Arvind Krishna & Nikesh Arora: Quantum Threat, Open vs Frontier AI, AI Cyber Warfare & SaaS Collapse

Arvind Krishna & Nikesh Arora: Quantum Threat, Open vs Frontier AI, AI Cyber Warfare & SaaS Collapse — All-In Podcast

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Key ideas

  • Cryptographically relevant quantum computers are projected to break standard public-key encryption around 2030, exposing an estimated $5 trillion in global enterprise IT infrastructure to retroactive decryption if migration to post-quantum standards continues to lag. (0:00)
  • Open-weight models are forecasted to capture 75% to 90% of enterprise token volume due to a 10x to 40x cost advantage ($1–$2 vs. $20–$50 per million tokens) and enterprise mandates to protect intellectual property embedded in chain-of-thought data. (12:46)
  • Enterprise cybersecurity is shifting toward collective intelligence pooling and platformization to counter the asymmetric reality where attackers need only one flaw while AI vulnerability scanners still produce a 20% to 40% hallucination rate. (15:20)
  • A massive consolidation wave is poised to compress enterprise vendor counts from 500–5,000 point solutions down to 5–10 dominant platforms, severely threatening the terminal value of interaction-rich SaaS while sparing mission-critical transactional cores. (37:43)

Detailed notes

## Background This episode was published by the All-In Podcast on YouTube on October 21, 2026. According to the page description, IBM CEO Arvind Krishna and Palo Alto Networks CEO Nikesh Arora discuss quantum computing's threat to encryption, open-weight versus frontier AI models, AI cyber warfare, AI regulation and the global arms race, and vertical integration and software consolidation.

## TL;DR IBM CEO Arvind Krishna and Palo Alto Networks CEO Nikesh Arora analyze the critical cybersecurity and structural shifts driven by advancements in quantum hardware and artificial intelligence. Krishna projects that cryptographically relevant quantum computers could arrive around 2030, putting trillions of dollars of enterprise infrastructure at risk if organizations defer post-quantum migration. Both leaders evaluate the economic advantages of specialized open-weight models over costly frontier APIs for routine enterprise defense, while detailing the asymmetry defenders face against automated vulnerabilities. Finally, the discussion outlines the aggressive consolidation facing the SaaS ecosystem, predicting that enterprise spend will collapse from thousands of fragmented point solutions into a handful of vertically integrated platforms.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries an urgent, authoritative, and boardroom-level gravity, grounded in the hard operational realities of running massive enterprise technology giants. The dynamic between Krishna and Arora is deeply collaborative, blending Krishna's rigorous systems-engineering perspectives with Arora's sharp commercial and cybersecurity instincts. Listening feels like sitting in on an executive briefing where hype is stripped away in favor of unit economics, physics, and balance-sheet risk, creating a sobering yet pragmatic look at the next decade of technological disruption.

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) Cryptographically relevant quantum computers are projected to break standard public-key encryption around 2030, exposing an estimated $5 trillion in global enterprise IT infrastructure to retroactive decryption if migration to post-quantum standards continues to lag. - [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) Open-weight models are forecasted to capture 75% to 90% of enterprise token volume due to a 10x to 40x cost advantage ($1–$2 vs. $20–$50 per million tokens) and enterprise mandates to protect intellectual property embedded in chain-of-thought data. - [15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) Enterprise cybersecurity is shifting toward collective intelligence pooling and platformization to counter the asymmetric reality where attackers need only one flaw while AI vulnerability scanners still produce a 20% to 40% hallucination rate. - [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) A massive consolidation wave is poised to compress enterprise vendor counts from 500–5,000 point solutions down to 5–10 dominant platforms, severely threatening the terminal value of interaction-rich SaaS while sparing mission-critical transactional cores.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) The consensus timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computing centers around 2030, driving immediate risk from adversaries executing 'harvest now, decrypt later' data exfiltration campaigns. - [02:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=153s) Tracking quantum viability requires observing validated live error correction by 2027 and annual 10x gate computation scaling from 10,000 operations today to 10 million operations by 2029. - [05:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=304s) Enterprises cannot replace $5 trillion in global IT infrastructure in a single year, yet approximately 50% of current IT infrastructure procurement remains non-quantum-safe. - [06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) Frontier AI running on classical hardware cannot bypass quantum hardware to break cryptography, as classical GPUs face exponential slowdowns of 1,000x to 10,000x when simulating quantum mechanics. - [10:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=615s) Cybersecurity economics dictate running compressed, specialized small language models locally on endpoints for $20 to $25 per year during peacetime, reserving frontier LLMs and agent swarms strictly for active breaches. - [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) Open-weight architectures will capture 75% to 90% of enterprise token volume because running optimized open models on private GPUs cuts costs to $1–$2 per million tokens and prevents proprietary trade secrets from leaking via external API logging. - [15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) The software defense landscape suffers from severe asymmetry: attackers need only one exploitable bug, while automated AI vulnerability scanners hallucinate 20% to 40% of findings and cannot autonomously patch production code without human oversight. - [17:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1077s) Effective cyber warfare defense requires collective syndication where organizations pool vulnerabilities once into shared platforms rather than duplicating security engineering across isolated corporate silos. - [19:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1148s) IBM generates roughly 50% of its internal software using autonomous AI agents with automated evaluation loops, yet computer science verification theory dictates that fully verifying code against unbounded inputs remains computationally intractable. - [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) Unilateral regulatory moratoria on AI do not halt technological progress globally; they merely disadvantage regional domestic industries while competitors in China and other nations rapidly advance. - [24:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1494s) The decisive technological bottleneck in frontier AI is the physical concentration of leading-edge silicon and data center compute almost entirely within the United States and China. - [28:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1703s) Economic history indicates that societies and enterprises that prioritize capital investment over preserving legacy labor arrangements consistently prevail across major technological disruptions. - [30:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1802s) Vertical integration is resurging as players like Nvidia replicate the classic IBM mainframe model, controlling the full hardware and software stack to shift profit pools whenever individual layers face margin compression. - [32:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1958s) Application defensibility requires tightly coupling contextual memory with reasoning pipelines, transitioning software monetization from traditional SaaS seats to cost-per-action (CPA) workflow automation. - [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) Enterprises are actively moving to collapse unwieldy footprints of 500 to 5,000 software vendors into 5 to 10 unified platforms, eroding the distribution economics and terminal value of standalone point solutions. - [38:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2331s) AI disruption will rapidly commoditize interaction-rich software facilitating human workflows, while mission-critical transactional cores requiring extreme determinism (such as 10^-15 database lookup reliability) remain highly insulated from replacement.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) The Quantum Threat to Classical Encryption

The discussion opens with a deliberate pivot away from the ongoing fixation on AI tokens and toward a looming crisis in cybersecurity: the structural threat quantum computing poses to standard cryptography. Prompted by recent breakthroughs such as OpenAI's math release and DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative (QBI), IBM CEO Arvind Krishna outlines where the hardware and mathematical realities currently sit. DARPA launched QBI with a few hundred participating companies a couple of years ago, but the field has rapidly culled down to approximately 13 genuine contenders, separating viable engineering from hype. The overarching race among these players is building a functional quantum computer, with industry projections for cryptographically relevant quantum computers clustering between 2028 and 2033.

Arvind targets 2030 as the realistic midpoint for when machines will possess enough compute power to shatter existing public-key encryption standards. The danger is not speculative: adversaries are already harvesting encrypted data today under the assumption that they can decrypt it retroactively once hardware matures. If an attacker steals an encrypted hard drive now, they can simply store it for five years until quantum decoders are online. While post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards and mathematical solutions are already established and coded, widespread enterprise adoption has lagged due to inertia. When asked whether existing post-quantum safeguards are merely quantum-resistant or genuinely quantum-proof, Arvind explains that their resilience matches the rigor of modern classical cryptography—not absolute mathematical theorems, but robust complexity theory grounded in foundational computer science assumptions.

Arvind summarizes the inevitability of the impending architectural shift: > “Well, it will break today's cryptography. That's not a supposition. That's just a reality.”

- **DARPA QBI Winnowing**: Hundreds of participating vendors have shrunk down to around 13 active, viable contenders. - **Breakthrough Horizon**: Estimates range between 2028 and 2033, with 2030 serving as the consensus target date. - **Harvest Now, Decrypt Later**: Encrypted assets compromised today face deferred exposure the moment quantum compute matures. - **Status of Post-Quantum Cryptography**: The algorithms are standardized and written, but implementation has stalled due to institutional complacency.

---

[02:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=153s) The Technical Milestones: Error Correction and Scaling Gate Computations

To evaluate when the industry must hit the panic button, Arvind outlines the evolutionary steps necessary to transition from current experimental systems to production-grade quantum machines. Today's hardware consists of noisy "toy quantum computers" capable of solving niche problems but severely hindered by physical error rates and an inability to scale. Tracking the arrival of cryptographically relevant quantum systems requires monitoring two distinct technical vectors: error correction and physical-to-logical qubit scaling.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Quantum Scaling Milestones accDescr: Progression from noisy toy computers to scalable error-corrected systems capable of breaking encryption. subgraph S1["Current Status"] A["Toy Quantum Systems<br/>~10k gate operations<br/>Noisy physical qubits"] end subgraph S2["Near-Term Milestones"] B["Error Mitigation Claims<br/>Target: 2025–2026"] --> C["Validated Error Correction<br/>Target: 2027"] end subgraph S3["Scaled Threshold"] D["10x Gate Scale / Year<br/>10M operations by 2029"] --> E["Cryptographically<br/>Relevant Quantum System<br/>Midpoint: ~2030"] end A --> B C --> D ```

The first critical milestone is the empirical demonstration of running error mitigation or correction directly on live hardware rather than through classical simulations. Arvind anticipates initial claims emerging within the year, followed by third-party verification and tangible, non-scaled error-corrected operations by 2027. The second milestone is operational density, measured in gate computations. Current machines handle approximately 10,000 gate operations—a minuscule figure compared to modern smartphone silicon that executes billions of operations per minute. If developers can scale operational capacity by an order of magnitude each year (adding a zero annually), systems will advance from 10,000 operations to 10 million operations by 2029, crossing the threshold into disruptive capability. While Arvind expresses skepticism about the term "logical qubit," he concedes it serves as a practical abstraction to communicate the net, noise-free computational capacity left after allocating physical qubits to redundant error-correcting codes.

Arvind describes the exponential trajectory of compounding gate scaling: > “You put those two steps together and now if you put a zero per year that means you could be at 10 million by 2029. That's remarkable. That can do some things that'll surprise the hell out of everybody.”

- **Phase 1 Validation (2025–2027)**: Moving from unverified vendor claims to independently audited error correction on live quantum processors. - **Gate Computation Growth**: Expanding from 10,000 gate operations today toward an order-of-magnitude annual compounding curve. - **Projected Capacity by 2029**: Achieving ~10,000,000 operations, unlocking capabilities that classical systems cannot emulate. - **Logical vs. Physical Qubits**: Error-correction overhead creates a steep ratio between noisy physical qubits and usable logical units (e.g., hundreds of physical cells required to yield a single stable logical qubit).

---

[05:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=304s) Enterprise Exposure and the $5 Trillion Infrastructure Problem

Palo Alto Networks CEO Nikesh Arora frames the quantum transition through the lens of enterprise IT security and capital deployment. Across modern enterprises, cryptographic keys safeguard every layer of corporate infrastructure—from internal network routing and endpoint communications to multi-vendor software supply chains. Because every device and network connection terminates with encrypted key pairs, any non-quantum-proof infrastructure is systematically vulnerable.

Nikesh rejects the notion that enterprises can afford to wait for 2029 or 2030 to overhaul their defenses. Global enterprises cannot abruptly scrap and replace an estimated $5 trillion in existing IT infrastructure within a twelve-month window. CIOs and CISOs are actively allocating hundreds of millions of dollars in annual capital expenditures, yet roughly half of current IT infrastructure budgets are still being spent on hardware and software stacks lacking quantum-safe capabilities. While stopgap solutions exist—such as wrapping post-quantum ready keys around existing network traffic—Nikesh warns that organizations deferring architecture overhauls are already dangerously behind schedule.

Nikesh delivers an urgent warning to enterprise leadership regarding infrastructure cycles: > “So our view is you can't wait for 2029 or 2030 because it's not like one day all of us are going to go out and say oh let's go burn $5 trillion of IT infrastructure and let's go build it again in one year because now we need quantum safe infrastructure.”

- **Ubiquitous Surface Area**: Cryptographic keys are embedded across every enterprise endpoint, perimeter, and SaaS integration. - **The Capital Replacement Bottleneck**: Global enterprise IT represents a multi-trillion-dollar base that requires multi-year replacement cycles. - **Current Capital Misallocation**: Approximately 50% of present-day corporate IT procurement remains non-quantum safe. - **Interim Countermeasures**: Deploying post-quantum key encapsulation wrappers around active network traffic acts as an immediate bridge.

---

[06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) AI, Number Theory, and the Limits of Classical Simulation

The conversation shifts to an alternative perspective raised by leading AI researchers: could frontier AI models solve advanced mathematics on classical computers quickly enough to break cryptography before quantum hardware even arrives? This hypothesis suggests that AI models could discover latent structures in number theory—such as predicting the distribution of prime numbers or developing novel factorization shortcuts—rendered visible by mathematical reasoning engines like the recent OpenAI math models.

Arvind refutes this hypothesis on foundational computing principles, referencing Richard Feynman's physics thesis that classical computing architectures cannot efficiently simulate non-classical physical phenomena. Classical systems (including modern GPUs) operate purely within arithmetic logic, whereas quantum mechanics operates across completely different probabilistic state spaces. While an AI model running on classical hardware might conceptualize or prove a novel quantum algorithm, running that algorithm on classical silicon incurs an exponential penalty, executing roughly 1,000 to 10,000 times slower than on native quantum hardware. Similarly, even if an AI model discovers an arithmetic shortcut in classical number theory, the sheer computational time required to crack an individual key renders it commercially and tactically useless if it demands a decade of sustained compute per key.

Arvind grounds his skepticism in the physics of computation: > “You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result.”

- **The Feynman Principle**: Classical arithmetic hardware cannot simulate quantum mechanical advantages without facing catastrophic efficiency losses. - **AI's Role in Quantum Discovery**: Machine learning can design or verify advanced quantum algorithms, but execution still demands native quantum hardware. - **Performance Deficit**: Simulating non-classical algorithmic steps on classical GPUs introduces an order-of-magnitude slowdown between 1,000x and 10,000x. - **Practical Cryptanalysis**: A theoretical classical mathematical breakthrough remains functionally obsolete if cracking a single production key requires years of continuous compute.

---

[09:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=542s) Navigating the Model Spectrum: Open Weight vs. Frontier Models

The panel transitions to the current enterprise landscape of generative AI, examining the tension between commercial frontier models and open-weight alternatives. With open-weight options rapidly closing performance gaps and giving enterprises viable on-premises solutions, leadership teams face strategic choices around cost optimization, privacy, and development speed.

Nikesh argues strongly against premature optimization during the initial adoption phase. Across typical large enterprises employing tens of thousands of workers, AI literacy is still in its infancy, having only gained broad traction over the preceding 12 to 18 months. Imposing rigid constraints—such as forcing teams to engineer bespoke pipelines around open-source models, restricting access to frontier APIs, or over-indexing on immediate infrastructure costs—creates friction that throttles grassroots experimentation. Instead, leadership must grant internal teams friction-free access to the most capable frontier models available to validate concrete business efficiencies before architecting long-term cost controls.

Nikesh details his management philosophy on enterprise AI experimentation: > “Don't start trying to cost optimize. Don't start trying to stitch your own in that phase because the teams who work for us 20 to 20,000 people have just discovered AI in the last 12 to 18 months and it's not fully diffused across the organization.”

- **Diffusion Curve**: Enterprise workforces are still in the early phases of understanding generative workflows and application viability. - **Premature Engineering Pitfall**: Attempting to host, fine-tune, and optimize bespoke model stacks before clarifying business utility introduces unnecessary organizational friction. - **Prioritizing Frontier Capabilities**: Early corporate rollouts should prioritize model quality and ease of integration over marginal infrastructure savings.

[10:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=615s) The Economics of Defense: Small Models vs. Frontier LLMs

Addressing the initial panic that generative AI would completely devour the cybersecurity sector, Nikesh Arora frames enterprise adoption into phases and dismisses the notion that massive foundation models can economically replace endpoint protection. He points out that Palo Alto Networks currently inspects all traffic at an endpoint for just $20 to $25 a year. That efficiency is made possible because traditional machine learning runs directly on the local compute of the client's endpoint against payloads of 20 to 40 megabytes. Routing all of an enterprise’s continuous network traffic through OpenAI via token-based billing would generate an astronomical bill—enough for OpenAI to extract a massive portion of its revenue from a single client. Instead, practical enterprise deployment relies on taking a small language model, heavily compressing it, tailoring it to a narrow task, and iteratively training it until it achieves 99.9% accuracy.

Arora emphasizes that enterprise security requires matching the intelligence tier to the specific operational cost, noting that organizations do not need an exotic solution for standard maintenance. However, the calculation flips completely during a catastrophic incident. If a client is actively undergoing an enterprise breach with billions of dollars on the line, budget restrictions vanish and customers demand whatever frontier model is necessary to halt the attack. Under active siege, defenders will deploy multi-agent swarms and unconstrained reasoning models to analyze and neutralize the threat. For standard "peace time" operations, however, Arora argues that defenders will almost certainly train specialized open-weight models using proprietary internal telemetry, ensuring the auditability, explainability, and governance that closed black-box models cannot provide.

> “So my point is what we're doing is we're trying to figure out what task requires what level of intelligence and what is the cost of that intelligence for that particular task and you'll suddenly discover you don't need a Ferrari for every task and by the way the customers don't want to pay for a Ferrari for every task.” — Nikesh Arora

- **Endpoint economics:** Machine learning models run locally on 20–40 MB payloads for approximately $20 to $25 per endpoint per year. - **Crisis escalation:** In peacetime, audited open-weight models handle routine protection; during an active multi-billion-dollar breach, defenders unleash frontier LLMs and agent swarms regardless of token cost. - **Operational transparency:** Enterprises require open-weight architectures to inspect weights, debug reasoning, and satisfy compliance and audit demands.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Threat Level Model Allocation accDescr: Diagram showing how enterprise defense routes tasks between low-cost local models and frontier LLMs based on threat severity.

subgraph Routine["Peacetime Defense"] A["Network & Endpoint Traffic"] --> B["Task-Specific Small Language Model"] B --> C["Local ML on Endpoint ($20–$25/yr)"] end

subgraph Crisis["Active Breach Defense"] D["Active Attack Detected"] --> E["Frontier Reasoning LLM"] E --> F["Coordinated Agent Swarms"] end ```

---

[12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) The 40x Cost Advantage and the Shift to Open-Weight AI

Arvind Krishna arrives at the exact same strategic outcome through three distinct lenses: raw compute economics, intellectual property protection, and geopolitical pragmatism. On the financial side, closed frontier models run anywhere from $20 to $50 per million tokens. In contrast, taking an open-weight foundation model—such as a Chinese open-weight model with hundreds of billions of parameters—and running it on self-managed GPUs with just a single week of targeted engineering optimization can slash that price to roughly $1 to $2 per million tokens. Krishna posits that virtually every enterprise executive will eagerly embrace a 10x to 40x price reduction for an open system capable of handling 95% of practical workloads.

