Rob Snyder Rejects Design Partners, Bases Startup Sales on Bottlenecks

Lenny's Podcast

Founders waste years pushing feature improvements to polite design partners because software sells only when fatal tool limitations block an individual buyer from completing an unavoidable task.

AI-assisted summary of How to find product-market fit (but, actually) | Rob Snyder (Author, The Power of Pull) — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published: 2026-10-26

Key ideas

Rob Snyder defines product-market fit around the PULL framework—Project, Unavoidable, List of options, and Limitations—arguing that true market pull is an individual psychological state discovered upstream, not created through salesmanship. (7:30)
Founders are advised against unpaid design partnerships and free POCs, as co-development arrangements frequently produce polite feedback without commercial skin in the game. (31:01)
For initial validation, founders should prioritize 100 to 150 concise LinkedIn outreach requests per week and diagnose interest within five calls using a two-slide narrative rather than building complex MVPs. (39:18)
Startups should be treated as repeatable case study factories operating across pipeline, sales, and delivery stages, focusing on delivering a specific milestone where it becomes 'weird to churn.' (73:37)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by Lenny's Podcast on October 25, 2026, this episode features Rob Snyder, author of The Power of Pull and writer of The Physics of Startups newsletter. Drawing from his own early founder mistakes and advisory work with over 50 startups scaling from zero to $1 million ARR, Snyder walks through his tactical framework for finding genuine product-market fit.

## TL;DR Rob Snyder presents the PULL framework—Project, Unavoidable, List of options, and Limitations—arguing that true market pull is an existing psychological state inside an individual buyer rather than something a founder creates through salesmanship. He breaks down how to discover high-urgency operational bottlenecks through firsthand immersion, test hypotheses with simple two-slide pitches, and avoid common traps like polite unpaid design partnerships. Snyder outlines practical playbooks for cold LinkedIn outreach, discovery sales calls, rapid deal closing, and post-sale onboarding aimed at reaching the milestone where churn becomes unthinkable. When progress stalls, he advises diagnosing churn forensically, asking the direct 'Hail Mary' question, or triggering 'goblin mode' to get in front of real buyers immediately.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries a frank, battle-tested, and diagnostic tone that strips away startup romanticism in favor of practical operational mechanics. Snyder speaks with the self-effacing candor of someone who spent years grinding on unwanted products, contrasting sharply with standard VC hype. Rachitsky acts as a grounded, inquisitive sounding board, drawing out tactical scripts and benchmarks that transform nebulous startup anxieties into clear, repeatable experiments.

## Bulletin - [07:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=450s) Rob Snyder defines product-market fit around the PULL framework—Project, Unavoidable, List of options, and Limitations—arguing that true market pull is an individual psychological state discovered upstream, not created through salesmanship. - [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) Founders are advised against unpaid design partnerships and free POCs, as co-development arrangements frequently produce polite feedback without commercial skin in the game. - [39:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2358s) For initial validation, founders should prioritize 100 to 150 concise LinkedIn outreach requests per week and diagnose interest within five calls using a two-slide narrative rather than building complex MVPs. - [01:13:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4417s) Startups should be treated as repeatable case study factories operating across pipeline, sales, and delivery stages, focusing on delivering a specific milestone where it becomes 'weird to churn.'

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=0s) Pull is an individual psychological phenomenon rather than an organizational attribute; software is sold to a specific person with an unavoidable task on their personal to-do list. - [07:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=450s) The PULL framework breaks down customer demand into four components: an active Project, an Unavoidable urgency driver, a List of considered options, and fatal Limitations in those options. - [13:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=833s) Market pull exists prior to and independently of the founder, meaning sales calls should be treated as investigative experiments rather than persuasive pitching. - [17:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1033s) Viable startup ideas emerge far more reliably from firsthand operational immersion and domain friction than from isolated brainstorms or abstract pain-point interviews. - [22:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1354s) A pull hypothesis can be rapidly tested before writing code using a two-slide deck that diagnoses the prospect's reality and proposes a conceptual unblocking mechanism. - [28:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1712s) The Hail Mary question—asking lukewarm prospects what current task on their to-do list they would pay someone to resolve right now—can unlock rapid, high-conviction pivots. - [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) Unpaid design partnerships often derail early startups because non-paying advisors give expansive feedback without having the urgency or intent to purchase. - [39:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2358s) Cold outreach should avoid AI-generated personalization templates and instead leverage short, founder-led LinkedIn messages aimed strictly at booking a discovery conversation. - [41:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2487s) First sales calls should focus on diagnosing pull within 30 minutes; if five consecutive calls show zero urgency, founders should discard or revise the hypothesis rather than running hundreds of calls. - [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3000s) Founders should seek 'coiled spring' buyers who are actively blocked rather than relying on the maxim that a product must be 10x better to overcome buyer inertia. - [01:00:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3643s) Early pricing discussions should prioritize verifying willingness to transact over maximizing extraction, utilizing third-party benchmark ranges to anchor deal sizes. - [01:02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3742s) When outreach stalls, founders can enter 'goblin mode'—an intense burst of operational energy involving rapid travel, in-person canvassing, and direct manual problem-solving. - [01:06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4016s) Post-sale customer onboarding must be designed around achieving a definitive operational milestone that makes it structurally 'weird to churn.' - [01:13:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4417s) A successful startup functions as a repeatable case study factory, where growth constraints are systematically addressed across pipeline, sales, and delivery stages. - [01:23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4985s) Copycatting established market leaders fails because incumbents have already resolved baseline friction, leaving new entrants stranded unless a specific sub-segment remains blocked.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=0s) Introduction to Rob Snyder and the Theory of Pull

Rob Snyder explains that the underlying theory of a sales call is that when genuine pull exists, the prospective customer will practically rip the product out of the seller's hands. Operating on this principle requires a disciplined structure for entering and exiting customer discovery. Addressing a common conceptual error founders make when brainstorming and evaluating startup concepts, Snyder emphasizes that pull is fundamentally an individual psychological phenomenon rather than an organizational one: “One of the main mistakes people make is thinking that pull is a thing that a company has. It's a thing a person has. You're not selling to SpaceX. You're selling to the head of legal at SpaceX who has a project on her to-do list that they can't do themselves.”

When early pitch conversations fall flat and prospects do not exhibit intense urgency, Snyder recommends deploying what he calls the "Hail Mary" approach. Instead of walking away empty-handed or trying to force-feed an unappealing pitch, the founder asks a direct, open-ended question: is there anything currently on your to-do list that you would pay me to do right now? If the prospect declines, the founder walks away with valuable negative signal and continues iterating. If the prospect names an urgent task and tries to buy a solution on the spot, the founder has unearthed a potential source of pull that can then be tested for repeatability across other buyers. Once an initial pocket of pull is located, Snyder notes that focusing immediately on retention becomes paramount.

[01:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=76s) Rob Snyder's Background and Reception Among Founders

Lenny Rachitsky introduces Rob Snyder, author of *The Power of Pull* and writer of *The Physics of Startups* newsletter, explaining that he discovered Snyder's work through unprompted endorsements within his paid Slack community. Multiple founders and product leaders had started threads urging Lenny to invite Snyder on the show, pointing out that his pragmatic, step-by-step advice for navigating the zero-to-one stage had transformed how they approached early-stage building. Snyder's insights stem from direct experience: after getting "punched in the face" as a founder pushing a product nobody wanted, he eventually unlocked traction, which led him to advise more than 50 different startups on growing from zero to beyond $1 million in ARR.

Lenny shares specific feedback from community members to underscore why Snyder’s message resonates so deeply in an ecosystem flooded with generic startup advice: - One founder noted that reading the first chapter felt like a weight lifting off their shoulders, confirming they were not a "silly clueless outlier" and that early disorientation is normal. - Another shared that Snyder's framing validated just how painful, lonely, and strange the search for product-market fit truly is. - A third acknowledged falling into the classic trap Snyder warns against: building features around what prospects claimed they wanted during discovery calls, rather than focusing strictly on what caused them to say yes and pay.

[04:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=250s) The Flaws of Push vs. Pull and the "Coiled Spring"

Snyder defines pull as an operating state where an individual buyer feels it would be irrational not to purchase the product. While market breakout stories often showcase effortless, exponential pull, the vast majority of founders find themselves constantly pushing—straining to persuade disinterested prospects to care about a solution. Snyder recounts falling directly into the standard playbook during his own startup days: he identified massive, "hair on fire" pain points, built a highly differentiated offering that delivered clear value, and secured daily design partners. Despite checking every conventional box, he spent two grueling years slamming into walls and aimlessly pivoting because prospective buyers ultimately declined to prioritize the solution.

Real pull occurs not when a product merely addresses pain or delivers abstract value, but when it aligns with an active, unyielding priority that the buyer is powerless to solve with existing means. Snyder observes that buyers will readily acknowledge that an idea is clever or valuable, yet still refuse to rearrange their day or spend budget on it. When a professional is under intense pressure to complete a specific project and finds themselves blocked by the shortcomings of their available tools, they behave like a "coiled spring"—the moment an external solution appears that eliminates that obstacle, they snap forward and eagerly buy.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Mechanics of Customer Pull accDescr: A flowchart illustrating the contrast between pushing conventional value propositions and triggering customer pull through unblocked priorities.

subgraph Push ["The Push Dynamic (Low Conversion)"] A["Identify Broad Pain Point"] --> B["Build Differentiated Feature"] B --> C["Engage Polite Design Partners"] C --> D["Prospects Refuse to Reprioritize"] end

subgraph Pull ["The Pull Dynamic (The Coiled Spring)"] E["Mandated To-Do List Project"] --> F["Immediate Urgency: Why Now?"] F --> G["Current Options Blocked / Limited"] G --> H["Buyer Snaps: Rips Product Out of Hands"] end ```

[07:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=450s) Breaking Down the PULL Acronym

To make this mechanism operational for founders and product builders, Snyder articulates the four components of the **PULL** framework:

- **P — Project:** The buyer has an explicit initiative or operational task on their personal to-do list. Drawing a parallel to the Jobs-to-be-Done framework popularized by Bob Moesta, Snyder stresses that a project is not an ambition to purchase software (such as "I want to buy recruitment software"), but an underlying business task (such as "I want to hire more employees"). - **U — Unavoidable:** The project carries immediate urgency and cannot be deferred. The buyer has a clear, non-negotiable answer to "Why must this be addressed now rather than later?" - **L — List of options:** The entire menu of workarounds, vendors, and internal pathways the buyer considers to get the project done, including hiring additional personnel, reassigning internal team members, leveraging existing internal software, or exploring off-the-shelf market tools. - **L — Limitations:** The fatal deficiencies and bottlenecks in those available options that prevent the buyer from completing their project to satisfaction.

Lenny observes that founders frequently focus only on the first two dimensions—identifying an urgent, "hair on fire" assignment delegated by a boss. Snyder explains why the second pair of factors is just as critical: if an engineering or product team faces a top-down mandate to release an urgent feature, their primary instinct is simply to build it in-house using existing tools and teammates. Unless their default options are crippled by severe limitations, they have zero incentive to look outside or buy third-party software, no matter how urgent the underlying project may be.

[09:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=569s) How Jump Found Pull with Financial Advisors

Rob Snyder underscores that a product idea cannot succeed simply because a tool exists; customers must be genuinely stuck where existing options are inadequate. Lenny Rachitsky asks for a concrete example using the PULL acronym as an operational Mad Libs template. Snyder shares the story of Jump, an AI notetaker built specifically for financial advisors. Like Snyder, Jump's founders spent 18 months hitting a wall trying to sell before discovering real pull.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The PULL Framework Applied to Jump accDescr: Diagram showing how Project, Unavoidable, List of options, and Limitations align for financial advisors versus insurance agents.

subgraph FA["Financial Advisors (Strong Pull)"] P1["Project: Minimize time taking meeting notes & CRM entry"] U1["Unavoidable: Strict SEC compliance (risk of jail)"] L1["List of Options: Generic AI notetakers"] Lim1["Limitations: Lack CRM integration & SEC compliance"] Outcome1["Result: Product ripped out of hands"] P1 --> U1 --> L1 --> Lim1 --> Outcome1 end

subgraph IA["Insurance Agents (No Pull)"] P2["Project: Minimize meeting note time"] U2["Unavoidable: MISSING (No legal requirement to log notes)"] L2["Existing Option: Simply not taking notes"] Outcome2["Result: Complains but will not buy"] P2 --> U2 --> L2 --> Outcome2 end ```

When Jump evaluated financial advisors through the framework, each element aligned: * **P (Project):** A clear task in their ongoing workflow to minimize the hours spent documenting client discussions and pushing that data into their CRM. * **U (Unavoidable):** Compliance is non-negotiable. If advisors do not record detailed notes and archive them into their CRM, regulatory bodies like the SEC can penalize them severely—they can literally face prison time. * **L (List of options):** Generic meeting summarizers and AI notetakers available on the open market. * **L (Limitations):** These general-purpose tools failed because they did not integrate directly with specialized financial advisor CRMs, and it was legally ambiguous whether they adhered to SEC compliance rules.

Because all four conditions were satisfied, advisors immediately embraced Jump. One customer even remarked, “This must be how Alexander Graham Bell felt when he invented the telephone.” Snyder points out how unusual and telling it is for someone to make such an extreme statement about mundane back-office software.

