Saudi-UAE Proxy Rivalry Stalls Yemen Peace and Fuels Sudan War

Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE can't stop the Yemen war | The Economist — The Economist

The Economist

Competing military interventions by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are proving self-defeating by destabilizing the critical Red Sea maritime corridors both monarchies require for their own food and energy security.

AI-assisted summary of Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE can't stop the Yemen war | The Economist — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • The close alliance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has deteriorated into an intense regional rivalry driven by clashing egos, conflicting views of leadership, and divergent foreign policy philosophies. (1:09)
  • In Yemen, the shared goal of countering the Houthis fractured as Saudi Arabia backed a unified state while the UAE supported southern separatists, eventually leading their respective proxies to clash. (2:51)
  • The rivalry has spilled across the Red Sea into Sudan, where Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces to secure its maritime flank while the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces to protect commercial port interests. (4:36)
  • Gulf investments in agricultural land across East Africa intended to ensure food security have proven counterproductive, as fueling regional conflict directly destabilizes the maritime trade corridors needed to import food. (7:41)

Detailed notes

## Background Published by The Economist on YouTube on October 24, 2026, this episode of The Insider explores the escalating regional rivalry between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed. According to the page description, the editors analyze the origins of the rift between the two former allies, how their competing agendas fuel wars in Yemen and Sudan, and why their interventions are ultimately proving self-defeating.

## TL;DR Once close allies who launched joint military interventions in Yemen and blockaded Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have drifted into an intense regional rivalry fueled by clashing personal ambitions and divergent strategic philosophies. While Riyadh adheres to state sovereignty and envisions itself as the natural leader of the Arab world, Abu Dhabi operates as an agile, commerce-driven middle power willing to back non-state proxies, including southern separatists in Yemen and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. These incompatible postures have sparked direct proxy clashes, prolonged Sudan's devastating conflict, and ignited a scramble for Red Sea ports and East African farmland. Ultimately, the editors argue that this proxy friction undermines the very maritime trade routes and regional stability that both Gulf monarchies require for their own food and economic security.

## Atmosphere & style The discussion carries a sober, clinical, and sharply analytical tone characteristic of The Economist's geopolitical reporting. The editors engage in a fluid, intellectual exchange that dissects monarchical ego and grand strategy with detached realism, before confronting the tragic human costs of these policies. Watching the program feels like sitting in on an insider foreign-policy debrief, where polished palace diplomacy steadily gives way to bleak examinations of proxy clashes, mercenary gold networks, and man-made famine.

## Bulletin - [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=69s) The close alliance between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has deteriorated into an intense regional rivalry driven by clashing egos, conflicting views of leadership, and divergent foreign policy philosophies. - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=171s) In Yemen, the shared goal of countering the Houthis fractured as Saudi Arabia backed a unified state while the UAE supported southern separatists, eventually leading their respective proxies to clash. - [04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) The rivalry has spilled across the Red Sea into Sudan, where Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces to secure its maritime flank while the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces to protect commercial port interests. - [07:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=461s) Gulf investments in agricultural land across East Africa intended to ensure food security have proven counterproductive, as fueling regional conflict directly destabilizes the maritime trade corridors needed to import food.

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=0s) Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially formed a tight regional axis anchored in shared monarchical systems, oil wealth, and personal rapport between MBS and MBZ. - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=0s) Early foreign policy alignment between the two Gulf monarchies included a joint military intervention in Yemen in 2015 and the blockade of Qatar. - [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=69s) MBS views Saudi Arabia as the natural hegemon entitled to guide Gulf policy, whereas MBZ views the UAE as a more agile, modern middle power unwilling to take Saudi directives. - [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=69s) Saudi Arabia relies on a traditionalist doctrine prioritizing established state sovereignty and Arab-world ties, while the UAE acts as a global commercial hub willing to partner with non-state actors and breakaway republics. - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=171s) While both powers sought to push back Houthi dominance in Yemen, Riyadh aimed to preserve national unity while Abu Dhabi backed the Southern Transitional Council seeking an independent South Yemen. - [02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=171s) Armed clashes between Saudi-backed and UAE-backed proxy forces in southern Yemen forced the UAE to scale back its operational footprint without resolving the underlying strategic schism. - [04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) The Red Sea represents an existential security corridor for Saudi Arabia, especially as threats in the Strait of Hormuz make western pipelines and coastal terminals critical for crude oil exports. - [04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) The UAE's strategy along the Red Sea basin focuses on commercial transit and maritime logistics, leading it to partner with General Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. - [04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) Sudan's civil conflict is fueled and prolonged by external Gulf commercial channels that help launder and monetize illicit gold mined by the RSF. - [04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) Introducing multiple external patrons into Sudan's war exponentially increases diplomatic complexity, making negotiated cease-fires significantly less likely. - [07:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=461s) To hedge against hyper-arid food vulnerabilities, Gulf nations purchased vast tracts of fertile land in Sudan and East Africa, generating deep local resentment over water and crop extraction. - [07:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=461s) The Gulf land-grab strategy in the Horn of Africa is fundamentally self-defeating because stoking regional conflict undermines the maritime shipping routes required to bring food imports home safely. - [10:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=606s) Beyond geopolitical rivalry, foreign military intervention and proxy warfare across the Red Sea basin have inflicted severe humanitarian catastrophes, displacement, and famine on local populations.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=0s) A Once-Close Relationship Between Two Gulf Monarchs