Beyond unit economics, Krishna highlights that enterprise IP is severely compromised when relying on third-party proprietary APIs that log and audit the intermediate chain of thought. If reasoning steps can be stored and analyzed outside the corporate perimeter, core trade secrets leak. Because frontier model providers refuse to hand over weights for private bare-metal hosting, enterprises are compelled toward open-weight alternatives. Furthermore, while the leading open-weight architectures currently emerge from China—posing little risk if run strictly in local, sandboxed environments—Western open-weight counterparts will close the capability gap within 6 to 12 months. Together, these pressures lead Krishna to forecast that 75% to 90% of all future enterprise token volume will be handled by open-weight models.

> “Which enterprise in the world will not accept a 10 times or in this case a 40 times cheaper answer for effectively what can do 95% of the work.” — Arvind Krishna

> “I don't know whether it'll be 75 to 90% but that's the range I would put of all token usage will go to open weight models for the reasons I mentioned added to the reasons that Nikesh mentioned.” — Arvind Krishna

- **Cost disparity:** Proprietary frontier tokens cost $20 to $50 per million tokens versus $1 to $2 per million tokens for optimized self-hosted open-weight models. - **Chain of thought exposure:** External API monitoring risks exposing internal enterprise logic, workflows, and proprietary intellectual property. - **Open-source parity timeline:** The capability lag between proprietary frontier systems and the strongest open-weight models is estimated at only 6 to 12 months.

---

[14:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=885s) Developer Inertia and the Production Reality Check

When asked whether the residual token usage on frontier models stems from genuine technical necessity or pure engineering laziness, Krishna pokes fun at his own background as a software developer. He observes that software engineers naturally gravitate toward the most capable, frictionless, and costly API available unless management imposes strict budgetary controls. While defaulting to frontier models is a completely acceptable shortcut during the early prototyping and experimentation phases to rapidly validate concepts, Krishna expresses deep skepticism about allowing those expensive dependencies into live production environments for anything beyond a minuscule fraction of edge cases.

> “Developers are lazy, they're going to use the most expensive answer unless you put a control on it because it's easy.” — Arvind Krishna

> “So I would say if experimentation phase you allow that to prove it works and now I got to put on a cheaper answer is probably fine if it gets me there a lot faster, but doing it for production usage is where I am skeptical that it's of value except for a tiny number of use cases.” — Arvind Krishna

---

[15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) Foundation Model Moats, Vulnerabilities, and the Asymmetry of Defense

Addressing concerns about whether foundation model labs like OpenAI or the creators of Mythos could encroach directly on Palo Alto Networks' territory, Arora remains entirely unbothered. He dismisses fears that model vendors can commoditize security, even as companies like Salesforce and Marc Benioff vigorously push for strict Zero Data Retention (ZDR) agreements while model providers leave loopholes to generate synthetic data. Arora points out that foundation coding agents, trained on massive troves of public code, have learned what good programming looks like—and, by extension, what software flaws look like. Consequently, models can scan codebases and identify vulnerabilities, yet early implementations hallmarked by Mythos still hallucinated around 30% of their findings.

This reality introduces an excruciating asymmetry into software warfare: an offensive attacker only needs to discover a single unpatched flaw to compromise an organization, whereas an enterprise defender must identify, verify, and resolve every single flaw across their footprint. Industry testing reveals that roughly 60% to 80% of model-flagged vulnerabilities represent real exposures, while 20% to 40% are hallucinations. Furthermore, because AI-generated code is inherently prone to bugs and hallucinations, automated tools cannot simply be turned loose to remediate their own findings. No security organization will allow an automated coding agent like Claude Code to push a security patch straight into production without rigorous human oversight and extensive validation testing.

> “When you're in the room, you come out and say, 'These guys are not going to get into my business.'” — Nikesh Arora

> “The reason it's perfect for attackers, they just need one vulnerability. They don't need 10 vulnerabilities. If you're a defender, you need to find every vulnerability and patch it.” — Nikesh Arora

- **Attacker advantage:** Threat actors require only one exploitable flaw, while defensive teams bear the burden of finding and remediating every single exposure. - **Vulnerability scan accuracy:** Security teams report that roughly 60% to 80% of vulnerabilities flagged by AI models are genuine flaws, while 20% to 30% are hallucinations. - **Automated remediation limits:** Autonomous coding assistants cannot be trusted to patch enterprise software vulnerabilities without separate verification environments and secondary testing.

---

[17:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1077s) Cyber Warfare and Collective Defense

Reflecting on whether modern cybersecurity resembles nation-state warfare, Arora argues that the ultimate defensive advantage lies in real-time collective intelligence. Rather than forcing every individual enterprise to independently run frontier models over open-source packages to discover and patch identical flaws, Arora and Krishna champion shared vulnerability pooling. Under collaborative initiatives like the ones IBM and Palo Alto Networks facilitate, organizations submit newly discovered attack vectors into a centralized repository. Trusted security partners analyze the threat once, engineer a verified fix or machine learning detection rule, and push that protection universally across their entire global customer base.

When pressed on whether agentic AI can write flawless, error-free software to solve these challenges outright, Arora gives a blunt, immediate rejection: "No." Autonomous agents still generate imperfect, bug-ridden code, confirming that AI-driven defense remains an iterative discipline anchored in centralized intelligence sharing rather than autonomous code generation.

> “Why don't we pull our vulnerabilities and find the defense once as opposed to every company in the room trying to go test all the open source vulnerabilities they have, figure out how to patch them, go patch them individually.” — Nikesh Arora

- **Vulnerability syndication:** Collective defense relies on pooling newly discovered attack vectors across enterprises rather than duplicating remediation efforts in silos. - **Global signature distribution:** When a novel adversary technique appears anywhere in the world, vendors convert it into localized ML detection logic and distribute it instantly across all managed endpoints. - **Imperfect agentic output:** Both leaders confirm that code generated by autonomous AI agents remains inherently prone to software defects and cannot operate unsupervised in critical infrastructure.

[19:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1148s) The Three Principles of Warfare and the Problem of Code Verification

Arvind Krishna outlines three core strategies historically used to prevail in conflict. The first approach, referenced by Nikesh Arora, relies on building powerful collective alliances where the united front becomes significantly stronger than any individual attacker. The second strategy centers on asymmetry: historically, attackers operate at a much lower cost than defenders, inevitably causing the defender to exhaust their financial resources and concede unless defense can be made equally inexpensive to establish parity. The third strategy—and the decisive factor across major conflicts like World War II, Korea, and Iraq—is securing decisive technological superiority. In the digital arena, that means discovering vulnerabilities, patching them immediately, and establishing robust security perimeters so that penetrating systems becomes economically prohibitive for adversaries.

Agentic code is rapidly transforming this defensive equation. Krishna reveals that IBM currently uses autonomous coding agents for roughly half of the software produced internally, noting that machine-generated code already outperforms human output because the models perform automated evaluations, catching and repairing flaws before release. However, the fundamental barrier remains verification theory in computer science: systems can only detect the classes of vulnerabilities they have been explicitly designed to anticipate. Completely verifying arbitrary software against unbounded inputs remains mathematically and computationally intractable in the near term, meaning absolute security guarantees are impossible whenever input space is unrestricted.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Strategies in Cyber Warfare accDescr: Three pillars of warfare strategy leading toward cyber dominance through agentic software.

subgraph Strategies["Pillars of Warfare"] A["1. Powerful Alliances<br/>Strength in numbers"] B["2. Managing Asymmetry<br/>Make defense cheap"] C["3. Tech Superiority<br/>Win via technological edge"] end

subgraph Execution["Agentic Defense Loop"] D["Autonomous Coding Agents"] E["Continuous Eval & Automated Patching"] F["Computational Infeasibility<br/>Verification limited on unbounded inputs"] end

C --> D D --> E E -.->|Constraint| F ```

- Krishna asserts the impact of technological advantage: “If you get technological superiority on one side, you tend to win.” - IBM currently writes approximately 50% of its internal software using autonomous AI agents. - Agentic code achieves higher quality because embedded evaluation routines identify and resolve code defects prior to deployment. - Formal verification of code remains computationally infeasible when input parameters can be entirely arbitrary.

---

[21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) The Global Arms Race, Accountability, and the Flaw of Deceleration

Addressing whether mounting political and social pushback could stall artificial intelligence, the discussion turns to the geopolitical imperative of the technology. David Friedberg points out that international competitors will never mutually agree to freeze research, turning AI into an unavoidable technological arms race requiring overwhelming compute capacity, defensive superiority, and offensive safeguards to protect national infrastructure, enterprise, and employment. Nikesh Arora agrees that halting development is an illusion, comparing the current panic over AI harms to historical precedents. In the early days of aviation, the Wright brothers were focused on achieving flight rather than designing airport security protocols or requiring passengers to take off their shoes at TSA checkpoints. Society has over-indexed on catastrophic narratives rather than appreciating AI's transformative benefits.

When dealing with software reliability and damages, Arora rejects the excuse that autonomous agents decouple developers from legal responsibility. Even if an engineer argues that a specific sub-agent generated the code, commercial enterprises selling products and capturing economic value must bear full legal liability for whatever their systems produce. Krishna reinforces that unilateral regulatory moratoriums—like those implemented across the European Union—do not curb the technology globally; they merely handicap local industries while competitors in China, India, and Japan accelerate to leapfrog the West.

- Arora dismisses developer disclaimers: “If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work.” - Arora stresses corporate responsibility: “You're taking economic value in return for giving me something. You're required to abide by the responsibility that you signed up for.” - Krishna highlights the competitive reality of digital technologies: “A digital technology is impossible to actually slow down and the European example tells us.” - Krishna warns that regional self-imposed slowdowns offer foreign competitors an uncontested opening to catch up and dominate.

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[24:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1494s) Congressional Politics, Data Center Bans, and the Global Compute Divide

Friedberg recounts a recent meeting in Washington, D.C. with a high-ranking member of Congress who shared that a top global CEO was privately panicked about cyber threats, while lawmakers were floating the prospect of an outright 50-state ban on AI data center construction. The panel dismisses the prospect of national consensus on restricting data infrastructure, noting that all fifty states have rarely agreed on any single policy. Krishna characterizes congressional discussions on AI restrictions as being propelled far more by populist voter appeals than by practical engineering realities. If 30 states opt to ban data center developments over energy and environmental concerns, the remaining 20 will enthusiastically capture that capital investment and corporate tax base.

Addressing whether the proliferation of potent, low-cost models will divide the world into technological "haves and have-nots," Arora argues that defensive software will become sufficiently commoditized for any legitimate enterprise to protect itself. Instead, the genuine strategic crisis lies in the physical hardware tier: advanced computing power is concentrated almost entirely within two superpowers—the United States and China. Because cutting-edge silicon and data center capacity remain exceedingly scarce and expensive, enterprises and nations situated outside these two dominant technological hubs will struggle to deploy large-scale frontier systems.

- Krishna remarks on political posturing over infrastructure: “The regulation question on AI and data centers is driven, I'm going to be sorry and cynical, is driven by populism, not by any reality.” - Krishna projects state-level arbitrage regarding data centers: “Is it possible 30 will ban? Yes. The remaining 20 will rub their hands in glee at that point.” - AI oversight discussions in the Senate and House have been churning continuously since closed hearings in 2022 and public sessions in 2023. - Arora highlights the geographic bottleneck of AI hardware: “I fear that we will see fast advances in compute development in two large countries in the world. We may not see that as evenly distributed across the rest of the world.”

[28:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1703s) Geography, Compute Access, and the Labor vs. Capital Trade-Off

Nikesh Arora begins by observing that geographical proximity to the epicenters of AI development dictates access to critical compute. This bottleneck is not necessarily financial, but rather an issue of severe supply constraints: an innovative European company with capital and the right intentions may still find itself shut out simply because it sits far away from the United States or China, where compute hardware is concentrated.

Arvind Krishna frames this geopolitical divide through the lens of economic history, identifying the current AI wave as the latest iteration of the classic labor-versus-capital trade-off. Looking back across the 1700s, 1800s, and 1900s, Krishna notes that societies and entities willing to invest aggressively in capital over labor consistently prevailed across seven or eight technological revolutions. The United States and China are both prepared to be intensely capital-driven and accept that labor inputs will decline in relative importance. In contrast, nations anchored in left-leaning philosophies focused on preserving every legacy job will fall behind:

> “People who spend more on capital than worried about labor tended to win every previous one of the seven or eight cycles like this.”

Krishna distinguishes between protecting opportunities for labor and safeguarding every single existing role at all costs. He argues that leaders and societies must welcome job displacement because it frees workers to transition into higher-value roles, warning that philosophical hesitation will separate the winners from the losers in the global economy.

[30:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1802s) The Return of the Conglomerate and Full-Stack Vertical Integration

Chamath Palihapitiya steers the conversation toward vertical integration and the historical pendulum swing between conglomerates and unbundled specialization. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, conglomerates served as safe harbors for capital during turbulence, only to be dismantled in subsequent eras of peace and prosperity. Palihapitiya argues that tech is swinging back toward integration, prompting Krishna to share the story of the IBM mainframe. The mainframe architecture has thrived for 65 years precisely because IBM controlled the entire stack. During the 1960s, IBM literally operated "all the way to dirt"—sourcing raw sand, fabricating silicon wafers, building foundries, manufacturing chips, and producing the sheet metal housing the units. This total control eliminated intellectual property leakage and kept the entirety of the stack's profit pool within the enterprise. Today, IBM outsources the fabrication foundry due to scale, but retains proprietary chip design, systems architecture, and core software.

Nikesh Arora points out that Jensen Huang is executing the exact modern playbook at Nvidia. Huang is controlling the hardware substrate, buying software infrastructure, funding ecosystem players like Hugging Face, and backing both frontier and open-weight labs to make sure nobody leaves the Nvidia ecosystem:

> “If you look at what Jensen is doing, he's the modern day version of the vertically integrated stack.”

Arora highlights the strategic power of this setup: when a company controls the entire vertical stack, it dictates which layer gets commoditized. If an external competitor attacks a specific tier and erodes its margins, the integrated provider simply shifts the economic profit pool to another layer of the stack where it commands unassailable leverage.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Vertical Integration and Profit Shifting accDescr: Diagram illustrating how a vertically integrated tech stack captures profits and defends against commoditization.

subgraph Stack["Vertically Integrated Tech Stack"] APP["Application Layer (Agents & Headless UI)"] REASON["Reasoning & Logic Layer"] CTX["Context & Memory Layer"] HW["Hardware & Compute Layer (Silicon & Fabric)"] end

HW --> CTX CTX --> REASON REASON --> APP

DEFENSE["Competitor attacks single layer"] -.->|"Compresses margins"| APP APP ==>|"Shift profit pool down"| HW ```

[32:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1958s) Open Stacks, Closed Stacks, and the Defense of the Application Layer

When asked how application-layer companies like OpenAI or Anthropic should vertically integrate and defend against commoditization, Arora dismisses the simplistic debate of open models versus closed models, characterizing the real battle as open stack versus closed stack. He explains that multi-model routing solutions like OpenRouter face an uphill battle because modern AI models demand tightly coupled memory, context, and reasoning. If an application developer attempts to decouple reasoning tokens from the underlying contextual memory, switching costs collapse; however, integrating context and memory into a proprietary reasoning pipeline creates an insurmountable moat:

> “If you start training a personal agent with all your context, all your APIs, all your connectivity, now you built a moat because now I can't take that every day and move it to a next stack and the next stack.”

Arora predicts that application software will shift toward a cost-per-action (CPA) model where models execute end-to-end logic from user prompt to final outcome. In this environment, enterprise and consumer adoption will be dictated by brute-force distribution. Arora expects frontier AI labs to launch an aggressive push into multimodal personal agents, forcing existing iPhone and mobile applications to surrender user interfaces and become headless data providers.

- **Unified Context:** Decoupling reasoning from context introduces high latency and friction, driving builders toward end-to-end proprietary stacks. - **Cost-per-Action (CPA):** Software pricing will shift from seats to end-to-end workflow execution. - **Headless Applications:** Consumer and enterprise apps will increasingly lose front-end control, serving as API endpoints to dominant AI agent interfaces.

[34:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2090s) Cybersecurity Platformization and the Vanishing Terminal Value of SaaS

The discussion transitions to horizontal expansion and enterprise software M&A against the backdrop of shifting multiples and higher capital costs. Arora reflects on his eight-year crusade at Palo Alto Networks to end point-solution sprawl in cybersecurity. Enterprise customers currently manage upwards of 40 disparate security tools from separate vendors, forcing corporate security teams to spend their time stitching incompatible datasets together rather than defending against threats.

Arora draws a parallel to his early career at Fidelity Investments, where the firm had to maintain 23 separate, custom database applications to track customer data before standard platforms emerged:

> “In the context of cyber, I have always maintained over the last 8 years that it's silly that our customers have to buy 40 different solutions and stitch them together.”

Just as customer relationship management consolidated 23 distinct systems into singular platforms like Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics, or Oracle, the cybersecurity market is undergoing identical platformization. Palo Alto Networks acquires category-leading tools to integrate them directly into an automated platform, eliminating vendor integration headaches.

Arora notes that cybersecurity vendors currently enjoy resilient market valuations because enterprises are compelled to spend aggressively on defense amid rising AI threats. However, looking at horizontal enterprise software outside of cybersecurity, Arora expresses profound skepticism, emphasizing that AI disruption has made it nearly impossible to model the terminal value of conventional SaaS companies.

