you think all five of those are equally important? No, it depends on kind of where you are as an organization, right? Because I'd say, If you're a new organization, you may have a different balance of those. If you're an older organization, Maybe you have a lot more in four, which is that toil. And that's like harder to fix, because in some ways that toil may come with and the toil may be at a place where one of the causes, this is an effect, right? I'm talking about the toil being an effect. The cause actually is having built an organization and a leadership that has an ethos of maybe learned helplessness. where, hey, I can't do that, or hey, we would fix that if we had more people, or I could do this if we could, you know, like, there's a lot of that, there could be a lot of that learned helplessness that then outputs this toil, which just people feel defeated by, right? And you have to change the culture, you have to change potentially some of the incentives around the leaders as well, to go tackle this. Sometimes it's not even quantifiable, because it's just sort of a, to get things into production or to go get these like security reviews done or to, to, hire people or to whatever it might be. These things are hard, And everybody just feels like, hey, I can't do anything about it, right? And that's a culture that in some ways has just sort of regressed into the meat, right? And like you have to change that. That's why the fifth one around building a great culture is, oftentimes, you know, rate limits your ability to like be great at the other four. Do you think on the fifth one culture, what are the primary input drivers to that? You have the people at the company. You have the CEO and/or founder, depending on the stage of the company. you have the functional lead, GM, line-level lead, and manager. There's probably a few other variables, but like... How do you think about driving and maybe a way to sort of frame it as if I'm working on your team now? 10 years ago at Facebook. And I'm working on your team today at Microsoft. Are the cultures of those teams surprisingly similar or stratospherically different? And what is then the input driver to that and how much of it is you? So I would say the inputs to those things, you captured a bunch of them, right? Because you do have to think about the people that you have, right? It's like hiring the best people you can, whatever competencies you need. And then also developing people as people are growing their career, maybe they're moving roles, maybe they're fresh out of school and they're trying to grow as an IC or as a manager, whatever it might be. So those two go hand in hand. It's the development of the org. Number two, I think it comes back to, sure, you can have the strategy, you can have a roadmap, you can have all of that really dialed in. But then it's like the execution of that, right? And it's like the ways of working the execution, the delivery of that, you can start with values, right? You can embody certain values and lots of companies have, you know, great values, customer obsession or like move fast or whatever it might be. Those can not be very deep. Those can be just things that people put on posters on a wall somewhere. But how are those embodied in terms of the behaviors and the minute by minute, hour by hour, I'd say, interactions between people? So when I talk about culture, it's really that. you know, the connection of people to other people in the organization and how they are really driving that execution and more importantly, that learning, because you want the organization, because I talk about this concept of a learning loop. So think about, you know, a circle and as an organization gets more people, [10:00] as it gets more successful, it tends to be that circle the diameter gets bigger And you traverse that circle slower, right? And every kind of revolution around the circle is kind of one unit of learning. And that basically you have kind of everything going against you as you get bigger and more successful and more people. Because not only does the distance travel for... learning something yet longer, but you also go slower through it, right? So everything that I think about is like how to fight that expansion and that slowness, right? And how do you continue to, as you get more scale, more people, more success, more products, culturally, how do you fight that, right? So those are going to be things like, making sure that you are adjusting to, you know your way of operating right so it's like hey we used to have these meetings a year ago and that worked then these meetings no longer apply because now they're 40 people and we got to get back to when the meetings eight people and here's ways to communicate here's ways to like set more prescriptive goals to you know talk about dri's or fast moving teams but you've got to keep recursing that into the system and a lot of people are allergic to process and i'd say you know processes for process sakes is terrible But what is the relevant and right structure so people can do their best work? So there's a lot of ingredients, people, CO, different values, etc. But it's how you put it all together and like communicating to the team. how you learn from the mistakes, from the challenges, from the outages, from the churn customers. and really facing those things as a, hey, this is curiosity for us, right? And we can get better by those sure by the things that go well but generally when you're scaling fast and successful not everything goes well forever right and if you have an organization that's not surprised by the failure and not thrown off by the failure, then I think you really kind of galvanize people and that culture really starts to help you accelerate. One of the points that you hit on multiple times is sort of the speed piece. Why is like the basic laws of company building as you grow and mature, everything slows down? And what do you actually do about it? So I think there's The things that you want to install and have as you're building an organization from small to big, and then there's the things that... If you are at a larger organization and you are slow and you want to go faster the things that you want to do right And I think I've been fortunate to have seen kind of many flavors of this kind of push on speed. I'd say also part of this bread is just maybe... Like it's something I believe in and sort of, I don't think it's optional. I don't think it's a nice to have. I think it is. just part of who I am in terms of, you know, what I think is important from building a great products and building great businesses is like speed really does matter because i think it's a competitive edge I think back to that