A16z's Casado Sees AI Labs Win 80% Revenue, Open Source 60% of Tokens

Martin Casado on Where the Value Is Going in AI — Martin Casado, Theo Jaffee, Sophia Dew

Martin Casado, Theo Jaffee, Sophia Dew

Surging compute absorption allows lean engineering teams to convert billions directly into growth, enabling frontier labs to capture most industry revenue through marginal capability leads while open-source models process the majority of token volume.

AI-assisted summary of Martin Casado on Where the Value Is Going in AI — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • Martin Casado highlights an unprecedented capital-to-compute sink where small engineering groups of roughly 20 people can productively absorb over $2 billion in compute without organizational bloat. (0:00)
  • Frontier foundation labs currently capture about 95% of dollar-weighted AI revenue, but Casado projects an 80/20 long-term split: frontier labs retaining 80% of revenue while open-source and long-tail models process 60% of total token volume. (15:00)
  • Model routing along the Pareto frontier for cost and performance works well in production, but dynamic routing based purely on qualitative accuracy is an AI-complete paradox requiring an evaluator as intelligent as the frontier model itself. (16:40)
  • Major M&A transactions like SpaceX acquiring Cursor for a reported $60 billion and Stripe buying OpenRouter show that strategic platform control points and applied engineering workflows command massive standalone market values. (28:30)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on August 22, 2026, on RSS/web by Martin Casado, Theo Jaffee, and Sophia Dew, this episode of MTS explores where value is accruing across the artificial intelligence landscape. The show notes outline a deep dive into whether frontier labs will capture the entire market, how AI has transformed venture funding into scale-up capital for lean teams, and the mechanics of open source, model routing, and startup economics.

## TL;DR Martin Casado, General Partner at Andreessen Horowitz, examines the structural shifts defining the AI wave, arguing that small engineering teams can now deploy billions of dollars directly into compute without collapsing under managerial bloat. Evaluating the debate between centralized frontier lab dominance and market dispersion, Casado projects a future where leading labs command roughly 80% of dollar-weighted revenue while open-source and specialized models process 60% of token volume. The discussion analyzes the strategic moats of portfolio successes like OpenRouter and Cursor, explains why qualitative smart routing remains an AI-complete paradox, and critiques balance-sheet skepticism in favor of securing essential infrastructure control points.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries the relaxed, high-conviction cadence of Silicon Valley insiders celebrating a monumental week of multi-billion-dollar portfolio acquisitions. Casado speaks with the easy authority of a seasoned operator-turned-investor, blending academic rigor and technical precision with candid humor about boardrooms, 'vibe coding,' and the anxiety of startup life. The dialogue feels intellectually expansive and unapologetically bullish, moving fluidly from computer science theory and hardware constraints to reflective, philosophical reflections on personal drive and the enduring culture of tech innovation.

## Bulletin - `00:00` Martin Casado highlights an unprecedented capital-to-compute sink where small engineering groups of roughly 20 people can productively absorb over $2 billion in compute without organizational bloat. - `15:00` Frontier foundation labs currently capture about 95% of dollar-weighted AI revenue, but Casado projects an 80/20 long-term split: frontier labs retaining 80% of revenue while open-source and long-tail models process 60% of total token volume. - `16:40` Model routing along the Pareto frontier for cost and performance works well in production, but dynamic routing based purely on qualitative accuracy is an AI-complete paradox requiring an evaluator as intelligent as the frontier model itself. - `28:30` Major M&A transactions like SpaceX acquiring Cursor for a reported $60 billion and Stripe buying OpenRouter show that strategic platform control points and applied engineering workflows command massive standalone market values.

## Key takeaways - `00:00` Modern AI funding operates as scale-up capital that routes directly into compute infrastructure rather than bloating human payroll and triggering Mythical Man-Month bottlenecks. - `02:18` Technical complexity has driven a resurgence in academic credentials and PhD founders, creating a bifurcated landscape alongside traditional college-dropout entrepreneurs. - `06:50` Expanding private markets contradict the zero-sum narrative of venture capital, with larger capital pools extending total addressable markets and compounding returns outside public markets. - `10:00` Early-stage venture investing prioritizes identifying strategic architectural control points over traditional balance-sheet metrics like current gross margins and revenue quality. - `11:15` The bull case for frontier labs relies on their massive capital advantage, GPU supply lock-in, and autocatalytic efficiency loops that preserve pricing power through tiny capability leads. - `15:00` Severe compute constraints are forecasted to ease around 2028, accelerating the fragmentation of enterprise demand across specialized and open-source models. - `16:40` OpenRouter derives its value primarily as a two-sided marketplace and aggregation layer that offers unified billing, observability, and long-tail model access. - `16:40` Qualitative smart routing remains an AI-complete problem because identifying the optimal model for an obscure query requires intelligence equal to the frontier engine. - `22:00` Frontier labs deliberately treat subsidized consumer and single-developer tokens as top-of-funnel customer acquisition, converting venture capital directly into immediate user demand. - `24:45` Flat-rate consumer subscriptions are heavily exploited by secondary arbitrage rings that exhaust monthly allocations in days and claim refunds, creating a persistent security struggle. - `26:00` The immediate conversion of capital into compute and traction has shifted executive roles, transforming CMOs and engineering leads into capital-allocation evaluators akin to CFOs. - `30:00` Cursor succeeded by prioritizing applied product engineering and developer workflows over academic model research, dedicating 30% to 40% of founder bandwidth to hiring. - `33:45` Current AI growth represents the largest wealth unlock since the 1990s, with value expanding simultaneously across hardware, foundational models, application interfaces, and inference layers. - `36:51` Evaluating early-stage infrastructure requires product taste to detect user feedback nuances, grounding investment conviction at the intersection of founder-market fit.

## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` The Core Divergence and the Scale-Up Era of Capital

The debate over the trajectory of artificial intelligence centers on two fundamental possibilities: either the frontier research labs end up monopolizing the entire value chain, or market power disperses across open-source models, specialized layers, and application developers. There are formidable arguments for each scenario. Looking back, giving a software team a billion dollars a decade ago was a surefire recipe for corporate ruin: companies hired indiscriminately, expanded their real estate, built out luxury espresso bars, and inevitably collapsed under managerial complexity.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Capital Deployment Dynamics Across Software Eras accDescr: Contrasting the failure mode of past software overfunding with modern AI capital-to-compute conversion.

subgraph Past["Past Software Dynamics (~10 Years Ago)"] direction TB C1["$1B Capital Inflow"] --> H1["Hire Thousands & Add Offices"] H1 --> M1["The Mythical Man-Month Bottleneck"] M1 --> F1["Organizational Bloat & Burn Blowup"] end

subgraph Present["Modern AI Dynamics"] direction TB C2["$1B–$2B+ Scale-Up Capital"] --> P1["Compute & Infrastructure Cluster"] P1 --> T1["Lean Team (~20 Engineers)"] T1 --> R1["Direct Capability, Usage & Growth Output"] end ```

Today, engineering teams actually possess a direct sink for massive amounts of capital. In modern AI, venture funding operates as scale-up capital where dollars can be directly routed into compute rather than operational overhead. “In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion,” Martin Casado points out. Where pouring capital into past engineering efforts failed to accelerate delivery timelines due to organizational drag, AI systems allow founders to inject funding and extract tangible capability, adoption, and usage on a remarkably short horizon.

- **Capital-to-output mechanics:** Capital translates directly into capabilities and usage; where historically putting money in rarely yielded immediate mechanical returns, today teams put money in and receive an identifiable proportion of performance and usage right back. - **The episode setup:** Martin Casado, General Partner at Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) leading the firm's infrastructure practice, joins MTS hosts Theo Jaffee and Sophia Dew. The discussion follows a monumental week in tech marked by SpaceX finalizing its $60 billion purchase of Cursor alongside Stripe's agreement to buy OpenRouter—two flagship a16z portfolio companies.

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`02:18` The Academic Spectrum: Dropout Founders vs. Deep Research PhDs

Venture capital has witnessed a notable cultural shift regarding founder credentials. For decades, the dominant archetype mirrored founders like Larry Page, Sergey Brin, or Mark Zuckerberg—entrepreneurs who gained fame by dropping out of school because completing a graduate degree implied you lacked an idea urgent enough to commercialize. While recent high-profile startup exits involve 20-year-olds leaving university to launch companies, Casado points out that the sheer technical complexity of modern artificial intelligence has made rigorous academic experience more valuable than it has ever been.

Casado reflects on his own trajectory, having worked at a national laboratory between his undergraduate and graduate studies before finishing his master's and Ph.D. in computer science. Today's ecosystem spans extremes: on one side are very young startup founders, and on the other are veteran researchers like Jeff Dean and Oriol Vinyals launching advanced labs backed by decades of pioneering deep learning breakthroughs. “I think we're in a bit of a schizophrenic period, which suggests to me you should do exactly what you're feeling is right for you,” Casado notes, emphasizing that neither path holds a monopoly on success.

- **PhD resurgence:** PhD founders are building some of the most competitive technical companies in the sector, citing examples such as Ali Ghodsi (Databricks) alongside leading generative model creators. - **Optics versus substance:** While tech social media platforms like X tend to highlight young, college-dropout founders, the aggregate data shows deep technical credentials and advanced degrees gaining historic ground. - **Pre-grad school experience:** Casado advocates for real-world laboratory or applied work prior to advanced degree programs to prevent researchers from becoming purely academic theorists.

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`05:00` Busting the Mythical Man-Month: How $2 Billion Works in 20-Person Teams

The historical rules of software development—rooted in Frederick Brooks' classic *The Mythical Man-Month*—dictated that throwing more bodies and capital at a delayed software project only made it later. Large checks simply bloated burn rates, injected endless layers of organizational friction, and diluted product roadmaps. In stark contrast, modern AI development bypasses these coordination problems by allocating billions directly into compute infrastructure rather than expanding payroll.

One of the world's most popular multimodal AI foundation models was built by a lean core team of roughly twenty people while consuming upwards of $2 billion in compute resources. This decouples company output from raw headcount. Rather than spending capital on sprawling corporate campuses, the capital is converted directly into GPU training clusters and data acquisition. Because the money bypasses human coordination bottlenecks, small engineering groups can ship breakthrough models at an unprecedented pace.

- **Scale-up mechanics:** Early venture-backed capital over-allocation previously destroyed startups by artificially ballooning payroll; in the current AI environment, massive capital is absorbed directly into compute clusters. - **Organizational leverage:** A lean footprint avoids political infighting, organizational friction, and distorted product roadmaps while preserving extreme execution velocity. - **Unprecedented capital density:** The ratio of dollars deployed per engineer has reached levels unmatched by any prior engineering paradigm in human history.

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`06:50` The Expansion of Private Markets and a16z's Early Bets

The traditional venture capital narrative has long held that VC is a constrained, boutique asset class where too much committed capital inevitably suppresses returns. Casado challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that this narrow framing stems from flawed, zero-sum mentalities. The capacity of private markets is undergoing a structural expansion driven by two forces: companies choosing to stay private far longer to harvest value outside the public markets, and foundation models absorbing massive amounts of money that convert into rapid enterprise and consumer adoption.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Private Market Expansion Feedback Loop accDescr: Showing how larger private market capital inflows expand total addressable markets and delay public exits.

subgraph Traditional["The Outdated Zero-Sum Consensus"] Z1["Fixed, Constrained VC Asset Class"] --> Z2["Excess Capital Dilutes Returns"] end

subgraph Reality["The Modern Compounding Flywheel"] P1["Deep Capital Infusion into Private Markets"] --> P2["Firms Remain Private Longer"] P2 --> P3["Aggressive TAM Expansion & R&D"] P3 --> P4["Massive Enterprise Value Trapped & Compounded Privately"] P4 --> P1 end ```

Casado argues that capital deployment actively dictates market boundaries: “I actually think that the causality is the more money goes to private markets, the larger the markets are going to grow and then the more returns go in the private markets.” Far from merely reacting to AI's need for capital, private capital itself is fueling the expansion of the entire AI economy.

Andreessen Horowitz's aggressive positioning in generative AI stemmed from internal debates dating back seven years prior to the emergence of ChatGPT, even when OpenAI was operating as an early-stage research experiment. Despite persistent skepticism from critics who claimed foundational models lacked defensibility or possessed poor margins, the firm placed widespread, foundational bets across the ecosystem.

- **Venture as scale capital:** The influx of large funding rounds does not inherently mean startups are overcapitalized; the capital expands the addressable market directly. - **Early a16z foundation bets:** Portfolio entries include OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Cursor, Ideogram, Black Forest Labs (BFL), and Mistral. - **Rejection of defensibility skepticism:** Every major historical technology wave began with critics claiming early architectures lacked economic moats and defensible business models, a cyclical skepticism that is repeating itself in modern generative AI.

`10:00` Balance Sheet Valuation vs. Strategic Control Points

Martin Casado draws a sharp distinction between late-stage balance sheet investors and early-stage venture investors when evaluating companies in high-velocity growth markets. Traditional financial analysis fixates on immediate metrics such as gross margins, churn, and revenue quality. While those are legitimate concerns when evaluating mature businesses with no strategic moat, Casado argues that applying that mindset to early-stage architecture is a fundamental error. If an investor ignores the underlying technology, the strategic position, and the eventual capacity for someone else to monetize the platform, they miss the larger economic reality: a business running at a loss today may occupy a vital choke point in the emerging platform stack that eventually lets it capture enormous value.

To Casado, early-stage venture requires identifying key control points within the technology landscape before the public markets understand how to price them. When an asset becomes an indispensable component of the core infrastructure, it gains leverage over downstream players, allowing it to capture outsized returns later through strategic acquisition or monetization shifts. As Casado summarizes the venture mindset: “You have to look under the lens of this is a very important part of the new stack.”

- Balance sheet analysis evaluates margins, churn, and revenue quality, which Casado argues can distract investors from recognizing strategic value in early market cycles. - Early-stage investing prioritizes identifying critical platform control points and the eventual capability to execute a massive transfer of value over current accounting profitability.

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`11:15` The Bull Case: Why Frontier Labs Could Run Away with the Market

Theo Jaffee raises a popular thesis across tech circles: that the frontier foundation model labs will simply eat everything in their path, using their intelligence advantage to absorb specialized verticals like biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (potentially swallowing legacy giants like Eli Lilly). Casado pushes back on the assumption that Andreessen Horowitz dismisses this thesis outright. In fact, a recent a16z partner offsite focused specifically on this unresolved split: will the frontier labs capture the entire ecosystem, or will the market fragment? The case for lab hegemony is backed by substantial precedent: frontier labs currently capture roughly 95% of dollar-weighted AI revenue after three years of commercialization, demonstrate an unprecedented ability to convert raw venture capital directly into revenue growth, and have collectively raised north of $200 billion—more capital than the entire downstream application ecosystem combined.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Frontier Lab Moat Cycle accDescr: A virtuous feedback loop where massive capital enables frontier models, driving revenue, autocatalytic efficiency, and hardware dominance.

subgraph CapitalAndCompute["Capital & Compute Dominance"] A["Massive Capital Scale<br/>($200B+ Raised)"] --> B["Bulk Hardware Access<br/>(GPU Supply Lock-in)"] end

subgraph IntelligenceEngine["Frontier Intelligence & Autocatalysis"] B --> C["Frontier Model Advantage<br/>(Epsilon Better Intelligence)"] C --> D["Autocatalytic Optimization<br/>(AI-generated GPU kernels/tools)"] end

subgraph MarketCapture["Economic Capture"] D --> E["Superior Pricing Power<br/>(Competitive Equilibria)"] E --> F["~95% Dollar-Weighted<br/>Market Share"] F --> A end ```

Casado explains that frontier labs do not need an overwhelming capability lead to preserve immense pricing power; they merely need to be an "epsilon" better than open-source alternatives, because customers competing at the highest levels cannot afford to deploy inferior models. Furthermore, the labs benefit from autocatalytic feedback loops. Responding to Jaffee’s question about whether this mirrors "recursive self-improvement" (RSI), Casado leans on his computer science background to correct the terminology. Recursive systems reproduce an entire copy of themselves (like a compiler compiling itself), whereas an autocatalytic process uses an artifact as a tool to accelerate its own production—such as using an LLM to generate hyper-optimized GPU kernels that run AI training runs faster. Because AI benchmarking has essentially become an AI-complete challenge where true quality can only be assessed through deployment, the labs' combination of capital, compute supply lock-in, and talent gives them a credible shot at running away with the industry.