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began with remarkable common ground. Both countries are wealthy, monarchical, resource-rich Muslim nations situated in close geographical proximity. Their rulers—Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia and President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) of the UAE—also shared striking personal parallels: both were younger brothers never originally guaranteed the throne. For years, MBZ served almost as a mentor to the younger Saudi prince.

Their foreign policies moved in lockstep across high-stakes regional interventions. In 2015, they launched a joint military intervention in Yemen, and they later joined forces to impose a diplomatic and economic blockade on Qatar. What appeared to outside observers as an unbreakable Gulf axis, however, gradually began to fracture, giving way to an intense regional rivalry.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Alliance to Rivalry Dynamic accDescr: Diagram illustrating the shift from shared Saudi-UAE cooperation to strategic divergence.

subgraph EraOfAlliance ["Early Era of Alliance"] direction LR A["Shared Interests & Wealth"] --> B["Mentorship: MBZ guides MBS"] B --> C["Joint Actions: Yemen (2015) & Qatar Blockade"] end

subgraph SourcesOfFriction ["Emergence of Friction"] direction LR D["Saudi Ambition: Regional Hegemon"] E["Emirati Pragmatism: Dynamic Middle Power"] end

subgraph Flashpoints ["Proxy Friction Flashpoints"] direction LR F["Yemen: State Unity vs. Southern Separatism"] G["Sudan & Red Sea: SAF vs. RSF & Maritime Control"] end

EraOfAlliance --> SourcesOfFriction SourcesOfFriction --> Flashpoints ```

[01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=69s) Personality Clashes and Divergent Worldviews

The unraveling of the partnership stems from two primary drivers: clashing egos and fundamentally incompatible doctrines of foreign policy. While the inner workings of Gulf royal courts remain notoriously opaque, the personal dynamic shifted as MBS consolidated power. MBS views Saudi Arabia as the undisputed heavyweight of the Gulf—boasting the largest economy, geography, and population—and felt entitled to dictate foreign policy priorities for the entire Arabian Peninsula. Conversely, MBZ bristled at this dynamic, regarding the UAE as a far more modern, agile, and dynamic middle power that had no interest in taking instructions from a younger Saudi prince.

Beyond personal friction lies a profound philosophical divergence over security and statecraft. Saudi Arabia operates with a traditionalist worldview deeply anchored in the Arab and Muslim worlds, treating established state sovereignty as paramount. The UAE, by contrast, operates like a global commercial, financial, and transit hub. Abu Dhabi is eager to look far beyond the Arab world, frequently forging ties with non-state actors, breakaway factions, and unrecognized republics if it advances Emirati commercial and trade reach.

As Greg explains: > “MBS in Saudi Arabia sees himself as the head of the biggest Gulf country, the biggest Gulf economy, what what he considers to be the natural leader of this region.”

In contrast, he points out the contrasting Emirati posture: > “It is happy to make deals with countries outside the region. In fact, very often it wants to look beyond the Arab and Muslim world. It is very happy to work with non-state actors and breakaway republics and things that are not traditional states.”

[02:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=171s) Yemen: One Goal, Two Incompatible Strategies

Nowhere did this philosophical split become clearer than in Yemen. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE shared the core objective of pushing back the Houthi movement and preventing it from dominating Yemeni territory. However, their methods directly collided due to their differing views on the Yemeni state.