learning process, loop that I talked about. I think it is all about if I can learn 2x, 5x, 10x faster than my competitors in the fullness of time, I like my chances at that point, right? So for me, I'd say, you know, let's take the coming into an organization and like, okay, you're the new head of product or the new head of eng in a team. And you're like, we got to move faster. Right. And we're, hundreds or thousands of people and the COs like you know, you got to move faster, right? We got to move faster. I say there's like a set of data that needs to be collected. And it's what we did when I joined and we created this CoreAI team, right? Which is, first of all, get both qualitative and quantitative data in terms of what is going on in terms of like that pace, what are in many ways the detractors, what are the headwinds. So we did a number of things to basically get that in subjective, almost like anecdotes or this and then we also had a bunch of quantitative data in terms of how product folks builders engineers were spending their time and we broke it up into what we call kind of like either you call productive time or we called it focus time and that was like we wanted more and more focused time and then come you know what we do with that focus time was like another thing we had to go do but we wanted to get more of your time spent into focus time. But we could measure this, right? And then we could actually have dashboards. We could have all of the engineering leaders see kind of where their teams were on this focus time. What's the role of people in important roles that are just impatient? in driving speed. And like, How much of it is just, as you articulated, you care about speed, you care about learning quickly, and you show up, and that's what you care about. It's going to be... spill over into the people that you work with and like, [15:00] One of your engineering leads talks about some project, and they're like, it's going to ship on September 30th, and you're like, well, what do we have to do to get to ship on August 15th? And like, sort of Is that a disproportionate effect or... It's a minority of what's required to increase cadence. It really depends on kind of where the, you know, again, what your business is, where your team's at. I'd say a few things here, which is one is... You have to, I think, coming into a new team, you have to kind of assess and understand where the team is in terms of their mindset, their thinking, right? Because some part of this is mindset. Which is, hey, we have been doing things this way, and this September 30th date is the normal way of doing things, right? then you have those, in some ways, the... kind of the Socratic method, right? Saying, okay, if we had to ship something on August 20th, what could we ship by then? Or walk me through kind of why and everything that goes into the September 30th date. And in some ways, when you're trying to maybe change the culture and trying to get peace, you know, there's probably some good reason why it's September 30th. And if you just say, get it all done on August 15th, you might get it done once or twice with that type of edict. It is not generally going to be a durable behavior or a culture that gets stronger over time. So in some ways, like one, you got to kind of meet the team where they're at, understand where they're at in terms of both mindset, technology. And a lot of this is just what assumptions do they carry into the way they work today, right? Because there may be certain things that you have to just go understand. Then you're trying to say okay well now we got to change the way we're working so First thing is, I got to share. I got to talk. I got to like... I got a lead by example here, right? So some part of this is like you got to communicate The culture aspects versus being in the weeds on this one date. You've got to shape and talk and storytell almost. right? It also helps bringing the voice of the customer in here and having the the customer also join you in this speed of learning conversation with your team The other thing is back to the toil part of it. You know, I think all engineers want to ship great things and deliver value to their end users, right? Like they want to land the impact. So what are all the things that are in some ways different? The things that are slowing him down are unnecessary in this process or they could be dealt with after the launch, right? So those are the things where you want to go back and just look at all the assumptions that they carry. The third thing to me is... it's like a crawl, walk, run in terms of this transition, right? It's like, get one release, maybe you do it a week or two earlier than September 30th. Then the next week, you know, the next release, you kind of shave off another couple weeks. The next release, you're at, you know, August 15. The next release, you're shipping every week. The next release, you're shipping every day. In fact, that's kind of what played out when I was at Facebook. When I joined, we did, which was like really fast at the time. We used to ship the main core of Facebook once a day. And it was like a Herculean effort that you know, most of the time went okay, but sometimes it didn't go okay. And, But I was like really fast being like, hey, we're shipping software to 300 million people around the world every day. And then we're like, okay, this isn't fast enough. So then we went three times a day. And then we went, by the time I left, we were doing basically continual deployments, right? And that was like culture, but also a big investment in our own internal kind of central systems to go do this. And so, you know, again, that's like what the, in some ways, the thing you got to hold and balance as an executive leading a product or tech team is that investment in technology, automation and that toil reduction we talked about. What's the period in your multi-decade career in where the team you were working with was the fastest you've ever experienced. And, what was going on in that moment or that three months or six months or the like, what's the story around it? I think there's multiple examples. I think it just depends on the kind of the part of the system that we're building, right? I mean, We have teams now in CoreAI and Microsoft that I support, that I work with, that are shipping daily, sometimes multiple times a day. And some of this stuff is like a newer product, so they don't have lots of tech debt and whatnot. But these are not big teams. These are super small teams, and they are just really... quick in terms of like understanding kind of where the customer's at, bringing kind of high taste designs. And, you know, with AI now, we can crank out a lot