[37:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2229s) The Disruption of SaaS and Product-Market Fit

Nikesh Arora continues his assessment of the vulnerability of existing enterprise software providers, questioning whether many current players can survive the next five to eight years given the rapid pace of artificial intelligence. He explains that traditional product-market fit is being shattered across the sector because enterprise buyers are beginning to understand exactly how their software should function in an ideal, AI-first environment. When enterprise leaders evaluate their software portfolios, the shortcomings of existing packaged tools become obvious against modern expectations of automation and intelligent interfaces.

Nikesh reflects on how clear this shift is from a buyer's perspective: “I know if if I could have my magic wand and make it do things, I know exactly how it should work in an AI first world, which means somebody's going to do it.” Because modern AI enables greenfield developers to build exactly what customers envision, legacy tools that merely wrap simple workflows are facing an existential threat. Nikesh concludes bluntly: “So I think there's going to be huge disruption in the SAS space over the next few years.”

[37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) Enterprise Software Consolidation and Distribution Costs

When asked whether he sees attractive acquisition opportunities and "juicy multiples" emerging from the SaaS sell-off, Arvind Krishna responds that market valuations have fluctuated significantly throughout the year—looking appealing earlier on, less compelling a month ago, and remaining dynamic moving forward. However, he immediately expands Nikesh's thesis beyond cybersecurity to enterprise software as an entire ecosystem. The fundamental operational problem is that large organizations manage an unwieldy number of point solutions that inflate overhead and expand the enterprise attack surface.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Enterprise Software Consolidation Model accDescr: Diagram showing the transition from fragmented software sprawl to 5 to 10 consolidated core platforms.

subgraph Fragmented["Legacy Enterprise Sprawl"] A["500 to 5,000 Point Solution Vendors"] B["Massive Cyber Attack Surface"] C["Unsustainable Independent GTM Costs"] A --> B A --> C end

subgraph Consolidation["AI-Driven Consolidation"] D["Minor AI Capabilities Replacing Niche Tools"] E["5 to 10 Core Enterprise Platforms"] F["Low-Cost Bundled Distribution"] D --> E E --> F end

Fragmented -->|"Disruption & Spend Migration"| Consolidation ```

Arvind lays out the mathematical and security realities driving enterprise consolidation: “The average enterprise uses anywhere from 500 to 5,000 distinct software vendors. In a world when you have to protect against it all, it's not just the cyber threat. That's a massive attack surface. So you have to ask yourself, could I replace 490 of them with minor AI capabilities and do I need to go back and leverage 5 to 10 main platforms?” In his view, software spend will inevitably migrate toward a small number of core platforms. As the standalone economic value of specialized software drops, vendors can no longer sustain the high customer acquisition and distribution costs required to support point products, forcing massive market consolidation whether it unfolds over six months or six years.

- Average enterprise vendor footprint: between 500 and 5,000 distinct software vendors. - Expected platform shrinkage: enterprise spend concentrating into just 5 to 10 primary platforms.

[38:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2331s) Interaction-Rich Software vs. Mission-Critical Systems

Arvind draws a sharp line between two categories of enterprise software, arguing that not all applications will succumb to AI disruption at the same speed. Applications defined by "interaction value"—tools that primarily facilitate workflows, communication, and human interactions—are the most susceptible to being rapidly substituted by AI-driven solutions. By contrast, deep operational software that requires extreme determinism and mathematically near-perfect reliability cannot be replaced overnight.

Arvind illustrates the dividing line with the standard required of foundational enterprise infrastructure: “But if in the end you go down to I need you to be reliable at 10 the minus15, which is a database lookup for somebody doing retail banking or closing the books. I think that's going to be hard to replace that easily with uh AI generated software.” Because replacing core transactional systems carries severe operational risk, enterprises would need to run digital twins alongside legacy software for years before feeling confident enough to cut over. The interlocutors agree that the absence of a clear cost advantage makes ripping and replacing mission-critical core records uneconomic, drawing the panel to a close with final acknowledgments and thanks to Arvind Krishna and Nikesh Arora.

## Notable quotes > [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work. — Nikesh Arora

> [14:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=885s) Developers are lazy, they're going to use the most expensive answer unless you put a control on it because it's easy. — Arvind Krishna

> [15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) The reason it's perfect for attackers, they just need one vulnerability. They don't need 10 vulnerabilities. If you're a defender, you need to find every vulnerability and patch it. — Nikesh Arora

> [06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result. — Arvind Krishna

> [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) Which enterprise in the world will not accept a 10 times or in this case a 40 times cheaper answer for effectively what can do 95% of the work. — Arvind Krishna

## Mentioned Arvind Krishna, Nikesh Arora, Chamath Palihapitiya, David Friedberg, IBM, Palo Alto Networks, OpenAI, DARPA, Quantum Benchmarking Initiative (QBI), Richard Feynman, Mythos, Marc Benioff, Salesforce, Claude Code, Jensen Huang, Nvidia, Hugging Face, OpenRouter, Apple, iPhone, Fidelity Investments, Microsoft Dynamics, Oracle, All-In Podcast

## Video description (0:00) Arvind Krishna & Nikesh Arora talk about Quantum Computing’s Threat to Encryption (9:07) Open Weight vs. Frontier AI Models (18:07) AI and Cyber Warfare (21:14) AI Regulation and the Global AI Arms Race (30:32) Vertical Integration and Software Consolidation

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#allin #tech #news

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI)

中文简报

阿尔温德·克里希纳与尼克什·阿罗拉:量子威胁、开源对比前沿AI、AI网络战与SaaS的崩溃 IBM首席执行官阿尔温德·克里希纳(Arvind Krishna)与派拓网络(Palo Alto Networks)首席执行官尼克什·阿罗拉(Nikesh Arora)深入分析了量子硬件与人工智能的进步所驱动的关键网络安全和结构性变革。克里希纳预计,具有密码学相关性的量子计算机可能在2030年左右问世,如果企业推迟向后量子标准迁移,数万亿美元的企业基础设施将面临风险。两位领导人评估了专用开放权重模型在企业常规防御中相较于昂贵前沿API的经济优势,并详细阐述了防御者在面对自动化漏洞利用时遭遇的不对称局面。最后,讨论勾勒出SaaS生态系统面临的激进整合趋势,预测企业支出将从数千个碎片化的单点解决方案收缩至少数几个垂直整合的平台中。 预计具有密码学相关性的量子计算机将在2030年左右破解标准公钥加密;若向后量子标准的迁移持续滞后,全球预计将有5万亿美元的企业IT基础设施面临回溯性解密风险。 (0:00) 得益于10倍至40倍的成本优势(每百万Token成本为1至2美元,而前沿API为20至50美元),以及企业保护思维链数据中所含知识产权的要求,开放权重模型预计将占据企业75%至90%的Token使用量。 (12:46) 企业网络安全正转向集体情报共享与平台化,以应对不对称的现实局面:攻击者只需找到一个漏洞,而AI漏洞扫描器的幻觉率仍维持在20%至40%之间。 (15:20) 大规模整合浪潮即将使企业的供应商数量从500至5000个单点解决方案急剧压缩至5到10个主流平台,这将严重威胁交互型SaaS的终值,而关键任务型交易核心则得以幸免。 (37:43)

Reading summary

IBM CEO Arvind Krishna and Palo Alto Networks CEO Nikesh Arora argue that emerging computational shifts—spanning cryptographically disruptive quantum hardware and AI-driven cyber warfare—are accelerating enterprise platform consolidation while destabilizing conventional software-as-a-service (SaaS) business models. Quantum Cryptanalysis Timelines and Infrastructure Exposure (0:00) The DARPA Quantum Benchmarking Initiative has winnowed hundreds of participating vendors down to roughly 13 viable contenders, with industry projections placing cryptographically relevant quantum machines between 2028 and 2033. Krishna identifies 2030 as the realistic midpoint for machines capable of breaking existing public-key encryption, noting that scaling from today's ~10,000 gate operations to ~10 million by 2029 requires compounding annual order-of-magnitude improvements alongside verified error correction by 2027. Krishna also dismisses theories that classical GPUs running frontier AI can bypass quantum hardware to crack encryption, citing Feynman's thesis and an efficiency penalty of 1,000x to 10,000x when simulating non-classical systems. Because threat actors actively employ "harvest now, decrypt later" strategies, Arora cautions that enterprises cannot defer remediation. Global enterprise IT represents an estimated $5 trillion infrastructure base that cannot be dismantled and rebuilt within a single year. Despite post-quantum cryptography standards being finalized, Arora observes that approximately half of current corporate IT procurement still purchases non-quantum-safe stacks, necessitating interim countermeasures such as post-quantum key encapsulation wrappers around active traffic. Model Economics, Verification Limits, and Defensive Asymmetry (10:15) Both leaders forecast that enterprise generative AI will bifurcate based on operational economics and threat levels. Routine enterprise endpoint defense requires extreme cost control—inspecting traffic locally on 20–40 MB payloads for $20 to $25 per endpoint annually using specialized small language models—whereas active breaches warrant deploying unconstrained frontier LLMs and agent swarms regardless of token expense. Krishna projects that open-weight models will capture 75% to 90% of enterprise token volume due to a 10x to 40x cost advantage ($1 to $2 per million tokens versus $20 to $50 on closed frontier APIs) and corporate fears of leaking proprietary reasoning steps over external APIs. In cybersecurity software, automated remediation faces sharp structural limits. Arora notes an asymmetry where offensive attackers need only one vulnerability to breach a network, whereas defenders must resolve every flaw. AI code-scanning models exhibit 20% to 40% hallucination rates, precluding unsupervised autonomous patching. Krishna notes that while IBM writes approximately half of its internal code using autonomous agents, formal software verification against unbounded inputs remains mathematically and computationally intractable, limiting autonomous code defenses to explicitly anticipated vulnerability classes. Geopolitics, Vertical Integration, and Compute Concentration (28:23) On the geopolitical front, Arora and Krishna dismiss proposed regulatory moratoriums and state-level data center bans as populist initiatives that will merely redirect capital to more permissive jurisdictions. However, Arora highlights a geographic hardware chokepoint: cutting-edge compute infrastructure is overwhelmingly concentrated in the United States and China, leaving enterprises in Europe and elsewhere facing severe physical supply constraints regardless of financial capital. Krishna links this divide to historical labor-versus-capital cycles, asserting that regions willing to prioritize capital investment over preserving legacy jobs consistently prevail. To capture enduring economic rents, technology architecture is swinging back toward full-stack vertical integration, mirroring IBM's historic mainframe control and Nvidia's current strategy of owning hardware substrates, software tooling, and ecosystem investments. Arora argues that owning the integrated stack enables firms to shift profit pools whenever an individual layer is commoditized. In application software, decoupling context and memory from reasoning models collapses switching costs, prompting leading AI labs to build end-to-end proprietary agents that transition pricing to cost-per-action (CPA) models while rendering traditional mobile and desktop application interfaces headless. Enterprise Software Sprawl and the Disruption of SaaS (37:09) Arora and Krishna anticipate widespread structural disruption across the SaaS landscape as generative tools undermine traditional product-market fit. In cybersecurity, enterprise demand is aggressively driving platformization to eliminate the operational burden of managing and integrating up to 40 disparate point-solution tools. Outside cybersecurity, Arora asserts that AI disruption has made it exceedingly difficult to model the terminal value of conventional SaaS providers that merely wrap basic workflows. Krishna extends this consolidation thesis to the broader enterprise software footprint, where typical organizations currently manage between 500 and 5,000 vendor relationships. This sprawl inflates both cyber attack surfaces and redundant go-to-market costs. Krishna projects that enterprise spend will consolidate into 5 to 10 primary platforms as minor AI capabilities substitute for hundreds of point tools. However, Krishna draws a boundary between interaction-rich communication software—which is highly vulnerable to AI displacement—and mission-critical systems requiring extreme reliability (such as core banking databases demanding error rates of 10⁻¹⁵), where high operational risk prevents rapid rip-and-replace cycles. While AI accelerates software consolidation and expands offensive cyber capabilities, both executives maintain that compute access bottlenecks, theoretical limits on autonomous software verification, and the multi-trillion-dollar scale of legacy IT infrastructure will dictate the actual pace of enterprise transformation.