[11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=697s) The Failure Mode: Comparing Advisors to Insurance Agents

To illustrate what happens when a piece of the framework is missing, Snyder recalls Jump considering whether to expand into selling to insurance agents, who also spend their days in back-to-back client meetings. On the surface, insurance agents had the same project (`P`): they wanted to minimize note-taking time. However, the unavoidable driver (`U`) did not exist—insurance agents are not legally mandated to maintain exhaustive CRM meeting logs. Consequently, their available option (`L`) was simply to avoid taking detailed notes, which was acceptable for their workflow. Without an unavoidable constraint, the force collapsed.

Rachitsky asks whether the project (`P`) must be an explicit, written item on a formal to-do list, or if an ongoing operational desire like saving time qualifies. Snyder clarifies that it does not have to be a literal item jotted in a planner; rather, it reflects the user's active intention during a daily workflow: “Like I think there's like a the action I'm doing right now on my calendar and then the project is my intention while I'm doing it. And so while I'm doing it, the project on my mental to-do list was like spend the least amount of time doing this annoying thing.”

When all four components are not met simultaneously, sales stall: * If a customer has a project (`P`) without urgency (`U`) or poor options (`L`), “what they'll do is they'll complain and they won't buy.” * If a customer has both `P` and `U`, but their current tools (`L`) are sufficient, “they're going to say, 'Yeah, that's exactly what we're doing right now and working with Claude Code on it. We're going to figure it out.'”

[13:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=833s) Why Pull Is Discovered, Not Created

Snyder explains that shifting away from the mindset of manufacturing desire was a profound turning point in his career. Early on, he believed his failure to close deals meant he was personally incompetent at persuasion, assuming an entrepreneur's duty was to talk customers into realizing how valuable a product was. Over time, he learned that the market’s underlying tension exists wholly independent of the founder.

“It turns out this pull, this project on their to-do list exists before and independent of me, which means I just have to go out there and find it. I don't have to convince people to have pull. And it's like I haven't quite figured out how to do that, but I think it's very very hard to do if it's possible at all.”

True pull reveals itself through an inversion of normal sales behavior: * For most prospective buyers, life is functioning adequately; “it would be weird if they bought our product given what's on their to-do list, given what they have, given their options.” * A prospect experiencing genuine pull represents a tightly wound spring; “a person with pull is weird not to buy.” * When speaking with someone experiencing pull, their immediate response cuts past standard pleasantries: “Wait a second, you can do what? Okay, how do we get started? Does the product exist yet? Like how do how do we get on board?” * Without pull, prospects often provide polite, false encouragement, telling the founder, “That's totally the future of our industry. Wow, I can see how that would save us so much money,” yet they never ask to purchase or onboard immediately.

[16:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=970s) Selling to a Person, Not a Company

A frequent error Snyder sees among B2B founders is targeting an abstract entity rather than an individual human being. Even in massive enterprise transactions, companies do not buy software—specific employees do.

“One of the main mistakes people make is thinking that pull is a thing that a company has. It's a thing a person has. Even if you're selling enterprise software, you're selling not to the company. You're not selling to SpaceX. You're selling to just going to your general conversation, you're selling to like the head of legal at SpaceX who has a project on her to-do list that that they can't do themselves.”

Founders often describe their market by declaring, “We sell to mid-market private equity companies.” In reality, they are selling to an individual general partner or operating partner inside that firm who is personally stuck trying to accomplish a specific operational objective.

[17:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1033s) Finding Startup Ideas Through Firsthand Experience

Rachitsky transitions to the stages of building an early-stage company, starting with idea generation. He asks how an aspiring founder can leverage the framework to distinguish viable opportunities from unviable concepts before writing code. Snyder admits that, left unguided, his own idea notebooks were full of abstract, disconnected concepts like an “API for APIs.”

The pull framework operates upstream of product feature sets by focusing on a specific individual's bottleneck: * It forces the founder to establish a testable claim: “I believe this specific person is stuck.” * It enables a team to test customer appetite and see whether people try to purchase before a functional product has even been developed. * It shifts the founder's initial objective away from feature brainstorms toward constructing a clear pull hypothesis.

Snyder emphasizes that founders do not treat the early ideation phase with the rigor it demands, noting that the selection of whose problem you choose to solve dictates the company's trajectory and that founders must approach it as if their lives depended on getting the hypothesis right.

[18:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1136s) Firsthand Immersion and the Physical Therapist Case Study

Rob Snyder challenges the standard playbook of conducting shallow, thirty-minute Zoom interviews when searching for a startup idea. If a founder's life depended on discovering authentic demand, they would not conduct ten polite video chats; they would go in person, immerse themselves entirely, and do the job alongside prospective buyers to feel their exact constraints firsthand. Lenny Rachitsky connects this philosophy to a quote from Nan Yu, the former Head of Product at Linear (who later joined OpenAI), who described searching for product opportunities by striving to “feel the pain of the person the same way they feel the pain.”

Snyder illustrates this deep immersion with a story about a friend from school who wanted to build a company serving small businesses but had no initial product idea or notebook full of concepts. Instead of brainstorming in a vacuum, the friend compiled a target list of small-business sectors and shadowed them on the ground for days at a time. He started with solar panel installers, but quickly realized “he hated them and they hated him,” so he walked away. He next shadowed independent physical therapists, where the rapport was immediate and genuine. To intimately understand their day-to-day operations and financial pressure points, he spent whole days looking directly over their shoulders at their workflows and even investigated acquiring a physical therapy franchise so he could analyze an actual profit-and-loss (P&L) statement.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Field Immersion to Hypothesis Validation accDescr: A flow showing the transition from hands-on observation in physical therapy clinics to drafting and repeating a pull hypothesis across five operators.

subgraph Immersion["1. Hands-on Immersion"] A["Shadow physical therapists & review P&L"] --> B["Detect active bottleneck: Trying to do X, but stuck"] end

subgraph Hypothesis["2. PULL Hypothesis Formulation"] B --> C["Formulate 4-part hypothesis (Project, Unavoidable, List of options, Limitations)"] C --> D["Present 2-slide pitch back to initial practitioner"] end

subgraph Validation["3. Repeatable Pull Check"] D -->|"Practitioner enthusiastically validates"| E["Interview 5 additional independent PTs"] E -->|"Identical pull observed"| F["Greenlight: Repeatable market pull confirmed"] end ```

Snyder argues that this physical observation is essential for two reasons. First, breakthrough ideas do not emerge from whiteboards or neat brainstorming sessions; they reveal themselves only through observing bottlenecks that practitioners themselves rarely mention in a standard interview. Second, it is a matter of founder empathy: “The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them?”

---

[22:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1354s) Testing the PULL Hypothesis with Two Slides

Once an acute friction point is uncovered, Snyder instructs founders to crystallize the observation into a formal PULL hypothesis. In the physical therapist example, the founder observed that clinics were actively trying to reduce a specific line-item expense on their P&L, that doing so was completely unavoidable for concrete business reasons, and that their existing remedy—hiring specialized consultants—was both too slow and too expensive.

To test whether this diagnosis matches reality, Snyder advises founders not to overwhelm prospective buyers with technical jargon, but to present two simple slides:

1. **Slide 1: The Diagnosis (The PULL Mirror):** Reframe their current reality back to them in plain language without mentioning framework names. The slide outlines the active project on their to-do list, explains why solving it right now is unavoidable, names the alternative options they have already evaluated, and articulates why those alternatives are fundamentally lacking. The founder asks: *“Do I have that roughly right?”* 2. **Slide 2: The Conceptual Solution:** A high-level overview proposing how the founder can help resolve the bottleneck faster, cheaper, or more effectively than their current alternatives, followed by: *“Does that kind of fit what you're looking for?”*

When Snyder’s friend showed this two-slide structure to the first physical therapist, the reaction was immediate: “Oh my god, yeah, that's exactly the thing.” When asked if they would pay to have it resolved, the clinic owner agreed on the spot. However, rather than writing code immediately, the founder took the critical step of presenting the exact same hypothesis to five other independent physical therapists to verify that the pull repeated across the industry rather than reflecting one practitioner's eccentricities.

---

[25:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1522s) Recognizing Real Buying Intent and "Pull-Shaped Actions"

Snyder emphasizes that the true signal of product-market pull is unmistakable behavioral commitment. Founders often confuse polite interest with buying intent. Real pull does not sound like polite, leaned-out corporate courtesy—phrases such as “let me think about it,” “tell me more,” or “could you send more information so our team can review that.” Snyder warns: “anything that is not like okay how do we actually move forward on this is just not worth your life force going after.”

Instead, founders must watch for what Snyder terms a “pull-shaped action”—a visceral, urgent demand where the customer leans across the table and tries to extract the solution from the founder right away:

- **Urgency and forward movement:** The buyer asks, “How do we get started?” or “If you can do that, I will pay you right now.” - **Physical body language:** Lenny Rachitsky references Josh Woodward (Head of Google Labs), who noted that when users encounter something they desperately want, their eyes visibly light up with excitement. - **Behavioral friction:** The dynamic inverts such that it feels unnatural or weird for the prospect *not* to purchase immediately. Postponing a decision with statements like “I could totally see us using this in Q4” is not pull; it is an active push into the distant future.

---

[27:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1644s) When "Solve Your Own Problem" Fails vs. Succeeds

Lenny asks about the classic startup maxim to “solve your own problem.” Snyder clarifies that building for yourself works only under very narrow, honest conditions. He cites Emily Choi-Greene, founder of Clearly AI, who worked in security engineering at Amazon Web Services (AWS). She experienced a severe internal engineering bottleneck that she would have eagerly paid external vendors to solve, yet discovered no commercial tooling existed. In that scenario, solving your own problem is completely valid because verified commercial willingness to pay existed before a line of code was ever written.

The pitfall arises when founders conflate what they wish existed with what they would realistically fund out of their own budget. Snyder admits having made this mistake himself: founders often encounter minor friction, convince themselves that “the world needs this,” and invest months of development into products they would never open their own wallets to purchase if confronted with the mirror. While Snyder's advisory work focuses predominantly on B2B SaaS, the underlying psychology of pull applies wherever someone experiences an unavoidable project they must urgently resolve.

[28:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1712s) The Hail Mary Question

Rob Snyder notes that while the PULL framework is designed around B2B dynamics, consumer founders apply similar instincts. He cites Sara Blakely's journey with Spanx: she solved her immediate personal pain by cutting off her pantyhose before an event, and then honed her product by pitching and selling one-on-one directly to women to observe their reactions. Lenny affirms this classic origin story, prompting Rob to introduce an unconventional pivot tactic for early founders: the "Hail Mary" approach.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Hail Mary Pivot accDescr: Flow showing how lukewarm sales feedback can trigger the Hail Mary question to uncover an urgent paid problem.

subgraph Pitch["Initial Pitch"] A["Standard Pitch"] --> B{"Prospect Reaction"} B -->|"Enthusiastic"| C["Proceed to Sale"] B -->|"Lukewarm / Polite 'Meh'"| D["Throw the Hail Mary"] end

subgraph Pivot["Discovery & Pivot"] D --> E["'What's on your to-do list that you'd pay me to do right now?'"] E --> F["Prospect reveals urgent problem"] F --> G["First Contract & New Direction"] end ```

The standard "happy path"—where a prospect instantly exclaims that your prototype is exactly what they need—often fails to materialize, leaving founders facing polite indifference. When that happens, Rob recommends throwing an open-ended Hail Mary rather than walking away empty-handed: asking what else is on their plate that they would pay someone to solve today. This single question has triggered massive, trajectory-altering pivots for several teams:

> “Is there anything on your to-do list that you would pay me to do right now, like that you would pay somebody to take off your plate?” — Rob Snyder

In one instance, a startup attempting to sell an applicant tracking system (ATS) to municipal governments met tepid responses until the founders asked that question. The government buyer admitted that their real bottleneck was drafting complex job descriptions; fixing that specific workflow became the company's first paid contract, establishing a beachhead that powered rapid expansion. For an overthinker or an introvert intimidated by enterprise selling, this reframing relieves tension: sales ceases to be about cajoling someone into a transaction and instead becomes an open inquiry into whether they need immediate help with an existing bottleneck.

---

[31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) Startup Traps and the Myth of Design Partners

When Lenny asks about common pitfalls during early ideation, Rob highlights two dangerous anti-patterns: 1. **Building in a silo before talking to customers.** Founders convince themselves that a concept is not yet "ready for prime time" or assume buyers must view polished software to understand it. While modern AI tooling enables teams to build prototypes in weeks rather than months, delay remains perilous. Founders need to "face the cold wind of reality as soon as possible" rather than insulating their ideas in development cycles. 2. **Relying on design partners.** Despite being standard Silicon Valley advice, Rob strongly warns against this arrangement based on dozens of startup engagements.

> “What I've seen in basically every single time I've seen somebody with a design partner is that you recruit a design partner who quote unquote buys into your vision for the product and they give a bunch of feedback and never buy from you.” — Rob Snyder

Design partners routinely treat the engagement like an opportunity to "play Steve Jobs," dispensing sweeping philosophical guidance because they do not have real skin in the game. By contrast, a buyer grappling with an authentic, urgent project has no interest in design sessions or product advisory roles—they simply want their problem resolved.

Regarding where viable concepts originate, Lenny references Floodgate's framework of the "earned secret"—insights earned through lived friction rather than abstract speculation. Rob breaks down the origin of ideas across the roughly 50 startups he has advised:

- **10%** originate from solving the founder's own direct, personal friction. - **90%** stem from acquiring firsthand, ground-level domain experience, often discovered by attempting to sell the wrong product first before uncovering the real requirement. - **Ayahuasca retreats**, Rob jokes, make up 0% of the pie chart in reality—though he playfully quips that attendance is "mandatory as part of me advising you."