of things, fix a lot of things very quickly, right? So, this is a [20:00] These are organizations, these are teams that are moving, I think, super fast for our scale and for our type of customers that we serve. You know, in other places, like being able to, whether it be at Facebook or other companies, being able to have these small teams. And for me, it's like, it doesn't make sense to me. Like large teams don't move fast. It's just like not possible to me, right? So it's all about how do you get, if you have a large team, how do you get this broken down into what you know, I call, we call the work chart, not the org chart. Just get rid of that nonsense around the org chart. have this thing and emphasize this thing called the work chart. And these are, you know, whatever you want to call them, B-team squads. There's lots of different terms for this. But how do you have that very small team with the right people and a clear... DRI are clear leader. that has the context, that has the agency, and you trust that team. to go. do what they need to go do. They can check in, they can update, They're guided by their metrics. Another thing for me is like escalation is not a bad word in this world, right? It's like I've told teams and like, listen, if you get stuck for more than 24 hours in anything that you're doing, you call me, right? Because I don't want this to be like, oh, we have to talk to our manager who talks to their manager who then comes to me two weeks later. So it's that speed of execution is like, hey, if you don't know, or you can't make a decision, or there's disagreement, then just like, get it to somebody who can help us make a decision and move on, right? So it's all about getting the right, again, high talent density, small teams with the context, And then in some ways, like getting all this stuff out of their way so that they can go through what they need to do. And like you have to assess, you have to develop them, give them feedback. Sometimes you put people in that DRI or lead role that are actually just not the right people. And you have to be able to make that call. quickly, right? Because sometimes you pick the wrong person or that person's just not cut out. for that leadership role. You know, you did a lot of prolific work in building the infrastructure that Facebook was built on top of and the engineering teams, you know, all the tooling and a lot of the magic of what allowed the teams to move so quickly was built on top of the stuff that you were working on. In that case, do you think it's important that those folks that are working on that think that the software engineering team at Facebook is their customer and they need to delight the customer and meet the customer where they are? At Facebook, the infrastructure team was not just the hardware. It was all of the software. And we actually went quite a bit up the stack to the end consumed, right? So, A lot of the mobile stack, in fact, was run by the infrastructure team. So we were, and I pushed, and our ethos is a culture in the teams that I supported. Even if teams were more infra or more product, everybody had to get closer to the customer. So you had to understand... Who you're shipping to? and sometimes you're shipping to internal people and other times you're shipping to something that Like if our part worked and the product piece didn't work, then like we still failed. So those teams had to be fused together and sort of a shared fate. I had no tolerance for this like, hey, just because you're In infra, you don't need to care about the customer. I had zero tolerance for that. I think it's really important that we understand how this ladder's up. Explain why that is. Maybe it will be obvious to people, but it feels like the average company is not that customer obsessed, is not like, I want to meet the needs of this customer, I want to delight them, you know, like... They're just kind of doing things. I don't disagree with you. And I think this comes back to kind of that vision, that strategy, that mission orientation, but then also that culture. Because if you don't have that curiosity of, and like, listen, sometimes customers say they want X, but they really meant Y. Sometimes they meant X, they didn't really need X. So, you know, you have to have processing to understand and judgment and intuition, right? And hopefully you get it more right than wrong. Even in, you know, the team at Microsoft, my team, Corey, like one of the things we have just as a cultural thing right now is like, you know, there is this like FDE thing out there, right? And it's like, I'm like, everybody on the team, you have to be an FDE, not Literally? But you have to have that mindset, right? You have to connect what you're working with in terms of how somebody is using that thing or building that thing or, you know, this platform is operating in this S500 company, right? And be curious about that. Watch, you know, join these briefings with these customers, ride along in a customer meeting, watch a, you know, a customer interview, read like the feedback, et cetera. Because I think one, there's two things here, which is one is it actually allows the organization to have purpose. And I think this building [25:00] It's a much more cohesive organization. So if everybody knows kind of how their work ladders up in some way, shape or form to not only just some numbers and some goals. but how it creates value, emotion, whatever it is in the customer. then I think it really drives that higher sense of purpose and galvanizes the team. And I think this just builds a more durable organization, right? And great people want to come there, great people want to stay at that point. Number two is part of this is, we adapt faster, right? Because what ends up happening is if you only have say, you know, the top layer of your organization connected to the customer. There's basically, there's sort of like loose layering here, right? So like the top layer can snap to a trend they see in the ecosystem. But because the connection between them and maybe the front-end engineering team and the back-end engineering team and then some infra thing and some ops thing, they're not all kind of wired more closely together. Then there's this delay in the organization responding. And I think these delays are like, really the penalties... in terms of your business, in terms of market share, in terms of, you know, success with the customers, I think these penalties are have just gotten really, really large today. One of the unique things I think about your career is that you've been at places where in different chapters... Comedy was on top of the world. There's no better place to work. There's no more brilliance. Team. Two, these