精炼阅读摘要

IBM 首席执行官 Arvind Krishna 与 Palo Alto Networks 首席执行官 Nikesh Arora 认为,企业正面临量子解密与生成式 AI 重塑底层架构的双重拐点;企业必须尽早推进后量子加密迁移,并在垂直整合平台、开源权重模型与任务自适应的防御体系中重构核心软件布局。 量子计算威胁与五万亿美元基础设施瓶颈 (0:00) Arvind Krishna 指出,具备破坏传统公钥加密体系能力的量子计算机预计将在 2028 至 2033 年间出现,2030 年是行业共识的中间节点。目前的攻击者已开始执行“先窃取、后解密”策略,截获加密数据以待未来硬件破译。硬件层面正沿着纠错技术验证(预计 2025 至 2027 年实现独立审计)与门运算密度演进;若门运算以每年 10 倍的速度扩展,到 2029 年将达到千万次级别,使经典模拟彻底失效。Krishna 援引理查德·费曼的物理学论点,驳斥了经典 AI 大模型能通过数论捷径超越量子硬件破解加密的设想,强调在经典 GPU 上模拟非经典算法会带来千倍至万倍的算力惩罚。 面对这种物理现实,Nikesh Arora 警告全球企业 IT 基础设施重构具有极高的资本与时间门槛。全球现存约 5 万亿美元的企业 IT 资产均广泛使用加密密钥保护网络端点与软件供应链,这些资产不可能在一夜之间全部报废替换。目前约半数企业的新增 IT 采购仍缺乏后量子防御能力,仅靠网络流量外的临时封装封装密钥并非长久之计。Arora 强调,企业必须从当前预算周期全面启动后量子加密(PQC)过渡,等待 2029 或 2030 年的到来将面临无法挽回的时间迟滞。 大模型防御经济学与开源权重替代趋势 (10:15) 在企业日常安全防御中,全量调用闭源前沿模型存在严重的经济学缺陷。Arora 说明,Palo Alto Networks 针对 20 至 40 MB 的端点有效载荷,通过本地运行经过高压缩与专项微调的小型模型,能将单端点年化检测成本压低至 20 至 25 美元;若将海量常规网络流量直接接入商业前沿 API,高昂的 Token 费用将不可承受。防御体系呈现双轨制分化:在日常状态下采用可审计、可解释的开源小模型,而在面临造成数十亿美元损失的突发入侵时,企业才会不惜成本动用前沿多智能体集群进行联合阻击。 Krishna 从算力单价与数据隐私角度预测,开源权重模型未来将承载企业 75% 至 90% 的 Token 总量。自托管的优化版开源权重模型每百万 Token 成本仅需 1 至 2 美元,而商业闭源前沿 API 则高达 20 至 50 美元,这形成了 10 到 40 倍的成本差距,足以覆盖 95% 的常规业务用例。更关键的是,闭源 API 在外部服务器记录与审计思考链存在泄漏核心商业机密的合规风险。Krishna 认为欧美顶尖开源模型与闭源前沿的代差仅在 6 至 12 个月,企业开发人员在原型验证后,出于预算控制必将把生产部署切回开源基础设施。 网络攻防不对称与多边协同防御机制 (15:20) 软件攻防对抗存在天然的结构性不对称。Arora 分析指出,攻击方只需找到单点未修补漏洞即可完成入侵,而防守方必须排查并加固系统内的每一处破绽。虽然基础代码生成模型可以自动审计漏洞,但行业测试显示其标记的问题中有 20% 至 40% 属于模型幻觉;即便借助自主智能体生成补丁,由于模型生成的代码同样包含缺陷,企业绝不可能允许未经验证的代码自动上线修复关键基础设施。Krishna 也补充表示,计算机科学验证理论在面对无边界输入空间时,完全形式化验证在算力上是不可行的,无法实现绝对的先验安全保障。 为了平衡防守成本劣势,Arora 与 Krishna 主张建立类似国家联盟性质的集中式威胁情报共享机制。不同企业无需各自独立运行大模型去盲目扫描开源依赖项,而是将新型攻击载荷汇聚到统一资产库,由专业安全服务商集中分析并生成轻量级机器学习检测特征码,再秒级分发至全球终端。通过将分散的漏洞修复转变为集约化分发,防守方得以借助底层技术优势建立规模经济,大幅抬高攻击者的试错成本。 算力地缘分配与全栈垂直整合护城河 (28:23) AI 基础设施正在重塑全球经济与科技的地理版图。Arvind Krishna 从几百年的技术革命史切入,指出历史上一贯是优先向资本倾斜、而非竭力保护落后劳动力存量的实体最终胜出,技术替代的本质是释放人力流向更高价值环节。当前尖端算力与数据中心资源高度向美国和中国聚集,欧洲等地区的创新企业即使资金充裕,也常常受制于物理层面的算力硬件短缺。与此同时,美国国内在数据中心建设议题上也受制于民粹政治,但各州间的招商套利将确保资本流动不受全面封锁。 面对算力聚集与单点技术贬值,科技产业正在回归类似早期 IBM 大型机的垂直整合模式。Krishna 回顾了 IBM 早期“从沙子提纯、晶圆制造、芯片设计到金属外壳”的全栈把控;Arora 则指出 Nvidia 正在现代产业中重现这一路径,即通过统揽硬件基底、系统软件、开源社区与前沿实验室,锁定全链路生态。对于 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 等应用层企业而言,仅作为多模型调度的中转网关极易被边缘化;真正的护城河必须将用户上下文、专属记忆与推理逻辑紧密咬合,借助“单次动作付费”(CPA)执行端到端工作流,将缺乏底层护城河的前端移动应用逐步降级为纯数据接口。 传统 SaaS 终端价值瓦解与核心系统壁垒 (37:09) 传统企业级软件的商业逻辑正面临根本性冲击。Arora 与 Krishna 指出,普通大型企业通常采购 500 到 5000 家不同独立软件开发商的单点工具,这不仅催生了庞大的跨系统整合开销,还大幅放大了网络攻击面。在 AI 原生软件开发门槛骤降的背景下,买方清楚了解理想工作流的形态,导致大量仅做简单工作流包装的存量 SaaS 产品失去了传统的产品市场契合度(PMF),其独立的高获客成本已难以为继。企业预算预计将向 5 到 10 个集成型核心平台收拢,大量垂直单点工具正失去可被量化的长期终端价值。 然而,这轮洗牌在不同应用层级之间存在明显的防御分化。Krishna 明确划分了“交互型软件”与“关键任务型软件”的界限:主打人际沟通、浅层协同和交互界面的应用极易被 AI 快速替代;但对于零售银行账目结算、基础数据库检索等要求失误率低于 10 的负 15 次方的核心记账与交易底层,企业很难轻易信任 AI 生成的替代系统。由于替换底层关键系统不仅缺乏显著的成本优势,还伴随极高的业务中断风险,传统核心业务系统在未来多年内仍将保持强大的抗颠覆韧性。 总体而言,对谈者明确了算力集中与大模型平民化背后的战略分水岭:虽然开源权重模型能打破闭源前沿的高昂成本垄断,但物理算力的地缘聚集与全栈垂直整合正在构筑更深的企业级壁垒。遗留 SaaS 厂商将面临加速出清,而如何在保证数学级确定性的前提下让基础设施完成抗量子过渡与 AI 集约化,是未来五年企业 IT 架构最核心的未解挑战。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期视频由知名科技播客《All-In Podcast》于 2026 年 10 月 22 日发布在 YouTube 平台。节目邀请了 IBM 首席执行官 Arvind Krishna 与 Palo Alto Networks 首席执行官 Nikesh Arora 共同做客,核心围绕量子计算对现代加密的威胁、开源权重模型与闭源前沿 AI 之争、网络空间攻防战、全球军备竞赛与监管态势,以及垂直整合与企业级 SaaS 行业的颠覆性大整合展开深度剖析。 ## TL;DR IBM 首席执行官 Arvind Krishna 与 Palo Alto Networks 首席执行官 Nikesh Arora 针对科技行业面临的系统性拐点展开了推演。他们指出,实用级量子计算预计将在 2030 年前后彻底击穿经典非对称加密体系,迫使全球 5 万亿美元的 IT 基础设施必须从现在起全面向抗量子架构过渡。在 AI 竞争格局上,开源权重模型凭借极低的算力成本、知识产权安全以及不断收窄的技术代差,有望吃下企业端 75% 至 90% 的 Token 用量,而顶级前沿模型将被严格保留给极高价值的高风险场景。同时,全球 AI 军备竞赛注定无法单方面踩下刹车,面对大模型对应用层的全栈重构,单点 SaaS 软件将面临产品市场匹配度的崩塌,企业软件正不可逆转地从数千家分散供应商向少数全栈核心平台横向收拢。 ## Atmosphere & style 全场对话充斥着万亿美元市值巨头掌舵者特有的沉稳、冷峻与高度务实,毫无空泛的概念炒作,而是字字直戳工程落地与商业底层的真实血腥代价。Arvind Krishna 凭借深厚的计算机科学与理论物理底蕴,以严谨且不容置疑的技术推演拆解了量子突破与计算复杂性的本质,语调从容却极具压迫感;Nikesh Arora 则以身处安全一线的攻防视角和极富穿透力的商业敏锐度,频频用生动锋利的现实比喻直击企业拖延症与盲目追赶 AI 的虚妄。两人在思想交锋中高度默契、层层剥茧,整场对谈既洋溢着对技术终极潜力的兴奋,又弥漫着对即将到来的基础设施洗牌与 SaaS 终局大颠覆的冷峻警示,带给听众一种如坐针毡却又豁然开朗的硬核智识冲击。 ## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) IBM 首席执行官 Arvind Krishna 指出,具备实用价值的量子计算机预计将在 2030 年左右实现,届体现存非对称加密体系将被彻底攻破,企业面临严重的“先窃取、后解密”数据风险。 - [05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=305s) Palo Alto Networks 首席执行官 Nikesh Arora 警告,全球有高达 5 万亿美元的 IT 基础设施需要升级置换为抗量子架构,企业若等到 2029 年才开始行动将为时已晚。 - [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) 开源权重模型由于极具优势的经济性(每百万 Token 成本仅需 1-2 美元,远低于前沿闭源模型的 20-50 美元)以及数据与知识产权自主可控,预计未来将承载企业 75% 至 90% 的 Token 用量。 - [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) 企业级 SaaS 行业正面临残酷洗牌,受攻击面膨胀与 AI 替代效应将推动企业从采购 500-5000 家独立软件向 5-10 个全栈平台收敛,但容错率要求达到 10^-15 的高可靠核心底层系统短期内难以被撼动。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) 实用量子计算机的到来将粉碎现有非对称加密体系,黑客现已采取“先窃取、后解密”手段静待量子算力突破。 - [02:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=153s) 量子计算实现实用化需跨越两大里程碑:一是硬件原生量子纠错的有效验证,二是量子门操作规模保持每年增长一个数量级并在 2029 年达到千万次。 - [05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=305s) 升级抗量子基础设施刻不容缓,企业无法在短期内突击重建 5 万亿美元的 IT 资产,必须从现在起在采购中全面引入后量子密码标准。 - [06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) 受限于经典计算架构的算术物理法则,前沿 AI 试图在经典 GPU 上通过模拟量子算法或纯数论破解现代加密在计算时间上不可行。 - [09:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=542s) 企业在探索生成式 AI 的早期阶段切忌过早推行成本优化与盲目自研,应优先借助最强商用前沿模型跑通业务价值验证。 - [10:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=615s) 端点安全依赖本地超低成本的小语言模型处理日常流量(年成本仅 20-25 美元),而昂贵的前沿大模型与智能体集群仅在遭遇入侵等高危突发场景下被按需调用。 - [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) 开源权重模型凭借高达数十倍的成本优势、避免思维链泄露以保护核心 IP 的安全性,预计将占据企业未来 75% 至 90% 的推理工作负载。 - [15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) 网络安全呈现显著的不对称性,攻击者只需利用大模型找到一个有效漏洞即可突破,而防御者必须修补所有漏洞且绝不敢在无验证测试下直接上线 AI 补丁。 - [19:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1148s) 网络战取胜的终极手段是建立绝对技术代差;尽管 AI 智能体目前已在企业内部编写了约一半的代码,但在开放场景下依然无法实现全量形式化验证。 - [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) 全球 AI 算力与模型研发军备竞赛不可阻挡,公众舆论过度渲染负面危险,而欧洲式的前置严苛监管已被证明会严重削弱自身科技经济活力。 - [28:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1703s) 核心算力资源正高度向美中两国倾斜,边缘国家企业面临物理供应链断层的严峻瓶颈,历史证明敢于用资本支出拥抱技术置换的国家终将赢得竞争。 - [30:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1802s) 科技产业正重回极致的垂直整合时代,掌控从底层芯片到顶层生态全栈能力的巨头(如 IBM 历史架构与当下的英伟达)拥有动态迁移利润池的绝对护城河。 - [32:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1958s) 应用层的交互逻辑正在向个人智能体和单次行动成本(CPA)商业模式演进,传统移动端 GUI 应用面临沦为无头化(Headless)后台接口的冲击。 - [34:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2090s) 网络安全单点工具必须横向平台化整合,企业无法承担拼接几十种碎片化工具的高昂运维成本与数据孤岛隐患。 - [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) AI 正彻底颠覆传统 SaaS 企业的 PMF 与独立分发经济学,企业软件供应商格局将从数千家分散采购大幅收敛至 5 到 10 个核心大平台。 - [38:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2332s) 业务软件正发生命运分化:前端交互与工作流类软件极易被 AI 替代,而对高可靠性有物理级严苛标准(容错率 10^-15)的核心交易与记账系统在短期内依然固若金汤。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) 量子计算对现代密码学的生存威胁与时间表 对话从近两天关于“Token”这个高频词的讨论转向了密码学及其面临的颠覆性风险。主持人指出,在 OpenAI 发布数学基准测试等最新成果之后,关于量子计划及其对现代加密体系威胁的讨论骤然升温。IBM 首席执行官 Arvind Krishna 随即介绍了现状:美国国防高级研究计划局(DARPA)启动了名为“量子基准计划”(Quantum Benchmarking Initiative, 简称 QBI)的竞赛,最初有数百家机构参与,如今已筛选淘汰至仅剩约 13 家。Krishna 直言,这场竞赛的核心就是看谁能制造出真正实用的量子计算机。业内对实现这一目标的时间节点争论不休——有人认为是 2028 年,有人认为是 2029 年,也有人推测到 2033 年,而折中的预测基本落在 2030 年前后。 一旦具备实用价值的量子计算机成型,当今所有的非对称加密体系都将被彻底粉碎。Arvind Krishna 严肃地警告:“它会破解当今的密码学。这不是一种假说,这就是一个现实。”(“Well, it will break today's cryptography. That's not a supposition. That's just a reality.”)更严峻的现实是针对静态数据的“先窃取、后解密”攻击:如果某人持有的加密硬盘今天被盗,攻击者只需妥善保存 5 年,待量子算力就绪时便能轻松破解。不过 Krishna 也提到,后量子密码学(Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQC)并非未知领域,其理论已经成熟,代码也早已写就,唯独因为企业和开发者长期的惰性而迟迟未能落地,如今已到了必须清醒应对的时刻。 关于后量子算法究竟是“完全抗量子”(Quantum Proof)还是“抗量子性”(Quantum Resistant),Krishna 解释称,这些算法在理论严密性上与当今经典计算密码学处于同一逻辑层级——现代密码体系无法被当今的经典计算机攻破,并非通过数学定理给出了终极证明,而是建立在计算机科学中计算复杂性理论的假设之上。后量子算法同样基于深厚的理论假设,其安全性在当下具备充分的严密性。 ### [02:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=153s) 量子算力演进的两大核心里程碑与逻辑量子比特 谈及在迈向 2030 年的过程中需要关注的技术进化节点,Arvind Krishna 坦承,目前的量子计算机充其量只是“玩具”(Toys)。它们固然可以处理某些特定问题,但内部充斥着噪声与错误,尚未形成完整的扩展路径。要想迈入真正的实用阶段,必须在未来几年内跨越两个核心里程碑: ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 量子计算机规模化演进路径 accDescr: 展示从当前含噪量子计算机到实用级量子计算的关键演进里程碑。 subgraph Milestone1 ["里程碑一:纠错与缓解"] A["当前阶段:含噪玩具机"] --> B["2025年:发布纠错机制技术主张"] B --> C["2026-2027年:第三方验证小规模纠错"] end subgraph Milestone2 ["里程碑二:量子门规模按数量级跃迁"] C --> D["当前水平:约10,000次门操作"] D --> E["每年规模提升一个数量级 (×10/年)"] E --> F["2029年:实现10,000,000次门操作"] end F --> G["2030年:具备破译经典加密能力的量子机器"] ``` 针对现场关于“逻辑量子比特”(Logical Qubit)概念的讨论,Krishna 表示自己虽然算不上喜欢这个词,但它确实是向大众解释机器有效算力的实用指标。因为当一家公司宣称造出了 10,000 个物理量子比特的计算机时,由于这些比特全部充满噪声,实际算力大打折扣;引入纠错机制后,虽然物理机器的部分容量被纠错算法占用,但机器会映射出一定数量纯净稳定的“逻辑量子比特”(例如数千个物理比特对应 200 个逻辑比特),这代表了整台量子机器的“有效运行容量”。 - **里程碑一(量子纠错与缓解)**:不再局限于仿真或外挂式修正,而是首次在实际运行的量子硬件上实现原生纠错。预计 2025 年将有团队公布技术突破并接受第三方审查,2027 年左右有望在小规模系统上验证纠错的有效性。 - **里程碑二(量子门计算规模的指数级扩展)**:目前绝大多数前沿硬件单次能承载的门操作(Gate Computations)仅在 10,000 次左右,相比 iPhone 每分钟数十亿次的运算量微不足道。评估量子进展的关键,在于门操作规模能否实现“每年翻一个数量级(增加一个零)”。如果能保持这种复合增速,到 2029 年门操作将跃升至 1000 万次。 ### [05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=305s) 红队视角:5 万亿美元 IT 基础设施的置换紧迫性 Palo Alto Networks 首席执行官 Nikesh Arora 从安全防御与企业红队的实战视角切入,指出全局性的风险已经迫在眉睫。在现代企业的 IT 架构中,加密密钥并不孤立存在于某一台服务器,而是贯穿在整个 IT 基础设施的毛细血管之中,所有厂商的端点之间都在使用加密密钥。一旦非量子安全的算法被破解,整个基础设施将全线失守。 Arora 对企业的拖延心态提出了直接警告,指出指望在 2029 或 2030 年临门一脚时解决问题纯属幻想: > “我们不能等到 2029 年或 2030 年,因为我们不可能在某一天突然对大家说:‘哦,让我们把 5 万亿美元的 IT 基础设施全烧掉,然后在一年内重造一套,因为我们现在需要抗量子基础设施了。’”(“Our view is you can't wait for 2029 or 2030 because it's not like one day all of us are going to go out and say oh let's go burn $5 trillion of IT infrastructure and let's go build it again in one year because now we need quantum safe infrastructure.”) Arora 强调,企业必须从今天起就用抗量子或量子安全(Quantum-safe / Quantum-proof)的设备替换现有的 IT 堆栈。尽管目前市场上已有诸如将就绪型后量子密钥包裹到流量中的过渡性解决方案,但如果按照 Krishna 提出的 2029 至 2030 年时间表,“我们现在实际上已经落后了”。他直言在场的企业高管今年大概都手握数亿美元的 IT 预算,然而其中至少 50% 仍被漫不经心地投入在根本不具备抗量子能力的传统基础设施上。 ### [06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) AI 能否用数论经典算力抢先破译密码体系? 针对部分资深 AI 研究员提出“前沿 AI 模型在数论上的突破可能会赶在量子计算机之前破解密码”的观点(例如借助数论模型预测质数分布,从而在经典算力上重构破译路径),Arvind Krishna 从计算底层的物理与数学机制出发,给出了明确的反驳。Krishna 搬出著名物理学家理查德·费曼(Richard Feynman)的计算理论架构,强调不能脱离体系结构空谈效率: > “归根结底这是不可能的。这可以追溯到理查德·费曼等人所做的工作:你不可能在一种完全不同的架构上进行模拟,还期望得到更高效率的结果。”(“It's not going to be possible at the end of the day. This goes back to stuff that people like Richard Feynman did. You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result.”) Krishna 详细解构了计算架构的差异: - 包括 GPU 在内的所有经典计算硬件,底层运行的均是算术运算(Arithmetic); - 量子计算机遵循完全不同的物理与概率规律,脱离了传统的算术范畴; - AI 算法完全有可能协助人类发现一种全新的量子算法(Quantum Algorithm); - 但如果试图让这种新型量子算法在经典硬件或 GPU 上运行,其效率将直接暴跌上千甚至上万倍。 当主持人补充提问,如果 AI 并非去模拟量子算法,而是在纯数论领域取得了数学突破,用经典算力找到破译 RSA 等加密的新算术解法是否可行时,Krishna 承认这在理论上有其极低的可能性,但工程现实是算力时间:“问题在于它们需要耗费多长时间?因为这永远是核心问题所在。所以即便可能,但如果破解一个密钥需要花费 10 年,绝大多数人完全可以高枕无忧。”在现实商业与安全世界中,缺乏时间效率的破解方法没有任何实用威胁。 ### [09:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=542s) 开源与前沿大模型之争:早期实验切忌过早成本优化 对话随后转向当前 AI 产业界最为核心的分野:开源权重(Open Weight)对垒闭源前沿(Frontier)模型。面对企业如何在全谱系的模型与能力中做技术选型的疑问,Nikesh Arora 分享了 Palo Alto Networks 的内部实践与管理哲学。 Arora 极力反对在技术探索初期推行过度的成本优化或盲目自研。他提醒各大企业管理者,在面对拥有 20,000 名员工的大型组织时,必须意识到普通团队接触和理解生成式 AI 不过才 12 到 18 个月,技术扩散仍在早期。管理者在这个阶段若人为增加使用门槛,只会扼杀创新的萌芽。Arora 阐述了当前应当坚持的试水策略: > “在实验阶段,切忌在能力层面限制你的团队。不要在这个阶段就开始尝试成本优化,不要在那个阶段试图自己去缝合一套方案。”(“Don't restrict your teams in terms of capability in the experimentation phase. Don't start trying to cost optimize. Don't start trying to stitch your own in that phase.”) 企业当下最明智的策略,就是放手让业务团队去使用市面上能找到的最强、最先进的商业模型,并以最简单、最无阻力的方式集成,优先验证大语言模型到底能给工作流带来何种维度的实质性提升。 ### [10:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=615s) 端点经济学:小语言模型与前沿大模型的权衡 Nikesh Arora 探讨了 AI 落地第一阶段的现实认知:不同任务需要完全不同的算力与模型配置。他提到,此前业界一度产生恐慌,认为网络安全行业将被顶级 AI 模型彻底吞噬,甚至直言“生活要结束了”。然而现实的工程经济学却截然相反:安全厂商在终端(Endpoint)检查全部网络流量的成本仅为每年每个端点 20 到 25 美元,这依托于直接运行在本地端点计算资源上的轻量机器学习模型,其有效载荷仅有 20 到 40 MB。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 端点安全与前沿模型的场景分工 accDescr: 对比低成本端点模型处理日常流量与前沿大模型应对突发安全入侵的分工流程 subgraph NormalFlow["日常防御场景(低成本/高频)"] direction TB A["端点网络流量 (数百 MB)"] --> B["小语言模型 / 本地 ML<br/>(20-40MB 载荷, 99.9% 准确率)"] B --> C["年成本: $20-$25/端点<br/>本地计算与审计"] end subgraph BreachFlow["紧急沦陷场景(高价值/低频)"] direction TB D["遭遇活跃入侵 (Breach)"] --> E["前沿大模型 / 智能体集群<br/>(Frontier LLMs / Agent Swarms)"] E --> F["阻断数十亿美元潜在损失<br/>极致推理与对策生成"] end ``` 如果将企业内每位员工产生的庞大流量全部接入 OpenAI 并按 token 计费,光是一家企业消耗的 token 费用就可能撑起 OpenAI 一整年的总营收,这在现实中毫无可行性。企业真正的做法是选用小语言模型(SLM),进行压缩和任务定向微调,直至准确率达到 99.9%。Nikesh 强调,各方正在摸索不同任务对智能等级与成本的匹配度:“突然之间你就会发现,你并不需要给每项任务都配一辆法拉利,而且客户也根本不想为每项任务都去买一辆法拉利的单。” 然而在遭遇入侵(Breach)的极端危急时刻,逻辑则完全逆转。当企业面临数十亿美元的业务损失威胁时,客户会要求不惜代价调动任何最先进的前沿大模型与智能体集群(Agent Swarms)进行深度推理以阻断攻击。而在平时的日常防御体系中,更具可行性的方案是基于开源权重模型,结合企业自有的专有数据进行训练与权重管理,以确保系统的可审计性、可解释性与透明度。 - 端点防护以本地 20-40 MB 载荷运行小模型,年成本仅约 20 至 25 美元。 - 绝大多数企业日常实用场景更倾向于微调开源模型,而非调用昂贵的通用前沿 API。 - 前沿顶尖模型被严格保留给突发入侵防御、药物研发等潜在商业价值或损失极高的特殊用例。 ### [12:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=766s) 开源权重模型的必然胜局:成本、IP 安全与地缘政治 Arvind Krishna 从纯商业和技术的底层逻辑支持了开源权重模型的普及趋势。在成本层面,前沿大模型的定价通常在每百万 token 20 美元(甚至在极端复杂场景下达到 50 美元),而企业如果采用性能达 8000 亿参数级别的开源模型,只需投入大约一周的工程优化时间在自有 GPU 上部署,就能将每百万 token 成本压缩至 1 到 2 美元。对于可以覆盖 95% 工作负载的场景,没有任何一家企业能够拒绝这种成本降低 10 倍乃至 40 倍的解决方案。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 开源权重模型胜出的三大驱动力 accDescr: 说明推动企业 75% 至 90% 采用开源权重模型的成本、IP与地缘政治因素 subgraph Drivers["三大核心驱动力"] A["成本优势<br/>($1-$2 vs $20-$50/M tokens)"] B["知识产权保护<br/>(防止思维链暴露与外部留存)"] C["技术差距缩小<br/>(全球与西方开源模型差距仅6-12个月)"] end Drivers --> D["最终格局:75% 至 90% 的企业 Token 走向开源权重模型"] ``` 除了经济账,知识产权(IP)与品牌安全构成了第二道硬性门槛。推理模型的思维链(Chain of Thought)如果被外部云厂商捕获、记录或审计,企业就相当于在白白拱手送出自己的核心知识产权;而顶尖商业前沿模型供应商绝不会允许企业将模型完全下载至本地内网闭环运行。第三个维度是地缘政治与开源发展节奏,当前表现优异的开源权重模型部分来自中国,在沙箱隔离环境下运行这些模型具有足够安全性;同时 Arvind 预计西方在未来一到两年内也会推出旗鼓相当的开源权重模型,二者的能力代差仅在 6 到 12 个月左右。 谈到究竟有多少 token 会流向开源模型时,Arvind 给出了清晰的判断:“我不知道最终比例会是 75% 还是 90%,但我划定的区间就是全部 token 用量中的 75% 到 90% 都会流向开源权重模型,这基于我提到的理由,也加上了 Nikesh 提到的考量。”针对为何仍有部分开发者依赖昂贵的前沿模型,Arvind 调侃道:“开发者天性是懒惰的,除非你施加成本管控,否则他们一定会选最贵、最容易上手的现成方案。”在前期的探索验证阶段允许开发者任意调用以加速验证是合理的,但在规模化生产环境中,依赖昂贵前沿模型则缺乏实际价值。 - 开源模型在自有算力优化后,可将百万 token 成本降至 1-2 美元,成本仅为前沿闭源模型的几十分之一。 - 思维链(Chain of Thought)的外部留存机制直接威胁企业的核心专有 IP。 - 开源模型与前沿闭源模型的技术代差正收窄在 6 至 12 个月之间。 ### [15:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=920s) 漏洞攻防的不对称性与安全壁垒 针对外界质疑 OpenAI 等底层模型巨头是否会下场通吃并终结垂直安全厂商的疑问,Nikesh 表现得十分笃定:“当你置身其中并走出来时,你会得出结论:‘这些人做不进我的核心业务。’”他剖析了代码大模型与安全攻防之间微妙的不对称性。