Throughout the Cold War, Yemen existed as two distinct entities: a religious monarchy turned dictatorship in the north, and the Middle East’s only communist state in the south, before unifying in 1990. Driven by its doctrine of state sovereignty, Riyadh prioritized preserving a unified Yemeni state, backing factions committed to national territorial integrity. The UAE took the opposite approach, seeing southern separatists organized under the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—who fight to re-establish an independent South Yemen—as their most effective operational proxy.

Eventually, Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed factions turned their guns on each other in the south. Riyadh eventually asserted its dominance and forced Abu Dhabi to scale back its footprint, but the strategic breach remained unhealed. As Greg summarizes: > “Eventually, the Saudi backed and the UAE backed forces in Yemen wound up clashing with one another over this issue of separatism. The Saudis got the upper hand, eventually forced the UAE to curtail its support for these factions in Yemen. But going forward, the the schism is still there.”

[04:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=276s) Ports, the Red Sea, and the Catastrophe in Sudan

The rivalry migrated across the water into the Red Sea basin and Sudan, shifting between pure security concerns and aggressive commercial positioning. For Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea is an existential security flank: Sudan lies a mere 200 kilometers across the water at its narrowest point. This waterway grew even more critical as threats around the Strait of Hormuz prompted Saudi Arabia to rely on Red Sea pipelines and terminals for crude oil exports. Consequently, Riyadh aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under the traditional status quo logic that the national army represented the sovereign state.

The UAE approached the region through a transactional commercial lens. Abu Dhabi has spent years amassing concessions and investments in commercial ports, maritime infrastructure, and littoral shipping routes. Seeking a pliable partner on the ground to safeguard these economic interests, the UAE backed General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (widely known as Hemedti) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

This external meddling has prolonged Sudan's civil war. While external actors cannot be blamed for climate change, the UAE is seen as directly magnifying the other two historic drivers of protracted warfare: corruption and complexity. Hemedti finances his operations by controlling illicit gold mines, using Gulf commercial channels to launder the proceeds and sustain the conflict. Introducing foreign patrons into an already crowded multi-faction war exponentially increases the diplomatic difficulty of negotiating a cease-fire.

As one host reflects on the devastating fallout of this commercial expansion: > “So in pursuit of these narrow commercial aims which they could have got in all kinds of other places, they've caused a humanitarian and—”

- The narrowest crossing between the Saudi coast and Sudan spans only about 200 kilometers across the Red Sea. - The RSF's war effort is bankrolled in part through seized gold mining operations whose yields flow through Gulf trading networks. - Academic studies on conflict resolution demonstrate that introducing extra foreign patrons significantly decreases the likelihood of early negotiated settlements.

[07:41](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=461s) Agricultural Land Grabs and a Self-Defeating Rivalry

Another core driver of Gulf involvement in the Horn of Africa is the pursuit of food security. Given their hyper-arid climate, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states rely heavily on food imports. To hedge against supply shocks, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have poured billions into purchasing large tracts of fertile agricultural land along the Nile in Sudan and across East Africa to export crops back home.

This policy has fueled local resentment, as regional water supplies and prime acreage are siphoned off to feed wealthy Gulf populations while local communities face food stress. The speakers point out that this entire strategy is inherently flawed: global food supply is rarely constrained by outright global scarcity, but rather by purchasing power and the safety of maritime trade routes. By backing armed factions and stoking conflict across the Red Sea basin, the Gulf states are destabilizing the very transit corridors required to bring food home safely.

As the discussion emphasizes regarding the policy's fundamental lack of logic: > “The idea that you have to sort of control large tracts of arable land makes no sense. And particularly so if you then fuel the war and you end up—”

The interventionism in Sudan and the Horn of Africa is described not only as a humanitarian tragedy, but as fundamentally self-defeating for both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. While ethical arguments against meddling rarely sway realpolitik decision-makers, the editors highlight that the proxy friction is undermining the core commercial and security goals the two monarchies set out to protect.

[10:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=606s) The Humanitarian Fallout of Occupation

The discussion touches on the devastating consequences and human suffering resulting from military intervention and territorial control in the region, pointing out the severe humanitarian toll on local populations: “causing a famine in the place where you've occupied it.”