people have no idea what they're doing. They missed the boat. They're going to be irrelevant. Two, there's no better place to be. There's no... Sometimes it takes three months. Sometimes it takes three years. How do you manage a team and talent through all the vibe changes that happen? Either way, like you're never as good as people say you are. At least you shouldn't feel that way. And you're probably never as bad as like what people say externally. Right. So. To me, you have to modulate some of this. And not that you should ignore it, because I do think that, If you're going to work on something like I've been afforded in my career that is consequential and important in the world, then... I welcome the fact that people care and are critical. or congratulatory either way, right? So to me, if you're going to work on something that is of meaning in the world, And, at a very large scale. you're not going to make everybody happy, right? And some part of that is like, you can't just ignore it, but you have to like understand maybe the intent of the feedback versus the actual literal words of things. So that I think is one thing where okay, well, let's Even internally, you know, there were times at Facebook where, you know, there was a various things happening and, you know, the company did this and there was, you know, people who disagreed with that thing internally. And in many ways, like you spending time with these individuals, like trying to get and really maybe like the words that they use to express their concern or their frustration or their disagreement. We're strong. But actually their intent, if you spend time with them and understood their intent, they And many of them were actually trying to help the company, but they were frustrated and the words were... maybe masking kind of their intent of the feedback and ideas that could actually help the company. So, Part of that is like, being a really good listener to understand this stuff. Right. And, you know, like we're all trying to work on this skill. Having a strong narrative that's adjusting with the team is, is like a nonstop job, right? Again, if you're doing really well and, you know, you can do no wrong and everything's up and to the right, then that doesn't last. That's, you know, there's some bit of luck or some bit of like it's good times. but at some point you will hit some challenges, some headwinds, something will happen. When you started... building products, you know, it was sort of the dawn of the internet. Then you had mobile, cloud and AI as sort of maybe the most important technology changes with many things underneath that. What's sort of interesting about building teams and building technology in the steepest part of the S-curve? What's... different. about that. than maybe when you're asymptoting a little bit or things are... more legible. I think there's a few things which is, you know, when I look at, let's say, Akamai or Facebook, When you're in that growth and or you're kind of in the steep part of the S-curve and you're learning really quickly and adapting really quickly and things are changing really quickly on you, spending time, because you get really busy doing all the things, right, like building some technology. [30:00] meeting with customers, etc., But that steep part also then requires you, it will expose and you will see kind of where you have holes from a talent perspective. Whether do you have the right managers or do you have the right technical expertise in this layer of the stack or this thing? So in some ways, being, I would say, kind of proactive about that. So if I look at what happened when I got to Facebook was You know, we were just like, wow, a few hundred engineers when I joined, and the stack was arguably pretty simple. And this is right after the initial iPhone was launched, that period? I joined in 2009. And the iPhone was 7 and 8? Yes. Yes. Honestly, when I joined, Facebook was all web. I mean, everything was Facebook.com. There was, you know, I guess there was like five people in the corner of the basement working on our iOS app. You know, nobody really used that, right? So, still Mobile really hit us in, I would say, 2000 in the IPO area. So like 11, 12, 13, 14 was kind of that whole mobile wave for us that we were challenged by. But in the beginning there, like the stack, the technology of Facebook was, it was arguably pretty simple. It was pretty big, massive in terms of hundreds of millions of people, but it was arguably pretty simple. that can go and build or take control of that layer of the stack, right? Like when I got to Facebook, we weren't building our own data centers. We weren't building our own hardware, We weren't. laying around subsea cables and, you know, those types of things. But over the years, as we saw, one, kind of the scale that we needed to operate, two, the price performance points that we needed to operate our business on, the off-the-shelf offerings were not going to keep up with it, right? So we, in many ways, had to go think about the talent hiring over a very long period of time, right? It's like, okay, every layer of the stack, we need to be able to, in some ways, insource it at the time. That's what required to do it really fast at Facebook, right? But that's not something you react to, you think about proactively, right? In terms of like, we need to become experts in this layer of the stack, where we need to build this part of the technology. in such a way to give us this scale or this price performance or this security or whatever it might be. And then how do you go find those people and bring them in? Some of these people come from very, very different backgrounds, very different cultures. Yeah. onboarding of folks into a company like Facebook or even in our team at Microsoft was something that our teams, me, put a lot of time into, right? And sort of I have always this moniker of like go slow to go fast in terms of an onboarding thing we oftentimes make such a tragic mistake you go out there and spend all this time and money to hire great people and then you're like day one here you know here's like a team of x hundred people and you know go for it and then there's all sorts of like organ rejection and other types of problems that come out But I have this other view of it, which is like go slow to go fast. And even my onboarding into both Facebook and Microsoft followed this path, right? Where for the first month or two, I was mostly an IC. At Microsoft, I spent the first two months, you know, as an IC, meeting people, learning all of like... all of the great cool things that happen at Microsoft. and then continue, you know, landed on this idea of what now has like formed the