- Frontier labs command approximately 95% of dollar-weighted industry revenue three years into the generative AI boom. - Leading labs like OpenAI and Anthropic have raised on the order of $220 billion to $240 billion, surpassing the total funding raised across the rest of the downstream ecosystem. - Autocatalytic effects allow frontier labs to use intelligence to improve hardware utilization (such as automated GPU kernel writing), continuously driving down their internal unit economics. - Casado emphasizes the enduring leverage of the leading edge: “And that argument is like, listen, they've been able to maintain pricing power just by being an epsilon higher.”

---

`15:00` The Bear Case: Capital Rationalization, Open Source, and the 80/20 Split

The argument against lab dominance hinges on the rapidly expanding surface area of practical software. General foundation models have demonstrated mastery primarily in code generation and language reasoning, but sprawling enterprise domains require human services arms, systems integration, and intimate customer relationships that a centralized frontier lab cannot practically scale. Simultaneously, open-source models are maturing quickly, backed by an expanding ecosystem of specialized hosting and fine-tuning infrastructure. The current dominance of the labs is also artificially subsidized by cheap, non-rationalized capital and bulk GPU procurement advantages that will evaporate once chip supply broadens.

Casado projects that severe GPU supply constraints will likely ease around 2028, sparking a natural fragmentation of the market as enterprise buyers balk at single-vendor lock-in. While incumbents will still preserve massive financial footprints, the distribution of compute tokens will look radically different from top-line revenue. Casado ventures a long-term breakdown: the elite frontier labs will likely retain 80% of dollar-weighted market revenue—consistent with classic enterprise software monopolies—while open-source and specialized long-tail models will process roughly 60% of all token volume. At the same time, end-user applications are capturing growing customer value and beginning to push down lab margins. Explaining this structural shift, Casado notes: “I think that the big labs will probably dollar-weighted get 80% of the market going forward, because that's historically what we've seen for large incumbents. But I think token-weighted 60% will be long tail and open source.”

- GPU and compute hardware supply constraints are forecasted by Casado to ease around roughly 2028. - Long-term economic distribution projection: 80% of dollar-weighted market share accruing to incumbent frontier labs, contrasted with 60% of token-weighted usage flowing to open-source and specialized long-tail models. - Downstream software applications are increasingly proving to be durable businesses that will steadily chip away at base-model gross margin share over time.

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`16:40` OpenRouter, Model Stickiness, and Why Quality Routing Is AI-Complete

As model options multiply, developers increasingly rely on intermediaries like OpenRouter. Casado characterizes OpenRouter as a two-sided marketplace and aggregator for the long tail: while an enterprise developer might maintain direct API keys with OpenAI, Anthropic, or xAI (Grok), they route through OpenRouter to tap dozens of open and specialized alternatives from a single control point featuring consolidated billing, observability, and analytics. Despite the theoretical ease of swapping models, real-world models remain unexpectedly sticky. Switching is hampered by enterprise procurement agreements, committed cloud credits, and prompt tuning tuned specifically to individual vendor quirks.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Practical vs. Impractical Model Routing Architectures accDescr: Comparing working cost-performance routing on the Pareto frontier against the circular paradox of quality-based smart routing.

subgraph ViableRouting["Cost-Performance Routing (Viable)"] UserReq["Incoming Query / Task"] --> ParetoRouter["Pareto Router<br/>(Cursor Auto / OpenRouter)"] ParetoRouter -->|"Low-complexity task"| CheaperModel["Low-Cost / Small Model"] ParetoRouter -->|"High-complexity task"| FrontierModel["Frontier Model"] end

subgraph AICompleteTrap["Quality-Based Routing Paradox (AI-Complete)"] MetaQuery["Which model answers this best?"] --> Evaluator["Evaluating Router"] Evaluator -.->|"Requires highest intelligence<br/>to evaluate query"| Paradox["Paradox: Router must be as smart<br/>as the smartest model"] Paradox -.->|"Degenerates to"| JustUseSmartest["Default: Just send to Smartest Model"] end ```

The hosts ask whether the future belongs to "smart routers" that invisibly triage prompts to whichever model delivers the best answer. Casado bifurcates the problem into cost-performance optimization versus answer quality routing. Routing along the Pareto frontier for cost efficiency—selecting the cheapest possible model that meets a baseline task threshold, as demonstrated by Cursor Router (Cursor Auto) and OpenRouter—is proving highly successful because token costs remain a heavy burden. Conversely, dynamically routing queries based purely on qualitative accuracy is an AI-complete paradox. As Casado points out, assessing which model in the universe possesses the nuanced context to answer an obscure or sophisticated prompt effectively requires an evaluator that is already as intelligent as the most advanced frontier engine: “The only thing that can answer that question is actually like the smallest, you know, sorry, the smartest model, and then in which case you just give it to the smartest model.”

- OpenRouter serves as the brand leader and aggregator on the token path, functioning as a consolidated marketplace for analytics, observability, and long-tail model access. - Enterprise model switching remains surprisingly sluggish due to contract procurement inertia, pre-purchased enterprise credits, and prompt dependencies. - Cost-performance routing along the Pareto frontier (exemplified by Cursor Auto and OpenRouter) delivers strong production results by optimizing token expenses. - Qualitative smart routing remains an AI-complete bottleneck because selecting the ideal model for a complex problem requires intelligence equivalent to the frontier model itself.

`20:00` Jagged Frontiers, Model Routing, and OpenRouter as a Two-Sided Marketplace

Martin Casado reflects on whether the model layer ultimately resolves into a cost-optimization and routing problem. Rather than one model being strictly smarter across the board, the frontier is turning distinctly "jagged." Frontier models excel unevenly based on deliberate choices made during training—one might excel in frontend development, another in 3D generation, and another in natural language. While model routers can technically dispatch queries to specialist models based on task type, Casado cautions against over-rotating on pure routing arbitrage right now. When asked whether OpenRouter's long-term worth hinges on achieving AI-complete model routing, Casado pushes back, emphasizing that its primary power lies in its structure as a classic two-sided marketplace. By aggregating millions of active users, OpenRouter brings ready demand to new model providers while guaranteeing developers plug-and-play access to every newly released model within their existing codebases.

The economic reality of routing is currently messy. Benchmarking remains elusive, pricing models are dynamic, and labs heavily subsidize token access. Furthermore, whenever an apex model such as Claude Opus drops, it frequently proves Pareto-efficient across nearly all tasks anyway, temporarily rendering multi-model arbitrage redundant. As Casado observes about the current utility of pure algorithmic dispatching: “So I think right now that like the actual routing piece is, you know, the gains are uncertain.” Instead of complex algorithmic arbitrage, OpenRouter’s tangible value today remains its brand, massive user traffic, and marketplace liquidity.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: OpenRouter Two-Sided Marketplace Dynamic accDescr: Diagram showing how OpenRouter connects developer demand with model providers.

subgraph Developers["Developers & Applications"] D1["Unified API Integration"] D2["Immediate Access to New Models"] end

subgraph Platform["OpenRouter Platform"] M["Two-Sided Marketplace<br/>& Brand Distribution"] end

subgraph Providers["Model Providers"] P1["Frontier Labs (OpenAI, Anthropic)"] P2["Specialist & Open Models"] end

Developers -->|"Aggregated Token Demand"| M M -->|"Distribution & Users"| Providers Providers -->|"Compute & Inference"| M M -->|"Unified Access & Routing"| Developers ```

`22:00` Token Subsidies and the Disruption of Traditional Marketing

The discussion moves to how long frontier model providers can afford to subsidize compute. Casado explains that frontier labs are sitting on unprecedented capital reserves—raising up to three times more money than the entire downstream application ecosystem combined—which makes subsidizing individual users a completely rational customer-acquisition strategy. Because the vast majority of enterprise margins in software are won on high-volume business contracts, labs treat consumer and developer single-user tiers as top-of-funnel marketing. Casado contrasts this directly with his past experience operating companies, where traditional field, content, and event marketing was an unpredictable black box that rarely offered clear conversion guarantees.

By contrast, the AI paradigm has made customer acquisition almost mathematically frictionless: if a company pours capital into subsidized tokens, users flock in immediately because market demand for compute is virtually bottomless. As Casado puts it: “A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens.” While power users on fixed plans (such as $200 per month accounts at OpenAI or Anthropic) can run at steep negative margins, Casado notes that in boardroom discussions, leadership treats this as an adjustable dial. Companies deliberately tune that knob between negative gross margins to buy market share and tighter throttling to protect unit economics.

- **The top-5% user problem:** Labs rarely lose money across aggregate user bases; losses are concentrated in the top 5% of heavy consumers, sparking perpetual cat-and-mouse account restrictions. - **The marketing-to-compute shift:** AI startups are replacing ambiguous marketing campaigns (such as conferences and content collateral) with raw compute subsidies that deliver immediate, quantifiable top-of-funnel usage. - **Executive trade-offs:** Usage limits and subscription terms act as controllable dials calibrated depending on whether a board prioritizes market expansion or margin defense.

`24:45` Subscription Arbitrage and the Cat-and-Mouse Game

Casado details how users game these flat-rate pricing tiers. Highly organized operations, notably based in China, systematically exploit single-service consumer subscriptions for industrial-scale arbitrage. An operation will purchase a $200-a-month subscription tier, exhaust the monthly token allocation within three days through automated scripts, and immediately cancel the subscription to claim a prorated refund for the remaining 27 days. The extracted tokens are then repackaged and resold on secondary markets—often for around $20—giving cut-rate buyers access to full Opus-level intelligence while sticking the model providers with the compute bill.

This dynamic creates an intense security struggle between major labs and arbitrage rings. As the hosts joke that modern routing has simply devolved into financial subscription laundering, Casado confirms that this cat-and-mouse dynamic occupies significant operational focus for frontier teams trying to close billing loopholes without alienating legitimate power users.

`26:00` Capital as Capability and the Evolution of the Executive Suite

Theo Jaffee queries whether pouring capital into AI correlates directly to gaining capability. Casado distinguishes between raw intelligence and directed capability: capital can purchase extensive reinforcement learning environments or massive human annotation pipelines for specific task areas, but pushing hard on one axis often degrades performance elsewhere, fueling the uneven "jaggedness" of modern models. Yet the profound divergence from historical tech cycles is that capital now translates almost instantaneously into product and revenue, bypassing the lengthy, high-risk development timelines of legacy software engineering.

Historically, tech startups spent millions hiring engineers who worked for two years with no guarantee that the resulting software would even function or monetize. Today, deployable capital directly buys GPUs, compute, and market traction in a predictable equation. This shift is collapsing artistic, open-ended roles into pure quantitative finance. Traditional chief marketing officers and engineering leaders are increasingly acting like chief financial officers evaluating capital-to-compute conversion ratios. Framing this tectonic shift, Casado asserts: “The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Traditional Software vs AI Scale-Up Mechanics accDescr: Comparison of historical engineering risks versus modern direct capital deployment in AI.

subgraph Legacy["Historical Software R&D"] direction TB L1["Deploy $10M Capital"] --> L2["Hire Engineers & Wait 2 Years"] L2 --> L3["High Risk of Execution Failure"] L3 --> L4["Uncertain Product-Market Fit"] end

subgraph Modern["Modern AI Scale-Up Engine"] direction TB M1["Deploy $10M Capital"] --> M2["Procure Compute, RL Environments & Tokens"] M2 --> M3["Direct Model Capability & Immediate Token Demand"] M3 --> M4["Measurable Usage & Direct Monetization"] end ```

`28:30` Cursor's Historic Acquisition and the SpaceX Synthesis

The conversation turns to Cursor's landmark acquisition by SpaceX, acknowledged by the hosts and Casado as the largest private M&A transaction of a venture-backed startup in history outside of Elon Musk’s internal restructuring with X. Casado dismisses the idea that the acquisition was merely an acqui-hire for engineering talent, pointing out that Cursor was already an extraordinary standalone business experiencing record-breaking momentum. The strategic marriage brings together Cursor's proprietary programming data, active developer distribution, and application expertise with Musk’s gargantuan compute clusters and fundraising reach.

Because code synthesis is widely viewed by researchers as the core foundation for computer use, automated agents, and artificial general intelligence, pairing Cursor's execution with sovereign-scale compute creates a formidable frontier competitor. When asked whether Cursor’s reported $60 billion valuation could have stood independently outside of SpaceX, Casado affirms that private market demand would have easily supported that number based on confidential financial milestones. Contextualizing Cursor's ascent against past tech cycles, Casado reflects: “If you saw the numbers that they talked about, I mean, this is the fastest growth certainly I've ever seen in 10 years of investing and in 20 years in the Valley.”

`30:00` Synergies in Big Acquisitions and the Culture of Cursor

Martin Casado discusses the rationale and strategic value behind marquee acquisitions, noting how strong founder-level and cultural alignment can amplify an acquired business. Addressing the pairing of OpenRouter and Stripe, Casado highlights that both organizations fundamentally operate as market platforms: Stripe views payments as units of value, whereas OpenRouter approaches tokens as units of value. Similarly, placing Cursor within an organization like SpaceX makes immense cultural sense because both run on intensely engineering-driven cultures, move with extreme scrappiness, and share the core conviction that code generation and general computer use represent the true path to artificial general intelligence (AGI). When reflecting on their execution speed, Casado notes: “This is the fastest iterating team I've ever seen outside of an Elon company.” Even though being backed by an massive engineering force and vast compute infrastructure makes a company significantly more formidable, Casado maintains that standalone assets of this caliber command massive valuation in their own right.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Core Differentiators of Cursor's Engineering Culture accDescr: Diagram illustrating how Cursor balances engineering, product focus, and hiring over traditional research orientation.

subgraph Strategy["Core Strategic Approach"] P["Product-First Orientation"] E["Engineering Over Pure Model Research"] end

subgraph Culture["Execution & Hiring"] H["Founders Spend 30–40% Time Hiring"] D["Dogfooding: Building Tools for Themselves"] end

Strategy --> Culture Culture --> Out["Ultra-Fast Iteration Cycles"] ```

When asked what specific cultural traits allowed Cursor to iterate with such unmatched speed, Casado explains that most AI companies tilt excessively toward research. In typical labs, getting core engineering talent excited about anything other than novel model architectures is remarkably difficult. Cursor avoided this trap by treating their objective as an applied engineering challenge:

> “And they always kept the main thing the main thing, Cursor, which is changing how you write software engineering. And they believed fundamentally it was a product problem, not necessarily a model architecture problem.”