虽然大模型通过海量代码训练掌握了优良代码的模式,进而能迅速反向识别出劣质代码与潜在漏洞,但其在实际运行中依然存在约 30% 的幻觉率。 | 角色 / 维度 | 成功所需条件 | 模型幻觉的影响 | 工具应用现状 | |:--- |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **攻击者 (Attackers)** | 仅需找到 **1 个** 有效漏洞即可实现破局突破 | 容错率极高,哪怕 30% 幻觉,剩下的命中也足以发起致命打击 | 大规模利用前沿代码工具快速扫描、尝试exploit | | **防御者 (Defenders)** | 必须找出并修补 **每一个** 漏洞,缺一不可 | 必须逐一深入验证与测试,无法盲信模型判断 | 必须经历“发现-验证-测试-修补”闭环,绝不敢未经人工或二次测试直接上线自动补丁 | 这种不对称性意味着大模型天然更偏向攻击者:黑客只需要一次成功,而防御者必须防住全部。当业内团队利用模型进行安全审计时,模型给出的漏洞线索中大约 60% 到 80% 是真实威胁,20% 属于误报幻觉。即便模型具备生成修复补丁的能力,目前没有任何一家严谨的企业敢在不经过二次严格回归测试的情况下,直接将代码大模型(如 Claude Code 等)编写的安全补丁发布到生产系统。 面对主持人和与会者关于“网络空间防御是否已彻底演变为真正战争”的提问,Nikesh 认为安全行业的未来在于协同联防,例如 Arvind 主导的安全共享计划。单打独斗去测试和修补每一个开源组件漏洞是极其低效的,行业正转向集中式协同:由受信任的机构汇聚漏洞信息,统一集中研发验证防御补丁,再全局下发分发至所有节点,这正是现代网络安全协同作战的核心运作逻辑。当被问及“由智能体(Agent)自主编写的代码是否能做到完全无错(Error-free)”时,Nikesh 和 Arvind 异口同声给出了干脆利落的否定回答:“不。” ### [19:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1148s) 网络战的三种打法与 AI 智能体写代码的验证难题 谈到网络安全攻防,Arvind Krishna 总结了战争史上的三种核心策略:第一种是 Nikesh Arora 提到的“结成强大联盟”,通过防守方联盟的力量彻底压制攻击方;第二种是利用“不对称性”(Asymmetry),攻击方的成本通常远低于防守方,往往导致防守方资金耗尽而被迫妥协,因此防守方的出路在于将防御成本大幅降低以实现“对称战”,从而博得更大的胜算;第三种也是决定所有战争胜负的根本法门——“技术代差与绝对优势”(Technological Superiority)。从二战、朝鲜战争到伊拉克战争,拥有单向技术优势的一方往往能直接获胜。当下的目标正是利用 AI 获取技术优势:主动发现漏洞、快速打补丁并建立防御边界,从而让对手寻找漏洞的攻击成本变得极高。 聊到 AI 代码编写时,Arvind Krishna 透露,目前 IBM 内部大约有一半的代码都是由软件 Agent 编写的,且这些代码在质量上已经超越了以往人类手写的水准。其优势在于 Agent 能够在代码上线交付前自主进行评估(eval)与修复。然而,这一体系仍存在根本局限:防守方目前只能捕获“已知如何寻找”的缺陷。由于在输入不受限的开放场景下进行全量验证在计算上几乎不可行(computationally infeasible),软件工程陷入了一种尚无法实现完全形式化验证的怪圈,唯有在输入高度受限的垂直任务中,验证的准确性才存在突破的可能。 “Look at the end will agentic code be superior to human written code absolutely we can find that we use agents and coding agents now for probably half the code that is written inside our place and it is superior to what was being written before but the reason it's superior is the agents can also do eval basically make sure that everything they can find is actually fixed before it ever goes out.” —— Arvind Krishna ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 网络战争与防御的核心策略演进 accDescr: 展示从联盟、成本对称到技术代差的三层网络战法以及当前智能体代码验证的局限流程。 subgraph Strat["网络攻防战的三种法则"] S1["联盟策略: 汇聚多方防守资源反超攻击方"] S2["对称策略: 大幅降低防御成本抗衡不对称攻击"] S3["技术优势: 建立技术代差压制对手 (核心决胜手)"] end subgraph AgentDev["AI 智能体开发与验证现状"] C1["Agent 编写约 50% 内部代码"] C2["自动化评测修复已知漏洞"] C3{"输入边界是否受限?"} C4["受限场景: 可验证代码正确性"] C5["开放场景: 全量验证计算不可行"] end S3 --> C1 C1 --> C2 --> C3 C3 -->|"是"| C4 C3 -->|"否"| C5 ``` ### [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) 全球 AI 军备竞赛的必然性与监管叙事的失衡 讨论转向地缘政治与宏观监管时,主持方指出,现实中中美等大国绝不可能“手拉手”一同停下 AI 研发的脚步,这就注定了算力、防御和进攻性技术代差是一场必须全力以赴的军备竞赛。Nikesh Arora 赞同这一现实,直言“显然没有任何人在踩刹车”,所有人都在以疯狂的节奏训练更快、更强、更智能的模型。 针对舆论环境,Nikesh Arora 批评当下的公众讨论过度陷入了“暗黑面与危险论”(Overrotated on the dark side),而忽略了 AI 带来的巨大正面价值。他打了个生动的比方:莱特兄弟发明飞机时,绝不是先想着怎么让人在登机前脱鞋检查、搞一套像运输安全管理局(TSA)一样的安检体系,而是先让人类飞上天空。在责任归属层面,Nikesh Arora 与 Arvind Krishna 一致强调,商业企业必须对其交付给市场的产品负全责。企业绝对不能在释放系统后两手一摊,借口说代码是“某某 Agent 跑出来的”来逃避法律与产品责任。 Arvind Krishna 进一步指出,在数字化时代单方面踩刹车不仅不切实际,而且适得其反。欧洲的现状就是前车之鉴:因过度恐惧未知的危险而抢先制定严苛法规,直接导致其在科技经济上失去了活力。假如欧美单方面暂停,日、中、印等国只会将其视为迎头赶上甚至实现反超的历史性良机。 - 全球竞相研发更好的模型,各方都不可能达成实质性的暂停协议 - 舆论过度聚焦 AI 潜在风险,在技术爆发初期形成了失衡的社会叙事 - 无论代码是由工程师手写还是由底层 Agent 自动生成,获取经济价值的商业实体必须对产品安全承担完全法定责任 - 欧洲式的强监管不仅无法阻挡数字化技术的扩散,反而严重削弱自身的科技经济竞争力 “If you build something, you're accountable for it. If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work.” —— Nikesh Arora “So a digital technology is impossible to actually slow down and the European example tells us. So there you get afraid of all the possibilities. I'm not saying they're real dangers. You get afraid of all of them and you impose regulations first. I guess it's such a vibrant tech economy there, right?” —— Arvind Krishna ### [24:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1494s) 华盛顿的算力博弈、民粹主义监管与算力垄断风险 针对政界对 AI 的真实态度,主持方分享了一桩近期在华盛顿特区与国会资深议员闭门饮酒时的对话内幕:该议员透露,全球顶尖巨头的一位 CEO 对当下网络安全态势极其恐慌,几乎陷入崩溃;甚至有传闻声称到第四季度全美 50 个州可能会联合出台针对数据中心建设的禁令。对这种极端说法,现场嘉宾一笑置之,直言美国 50 个州在历史上几乎从未在任何事情上达成过绝对一致。 Arvind Krishna 结合自己与两届美国政府及长期任职的参议员打交道的深层经验分析,华盛顿围绕 AI 和数据中心的听证会自 2022 年便反复进行,政客推动所谓严苛监管在很大程度上纯粹是出于“民粹主义”(Populism)和拉选票的政治秀,而非基于技术现实。不过,政界核心层同样深知维持长期经济竞争优势的重要性,双方目前仍在微妙的平衡木上博弈。对于数据中心的审批,即便未来有 30 个州因环保或选民压力设限,剩下的 20 个州也会抢着笑纳这些庞大的基础设施投资。 在谈到全球技术鸿沟时,主持方抛出了“拥有者与匮乏者”(Haves and Have-nots)的阶层分化问题。Nikesh Arora 认为软件和防御技术的普及门槛最终会被打得很低,正常商业主体都能负担得起安全防御成本;但他表达了另一层更深的地缘忧虑:当前全球顶尖算力极度稀缺且昂贵,算力的狂飙演进正高度集中在中美两个大国手中,未来算力在世界其他地区的分布将极不均衡,远离核心算力圈的国家与企业将面临极其严峻的竞争劣势。 “The regulation question on AI and data centers is driven I'm going to be sorry and cynical is driven by populism, not by any reality. If I can get more votes, should I look like I'm trying to do those things? Politics is politics.” —— Arvind Krishna “I fear that we will see fast advances in compute development in two large countries in the world. We may not see that as evenly distributed across the rest of the world. And compute is very dear right now.” —— Nikesh Arora ### [28:23](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1703s) 算力地缘瓶颈与资本对劳动的历史替代 Nikesh Arora 谈到,距离算力震中越远,获得尖端算力支持的概率就越低。这并非源于经济支付能力,而是纯粹受制于严重的供应链瓶颈。欧洲企业即便拥有绝佳的创新意愿、充足的优化动力和向前推进的热情,也会突然惊觉,由于身处远离震中的地理边缘,它们根本无法获得与美中两国同行同等量级的硬件资源。 Arvind Krishna 随即从数百年的技术变革史切入,指出当下的竞争本质上是资本与劳动之间极其经典的权衡替代,这一幕在 18 世纪、19 世纪乃至 20 世纪的历次工业技术浪潮中曾反复上演。在以往七到八轮技术大周期中,那些敢于将重心压在资本支出而非过度纠结保护现有劳动力的国家和实体,无一例外都赢得了最终的胜利。Arvind Krishna 尖锐地总结道:“那些深陷于‘无论付出何种代价都必须保护既有劳动力’的左倾与社会哲学偏执中的国家,注定会成为输家。”他强调,保护劳动力应在于创造未来的机会,而非固步自封地保全每一个既有工种;直面工作岗位的转移与替代是阵痛,但它终将孕育出生产力更高、质量更好的新型岗位。 - **供应链分配失衡**:欧洲等外围地区企业在技术抱负与资金上并不匮乏,但在物理层面上遭遇芯片与算力供应的刚性壁垒。 - **资本密集度决定胜负**:美中两国在算力基础设施上的压倒性资本下注,使其在 AI 竞赛中占据绝对主动。 - **劳动力哲学分水岭**:区分赢家与输家的关键在于社会机制是积极拥抱“岗位置换(Job displacement)”以追求生产力飞跃,还是因恐惧“岗位流失(Job loss)”而采取防御性阻碍。 --- ### [30:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1802s) 垂直整合的回归:从 IBM 帝国到英伟达生态统治 对谈转入企业架构演进的钟摆效应。主持人提到,市场正从前些年的高度分工、细分拆解,重新摆向类似 20 世纪 60 至 80 年代的大型财团与全栈垂直整合模式;在动荡时期,能够纵向贯穿全产业链的企业往往成为资本最稳固的避风港。Arvind Krishna 随后分享了 IBM 大型机(Mainframe)长盛不衰的经典案例。这套系统历经 65 年依然在核心商业金融系统中被大规模稳定使用,其基石正是极致的垂直整合。在 20 世纪 60 年代,IBM 真正做到了“深入泥土(all the way to dirt)”——从开采沙石、自制硅晶圆、自建芯片晶圆厂(Fab)、自主研发芯片架构,到包裹机器的外部钣金结构,全部由内部制造。这种全栈掌控不仅杜绝了任何核心知识产权外泄,还将整条价值链的所有利润池悉数截留在公司内部。即便在今天,IBM 虽因规模效应不再自营晶圆制造,但芯片设计、工程架构、系统弹性与核心软件依然紧锁于内部。 Nikesh Arora 随即指出,英伟达的黄仁勋正是这种垂直整合哲学的当代化身。从底层硬件构架一直延伸到开源社区 Hugging Face,黄仁勋深刻理解前沿模型与开源生态的动态博弈,并通过投资扶持整个上下游生态系统,确保所有人始终被牢牢锚定在英伟达的全栈软硬件体系中。掌握了垂直全栈的领军企业拥有极具压迫感的战略杠杆:它们可以自主决定让哪一层商品化(Commoditize)。当竞争对手试图在某一特定层级发起攻击、摧毁该环节的利润池时,掌控全栈的巨头可以轻而易举地将超额利润转移到其他层级,从而让挑战者劳而无功。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 全栈垂直整合与利润转移机制 accDescr: 展示从底层硬件到应用层的全栈掌控如何让巨头在遭受局部攻击时灵活迁移利润池。 subgraph Stack ["垂直整合全栈架构"] A["顶层:应用与开发生态 (Hugging Face / 核心软件)"] B["中间层:推理框架与专有算法 (CUDA / 系统架构)"] C["底层:芯片硬件与算力底座 (GPU / 自研芯片设计)"] end D["外部攻击 / 竞争者低价内卷"] -.->|"利润池被削弱"| B Stack -->|"动态定价策略"| E["利润池顺畅转移至底层硬件或生态锁定层"] A --- B B --- C ``` --- ### [32:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1958s) 应用层终局:闭环垂直栈对阵无头化应用 针对 OpenAI 或 Anthropic 等前沿实验室在应用层的垂直整合策略,以及下游企业的防御手段,Nikesh Arora 认为当下的讨论流于表面。市场上关于开源模型与前沿权重(Open Weight)的争论,其实质是“开放技术栈”与“封闭全栈”的生死对决。随着模型演进,每个模型都需要庞大的长期记忆、极宽的上下文窗口以及对用户场景的深度理解,推理(Reasoning)已经无法再与记忆和上下文生硬剥离。如果强行把二者分开,类似 OpenRouter 这样的中转路由将沦为只能在模型间来回搬运推理 Token 的低效工具。 未来的交互必然演进为端到端的垂直闭环体系,商业结算也将围绕“单次行动成本(Cost Per Action, CPA)”展开。一个行动指令必须完整穿透从用户 Prompt 到最终执行结果的全部逻辑链路。一旦用户的个人智能体(Personal Agent)深度学习了个人的全部私有上下文、API 接口和连接权限,就形成了极高的迁移摩擦力与深厚护城河,用户绝不可能每天将这些数据在不同的技术栈之间轻易搬运。而在消费级领域,正如 Meta 所展示的那样,前沿实验室正发起全面进攻,残酷的渠道蛮力(Brute force distribution)将再度统治市场。在这一洗牌过程中,iPhone 等设备上的所有现有原生应用都将面临被“无头化(Headless)”解构的命运,沦为后台默默响应 AI 调用的功能接口。 - **推理与记忆的深度绑定**:模型能力的跃升使得“上下文+记忆”与“推理核心”不可分割,纯中介路由层失去独立生存空间。 - **行动成本(CPA)商业化**:企业与用户买单的不再是孤立的 Token 输入输出,而是穿透全链路、达成确定性任务结果的闭环动作。 - **智能体护城河与无头应用**:高度个性化的私有数据沉淀构筑了排他性壁垒,移动端应用界面被 AI 智能体全面接管,传统图形用户界面(GUI)走向后台化。 --- ### [34:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2090s) 平台化吞噬单点工具:网络安全整合与软件终局价值迷局 当探讨从垂直整合转向软件行业横向并购(M&A)与资本溢价时,Nikesh Arora 以网络安全行业为例,直言当前的单点割裂现状极其荒谬。在过去八年里他始终坚持一个判断:“在过去的八年里,我一直坚持认为,让我们的客户去采购 40 种不同的解决方案然后再把它们生拼硬凑在一起,是一件极其荒唐可笑的事情。”企业客户往往连一家厂商的代码逻辑都无法彻底吃透,更遑论指望他们凭自身能力去整合十家不同供应商的产品并保证数据实时互通。Palo Alto Networks 正在做的,就是以最快速度收购各细分领域的顶级单点产品,打通底层数据孤岛,彻底免除客户自行拼接的痛苦。 Nikesh Arora 进一步援引自己在富达投资(Fidelity Investments)的第一份工作经历作为历史参照:三十年前,富达内部运行着 23 套各异的业务系统,维护着海量主表(Master Tables)与级联关联表,分别处理不同的客户交互,这些系统合起来正是今天通称的客户关系管理(CRM)。而如今,企业直接采购 Salesforce、Microsoft Dynamics 或 Oracle 的开箱即用套件即可,虽然用户常常对其高昂费用皱眉叹气,但这证明了经过三十年演进,碎片化软件终将收敛于统一平台,因为所有细分功能最终都会趋向同质化与标准化。网络安全领域正在复刻这一整合进程。虽然当前网安标的在 AI 叙事驱动下享受着极高估值与无上限的算力投入预算,但从整个宏观科技行业来看,非安全领域的通用企业级软件已陷入空前迷雾,其长期的终局价值(Terminal Value)正变得越来越难以捉摸。 | 发展阶段 | 20 世纪 90 年代 CRM 演进史 | 现代网络安全行业现状与未来 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **初期割裂态势** | 企业自建多达 23 套独立业务系统,通过复杂主表拼接数据。 | 客户被迫向不同供应商采购 40 余种离散单点工具,安全体系千疮百孔。 | | **平台化整合** | 细分工具同质化,Salesforce、Oracle 等标准化平台完成横向收口。 | 平台型巨头加速整合各赛道最优产品,统一底层数据流,消除拼接成本。 | | **商业与估值特征** | 客户忍受昂贵套件成本以换取系统确定性与低运维复杂度。 | 虽受 AI 浪潮推高估值,但整体通用 SaaS 的终局价值与护城河正遭受根本性拷问。 | ### [37:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2229s) AI 对 SaaS 商业模式的冲击与产品市场匹配度的颠覆 Nikesh Arora 深入探讨了传统 SaaS 软件企业在当前技术周期中所面临的生死考验。他指出,随着人工智能技术的发展,许多现有软件公司的产品市场匹配度(Product-Market Fit, PMF)正在被剧烈颠覆,它们很难在未来 5 到 8 年内维持原有的生存状态。在理想情况下,如果把 AI 充分运用到现有软件体系中,用户完全能够预见软件应当如何以更智能的方式运转。Nikesh Arora 坦言,针对自己采购的一半以上套装软件,他非常清楚其在 AI-first(AI 原生)世界中应该具备何种功能,一旦有人通过更前沿的 AI 手段将其实现,传统软件便会迅速失去立足之地。 谈及 SaaS 领域的未来前景时,Nikesh Arora 给出了极为直接的判断:“So I think there's going to be huge disruption in the SAS space over the next few years.”(因此我认为在接下来的几年里,SaaS 领域将会发生巨大的颠覆。) ### [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) 企业软件的大整合:从数千独立供应商到少数核心平台 针对主持人关于软件估值倍数(multiples)是否已经变得极具吸引力的提问,Arvind Krishna 回顾道,这些估值在年初确实非常有吸引力,但一个月前又变得不再那么诱人,后续走势仍有待观察。随后,Arvind Krishna 顺着 Nikesh Arora 的思路进一步指出,这种颠覆绝不仅限于网络安全领域。当前一家典型的企业平均会使用 500 到 5,000 家互不相同的独立软件供应商(distinct software vendors)。在安全防护视角下,每一个外部供应商都意味着一个潜在的受攻击面(attack surface),成千上万个供应商的存在构成了极其庞大的安全隐患。 面对这种痛点,企业必然会思考是否能够借助轻量级的 AI 能力,直接替代其中 490 家甚至更多的小型独立工具,转而将核心业务收敛并依托于 5 到 10 个主力平台。Arvind Krishna 强调,由于软件的核心价值正在被通用 AI 能力稀释,独立软件供应商将无法继续承受高昂的独立获客与分发成本(distribution cost),而大型综合平台则能以极低的分发成本统揽全局。 Arvind Krishna 明确断言这一整合趋势不可逆转:“That implies massive consolidation because that's where the spend goes.”(这意味着大规模的行业整合,因为企业的资金支出正是流向那些核心平台。)他认为无论整个过程耗时 6 个月还是 6 年,企业软件采购的大整合格局终将成为现实。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 企业软件从碎片化向核心平台的整合趋势 accDescr: 展示企业从采购数千家独立软件逐步向少数具备 AI 能力的核心平台收敛的过程 subgraph Before["整合前的企业现状"] A["500 - 5,000 家独立软件供应商"] B["高昂的独立分发与销售成本"] C["庞大且脆弱的网络安全受攻击面"] A --> B A --> C end subgraph Catalyst["AI 驱动的整合催化剂"] D["企业自研/轻量级 AI 能力替代长尾工具"] E["大平台低成本分发全套能力"] end subgraph After["整合后的未来格局"] F["5 - 10 个主流核心企业平台"] G["预算集中、受攻击面大幅缩减"] F --> G end Before --> Catalyst Catalyst --> After ``` - **供应商数量激增带来的隐患**:普通中大型企业往往采购了 500 至 5,000 个不同供应商的软件,给合规和网络防御带来了难以承受的暴露面。 - **分发经济学的崩塌**:当单点软件的功能价值下降后,依靠高昂销售与分发渠道生存的单点 SaaS 企业将失去独立存活的经济可行性。 ### [38:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2332s) 交互型软件与高可靠性底层系统的命运分化 Arvind Krishna 进一步对企业级软件进行了深度分类,认为不同技术层级的软件在抵抗 AI 冲击时的难度截然不同。一类是具有大量“交互价值”(interaction value)的前端与业务交互型软件,这类软件主要承载用户沟通与工作流编排,极易被智能化程度越来越高的大模型与 AI 智能体所替代;另一类则是支撑核心业务运转的底层事务系统,例如零售银行的核心数据查找系统或企业期末财务关账(closing the books)系统。这类核心基础设施对可靠性的要求达到了极端严苛的物理级标准——即容错率低至 $10^{-15}$。 Arvind Krishna 认为,AI 生成的软件在短期内根本无法轻易替代这种对超高可靠性有着绝对要求的核心数据库和底层系统:“I think that's going to be hard to replace that easily with AI generated software.”(我认为要用 AI 生成的软件轻易替代它们将会非常困难。) 针对这种高关键性基础设施的替换难度,现场对话补充指出,企业在真正废弃旧系统之前,往往需要让数字孪生(digital twin)与旧系统并行运行数年之久来验证其绝对稳定性;而在这种漫长的验证周期下,盲目用 AI 重构核心系统不仅风险极高,而且完全没有任何成本优势(cost advantage)。 对话最后,主持人在掌声中向 Arvind Krishna 与 Nikesh Arora 致谢,为全场关于量子威胁、模型开源与前沿竞争、网络空间战及 SaaS 整合的深度对谈画上了句号。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=0s) Well, it will break today's cryptography. That's not a supposition. That's just a reality. — Arvind Krishna > [06:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=400s) It's not going to be possible at the end of the day. This goes back to stuff that people like Richard Feynman did. You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result. — Arvind Krishna > [09:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=542s) Don't restrict your teams in terms of capability in the experimentation phase. Don't start trying to cost optimize. Don't start trying to stitch your own in that phase. — Nikesh Arora > [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=1270s) If you build something, you're accountable for it. If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work. — Nikesh Arora > [37:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2229s) So I think there's going to be huge disruption in the SAS space over the next few years. — Nikesh Arora > [37:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2263s) That implies massive consolidation because that's where the spend goes. — Arvind Krishna > [38:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2332s) I think that's going to be hard to replace that easily with AI generated software. — Arvind Krishna > [34:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI&t=2090s) 在过去的八年里,我一直坚持认为,让我们的客户去采购 40 种不同的解决方案然后再把它们生拼硬凑在一起,是一件极其荒唐可笑的事情。 — Nikesh Arora ## Mentioned Arvind Krishna, Nikesh Arora, IBM, Palo Alto Networks, DARPA, OpenAI, Richard Feynman, Claude Code, Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics, Oracle, Fidelity Investments, Nvidia, Jensen Huang, Hugging Face, OpenRouter, Meta, Anthropic ## Video description (0:00) Arvind Krishna & Nikesh Arora talk about Quantum Computing’s Threat to Encryption (9:07) Open Weight vs. Frontier AI Models (18:07) AI and Cyber Warfare (21:14) AI Regulation and the Global AI Arms Race (30:32) Vertical Integration and Software Consolidation Follow Nikesh: https://x.com/nikesharora Follow Arvind: https://x.com/ArvindKrishna Follow the besties: https://x.com/chamath https://x.com/Jason https://x.com/DavidSacks https://x.com/friedberg Follow on X: https://x.com/theallinpod Follow on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theallinpod Follow on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@allin Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/allinpod Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://x.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://x.com/TheZachEffect #allin #tech #news [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yzk44lz-RGI)