core of Core AI. But onboarding, I think, is a really big part of how you build a durable organization over time. What else can you say about what's important about running engineering organizations? in these sort of steepest part of the S-curves. Again, it's like being close to your customer is really important. And we talk, a lot of people talk about being, you know, customer obsessed or whatnot. And in these moments, you have to understand that the customers, where they are in their maturity of adopting these S these T best curve technologies and not all customers are equal right there are customers that in many ways what I kind of think about is there in the past, And they're looking to you to get into the present. And then there's customers that you will work with that are living in the future. And like you need to work differently with them to move faster and to get in the future faster. I think it's really important. I think many engineering teams don't understand this like spread between kind of where the customers are. And it could be that you just rate it by dollar. [35:00] or something like that, and it's actually not by dollars. And in order to be successful in one of these technology waves or inflections, I'd say the other part of this also is it's really important to think about your leadership bench, right? And for me, one of the other, I think, shifts we're trying to make in CoreAI at Microsoft is, this balance between More ICs leading things. And what I also saw and what we did at Facebook is when these things like mobile or other things came in that were these steep inflections for us. is like having the right balance of IC lead or kind of an IC... prominent culture in product and eng. And not just this like manager heavy kind of layered tops down type of approach, right? Because both are kind of needed. There's structure that managers can offer... managing dependencies, people, development, performance management, those types of things. But if you want to be able to really... like accelerate through one of those steep technology inflections, the people who generally know the best about the technology are actually the ICs. So you have to like elevate them, you have to like protect them. You have to, like, expect more of them. and not have this like culture where they defer or they report into managers because everything just gets slow at that point, right? So you really have to make sure you're pulling the ICs out, holding them accountable. One of the things that I do at Microsoft is I have these brain trusts. And they're in different parts of our stack. And these brain trusts are formulated with like six to eight senior ICs, mid-level ICs only. and no managers right so we get to talk and learn and push and debate and argue about these inflections that we see in our customers or with the technology and we have other representations of this as well so i think that's also really important is to like have in my mind that career tracks are parallel it's not a promotion to be a manager these are parallel career tracks When you think about what's happened... in AI in the past few years, in what way does it remind you of things of the past And what is like... wholesale net new and that either you... overly pattern match to the past or it's like so abundantly clear to you that nothing in the past is useful and trying to model and understand what it means to like either where we go or what it means to win or how do we position ourselves or sort of those types of things. I would say a few things here, which is, first of all, I think there's good arguments to say nothing's the same and everything is different, right? Because we're not typing code and writing code is not the long pole in the tent anymore. code is an output now. It's not an input. And the half-life of the, as I will talk about, the typical software development lifecycle or the product development lifecycle, the half-life of that is dramatically shorter if you are kind of an AI first organization. So what does that mean in terms of how you think about everything, not just like building a feature or building some code. And you think about how you get that, you know, into sales and marketing and pricing and packaging into your partner ecosystem, like that's all still a lot of humans, right? And so you can generate a lot of cool things and nobody ever sees them or pays you for it. Right. And these are like, I think. very hard, unsolved kind of problems right now. When you're in an environment right now where enabling technology is changing so quickly, even for the people... At the cutting edge, it's often hard to forecast. How does that impact the way that you think about the technical vision that you're outlining for a team? And does it change the time horizon? Like you're much less willing to make a big multi-year bet when things are so unstable. Does it change... the rate at which you'll change your mind when technology changes. Does it make you more risk-seeking? or less risk-seeking. What are your reflections on that set of questions around like technical direction and the bets that we're going to make at the technology or product level when so much is changing. Yeah, I would say, first of all, I think it is hard these days to take a bet. That is multi-year at this point. Maybe not on the, I would say, Adams-level infrastructure, because those do still take a while. But if it's in, you know, in product, in software, because I don't know that it needs to take that long anymore, right? Because of the power of the tools that we have accessible. So the thing that may have taken... in my career a software team a year to write. [40:00] She'd think we can get something pretty good in a month, maybe, you know, at least as a prototype. It maybe is not production ready, but we can put some load on and we can't see this thing right so That, I think, is just like, hey, maybe I had end number of people locked up doing this quote-unquote big bet for 12 months to see something and maybe we would have seen two or three milestones. Now I can durably see that same thing get done in two months with, you know, every two week or every three week or like kind of monthly. snapshots or milestones here so now in the i'm being optimistic here in the fullness of time instead of taking one bet with this team for 12 months now i can take you know four bets five bets in the same period of time in that year with the same number of people so For me, the shots on goal go up, right? And I think that's super great for building a great team. You want to have more... short-term bets. They're long-term, but I can get them done short-term. What would have been long-term, but they instantiate