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[34:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2086s) Landing the First Cold Conversation with "Founder Magic"

Once a founder formulates a pull hypothesis, the immediate goal is to establish an operational rhythm of two to three prospective customer calls per day. When warm intros are unavailable, cold outreach becomes unavoidable. Rob advises against using typical online sales templates packed with manufactured pain points and dramatic claims of revolutionary value propositions; such messages invariably end up marked as spam.

Instead, Rob champions what he terms "founder magic" outreach: brief, intriguing, human notes that do not attempt to sell the product or articulate a complex value proposition inside the inbox. Because pull already exists on the prospect's real-world agenda, the message needs to accomplish only one goal: earning a conversational meeting.

> “The pull exists out there on their to-do list. And so the message doesn't do anything about that. It just it's just to get them to talk to you. So just say something interesting to cause them to meet with you.” — Rob Snyder

Effective angles for founder magic outreach depend on matching genuine personal narrative to the audience: - **High-profile investor hook:** One founder achieved high conversion by writing: *"Hey, Snoop Dogg invested in us and I thought you'd find it interesting, too. Would you be open to chat?"* - **Personal background transition:** *"Hey, I dropped out of my PhD and I'm now working on something for content marketers. Open to chat?"* - **Pedigree hook (tailored to audience):** Referencing time as Sam Altman's former chief of staff works well with tech executives, but will alienate small businesses. - **Blue-collar / vertical alignment:** When pitching HVAC companies, the message must reflect their world: *"Hey, I worked at my family's plumbing company in high school and now I'm working on this interesting thing. Thought you might find it interesting. Would you be open to chat?"*

The overarching rule is brevity: keep the copy ultra-short, lead with an engaging curiosity hook, and resist the urge to pitch features or ROI before getting into an actual room or call.

[38:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2289s) Cold Outreach Tactics and Why AI Personalization Fails

When founders reach out to prospective buyers, Lenny Rachitsky asks whether they should rely on automated AI tools to personalize messages at scale or painstakingly craft bespoke outreach for every individual. Rob Snyder strongly advises against AI-generated personalization at the pre-product-market fit stage. In practice, automated messages usually spit back facts prospective buyers already know about themselves in an artificial tone, causing prospects to immediately think, “that looks like Claude wrote it.” Instead of spending hours overthinking personalization or automating fluff, Snyder points out that cold outreach messages should be only a sentence or two long and focus on offering something genuinely compelling or contextually relevant. A concise hook—such as noting attendance at an upcoming industry conference and asking to connect—is more than enough.

The objective of initial outreach is strictly to secure a conversation, not to pitch or close a deal over text. As Snyder explains, whether the prospect has any real demand will become evident once they are on the phone: “And on the call, we'll see if you have pull. If you do, you're going to turn it into a sales call. If you don't, nothing I do is going to change that.”

[39:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2358s) Outreach Benchmarks and Diagnosing the Funnel

When founders wonder where to begin and what volume to target, Snyder recommends starting on LinkedIn rather than cold email. In knowledge-work and B2B sectors, founders and buyers typically maintain detailed profiles, which allows a well-crafted personal profile to do the heavy lifting of establishing credibility before a conversation even starts.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Rob Snyder's LinkedIn Outreach Funnel Benchmarks accDescr: Weekly funnel showing connection volume, acceptance rates, response rates, and diagnostic steps for failure points.

subgraph Outreach["Weekly Connection Funnel"] A["Send 100-150 LinkedIn Requests/Week (~20 per day)"] -->|"30% to 40% accept"| B["30 to 60 Connections Accepted"] B -->|"Send short follow-up message"| C["30% to 50% Reply Rate"] C -->|"Majority agree to chat"| D["Qualified Discovery Calls Booked"] end

subgraph Diagnostics["Diagnosing Breakdowns"] E["Below 30% acceptance? Profile lacks credibility/context"] F["Accepted but no replies? Message hook is boring or salesy"] end

A -.-> E B -.-> F ```

Snyder provides clear numerical benchmarks for founders running cold LinkedIn outreach:

- **Weekly volume:** Aim to send connection requests to 100 to 150 people per week (roughly 20 per day), following up with a short message once they accept. - **Acceptance benchmark:** 30% to 40% of targets should accept the connection request. If acceptances fall below this range, the issue is almost always the sender's profile: prospects look at the profile and conclude the person does not look relevant or credible enough to accept. - **Reply benchmark:** Of the people who accept, 30% to 50% should respond to the direct message, and the majority of those who reply should agree to a chat. If people accept connections but do not reply to the message, the hook is not interesting enough.

[41:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2487s) Structuring the First Sales Call: Discovery Before Pitch

When stepping into an initial sales call, Snyder structures the meeting into two distinct phases: discovering whether pull exists, and delivering a conceptual pitch of how the product might help. Founders often make the mistake of entering customer calls visibly amped up, hyper-caffeinated, and determined to persuade the prospect to buy. Snyder urges founders to abandon high-pressure persuasion entirely in favor of a relaxed, leaned-back posture: “No, it's just if you have pull, you're going to convince me to let you buy.”

To execute this, Snyder uses a precise opening script to transition gracefully from pleasantries into discovery without making the buyer feel interrogated: 1. **The opening question:** Start by asking: “Hey, thanks so much for taking the time. I'm curious. I'm sure you get a bunch of people reaching out to you. Like why did you take the call with me today?” Occasionally, the buyer will immediately lay out their entire problem unprompted (e.g., they saw a mention of AI agents, have been struggling with a specific workflow, and visited the website), handing over the full PULL framework on a silver platter. 2. **Aligning on the agenda:** Most of the time, the prospect will reply with the standard brush-off: “I don’t know, you reached out to me; excited to hear what you have to say.” Rather than jumping into a demo, the founder should adopt that exact statement as the joint agenda: “Great, that sounds like a great agenda for today's call. Does that sound good to you?” 3. **Earning the right to ask questions:** Once the prospect affirms the agenda, the founder earns permission to conduct discovery by adding: “Great. Okay, before we get to those items on our agenda, do you mind if I ask you a few questions to better understand your context?” By gaining explicit buy-in first, the diagnostic questions feel collaborative rather than intrusive.

[43:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2612s) Meeting Logistics and Knowing When to Pivot

For call logistics, Snyder recommends booking exactly 30 minutes on the calendar. Shorter calendar blocks (such as 15 minutes) are easily overlooked by busy executives and frequently result in no-shows. Regarding product demos, Snyder cautions against rushing to show software on the first call. At the earliest stages of testing a pull hypothesis, founders often do not have a working product anyway; even when software does exist, the priority of call one must remain diagnosing whether pull is present rather than giving an enterprise feature tour.

A successful call is not measured by polite compliments, but by whether the founder leaves with a completed PULL framework or an understanding of why the problem is irrelevant to that customer. If founders run five consecutive calls where every buyer leans back, displays no urgency, and reveals nothing useful, it is a clear signal that the current hypothesis is dead. Snyder notes that founders frequently fall into the trap of running hundreds of dead-end calls hoping someone will bite, when they should instead run five calls, pause, and evaluate what was learned.

As a real-world example, Snyder describes a startup he advised that conducted five calls with commercial banks and encountered zero enthusiasm:

- During one of the uninspired banking calls, a contact remarked that while the tool was irrelevant to banking, the founders should explore defense companies. - Despite knowing nothing about the defense sector, the founders secured an intro to a defense firm. - On their very first call, the defense contact reacted with immediate, high-stakes urgency: “Holy, are you serious?” That single reaction validated pull and caused the founders to pivot their hypothesis immediately.

Lenny observes that Snyder's methodology acts as a forcing function for radical honesty, preventing founders from fooling themselves with false hope. Snyder agrees, emphasizing: “I think it's thinking of it as we're selling to learn, not really to push.” If a founder ever catches themselves trying to push or convince someone, it serves as an immediate red flag that the pull hypothesis is misaligned.

[46:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2816s) The Simple Pitch Once Pull Is Identified

When a prospect demonstrates authentic pull, crafting the pitch becomes straightforward. Snyder illustrates this through the example of a buyer who reveals their frustration during discovery: “I'm trying to make a website, but one of those typical point-and-click website design things are just like too much effort for me.”

Because the buyer has already identified their project (building a site), the unavoidable trigger, and the limiting factor of current solutions (point-and-click tools require too much tedious effort), the founder does not need to deliver a sprawling, visionary monologue about market dynamics or technical architecture: “What you're not trying to do here is you're not trying to describe this massive product vision or your theory of the problem. You know that they're trying to do X but blocked.” The entire pitch merely needs to connect their specific bottleneck directly to how the product removes it.

[47:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2865s) Unpacking Customer Pull and Asking the Scariest Questions

Rob Snyder explains that when pitching during an early sales conversation, the founder's response should stay deliberately constrained. Instead of presenting a grand, sweeping vision, the pitch should summarize the buyer's pain in modest, concise language: “And you describe it in a really really small and simple way. Not a really big way. You describe it in a small way and they say yeah that's that sounds like it. How exactly does that work like tell me more?” When the prospect leans in to ask how it operates and demands more details, that is the unmistakable signal of pull—they are actively extracting information from the founder rather than being sold to.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Pull Discovery Flow accDescr: Steps to uncover genuine customer pull during an early discovery call.

subgraph Listen["1. Probe Current State"] A["Ask open question: What QA/work can't you do with existing tools?"] end

subgraph TestNecessity["2. Test Urgency & Alternatives"] B["Ask: Is it okay if you don't do this now?"] C["Ask the scariest question: Are existing options good enough?"] end

subgraph Outcome["3. Identify Intent"] D{"Can they live with status quo?"} E["False pull / Walk away"] F["Real pull: Customer asks 'How exactly does that work?'"] end

A --> B B --> C C --> D D -->|Yes| E D -->|No| F ```

Lenny Rachitsky asks whether Snyder keeps the four components of the PULL framework running in his head throughout the meeting to evaluate urgency and alternatives. Snyder confirms this and notes that if the buyer does not explain why they took the call right away, he probes directly into their blockers. He suggests asking a question such as whether there is anything related to their QA process that they are trying to do but cannot achieve with their existing tools, methods, or team. That single inquiry bundles the core components of pull:

- Many founders keep a live document open during the call with the PULL framework laid out, filling in notes in real time. - The next step requires testing urgency by asking if leaving the project undone right now is acceptable: “Like can you is there some reason you have to do this now or is this okay to do another time?” - Lenny observes that founders are often terrified to pose that question because they fear discovering that the opportunity is not real. - The most daunting inquiry of all is evaluating alternatives directly: “Oh and the scariest one is to say well what have you I'm sure you've looked into other options. Are they good enough?”

Hearing a prospect answer that they can handle the issue internally and that the current setup is good enough is difficult, but it saves founders from wasting years pushing a product nobody wants. Snyder quips, “There's a reason I look like I'm 60 and I'm 35, right? Like don't push.”

[50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3000s) Does a Product Need to Be 10x Better?

Lenny brings up the challenge of inertia: the status quo is typically fine, potential buyers have packed priority lists, and the friction required to get someone to buy something new is notoriously steep. He asks Snyder how to interpret the popular Silicon Valley maxim that a new product must be "10 times better" than existing alternatives, or if being marginally better suffices.

Snyder rejects the premise of convincing reluctant buyers altogether: “Well, it's to find the people for whom stat the status quo is not okay, right? It's to find the people, you know, everyone says like change is hard and all this kind of stuff. Well, you're looking for the people who are already trying to change who don't need convincing.”

Addressing the 10x metric, Snyder points back to Jump, the AI note-taker built specifically for financial advisors. If generic AI note-takers fail to complete the required compliance and CRM workflows, Jump is not merely a quantitative 10x improvement—it is an unlocking mechanism: “How much better are they than the other generic AI note takers well if those notetakers don't get the job done and we do they are infinitely better they unblock something.” Snyder summarizes his perspective bluntly: “It's really are they a coiled spring and how do they respond when I show up?”

[51:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3088s) Deconstructing Linear vs. Jira and the Speed of Pull

Lenny asks how this logic applies to Linear, a company widely understood to have won market share from Jira on the strength of a clean, fast, and meticulously crafted user experience that software engineers enjoy using. Snyder explains that under the lens of pull, Linear's success still requires a specific operational blocker: there had to be a group of users for whom Jira's friction directly blocked the way they needed to execute issue tracking, making Linear's superior UX functionally relevant to their workflow.

Snyder cautions against blindly applying the "better UX" playbook elsewhere, sharing a painful personal failure: “So I've made the mistake of taking that analogy and being like, 'Okay, so I can just come into a category with way better UX, way better experience, and I'm going to crush it.' And like try that in HR software and uh I try I tried it in HR software and it turned out the user experience was not relevant to the buyer and so they didn't have pull. They didn't care that their systems look like they're still on COBOL or whatever it is.”

Lenny reflects that Linear's growth took considerable time because building trust and switching issue trackers takes patience, whereas intense pull creates explosive growth. Snyder agrees, noting that modern startups that pinpoint hyper-concentrated pull scale at unprecedented speeds: - Startups with genuine pull experience buyers who will literally "rip a product out of their hands." - Particularly in the AI era, prospects see demos that unblock critical tasks and decide to purchase almost immediately. - Snyder points out that enterprise sales cycles are shifting radically: “I saw an enterprise deal close in like two weeks and it's just like that thing did. When I was growing up, enterprise deals took 18 months. Like what what the heck?”