Source quotes

[0:00] Arvind Krishna: Well, it will break today's cryptography. That's not a supposition. That's just a reality. [6:40] Arvind Krishna: It's not going to be possible at the end of the day. This goes back to stuff that people like Richard Feynman did. You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result. [9:02] Nikesh Arora: Don't restrict your teams in terms of capability in the experimentation phase. Don't start trying to cost optimize. Don't start trying to stitch your own in that phase. [21:10] Nikesh Arora: If you build something, you're accountable for it. If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work. [37:09] Nikesh Arora: So I think there's going to be huge disruption in the SAS space over the next few years. [37:43] Arvind Krishna: That implies massive consolidation because that's where the spend goes. [38:52] Arvind Krishna: I think that's going to be hard to replace that easily with AI generated software. [34:50] Nikesh Arora: 在过去的八年里,我一直坚持认为,让我们的客户去采购 40 种不同的解决方案然后再把它们生拼硬凑在一起,是一件极其荒唐可笑的事情。

Source quotes

[21:10] Nikesh Arora: If you build something and unleash it, you can't unleash and say, 'Oops, I don't know how to control it.' That argument doesn't work. [14:45] Arvind Krishna: Developers are lazy, they're going to use the most expensive answer unless you put a control on it because it's easy. [15:20] Nikesh Arora: The reason it's perfect for attackers, they just need one vulnerability. They don't need 10 vulnerabilities. If you're a defender, you need to find every vulnerability and patch it. [6:40] Arvind Krishna: You cannot simulate something on a different architecture and expect a more efficient result. [12:46] Arvind Krishna: Which enterprise in the world will not accept a 10 times or in this case a 40 times cheaper answer for effectively what can do 95% of the work.