themselves as shorter-term bets. Correct. Correct. I would say like the, What's a good example of it? Well, and for me, it's like you got to remember like a bet to me is not something that gains me like 10 or 20 or 30 percent kind of improvements, right? this is something that you do see the step function, right? There's some discontinuous kind of impact to the business, right? And there are places where like in the past, At Facebook, we used to have a whole set of projects and that we and I would curate and sort of track and work with a team that was like our big bets list. And these in that time were like multi-year bets, right? And these things... There's like really strong characteristics of what I think is a big bet, right? Which is one is they have to bring that discontinuous impact to the business. Number two is... Generally speaking, they should be cross-functional in nature. Because if it's just a single team with some... discontinuous thing They may be seeking... a local maxima But you may... be closing off a global maximum. So I push to have these big bets span multiple teams, seeking some new global maxima for the organization versus each team kind of like trying to max out what they're constrained to be able to do because i don't know that it's enough so a lot of our big bad set Facebook and our team were three, four, five teams that had to come together to get that discontinuous impact. And all teams had to come together to try to achieve that some new global maxima. versus five teams all trying to get a little bit right so And then the other thing, too, is, you know, you want to be able to have some... measurable kind of you don't want this to just kind of go into a hole for three years and then come out with something you don't need. So the burden is on the team to kind of make sure they're gaining context. If something's zigging in the market or internally and they're zagging, they need to Go in and adjust and pivot. I also think that many big bets, it's okay for them to fail. I don't think and prescribe that all of these should work. Some of them should fail. Oftentimes when we saw these things fail at Facebook, the derivative that landed somewhere else, right? And the learning or some part of it ended up accruing to something else we did. So there was always goodness and learning that came out of it. But if I had five big bets and two of them really took off, then that was success. And if one was kind of meh and the other two failed, that was like a decent batting average. And then you've also created a culture where people know that as a leader, I am willing to, and I want to take risks, right? And so that does, I think, drive a certain level of passion and energy and curiosity and learning in an organization. Because you have to fight, as we talked about earlier, as the organization gets bigger, you get more successful. This reversion to the mean happens, right? And you get complacent, that complacency breeds mediocrity, and then people don't want to take risks, and we know the rest. So having a culture of taking these big bads and these discontinuous or disruptive projects and curating them and sort of protecting them, I think is really important to to try to be ready for what's coming at us next. And so in the Facebook days, what are like the canonical examples of what was a big bet at the time? I mean, it was at every layer of the stack, right? I mean, it was when we were... you know we didn't build hardware and that was like a big bet to go build hardware we started in some ways simple with one type of server and then We took a big bet to get all of the other pieces of the typical SKUs for storage and database [45:00] networking and all of those done in a very, very short period of time. There was other bets in terms of how we handled different storage systems, and those were things that would give us that proverbial 10x improvement, either in cost or performance or scale. There was other things that we did from a product perspective, working with, you know, the videos team or working with the messaging team. And these were like disruptive bets to bring a new product experience, but it required kind of changing trends. a lot of layers of the whole stack right together not independently And so those were things that, you know, they would take a year maybe or more to do that. And some of these then just, you know, these are became things that we cannot fail at some point, right? And we had to really, really make sure those were perfect. There was other places where we took multiple bets in the same area and kind of had These run parallel, to see... which one would be best. Sometimes we ended up blending some of these. Other times there was a clear, like, this option worked better than... But when I didn't know, I would try to take multiple parallel bets. I feel like that's underappreciated. Like, if there's a 50% chance X works and another 50% chance Y works... Maybe you should just do both. And it's okay to say I can't forecast that accurately. We spend, I think, having been in lots of different teams, spend an inordinate amount of time arguing A or B. It's kind of a funny thing that my team will say about me because when they bring those things to me. I'm like, we'll just do both. They're like, well, that sounds way harder. I'm like, well, neither one of you, we don't know. So let's just do both. we can talk in a month or two months and see where we're at. And maybe we don't need to do both then, or maybe something else emerges, but, Why not, in some ways, keep the option value open at this point? Keep learning. Again, back to this learning point. It's like, if I can do both and learn faster versus do one, fail at it, and then do something else after that, then that takes me four months to figure that out versus doing two in parallel. And I learn in two months what I would have done in four. That is like a trade I'll make all day long. Why did it often make sense to vertically integrate? And is there sort of a pattern to this that it feels like, you know, the benefit of specialization is, is that you have a whole group of people trying to make this widget better and better for you. and a thousand other customers or 10,000 customers. And you have economies of scale and you have All these people going to work every day to make this little widget for you better. But it feels like in so many cases, at least in the case of Facebook and many other extraordinary companies over time. you become more and more vertically integrated. And it's the correct thing for the company. And so instead of leveraging AWS, you build your own. and optimize your own data centers. Why is that so often the correct thing to do? I think it's