Casado points out that while the AI landscape is crowded with service-style fine-tuning or post-training consultancies—and pure research organizations like NeoLab—true product-led companies remain exceptionally rare. Cursor succeeded because its founders dedicated 30% to 40% of their bandwidth directly to hiring and establishing an uncompromising culture. The MTS hosts corroborate this from their own discussions with the Cursor team, who constantly build tools internally to dogfood on themselves as developers. Theo Jaffee and Sophia Dew cite former head of design Rio Lu and his project Rio OS—a retro Mac OS-style emulator—while Casado laughs about his own hobbyist habits, comparing his leisure time spent “vibe coding” retro video games to an older person in a garage assembling model train sets.

- **OpenRouter & Stripe synergy**: Shared philosophy of operating two-sided marketplaces (tokens vs. payments). - **Cursor & SpaceX synergy**: High-velocity engineering cultures aligned on computer use and coding as the bridge to AGI. - **Hiring priority**: Cursor founders consistently spent 30% to 40% of their time on talent acquisition and cultural design. - **Product orientation**: Cursor explicitly rejected positioning itself as a services/fine-tuning shop or a pure academic research lab, focusing solely on the developer workflow product.

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`33:45` Value Accrual across the Stack and Rejecting Zero-Sum Thinking

Casado pushes back against social media commentary and online critics who obsess over short-term business quality metrics to dismiss emerging AI leaders. Properties like OpenRouter and Cursor establish durable, strategic control points—OpenRouter serving as the liquidity layer and marketplace for the long tail of new models on the token path, and Cursor dominating the software development interface. Rather than value pooling in a single bottleneck, Casado observes capital and enterprise value surging simultaneously across hardware, foundation models, application interfaces, inference providers, and media tooling:

> “I mean, right now, listen, I think this is the biggest unlock of wealth I've seen in my entire career. I never thought I'd see another one after the 90s.”

Because the expansion of value is broad-based, Casado warns both operators and investors against approaching the current AI ecosystem with an adversarial or defensive mindset:

> “And, you know, I think anybody that wants to do a company or invest in the company, I would strongly recommend against zero-sum thinking or worrying about moats or defensibility too much in the near term and really think about what is strategically important in this new world that's being created.”

When asked to specify where founders should begin building to capture these opportunities, Casado admits that as a venture capitalist, he does not have to claim omniscience or map out the future unilaterally. Having founded two startups himself—including building a global venture—he recalls the agonizing toll of attempting to anticipate incumbent countermoves and shifting technical currents, describing the founder experience as feeling like a “walking ulcer all the time.” Instead of carrying that anxiety, he relies on the conviction of high-caliber founders who are willing to wager their careers and time on a market, viewing his venture role as supporting their vision rather than inventing the thesis for them.

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`36:51` Hiring for Product Taste and the Primacy of Founder-Market Fit

Casado details the hiring standards within the Andreessen Horowitz (a16z) Infrastructure team, emphasizing that they actively look for investors with direct product backgrounds. Because a16z Infra frequently targets high-value strategic acquisition outcomes, its team members must possess the instinct to assess early product-market fit long before mature financial metrics or revenue reports materialize. Candidates from purely financial backgrounds often fall short because they lack the qualitative sensitivity required to judge user feedback:

> “And I will say having worked with many great people, I actually mean, I love working with my team. But we have in the past hired people that don't have that background, like let's say they come strictly from finance. And even though they can do the work, like they can call into the customers, they just don't have the sensitivity to come back with the right answers.”

This sensitivity comes down to product taste: determining whether customers genuinely intend to purchase, whether the tool delivers enduring value, and how technical capabilities map into end-user interfaces.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Investor Philosophy Spectrum accDescr: Shows the contrast between pure founder-centric, pure market-centric, and founder-market fit philosophies.

F["Ben Horowitz View<br/>Founder is Everything"] M["Andy Rachleff View<br/>Market is Everything"] FMF["Martin Casado / a16z Infra<br/>Founder-Market Fit Intersection"]

F --- FMF --- M ```

This product focus directly shapes how Casado evaluates startups. He contrasts the prevailing schools of venture thought: the philosophy articulated by Ben Horowitz that the founder is everything, against the stance of veteran investors like former board member Andy Rachleff, who insist that the market is everything. For early-stage infrastructure investing, Casado grounds his conviction squarely at the intersection:

> “No, I'm founder market fit. I'm like literally the intersection of the founder and the market. Like I don't think unless it's very, very rare, like Travis Kalanick. These guys are so amazing and they're so rare. I think that the path that someone took to getting to a startup kind of carves them in a certain way.”

Casado explains that an individual's career experiences carve out specialized knowledge and unique intuitions that align them with specific market needs, while rendering them entirely unsuited for others. Consequently, the a16z Infra team spends the vast majority of its working hours dissecting market dynamics in the abstract, ensuring they already understand the structural needs of a domain before meeting the founders building in it. When asked what drives him personally at this stage of his career, Casado summarizes his internal drive simply: “Honestly, I'm just a hill climber,” recalling conversations with Pat Gelsinger during the acquisition of his company by VMware.

- **Investment philosophy debate**: - *Founder-centric* (e.g., Ben Horowitz): Top-tier founders will find a way regardless of headwinds. - *Market-centric* (e.g., Andy Rachleff): The market dynamics ultimately dictate success or failure. - *Founder-market fit* (Martin Casado): Sustainable early-stage infra investing relies on matching a founder’s specific lived experiences and instincts to the exact friction points of a target market. - **a16z Infra workflow**: Team members spend more time performing standalone market mapping than analyzing individual live deals, allowing rapid pattern recognition once a startup is engaged.

`40:00` Being a “Hill Climber” and Staying Long Silicon Valley

Reflecting on what fundamentally motivates him, Martin Casado recalls a pivotal conversation from his time at VMware after his startup Nicira was acquired. During a one-on-one interview, the CEO of VMware posed a question that stopped him in his tracks: “Martin, what gets you up in the morning?” Recognizing it as a heavy, philosophical inquiry, Casado admitted on the spot that he didn't have an immediate answer and asked for the night to think about it before returning the next day.

After wrestling with the question at home, he came back with a clear synthesis of his personal and professional drive. As Martin Casado recounted his answer: “Listen, listen, I am a hill climber. My first love, my absolute first love is technology and startups and and creative destruction and innovation. I am very, very long Silicon Valley. I think we've got the most unique culture in history and I love to be part of that. So as long as there's a hill for me to climb and I can do it in this place that I love, I'll be incredibly happy.”

With that philosophy framing his outlook on the current AI cycle, co-hosts Theo Jaffee and Sophia Dew wrap up the interview, thanking Casado for joining MTS and congratulating him on a milestone week that included the OpenRouter announcement.

## Notable quotes > `00:00` In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion. — Martin Casado

> `15:00` I think that the big labs will probably dollar-weighted get 80% of the market going forward, because that's historically what we've seen for large incumbents. But I think token-weighted 60% will be long tail and open source. — Martin Casado

> `26:00` The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. — Martin Casado

> `22:00` A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. — Martin Casado

> `06:50` I actually think that the causality is the more money goes to private markets, the larger the markets are going to grow and then the more returns go in the private markets. — Martin Casado

## Mentioned Martin Casado, Theo Jaffee, Sophia Dew, Andreessen Horowitz, SpaceX, Cursor, Stripe, OpenRouter, Frederick Brooks, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Dean, Oriol Vinyals, Ali Ghodsi, Databricks, OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Ideogram, Black Forest Labs, Mistral, Eli Lilly, Anthropic, xAI, Claude Opus, Elon Musk, X, NeoLab, Rio Lu, Rio OS, Ben Horowitz, Andy Rachleff, Travis Kalanick, Pat Gelsinger, VMware, Nicira

## Video description Martin Casado joins MTS hosts Theo Jaffee and Sophia Dew to unpack where value is actually accruing in AI, why this technology cycle looks fundamentally different from previous waves, and whether the frontier labs will ultimately capture most of the market. Martin explains why AI has turned venture into a scale-up capital game, where small teams can productively deploy extraordinary amounts of money, and why the relationship between capital, innovation, and growth has never been tighter. He lays out the case both for and against the frontier labs dominating AI, the role of open-source and specialist models, and why applications are increasingly capturing more value. The conversation also explores model routing, AI economics, founder-market fit, and why Martin believes this may be the biggest unlock of wealth he's seen since the 1990s.

[Source](https://mgln.ai/e/1344/afp-848985-injected.calisto.simplecastaudio.com/3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8/episodes/0f74143d-54d1-41fc-bb21-edb7d10bf376/audio/128/default.mp3?aid=rss_feed&awCollectionId=3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8&awEpisodeId=0f74143d-54d1-41fc-bb21-edb7d10bf376&feed=JGE3yC0V)

中文简报

a16z合伙人Casado:前沿AI实验室将获80%营收,开源模型占60%Token处理量 算力消耗激增使精干的工程团队能将数十亿美元直接转化为增长,让前沿实验室凭借微弱的能力优势夺得行业大部分营收,而开源模型则处理绝大多数Token体量。 Andreessen Horowitz普通合伙人Martin Casado探讨了定义本轮AI浪潮的结构性转变,指出如今小型工程团队无需承受管理臃肿的拖累,便能将数十亿美元直接部署于算力。在评估中心化前沿实验室主导与市场分散化之争时,Casado预计未来领先的实验室将占据约80%的美元加权营收,而开源及专用模型则将处理60%的Token体量。讨论分析了OpenRouter和Cursor等投资组合成功案例的战略护城河,解释了为何定性智能路由依然是一个AI完全难题,并反驳了资产负债表层面的怀疑论,主张获取核心基础设施控制点。 Martin Casado指出了一种前所未有的资本转化为算力的消耗模式:约20人的小型工程团队能够高效吸收超过20亿美元的算力,而不会产生组织臃肿。 (0:00) 前沿基础实验室目前吸纳了约95%的美元加权AI营收,但Casado预计长期将呈现80/20格局:前沿实验室占据80%的营收,而开源及长尾模型则处理总Token体量的60%。 (15:00) 沿成本与性能的帕累托前沿进行模型路由在生产环境中表现良好,但纯粹基于定性准确率的动态路由是一个AI完全难题,其所需的评估器必须与前沿模型本身同样智能。 (16:40) 诸如据报道SpaceX以600亿美元收购Cursor以及Stripe收购OpenRouter等重大并购交易表明,战略性平台控制点与应用工程工作流拥有巨大的独立市场价值。 (28:30)

Reading summary

Andreessen Horowitz general partner Martin Casado argues that artificial intelligence breaks historical software economics by converting scale capital directly into compute and market traction rather than organizational bloat. While frontier labs currently capture roughly 95% of dollar-weighted industry revenue, Casado forecasts a structural shift toward an 80/20 split where incumbent labs retain 80% of revenue while open-source models handle 60% of token volume. Direct Capital Conversion and Lean Team Scaling (0:00) Historically, pouring large amounts of capital into software startups created organizational drag and management overhead, consistent with Frederick Brooks' observation in The Mythical Man-Month that adding headcount to delayed projects slows them down. In modern AI, venture funding operates as scale-up capital that can be deployed directly into GPU compute clusters and data pipelines. Casado highlights that lean teams of approximately 20 engineers can now productively deploy $1 billion to $2 billion, decoupling an organization's output and capability from raw headcount. This direct capital sink also transforms go-to-market mechanics. Rather than spending funds on uncertain conventional marketing channels, foundation labs subsidize compute and access tokens to drive immediate customer acquisition. Because compute demand is exceptionally high, deploying capital into subsidized tokens produces measurable user growth, although it exposes providers to margin pressure and subscription arbitrage schemes. Frontier Hegemony Versus the 80/20 Distribution (11:15) The bull case for frontier research labs rests on concentrated capital and autocatalytic efficiency. Leading labs have raised between $220 billion and $240 billion—surpassing the funding of the entire downstream application ecosystem—and maintain pricing power simply by keeping an "epsilon" capability edge over open-source alternatives. Additionally, frontier labs leverage autocatalytic workflows, such as utilizing their own models to generate optimized GPU kernels that directly improve hardware utilization and reduce internal compute expenses. Conversely, the bear case against total lab dominance emphasizes the expanding surface area of specialized software, enterprise integration requirements, and an anticipated easing of hardware supply constraints by roughly 2028. Casado projects an eventual equilibrium where frontier labs capture 80% of dollar-weighted software revenue, while open-source and specialized long-tail models process 60% of aggregate token volume as enterprises diversify to avoid single-vendor lock-in. Two-Sided Aggregation and the Routing Paradox (16:40) As model options expand, developer intermediaries such as OpenRouter function as two-sided marketplaces and aggregators. They offer consolidated billing, observability, and unified API access across diverse open and proprietary models. While enterprise switching remains somewhat sluggish due to contracted credits and prompt-tuning dependencies, routing across the Pareto frontier for cost efficiency—directing routine tasks to smaller, cheaper models—delivers proven economic gains. However, Casado cautions that purely qualitative smart routing remains an AI-complete bottleneck. Selecting which model across the ecosystem will deliver the optimal answer to a complex, obscure prompt requires an evaluation engine that possesses intelligence comparable to the frontier models themselves. If a router requires frontier-level capability to evaluate a prompt, routing queries dynamically becomes redundant compared to simply querying the smartest model directly. Strategic Control Points and Product Execution (30:00) Casado argues that early-stage venture investors must focus on strategic platform control points rather than immediate balance-sheet metrics like gross margins or churn. High-profile transactions—such as SpaceX acquiring Cursor for $60 billion and Stripe acquiring OpenRouter—demonstrate the value of owning essential interfaces on the token and developer path. Placing Cursor within SpaceX aligns high-velocity engineering cultures around code generation as a core foundation for general computer use and eventual artificial general intelligence. Cursor's trajectory also reflects the value of applied product development over purely theoretical model research. By focusing squarely on developer workflow tools rather than novel architectures, its founders avoided becoming a generic fine-tuning consultancy. In early-stage infrastructure investing, Casado emphasizes founder-market fit, backing individuals whose specific professional experiences align precisely with structural market needs. Casado characterizes the generative AI expansion as a historic wealth creation event, advising founders and investors to avoid zero-sum defensiveness. An enduring strategic question remains how effectively downstream software applications can defend their gross margins and build sustained customer moats before hardware bottlenecks ease and market structures normalize around 2028.