## Notable quotes > [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA&t=69s) MBS in Saudi Arabia sees himself as the head of the biggest Gulf country, the biggest Gulf economy, what what he considers to be the natural leader of this region. — Greg

## Mentioned Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ), Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, Sudan, Qatar, Houthis, Southern Transitional Council (STC), Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Nile

## Video description The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is fuelling conflict in the Middle East.

Mohammed bin Salman, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, and Mohamed bin Zayed, president of the UAE, were once allies. But personal animosity and differing foreign policy has driven a wedge between the two men—and their countries—that has knock-on effects in the wars in nearby Sudan and Yemen.

On the latest Insider show, The Economist’s editors discuss where the rivalry between MBS and MBZ comes from, how it is playing out on the ground, and why it is proving self-defeating for both countries.

#SaudiArabia #UAE #MiddleEast #TheEconomist #TheInsider

00:00 - A once-close relationship 01:09 - What went wrong between MBS and MBZ 02:51 - One goal in Yemen, two strategies 04:36 - Ports, oil and the Red Sea 06:13 - Why the rivalry is self-defeating

Watch the full show: bit.ly/4z8v0lS Sign up to the Insider newsletter: https://econ.st/4nOyzIb

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[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPpWpZEmgPA)

中文简报

沙特与阿联酋代理人竞争阻碍也门和平并加剧苏丹战乱 利雅得与阿布扎比互相竞争的军事干预正产生适得其反的效果，破坏了两大君主国自身粮食与能源安全所依赖的红海关键海上走廊的稳定。 沙特阿拉伯与阿联酋曾是一同在也门发起联合军事干预并封锁卡塔尔的亲密盟友，如今却在个人野心冲突与战略理念分歧的推动下演变为激烈的地区竞争。利雅得坚持国家主权并将自身视为阿拉伯世界的天然领袖，而阿布扎比则以灵活且商业驱动的中等强国姿态行事，愿意支持非国家代理人，包括也门南部分离主义势力和苏丹快速支援部队。这些互不相容的立场引发了直接的代理人冲突，拉长了苏丹毁灭性的冲突，并激化了对红海港口和东非农田的争夺。编者最终认为，这种代理人摩擦正在破坏海湾两大君主国维持自身粮食与经济安全所必需的海上贸易航线及地区稳定。 沙特与阿联酋之间的亲密同盟已恶化为激烈的地区竞争，其根源在于个人野心碰撞、领导地位诉求冲突以及外交政策理念的分歧。 (1:09) 在也门，抗击胡塞武装的共同目标出现破裂，沙特支持维持国家统一，而阿联酋则支持南部独立分离势力，最终导致各自的代理人爆发冲突。 (2:51) 这场对抗已越过红海蔓延至苏丹：沙特支持苏丹武装部队以确保自身海上侧翼安全，而阿联酋则支持快速支援部队以保护其商业港口利益。 (4:36) 海湾国家为保障粮食安全在东非多地进行的农田投资已被证明适得其反，因为煽动地区冲突直接破坏了进口粮食所需的海运走廊。 (7:41)