[54:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3248s) From First Sales Call to Closing: Vibe Coding and Pricing Talk Tracks

When moving from an initial discovery conversation to closing a deal—even when no finished product exists yet—Snyder advises coming back to the prospect promptly with a rough concept and a collaborative plan.

He revisits the founder selling into pharmaceutical companies. On an introductory call, the founder tossed out a conversational Hail Mary, and the pharma executive vented about how slow and painful their current market research was. The founder had no prepared deck or product. Instead, he reflected the need back in simple terms, asking if they were looking for research that was significantly faster while matching the structure of what they currently receive. When the executive agreed, the founder set a clear, low-fidelity next step: he offered to return in a couple of days with a rough mockup to confirm whether it met their needs.

The founder went off, "vibe coded" a rough layout, brought it back for direct feedback, and asked if there was any other information required to move forward inside their organization. When the executive asked about price, the founder applied the boundaries inherent in the PULL framework:

- Pricing boundaries are dictated by either the total value of getting the project completed or the cost of existing alternatives (the "L" in PULL). - If an enterprise is spending $50,000 per year on external market research consultants, that existing spend establishes a natural, intuitive anchor. - Framing the software around that exact anchor—such as proposing $50,000 annually to replace slow consultant work—makes the price immediately comprehensible to the buyer.

Lenny notes that closing ultimately splits into two halves: validating whether the solution is a genuine fit, followed by straightforward project management to drive the contract across the finish line.

[57:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3421s) Enterprise Sales Processes and Why Rob Rejects Design Partnerships

When closing enterprise deals, the mechanics differ drastically from closing smaller accounts. Rob references previous episodes Lenny recorded with Jen on the sales process, explaining that in an enterprise organization, a champion might feel intense pull and decide they want the product, but you still have to jump through corporate hoops: “You have to do a set of like 17 demos. You have to genuflect in front of four committees. Like there's all of these things that you have to do.” For a smaller deal, by contrast, a CEO can immediately decide to buy: “Yeah, cool. Next step is you send me the Stripe link and we schedule an onboarding call.”

To project-manage a complex sale inside an enterprise, Rob recommends turning the client's own timeline into an operational forcing function. You ask the champion: “Cool, this is the project on your to-do list. When does this need to be showing results by?” If they reply that it must show results by Q1 of next year, you work backwards from that date together to map out every single approval, security review, and integration step necessary to hit that deadline.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Enterprise Forcing Function Flow accDescr: Mapping an enterprise deal backwards from the target outcome date to create urgency.

subgraph Timeline ["Timeline Back-Mapping"] A["Target Success Date (e.g., Q1)"] --> B["Required Deployment Date"] B --> C["Procurement & Committee Approvals"] C --> D["Current Sales Action Steps"] end ```

Lenny notes that at this junction, many startup founders fall back on creating unpaid or loose “design partnerships,” where they offer to co-develop the product with the prospect for free. Rob strongly advises founders against this practice:

> “It basically takes something from 'I need to solve this right now' to like, 'Okay, now I'm helping you build your product.' Like, what are we doing here? So it's a negative signal to people who actually have pull, and it's a positive signal to people who don't.”

When Lenny asks why founders should avoid this route if building alongside a partner seems safe, Rob retorts, “Why shoot yourself in the foot?” If genuine pull exists, you should sell to it directly rather than downgrading the urgency into a product-building advisory relationship.

[59:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3556s) Selling Services Before Automating the Software

Founders often hesitate to sell because their software is not yet robust enough to handle the customer's needs end-to-end. Rob points out that you do not need an enterprise-grade platform fully functional on day one; you can start by selling a service-shaped solution. For instance, several startups pitch that they provide an "AI product manager" to handle a set of tasks, but behind the scenes, the founders and early employees manually deliver the bulk of the work while the tech stack is being built.

This approach sets expectations correctly so the customer does not expect a flawless UI the following week, while giving the founders a way to validate real pull, understand operational nuances, and discover what to automate over time. When Lenny remarks that founders historically feared being trapped in low-margin consulting businesses, Rob acknowledges the risk:

> “You definitely can get stuck in a kind of service businesses kind of thing, but everything has downsides.”

However, with AI capable of automating more human tasks as you learn, starting with hands-on human labor provides the fastest route to discovering the precise problem to solve.

[01:00:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3643s) Pricing Strategy: Willingness to Transact vs. Willingness to Pay

When founders confront the awkward moment of pitching price on early calls, Rob clarifies that at the very beginning, your goal is to validate whether people are willing to transact at all rather than optimizing for absolute revenue:

- **Initial Stage Goal:** Test *willingness to transact*, not *willingness to pay*. Getting someone to exchange money confirms real pull. - **Demo Day / Enterprise Goal:** If a founder is preparing for a fundraising demo day and needs to show high ARR numbers immediately, they need a safe way to throw out large numbers without alienating the buyer.

To pitch enterprise pricing without risking instant rejection, Rob suggests presenting pricing through the lens of a semi-real third-party case study rather than a rigid top-down quote:

> “When we talk to others, everyone's kind of done pricing differently. Some of them have been a small project for $80,000; other times it's been up to a million in terms of the levers here, and a lot of people wind up in the middle. You tell me: how are you thinking about this?”

By framing it this way, both you and the prospect sit on the same side of the table looking at an external benchmark, allowing them to react candidly—or as Rob puts it, “letting them throw up on that”—without putting the deal in jeopardy.

[01:02:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3742s) Reviewing the First Calls and Unleashing “Goblin Mode”

After conducting an initial cohort of around five sales calls, paths diverge based on how prospects responded:

Rob notes that getting it right on the first try is extremely rare: “I've seen like maybe once or twice where it was there from the beginning, and that's magical. You feel like a hero when you get it right the first time.” Far more often, founders are completely backwards on their assumptions. In those moments, you can ask a Hail Mary question to find out what project is actually on their plate, or you can switch into what Rob calls **goblin mode**.

Rob compares goblin mode to a dog getting the sudden, hyperactive “zoomies.” In startup life, it represents a desperate, unhinged burst of energy where a founder does whatever it takes to get in front of real buyers:

> “It's a break glass in case of emergency thing... doing kind of somewhat crazy things with the goal of getting in front of customers right now.”

Examples of goblin mode in practice include: - A founder friend who was completely stuck, booked a ticket to a conference, set up 20 back-to-back meetings, and bluntly told attendees: *“I don't know what to do. You tell me what to build for you.”* - A founder booking a last-minute flight to Europe on zero notice just to hunt down target prospects gathered at an event because cold outreach failed. - The founder of **Tiro** (a dental hygienist staffing company), who deployed his parents to walk door-to-door into local dental practices to talk to office staff directly until they got their first customers.

[01:05:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3954s) Revising the Pull Hypothesis and the Iterative Loop

When outbound outreach fails to generate pull, the founder must decide how to pivot. Rob Snyder notes that if you asked the "Hail Mary" question during earlier conversations, you hopefully uncovered unexpected friction worth investigating further. As Lenny Rachitsky summarizes, that question simply asks: "Is there anything that we can do right now that is a problem on your to-do list?" Any genuine reaction provides raw material to draft a fresh pull hypothesis and schedule another batch of five calls. If nothing came of those discussions, the founder must return to the field, observe reality directly, and rebuild their firsthand knowledge before trying again.

Lenny recaps the entire discovery sprint: develop a pull hypothesis, complete the two-slide template, send surprising outbound messages that cut through noise, run roughly five calls to gauge genuine interest, and toss out Hail Mary questions or enter "goblin mode" if pull is absent. Once genuine market pull is felt, the foundational hypothesis is validated, and the founder officially has the seeds of a viable business.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Pull Iteration Loop accDescr: Step-by-step process of testing hypotheses, running calls, and iterating until pull is unlocked. subgraph Discovery ["1. Hypothesis & Outreach"] A["Draft PULL Hypothesis"] --> B["Send Surprising Outbound"] B --> C["Run 5 Discovery Calls"] end subgraph Evaluation ["2. Signal Evaluation"] C --> D{"Market Pull Detected?"} D -- "Yes" --> E["Validated Business / Onboarding"] D -- "No" --> F["Ask Hail Mary Question / Goblin Mode"] end subgraph Reset ["3. Iteration"] F --> G{"Uncovered New Pain?"} G -- "Yes" --> A G -- "No" --> H["Get Firsthand Knowledge"] --> A end ```

[01:06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4016s) Post-Sale Delivery and the "Weird to Churn" Milestone

Closing early deals often leaves founders completely unprepared for onboarding. Snyder admits that in his own early startup days, he felt like a dog that had finally caught a car: he simply threw the software over the fence, emailed the login credentials, and hoped for the best. Through painful trial and error, he learned that post-sale delivery requires an intentional, highly engineered track toward customer retention.

Snyder frames retention with a clear rule: “Basically everybody who buys is guaranteed to churn until X, in which case they're weird to churn.” The entire post-sale effort must focus on identifying what "X" represents and constructing a friction-free bullet train that forces every buyer through to that milestone. It is rarely a vanity metric like platform usage or a high Net Promoter Score (NPS). Drawing on Mark Roberge’s concept of a leading indicator of retention, Snyder references how Slack discovered that sending a threshold of messages early on made churning statistically abnormal.

At his own startup providing retention software to restaurants, that defining moment occurred when an owner caught a high-risk employee resignation in time to stop it within their first two weeks. Preventing that single departure caused managers to rave to peers and made ongoing subscription renewals practically guaranteed. Founders must personally shepherd early customers through setup, continually asking themselves whether the account is at risk until that indispensable turning point is reached.

- Post-sale delivery is not about sending credentials and praying; founders must personally handle early implementations to uncover real behavior. - Traditional metrics like platform usage or high NPS rarely predict retention reliably. - The objective of onboarding is to locate the exact threshold where it becomes unnatural or irrational for the customer to leave.

[01:09:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4168s) Diagnosing Severe Churn to Find True Pull

Massive customer churn at an early stage is an urgent diagnostic signal rather than a reason to surrender. Snyder stresses: “If everybody's churning, it is unacceptable for you to not figure out why.” Waking up sweating at 4:00 AM over catastrophic drop-off is emotionally agonizing, but dissecting the departures reveals whether the problem stems from product execution or targeting the wrong audience entirely.

This forensic examination often rescues horizontal tools suffering from an identity crisis. Snyder points to a horizontal AI workflow startup where more than 90% of signups churned rapidly. Instead of attempting to satisfy every generic user, the founders investigated the tiny cohort that consistently retained. They discovered that freight forwarders were reliably relying on the platform for one highly specialized operational workflow. Capitalizing on that insight, the company pivoted completely away from its low-cost, horizontal footprint to launch a high-priced, specialized solution tailored exclusively for freight logistics.

Lenny notes that this progression provides founders with compounding certainty even while macro questions about total market cap remain open. He recalls speaking with the founder of Databricks, who confessed that even after crossing $100 million in ARR, the leadership team remained uncertain whether the company was built to last. Snyder agrees that founders should let go of worrying about endgame scale in the early days and simply focus on clearing each hurdle in front of them.

[01:11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4297s) The Repeatable Case Study Factory

Snyder outlines his core mental model for scaling an early-stage company: treating the business as a "case study factory." Many founders overcomplicate company building by assuming they must master dozens of disparate operational disciplines simultaneously. Instead, Snyder explains: “A startup is just a thing that repeats one case study infinite times, and all the stuff that I do is to build a factory for repeating that case study.”

The anatomy of a single case study perfectly mirrors the mechanics of pull: 1. The customer was actively trying to accomplish project $X$. 2. Their existing alternatives failed because of limitations $Y$. 3. The startup provided unblocking mechanism $Z$.

A founder's goal is not to produce one hundred completely different case studies for disparate use cases; that approach creates an unscalable services trap. The objective is to identify a single narrative where the buyer says an enthusiastic "hell yes" both before purchasing and after implementation, and then replicate that experience continuously. When functioning properly, customers naturally pull themselves through the three production stations of the factory:

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: The Case Study Factory Stages accDescr: Three sequential steps of customer flow through the factory model. A["Pipeline Station (Attract prospect conversations)"] --> B["Sales Station (Convert prospects into buyers)"] B --> C["Delivery Station (Reach the 'weird to churn' milestone)"] ```

Once a founder visualizes their company as a case study factory, they can apply Eliyahu M. Goldratt’s Theory of Constraints from industrial manufacturing. Growth is limited by exactly one bottleneck at any given moment: - If lead volume is dry, top-of-funnel pipeline generation is the only problem that matters. - If prospect volume is high but close rates flounder, sales conversion becomes the single point of failure. - If sales close easily but buyers cancel, the delivery station requires all attention.

Framing the startup as an engine that stamps out identical success stories cuts through operational noise and tells founders exactly where to direct their energy.

[01:14:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4474s) Building a Repeatable "Case Study Factory"

Lenny and Rob examine how to transform early customer wins into an enduring sales engine by working backwards from the desired outcome. Lenny draws a parallel to Amazon’s famous practice of writing the press release before building a feature, suggesting that founders should work backwards from the specific case study they want to publish about a customer like SpaceX: how the startup reached them, how the deal was closed, and how value was delivered. Rob enthusiastically agrees, pointing out that this turns sales calls into a crisp diagnostic tool. Instead of pitching generic software capabilities, a founder can present a concrete story of how they helped a peer accomplish a specific project and ask whether that same outcome is relevant to the prospect.