精炼阅读摘要

Andreessen Horowitz(a16z)合伙人Martin Casado认为,生成式AI正在彻底打破软件研发的传统组织瓶颈,资本能够直接转化为算力与即时产出;未来的价值不会被前沿大模型单极垄断,而是将在占据底层控制点的前沿实验室、双边市场与产品化应用层之间形成结构化分配。 资本直转算力破除人月神话 (0:00) 回顾十年前的传统软件工程,Frederick Brooks在《人月神话》中阐述的规律始终生效:向延期的软件项目追加过多资金和人员,往往会因沟通阻力和管理复杂度飙升而导致项目进一步延误。然而Casado指出,在当今AI研发范式下,风投资金直接充当了规模化算力的载体,资金不再流向膨胀的行政人员或地产扩张,而是直接注入GPU集群与数据获取环节。这一转变实现了人类工程史上罕见的资本密度——例如仅约20人的精干团队便能高效吸收并调度超过20亿美元的算力开销,直接交付世界级多模态模型。 这种机制从根本上缩短了资本转化为功能、采用率与商业增长的周期。传统软件初创公司需要经历长达数年的开发与不确定性验证,而现代AI团队将资本直接映射为算力、强化学习环境与Tokens。与此同时,技术复杂性的激增也逆转了过去盲目崇拜大学辍学创业者的风气,促使具备深厚学术研究背景的博士创业者重新成为极具竞争力的中坚力量。 前沿模型垄断与长尾生态的博弈 (11:15) 关于AI产业链的价值沉淀,行业核心分歧在于前沿研究实验室是否会通吃整个价值链。Casado指出,看好多模态巨头的论据相当充分:前沿实验室目前占据了全行业约95%的按美元加权收入,累计融资超过2000亿美元,并且具备利用AI自身优化算力底层的“自动催化”(autocatalytic)能力(例如自动编写高度优化的GPU内核)。在高水平竞争中,领先模型只需保持极其微小的“epsilon”级智能优势,就能迫使关键企业客户持续为其买单,从而维持极强的定价权。 但反对单极垄断的逻辑同样坚实:通用大模型无法包揽企业落地所需的垂直集成与长期客户服务,且开源模型正在迅速成熟。Casado预测,随着GPU供应短缺预计在2028年左右缓解,企业对单一供应商锁定的抵制将加速市场分化。从长远来看,行业价值可能呈现典型的“八二法则”分化:前沿实验室或将维持按美元收入计算的80%市场份额,但在实际处理的Token调用总量上,开源模型和垂直长尾模型将占据约60%。 模型路由分流与Token补贴获客 (16:40) 随着模型种类激增,类似OpenRouter的双边市场平台成为关键的控制点。Casado分析,开发者的真实迁移往往受制于企业采购合同、预付云抵扣额以及Prompt对特定模型的深度依赖。在模型路由机制上,基于Pareto前沿的“成本-性能路由”(如Cursor Auto和OpenRouter)高度有效,能在满足任务基准的前提下精准指派低成本模型;然而,试图依据回答质量进行动态分发的“智能路由”却陷入了“AI完全”(AI-complete)悖论——要评估哪个模型最适合回答晦涩复杂的问题,评估器本身必须具备与最强模型匹敌的智能水平,此时直接调用最顶尖模型反而成了最优解。 在商业模式层面,坐拥巨额资金的前沿实验室正在以底层的算力补贴重塑传统营销漏斗。传统的企业营销转化路径往往充满不确定性,而直接提供算力补贴几乎能保证用户即时涌入。尽管各家平台对重度用户(尤其是最耗费算力的前5%用户)往往承担着亏损风险,甚至面临跨国套利团伙利用短期订阅疯狂套取Tokens并在二级市场转售的猫鼠游戏,但在董事会层面,算力亏损率与限流机制只是管理层用来在抢占市场与保护单位经济效益之间灵活调节的旋钮。 控制点并购与产品驱动工程文化 (30:00) 针对近期重大并购案(如SpaceX以600亿美元收购Cursor,以及Stripe收购OpenRouter),Casado强调不能单纯以财务审计视角评判处于高速爆发期的关键控制点。成熟阶段的资产负债表分析往往过度聚焦于毛利率、客户流失率或短期利润,但早期风投的核心在于识别技术架构中的必经之路。OpenRouter作为Token路径上的双边流动性中枢,与Stripe在支付领域的定位高度吻合;而Cursor与SpaceX的结合,则融合了Cursor在代码合成和产品开发上的极速迭代能力,与马斯克旗下庞大的主权级算力集群。 Casado强调,大多数AI初创团队容易过度偏向纯学术模型研究,或退化为定制微调咨询机构;Cursor的胜出在于坚守产品定位,将代码生成视为改变软件开发流程的“产品工程问题”,其创始人将30%至40%的时间精力投入到招聘与工程师文化建设中。对于早期投资而言,盲目追求短期护城河或零和博弈并不可取,核心在于敏锐捕捉技术栈变革中具有战略不可替代性的控制点,并寻找个人特质与市场痛点高度嵌合的“创始人-市场匹配度”(Founder-Market Fit)。 Martin Casado明确反对将当前AI发展视为零和博弈或过早纠结于传统护城河的防御心态,坚信这是其从业生涯中见证的最大规模财富释放。然而,前沿实验室的高昂研发开销能否持续依靠资本补贴支撑,以及各垂直领域应用能否在2028年算力瓶颈缓解后摆脱对通用底座模型的依赖,仍将是检验整个AI价值链格局能否最终走向多元平衡的关键考验。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期播客由 MTS 主持人 Theo Jaffee 和 Sophia Dew 主持,嘉宾为 a16z 普通合伙人 Martin Casado,于 2026 年 8 月 22 日在 RSS 及各大播客平台发布。节目主要探讨了 AI 领域的价值沉淀路径、本轮技术周期与以往的根本差异、前沿实验室与应用层的竞争博弈,以及为何当前的 AI 浪潮构成了 90 年代以来规模最大的财富释放。 ## TL;DR Martin Casado 深入拆解了 AI 时代资本与工程逻辑的剧变:极少数人的精英小团队如今能以惊人效率消化数十亿美元资本,彻底颠覆了传统软件工程的《人月神话》。他系统对比了前沿模型实验室“通吃一切”与生态多元化/应用层崛起的双重视角,并结合 OpenRouter 的双边市场机制与 Cursor 的产品至上主义,剖析了技术栈中关键战略控制点的形成。Casado 强调当下的企业增长与研发反馈极为直接,整个技术栈全链路都在捕获巨大价值,并指出早期基础设施投资的核心在于敏锐的产品嗅觉与“创始人-市场匹配度”。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话节奏轻快且充满硅谷一线特有的高密度行业洞察,两位主持人善于从硬核技术与资本动态切入,与 Casado 形成了高度专业、默契十足的探讨氛围。Casado 的表达兼具资深科学家的严谨与连续创业者的风趣自嘲,不仅毫无保留地分享了董事会层面的内幕博弈与产业套利黑客现象,还生动描绘了创始人日常承受的“战略胃溃疡”。访谈在畅谈宏大商业格局之余,更贯穿着一种对技术纯粹主义、颠覆性创新与硅谷文化的炽热信念,听感振奋人心且极具思想冲击力。 ## Bulletin - `05:00` Martin Casado 指出 AI 打破了传统软件工程的《人月神话》,现今 20 人左右的精简团队即可高效调度 20 亿美元以上的研发与算力资本,将资金直接转化为模型能力与用户增长。 - `15:00` 前沿实验室虽占据约 95% 的市场份额并享有定价权,但 Casado 预测未来按美元计价大实验室将占 80%,而在 Token 消耗量维度上,60% 将属于长尾与开源模型。 - `15:00` 基于回答质量的智能路由被定性为“AI 完全问题”,而基于成本与性能帕累托前沿的性价比路由切实可行,OpenRouter 等平台的核心壁垒更在于其双边网络效应与需求端聚合。 - `27:14` Cursor 以 600 亿美元被 SpaceX 收购、Stripe 收购 OpenRouter 等重磅交易表明,代码与计算机交互正成为通向 AGI 的战略控制点,当前浪潮是自 90 年代以来规模最大的财富释放。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` AI 颠覆了风险投资与软件工程的底层规律,资金反馈回路大幅缩短,资本运作演变为极少数核心人员调度数十亿美元的“规模化资本游戏”。 - `02:30` 创始人背景呈现两极化趋势,不仅有低龄退学极客,兼具深度学术积淀与工程能力的资深博士也重新成为核心创新的中坚力量。 - `06:45` 非公开市场的充沛资金并未造成资产类别容量过剩,反而推迟了企业上市节点并拓宽了整体潜在市场空间(TAM)。 - `10:00` 早期投资的核心在于寻找新技术栈的关键战略控制点,而非单纯盯紧短期的财务报表或损益状况。 - `10:00` 前沿实验室的飞轮本质上是“自动催化效应”(例如人类借助 AI 编写极速 GPU kernel 反哺底层),而非 Nick Bostrom 语境下的泛化递归自我改进(RSI)。 - `15:00` 随着垂直业务场景复杂化以及 2028 年左右算力供应瓶颈的缓解,开源与长尾生态将占据 Token 消耗的大头,价值正持续向上层应用转移。 - `15:00` 基于质量的路由由于需要“最聪明的大脑”做仲裁因而不切实际,当前切实可行的是在成本与性能构成的帕累托边界上做性价比路由。 - `20:00` OpenRouter 的本质是汇聚数百万高频用户与主流开发者的双边市场与聚合品牌,而非单纯依赖跨模型套利算力。 - `22:21` Token 补贴彻底重构了传统企业级营销,将不可预测的获客漏斗转化为“投入资金即刻换取无限 Token 需求”的确定性商业杠杆。 - `24:45` 资本可以直接兑现为强化学习环境构建与专家标注能力,工程与市场负责人的职能正趋向于由财务逻辑主导的资源分配。 - `30:00` Cursor 团队将自身坚定定义为纯粹的“产品公司”而非科研实验室,凭借自产自用(Dogfooding)与极致的工程迭代速度取得爆发性增长。 - `33:23` 当前价值正在从芯片、前沿模型到应用层的全栈各环节全面沉淀,从业者应摒弃零和思维与短视的防御壁垒焦虑。 - `36:39` 早期基础设施投资更看重“创始人-市场匹配度”(Founder-Market Fit)以及对产品的敏锐品味,投资人应通过深度行业推演来匹配愿意全力承担宏观焦虑的顶尖团队。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` AI 价值走向的双重路径与播客开场 讨论从当前关于 AI 行业格局最核心的争论切入:未来的价值沉淀究竟遵循哪种走向?一种是前沿实验室(Frontier Labs)通吃一切,另一种则是非实验室阵营凭借专业化与应用层占据主导。两种推演都有着极其强硬的论据支撑。在此背景下,AI 不仅改变了公司能构建什么,更彻底重塑了资本运作的底层规律。小规模团队现在能够以前所未有的效率消化并运转巨额资本,并以远快于以往任何技术周期的速度,将资金转化为算力、使用量与业务增长。 播客主持人 Theo Jaffee 与 Sophia Dew 隆重介绍了本期嘉宾——Andreessen Horowitz(a16z)普通合伙人、负责公司基础设施投资方向的 Martin Casado。节目录制正值科技并购风起云涌的一周:SpaceX 宣布以 600 亿美元收购 Cursor,Stripe 亦达成协议收购 OpenRouter,这两家明星企业均为 a16z 投资的标的。Martin 幽默地感叹道,虽然这些成果看似在几天内集中爆发,但背后其实是整整十年的积累与蓄力。 Martin Casado 在总结当下的资本转化效率时指出:“Let's say you put in $10 to do this. I don't know if you get $9 back on the other side of that, but what we've never been able to do in the history of this industry is put in $10 and get anything back. But now it really is $10 in and then some amount out pretty directly.” - 当前 AI 演进的两大核心假设:前沿实验室通吃(Labs win everything)对决生态多元化格局(Labs don't win everything)。 - 近期两大标志性事件落地:SpaceX 以 600 亿美元收购 Cursor,Stripe 宣布收购 OpenRouter。 - 资本反馈回路发生质变:投入资金后能迅速转化为实际的使用量与直接的价值回流。 --- ### `02:30` 创业者的学历悖论:名校退学潮与博士创业者的回归 主持人和 Martin 探讨了当今技术创始人的背景分野。Theo 提到 Martin 是在 30 岁左右完成了斯坦福的硕士与博士学位,而当下像 Cursor 的创始人往往在 20 岁出头就从大学退学创立公司。面对“退学还是深造”的路径选择,Martin 回忆自己本科与研究生之间曾在国家实验室工作过,他认为接地气的实践经验极其重要,能避免纯学术视角的狭隘。如今社会舆论正处于一种微妙的分裂状态:一边是抨击高等教育、推崇退学创业的流行文化;另一边则是 AI 涉及极其底层的深度研究,学术训练的必要性达到了前所未有的高度。 随着行业深入,技术实验室的创始阵容呈现出两极化:一端是年仅 22 岁的天才少年,另一端则是像 Jeff Dean 和 Oriol Vinyals 这样拥有数十年顶尖科研积淀的行业泰斗。在硅谷传统的叙事中,读完博士往往被戏称为“创业失败者的标志”,因为如果在博士就读期间有了足够亮眼的想法,早就应该像当年谷歌的 Sergey Brin 和 Larry Page 那样退学创业。但当下这一代由技术驱动的浪潮彻底颠覆了旧范式,博士创业者的含金量正在全面复兴。 Martin Casado 评价当下的教育与创业趋势时说道:“I think we're in a bit of a schizophrenic period, which suggests to me you should do exactly what you're feeling is right for you. I think both paths are totally legitimate.” - 创始人画像的两极分布:既有二十岁出头的新锐年轻人,也有坐拥数十年顶级研究经验的资深科研巨擘。 - 博士背景从“负面信号”逆转:过去认为读完博士说明缺乏商业嗅觉,而如今在深度学习与基础模型领域,博士学位几乎成了孵化硬核创新的摇篮。 - 社交媒体(如 X)上的舆论偏向年轻少壮派,但从加权和行业实际表现来看,兼具高学历与深度工程能力的高精尖团队正在引领风潮。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 创始人背景演进对比 accDescr: 对比传统互联网时代与当前深度学习 AI 时代对创始人学历与背景的价值评判 subgraph Traditional["传统互联网时代范式"] T1["名校退学创业 (如 Sergey / Larry)"] -->|"被视为拥有极高商业敏锐度"| T3["高估值与风投追捧"] T2["攻读完成博士学位"] -->|"被戏称缺乏落地想法"| T4["学术象限或大厂研发"] end subgraph Modern["当前深度学习 / AI 时代范式"] M1["低龄极客团队 (20岁出头退学)"] -->|"快速工程化与敏捷迭代"| M3["两极皆获市场高度认可"] M2["资深博士/国家实验室/顶级学者"] -->|"底层深度研究与架构突破"| M3 end ``` --- ### `05:00` 规模化资本游戏:从“人月神话”到 20 人花掉 20 亿美元 对话随后深入探讨了软件工程物理法则的根本重构。在过去,如果给一家初创团队 10 亿美元,盲目招聘和扩张办公室只会导致组织臃肿、烧钱失控并最终崩溃,这就是经典《人月神话》所揭示的规律——通过堆砌人力往往无法缩短开发周期,反而会稀释产品路线并带来毁灭性的组织复杂度。然而在 AI 时代,资本运作蜕变成了一种“规模化资本游戏”(Scale-up Capital Game)。极其精简的微型团队现在能够以合乎工程逻辑的方式,将海量资金直接倾注进算力与训练管线中,而不会陷入组织内耗。 Martin 透露了一个极具冲击力的行业事实:如今广受数千万人使用、排名前列的某顶级多模态大模型,其核心构建团队仅有大约 20 人左右,而消耗的研发与算力成本高达 20 亿美元以上。这在人类工程史上是绝无仅有的奇观,它证明资本不仅能直接转化为技术能力,还能在极短时间内拉动惊人的用户增长。 Martin Casado 在强调这种生产力变革时断言:“In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion. Like, what does that even mean? Put that much money to work with that small of a team in that small of a timeline.” - 颠覆《人月神话》的经典定律:传统软件无法靠加钱招人来加速研发,而 AI 模型开发通过算力集群直接将资本转化为智力与功能产出。 - 20 人承载 20 亿美元:极少的核心技术骨干主导数十亿美元级别的算力开销,组织复杂性被降至最低。 - 资金吸纳效率空前:衡量团队竞争力的标准不再单纯是谁能写出更好的业务软件代码,而是谁能以极高效率部署大规模资本并推动底层模型飞轮运转。 --- ### `06:45` 风险投资认知的颠覆与 a16z 的早期全栈押注 Martin 指出,传统风投界长期存在一种落后的“零和思维”(Zero-sum thinking),认为风险投资容量狭小、好公司寥寥无几、无法部署海量资本,甚至认为市场存在“过度融资”。而在新时代,这种陈旧观念被彻底粉碎。一方面,优秀企业选择长期保持私有化(Private),在非公开市场中完成巨额价值沉淀;另一方面,基础模型极度饥渴地消耗资金,同时将其以肉眼可见的速度转化为实际增长。关于到底是“技术浪潮消耗了资本”还是“私人市场资本催生了更大市场”,Martin 倾向于因果关系是后者:更多的资金注入未上市市场,极大地拓宽了整体潜在市场空间(TAM),使企业无须过早上市就能达成惊人的体量。 回顾 a16z 自身的发展,作为硅谷技术信念最强烈的风投基金之一,他们始终坚信“从长期来看技术终将奏效”。在 OpenAI 尚处于非营利早期实验性质阶段时,a16z 内部就曾严肃探讨是否应该全面押注 AI,这比 ChatGPT 的爆发早了整整七年。在经历无人机和自动驾驶浪潮后,面对这轮生成式 AI 浪潮,a16z 以前瞻性的行动节奏在整个版图上广泛落子,投资了 OpenAI、Cursor、ElevenLabs、Ideogram、Black Forest Labs(BFL)、Mistral 等一系列重量级项目,牢牢掌握了整个 AI 基础设施与前沿模型层的核心入口。 在抨击风投传统狭隘视角并阐释资本与市场关系时,Martin Casado 明确表示:“I happen to think causality goes the other way, which is if you put more money privately, into the private markets, it actually grows the TAM. And companies don't need to go public as quickly. And companies can do more privately.” - 破除风投资产类别容量受限的迷思:模型对资本的高效吸收与转化,打破了风投无法承载超大资金规模的陈旧成见。 - 资本推动 TAM 扩张:非公开市场提供充沛弹药,推迟了 IPO 的时间节点,在私有化阶段直接培育出超级独角兽。 - a16z 的前瞻布局:早在 ChatGPT 面世七年前就开始推演全面押注 AI 的可行性,并在模型层与工具链(涵盖语音、图像生成、代码助手及开源基座模型)上构建起庞大投资组合。 ### `10:00` 早期投资视角与前沿实验室“通吃”的论据 谈及如何评估 AI 公司的价值,Martin Casado 区分了只看资产负债表的增长期投资人与早期投资人的本质区别。在财务视角下,投资人关注利润率、客户流失率(churn)以及收入质量,但如果完全抛开技术和战略价值,仅仅盯住资产负债表,就会错失全局。Casado 强调:“有些公司可能会亏损,但它们会走到一个能够主导巨额价值转移的位置(command a tremendous transfer of value)。”作为早期投资人,核心是要看这家公司是否占据了新技术栈中的关键控制点。 面对主持人提到关于“前沿实验室(Frontier Labs,如 OpenAI、Anthropic)将吃掉一切领域,甚至进军生物医药、颠覆传统药企”的观点,Casado 透露 a16z 内部近期召开过闭门离线会(offsite),围绕“模型的未来”展开了深度讨论。Casado 指出,这其中存在两条针锋相对但都极具说服力的逻辑线。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 前沿实验室通吃市场的核心逻辑架构 accDescr: 展示前沿实验室依靠资本优势、微弱领先与自动催化效应维持市场垄断的闭环机制 subgraph CapitalGrowth["资本与收入垄断"] A["三年数据支持:<br/>占据 95% 市场份额"] --> B["超大规模融资:<br/>规模超越整个下游总和"] B --> C["资本直接转化为算力与增长"] end subgraph Advantage["护城河与飞轮"] C --> D["前沿微弱领先 (Epsilon Superiority):<br/>掌握极高定价权"] D --> E["自动催化效应 (Autocatalytic):<br/>AI 构建更强 AI 优化经济模型"] E --> F["买断顶级算力供应 (GPU 垄断)"] end F --> A ``` 支持前沿实验室将“赢下一切”的核心论据包括: - **市场份额压倒性领先**:过去三年的数据显示,前沿实验室掌控了约 95% 的市场份额,在按美元计价的收入中占据绝对大头。 - **资本转化效率极高**:OpenAI 和 Anthropic 筹集了极其庞大的资金规模,远远超过下游整个生态系统的融资总和,且能将资本直接转化为业务增长。 - **微小领先即可享有定价权**:在竞争均衡中,身处前沿并不需要大幅领先,只需保持极其微小的优势(epsilon higher),就能维持极强的定价权。 - **供应链掌控力**:前沿实验室垄断了受限的算力供应,具备批量采购顶级 GPU 的绝对资源优势。 针对前沿实验室的飞轮效应,Casado 提出了“自动催化效应”(autocatalytic effects)这一概念。当主持人询问这是否就是“递归自我改进”(Recursive Self-Improvement,简称 RSI)时,拥有计算机科学博士学位的 Casado 纠正了这种说法。他认为“递归”意味着程序或编译器直接生成自身的完整副本,而当前 AI 领域的实际情况是:人类利用 AI 工具去编写人类写不出的极速 GPU kernel,从而优化底层硬件利用率,反哺后续模型的构建与运行。Casado 认为将这种现象泛称为 RSI 是 Nick Bostrom 时代留下的用词惯性,而“自动催化效应”才是准确描述 AI 作为生产工具不断优化产业自身单位经济模型的正确框架。 --- ### `15:00` 反方论据:开源生态、算力配额缓解与应用层崛起 在剖析完前沿实验室的强势之后,Casado 详尽阐述了“前沿实验室不会赢下一切”的反方逻辑。首要原因在于 AI 面向的业务接触面(surface area)正在急剧膨胀,目前实验室真正擅长的主要是代码和语言推理;一旦深入更复杂的垂直领域,需要配套专业服务团队并深入客户场景,单一大组织根本无法全面覆盖。此外,模型实验室当下的超高速增长很大程度依赖于低成本资本的投喂,随着市场对高估值的理性回归,加之 2028 年左右算力供应链瓶颈有望缓解,大实验室批量垄断 GPU 的优势将被大幅削弱,技术历史中一贯的“碎片化与多元化”必然再次发生。 关于未来的市场格局,Casado 给出了个人推测:“如果让我猜的话,我认为按美元计价,大实验室未来可能会拿到 80% 的市场份额,因为这是我们在大型现任者身上见过的历史规律;但在 token 消耗量维度上,60% 将属于长尾和开源模型。”与此同时,价值正在不可逆地向上层应用转移。应用层不仅业务表现亮眼,而且在逐步侵蚀利润份额,未来会捕获越来越多的行业总价值。 在这个过程中,像 OpenRouter 这类平台展现了聚合长尾市场的生态价值。对于主流开发者而言,除了手头常备的 Anthropic、OpenAI 或 xAI Grok 的 API Key,其余模型均可通过 OpenRouter 进行调用。它构成了连接长尾模型的双边市场,在 token 传输路径上形成了具有极高辨识度的品牌聚合器。 在谈到“模型智能路由”(Smart Routing)时,Casado 指出开发者原本以为模型可以随意替换,但现实中由于采购协议、折扣额度等商务绑定,模型具有很高的黏性。关于路由的技术路线,Casado 提出了明确的边界划分: | 路由考量维度 | 现实可行性与评估 | |:--- |:--- | | **基于回答质量的路由 (Quality Routing)** | 被 Casado 认定为属于 **AI 完全问题(AI-complete problem)**。若想判断哪种模型回答该问题最好,本身就需要宇宙中最聪明的模型来做决策;如果是这样,直接把问题交给最聪明的模型即可。 | | **基于性价比与帕累托前沿的路由 (Cost/Performance Routing)** | **切实可行且成果显著**。在给定任务下,优先在成本与性能构成的帕累托最优边界(Pareto Frontier)上匹配最便宜的模型,Cursor Auto、Cursor Router 及 OpenRouter 在此场景下表现极佳。 | 针对智能路由的技术本质,Martin Casado 总结道:“如果想要回答‘解答该问题需要宇宙中最聪明的事物具备什么能力’,我认为你必须本身就是宇宙中最聪明的事物才能回答。你明白我的意思吗?唯一能回答这个问题的恰恰是最聪明的模型,而如果是这样的话,你直接把问题抛给最聪明的模型就好了。” ### `20:00` 模型能力的参差与 OpenRouter 的双边市场本质 关于模型路由(model routing)是否仅仅沦为一种“成本优化”手段,Martin Casado 坦言业内众说纷纭,目前尚无定论。当前的尖端模型正在变得极度“参差不齐”(jagged)。这种差异并非单纯指核心技术能力的高低,更多是模型创造团队在路线决策上的取舍:有的团队专注于前端生成,有的精于 3D 渲染,有的则在自然语言上见长。虽然未来由专业模型构成的生态必将由模型路由来调度(判断何时用代码模型、语言模型或前端模型),但从目前各类应用公司(如 a16z 投资的大量应用组合)的实践来看,实际落地中的纯路由收益仍不明朗。 针对主持人关于“OpenRouter 的价值是否在于最终实现全自动 AI 路由”的提问,Martin 指出外界过度执着于纯粹的路由与套利功能,忽视了其作为“双边市场”(two-sided marketplace)的根本价值。OpenRouter 的核心产品之一其实是**需求端本身**:平台握有数以百万计的高频用户,向模型厂商谈判时可以作为流量入口;同时向开发者承诺第一时间接入最新模型,无需繁琐的系统改动。虽然长期来看套利空间会持续扩大,但当下评估实际路由收益极其困难,原因在于: - 模型基准测试(benchmarking)本身极难标准化; - 算力与模型定价往往高度动态且处于巨额补贴状态; - 每当新的划时代模型发布时,它往往在所有维度上呈现帕累托最优(Pareto efficient),例如直接调用一次 Claude 4/5 即可覆盖所有需求,削弱了跨模型路由的必要性。 Martin 强调,OpenRouter 作为一个极其流行且成功的互联网产品与品牌,其核心基本盘始终在于双边网络效应,而非单纯算法驱动的模型路由。 --- ### `22:21` Token 补贴与传统营销逻辑的瓦解 对话转向尖端实验室的模型补贴何时停止。Martin 直截了当地指出,实验室之所以敢于疯狂补贴,是因为他们能筹集到比整个下游生态系统总和还要高出三倍的充裕资金,并且“所有的利润最终反正都是从企业级(Enterprise)市场赚回来的”。以往创办企业时,市场营销(无论是现场地推、内容运营还是赞助会议)不仅成本高昂,且线索(Leads)与销售线索转化率(SQL)极难衡量。然而在 AI 时代,这一传统营销逻辑被彻底颠覆:只要投入资金补贴 Token,就能即时换取用户,因为市场对 Token 的需求几乎是无穷无尽的。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: AI补贴与传统营销对比 accDescr: 对比传统市场营销漏斗与AI时代直接补贴Token转化用户的路径差异 subgraph TRAD["传统企业营销 (高不确定性)"] direction TB M1["营销预算投入"] --> M2["地推/展会/内容分发"] M2 --> M3["不确定的销售线索 (SQL)"] M3 --> M4["周期长、转化链路模糊"] end subgraph AI["AI Token 驱动 (高确定性)"] direction TB A1["资本投入补贴"] --> A2["提供免费/廉价Token"] A2 --> A3["直接获取海量真实开发者与用户"] A3 --> A4["从头部企业级客户变现高毛利"] end ``` 针对“在 200 美元月费套餐中高频调用是否会让 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 亏损严重”的疑问,Martin 透露这在董事会层面实际上是一个非常精准的“控制旋钮”(knob): - 亏损往往只集中在最顶端的 5% 极端重度用户身上,平台会像打地鼠(whack-a-mole)一样通过封禁多账号等机制加以限制; - 董事会经常直接辩论:是将旋钮调向亏损与负毛利,以极速扩张漏斗顶端(Top-of-funnel)与使用量,还是调向正向毛利回收现金流; - Martin Casado 评价这种业务模式转型道:“A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. And so in many ways, it's kind of disrupting the entire marketing.” --- ### `24:45` 账户洗劫套利与“资本即能力”的新商业常态 Martin 分享了一个极具产业黑客色彩的真实案例:有来自中国的极精明团队专门对海外模型服务进行结构性套利。他们会开通 200 美元的高阶订阅计划,在短短三天内通过高并发脚本榨干全部 Token 额度,随后利用退款条款立即取消订阅,按照未使用的 27 天按比例追回预付费,从而以接近白嫖的成本套取高价值算力,再转手包装成 20 美元的低价代充或转接服务卖给散客。这种在各大头部实验室眼皮底下洗劫算力套餐的“猫鼠游戏”,展现了算力套利市场的疯狂。 深入到技术与资本的关系时,Martin 阐明了其核心洞见:资本现在几乎可以直接兑换为模型能力与业务增长。如果要让模型在特定领域 X 变强,企业可以直接投钱搭建强化学习(RL)环境,或者斥巨资雇用各行业专家标注答题——资本能够立竿见影地换取针对 X 的能力提升。虽然模型能力参差(jaggedness)会导致某些其他维度的取舍未知,但这打破了整个软件产业的历史规律:过去向研发投入千万美元需要经历漫长的工程试错,两年后产品大概率面临失败;而现在投入资金,产出是高度直接且确定性反馈的。 Martin 总结道,在这种新范式下,市场总监(CMO)和工程负责人都在逐渐退化为“套着风衣的首席财务官(CFO in a trench coat)”,因为工程不再单纯探讨复杂的架构艺术,而是归结为能否融到购买 GPU 的资金;营销也不再讨论渠道与内容,而是简化为补贴旋钮的高低。正如 Martin Casado 所强调的:“The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. And by the way, I really think that is the big thing that's going on here in the industry.” --- ### `27:14` Cursor 创纪录被收购背后的估值与逻辑 谈话转移到本周另一桩震动业界的重磅交易——Cursor 被 SpaceX 收购(Martin 认为这是除埃隆·马斯克对 X 的内部关联交易外,风险投资支持的初创公司有史以来规模最大的独立私募并购案)。探讨这笔高达 600 亿美元估值的核心逻辑时,Martin 否定了单纯的“人才收购”假说,指出这是一场算力、数据与前沿技术路径的深度聚合: - Cursor 拥有无可比拟的代码数据与工作流资产,而马斯克与 SpaceX 拥有极为庞大的算力集群; - 业界普遍意识到,代码编写(Coding)正是通往更广泛的计算机操作(Computer Use)乃至 AGI(通用人工智能)的关键路径; - 尖端模型竞赛本质上是一场资本游戏,而马斯克拥有全行业最顶尖的资本调动能力。 针对 Cursor 高达 600 亿美元的估值是否全靠 SpaceX 溢价的质疑,Martin 给予了否决。他确认在交易达成之前,Cursor 哪怕以独立公司的身份也能在私募市场上轻松以该估值完成融资。尽管公开二级市场的反应无法预测,但 Cursor 私下展现出的真实业务增长指标令人震撼。Martin Casado 由衷感叹道:“If you saw the numbers that they talked about, I mean, this is the fastest growth certainly I've ever seen in 10 years of investing and in 20 years in the Valley.” - **历史级并购**:Cursor 被收购成为硅谷风投史上规模最大的独立初创公司私募 M&A 交易。 - **协同优势**:Cursor 提供专属代码工程数据与最快的分发入口,SpaceX 与马斯克生态补充巨量算力与前沿资本。 - **独立价值佐证**:600 亿美元的估值完全经得起私募投资人的尽调支撑,其增长斜率刷新了 Martin 过去 20 年在硅谷见识过的所有历史纪录。 ### `30:00` 战略收购的逻辑与 Cursor 的“产品至上”文化 对话伊始,主持人和 Martin Casado 探讨了假想或真实的重大并购场景所蕴含的战略逻辑。在谈及类似并购的协同效应时,Casado 剖析道,OpenRouter 与 Stripe 的结合极其合理,因为两家公司的底层世界观高度一致——都以“市场(Marketplace)”的视角看世界,Stripe 将支付流视作价值承载,OpenRouter 则将 Token 流视作价值承载,在创始人层面有着极强的同频。同理,若将 Cursor 放在具备庞大算力与工程资源的体系(如 SpaceX)中审视,两者的文化也高度契合:它们极度工程导向,深信代码与通用的计算机交互才是通向 AGI 的路径,并且执行力极强、极具创业韧性(scrappy)。Casado 称赞道:“这是我见过的除埃隆·马斯克旗下公司之外迭代最快的团队(This is the fastest iterating team I've ever seen outside of an Elon company)。” 当被问及 Cursor 究竟凭何具备如此迅捷的迭代速度时,Casado 指出,当下的 AI 公司普遍存在“科研过载(research-heavy)”的倾向,如果不在做全新的模型架构,核心技术团队往往很难被调动起来。但 Cursor 的团队却始终坚守核心目标:彻底改变软件工程的编写方式。他们从根本上认为这是一个“产品问题”,而非单纯的“模型架构问题”: - **招聘与文化权重高**:创始人将约 30% 到 40% 的时间专门用于招聘和建设公司文化,网罗了极高水准的工程人才。 - **工程优先于模型科研**:Casado 强调模型架构和研究固然重要,但它们具备不同的生命周期,需要完全不同的研究环境,而 Cursor 当时并不以此为核心。 - **纯粹的产品型公司定位**:市场上充斥着“类似 Palantir”的技术服务公司(如做微调、后训练的服务团队)或是类似 Neolab 这样的纯研究实验室,但 Cursor 旗帜鲜明地将自己定位为“产品公司”。 主持人 Sophia Dew 与 Theo Jaffee 也补充了 Cursor 内部浓厚的“自产自用(Dogfooding)”文化:Cursor 团队成员全都是开发者,他们不断为自己开发工具并自我测试。例如前设计主管 Rio Lu 曾做过一个名为 Rio OS 的复古 Mac 风格模拟器项目。Casado 笑着接话说,自己平时也以一种“可笑的 VC 方式”玩 Vibe Coding 去写复古电子游戏,这就像过去中老年人在车库里鼓捣遥控火车模型一样,如今的爱好变成了用 AI 搓复古小游戏。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Cursor 与多数 AI 公司的发展路径差异 accDescr: 对比传统 AI 实验室的研究与服务导向,与 Cursor 以产品为核心、快速迭代驱动的区别。 subgraph LABS["多数 AI 初创团队"] L1["专注底层模型架构"] --> L2["研究周期漫长"] L1 --> L3["偏向外包/微调服务"] end subgraph CURSOR["Cursor 团队范式"] C1["30%-40% 精力用于招聘与文化"] --> C2["定义为纯粹的『产品公司』"] C2 --> C3["自产自用 (Dogfooding)"] C3 --> C4["针对真实开发流超高速迭代"] end ``` --- ### `33:23` 价值正在全栈捕获:自 90 年代以来最大的财富爆发 从 Cursor 和 OpenRouter 的市场动向中,Casado 反思了当下科技舆论场(如社交平台 X)上盛行的冷嘲热讽(schadenfreude)与针对商业质量指标的苛责。很多评论家往往看走眼了,忽视了这类业务本身拥有巨大的未来期权(optionality): - **OpenRouter**:牢牢占据 Token 路由的关键路径,是长尾模型和新兴模型双向交易市场的领头羊。 - **Cursor**:在软件工程开发工具领域确立了绝对的统治地位。 这些产品构成了关键的“战略控制点(strategic control points)”。针对“价值究竟沉淀在技术栈哪一层”的争议,Casado 直言,外界非要从单一交易中推导底层趋势的做法并不准确,因为现实是整个技术栈的各个环节都在狂赚价值——NVIDIA 表现惊人、前沿模型公司势头强劲、应用层百花齐放、推理公司与媒体生成公司均在大规模变现。 面对这股浪潮,Casado 发出了极高评价的论断:“说实话,我认为这是我整个职业生涯中见过的最大规模的财富释放,我从没想过在 90 年代之后还能再见到一次(I mean, right now, listen, I think this is the biggest unlock of wealth I've seen in my entire career. I never thought I'd see another one after the 90s)。”他强烈建议当下的创业者和投资人,必须立刻摒弃零和博弈思维,也不要在短期内过度纠结于所谓的“护城河”和“防御壁垒(defensibility)”,而是应当将眼光放远,全力思考在这个正在成型的新世界里,究竟什么是具备全局战略重要性的资产。 --- ### `35:28` VC 的“偷懒”哲学与创始人所承受的“科技下棋溃疡” 当主持人询问,在当前的新世界中如果有创业者前来求教“我该去哪起步、去哪构建”时,Casado 给出了一个极为坦诚且出人意料的回答:作为风险投资人,最美妙的一点就是“我根本不需要知道答案”。 很多外行人误以为 VC 能洞察未来、有一套现成的未来推演框架,Casado 澄清自己根本没有: 1. **创业者的精神溃疡**:Casado 曾创办过两家公司,深知做全局性大业务的痛苦。创始人必须时刻将自己的神经系统接入宏观的“技术战略棋局”,每天都得殚精竭虑:未来会怎样?巨头会有什么动作?底层技术转向会不会在一夜之间让我彻底边缘化?“这就像天天揣着个会走动的胃溃疡一样(it's like a walking ulcer all the time)。” 2. **VC 的定位与借梦前行**:Casado 幽默地表示,既然整个生态里有那么多创始人愿意主动替大家去扛这个“溃疡”,每天夜不能寐地去构想未来,那他作为投资人,非常乐意“搭乘他们的梦想,并全力支持他们(I'm very happy to borrow along their dreams and support them)”。 3. **投资决策的直觉逻辑**:只要在一个自己能看懂的赛道里,有三到四个极强的创始人愿意押上自己的机会成本、牺牲陪伴家人的时间全力入场,他就默认这是一个值得做的好领域并直接下注,绝不妄加揣测或过度自我怀疑。 --- ### `36:39` a16z Infra 的团队画像:敏锐的产品嗅觉与“创始人-市场匹配度” 在谈及 a16z 基础设施(Infra)投资团队的招聘标准与选人哲学时,Casado 详细拆解了为什么纯金融背景在早期技术投资中往往行不通,以及为什么他们极度渴求具备“产品背景(product background)”的人才: - **从产品接口洞察战略价值**:a16z Infra 拥有数量极多的战略并购退出案例,这得益于他们总是将初创项目视为具有战略价值的资产。评估这类资产的核心是在财务数据尚不完备的极早期,看透其技术如何映射到产品、产品又如何映射到市场演进。 - **金融背景与“产品品味(Taste)”的隔阂**:团队过去曾招募过纯金融背景的人,虽然他们工作很拼、也能严格执行对客户的调研 Call,但他们往往缺乏关键的“敏感度(sensitivity)”与品味,无法准确嗅出客户到底会不会真正购买、产品能否形成长期价值。 - **投资流派的争论与 a16z Infra 的落点**:投资界往往分立为两大阵营——以 Ben Horowitz 为代表的“创始人至上派”(认为最顶尖的创始人是一切的核心),以及像 Andy Rachleff 这样的“市场至上派”(坚信市场是一切,好市场才能成就伟业)。但 Casado 坚称,基础设施赛道在他们所处的阶段,唯一最重要的核心考量是 **Founder-Market Fit(创始人与市场的匹配度)**。 Casado 强调,除了像 Travis Kalanick 这样凤毛麟角的特异天才之外,绝大多数创始人的过往轨迹都在潜移默化中塑造了他们的特质、直觉与知识边界。因此,a16z Infra 团队绝大部分的工作时间并不是在逐个机械地分析某笔具体交易(deal),而是在没有具体公司介入的情况下,自主对各个市场做极深的基础研究。只有摸清了市场真实的演进脉络,当特定的创始人出现时,才能精准判断他们是否就是这片拼图的最佳答案。 最后,当主持人抛出个人问题:“作为 Martin Casado,究竟是什么在驱动着你?”Casado 坦言,自己本质上就是一个纯粹的“爬山者(hill climber)”,总在不断寻找下一个山峰去攀登。他正准备回忆自己当年把第一家公司(Nicira)卖给 VMware 时与 Pat Gelsinger 的往事…… ### `40:00` 攀登者的内在驱动:技术、创造性破坏与坚守硅谷文化 Martin Casado 回忆了早年间与时任 VMware 首席执行官进行一对一谈话时的经历。当时对方正在对他们进行考察面试,并向他抛出了一个极其深刻且直击灵魂的问题:“Martin,究竟是什么让你每天早晨能够充满动力地起床奋斗?”Casado 坦言,这在当时听起来是一个非常深奥的哲学命题,他无法当场草率回答,便告诉对方自己需要回家认真思考一晚,第二天再给出答案。 在经过深思熟虑后,Casado 第二天回到办公室,直截了当地给出了自己的回应——他将自己定义为一个纯粹的“攀登者”(hill climber)。Casado 解释说,自己发自内心最纯粹、不可动摇的初恋,永远是核心技术、初创公司、创造性破坏(creative destruction)以及颠覆式的创新。他坚定地长线做多硅谷,深信这里孕育了人类历史上独一无二的创新土壤与文化;只要在这片他所深爱的土地上还有值得征服的险峰等待去翻越,他就会感到无比充实与幸福。Martin Casado 动情地表白道: > “My first love, my absolute first love is technology and startups and and creative destruction and innovation i am very very long silicon valley i think we've got the most unique culture in history and i love to be part of that so as long as there's a hill for me to climb and i can do it in this place that i love i'll be incredibly happy.” 访谈尾声,播客主持人 Theo Jaffee 与 Sophia Dew 对 Casado 的倾囊相授致以由衷感谢,盛赞这是一场极具启发性的精彩对话,并向他热烈祝贺 OpenRouter 近期所取得的爆发性进展。Casado 也向两位主播致谢,感慨能够参与 MTS 播客畅聊 AI 变革是一段极其愉悦的体验。节目的最后还播放了 a16z 的标准免责声明,明确指出播客中所有讨论与信息仅供教育参考,不构成任何金融资产或投资标的的买入、持有或出售建议。 - **核心人生驱动力**:Casado 将自己定位为“攀登者”(hill climber),驱动他前行的不是名利,而是对技术、创新、初创生态与创造性破坏本身的绝对热爱。 - **坚定做多硅谷**:Casado 明确表达了对硅谷文化的高度推崇,认为其具有全球商业史中最独特的创新基因。 - **祝贺 OpenRouter**:主持人在结尾特别对 OpenRouter 团队当周所取得的惊人突破(incredible week)表达了祝贺。 ## Notable quotes > `24:45` The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. And by the way, I really think that is the big thing that's going on here in the industry. — Martin Casado > `22:21` A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. And so in many ways, it's kind of disrupting the entire marketing. — Martin Casado > `06:45` I happen to think causality goes the other way, which is if you put more money privately, into the private markets, it actually grows the TAM. And companies don't need to go public as quickly. And companies can do more privately. — Martin Casado ## Mentioned Martin Casado, Theo Jaffee, Sophia Dew, Andreessen Horowitz (a16z), Cursor, OpenRouter, SpaceX, Stripe, Jeff Dean, Oriol Vinyals, Sergey Brin, Larry Page, OpenAI, Anthropic, ElevenLabs, Ideogram, Black Forest Labs (BFL), Mistral, xAI Grok, Claude, NVIDIA, VMware, Pat Gelsinger, Ben Horowitz, Andy Rachleff, Travis Kalanick, Nick Bostrom, Palantir, Rio Lu, Rio OS ## Video description Martin Casado joins MTS hosts Theo Jaffee and Sophia Dew to unpack where value is actually accruing in AI, why this technology cycle looks fundamentally different from previous waves, and whether the frontier labs will ultimately capture most of the market. Martin explains why AI has turned venture into a scale-up capital game, where small teams can productively deploy extraordinary amounts of money, and why the relationship between capital, innovation, and growth has never been tighter. He lays out the case both for and against the frontier labs dominating AI, the role of open-source and specialist models, and why applications are increasingly capturing more value. The conversation also explores model routing, AI economics, founder-market fit, and why Martin believes this may be the biggest unlock of wealth he's seen since the 1990s. [Source](https://mgln.ai/e/1344/afp-848985-injected.calisto.simplecastaudio.com/3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8/episodes/0f74143d-54d1-41fc-bb21-edb7d10bf376/audio/128/default.mp3?aid=rss_feed&awCollectionId=3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8&awEpisodeId=0f74143d-54d1-41fc-bb21-edb7d10bf376&feed=JGE3yC0V)