Reading summary

The once-solid alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has deteriorated into an intense regional proxy rivalry, driven by clashing leadership ambitions and fundamentally incompatible foreign policy doctrines. Leadership Clashes and Divergent Foreign Policy Doctrines (1:09) The fracture in the Gulf axis reflects a collapse in the personal dynamic between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ). Although MBZ initially acted as a mentor to the younger Saudi prince during their joint 2015 intervention in Yemen and the blockade of Qatar, personal relations frayed as MBS consolidated authority. MBS views Saudi Arabia—the region's largest economy, landmass, and population—as the natural hegemon entitled to direct regional priorities. In contrast, MBZ resists taking guidance from Riyadh, viewing the UAE as a modern, agile middle power. This friction is reinforced by opposing strategic worldviews. Saudi Arabia adheres to a traditionalist statecraft anchored in the Arab and Muslim spheres, prioritizing established state sovereignty. The UAE operates as a global commercial and transit hub willing to look beyond regional orthodoxy. To secure trade routes and commercial leverage, Abu Dhabi frequently partners with non-state actors, unrecognized republics, and breakaway factions. Divergent Strategies and Proxy Clashes in Yemen (2:51) Yemen exposed the strategic divide between the two monarchies. While both sought to prevent the Houthi movement from controlling the country, their methods directly collided over the structure of the Yemeni state. Drawing on its doctrine of territorial integrity, Riyadh backed factions committed to preserving a unified Yemen. Conversely, the UAE aligned with southern separatists organized under the Southern Transitional Council (STC), who seek to restore an independent South Yemen. These incompatible approaches eventually resulted in Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed factions engaging in armed conflict against each other in southern Yemen. While Saudi Arabia eventually asserted control and compelled the UAE to curtail its operational footprint in the country, the underlying strategic schism between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi remains unresolved. Geopolitical and Commercial Rivalry in Sudan (4:36) The rivalry between the two powers expanded across the Red Sea into Sudan, situated roughly 200 kilometers from the Saudi coast at its narrowest point. For Saudi Arabia, the waterway is an existential security flank and an alternative conduit for crude oil exports amid maritime threats in the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, Riyadh aligned with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under the premise of supporting sovereign state institutions. The UAE approached the conflict through a commercial lens focused on expanding its control over maritime infrastructure and shipping lanes. Abu Dhabi backed General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to secure its economic interests. The RSF funds its operations partly by seizing gold mining networks and laundering