This approach serves as an immediate mechanism for qualification and disqualification. If a prospect's circumstances do not match the profile, the founder can confidently push back, noting that taking them on would require too much custom work and likely prove a poor fit. Lenny observes that while Silicon Valley currently obsesses over building automated "software factories," Rob's model represents a broader, more impactful factory: an engine for generating repeatable customer proof points. Rob summarizes this operational mindset bluntly, noting that the goal of early go-to-market is not merely writing code, but manufacturing evidence of customer success.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Case Study Factory Model accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how founders use the target case study to qualify customers and drive repeatable sales motions.

subgraph Define ["1. Working Backwards"] A["Draft Target Case Study (PULL Framework)"] end

subgraph Engage ["2. Sales Qualification"] B["Present Case Study to Buyer"] C{"Does this match your project?"} end

subgraph Outcome ["3. Motion & Delivery"] D["Disqualify / Avoid Custom Work ('Poor Fit')"] E["'Hell Yes' Customer Pulls Addictive Usage & Value"] F["Publish Repeatable Result into Case Study Factory"] end

A --> B B --> C C -->|"No / Misaligned"| D C -->|"Yes / Exactly"| E E --> F F --> B ```

- Rob crystallizes the primary objective for an early go-to-market team: “We don't make software here. We make case studies.” - When founders map a deal using the PULL framework, the case study writes itself because it directly documents the customer’s unavoidable project, the limitations of their alternatives, and how the product delivered the win. - Case studies function as a mirror: prospects immediately recognize their own operational pain or reveal that they are not the right profile to buy today.

[01:16:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4573s) "Hell Yes" Customers and Banning Free Pilots

Transitioning to key insights gathered from his advisory work and community questions, Lenny asks Rob to expand on what he terms "hell yes" customers. Rob explains that true pull manifests in distinct, unmistakable behaviors on both sides of the transaction. Before purchasing, the buyer practically tears the product out of the founder's hands because their need is so acute. Once onboarded, they integrate the tool so deeply into their workflow that their ongoing engagement looks almost addictive. These buyers are statistical outliers who would look strange if they opted *not* to buy, and whose decision to churn would make no operational sense. A founder's sole job at this stage is to identify these individuals and hunt down clones who share their exact pressures.

Building on this strict definition of customer pull, Lenny asks Rob to reinforce his controversial stance against free trials, proofs of concept (POCs), and design partner agreements. Rob reiterates that founders should never proactively offer a pilot or discounted exploratory phase; they should pitch a full rollout under standard commercial terms from day one. If an enterprise customer insists that their internal procurement policy mandates a formal evaluation period, the founder can accommodate that requirement, but offering a pilot unprompted merely signals a lack of confidence and delays genuine commitment.

- As Rob describes the visceral nature of genuine demand: “It's basically somebody who pulls the product out of your hands before they buy and then afterwards they use it as if it is addictive.” - Perfect-fit customers require minimal pushing because their urgency drives the sale forward at every stage. - Founders should avoid proactively proposing pilots, POCs, or unpaid design partnerships, insisting instead on direct commercial adoption unless the buyer explicitly forces an evaluation protocol.

[01:17:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4644s) Applying the Framework to Mature Companies and Surviving the Pain Cave

Lenny raises an important community inquiry: does the PULL framework apply exclusively to early-stage startups, or can established companies leverage it when developing new products or launching secondary business lines? Rob explains that he is currently advising several scaling companies launching their second major product, where the founders are deliberately running the exact same playbook on their existing customer base. Rather than building speculative features behind closed doors, these teams pitch and sell future capabilities directly on calls with current accounts to test willingness to pay before writing any production code.

Rob shares an anecdote from a product leader at an established company who realized that every successful initiative in their company's history originated directly from sales calls where customers asked whether the software could tackle a adjacent, high-friction project. Conversely, every single product initiative conceived in internal whiteboarding sessions failed in the market. While mature organizations often delegate zero-to-one exploration to product managers or innovation teams, Rob stresses that whoever leads the effort must learn directly through the act of selling. When initiatives stall and teams find themselves trapped in zero-to-one purgatory, Rob advocates switching into "goblin mode"—a break-glass emergency response of getting on planes, scheduling twenty in-person meetings, and testing wild variations to escape stagnation.

- Highlighting the psychological toll of lingering in product uncertainty, Rob warns: “If you're in this like pain cave of zero to one, it's like the worst time of your life and you just don't want to prolong that.” - Products born from customer pull on active sales calls succeed, whereas internally conceived, whiteboarded feature ideas routinely miss the market. - Even at scale, founders and product leaders should personally attempt to close deals before handing off sales responsibilities, as direct exposure to commercial friction accelerates discovery. - Entering "goblin mode" requires founders to discard comfortable remote routines, travel to customer offices, and pursue radical shifts in outreach until genuine pull is located.

[01:20:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4803s) A Metal Detector on the Beach: The Core Simplicity of PULL

As the main walkthrough draws to a close, Lenny asks Rob to distill the fundamental takeaway founders must remember before diving into complex execution. Rob stresses that the mechanics of finding product-market fit are far simpler than people make them out to be. Founders frequently trap themselves by attempting to mathematically solve dozens of theoretical variables in their heads before speaking to a customer. In reality, the playbook requires only formulating a clear pull hypothesis, placing it in front of live prospects, and checking whether they attempt to buy.

Lenny points out that while the concept is clean, discovering an idea with organic pull remains notoriously difficult, and having a reliable methodology protects founders from squandering years on initiatives doomed to fail. Rob offers a vivid metaphor to frame the framework’s real utility: the framework is not a guarantee of instant buried treasure, but rather a proper detection tool. It equips a founder to scan the landscape efficiently so they do not waste their career digging through miles of sand with an ordinary kitchen utensil.

- Rob provides a metaphor for startup validation: “Think of it as like a metal detector on a beach. Like this is just giving you a metal detector. You might not find metal where you're looking right now, but at least I'm not giving you a spoon.” - Founders should actively "think less" in abstract strategy docs and spend more time testing clear hypotheses in commercial interactions. - The framework prevents founders from living under the illusion that momentum exists when they are simply pushing an unwanted product uphill.

[01:21:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4896s) The Lightning Round: Architectural Tomes, Animated Penguins, and Muse

With the core framework covered, Lenny transitions into his rapid-fire lightning round, posing five quick questions covering Rob’s favorite media, tools, and philosophical principles:

- **Book Recommendations:** Rob selects the four-volume *The Nature of Order* series by architect Christopher Alexander, describing it as an extraordinary study on design and living structure that he considers the best series ever written. Lenny notes that among all his guests, he has never heard anyone recommend it before. - **Favorite Movie / TV Show:** Rob highlights two films his household rewatches endlessly across opposite ends of the tonal spectrum: the recent adaptation of *Pride and Prejudice* alongside the *Penguins of Madagascar* animated movie. - **AI Product Discovery:** Rob shares his recent love for the tool Muse, joking that if someone like him can successfully get leverage from it, anyone can. - **Life Motto:** When asked for a personal mantra he relies on in life and work, Rob keeps it brief: "Life is what you make of it." - **Tarpit Ideas Preview:** To close the conversation, Lenny introduces Y Combinator partner Dalton Caldwell’s concept of "tarpit ideas"—problem spaces that seem universally attractive to founders on the surface but are practically impossible to commercialize—prompting Rob for his thoughts on how to avoid these alluring structural traps.

[01:23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4985s) The Tar Pit of Copycat Ideas and the "Unblocked" Trap

Lenny asks Rob about "tar pit" ideas—recurring concepts founders repeatedly bring to him that simply do not work. Rob immediately points to a specific pattern: entering a space where an established winner already exists without having any distinct theory of differentiation. Founders often look at a successful breakout company—for instance, seeing Lemlist build a bootstrapped sales automation tool that is growing rapidly—and decide to build the exact same thing or something nearly identical. The fatal flaw is ignoring that the incumbent has already captured that opportunity. Unless a founder identifies a specific segment of customers who remain blocked by the incumbent's solution and builds something meaningfully different to unblock them, the venture inevitably stalls. This leads to immense founder frustration: “And you feel like you're going crazy because you're like, 'Well, it worked for them. What am I doing wrong?'”

Lenny notes that the standard founder rebuttal in these situations is always, "But my product is better." However, being marginally better is rarely sufficient, raising the question of whether even a 2x improvement moves the needle. Rob counters that pure product superiority is meaningless if the buyer is not actively blocked in pursuit of an unavoidable priority: “You could give me a 100x better printer for my house and I won't buy it because I don't I'm not blocked.” Lenny agrees that this analogy cuts straight to the core problem of demand generation.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Copycat Trap vs. The Pull Model accDescr: Diagram contrasting how copycat startups fail versus how identifying unblocked needs creates demand.

subgraph CopycatTrap["The Tar Pit Trap"] Winner["Established Market Winner (e.g., Lemlist)"] Copycat["Founder builds clone: 'Ours is 2x better'"] Winner -.->|"Already solved problem"| Copycat Copycat --> Stagnation["No Buyer Demand (Customer is not blocked)"] end

subgraph PullValidation["The Unblocked Dynamic"] BlockedCust["Specific Sub-Segment of Customers"] Limitation["Existing tools fail their constraints"] Differentiated["Tailored Alternative That Unblocks Them"] BlockedCust --> Limitation Limitation --> Differentiated Differentiated --> RealPull["Genuine Customer Pull"] end ```

[01:24:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=5070s) How Listeners Can Help and Closing Remarks

Reflecting on completing the comprehensive 86-minute walkthrough, Lenny and Rob celebrate having unpacked the full journey of finding product-market fit. When asked how listeners can be helpful to him, Rob encourages founders to put the framework to work in the real world, share it with others, and explore his book, *The Power of Pull*. He emphasizes that his frameworks remain an evolving body of work: “This is a kind of this is a theory framework model that is just in development. I still feel like I'm kind of scratching the surface on this is kind of like what I'm what I'm going to be doing for the next 10 20 years. So, if you have ways to improve it, like reach out and tell me.”

Lenny highlights Rob's ongoing writing, noting that his newsletter, *The Physics of Startups*, serves as the continuous testing ground where he regularly explores fresh angles, wrinkles, and operational principles behind startup mechanics. After thanking Rob for the deep dive, Lenny closes the conversation and directs listeners to subscribe, leave reviews on Apple Podcasts or Spotify, and visit lennyspodcast.com for episode transcripts and the show archive.

## Notable quotes > [01:11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4297s) A startup is just a thing that repeats one case study infinite times, and all the stuff that I do is to build a factory for repeating that case study. — Rob Snyder

> [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=0s) You're not selling to SpaceX. You're selling to the head of legal at SpaceX who has a project on her to-do list that they can't do themselves. — Rob Snyder

> [50:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3000s) You're looking for the people who are already trying to change who don't need convincing. — Rob Snyder

> [18:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1136s) The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them? — Rob Snyder

## Mentioned Amazon, Amazon Web Services (AWS), Bob Moesta, Christopher Alexander, Claude, Clearly AI, COBOL, Dalton Caldwell, Databricks, DX, Eliyahu M. Goldratt, Emily Choi-Greene, Floodgate, Google Labs, Jira, Josh Woodward, Jump, Lemlist, Lenny Rachitsky, Linear, LinkedIn, Mark Roberge, Muse, Nan Yu, OpenAI, Penguins of Madagascar, Pride and Prejudice, Rob Snyder, Sam Altman, Sara Blakely, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Slack, Snoop Dogg, Spanx, SpaceX, Stripe, The Nature of Order, The Physics of Startups, The Power of Pull, Tiro, WorkOS, Y Combinator

## Video description Rob Snyder is the author of The Power of Pull and writes the newsletter The Physics of Startups. He has advised more than 50 startups on growing from zero to $1 million in ARR, drawing on his own experience as a founder who spent two years pushing a product the market didn’t want before accidentally stumbling onto what actually works. In this episode, we walk step by step through his framework for finding product-market fit, from coming up with an idea to closing your first handful of deals.