Source quotes

[24:45] Martin Casado: The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. And by the way, I really think that is the big thing that's going on here in the industry. [22:21] Martin Casado: A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. And so in many ways, it's kind of disrupting the entire marketing. [6:45] Martin Casado: I happen to think causality goes the other way, which is if you put more money privately, into the private markets, it actually grows the TAM. And companies don't need to go public as quickly. And companies can do more privately.

Source quotes

[0:00] Martin Casado: In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion. [15:00] Martin Casado: I think that the big labs will probably dollar-weighted get 80% of the market going forward, because that's historically what we've seen for large incumbents. But I think token-weighted 60% will be long tail and open source. [26:00] Martin Casado: The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. [22:00] Martin Casado: A remarkable thing about AI is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. [6:50] Martin Casado: I actually think that the causality is the more money goes to private markets, the larger the markets are going to grow and then the more returns go in the private markets.

Original transcript

[0:00] I think there's basically two paths that are meaningful to talk about. One of them is that the labs win everything, and then the other one is the labs don't win everything. And you can make very strong arguments on either side of that. What would happen 10 years ago if I gave you a billion dollars? What would you do? Hire a ton of people, get through when they talk it. And you would blow up. A sprecno bar. The whole thing would be like a total mess, right? And so now we actually know what to do with that money. In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion. Like, what does that even mean? put that much money to work with that small of a team and that small of a timeline, you can put capital into these things and tends to turn into usage. Let's say you put in $10 to do this. I don't know if you get $9 back on the other side of that, but what we've never been able to do in the history of this industry is put in $10 and get anything back. But now it really is $10 in and then some amount out pretty directly. AI isn't just changing what companies can build. It's changing the and Sophia Du on MTS to explain why AI has created something unusual. Small teams that can productively put enormous amounts of capital to work and turn that capital into capability, usage, and growth faster than we've seen in previous technology cycles. They debate whether frontier labs ultimately eat the rest of the AI stack, where open source and applications fit in, and what model routing tells us about how the market could evolve. Martin also explains why then identifying the strategic control points of a new technology staff in what he calls the biggest wealth unlock he's seen in his career. Hello, everyone, and welcome to MTS. Today, we are joined by Martin Casado, who's a general partner at Andreessen Horowitz and leads the firm's infrastructure practice. In the last week, SpaceX closed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor, and Stripe agreed to acquire OpenRouter, two major A16Z-backed companies. we'll talk about what those deals tell us about where value is actually accruing in the age of AI. Martin, welcome to MTS. Super happy to be here. Thanks for having me. We're super excited to have you. Yeah, it's been what an incredible week. One of the weeks of all time. It's been pretty well. Well, yeah, 10 years in the making, but it all happened in a couple of days. Yeah. Yeah. So I guess we could start with a little backstory. You got a master's and PhD in computer 30ish, yeah. Yeah, who's counting? Yeah, 30ish, yeah, yeah. But these days, a lot of top founders, including the founders of Cursor, will drop out of college at like 20 in order to start companies. So which path do you think is better? Um, you know, listen, I actually took time off between undergrad and grad school and I worked for a national lab. I actually think it's probably a good idea to get on the ground experience so that it's not entirely academic. I mean, the one caveat I will say is a lot of the AI stuff is pretty deep research. I do think like, you know, in one hand, you have this whole kind of outcry against higher education and it's kind of very in vogue not to do it. On the other hand, it's kind of never been more relevant to. I think we're in a bit of a schizophrenic period, which suggests to me you should do exactly what you're feeling is right for you. I think both paths are totally legitimate. Yeah, I mean, there's like a spectrum of NeoLabs where on the one hand, you have like flapping airplanes where the co-founders are like 22 years old. And then on the other hand, you have Jeff Dean and Oriol Vignoles' new lab. which I'm forgetting the name, it's slipping my mind, but obviously these are like incredibly senior people with like decades of experience. So like how much does... Decades of experience matter. So one thing that we forget is like the PhD used to be the rarity for founders, right? Like it used to be like you would start a company if you dropped out of PhD or you dropped out of grad school. Like very famously, Sergey and Larry, this is the case for. And we always say like you're kind of failing if you got the PhD because clearly you didn't have a good enough idea to do it. We're actually seeing a lot of really good PhD founders now, right? Like Olly Goetze has a PhD. and also has a PhD. So I would say we're seeing more PhD founders now than ever before in the history of the industry. We've always had the young tech founder, Mark Zuckerberg. And so I would actually think that even the optics on X feels like it's going towards the younger, less experienced founder. I would say weighted, it's actually probably the trend is more in that direction. It seems like the main thing right now that matters is how much you can raise because you're not bottlenecked anymore on who could build the best software. Right now, the big competition Raise the most money are typically the types of companies who can compete the most. So are you seeing that for the companies who are able to raise the most, they are the most competitive? I mean, I think that when it's all said and done and we look back on this, I think, this wave, I think the biggest [5:00] change is the fact that you can actually put a lot of money to good use. So what would have happened 10 years ago if I gave you a billion dollars? What would you do? hire a ton of people, get ruined in a office, espresso bars. Yeah, and then you would blow up. Espresso bars. Yeah, the whole thing would be like a total mess, right? And so now we actually know what to do with that money. So I do think that now it's become a scale-up capital gain. I think the companies that do raise a lot of money, they don't necessarily blow up, they know how to use it. And I think that that actually is changing a lot of what's happening on the ground for us. So the typical path before is if you get too much money too early, it could be an issue, but you're not seeing that anymore being the case? physics, right? Where you raise a bunch of money and then you try and hire a bunch of people to build a product. And this is where the mythical month came from. And you just can't really speed up timelines that way. But then you end up like increasing burn and adding a lot of complexity. And like the roadmap gets very diluted. And then you have all like the organizational, you know, complexity that happens as a result. And so, I mean, listen, some of these major model efforts were done with very, very small teams. Like, you know, I'm not going to say the exact you know, multimodal model that many people use is probably one of the most popular models was built with a team of about 20 people. And I would say the cost of that was probably $2 billion plus, right? And so this is unheard. In the history of humanity, in the history of engineering efforts, we've never been able to have 20 people, I don't think, being able to productively use $2 billion. Like, what does that even mean? Put that much money to work with that small of a team in that small of a timeline. And so I know we like to look at this wave in the context of like, you know, new capabilities. But I actually think like one of the major stories is the fact that we're able to apply large amounts of money productively in short amounts of times to whatever problem that we're trying to solve. Would you say that this age and venture is just completely different from any age before it? Totally, totally. I mean, it's just, you know, again, there's always been this weird meme in venture, which is it's kind of not much of an asset class. There's only a few companies. You can't deploy a lot of money in it, which has often been very weird to me to have like this zero sum thinking from people whose entire job shouldn't be zero sum thinking. deploy it and get the returns. And you can just give two examples. One of them is like, companies are staying private longer and accruing a lot of value that way. So that's one. And then the second one is like, these models consume a lot of money and they turn that money into growth. And so this kind of almost archaic view that venture has to be limited in capital, we're overfunding it, absolutely is not the case now. And listen, I think there's two conclusions Well, there's a new technology wave that can consume more capital. Like AI can consume more capital. And so it's a result of a technology wave. I happen to think causality goes the other way, which is if you put more money privately, into the private markets, it actually grows the TAM. And companies don't need to go public as quickly. And companies can do more privately. So I actually think that the causality is the more money goes to private markets, the larger the markets are going to grow and then the more returns go in the private markets. But just interestingly, we're seeing both things happen at once. So when did A16Z realize for the first time, like, wow, this AI thing is going to be a really big deal. We're going to need to spend like enormous amounts of money investing in infrastructure. and in other things. When did we first, I mean, listen, I think that we're the most kind of, one of the most tech forward venture funds, and we just kind of assume everything is going to work in the long run. And so I remember when, you know, when OpenAI was still an experiment, and we had very legitimate conversations about should we be going all in on AI then, and this was like seven years before, like say GPT, like actually was pretty significant. And so, you know, we've always been investing in AI, we've invested in multiple waves of AI, the drone AV wave of AI. For this generative wave, I think we're one of the earliest that we're very active in it. We did a lot of the early foundation model companies. We're in 11 labs, we're in OpenAI. Of course, we're in Cursor, we're in Ideogram, we're in BFL, we're in Mistral. So, we just did a lot of very, very active deployment. But I will say, the intent to deploy was even before that. Now, again, I would say that Our conviction on technology waves tends to actually precede quite a bit, the on-the-ground gains, which can sometimes work and sometimes not work. But in this case, it was actually quite prescient. Yeah, it's interesting because the old view was very zero-sum. It's what's the point of investing in another model when open AI is pretty good. None of it's defensible. Exactly. The quality of revenue is... By the way, every single way... finance, [10:00] kind of based investor that should be in a growth market and an early stage investor. primarily in the balance sheet and in finance, you worry about things like margins, churn, you know, revenue quality, which are all very legitimate things to worry about if you see no strategic value in the business. So if you think like the entire business, forget the tech, forget the strategic value, forget the ability for somebody else to monetize it. I'm just only going to look at the balance sheet, which many, many people do and make that mistake. Then sure, if you look at that, you'll have difference of opinions. But that's entirely divorced to the strategic value of a company. Like some value, some companies may lose money, but they'll get to a position where they can command a tremendous transfer of value. can be an early stage investor. You have to look under the lens of this is a very important part of the new stack. It's a very important control point. And either somebody will want to own that because of a true value or it itself will be able to attract. accrue value, even if right now when you look at it, the financials don't look like whatever, something that would trade highly on a public market. Yeah. So relatedly, there is an argument that some people make where it's like the labs are just going to eat everything. They're going to have the smartest models. They're going to take over every vertical. OpenAI and Anthropic are doing biotech now. They're going to eat Eli Lilly. They're going to eat all the pharma companies. Obviously, A16Z doesn't believe in this. Well, I don't know if we don't believe in that. Really? I mean, listen, we actually had an offsite recently. the big discussion points on what is the future of models. And I think there's basically two paths that are meaningful to talk about. One of them is that the labs win everything, and then the other one is the labs don't win everything. And you can make very strong arguments on either side of that. So if you want, I'm very happy to detail the arguments on either side. Let me give you the argument for. So why will the models win everything? Well, the first one is... We've got three years of data, and they own 95% of the market. So you just look at the data. You're like, well, okay, so they're doing tremendously well. They have the majority, certainly dollar-weighted of revenue. The second one is that their ability to raise capital is just unbelievable, and then they can turn that capital pretty directly into growth, which we've very rarely seen. So let's say OpenAI and Thratbook have raised $240 billion, I don't know, $220 billion. That's more than the entire downstream ecosystem combined, which is really unbelievable. And that argument is like, listen, they've been able to maintain pricing power just by being an epsilon. higher. So being on the frontier is expensive, but also being on the frontier can command a tremendous amount of pricing power. And so it's not like you have to be way better. You can just be a little bit better because these get used in competitive equilibria. We're starting to see autocatalytic effects. What do I mean by autocatalytic effects? If you have sophisticated enough AI, you can use that AI to create more AI and that improves your unit economics. They think they're actually getting further away from open source than not. And the benchmarks don't reflect that because benchmarking in AI is kind of an AI complete problem. You just kind of have to use it to do the thing to know how good it is. So there's a lot of data that would suggest, listen, they have the capital. They have the teams and the talent. They have the best models. They're going to run away with it. What kind of lytic effects do you mean like recursive self-improvement? annoying pedant. So to me, recursive means something. This is my PhD in computer science. I've done programming. Recursive is when you take something and you make another copy of that thing wholesale. If I have a compiler, could a compiler, that would be recursive. Where autocatalytic is, is use the thing to help you make that thing faster as a tool. If I use a computer to design a chip, because I'm using like whatever, like some chip design software. Would you call that recursive self-improvement? I would say no. I mean, nobody's used that word before. Not in the literal sense. No, I mean, not in any sense. We've never used that word. Like, let's say we all use software to build software, and we don't call it RSI. And we never have. And so I feel like what we're seeing today is much more autocatalytic effects, which we've had forever. But for whatever reason, I think this is a legacy of Bostrom. We call it RSI, recursive self-improvement. Definitely focus on recursive self-improvement, and that's great, but it's a subset of the broader phenomenon, which is very important for all of us to understand, which is autocatalytic effects. So just give me an example. If I use AI to create a really good GPU kernel that's faster than a human being can do, and that improves my ability to run or build AI, I would say that's autocatalytic. I would think that's very important for us on the economics, the convergence properties of the industry— But it's hard to say. So what about the arguments against then that the labs will not own an [15:00] Oh, another one for it, by the way, is they own all the supply. Yeah. And the supply limit. Okay, so the arguments against. The arguments against is the surface area is really expanding. And, I mean, really what's working are primarily code and language reasoning. And so there's a bunch more domains where actually probably you need a services arm. Probably you need kind of more connection with the customers. And this would be very hard for a single organization to do. Second one is, you know, like there is a wealth of open source models. They are doing very well. And we've seen some recent examples of that. And there's a maturing ecosystem around them to serve those. I think a lot of the reason the labs are so far ahead is they have very cheap access to capital, which will almost certainly rationalize. Like, listen, if I give you free money and I say you're worth like whatever trillions of dollars, like, of course, you can use that to grow. But at some point in time, I may be like, you know, like you're probably worth, you know, something different because we've rationalized like the company and then it'll be harder for you to grow. I think that right now they're taking advantage of the supply constraints because they can actually buy, you know, GPUs in bulk. When you have more supply they won be able to do that So I think actually the landscape right now is very much in favor of the large labs primarily from funding and supply And once those rationalize the growing surface area is likely to fragment, which almost always happens in the history of this industry for sure. And I think that will play in favor of everybody else. If I were to guess, This is Martine totally guessing, no idea. If I were to guess, I'd say supply constraints will ease in 2028-ish. I think that the big labs will probably dollar-weighted get 80% of the market going forward, because that's historically what we've seen for large incumbents. But I think token-weighted 60% will be long tail and open source. And one more thing about all of this, I'm sorry to kind of rant on it. I just think it's such an important point. We're seeing increasing value go to the actual apps. The apps are doing incredibly well, and so I think they will start to actually erode on some of that margin share. And you don't view them as necessarily competitive with the labs, but I do think they're going to capture more and more of the value going forward. But it'll be a couple years. I mean OpenRouter is a good example of what the future might actually predict on how we be using these models long term Yeah so listen so OpenRouter is many things I mean it an API router but one thing you can think of it as is you know maybe you have your Anthropic key maybe you have your OpenAI key maybe you have your Grok key, but for all the other models, you use OpenRouter, right? And it's like, it's basically a two-sided marketplace to give you access to a bunch of models. It's a single place for visibility. It's a single place for analytics. It's a single place for access to these models. It's on the token path, it is the leader in kind of a brand monopoly in the space from a brand standpoint. It's a very well-known brand in the space. And I think with all of these phenomenons where you have a couple of incumbents, somebody has to aggregate kind of the longer tail marketplace, which I think will impact the dynamics of the model market going forward for sure. But are you seeing smart routing just growing in popularity? And so maybe the future of applications is you don't even know what model is actually being used. You know, it's a good question. I go back and forth on this. We've actually learned that these models are a lot stickier than people assumed. Everybody talks about just swapping them out, but it actually doesn't happen very often. And I think a lot of this could be actually like procurement dynamics. Like I bought a bunch of credits from OpenAI, like why would I swap them out So you can think about like smart routing in one of two contexts One of them you can be like you know like almost from like a quality standpoint like you answer the question better on the right router I think it a very very hard problem and maybe an AI complete problem And right now I think, you know, that doesn't happen very often. You can think about it in a second way, which is basically cost performance, which is like I will minimize the cost. And because tokens are so expensive, that's actually kind of a high priority for many. And that we're seeing great results, right? And if you've seen, for example, Cursor Auto and Cursor Router does a great job, Open Router does a great job. And so I would encourage, if you think about smart routing, I think in the context of how do I, for the given task, choose the right model on the Pareto Frontier relative to cost as opposed to I'm somehow going to choose the right model that's going to answer the question in the right way. Yeah, it does seem like model routing is a very difficult technical problem. I think it's AI complete. Yeah. Okay, so let's imagine you're trying to answer the question. What question does the smartest thing in the universe need to answer? Like, I think you need the smartest thing in the universe to answer that question. You see what I'm saying? The only thing that can answer that question is actually like the smallest, you know, sorry, the