proceeds through Gulf markets. Observers point out that this external patronage has multiplied the warring factions, escalating conflict complexity and significantly undermining prospects for a negotiated cease-fire. Agricultural Expansion and Destabilized Transit Corridors (7:41) Gulf involvement in East Africa is also driven by domestic food security concerns. To hedge against food import disruptions, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar invested heavily in purchasing prime agricultural tracts along the Nile. This policy has triggered significant local resentment by diverting regional water and land resources to feed wealthy Gulf populations while local communities experience severe food distress and famine. Analysts emphasize that this agricultural strategy is fundamentally self-defeating. Global food security is primarily constrained by maritime safety and purchasing power rather than absolute land availability. By financing rival armed proxies and fueling regional warfare across the Red Sea basin, Gulf states are destabilizing the critical trade and transit routes required to transport food and commodities securely back to their home markets. The competitive interventionism pursued by Saudi Arabia and the UAE has prolonged conflicts in Yemen and Sudan while yielding severe humanitarian consequences. In pursuing localized military and commercial leverage, both monarchies have ultimately undermined the maritime stability and security corridors vital to their own long-term interests.

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《经济学人》指出，沙特阿拉伯与阿联酋已从早期的紧密战略盟友演变为激烈角逐的区域对手；两国领导人个人野心的碰撞与根本相悖的对外战略哲学，导致双方在也门、红海及苏丹扶持对立势力，使冲突长期化并引发严重人道危机。 领导人权力意志与战略哲学的分歧 (1:09) 沙特与阿联酋拥有高度相似的国家特征：同为资源丰富且地理相邻的海湾君主制国家，且沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼（MBS）与阿联酋总统穆罕默德·本·扎耶德（MBZ）早年曾建立如师徒般的紧密关系，并在2015年联合介入也门冲突以及协同封锁卡塔尔。然而，随着MBS巩固权力，两国内部出现难以调和的权力摩擦。MBS视沙特为海湾地区无可争议的经济与人口大国，理应由其主导半岛外交秩序；MBZ则认为阿联酋作为更加现代化、敏捷且有活力的中等强国，拒绝接受沙特领导。 双方在国家安全理念与国家治理模式上也存在深层分歧。沙特奉行传统主义世界观，立足于阿拉伯与穆斯林世界，将既有主权国家秩序视为核心利益；阿联酋则以全球商业、金融与中转枢纽自居，热衷突破传统阿拉伯世界圈子，为了拓展商业贸易网络，极为开放地与非国家武装力量、分离主义派系以及未受承认的政权展开合作。 也门战略分歧：国家统一对抗南方分离 (2:51) 这一战略哲学分歧在也门战场表现得最为尖锐。尽管沙特与阿联酋介入也门的共同底线均是击退胡塞武装、阻止其全面控制领土，但两国的实现路径完全背道而驰。自冷战时期南北分治至1990年统一以来，也门始终存在南北结构性裂痕。出于维护既有国家主权与边境稳定的诉求，沙特坚持维持也门统一国家的领土完整，并全力扶持支持国家统一的势力。 阿联酋则采取完全相反的实用主义策略，将谋求恢复南也门独立的“南方过渡委员会”（STC）视作其最有效的地面行动代理人。这最终导致沙特支持的武装派系与阿联酋扶持的南部分离势力自相残杀。虽然沙特凭借地缘主导权迫使阿联酋缩减了也门境内的军事足迹，但两国在也门战略取向上的核心裂痕始终未能愈合。 红海博弈与苏丹代理人战争的致命扩散 (4:36) 两国地缘争夺随后跨越红海蔓延至苏丹与非洲之角。在地理上，苏丹距沙特海岸最窄处仅约200公里；在霍尔木兹海峡受安全威胁的背景下，红海沿线港口与管道成为沙特原油外运的生命线。沙特出于生存性安全考虑，坚持支持苏丹武装部队（SAF），以维系传统主权代表的正统地位。 阿联酋则从商业港口特许权、海运航道与物流基建的经济视角切入，选择拉拢达加洛（Hemedti）及其领导的准军事组织“快速支援部队”（RSF）。达加洛通过控制非法金矿并将收益经由海湾商业渠道洗白来维持作战资金。分析指出，外部力量的干预大幅增加了冲突的复杂性与腐败网络，严重阻碍了停火谈判的达成，直接加剧了苏丹内战的烈度与人道主义灾难。 粮食安全焦虑与适得其反的扩张策略 (7:41) 驱使海湾国家深度涉足东非的另一关键动因是保障自身粮食安全。受制于本国极端干旱的气候条件，沙特、阿联酋与卡塔尔投入数十亿美元，在苏丹尼罗河沿岸及东非各地大举圈购肥沃农田以供农作物回运。然而，此举因挤占当地水源与土地资源而激化了当地民众的怨恨，在当地社会面临严重粮食短缺的同时进一步推高了紧张局势。 评论指出，此类海外圈地策略在逻辑上存在内在缺陷：全球粮食安全的决定因素在于购买力与海运通道的安全，而非对实体耕地的强制控制。海湾国家在红海盆地资助武装代理人并点燃战火，反而直接威胁了将粮食运送回国所必须依赖的安全航道，导致其战略行动在逻辑上自相矛盾。 分析认为，沙特与阿联酋在红海周边的扩张与代理人冲突，不仅引发了占领地区的严重饥荒与人道灾难，更在根本上侵蚀了两国最初试图维护的商业走廊与国家安全利益，最终呈现出损人不利己的战略自毁后果。