Original transcript

[0:00] I know that you guys have been using the [0:01] T-word a lot the last day or two in your [0:04] conversations, the tokens, but maybe we [0:06] could kind of pivot a little bit away [0:08] from AI. I guess it's a little bit [0:10] rooted in AI, but there's been this big [0:12] conversation set in the last couple days [0:14] about cryptography [0:16] and uh some of the risks to [0:17] cryptography. [0:19] I think it it took root after the open [0:21] AI math drop, but there's more [0:23] conversations now about this big quantum [0:26] initiative and how that might kind of [0:28] take us into an era where we need to [0:30] kind of start to think about adopting [0:31] quantum cryptography. But Arvin, maybe [0:34] we could start and talk a little bit [0:35] about where things stand today from your [0:36] view. [0:37] >> Sure. So, um, a little bit of what David [0:40] just touched on is, uh, DARPA has been [0:42] running a competition called QBI or [0:44] quantum benchmarking initiative. um a [0:47] couple of hundred companies joined it a [0:48] couple of years ago. I think it's down [0:50] to maybe 13 are left. So that tells you [0:53] kind of what's maybe real. I'm calling [0:55] it maybe not quite real. Some of it is [0:58] real. And so their goal is who can build [1:00] a quantum computer that works. Let's [1:03] sort of put the technology side out of [1:05] it. And the debates are is it 2028, [1:08] 2029, 2033 and sort of if you pick the [1:11] middle point, let's call it 2030. Well, [1:14] it will break today's cryptography. [1:16] That's not a supposition. That's just a [1:19] reality. And if that's going to happen, [1:21] then what's the cryptography that you [1:23] got to use to uh protect yourself [1:26] against that? [1:28] Unfortunately for some of you, what's [1:30] even worse? If you have an encrypted [1:32] hard disk today that gets stolen, [1:34] somebody could keep it for 5 years and [1:36] break it at that point. The good news is [1:39] postquantum cryptography is understood. [1:42] It's well known. The code is written but [1:45] people have been too lazy to get to it. [1:48] But I think the wake up moment is now. [1:50] >> Are the solutions that we understand [1:52] quantum proof or quantum resistant [1:55] because it's sort of based on our basic [1:57] understanding today of what quantum [1:59] probably looks like. [2:00] >> Yeah. Um no it is based on understanding [2:03] at a theoretical level of what quantum [2:06] could do. So they are quantum proof in [2:10] the same level of rigor that today's [2:13] cryptography cannot be broken by today's [2:16] classical computers. That's actually not [2:18] a theorem proof level answer. It's more [2:21] based on complexity theory in computer [2:23] science which is grounded at the end on [2:26] some assumptions not on. So if you look [2:29] at where we are today and that 2030 [2:32] midpoint, [2:33] >> can you just walk us through the [2:35] evolutionary moments that you need to [2:36] see where we all have to start paying [2:39] attention and say, "Okay, how do we [2:41] move?" [2:41] >> Yes. So today you got toy quantum [2:45] computers. I'll call I'll call them toys [2:46] because they can do certain problems, [2:48] but they are rife with errors. They have [2:51] no way to scale fully yet. So question [2:54] one will be who's the first one who can [2:57] demonstrate not a simulation not on the [2:59] side but some level of error correction [3:02] or mitigation on a running quantum [3:05] computer step one and so I'll predict [3:09] you'll see somebody [3:11] make claims by next year then you should [3:14] get third parties to evaluate are those [3:16] claims real you'll find one or two will [3:19] make progress by 2027 error correction [3:22] not at scale but a correction. Yeah. [3:25] >> Question two will be [3:28] can you run these things at some level [3:30] of scale? Not yet complete scale. I call [3:33] it gate computations for the lack of a [3:36] better word. Today most people are [3:38] somewhere around 10,000 [3:40] which if you think of a normal computer [3:41] is not very much when your iPhone does a [3:44] couple of uh billion uh per minute. [3:48] >> Yeah. So gate competitions is somebody [3:51] scaling from 10,000 are they adding a [3:53] zero each year? That's the second [3:55] milestone I would put. You put those two [3:57] steps together [3:59] and now if you put a zero per year that [4:02] means you could be at 10 million by [4:04] 2029. [4:05] That's remarkable. That can do some [4:07] things that'll surprise the hell out of [4:10] everybody. [4:11] >> Does this reference kind of this notion [4:13] of a logical cubit being kind of an [4:15] error corrected operating cubit? Is that [4:18] is is that is that a term you've adopted [4:20] logical cubits and [4:22] >> that everyone kind of has the same [4:23] milestone the same metric? [4:25] >> I don't love the term but I think it's a [4:27] fair term to just explain to people to [4:29] say hey if I say I'm building a computer [4:32] it's got 10,000 cubits and they say yeah [4:34] but they're all noisy you're right. So [4:36] if I begin to error correct it in some [4:38] sense decreases the effective capacity [4:40] of the machine. So a logical then says [4:44] okay what's the effective capacity of [4:46] this machine is I think a reasonable way [4:48] to look at it. So that's a that's a term [4:51] that I while I don't love because it's [4:53] not like I've taken these four things [4:54] and it's like a DM cell and that's it. [4:57] It's actually the whole machine is that [4:59] I corrected but it's got some divide in [5:03] physical maybe 200 logical [5:04] >> in case you have red teams that think [5:06] about what is at the frontier and [5:08] pushing it. Let's say that you start to [5:10] see these oos, these orders of magnitude [5:12] start to compound. [5:15] If you had to guess, where would your [5:17] red team say are the obvious honeypotss? [5:19] Where do you point that if you were a [5:22] bad actor? If you think from the [5:24] perspective of everybody here has pretty [5:27] much crypto keys running across their [5:30] entire IT infrastructure. It's not one [5:32] thing. Everything is running with crypto [5:34] keys which are encrypted. Every vendor [5:36] in our space has keys at each end. So [5:39] the first thing that's going to happen [5:40] is whatever is not quantum proof is [5:44] going to be breakable. So our view is [5:48] you can't wait for 2029 or 2030 because [5:50] it's not like one day all of us are [5:52] going to go out and say oh let's go [5:53] burn $5 trillion of IT infrastructure [5:56] and let's go build it again in one year [5:58] because now we need quantum safe [5:59] infrastructure. So you should be buil [6:02] you should be replacing your IT stack [6:04] today with quantum safe or quantum proof [6:08] infrastructure right now. Now now there [6:09] are technologies there are capabilities [6:11] which are already out of the market [6:12] where you can start you know wrapping uh [6:16] postquantum ready keys around traffic as [6:20] a stop gap. So you can do that but the [6:23] time if if he says it's 20 2930 we're [6:25] already late. [6:26] >> We're 3 years away. Well, the way and [6:28] I'm pretty sure everybody in this room [6:30] has got few hundred million of IT spend [6:32] that is earmarked for this year and I'm [6:35] guessing 50% of your spend is on [6:38] infrastructure that is not quantum safe. [6:40] >> There was a pretty senior AI researcher [6:43] that said we don't [6:45] >> h [6:45] >> 29 [6:46] >> well I mean his view was actually models [6:48] AI models today can get us there before [6:51] quantum computers get us there. Do you [6:54] have a view on this? And I guess, you [6:56] know, and and I guess it's rooted in [6:57] this idea that on the frontiers of [7:00] number theory, you can see AI start to [7:03] develop models and proofs that are not [7:06] apparent to humans today that allow us [7:09] to rethink how we can effectively do [7:11] codereing. And perhaps the OpenAI math [7:14] dump this week is an early indication [7:17] that this might actually be a good [7:19] prediction that he made. Since you [7:21] geeked a little bit by going down that [7:23] direction, you'll excuse me if I just [7:25] geek a little bit. It's not going to be [7:27] possible at the end of the day. This [7:30] goes back to stuff that people like [7:32] Richard Fineman did. You cannot simulate [7:36] something on a different architecture [7:37] and expect a more efficient result. [7:40] >> Right? [7:40] >> So if you take that as a thesis, quantum [7:42] computers do not operate in arithmetic, [7:46] right? [7:46] >> Which is what all of classical computers [7:48] including GPUs do. Could you have an AI [7:52] algorithm discover a new quantum [7:54] algorithm? Absolutely. Could it run it [7:58] effectively and efficiently on today's [8:00] hardware? Yes, it's not possible. So, [8:02] you need quantum hardware to run these [8:05] things to get the positive advantage [8:08] that the quantum algorithm has. [8:10] Otherwise, it'll be slower by an order [8:14] of a thousand or 10,000. So, could you [8:17] prove that it's a workable algorithm? [8:19] Yes. Could you get that benefit? [8:21] Unlikely. [8:22] >> I think the argument is using and I know [8:24] we're geeking for a minute, but just [8:25] using classical computing, you can [8:27] actually have a different path, an [8:29] arithmetic path. For example, if you had [8:31] a better predictor of the distribution [8:33] of prime numbers, you know, like at the [8:36] frontiers of number theory that we've [8:38] not really resolved, we can start to [8:40] have classical models that can start to [8:42] break cryptography. [8:44] >> It is possible. The question is how long [8:46] will they take? Because that's always [8:48] the question. So I think it it is going [8:50] to be possible but if it takes 10 years [8:52] to break one key most people are going [8:54] to rest in peace. That's not a practical [8:56] answer. That's the that's I think where [8:58] the debate is going to lie but it won't [9:01] prove out until it's done. [9:02] >> Let me move the conversation to [9:05] something that's happening currently. I [9:07] would love to get both of your takes on [9:10] the following concept. There's open [9:12] source, there's closed source, there's [9:16] frontier, there's pacing the frontier, [9:18] there's now effectively very reasonable [9:21] alternatives that are uh open weight at [9:24] a minimum. [9:26] Your philosophy around the entire [9:28] spectrum and just give us a sense of how [9:31] we should think about models and [9:33] capabilities over the next couple of [9:34] years. Nikesh, you want to start? [9:36] >> Sure. Look, I think earlier in the day [9:38] somebody said don't restrict your teams [9:41] in terms of capability in the [9:43] experimentation phase. Don't start [9:45] trying to cost optimize. Don't start [9:47] trying to stitch your own in that phase [9:49] because [9:51] the teams who work for us 20 to 20,000 [9:54] people have just discovered AI in the [9:55] last 12 to 18 months and it's not fully [9:57] diffused across the organization. So if [10:00] you make it harder for them to adopt, if [10:01] you make it harder for them to [10:02] understand, it's going to take longer [10:04] for us to be ready. So right now we're [10:06] saying go use the best model you can [10:08] find the easiest way to use it so you [10:10] can understand can we validate the [10:12] things that these things can do whether [10:14] it's from an efficiency perspective a [10:15] revenue perspective or a product [10:16] development perspective that's kind of [10:18] I'd call it phase one but in phase one [10:21] what we've discovered is there's [10:23] different forces for different courses [10:25] right what people don't understand you [10:27] know there was a moment whenever we [10:28] thought the cyber security was going to [10:30] get consumed by AI models and you know [10:32] our lives are over because mythos is [10:34] going to solve every Well, guess what? [10:36] We inspect all traffic at an endpoint at [10:40] the cost of $20 a year, [10:43] right? [10:45] Hundreds of megabytes of traffic per [10:46] endpoint at the cost of 20 $25 a year [10:49] because machine learning is running on [10:50] your endpoint, your compute, and we run [10:53] it on a 20, 30, 40 megabyte payload. [10:57] Now, if you want to take all that [10:58] traffic, run that through OpenAI using [11:00] tokens for every employee in your [11:01] company. Sounds like a sound of revenue [11:04] like open I would probably generate all [11:05] the revenue in one ear from one company [11:07] right so that's not a practical example [11:09] of how models do so what you do is you [11:11] take a small language model you compress [11:14] it you make it task specific you keep [11:17] keep training it until it gets to 99.9% [11:19] accuracy and say instead of using it [11:21] using machine learning algorithms we're [11:23] going to use generative AI small [11:24] language models and they're going to do [11:25] that at the end so my point is what [11:27] we're doing is we're trying to figure [11:29] out what task requires what level of [11:31] intelligence and what is the cost of [11:33] that intelligence for that particular [11:35] task and you'll suddenly discover you [11:37] don't need a Ferrari for every task and [11:40] by the way the customers don't want to [11:41] pay for a Ferrari for every task I'll [11:42] give you the flip side flip side is [11:44] let's assume you're undergoing a breach [11:46] you're being attacked you know you're [11:48] being attacked at that point in time [11:50] every customer in the room says don't [11:51] worry use whichever model you to stop [11:53] the breach because they know the [11:55] business impact of that breach is in the [11:56] billions of dollars at that point in [11:58] time I can run agent swarms I can do all [12:00] kinds of stuff that you want from a [12:01] defensive perspective. So there I may [12:03] want to use the most up-to-date frontier [12:05] LLM and say go think about it, reason [12:07] the hell out of it and figure out how to [12:09] stop this breach, how to make this [12:10] happen. So what we're discovering is [12:13] you're going to end up using frontier [12:14] LLMs in unique cases where the business [12:16] value that is going to get disrupted [12:19] justifies. We can do drug discovery if [12:20] you want. I think for most practical use [12:23] cases in enterprises, we're going to end [12:24] up training some verge of an open-source [12:27] model. And I think when it comes to even [12:30] in peace time for us for example running [12:32] a defender model we're most more than [12:34] likely going to take an open weight [12:36] model use our own proprietary data train [12:38] it manage the weights because that's [12:39] what gives us the auditability the [12:41] explanability and the the open system we [12:44] can actually explain how that happened. [12:46] >> I completely agree but I'm going to take [12:48] a slightly different lens to get to the [12:49] same exact end conclusions. Let's take [12:52] economics. So today, $20 for a million [12:56] tokens for probably generation minus [12:59] one. 50 if you want to go to the most [13:01] extreme. Uh we could take uh one of the [13:05] Chinese openweight models, take a Kim K3 [13:07] something 800 billion parameters and if [13:10] you run your own GPUs with a little bit [13:12] of optimization, but I'm talking like a [13:13] week of engineering work, we could drop [13:15] the cost to about a dollar to $2 for a [13:17] million tokens. Which enterprise in the [13:20] world will not accept a 10 times or in [13:22] this case a 40 times cheaper answer for [13:25] effectively what can do 95% of the work. [13:28] >> So I think economics is important. The [13:30] second is going to be at the end of the [13:32] day um you you just talked previously [13:35] about chain of thought not just uh the [13:38] end tokens. Well effectively then you're [13:41] giving away your IP if that chain of [13:43] thought can be captured and logged and [13:44] audited by somebody else. So, so brand [13:48] and IP is going to drive people to say I [13:50] need to run the models on my own. Well, [13:52] you can't run a frontier model on your [13:53] own because none of them will give it to [13:55] you. So, then you're back to open [13:56] weight. And the third is geopolitics. [13:58] The best openweight models today are [14:00] Chinese. By the way, I think there's [14:02] very little danger if you're putting [14:03] them in a sandbox and running them by [14:04] yourself. Sure, if you use them from a [14:07] cloud, that's different. But I think [14:09] that over the next year or two, I'm very [14:11] doubtful that there will not be great [14:14] models that come up in the west that are [14:15] also openweight and that are as capable [14:18] as the Chinese. The gap in these things [14:20] are 6 to 12 months at the most. And so [14:22] all those three drive me to conclude. I [14:25] don't know whether it'll be 75 to 90% [14:28] but that's the range I would put of all [14:30] token usage will go to open weight [14:31] models for the reasons I mentioned added [14:34] to the reasons that Nikesh mentioned [14:36] >> and the token consumption that's left [14:38] over is that because you actually need [14:41] it or is that because it's a default [14:42] behavior and people are too lazy to [14:44] change [14:45] >> okay so I'm going to talk about [14:46] developer behavior and since I was one [14:48] I'm making fun of myself in a younger [14:50] age developers are lazy they're going to [14:53] use the most expensive the most [14:55] expensive answer unless you put a [14:56] control on it because it it's easy. [14:59] >> Yeah. [14:59] >> And so that is going to take it there. [15:02] So I would say if experimentation phase [15:04] you allow that to prove it works and now [15:07] I got to put on a cheaper answer is [15:09] probably fine if it gets me there a lot [15:11] faster. But doing it for production [15:13] usage is where I am skeptical that it's [15:16] of value except for a tiny number of use [15:20] cases. In case you were brought in as [15:22] one of this small circle of people for [15:24] Mythos, kind of preview it, be it their [15:27] partner. I'm sure you're now doing that [15:28] with OpenAI as well. When you're sitting [15:30] with these guys, is part of you thinking [15:33] they're looking at my business and [15:35] they're like, "Wow, this is a great [15:36] business. I do do you think that [15:40] and and and what is the what is the [15:42] actual technical [15:44] boundaries that you expect to be [15:46] respected?" And the reason I asked this [15:47] is we've talked to a couple of other [15:49] CEOs. I think Mark Beni off does the [15:52] best example of this where you know [15:53] we've talked about ZDR and he's been [15:54] incredibly aggressive about making sure [15:56] there's zero data retention and doing [15:58] that on behalf of his customers. [16:00] What's so interesting about these ZDR [16:02] and all of this stuff is like none of [16:03] the models say that they won't generate [16:05] synthetic data. It's literally not in [16:08] there. You guys should look. There's all [16:09] these outs. There's all these trap [16:10] doors. So I'm just wondering like when [16:12] you're in the room, what are you [16:14] thinking? [16:16] when you're in the room, you come out [16:18] and say, "These guys are not going to [16:20] get into my business. [16:21] >> They're not going to [16:22] >> they're not going to be able to get into [16:23] my business." [16:23] >> Okay? [16:24] >> Because if you think about what when [16:26] mythos came out, right? The we we've [16:29] been spending billions of dollars in [16:32] coding agents. Well, guess what? We're [16:34] fundamentally every not everybody's got [16:35] ZD out on coding. There's tons of people [16:37] out there using cloud code who have no [16:40] issue about that data training the [16:41] model. So, we are training these models [16:43] with end users doing coding. These [16:46] models are getting better and better [16:47] doing coding. Well, guess what? If you [16:48] teach a model what model what good code [16:50] looks like, it also can figure out what [16:52] bad code looks like. So, the first thing [16:54] that mouse did, it figured out what bad [16:55] code looks like. And if you let it loose [16:57] against your code, it'll tell you what [16:59] is bad. What's fascinating is when it [17:01] did that, even then it was find it was [17:04] hallucinating 30% of the time, right? [17:07] But the problem is the reason it's [17:09] perfect for attackers, they just need [17:10] one vulnerability. They don't need 10 [17:12] vulnerabilities. If you're a defender, [17:14] you need to find every vulnerability and [17:16] patch it. So all the people in this room [17:18] I think have been through this journey [17:19] in the last 12 months is that everybody [17:21] here has gone tested them either with [17:24] mythos or with some cousin of mythos or [17:26] some open source models and discovered [17:28] every vulnerability has to then be [17:30] tested understood you know figured out [17:34] and I would guess in this room if a show [17:36] of hands people say the numbers roughly [17:38] 60 to 80% have been have been real and [17:42] 20% have been hallucinations. So from [17:45] that perspective, the models are great [17:46] to be able to tell you what the [17:48] vulnerability is. But I I don't even [17:51] think anybody in this room, if you ask [17:52] them to raise their hand, will tell you [17:53] that they're not going to even use claw [17:54] code to patch the vulnerability without [17:56] having to test it again. [17:57] >> I have a very random question, but it [17:58] makes me think. So you're engaged to [18:01] defend companies, but it now looks [18:04] basically like warfare, like both of you [18:06] guys, you know, it's like warfare. And [18:08] so is there something that you can learn [18:11] from how war has been fought or how war [18:13] is being fought and do you do that to [18:15] actually inform how the technology [18:17] should behave? I don't know if this [18:19] question makes sense, but [18:21] >> I think to the extent that you can be [18:25] better together, you can collaborate [18:28] like Arvin runs a program. We're now [18:29] saying we're all finding [18:30] vulnerabilities. Why don't we pull our [18:32] vulnerabilities and find the defense [18:34] once as opposed to every company in the [18:36] room trying to go test all the open [18:38] source vulnerabilities they have, figure [18:39] out how to patch them, go patch them [18:41] individually. So then you take some [18:43] trusted parties, give us your [18:44] vulnerabilities, we'll patch them, we'll [18:46] distribute the patches so you can all be [18:48] safe at the same time. It's kind of like [18:49] how cyber security works today. If you [18:50] find an attack technique in a different [18:53] part of the world, we can take that [18:54] attack technique, write machine learning [18:57] code and ingest that into our product [18:59] and make sure it gets available to every [19:00] customer. [19:01] >> Is a gentically written code error-free? [19:03] >> No. [19:04] >> No. Okay, explain that. [19:06] >> So look, but first on your war question. [19:08] So what Nikkesh talked about is you can [19:10] have powerful alliances where the [19:12] alliance effectively can become more [19:14] powerful than the attacker. That's [19:16] technique one. Technique two in warfare [19:18] what has been the most effective is [19:19] asymmetry. And so often an attacker is [19:22] cheaper than the defender. So the [19:24] defender runs out of money and at some [19:25] point then conceds or can you make [19:27] defense equally cheap in which case you [19:30] can basically have symmetric warfare and [19:32] then you have a much better chance of [19:34] success. And the third which has been [19:36] the way all wars have been won is when [19:39] you get technological superiority on one [19:41] side. So go back to World War II, go [19:42] back to Korea, go back to Iraq, go back [19:44] to anyone. If you get technological [19:47] superiority on one side, you tend to [19:49] win. And so our goal is can we get [19:51] technological superiority and that's [19:53] what Nik was referring to. Can we find [19:56] vulnerabilities? Can we patch them? Can [19:58] we put boundaries around them that makes [20:00] it really expensive for the other side [20:02] to now try to find a way through? So [20:04] that's what I would answer there. Look [20:07] at the end will agentic code be superior [20:10] to human written code absolutely we can [20:12] find that we use u agents and coding [20:14] agents now for probably half the code [20:17] that is written inside our place and it [20:19] is superior to what was being written [20:21] before but the reason it's superior is [20:23] the agents can also do eval basically [20:25] make sure