smartest model, and then in which case you just give it to the smartest model. [20:00] comes a cost optimization type of question? Well, okay, so there's many opinions. I don't think we know the answer to this. Like clearly, and you hear this often, clearly the frontier models are getting very jagged, meaning, and this isn't like a core technical capability. It's like the decisions of the people that created it decided to make it very good in say front end or very good in 3D or very good in language. And so one of it, it's not like this one's smarter than this one. It's like, this one's very good at this type of thing that for sure. I think we have a lot of specialist models, a lot of fun, you know, and then a model router will just decide this is better in code, this is better in language, this is better in front end, this is, you know, whatever. So like that will happen. But I think today, if you look at like model routing and the gains, you know, as deployed by the application companies, you know, I mentioned cursor, but you know, we've got a huge portfolio application companies. I think the So what like To what extent is the value of OpenRouter that it will eventually be able to do this kind of AI complete model routing? Um... Listen, I think that you need a two-sided marketplace. And in many ways, you can view one of the products of open routers, the demand. Right. So I can go to the next model provider and say, hey, listen, we've got, you know, you know, millions of users all the time and we can bring that to you. And this is a very common thing. And then you can go to all the developers and say, hey, listen, you know, the next time a model comes out, you know, it'll be on here and you'll have access to it in your existing system and so forth. And so I think there's a tremendous amount of value in the two sided marketplace independent of all of that. That said, clearly over time, there's going to be more and more ability to do this sort of arbitrage. for whatever reason, we tend to kind of over-rotate on that now. And it's a hard question to answer just because we don't even know how to benchmark these models to begin with. The pricing is dynamic. It's often subsidized. And then honestly, like the next big model comes out and it tends to be Pareto efficient and everything anyways. And so like then you only would route to like one model like Opus 4 or 5 anyway. So I think right now that like the actual routing piece is, you know, the gains are uncertain. This is a very, very popular, very successful internet property and brand, and I think it's more the two-sided marketplace. Yeah. The costs are subsidized. When will that stop? I mean, right now these guys get free money. I would use it too, right? Like, you know, if I could raise, you know, three times more money than the entire downstream ecosystem combined. I mean, you know, like this is a very classic thing. Of course, you'd subsidize in order to get kind of single users. And by the way, all the margin tends to be made in the enterprise anyways for this business. And so why wouldn't you do that? And by the way, this is, having run businesses, marketing is hard, man. Like, you know, like it's really hard. Field marketing, content marketing. Like events, like maybe get leads. Will those leads qualify? I have no idea. I'm going to do this content. Like it's got this atmospheric value. But like it's always been hard to like spend a marketing dollar and be like, this is going to be this many sales qualified leads, except for very mature organizations. A remarkable thing about AI. is you can spend a dollar and get users because there's unlimited demands for tokens. And so in many ways, it's kind of disrupting the entire marketing. And so this is what we're seeing. We're saying like, if I'm a company and I want to attract users for the top of funnel, why wouldn't I subsidize? Yeah, I mean, like if you use a decent amount of tokens on your $200 a month opening Ior Anthropic plan, like they're losing a decent amount of money off of that. Well, okay, so again, these things are a little complicated. I mean, only if they want to, because this is a knob, right? And it tends to be you only lose money on the top 5% users. And there's always this whack-a-mole with those top 5% users, right? That's why you see things like you can't have multiple, like a single person can't have multiple accounts. losing that much money. But in aggregate, these are often board level discussions that I'm involved in. You're like, okay, listen, we've got this free tier. There's a knob. Do we want to use the knob to grow top of funnel and to grow use? And that way we'll go to negative margins or we do and use the knob to kind of go more towards margin gain. And it's actually like this stuff is, the demand is so strong that it's kind of a very simple business decision. We're in the past, you literally don't know how to like, apply money to marketing. You just haven't. Yeah. By the way, I have these very interesting things. So for example, there are these very sophisticated things operations out of China that will use the single service tiers and arbitrage. And the way they do it is like, so they will [25:00] Sign up to like a $200 plan. They'll use all the tokens in like three days and then they'll cancel and they'll get prorated for the 27 days, even though they used all the tokens. And then they'll use that to basically provide people with like a service where they're arbitraging these. And so like the market around like laundering these plans is actually very, very sophisticated. And so we're seeing like a lot of cat and mouse between the big left. It's like the new router is just arbitrage between these subscription models. No, seriously. That's what they do. They'll sign up, they'll drain it all, then they'll cancel it, they'll recoup the cost, and then they kind of use that to offer like a $20 service, right, to somebody for basically kind of full Opus tokens or whatever. Fair. So one of the things you're arguing is that more capital is almost directly correlated to more capability? Capability, again, I don't mean to pedantic. More capital, because the demand is so high, you can put capital into these things and that tends to turn into usage. It also seems to tend to turn into capability in some direction. If I training a model and I want it to be good at X I can create an RL environment of X or I can go pay someone to answer questions for X and I can turn capital into being good at that X The problem is is you don know what gets worse So like I think we're kind of at this point where you are starting to see like more jaggedness and you are starting to see more trade-offs. And what I don't know is like, let's say you put a dollar and you get, let's say you put in $10 to do this. I don't know if you get $9 back on the other side of that, But what we've never been able to do in the history of this industry is put in $10 and get anything back. It was literally put in $10, engineer, engineer, engineer, wait two years, probably screw stuff up. It'll probably fail. But maybe, maybe on the other side, you'll have a product that you can monetize. But now it really is $10 in and then some amount out pretty directly. Yeah. Yeah, incredible. It's like the new CMO is turning into a CFO now. It really is. I mean, really, like many of the things that required a lot more art, like engineering and marketing. These are the two. I think, you know, again, I just I work so close to these companies that it used to be there are these long discussions about the art of marketing. And what like do you do paid? Like do you do content? Do you do events? Do you do social? Like how do you do this? And now it's literally like should we subsidize more or less? So you're right. It's becoming finance. Engineering is the same type of way Like it used to be like OK like I mean it such a complex thing And we spend so much time in the engineering Now a lot of it reduces down to can we raise the capital for the GPUs to do what we want yes or no Wow. Very different. Every new role will just be the role of a CFO in a trench coat. No, I don't think so. The relationship between money and innovation and growth and demand has never been closer. And by the way, I really think that is the big thing that's going on here in the industry. Yeah. So we talked about Open Router. The other big acquisition of the week was Cursor. Oh. Which was, I believe, I'm getting this right, the biggest acquisition of a venture-backed startup ever. I think so outside of Elon's kind of self-dealing with X. Right. But yeah. So for like an independent thing, I think it's the largest private M&A ever. So where does the bulk of the value of Cursor to SpaceX come from? Is it the team? Oh, no. I mean, of course, it was a phenomenal business. They have all the data. Elon has all of the compute. They've released phenomenal models in the past. Many people realize that coding is kind of the path to some will say AGI but like say broader computer use or intelligence more broadly And so I actually think both companies bring a ton to the table And if you going to reduce it to something very simple it's like, you know, one has the data, one has the compute, one has the distribution, you know, and the other has like enough resources that you would need to be on the frontier. Because remember, the frontier is a capital game. And of course, this is something Elon is phenomenal at scaring up. Do you think their $60 billion value would have been their value independently, or was that mainly because of SpaceX? To who? To just its value. To SpaceX for sure, but would that have been its value independently outside of SpaceX? To like an investor? Yeah. Yeah, for sure. I know for sure, because we could easily have raised at that value. Now, that said, private investors are crazy, and they kind of see the future and everything else like that. How would it have done the public market? I don't know. I can't even speculate about those types of things, but for sure the private independent value was of that order. And there's a lot of non-public proof points to that, which I can't talk about, but yes, I do think so. And again, the business was doing phenomenally. If you saw the numbers that they talked about, I mean, this is the fastest growth certainly I've ever seen in 10 years of investing and in 20 years in the Valley. Yeah, but would it not be even better to be like... [30:00] part of SpaceX with all of their compute and all of their infrastructure, uh, Um, And, you know, the entire engineering force of SpaceX behind them. It seems like that would make cursor more valuable now. Of course. I agree. I agree. Are you suggesting that Cursor buys SpaceX? That might have happened in a couple of years. Yeah, a few more years ago. No, listen, I think... I think OpenRouter and Stripe make a lot of sense. Both companies kind of view things as markets. One views like tokens is value. The other, payments is value. There's a lot of alignment at the founder level for these types of businesses. Very, very similar thing for Cursor and SpaceX, right? Very engineering-focused cultures. Both believe that code is the path and general computer use is the path to AGI. very, very scrappy, moved very, very fast. We even wrote a post about it. This is the fastest iterating team I've ever seen outside of an Elon company. And so I would say there's a lot of alignment. There's a lot of synergy. I think the combined entities are greater on both sides for these acquisitions, but I still think it was worth $60 billion. How did they do it? What are the aspects of Cursor's culture that make them capable of iterating so quickly? You know, that's a good question. I, um... You know, they, um... In many ways, a lot of these AI companies that I work with are so research heavy. If you're not working on a new model architecture, it's kind of hard to actually interest the core teams. And they always kept the main thing the main thing, Cursor, which is changing how you write software engineering. And they believed fundamentally it was a product problem, not necessarily a model architecture problem. The model is very, very important, but it was a product problem. And so they hired incredibly well. incredibly well. I would say the founders probably spend 30-40% of their time hiring and setting culture. They were very focused on engineering and not research and model architecture. I think research and model architecture is incredibly important, but it's got a different life cycle and it requires a different type of environment. And that's not what they were focused on at the time. They are more so now, of course, now that they've got the resources. And then listen, I mean, is this wild in this space? There's actually not a lot of companies that are actually focused on product, right? They'll focus on services. They'll be like, we are the palantir the fine-tuning, post-training companies. They're kind of more service-oriented companies. And there's a lot of research companies. I mean, Neolab is a research company, but they were like, we are a product company. And I think that's actually a key differentiator in this era. Yeah, it's pretty cool. We had people from the cursor team actually here on MTS, and they're sharing a little bit about their internal culture, and they're constantly building products internally for themselves and then testing it on themselves. Yeah, their own users. I love that. They're all like, well, we're all developers. will use and they really, really took that one to heart. Yeah, I think my absolute favorite example of this was Rio Lu, who was the head of design. He was amazing. He did this project called Rio OS. Yeah, I loved it like that. I know. It was like retro Mac looking. It was so good. It was like a retro Mac OS emulator of sorts. I do think it's funny. So I do vibe coding in a silly VC way, and I build retro video games. And I feel like the kind of like, you know... older person in the garage doing a hobby. It used to be like train sets or whatever, and now it's like building retro video games or retro. You see an awful lot of that coming out. Yeah. What did both the cursor and open router deals tell you about where value is accruing in general? you So I'm going to go back to what I said before, which is so much of the general schadenfreude and criticism on X and the socials are around business quality metrics. And often they're wrong, by the way. Like, this was a great business and it was doing great. have a tremendous amount of optionality going forward, right? I mean, OpenRouter is on the token path. It is the leader in the long tail of models and new models that has a two-sided marketplace of those. Cursor was by far the leading software dev tool. And so to me, it's obvious that you're going to have these properties that are strategic value, strategic control points. I don't think it says something more deeply about where in the stack value is going to occur. tell, by the way, values are going in all areas of the stack. I mean, NVIDIA's doing great. The model companies are doing great. The app companies are doing great. The inference companies are doing great. The media companies are doing great. I mean, right now, listen, I think this is the biggest unlock of wealth I've seen in my entire career. I never thought I'd see another one after the 90s. And, you know, [35:00] I think anybody that wants to do a company or invest in the company, I would strongly recommend against zero-sum thinking or worrying about moats or defensibility too much in the near term and really think about what is strategically important in this new world that's being created. What do you think are the top opportunities right now in this new world that's being created? If someone were to come to you asking for advice, like, where do I start? Where do I build? What would you urge them to do? You know, one thing I love about being a venture capitalist, I don't have to answer that. Like, I don't have to know the answer. No, seriously. No, no. question. People assume as a venture capitalist, like, I see the future, I've got thesis on it, and I just don't. I mean, like, having been a founder, doing two startups, one startup was, like, you know, it was the whole thing. It was, like, you know, build a global business. And there you have to predict the future. And there you have to, like, you have to be piped in the nervous system of the techno-strategic chess game being played. And what does the future look like? What are the incumbents going to do? How's the technology going to shift? Is it going to make me irrelevant? And it's like a walking ulcer all the time, is, like, trying to figure know what, there's a whole ecosystem of founders that are bearing that ulcer and that's what they think about and I'm very happy to borrow along their dreams and support them. And so, I am generally very bullish and optimistic about AI. I think this is a massive unlock. If there are three or four strong founders in a space that I understand, I won't second guess it. I mean, you know, they're going to be... taking the opportunity costs and risking their time and their family's time on this, I just assume it's a good space and I'll invest. Yeah. So how are you thinking about hiring at A16Z Infra? What kind of people are you looking for? What kind of skills are you looking for? So we've found what works best for us are people that actually have product background of some sort. I just think it's the nature of the conversations we have. I think there's a reason why we have probably the most strategic acquisition exits. We've had a lot of those because I think we view a lot of these things as strategic opportunities. assets. And that means you have to understand product market fit. So you have to understand the market, the evolution of the market, you have to understand the product, how the technology maps to the product and that interface. And that's a very kind of like product based discussion. And you tend to do this. like before you have enough financials to really read kind of the outcome of the business and value it that way. And I will say having worked with many great people, I actually mean, I love working with my team. But we have in the past hired people that don't have that background, like let's say they come strictly from finance. And even though they can do the work, like they can call into the customers, they just don't have the sensitivity to come back with the right answers. Like the taste? What's that? Like the taste? if there's going to be, if they're going to buy, if there's going to be value, if there's going to be long-term value. I mean, this is what a product manager's job is. So not everyone who works with is a product manager, but most people have been involved in product in some sort or another, and so that they understand how important that interface is. And by the way, I mean, I would say even when it comes to the types of founders we work with, I mean, it's so funny. I feel like there's two views from investors. Some are very product-focused. I was talking to Ben Horowitz yesterday. site. Back to the strongest founders, the founder is everything, which is true. And then other people are very market focused, like Andy Radcliffe, who was on my board. He's like, the market is everything. Like, you need a good founder and a good market, you know, whatever. And I think for infrastructure, for the stage we invest in, our primary form of inquiry is around founder market fit, right? There's just certain founders that will be good for certain markets. And there's great founders who would not be good for them. And, you know, we spend a lot of time trying to understand that interface. We build the type of team that we do. Yeah, definitely. What's your perspective there? Where do you lay... My perspective on founder market fit? Or just are you more pro just the founder matters, just the market matters? No, I'm founder market fit. I'm like literally the intersection of the founder and the market. Like I don't think unless it's very, very rare, like Travis Kalanick. These guys are so amazing and they're so rare. I think that the path that someone took to getting to a startup kind of carves them in a certain way. They'll have certain sensitivities. knowledge that other people don't have. And I think you want to take that and their kind of inherent skills and map it to like what the actual market needs, which means you have to do a lot of market work. I would say the majority of the work that we do is not like analyzing a given deal at any point in time. The majority of the work we're doing is analyzing the market, you know, in the absence of any given company to understand it so we can actually make these decisions once we meet the company. Definitely. Well, Martin, a personal question for you. What motivates you? What's the What motivates me in general? Honestly, I'm just a hill climber. When I was selling my company, I went to, this is to VMware. I remember Pat Gelsinger. [40:00] kind of interviewing us. He was the CEO of VMware. And he was kind of interviewing us. And I had this one-on-one with him. And he's like, Martine, what gets you up in the morning? I'm like, this is a really deep philosophical question. I'm going to have to think about that. I'll tell you tomorrow. So I went home and I thought about it and I came back in and I told him, I'm like, listen, listen, I am a hill climber. My first love, my absolute first love is technology and startups and and creative destruction and innovation i am very very long silicon valley i think we've got the most unique culture in history and i love to be part of that so as long as there's a hill for me to climb and i can do it in this place that i love i'll be incredibly happy yeah well martin it's been amazing having you on mts so good congratulations on open router congratulations incredible incredible week thank you so much yeah it was a pleasure getting to have you on mts super fun thank you Thanks for listening to this episode of the A16Z podcast If you liked this episode be sure to like comment subscribe leave us a rating or review and share it with your friends and family For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcasts and Spotify. Follow us on X at A16Z and subscribe to our sub stack at A16Z.substack.com. Thanks again for listening and I'll see you in the next episode. 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