Source quotes

[1:09] Greg: MBS in Saudi Arabia sees himself as the head of the biggest Gulf country, the biggest Gulf economy, what what he considers to be the natural leader of this region.

Original transcript

[0:00] Once upon a time, there were two princes [0:02] in two kingdoms. They arguably had a lot [0:05] in common. If you look at at Saudi [0:06] Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, [0:09] they are two countries with enormous [0:13] natural resources and wealth that [0:14] derives from that. [0:16] They're both ruled by monarchs. They're [0:18] both Muslim countries. They They have an [0:20] awful lot in common. They have a lot of [0:22] common interests and they are ruled by [0:25] two men, Muhammad bin Salman in Saudi [0:26] Arabia [0:28] and Muhammad bin [0:29] Zayed in in the UAE [0:32] who also have quite a lot in common. [0:34] They were both younger brothers who were [0:36] not always intended to be the rulers. [0:40] They had a relationship [0:42] in which MBZ in in the UAE was was a [0:45] mentor [0:48] they work together [0:50] in certain foreign policy areas. They [0:51] went into Yemen together in 2015. They [0:54] united against Qatar together. So [0:57] historically these two countries which [0:59] are geographically very close and in [1:01] many ways very similar had really quite [1:04] a close relationship. [1:06] But recently that has begun to sour. [1:09] >> So Greg, what went wrong? [1:11] >> I think we'll never know the full story [1:13] of what changed because the royal courts [1:15] in this region are very very opaque. But [1:18] I think broadly two things. One is you [1:21] had some personal animosity that set in [1:24] between these two rulers. MBS in Saudi [1:26] Arabia [1:27] sees himself as the head of the biggest [1:30] Gulf country, [1:31] the biggest Gulf economy, what what he [1:33] considers to be the natural leader of [1:35] this region. And so he wanted to call [1:38] the shots. He wanted to set the [1:39] direction not only for Saudi foreign [1:41] policy, but for Gulf foreign policy more [1:44] broadly. [1:45] And I think MBZ in the UAE came to [1:47] resent he sees his own country as being [1:50] more dynamic, as being a significant [1:52] middle power and he resents taking [1:54] orders from uh the younger Crown Prince [1:56] who who runs the Saudi Arabia. So, [1:58] that's one piece of it. But, then these [2:00] are also just countries that see foreign [2:02] policy and security in very different [2:05] ways. The Saudis are very much a part of [2:09] the Arab world, the Muslim world. They [2:10] they want to be a leader [2:12] in that region, and they have a very [2:14] traditional conception of foreign [2:16] policy, where for them state sovereignty [2:18] is is paramount. It's the most important [2:21] thing. The UAE doesn't see it that way. [2:23] It is happy to make deals with countries [2:26] outside the region. In fact, very often [2:28] it wants to look beyond the Arab and [2:30] Muslim world. It is very happy to work [2:33] with non-state actors and breakaway [2:35] republics and things that are not [2:37] traditional states. And it sees itself [2:40] as as being a a hub for finance and [2:42] travel and trade, and that is the the [2:45] root of its foreign policy, whereas [2:47] Saudis have a much more sort of, again, [2:50] traditionalist view of the world. [2:52] >> Let's try and break this down a bit. And [2:53] I think I want to try and take [2:56] like different aspects [2:58] of their conflict and try and look at [3:01] how how that plays out in particular [3:03] countries. And I kind of want to start [3:04] with security, and Greg, in Yemen, [3:07] because they have [3:09] they have a common interest, but they [3:10] seem to express it differently. [3:15] >> They have a common interest. Both of [3:16] them would like the Houthis to not be in [3:19] charge of of large parts of Yemen [3:21] anymore. But, right, the disagreement is [3:23] how do you advance that common interest? [3:26] Yemen was two countries throughout the [3:29] Cold War. You had the north, which was a [3:31] religious monarchy at first, and then it [3:33] became a dictatorship. And you had the [3:35] south, which was a communist state. It [3:36] was the only communist state in the [3:38] Middle East, actually, until 1990, when [3:40] the two Yemens were unified. The Saudi [3:43] view is very much that the unity of [3:45] Yemen is important. Again, going back to [3:47] this idea of sovereignty. And so, they [3:51] want to work with [3:53] factions in Yemen to fight the Houthis [3:55] that are interested in preserving the [3:57] unity of the country. The Emirates don't [4:00] see it that way. The Emirates have [4:02] looked at Yemen and they have decided [4:03] that among their most useful allies [4:06] there are separatists in the south, [4:08] what's known as the Southern [4:09] Transitional Council, which is a group [4:11] that advocates for South Yemen to once [4:14] again become an independent country. [4:16] That's who the UAE decided to work with. [4:18] Eventually, the Saudi backed and the UAE [4:21] backed forces in Yemen wound up clashing [4:23] with one another over this issue of [4:25] separatism. The Saudis got the upper [4:26] hand, eventually forced the UAE to [4:29] curtail its support for these factions [4:32] in Yemen. But going forward, the the [4:35] schism is still there. [4:36] >> So in this instance, they have a common [4:38] interest, but they let their rivalry [4:40] overcome that to the detriment of both [4:42] of them. Let they also have Lena, they [4:44] have commercial interests and concerns, [4:48] particularly about the access to ports [4:51] and the waterways. Tell me a little bit [4:52] about that. [4:53] >> As Greg was saying, the Saudis are very [4:55] much this [4:57] status quo type power. They were quite [4:59] interested in working with the state of [5:01] Sudan, [5:02] which they see as represented