that everything they can find [20:27] is actually fixed before it ever goes [20:29] out. All that said, we're only finding [20:32] all the flaws that we know how to find. [20:35] And so we get into this weird loop in [20:38] computer science. Okay. Do I [20:39] >> It's not really properly verifiable. [20:41] >> It's not fully verifiable because that [20:43] is a task that is going to be almost uh [20:45] computationally infeasible right now. [20:49] Now I'm not going to hold out hope that [20:50] it's doesn't become what you were [20:52] talking about in number 30 and all that. [20:54] This is the task in which maybe we'll [20:56] find a way to actually get to be able to [20:59] verify the correctness of these things [21:02] at least in where the inputs are [21:05] limited. If the input can be anything [21:07] then I think it's really hard. [21:09] >> Does that make sense? [21:10] >> Yeah. [21:10] >> Let me ask the implications of the [21:12] points that you just made. It seems [21:14] obvious to me that there isn't a world [21:17] where China and the United States or the [21:20] West or whomever bunch of international [21:23] countries all hold hands and say, "Let's [21:24] all stop [21:26] AI development." That being the case, it [21:30] becomes a necessity that there's an arms [21:32] race, that there's a defensive or [21:35] offensive superiority requisite, that [21:37] there's a compute capacity requisite, [21:40] that there are all of these needs that [21:42] arise to protect industry, to protect [21:44] our economy, to protect our jobs. Does [21:47] that argument win the day with everyone [21:50] that's trying to stop AI and the [21:53] political conversations and the social [21:55] stuff about AI needs to stop and we need [21:57] to stop doing this? Does this point [21:59] about the inevitability of one side [22:01] having it requiring the other side to [22:04] defend it change the the conversation? [22:07] And I'd love for you guys to share any [22:09] anecdotes you've had with senior [22:13] party officials who might not be in [22:15] power today but might be coming into [22:16] power and whether they're going to kind [22:18] of have a view change around this [22:20] because of that point. [22:21] >> I think it's abundantly clear that [22:24] nobody's stopping. [22:26] Everybody seems to be working at a [22:28] frenetic pace to try and make sure that [22:30] they get a better, smarter, faster [22:32] model. Um it's [22:36] kind of interesting. You can take the [22:38] charitable side and say there was no [22:40] technology in the world that was built [22:42] where people were building security and [22:44] power. I don't think TSA existed when [22:46] they built planes. Like right brothers [22:49] say great we have planes let's figure [22:51] out how take your shoes off. [22:52] >> Let's risk everybody before they get on [22:54] the plane. That was not what they were [22:55] thinking about. [22:57] >> Keep keep the explosives out of the [22:59] shoes. [22:59] >> Yes. Right. That's not what they were [23:01] thinking about. So unfortunately we've [23:03] been shown the dark side of these models [23:05] and we've overrotated on the dark side [23:08] of the model where now the entire [23:10] conversation is about the dark side and [23:12] the perils of AI and not on the benefits [23:14] of AI. I think there's a narrative [23:16] problem that notwithstanding I don't [23:18] think anybody's slowing down. I think [23:20] the most likely [23:23] outcome, which I think hopefully is the [23:24] right outcome, is that in the world, you [23:27] said it and Arvin said it earlier. If [23:29] you build something, you're accountable [23:31] for it. If you build something and [23:34] unleash it, you can't unleash and say, [23:36] "Oops, I don't know how to control it." [23:38] That argument doesn't work. [23:40] >> Yeah. [23:40] >> Cuz you wrote the software. [23:41] >> Yeah. Yeah. And this whole argument that [23:43] you didn't write the software that the [23:44] software was wrote it [23:46] >> because the engineer is going to say [23:47] well agent 74565 from my harness wrote [23:50] it and it's like no you wrote it. [23:51] >> Well but the company still wrote it. So [23:53] there's product but you're a commercial [23:55] enterprise. Exactly. You're taking [23:57] economic value in return for giving me [24:00] something. You're required to abide by [24:02] the responsibility the responsibility [24:04] that you signed up for. So I think [24:06] that's in my mind it's simple as that. [24:08] And there's enough regulation in the [24:09] world, perhaps too much to hold people [24:11] accountable for stuff that they put out [24:13] in the open market where they don't take [24:15] responsibility. They don't take [24:16] responsibility. [24:17] >> But but David, it's actually impossible [24:18] to control it unless we think the entire [24:20] world is going to sing kumbaya and say [24:22] let's slow down, which as you said is [24:23] unlikely. So if that's the case, fine. [24:26] You put slowdown here maybe. Well, okay. [24:29] Does it mean Japan slows down? Does it [24:30] mean China slows down? Does it mean [24:31] India slows down? No chance. They'll [24:32] say, great, you're slowing down. Gives [24:34] me a chance to catch up and get ahead. [24:36] So a digital technology is impossible to [24:40] actually slow down and the European [24:41] example tells us. So there you get [24:44] afraid of all the possibilities. I'm not [24:47] saying they're real dangers. You get [24:48] afraid of all of them and you impose [24:50] regulations first. I guess it's such a [24:52] vibrant tech economy there, right? [24:54] >> Yeah. Well, I mean, neither of you [24:56] actually answered my question about [24:57] conversations you've had, which uh cuz I [25:00] I'll tell you a conversation I had last [25:01] week in DC. I had drinks with a member [25:05] of Congress, pretty senior ranking guy, [25:07] and the conversation had two parts to [25:09] it. One is I think one of the CEOs of [25:13] the biggest companies in the world is [25:15] completely freaked out about cyber and [25:16] he's losing his mind and he doesn't know [25:18] what to do and I just had dinner with [25:19] him and here's all the stuff he said. [25:21] And then I also think that by Q4 we [25:24] might see a 50-state ban on data [25:26] centers, which isn't likely, but he says [25:30] 50 is a big number. Big number. [25:32] >> Have 50 states ever agreed on anything [25:34] in this country? [25:35] >> No. [25:36] >> Well, a few things about [25:37] >> that would be amazing. [25:38] >> Yeah. Get everyone together. [25:40] >> When everyone agrees on something, you [25:42] know, it's not true. But [25:43] >> I think um like a miracle and and it's [25:46] that it's it's the fact that both of [25:47] those statements are being being said by [25:49] someone. So where do you think this [25:51] resolves? Like how do we resolve this [25:52] path forward? [25:54] >> I'll try to answer your direct question. [25:56] So look amongst us we have all and other [25:58] members of your group have we all had [26:00] different conversations with different [26:01] members of this administration the [26:03] previous administration the Senate runs [26:05] longer than just one admin uh Congress [26:07] tends to change a lot faster this [26:10] question has been in there since 2022 [26:12] the Senate had closed hearings in 22 [26:14] they had open hearings in 23 Congress [26:17] had them the White House had them in [26:19] both admins and they go round and round [26:21] this question the regulation question on [26:23] AI and data centers is driven I'm going [26:25] to be sorry and cynical is driven by [26:27] populism, not by any reality. If I can [26:30] get more votes, should I look like I'm [26:32] trying to do those things? Politics is [26:34] politics. I'm not going to say that's [26:35] not real. It is real. That said, enough [26:38] people also care deeply about the [26:40] long-term economic advantage. And so [26:42] that's the balancing act that is [26:44] happening. I do think we're on the [26:46] correct balance right now, but I'll [26:49] acknowledge an election can change where [26:51] we fall on that balancing act. on data [26:54] centers. I think there's no chance all [26:55] 50 will ban. Is it possible 30 will ban? [26:58] Yes. The remaining 20 will rub their [26:59] hands in glee at that point. [27:00] >> If you look geopolitically for a second, [27:02] it seems like we're trending to a place [27:04] of halves and have nots. So I can [27:06] everybody in this room is a have. You [27:08] know, you're a western market company. [27:12] You have the benefit of being able to [27:14] work with guys like you, but there's a [27:16] certain price of entry that may not make [27:18] sense for the random pick your company [27:20] anywhere else around the world. [27:23] What happens then when these models are [27:25] so capable and effectively free? What is [27:27] the actual manifestation? I'm sure [27:28] you've had to think about this in terms [27:29] of how you want to respond. So how do [27:31] you how do you think about that problem [27:33] this separation of halves and have nots? [27:36] >> Look, I think Arvin said that you have [27:38] to make technology so cheap that it can [27:40] be easily accessible by everyone. And I [27:42] think we have the opportunity of making [27:44] that happen. I don't think that it's [27:46] going to be so expensive that if you can [27:48] run an economic enterprise, it should be [27:50] possible in the envelope to be able to [27:51] find a way to protect yourself. So I [27:53] don't think we're going to end up in a [27:54] have have not scenario. I think the [27:56] bigger challenge which is more pertinent [27:59] to people in the room is I fear that we [28:02] will see fast advances in compute [28:05] development in two large countries in [28:08] the world. We may not see that as evenly [28:12] distributed across the rest of the [28:13] world. And comput is very dear right [28:15] now. It's very hard to get compute to [28:17] run anything at scale at the current [28:20] moment. And the challenge is going to be [28:22] that the further away you are from the [28:23] epicenter, the less likely you will have [28:25] access to this computer. It's not [28:27] because of economic reasons. It's purely [28:28] because of supply constraints. I think [28:30] that's the bigger challenge. Like you [28:31] could be a company in Europe and you [28:34] have the right intentions, the [28:35] motivation to go and sort of innovate, [28:38] optimize and run with it. and you may [28:40] just suddenly discover that because [28:42] you're far away from the epicenter, you [28:44] don't get access as much as companies in [28:45] the western world, in the US or perhaps [28:47] in China going to get. [28:48] >> I think, look, I like to look at history [28:51] because it gives us some information on [28:53] how these things roll out. I think this [28:55] is the classic labor versus capital [28:57] trade-off that is happening. It happened [28:59] in the 1700s. It happened again in the [29:01] 1800s. It happened again in the 1900s. [29:04] People who spend more on capital than [29:06] worried about labor tended to win every [29:08] previous one of the seven or eight [29:10] cycles like this. So this is what is [29:12] going to happen this time. What Resh [29:14] pointed out is the two nations here are [29:16] also quite willing to be capital [29:18] intensive. [29:19] >> Yeah, it's not as simple as this. And [29:21] they're willing at the end of the day to [29:23] concede that labor is going to be less [29:25] important. That's the way it go is going [29:28] to play out. nations that get very hung [29:30] up on social and left-leaning [29:32] philosophies that labor has to be [29:34] protected at all costs. Not that there [29:36] has to be opportunity for labor, but [29:38] every existing job has to be protected [29:41] are the ones are going to lose. Because [29:42] I think the ones there to Nikesha's [29:44] point, it's cheap enough. Somebody in [29:46] one country can use the capability, but [29:48] what's going to be in their head is hey, [29:50] but does it mean there's a job loss or a [29:52] job displacement? Job displacement you [29:55] should take because it may result in a [29:56] better job. I think that's the social [29:58] philosophy that's going to determine [30:01] winners and losers here. [30:02] >> I have a final question before I give it [30:04] to you for the final question, but my [30:05] final question to both of you, you [30:07] mentioned this here, which was great. [30:08] Can you tell the story about I'm a huge [30:11] fan of vertical integration, huge fan. I [30:13] I think like you know markets swinging [30:14] pendulums and you know there was a world [30:17] like even in the '60s '7s and ' 80s [30:19] where there was the conglomerate and it [30:22] was a an incredibly valuable enterprise [30:24] and it was in a time of turbulence it [30:27] was the safe harbor for capital because [30:29] the conglomerate was the mechanism by [30:31] which you organized and then when you [30:33] had peace and prosperity then people [30:35] disagregated [30:37] and I think we're moving back to the [30:38] world of the conglomerate and you told [30:40] me you just back there about the [30:42] vertical ical integration of IBM at its [30:43] peak. I just wanted you to and then [30:45] Nick, what your thoughts on vertical [30:46] integration over [30:47] >> so what and I have often talked about is [30:49] the IBM mainframe which by the way [30:51] there's a few people in the room who do [30:53] use it quite well and at scale the IBM [30:56] mainframe has lasted 65 years. Why? It [31:00] was vertically integrated. We're a [31:02] little less right now in the sense we [31:04] don't go all the way to dirt. In the [31:07] 60s, we went all the way to dirt. [31:09] Meaning, we found sand. We made our own [31:11] wafers. We built our own fabs. We built [31:13] our own chips. Every single thing out to [31:16] the metal that surrounded the machine. [31:18] What that avoided was any IP leakage, [31:21] but it allowed us to keep the profit of [31:23] the complete stack in the company. Today [31:26] the only piece we don't do is the actual [31:28] fab still the design of the chips the [31:31] design of the engineering the resilience [31:33] the bulk of the software is inside and [31:36] that vertical integration you've got to [31:38] decide yeah of course I'm not going to [31:40] make our own metal you buy metal and [31:43] fabs is because of scale but I think [31:45] that vertical integration in areas which [31:47] are of incredible important advantage [31:49] which goes back to the infrastructure [31:51] point the two of you were making before [31:53] is incredibly important to understand [31:55] where do you want to be and where if [31:57] it's a commodity then you should not be. [31:59] >> Yeah. [31:59] >> But you can see that the modern day [32:01] version of that is Nvidia. [32:03] >> Yeah. [32:03] >> If you look at what Jensen is doing, [32:05] he's the modern day version of the [32:06] vertically integrated stack. You know, [32:08] he went and bought [32:09] >> Jensen is at the dirt and he's at [32:10] >> he's hugging face. He wants he [32:12] understands that there's going to be [32:13] balance between Frontier models and [32:14] other models. He's trying to fund [32:16] everybody in the ecosystem to ensure [32:17] that they don't stray from the vertical [32:20] integrated stack that he's producing. [32:22] And the good news is if you control the [32:24] vertical stack, you can decide which [32:26] part of the stack to commoditize. So you [32:28] can decide to move profit between layers [32:30] and if you see that there are other [32:31] people attacking a certain part of your [32:33] stack, you they destroy the profit pool [32:35] in that stack, you move the profit to [32:36] the other part of the stack. And you can [32:37] see that happening. [32:38] >> Very powerful market leverage. So to put [32:40] you on the spot, so if you look at the [32:42] application layer today, what's the [32:45] obvious vertical integration strategy [32:46] that OpenAI or Anthropic should be [32:48] taking and then what's the defensive [32:50] mechanism for the companies that are [32:52] maybe on the receiving end of that? [32:54] >> I think you're already seeing that and I [32:56] think we're we're trivialize this [32:58] conversation. we start saying open [33:00] models open weight it's literally it's [33:02] an open stack versus a closed stack [33:05] because I don't think I I think at some [33:07] point in time this notion of running [33:09] something like an open router become [33:11] impossible because models are getting [33:13] more and more each model is requiring [33:16] more memory more context more [33:18] understanding you can't separate context [33:20] and memory from the reasoning now if you [33:22] want to separate reasoning from the [33:23] context and memory then open router is [33:25] only responsible moving the reasoning [33:26] tokens back and forth [33:28] Right. So I think over time you'll start [33:30] seeing it doesn't make sense that you'll [33:31] have a effectively end to end stack. [33:33] It'll be it's like a CPA you talked [33:35] about earlier when you were chatting. So [33:36] it's a cost per action. The action will [33:38] require you to go and traverse the [33:39] entire logic from prompt till outcome [33:42] and then memory will require or make it [33:44] easier and there'll be too high a [33:46] friction for you to move your task from [33:48] one stack to the other stack because it [33:50] has all your context in memory. And [33:51] you're going to see that look look at [33:52] what's happening in the personal agent [33:54] space right? If you start training a [33:55] personal agent with all your context, [33:57] all your APIs, all your connectivity, [33:59] now you built a mode because now I can't [34:01] take that every day and move it to a [34:03] next stack and the next stack. So I [34:04] think you will find [34:06] in the application layer, they're going [34:08] to have a vertical stack as well, which [34:10] will go through the entire process of [34:12] software reasoning, memory, context. [34:14] >> To your logical conclusion, everybody [34:16] will have their own then. [34:17] >> Yes. [34:18] >> Because it's just the right thing to do. [34:19] >> And then brute force distribution wins [34:21] again in the enterprise space, right? [34:23] You're seeing that in the consumer [34:24] space. Brute force distribution is going [34:26] to compete. In the next three months, [34:28] every frontier lab is going to have a [34:30] full-on full court press on the Muse [34:33] concept, right? They tried that 6 to9 [34:35] months ago. It didn't work. [34:37] >> They now with Facebook showing us how it [34:39] can work. I think pretty much everybody [34:41] has it. There will be APIs. There will [34:43] be the largest battle of consumer [34:46] control. Every app that exists on the [34:48] iPhone is has to become headless. Maybe [34:50] we can wrap by going from vertical [34:53] integration to horizontal expansion. [34:55] It's been a common business strategy in [34:58] enterprise technology companies to [35:00] expand horizontally through M&A, drive [35:03] synergies, cross sales and so on. And [35:05] you've obviously both done it [35:06] exceptionally well uh and executed it [35:08] well. How has your view been affected in [35:12] the last year this year let's say in [35:14] terms of valuations and multiples cost [35:17] of capital? Let's talk about M&A in the [35:19] context of cyber. Then we can talk about [35:21] M&A in the context outside of cyber. In [35:24] the context of cyber, I have always [35:27] maintained over the last 8 years that [35:28] it's silly that our customers have to [35:31] buy 40 different solutions and stitch [35:34] them together. We barely understand our [35:39] you think you understand our 10 other [35:41] vendors worth of you can stitch it. God [35:43] bless your soul. Right? So we're working [35:46] as fast as we can to take disparate [35:48] parts of our industry and find the way [35:50] to stitch them together to have the data [35:52] work together. I think that's a journey [35:54] and if you want parallels when I started [35:56] my first job was at Fidelity Investments [35:59] many years ago we had 23 systems which [36:02] collectively would be called CRM today. [36:05] We had master tables. We had tables that [36:07] concatenated with them. We had 23 [36:08] different applications that did 20 [36:09] different things. today you go buy it [36:11] off the shelf and you cringe at the cost [36:13] of Salesforce or the cost of Microsoft [36:15] Dynamics, Oracle, whatever you choose to [36:17] do. So in 30 years what's happened is [36:19] that's consolidated to singular [36:20] platform. The customers don't stitch the [36:22] solutions anymore because what happens [36:24] is these software solutions become [36:26] consistent. They all become like each [36:28] other. They all roughly do the same [36:30] thing and there's no differentiation. So [36:32] I think same thing is going to happen in [36:33] cyber. That's what we've tried to do. [36:34] We've tried to find things that are best [36:36] in their category, stitch them, make [36:38] them work so our customers don't have to [36:39] do the stitching. It's like that's kind [36:41] of the answer on cyber. For some reason, [36:43] you know, cyber is enjoying much better [36:45] valuations lately because of the the AI [36:48] mythos event, which is fine, which will [36:50] rationalize over time because all these [36:52] guys are going to go spend unlimited [36:54] amounts of money on cyber. Outside of [36:56] cyber, I think it goes back to the [36:59] conversation Chamatan we were having [37:01] earlier about it's very hard to [37:04] understand the terminal value of [37:05] software. [37:07] It's not clear what software is going to [37:09] survive the next 5 to 8 years with where [37:12] we are from an AI perspective and the [37:14] notion that product market fit is [37:16] getting disrupted for many of these [37:18] companies. We all know with if AI was [37:22] applied well how our current software [37:25] should behave in an ideal scenario. I [37:27] know what I want from half the package [37:29] software that I buy. I know if if I [37:30] could have my magic wand and make it do [37:32] things, I know exactly how it should [37:34] work in an AI first world, which means [37:37] somebody's going to do it. So I think [37:39] there's going to be huge disruption in [37:41] the SAS space over the next few years. [37:43] >> Arvin, are you looking at anything [37:44] thinking hm juicy multiples? So, [37:49] so over the year it was very attractive [37:52] at the beginning, not so attractive a [37:54] month ago. We'll wait and see how it [37:55] goes over the next few. But actually, I [37:58] want to build on Nikesha's thought. This [37:59] is not just unique to cyber. The average [38:02] enterprise uses anywhere from 500 to [38:04] 5,000 distinct software vendors. In a [38:07] world when you have to protect against [38:09] it all, it's not just the cyber threat. [38:11] That's a massive attack surface. So you [38:14] have to ask yourself, could I replace [38:16] 490 of them with minor AI capabilities [38:21] and do I need to go back and leverage 5 [38:24] to 10 main platforms? That implies [38:26] massive consolidation because that's [38:28] where the spend goes. That's what I [38:30] believe is going to play out. So there [38:32] is going to be consolidation because if [38:35] you want to keep your cost of [38:36] distribution low, then they can [38:38] distribute all of it. And if the value [38:40] of that software is falling then you [38:42] cannot afford independent uh [38:43] distribution for each of those. I [38:45] believe that's going to play out whether [38:46] it takes 6 months or 6 years. It's [38:49] somewhere inside that equation. Uh I do [38:52] think also software should be [38:53] distinguished. There is software where [38:55] there is a lot of interaction value [38:57] which as we have seen clearly can be [38:58] replaced with a lot of AI. Both examples [39:00] you used were things which were [39:02] interaction rich [39:03] >> right? But if in the end you go down to [39:06] I need you to be reliable at 10 the [39:08] minus15 [39:09] >> right [39:10] >> which is a database lookup for somebody [39:13] doing retail banking or closing the [39:15] books. I think that's going to be hard [39:17] to replace that easily [39:19] >> with uh AI generated software. So I [39:22] think there is going to be a distinction [39:24] on how easy it is. [39:25] >> You're going to run that digital twin [39:26] for years before you cut away. [39:28] >> Correct. [39:28] >> And then is there's no cost advantage to [39:30] do that. Yeah guys, thank you very much. [39:34] Arvin Krishna, thank you. [39:36] >> Thank you. [39:37] >> Thanks everybody. All of you. [39:55] >> I'm going all in.