a matter of scale. When I joined Facebook, AWS, the public cloud was fairly nascent at that point, so I don't think it was a real option at that point. Unclear what the counterfactual would look like today if that were happening today in the age of massive hyperscalers. I would say there's a few things here which I believed in terms of my time at Facebook or my time at Akamai. One is the vertical integration. One, it's the most optimal. And it's the most optimal when you look at the overall kind of efficiency of the stack. So you think about just tops to bottom, if you are, you know, having to buy a lot of different things from different people, you can think about, you know, all the different places where you're giving other people margin, so to speak. So from a dollar perspective, there is an argument or like a calculation that needs to be made there. And, you know, in the beginning that. maybe is unobtainable because you don't have the people, you don't have the capital to do it, so you have to pay to do this. But as you get bigger and bigger and bigger than this isn't a trivial amount, right? And so you have to look at that. That's number one. Number two is, back to there's a speed, there's a control your own destiny argument that I always felt. Because When you take some layer of your kind of core stack and it's like outsourced to this vendor and vendor, you know, could be great. But when I was at these companies that were kind of N of 1 in terms of what they were doing scale-wise... They weren't making a product for us. They were making a product for the normal customer. So we were always on the bleeding edge of their capabilities, their ability to service our needs, to provide. regression test to QA things for our kind of scale, our operations. So we were always kind of on the not in an optimal place of their yield curve, right? And so that was another thing where it would slow us down, right? Because like you would be [50:00] waiting on them to do something, you would have bugs, etc., etc., Those things would all slow us down. And so and then the third thing is like when we would reimagine or come up with a new product experience. So when we started thinking about live video or video or something in messaging or whatever it be. That did actually require a lot of changes throughout the whole stack, right? So it was like, hey, here's what needs to happen in mobile, here's what needs to happen in the edge network, here's what happens in this app server, here's what happens in storage, here's what happens here. And if that was... not all vertically integrated. That stack doesn't. change. It would take too long to change that, right? So we could reimagine an entire and launch an entire new experience to tens, hundreds of millions of people, billions of people, In a shockingly short amount of time, because it was all vertically integrated. And everybody that built that was employees, engineers on our team. So you could just say... This is what we're doing, you know, two weeks, three weeks, one month, two months, whatever. And the whole thing is done. And it's built together and it's customized for the experience that we want. We wanted to deliver. So I'd say it's cost. It's also kind of just controlling your own destiny. And three, it's like speed. How did it change you? as an engineering leader again. Like if you had not had that experience of being a CEO. In what ways are you? Would you be different? The things were lots of learnings, right? I mean, just it's a long list as I was reflecting as I was moving. from that company and then after a couple months ended up at Microsoft. But where I feel the learning has really propelled is a lot deeper understanding of the mechanics of, you know, go to market of sales, of sales terminology of like sales metrics, all of the machinery around a great operating sales team, which, you know, I get to learn a tremendous amount at Microsoft with our go-to-market team. Now I understand that stuff at a much more intuitive level, right? It's not foreign to me. So that was like a deeper appreciation being a CEO where you had to put all of that together, understanding. the go-to-market. And how that evolves, you know, we were down market in our offering and we had to move up market into the enterprise. That was a changing of the system. It was a changing of the product. It was a changing of pricing and packaging. It was a changing of our pitch. It was a changing of... The sales team, how we managed support, the ecosystem of partners that we had. So, you know, going through that journey afforded all us, but me like a ton of learning and that carries over. to being way more, I would say, in tune with what needs to happen or what we're doing at Microsoft. When you think about your role as an engineering leader today, what is the six months or a year of your career period? you did the most learning transformation growth into who you are right now. And let's remove sort of this last chapter of Microsoft. And you look back at the previous couple of decades. So what's like the period that comes to mind? And maybe you could tell a little bit about the story of like what you figured out, how you evolved. why it sort of was so formative in terms of who you are today as an engineering leader? Yeah, I would say, and maybe right up front is... Whether it be, you know, being... Maybe just a... a glutton for punishment or not. I always seem to go running after heart problems, right? It's just something where When? it's I'm sort of addicted to it or I'm just like I fall into it I don't know so for me And I talk about this in these S curves, right? So for me, it's like maximizing... my professional time and being on that steep part of the s-curve is what i always think about right and when i feel like it's starting to curve or arc, bend over, like flattened. then I'm always trying to find the next thing, right? Many a times that's been afforded in the same company and other times it's required to change, right? Because I don't, want to waste and spend my time on any part of that flat curve for me. So, I maximizing kind of that time spent on the steep part of the S curve is something that I think about and I like, I'm really like intently focused on, right? So that is, And some of these are all different chapters in my career. But to give you a specific example where I think I would say I grew up a lot as a leader. was the first probably four or five years when I was at Akamai, right? Because I joined and there was maybe a few dozen people when I joined the [55:00] company. And, you know, this is a company that... was one of the I guess we didn't have the term unicorn back then, but it was one of the unicorn