*We discuss:* 1. The PULL framework: Project, Unavoidable, List of options, Limitations 2. Where the best startup ideas come from 3. Tactics for cold outreach and running your first sales call 4. Why Rob advises against design partners 5. Goblin mode: what to do when nothing is working 6. How to apply the PULL framework inside larger companies

*Brought to you by:* https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf WorkOS—Make your app enterprise-ready, with SSO, SCIM, RBAC, and more: https://workos.com/lenny DX—Engineering intelligence for the AI era: https://getdx.com/?utm_source=lenny&utm_medium=sponsorship&utm_campaign=q42026

*Episode transcript:* https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf *Archive of all Lenny's Podcast transcripts:* https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/yxi4s2w998p1gvtpu4193/AMdNPR8AOw0lMklwtnC0TrQ?rlkey=j06x0nipoti519e0xgm23zsn9&st=ahz0fj11&dl=0 *Highlights:* https://lennyspodcast.com/mostreplayedmoments

*Where to find Rob Snyder:* • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rsnyder1 • Newsletter: https://thephysicsofstartups.substack.com • Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4Cic56E1UEbU25P3v14Vkq • Website: https://robsnyder.org

*Where to find Lenny:* • Newsletter: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com • X: https://twitter.com/lennysan • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lennyrachitsky/

*In this episode, we cover:* (00:00) Introduction to Rob Snyder (01:13) The PULL framework: what makes customers buy (07:30) The “PULL” acronym (09:44) How Jump found pull with financial advisors (13:53) Why pull is discovered, not created (16:10) Selling to a person, not a company (17:13) Finding startup ideas through firsthand experience (22:34) Testing your pull hypothesis with two slides (26:41) Recognizing real buying intent (27:24) When solving your own problem works (29:02) The Hail Mary question that can unlock a pivot (31:01) Common traps to avoid (32:50) Quick recap (34:46) Landing your first customer conversations (39:18) Outreach benchmarks and diagnosing what isn’t working (41:27) How to run your first sales call (46:56) Successful pitch tactics (49:59) Does your product need to be 10 times better? (54:08) Closing the deal (01:00:41) Using the PULL framework to set pricing (01:02:22) Revising your hypothesis and going into goblin mode (01:06:56) Designing onboarding to make customers stay (01:09:28) What churn can teach you about your ideal customer (01:11:37) Building a repeatable case study factory (01:16:15) Applying the framework inside established companies (01:20:03) Lightning round and final thoughts

*Referenced:* • The PULL framework: https://thephysicsofstartups.substack.com/p/the-pull-framework • The ultimate guide to JTBD | Bob Moesta (co-creator of the framework): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/the-ultimate-guide-to-jtbd-bob-moesta • How to find work you love | Bob Moesta (Jobs-to-be-Done co-creator, author of “Job Moves”): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/how-to-find-work-you-love-bob-moesta • Jump: https://jump.ai • Linear’s secret to building beloved B2B products | Nan Yu (Head of Product): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/linears-secret-to-building-beloved-b2b-products-nan-yu • Josh Woodward on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshwoodward/ • Clearly AI: https://clearly-ai.com • Emily Choi-Greene on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/emilycg • Spanx: https://spanx.com • Floodgate: https://www.floodgate.com • Snoop Dogg on X: https://x.com/SnoopDogg • Jira: https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira • Linear: https://linear.app • “Sell the alpha, not the feature”: The enterprise sales playbook for $1M to $10M ARR | Jen Abel: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/the-enterprise-sales-playbook-1m-to-10m-arr • How to close $100K+ enterprise deals, step by step | Jen Abel: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/how-to-close-100k-1m-deals-step-by • Teero: https://www.teero.com ...References continued at: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf

_Production and marketing by https://penname.co/._ _For inquiries about sponsoring the podcast, email podcast@lennyrachitsky.com._

Lenny may be an investor in the companies discussed.

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc)

中文简报

Rob Snyder摒弃设计伙伴模式，主张基于瓶颈开展初创销售创始人往往耗费数年向礼貌的设计伙伴推销功能改进，然而软件只有在致命的工具限制阻碍具体买家完成不可避免的任务时才能卖出。 Rob Snyder提出了PULL框架——项目（Project）、不可避免（Unavoidable）、备选项列表（List of options）与限制（Limitations），认为真正的市场拉动力是具体买家内部已有的心理状态，而非创始人通过销售技巧创造出来的。他详细拆解了如何通过一线沉浸式体验发现高紧迫性的运营瓶颈，利用极简的两页幻灯片陈述检验假设，并避开礼貌的无偿设计合作等常见陷阱。Snyder梳理了涵盖LinkedIn冷联络、探索性销售电话、快速成单以及旨在达成让客户“难以设想流失”这一里程碑的售后面向落地的实用策略手册。当进展停滞时，他建议对流失原因进行深度排查，提出直接的“终极一问（Hail Mary）”，或开启“哥布林模式（goblin mode）”立即直接面对真实买家。 Rob Snyder围绕PULL框架（项目、不可避免、备选项列表及限制）来定义产品市场契合度，认为真正的市场拉动力是一种在前端被发现的个人心理状态，而非通过推销手段制造出来的。 (7:30) 建议创始人不要搞无偿设计合作伙伴关系和免费概念验证（POC），因为共同开发机制往往只会换来礼貌的反馈，买方缺乏切实的商业利益绑定。 (31:01) 在初步验证阶段，创始人每周应优先发送100至150条简短的LinkedIn联络请求，并通过包含两页幻灯片的叙述在五次通话内判断客户意向，而不是去构建复杂的最小可行产品（MVP）。 (39:18) 初创公司应被视作跨越获客管道、销售和交付阶段的可复制案例研究工厂，重点在于达成让客户觉得“流失反而很奇怪”的具体里程碑。 (73:37)