by the [5:04] army, even though you know, there [5:07] there always questions about how stable [5:08] that was possibly. [5:10] Whereas the UAE decided [5:12] the RSF was actually a [5:14] better partner in terms of their [5:17] finding somebody who would represent [5:19] their commercial interest. So then in [5:20] order to understand the UAE's commercial [5:22] interests, they have [5:24] investments in ports and infrastructure [5:25] all along the seashore, which they which [5:28] they really care about and for which [5:29] they want sort of local powers that will [5:31] back their investment interests in these [5:34] places. Whereas for the Saudis, as Greg [5:36] said, the the Red Sea is much more [5:38] security issue. They they think that the [5:40] one Sudan for them is across the sea. [5:42] It's quite close. It's only about 200 km [5:45] in in the sort of [5:47] most narrow part of the sea. [5:49] And as the war in Iran has closed the [5:52] Strait of Hormuz, which both the Saudis [5:54] and the Emirates depended on depended on [5:57] for for exporting their oil, I think [5:59] that security aspect [6:01] has become much better has become much [6:04] more important for the Saudis commercial [6:06] interests in the Red Sea as well because [6:08] they use the Red Sea now as an outlet [6:10] for their oil exports. So that that [6:11] concern has just increased a lot. [6:13] >> Okay, so here you have security being a [6:16] particular Saudi concern, whereas [6:19] originally anyway, the commercial [6:20] interests were the Emirati concern. I [6:23] mean that [6:24] there's an incredibly foolish approach [6:26] to to commerce. You know, the Emirates [6:29] are able and would be welcome as [6:31] investors in all manner of peaceful [6:34] places. [6:35] But what you've got going on here is if [6:38] there's three things in the world that [6:39] have made wars last longer, it's [6:43] climate change, corruption, and [6:45] complexity. And you can't blame the [6:46] Emirates for climate change, but in [6:48] Sudan, they're definitely part of the [6:51] other two. So [6:53] the war between [6:55] basically these two very criminal [6:57] forces, the army and the even more [6:59] criminal RSF, a lot of it's about [7:01] looting. Hemeti runs gold mines. The [7:03] fact that he now has lots of [7:06] commercial ties within the Gulf makes it [7:08] easier for them to launder the proceeds [7:10] of that. It fuels the conflict, gives [7:12] the combatants more of an incentive to [7:14] keep fighting. And then complexity, when [7:17] you have multiple actors, and Sudan was [7:20] pretty complicated to begin with. When [7:22] you have multiple belligerents in a war, [7:25] studies show that it just is harder to [7:27] resolve it cuz there's more variables, [7:30] more people you have to satisfy to bring [7:31] it to an end. So in pursuit of these [7:34] narrow commercial aims which they could [7:35] have got in all kinds of other places, [7:38] they've caused a humanitarian and [7:41] >> [snorts] [7:41] >> One other concern, I think, long-term [7:43] concern of the of the Emirates, I [7:46] Greg, has been the desire to be able to [7:48] secure supplies of food. Tell me a [7:50] little bit about that. [7:53] >> It's a concern for the UAE. It's a [7:54] concern, actually, for everyone in the [7:57] Gulf. This is obviously a very [7:58] inhospitable region. They can't grow [8:00] much food here. They are reliant on [8:03] imports from overseas. And so, you've [8:05] seen in recent years Saudi Arabia, the [8:09] UAE, and Qatar They're all of the the [8:10] big players in the Gulf investing large [8:13] sums of money, particularly in the Horn [8:16] of Africa buying up arable land, which [8:19] they see as as being central to a food [8:22] security strategy in the future. So, you [8:24] know, in the case of the UAE, for [8:25] example, they have bought large tracts [8:27] of land in Sudan along the Nile River, [8:30] very fertile land [8:32] that is then used to or should be used [8:35] to grow crops that are exported to the [8:38] Gulf. And and this has become a [8:40] venue for competition amongst the Gulf [8:43] states in the Horn. And it's become a [8:45] concern for governments and for farmers [8:48] and citizens in the Horn of Africa [8:50] because all of this arable land is being [8:52] bought up. All of these water resources [8:54] are being utilized to grow food that is [8:56] not ultimately for the benefit of the [8:58] people who live in these countries, but [9:00] is meant to be exported to to the GCC. [9:03] >> And I think that is sort of [9:06] a prime example of just how [9:08] self-defeating [9:09] rivalry between the UAE and the Saudis [9:12] and the way that it is playing out in [9:13] the Horn of Africa is for the two Gulf [9:16] countries. You could you could make a [9:18] very powerful argument that they should [9:20] stop their meddling because of the scale [9:22] of the humanitarian crisis that they are [9:24] contributing to. And that would be [9:26] reason enough to argue that they should [9:28] change their foreign policy. [9:31] Governments don't always act on the [9:32] basis of those kinds of more altruistic [9:34] arguments, but you can make a very [9:36] powerful one that their foreign policy [9:39] is having a self-defeating impact on the [9:41] two of them as well. [9:42] >> I mean the the the whole sort of let's [9:44] buy up farmland policy was wrong-headed [9:46] from the start. There's no shortage of [9:48] food in the world. If you've got money, [9:49] you can get food. What they needed to [9:50] worry about was the safety of the sea [9:53] lanes by which they import food. They [9:55] can buy it from anywhere. So, the idea [9:57] that you have to sort of control large [9:59] tracts of arable land um [10:01] makes no sense. And particularly so if [10:04] you then fuel the war and you end up [10:06] causing a famine in the place where [10:07] you've occupied it.