companies. Right. And it was. There was this buzz, there was this meme, there was this energy about this company that... had all of these PhDs cracking this code with these sophisticated algorithms to scale massive traffic explosion on the internet. So I joined as an IC member did a bunch of roles, as I said earlier, which is like I joined in sales because they Did I know anything about being a technical sales... Engineer, no, but they needed somebody to help translate the technology to and what we're building to our customers, to our prospects. And I did a number of different roles and BizDev and back into PM and product marketing, back into engineering. But, you know, that journey in the first few years was like, hey, we had this... kind of rocket company that, you know, had at that time, when we went public was the fourth largest, or biggest IPO ever in tech, right? So it was like, lots of buzz about this company. But in many ways, if you look at this was like the dot com boom, everything was you kind of look at these valuations and stuff like that and. scratch your head and then you know we went through obviously the phase where the dot com Bust, crash, happened. So that company, Akamai at the time, had to go through a lot of changes, right? So many things happened. One is, we endured multiple rounds of downsizing of the company, right? And I'd never been through that before in terms of how do you manage... layoffs and how do you communicate to your team? Here I am a line manager, right? Like how do we communicate this to our team and friends, colleagues above are here yesterday. They're no longer here today. Then in 9-11, Danny, our founder, co-founder, passed away in 9-11. And, you know, Danny was a force of nature for us is like people that were early in the company. and got to work with him closely, losing him was sort of unexplainable in terms of what it did to shift the way we all thought about the mission of the company. what we had to go do. But having Danny one day, not having Danny the next day, it was hard in terms of how do you lead through that? How do you adjust? How do you adapt? How do you communicate to people? And back to just being real about it, being transparent. And this is stuff where nobody trains you on this stuff, right? When you come in out of school, you end up Thank you. no wrong, you know, and everybody's like buying your stuff and your stock price goes up and up and up and up and up and then something happens in the world. And all of a sudden, you're on the other side of this, this hill, right? And not having been through that before, There's just countless learnings every day in terms of the one-on-one interactions I'm having, the team meetings. I'm watching, you know, the other execs lead, you know, the CEO and George and Paul and Tom lead through this and learning and learning. like observing them right because here i am as a first-time manager learning from them so i grew up a lot in terms of that this and this and still managing to survive and the company's still an important infrastructure company in the world today. And having been a part of that journey and helping the company make all these adjustments and, you know, Hopefully we got it mostly right, but we made a lot of mistakes too. So I would say that was a very I'd say dense, condensed period of learning in terms of just growing up. Was there like a big thing, like one big idea you took from that or was the hundreds of little things that you had to figure out? It was a lot of, I mean, you know, I would say that obviously 9-11 was, I just say it's a, it's sort of a very stark kind of memory. in terms of being an employee but also then being a leader. in the company and what you had to do. And like, again, we're prepared for this, right? And it was like, how do you work with each other in the leadership team to figure this out and take it kind of, you know, hour by hour in terms of what we're learning and how we communicate this stuff and how we're there for the employee base. for customers and stuff like that. Because the business was changing, right? And it wasn't kind of an overnight thing. But you're doing these reductions and then you're building and then you're having to shift your business because a lot of our business in the beginning was all dot com companies. And now you're like, oh, wait, we don't have a product. We don't have a sales team. [60:00] have pricing and packaging we don't know how to like sell to the enterprise. Like we had no, no right to talk to them, you know? And like, wait, you don't have a product, you don't have a sales team, you don't have pricing and packaging, you don't have partner ecosystem, you don't have solutions. You don't have support that can service the Global 2000. And we had to hustle in figuring that out. So how we did that, the intensity, the teamwork, the culture that had to in some ways be evolved to do that in whatever it was, probably around two, three years or so. And then also just we had to go and get our finances, our P&L under order because we were losing a lot of money. We were burning a ton of money. So we had to go build product and grow the top line, but we also had to, you know, do a ton of efficiency work. And so, you know, that efficiency work came at potentially at the expense of innovation, but that was survival to us. Right. So, yeah. And so, you know, for example, When I went to Facebook, even though Facebook was doing great top line, I remember talking to Mark and Mark was like, we have money, so we should just build features and we should put all the engineers working on product. And I said, cool, but I'm going to work on efficiency because I'm not going to go through that journey that we all went through at Akamai, and so we're going to be efficient. And we're going to build a great product, but we're not going to do just product and ignore efficiency. So we're going to be really diligent. We're going to build kind of great data systems and a great culture of engineers doing everything. very significant efficiency work. And that led to, you know, this vertical integration, but also big bets in terms of efficiency, and a very data driven approach around like saving and being frugal with how we consume the capex that we spent, right? and being really, really diligent about that efficiency. But that afforded us lots of capital allocation options down the road, right? Because we weren't wasteful from the early, early days. We didn't have to fix it later. We inceptionized that culture early, Because I was not going to have the nightmare that we lived through as we grew up as leaders at Akamai. Nice place to end. Thank you so much for spending the time. Thank you, Brett. Pleasure.