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 该内容由 Lenny Rachitsky 于 2026 年 10 月 25 日发布在 YouTube 频道的《Lenny's Podcast》中。视频对谈嘉宾为《The Power of Pull》作者兼 Newsletter《The Physics of Startups》主理人 Rob Snyder，内容围绕初创公司从零到 100 万美元 ARR 的全流程，系统拆解如何利用 PULL 框架寻找产品与市场匹配度（PMF）、进行冷启动销售与交付留存。 ## TL;DR Rob Snyder 指出，真正的市场需求是“发现”出来的而非说服出来的，客户只有在面临不可避免的紧急任务且现有替代方案存在致命局限时，才会产生无法抗拒的购买“拉力”（Pull）。他提出了由 Project（项目）、Unavoidable（不可避免）、List of options（备选清单）和 Limitations（局限性）组成的 PULL 框架，建议早期创始人用两页纸的极简假设去替代闭门造车，并坚决避免免费的“设计伙伴”陷阱。在实战落地中，团队应通过极具好奇心的冷邮件和以学习为目的的销售通话快速验证真实拉力，遇到阻滞时可用“终极一问”（Hail Mary）或极端拼搏的“哥布林模式”破局，并在成单后打造直达“不流失节点”的交付流水线，最终将公司运转为可无限复制单一定点胜利的“客户案例工厂”。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈透着一种经历过真实商业毒打后的坦率与清醒，完全摒弃了传统硅谷式的宏大叙事与空泛鸡汤。Rob Snyder 以自嘲而务实的语气倾囊相授，将自己碰壁两年的教训转化为如手术刀般精准的行动法则，与主持人 Lenny 严谨且极具共鸣的追问形成极佳的互动节奏。听众能清晰感受到那种从最初迷茫试错的窒息感，逐步走向看透底层商业物理规律后的释然与踏实，既有反直觉认知的当头棒喝，又充满了一线实战的踏实力量。 ## Bulletin - [04:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=250s) 市场“拉力”（Pull）存在于具体责任人而非抽象公司，它由客户当下必须交付且无法通过内部或现有竞品搞定的紧急项目驱动，客户不买反而是反常行为。 - [07:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=451s) PULL 框架拆解为四个不可或缺的维度：待办项目（Project）、不可回避的紧迫性（Unavoidable）、备选清单（List of options）以及现有方案的硬性局限（Limitations）。 - [18:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1136s) 绝大多数初创点子（约 90%）源于一线实地跟班作业与挨打摸索获取的一手经验，而非闭门白板脑暴；验证拉力只需两页 PPT，且在成型前即可收费或预售。 - [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) 应彻底摒弃免费的“设计伙伴”机制与主动推销试点，这往往会招致虚假反馈；初创公司的本质是建造一台将单一极佳案例无限复制的“案例研究工厂”。 - [28:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1712s) 当销售与探索陷入彻底僵局时，可通过“Hail Mary（绝杀提问）”探寻客户当下愿立刻掏钱甩包袱的事项，或开启不计体面的一线“哥布林模式”破局。 ## Key takeaways - [13:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=833s) 拉力是客观存在并被发现的，而不是被说服或创造出来的；试图强推给没有拉力的人往往徒劳无功。 - [16:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=970s) B2B 采购决策永远由具体承压的人做出，软件是卖给背负不可推卸指标的个体，而非卖给空泛的企业组织。 - [07:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=451s) 单凭痛点不足以促成购买，唯有当手头项目具有时间紧迫性且现有备选方案全都存在致命硬伤时，交易才会发生。 - [22:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1354s) 验证需求时切忌先写代码，使用仅包含“客户现状/卡点”与“概念方案”的两页极简 PPT 即可测试客户是否愿意立刻付款。 - [25:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1522s) 警惕“身体后倾的客套热情”，真正具备拉力的标志是身体前倾、追问何时上线并主动询问如何付费推进的拉力型动作。 - [28:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1712s) 在销售通话陷入平淡时抛出“绝杀提问（Hail Mary）”，询问客户清单上是否有愿立刻花钱请人代劳的杂务，往往能直接催生业务转型。 - [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) 强烈建议初创团队拒绝“设计伙伴（Design Partners）”模式，因为背负极度紧急任务的高价值客户只想解决问题，绝不想陪团队做产品演练。 - [34:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2086s) 早期冷启动外联不应兜售价值主张或使用 AI 模板，而应依靠极简、激发好奇心的“创始人魔法”消息，唯一目标是促成初次通话。 - [44:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2661s) 销售通话的底层是“通过销售来学习”，严格遵循以 5 场通话为周期的假设检验，一旦察觉在费力推销即说明方向已脱轨。 - [49:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2999s) 新产品并不需要抽象地“好上 10 倍”，只要现有工具完全卡住了流程而你能帮其打破僵局，对客户而言价值就是无限倍。 - [54:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3248s) 早期定价重点在于“验证交易意愿”而非榨取最大利润，可将报价锚定在客户现存备选方案或外部咨询支出的成本上。 - [57:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3421s) 在大单推进中，应以买方自身的最终考核节点作为硬性倒推抓手（Forcing Function），反向排期各审批与部署环节。 - [01:02:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3751s) 在假设彻底失效的绝境下果断启用“哥布林模式”，通过高密度的线下扫楼或疯狂参会面谈，强行撞出行业隐秘需求。 - [01:06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4016s) 客户购买后注定会流失，直到跨过某个关键前置留存行为指标 X；交付团队的核心职责就是建造直达该指标的一站式高铁。 - [01:11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4297s) 初创公司本质上是一个将单一优质案例研究重复无限次的机器，应运用约束理论在管线、销售、交付中逐一攻克核心瓶颈。 - [01:23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4985s) 警惕缺乏差异化理论的“沥青陷阱”赛道，如果客户的工作流未被卡死，即便产品在体验上比既有赢家好很多也无人买单。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=0s) 销售通话的本质与“拉力”（Pull）概念引入销售通话的底层逻辑非常纯粹：如果你找到了真正的拉力（Pull），客户会恨不得直接从你手里把产品抢过去。Rob Snyder 针对这种动态设计了一套严密的销售沟通结构，明确如何切入客户发现（Discovery），以及如何顺畅地完成后续转化。创业者最常陷入的一个典型误区，是将拉力视为“企业级别”的属性。但事实上，拉力只存在于具体的人身上。你卖软件不是卖给 SpaceX 这家公司，而是卖给 SpaceX 的法务总监——因为她的待办清单上正压着一个凭借自身能力无法独立完成的项目。在与潜在客户沟通时，绝大多数情况并不会出现“天啊，这正是我梦寐以求的东西”这种理想反应。这时创始人可以使用“终极一问”（Hail Mary 策略）去测试拉力：直接询问对方待办清单上是否有任何事情是愿意立刻付钱让人解决的。如果对方没有购买意愿，这同样是有价值的市场反馈；若对方真的愿意掏钱，这就成为了验证可复制性与探索 PMF 的契机。在实现初步拉力、客户迫切需要产品之后，留存率（Retention）便成了最关键但也极易被忽视的下一步。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 销售拉力转化逻辑图 accDescr: 展示从销售通话中的客户发现、终极一问测试，到最终确认拉力与留存重点的完整流向。 subgraph DiscoveryStage["发现阶段"] A["进入客户发现 (Discovery)"] --> B{"客户是否主动抢购?"} end subgraph TestingStage["测试与验证"] B -->|"是"| C["验证拉力存在"] B -->|"否"| D["抛出终极一问 (Hail Mary)"] D -->|"付费意愿"| C D -->|"无意向"| E["获取认知反馈，持续迭代"] end subgraph GrowthStage["留存阶段"] C --> F["验证模式可复制性"] F --> G["聚焦留存 (Retention)"] end ``` ### [01:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=76s) 从自身碰壁到辅导 50 家初创公司的实战积累 Rob Snyder 撰写了《The Power of Pull》一书，并主理名为 *The Physics of Startups* 的 Newsletter。Lenny Rachitsky 提到，自己是通过付费订阅社区中两位成员的主动推荐才得知 Rob 的。多位创始人和产研人员在社区中发帖表示，Rob 的书对他们业务的实际帮助远超市面上常见的指导内容，甚至有人称读完第一章就感觉卸下了心头重担，意识到自己并非毫无头绪的个例，而是在经历每个创业者都会面对的迷茫。面对这些评价，Rob Snyder 坦言自己最初从未设想过写书或给别人做咨询。他自己做创始人时在 0 到 1 阶段摔得鼻青脸肿，经历了长达两年的盲目摸索，随后在机缘巧合下突然搞懂了其中的机制。此后，身边许多创业朋友纷纷找他帮忙梳理 0 到 1 的业务冷启动，他便逐渐沉迷于这个充满反直觉规律的特殊时期。迄今为止，他已经协助超过 50 家初创公司跨越从零到 100 万美元 ARR 的门槛。 Rob Snyder 指出，市面上充斥着教人“如何找点子”、“如何找 PMF”的大道理，但创业者往往容易踏入一个典型陷阱：“根据潜在客户‘口头声称想要什么’去开发功能，而不是根据‘能促使他们真正掏钱买单的原因’去构建产品。” Rob Snyder 对此总结道：“我作为创始人经历过被现实狠狠扇耳光的惨痛教训，在尝试 0 到 1 的过程中四处碰壁，直到后来偶然开窍。随后许多朋友拉我去帮他们的初创公司做 0 到 1，我也就对这个阶段彻底着了迷。”（“I got punched in the face as a founder trying to go zero to one and then randomly figured it out and then a bunch of my friends started pulling me in to help their startups go zero to one and just kind of got obsessed with this stage.”） ### [04:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=250s) 为何传统“痛点”和“设计伙伴”无法形成真正的购买拉力 Rob Snyder 阐述了“拉力”（Pull）的核心定义：拉力描述的是这样一种客户——如果他不买你的产品，反而是极不合常理的反常行为。大多数创业团队每天都在经历痛苦的“推力”（Push）模式，竭尽全力向客户推销，说服对方关注、尝试并购买产品，整个过程异常费力。传统的创业法则强调：寻找头发着火般的痛点（Hair-on-fire pain points）、解决大问题、提供差异化解决方案并输出实质价值。Rob Snyder 回忆，自己当年正是完全按照这套逻辑执行的。他们找到了所谓的极度痛点，拿出了极具差异化的解决方案，甚至有“设计伙伴”（Design partners）每天都在深度使用他们的产品。当时整个团队信心满满，以为公司即将起飞，但真正开始销售时却撞得头破血流，在长达两年的时间里漫无目的地反复转型，根本找不到滞销的原因。最终他意识到，促使客户从你手里把产品夺走的关键，从来不是简单的“痛点”或“价值主张”。因为客户完全可以说：“你的产品确实解决了我的痛点，也确实很有价值，但这不足以让我放下手头的核心优先级来买你的东西。” 购买行为完全取决于客户当前的“核心优先级”。具体而言，客户必须正处于这样一种状态：他们的待办清单上压着一个紧急项目，他们必须在当下立即完成它，但是凭借现有的工具、手段或市面选项根本无法达成。处在这种境地的客户就像一根被紧紧压缩的弹簧（Coiled spring），处于极度被卡住的紧绷状态。此时你只要拿出能帮他们破局、完成优先级的方案，他们就会毫不犹豫地抢购。 Rob Snyder 将这一心理机制总结为：“拉力框架描述的是一个如果不买你的产品就会显得极不正常的人。”（“The pull framework describes a person who will pull your product out of your hands... someone who's weird not to buy your product.”） ### [07:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=451s) 解密 PULL 框架的四大字母要素 PULL 框架是一个直观的缩写词，拆解了促成客户产生不可抗拒购买意愿的四个要素： - **P 代表 Project（项目）**：客户当前待办清单上的具体项目，类似于 Bob Moesta 所倡导的“待办任务”（Jobs to be Done）。它不是抽象的“我想买一套招聘系统”，而是极度具体的“我需要立刻多招募几名员工”。 - **U 代表 Unavoidable（不可避免 / 紧迫性）**：这件事情为什么必须在“当下”完成，而不是推迟到下个季度或明年。它必须具有不可拖延的时间紧迫感。 - **第一个 L 代表 List of options（备选方案清单）**：客户为了完成该项目所评估的所有替代方案。这包括招聘专职人员、交由现有内部团队硬扛、利用现有的存量工具，或是购买市面上已有的成熟软件。 - **第二个 L 代表 Limitations（局限性）**：为什么上述备选方案清单中的每一个选择都存在硬伤，无法支持客户在预期标准下完成手头的项目。针对前两项与后两项的差异，Lenny Rachitsky 提出疑问：前两项（明确的项目与必须现在做的紧迫性）本质上就是非常具体的“头发着火型痛点”——老板正在催进度、不得不立刻交付的工作任务。相比之下，后两项关于竞品和替代方案的局限性为何同样不可或缺？ Rob Snyder 解释，后两项是决定最终交易能否发生的决定性门槛。以产研团队为例，管理层可能向下传达了一个极度重要、不可推卸的业务功能开发指标（满足了 Project 与 Unavoidable），但如果技术团队凭借现有人员和工具自己就能开发搞定，他们就绝不会对外采购任何外部软件。客户唯有在意识到现有的所有备选项都“行不通”或“不够好”时，才会产生对外部产品的绝对依赖与采购需求。 Rob Snyder 强调：“客户只有在现有选项无法满足需求的情况下才会购买东西。因此，这不仅仅关乎‘我正在尝试做某件事’，后两点要素同样极其关键。”（“They won't buy anything unless their existing options aren't good enough. And so, it really, really is important that it's not just I'm trying to do something.”） ### [09:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=569s) Jump 案例：PULL 框架在财务顾问领域的完美契合为了让抽象的 PULL 框架更具实操感，Rob Snyder 分享了他朋友创立的 Jump 公司作为范例。Jump 是一款专门面向财务顾问（Financial Advisors）的 AI 会议纪要工具。在此之前，该团队也经历过漫长而痛苦的探索，足足撞了 18 个月的南墙才终于摸索出真正的“拉力”（Pull）。当套用 PULL 框架时，财务顾问群体的画像极其精准地填满了每一个字母： - **P（Project / 待办事项）：** 他们的工作日程上有一项持续存在的任务——尽可能减少在客户会议记录以及将笔记手动录入 CRM 系统上耗费的时间。 - **U（Unavoidable / 不可避免）：** 这项任务具有高度强制性。在受严格监管的金融行业中，如果财务顾问不记录这些沟通内容并存入 CRM，可能会面临法律指控甚至锒铛入狱（“they could go to jail”），因此他们绝对无法回避。但同时，他们极度讨厌做这件事，核心诉求就是将其耗时降到最低。 - **L（List of Options / 现有备选）：** 他们首先尝试过各种通用的 AI 会议记录工具。 - **L（Limitations / 局限性）：** 现有的通用 AI 工具存在致命硬伤——它们无法与财务顾问特定的垂直 CRM 系统打通，更无法确认是否完全符合美国证券交易委员会（SEC）的合规监管要求。由于现有选项根本无法满足需求，财务顾问群体处于彻底被卡住（blocked）的状态。因此当 Jump 带着解决方案出现时，客户的反应近乎疯狂，直接把产品从他们手中“抢”了过去。Rob Snyder 提到，当时甚至有一位客户激动地给出评价，声称：“‘This must be how Alexander Graham Bell felt when he invented the telephone.’（这一定就是亚历山大·格拉汉姆·贝尔发明电话时的感觉吧。）”这种震撼的评价出现在一款针对财务顾问的企业软件上，足以证明其痛点被击穿的程度。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: PULL 框架在财务顾问场景下的匹配流程 accDescr: 展示财务顾问面临的待办事项、监管强制性、现有方案的局限性，以及 Jump 带来的强烈市场拉力。 subgraph Problem["痛点与限制"] P["P - Project 极力压缩会议记录与导入 CRM 的时间"] U["U - Unavoidable 监管强制：不合规录入可能面临牢狱之灾"] L1["L - List of Options 市面上的通用 AI 会议纪要工具"] L2["L - Limitations 无法集成专业 CRM、不符合 SEC 合规标准"] end P --> U U --> L1 L1 --> L2 L2 --> Outcome["强烈的拉力 (Pull) 客户强烈渴求方案，抢购产品"] ``` --- ### [11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=697s) 反面教材：为什么保险代理人没有产生拉力为了说明 PULL 框架的严谨性，Rob Snyder 讲述了 Jump 团队随后经历的一个反面测试。在财务顾问领域获得成功后，团队很自然地联想到：“还有谁也整天和客户开会？保险代理人（Insurance Agents）。” 表面上看，保险代理人同样符合 **P**：他们日常也要开大量的客户会议，也希望能减少记录会议的时间。然而，测试结果却大相径庭，因为整个链条在 **U** 上断裂了： - **缺失不可避免性（No U）：** 保险行业没有极其严苛的法定义务强制代理人必须把详尽会议记录录入 CRM。 - **现有选项被替代：** 正因为没有强制要求，保险代理人最主要的现有选项（第一个 L）实际上就是“根本不做会议纪要”，而他们原本就已经这么干了。 Lenny Rachitsky 对此总结道，这个对比生动展示了为什么 PULL 的四个要素缺一不可：“Basically you need all four here.” Rob Snyder 极为赞同，并深入拆解了当要素不齐备时创业者会遭遇的典型假象： - **有 P 但没有 U 和局限性（Limitations）：** 客户虽然嘴上说想要做某件事，但手头并不紧急，现有方案再烂也能凑合。这种情况下，客户只会不断向你抱怨、吐槽，但“绝对不会掏钱购买”（“they'll complain and they won't buy”）。 - **有 P 和 U，但现有选项（L）够用：** 客户会告诉你，他们确实急需完成这项任务，并且已经在用 Claude Code 或现成竞品解决得很好了，团队不需要新工具。关于 **P** 的本质，Lenny 追问这是否必须是字面写在待办清单上的待办事项。Rob Snyder 澄清，它更像是一种深嵌在日常工作流中的行为意图：“‘I think there's like the action I'm doing right now on my calendar and then the project is my intention while I'm doing it.’（我认为这就像是我当前日程表上正在做的事情，而这个待办事项就是我做这件事情时的意图。）”比如在做枯燥记录时，顾问大脑中的隐形待办事项正是“用最少的时间摆脱这个烦人的差事”。 --- ### [13:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=833s) 拉力是发现出来的，而不是创造出来的许多创始人在初期都会陷入严重的自我怀疑，认为是自己的销售能力或说服技巧不够，才无法让市场买单。Rob Snyder 表示，当他意识到“拉力是客观存在的”那一刻，内心获得了巨大的解脱。 Rob Snyder 直言，创业者并不是在无中生有地制造需求： > “It turns out this pull, this project on their to-do list exists before and independent of me, which means I just have to go out there and find it. I don't have to convince people to have pull.” > （事实证明，这种拉力、他们待办清单上的这个项目，在我出现之前就已经独立存在了。这意味着我只需要走出去找到它即可。我不需要去说服人们产生拉力。）他指出，试图硬生生去“说服”一个没有拉力的人购买产品，如果不是完全不可能的话，也是极其艰难的。创始人应该扮演的是搜寻拉力的“猎人”，而不是试图改变人性的布道者。这种拉力的存在与否，在销售对话中体现得黑白分明： - **面对绝大多数没有拉力的人：** 如果他们买了你的产品，反而是反常的。缺乏拉力的客户在交谈中往往礼貌且热情，他们会说：“哇，这太神奇了，这绝对是我们行业的未来，能帮我们省下大把银子！”但随后就没有下文了，因为他们手头根本没有迫在眉睫的动力。 - **面对真正具备拉力的客户：** “如果不买才显得极其反常（weird not to buy）。”这类客户如同被压紧的弹簧（coiled spring），他们听到产品后的典型反应是立刻打断并急迫追问：“等一下，你们真能搞定这个？我们什么时候能开始用？产品做出来了吗？怎样才能尽快上线？”这种近乎失态的迫切，才是存在真实拉力的唯一信号。 --- ### [16:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=970s) 软件不是卖给“公司”，而是卖给具体被卡住的“人” 在探讨如何利用该框架推进创业全流程前，Rob Snyder 强调了一个极为普遍且致命的认知误区：**创始人总以为拉力是属于某家“公司”的，但拉力永远只属于具体的“人”。** 即使是在复杂的 B2B 企业级软件领域，购买决策依然由个体做出： - 创始人们常说“我们的客户是 SpaceX”或者“我们面向中端市场的私募股权公司销售”。 - 但现实中，并不是 SpaceX 作为一个庞大组织需要这个工具，而是 SpaceX 内部具体的某个人——比如其法务负责人 Jen。Jen 的个人工作清单上恰好有某项推进不下去的任务，她靠自己的现有工具解决不了，所以她迫切需要救星。 - 软件面对的永远是一个个具体的角色（例如私募股权机构里的某个投资合伙人或运营合伙人），他们各自承担着特定的压力和意图。 --- ### [17:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1033s) 从点子阶段开始：用 PULL 框架提出假说而非空想产品谈及早期创业者如何构思切入点时，Rob Snyder 坦言很多技术型创始人容易掉进“产品点子堆”里。翻开笔记本，满纸都是诸如“做一个面向 API 的 API”这类天马行空、甚至看似有点荒诞（unhinged）的功能构想，创业者很难仅凭产品概念本身去判断优劣。而 PULL 框架的价值在于将思考维度置于“产品构想的上游”： - 它不要求你立刻设计产品形态，而是要求你先立下一个明确的主张：“我认为某类特定的人现在正在尝试完成某件事，并且被卡住了，以至于如果他们不买我的方案会显得极其诡异。” - 创业的真正起点，是确立一个关于“谁身上存在拉力”的假说（pull hypothesis）。 - 甚至在写一行代码、做出任何实体产品之前，创始人就应该直接去找这类人群求证，观察对方是否会急切地想要掏钱。 Rob Snyder 严肃地警告说，绝大多数创业团队对待这个立项阶段都远远不够敬畏，往往缺乏足够的严谨度就匆忙上马，而这一步其实决定了创业生死。 - **创业想法的本质转变：** 从思考“我们能造一个多酷的产品”，转变为验证“当前是谁在什么具体任务上面临不可回避的死胡同”。 - **验证拉力的前置性：** 真正的拉力不仅先于代码存在，而且可以在没有 MVP（最小可行产品）的情况下通过深度访谈与意向测试被直接感知。 ### [18:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1136s) 深入一线：为什么真正的需求无法在白板前脑暴出来 Rob Snyder 强调，寻找真正的市场拉力绝不能靠坐在会议室里脑暴或在 Zoom 上隔靴搔痒地做十次 30 分钟的客户访谈。如果你的生存完全取决于能否找到真实需求，你必须亲临一线，与潜在客户并肩工作，亲身体验他们在哪个具体时刻被卡住。Lenny Rachitsky 提到，前 Linear 产品负责人、现加入 OpenAI 的 Nan Yu 曾如此描述自己挖掘机会的方式：“I want to feel the pain of the person the same way they feel the pain.”（我想以客户感受痛苦的同一种方式，去感受他们的痛苦）。 Rob 分享了他在商学院一位朋友的亲身经历。这位创业者最初毫无产品点子，既没有现成的灵感笔记，也没有具体的软件构想，但他明确知道自己喜欢为小微企业（SMB）服务。于是，他列出了一张感兴趣的行业清单，直接跑到一线去跟班作业（shadowing），连续数天跟着从业人员四处奔波。他首先尝试了太阳能电池板安装工，结果双方相处得非常糟糕，彼此都讨厌对方，他便果断换到下一个目标；随后，他找到了一群独立的物理治疗师，双方一拍即合、相处融洽。为了彻底摸清业务全貌，他连续多天站在物理治疗师身后观察他们的具体操作，甚至一度试图收购一家物理治疗连锁加盟店，以便直接查阅其损益表（P&L）。正是通过这种极度深入的沉浸，他敏锐地捕捉到了对方在削减某项特定成本时遭遇的卡点。 Rob 指出，这种一线真实体验之所以至关重要，原因有两点： - **真正的洞察无法诞生于白板**：仅仅依靠头脑风暴，一个人可以凭空捏造出成千上万个伪需求，而这些卡在泥潭里的细节在常规的问答式访谈中也极难被主动提及，唯有近距离实地观察才能发现。 - **产品决策的底层依托**：创业的本质是帮助某一特定人群解决问题。Rob 直言：“The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them?”（创办一家公司的全部意义在于为某类人服务并帮助他们做成某件事。如果你没有一手经验，你该如何做出打造出真正契合他们需求的产品所需的成千上万个决策？） --- ### [22:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1354s) 用两页 PPT 检验拉力假说与重复性验证在通过一线观察提炼出业务卡点后，创业者需要将其组织为“拉力假说”（Pull Hypothesis）。以那位调研物理治疗行业的创业者为例，他梳理出假说：物理治疗师正试图削减损益表上的某项具体成本；这项任务不可避免；他们现有的替代选项（例如聘请外部顾问）不仅成本高昂而且推进太慢，存在严重局限。随后，他将这套逻辑带回给客户验证，对方立刻激动地回应：“Oh my god, yeah, that's exactly the thing.”（天哪，没错，这完全就是我遇到的问题）。确认对方有强烈的付费解决意向后，他没有立刻动手写代码，而是立刻去访谈了另外 5 位物理治疗师，以确保这种需求具备可重复性，而非仅仅服务于单一客户的定制需求。 Rob 建议创业者在向潜在客户求证时，只需准备极度精炼的两页 PPT，不必搬出晦涩的理论框架，而是用纯粹的大白话进行直击痛点的沟通： ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 两页 PPT 验证拉力假说流程 accDescr: 展示两页极简幻灯片如何递进检验客户的真实痛点与付费意向 subgraph Slide1 ["第一页 PPT：陈述客户现状 (Pull 假说)"] A["明确卡点：你们当前正试图完成 X 任务"] B["说明不可避免：因为 Y 现实原因，此任务不可跳过"] C["剖析现有方案：你们尝试过现有选项，但因 Z 原因无法令人满意"] A --> B --> C end subgraph Slide2 ["第二页 PPT：概念性解决方案"] D["展示解法：提供一种比顾问更快、成本更优的路径"] E["确认匹配度：询问这是否契合你们的预期与推进方式"] D --> E end Slide1 -->|"客户反应：Oh my god, yes! (高度共鸣)"| Slide2 Slide2 -->|"客户反应：这具体怎么运作？我们如何开始？"| F["进入购买转化与交付闭环"] ``` - **第一页 PPT（澄清问题）**：直白地写出对方的任务清单、不可逾越的阻碍以及现有方案的不足。例如告诉客户：“这是我了解到的情况：因为特定原因，你现在不得不完成某项任务；你曾考虑过现有选项，但由于费用过高或速度太慢而行不通。请问我的理解大致准确吗？”创业者在这一页期待的反应是客户脱口而出：“天啊，太对了！” - **第二页 PPT（概念性方案）**：给出一个高层次的解决方案概述。例如说明：“听起来你需要一种比请顾问更快削减该预算项的方式，我们能以某种方式提供支持。这是否符合你的期待？”创业者在此处期待对方追问：“你们具体怎么运作？我们下一步该怎么推进？” --- ### [25:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1522s) 识别真正的购买意愿：“拉力型动作”与客套热情的本质区别当展示完这两页 PPT 后，创始人必须极其冷静地分辨客户的反应是真实的“拉力”还是虚假的客套。Rob 指出，真正具备拉力的标志是客户做出了“拉力型动作”（pull-shaped action）——他们不仅在身体语言上前倾，急迫地探寻“等等，你们真的能做到这个？”，而且会主动追问：“太棒了，我们怎么开始？”甚至在产品连一行代码都还没写出来时就准备掏钱。Rob 举例说，他的一位朋友在医药行业寻找方向，在历经多次摸索后，一位制药高管在尚未看到任何成型产品时就明确表示：“If you can do that I will pay you right now.”（如果你真能做到那个，我现在就给你付钱）。这种生怕买不到的迫切感，才是创始人应该拼命捕捉的信号。相反，创业者经常被那种“身体后倾的客套热情”（leaned out enthusiasm）所欺骗。客户可能会礼貌地说：“听起来很有意思，再多跟我讲讲吧”、“我们考虑一下”、“能不能把资料发给我，我转给团队评估一下”，或者表示“我觉得我们在第四季度完全可以用得上”。Rob 警告称，任何把行动推向未来的表态都不是拉力，而是推脱，创始人绝不应该把宝贵的生命力消耗在这些非迫切的线索上：“any of those kinds of things anything that is not like okay how do we actually move forward on this is just not worth your life force going after.”（任何不是‘好，我们具体如何推进’的反馈，都不值得你耗费生命精力去跟进）。 Lenny 补充提到，Google Labs 负责人 Josh Woodward 也曾表达过类似的观察：当用户真正兴奋时，他们的眼神会放光（a twinkle in their eyes）。Rob 总结道，衡量拉力的终极标准在于：客户当下的表现是否说明，如果他们现在不买，反而是一件极不合常理的怪事（Is it weird for them not to buy right now?）。 --- ### [27:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1644s) “解决自身痛点”的陷阱：Emily 与 Clearly AI 的启示针对创业圈广为流传的“解决自身痛点”（solve your own problem）这一建议，Lenny 询问这是否依然是一条值得推荐的路径。Rob 表示这一路径确实有效，但有一个至关重要的前提：这个痛点必须是你自己愿意真金白银掏钱解决的问题，而不能仅仅是你“觉得世界上应该存在”的东西。 Rob 举了 Clearly AI 创始人 Emily Choi-Greene 的正面案例。Emily 此前在 AWS 担任安全工程相关职务，在实际工作中，她遇到了一个极其棘手且如果市面上有现成方案她绝对会立刻自掏腰包付费解决的难题，然而当时市场上根本没有成熟工具。在这种场景下，亲自下场解决自己的痛点是完全成立且极具威力的。然而，Rob 坦言，许多创始人（包括他自己过去的经历）往往容易陷入自欺欺人的误区： - **“应然愿望”并非“商业需求”**：创始人在日常生活中遇到了某种不便，便主观认为“世界需要这个产品”，但如果诚实地照照镜子问自己，哪怕产品真的做出来了，自己其实也根本不会立即刷卡购买。 - **缺乏商业严谨性**：如果连创始人自己都没有迫在眉睫的付费冲动，指望市场上其他理性的客户掏出预算无异于天方夜谭。在厘清了真实拉力与自嗨痛点的界限后，Lenny 接着提出疑问：这种以极高压力的紧迫感和明确预算为核心的 PULL 框架，究竟是仅仅适用于 B2B SaaS 领域，还是对面向普通用户的消费级应用（Consumer App）同样具有普适性。Rob 回应道，虽然自己的核心经验集中在 B2B 领域，但在消费领域也见证了大量类似的逻辑。 ### [28:32](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1712s) “万福玛利亚”式挽救提问法（Hail Mary Question）与销售心态重塑 Rob Snyder 发现，拉力（Pull）框架不仅在 B2B 领域有效，许多消费品创始人也应用了类似的逻辑。比如 Spanx 的创始人 Sara Blakely，起初也是通过一对一面对面销售、观察潜在顾客的真实反应，来摸索出最终产品的关键形态；更经典的是，她正是为了解决自己马上面临的问题（准备参加活动时把连裤袜剪开），才促成了产品的诞生。在探讨找寻创业想法的过程中，Lenny 提示 Rob 展开讲讲所谓的“Hail Mary（万福玛利亚式放手一搏）”策略。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Hail Mary Question Pivot Flow accDescr: A flowchart depicting how a lukewarm sales meeting can be turned into a pivot using the Hail Mary question. A["客户反应平淡 / 迟疑 (Lukewarm Reaction)"] --> B["抛出'Hail Mary'提问 '你待办清单上有什么愿付钱让我解决的事？'"] B --> C{"客户是否存在 紧急待办事项？"} C -->|"是：提出迫切需求"| D["锁定真实拉力 快速拿下首单并实现业务转型"] C -->|"否：无明确痛点"| E["果断结束对话 不强行推销，继续寻找下一个目标"] ``` Rob 解释道，大家通常讨论的都是理想状态（Happy Path）——你找到一个方案，客户一听就兴奋地说这正是他们想要的。但现实中绝大多数对话得到的都是不温不火的迟钝反应。这时就可以使出 Hail Mary 招式：“好吧，看来我们刚才聊的不是你的当务之急。那你现在的待办清单上，有没有什么事情是只要有人帮你搞定、从你肩上拿走，你就愿意立刻付钱的？”Rob 见过不少初创公司靠这个开放式提问完成了彻底的业务转型并迅速腾飞。例如一家原本想向政府机构销售招聘管理系统（ATS）的团队，在通话即将陷入冷场时抛出了这个问题，对方立刻说：“其实我现在最愿意掏钱解决的是写职位描述（Job Description）这件事。”这句话直接促成了他们的第一笔合同和第一位付费客户，此后该公司的业务增长极其迅猛。面对 Lenny 的共鸣，Rob 进一步剖析了这种提问背后对销售心态的重塑。作为自认的“超级内向者（mega introvert）”和习惯性过度思考者，Rob 过去总觉得销售压力巨大，以为必须强行说服对方掏钱。但一旦转变思维，将销售看作“去看看对方是否有卡住的难题需要帮助”，心态就会彻底放松。Rob Snyder 直言： > “如果你在脑海中重新构想它，告诉自己我只是在确认他们是否在某件卡住的事情上需要帮助；如果不需要，那完全没关系；如果需要，太棒了，我们可以一起探讨我是否帮得上忙。这会彻底改变你对待销售的姿态。” --- ### [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) 创业初期的典型误区与“设计伙伴”陷阱在进入拓客阶段前，Lenny 询问创始人在发掘想法时最容易踩入哪些反模式与陷阱。Rob 指出，最致命的误区就是觉得自己必须先把产品造出来。许多创始人总以为“产品还没准备好惊艳亮相”或者“人们必须亲眼看到成品才能理解”，于是闭门造车数月。虽然现在借助 AI 工具，几周内就能把想法具象化并排解这种冲动，但核心逻辑依然没变：创始人必须尽快直面冰冷的市场现实，绝对不能拖延能够发现真实拉力的客户对话。更具颠覆性的是，Rob 强烈建议初创团队**不要寻找所谓的设计伙伴（Design Partners）**。尽管在硅谷这是极其通行的常规建议，但 Rob 直言自己从未见过设计伙伴真正发挥积极作用。 | 合作模式 | 核心动机 | 典型行为与实际结果 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **传统设计伙伴 (Design Partners)** | 认同创始人的宏大愿景，享受指导创业的过程 | 频繁扮演“乔布斯”，提大量虚浮的反馈与功能需求，但**永远不会真正掏钱买单** | | **真实拉力客户 (Customers with Pull)** | 自身背负紧急、必须完成的实际工作任务 | 根本没心思当什么“设计伙伴”，只想尽快把手头棘手的问题彻底解决 | Rob Snyder 针对这种虚假繁荣总结道： > “如果你仔细想想，那些手头真正有极度重要的事情要赶着办完的人，根本不想当什么设计伙伴，他们只希望把那件事情搞定。” --- ### [32:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1970s) 想法来源的真实比例与“已获秘密”（Earned Secret）谈及创业灵感的提炼，Lenny 提到 Floodgate 风险投资公司经常使用的术语——“已获秘密（Earned Secret）”。这种洞察要么来自创始人在大型组织中的亲身经历（如 AWS 萌芽于亚马逊内部的基础设施痛点），要么来自与一线目标客户朝夕相处、在泥泞中摸索出来的真实困境。Rob 完全赞同这一观点，他打趣说无论灵感是通过何种形式降临——哪怕是在死藤水静修会（Ayahuasca retreat）上顿悟——最终能够行得通的，永远是那些创始人弄脏双手、从现实而非纯理论中摸爬滚打学到的真知灼见。当 Lenny 追问在他辅导过的约 50 家初创公司中，成功的点子来源分布大致如何时，Rob 拆解了这一数据的比例： - **10%** 来自创始人以往自身的从业经验； - **90%** 来自深入现场获取的第一手经验（Firsthand Experience）。在这 90% 中，还有一部分团队是先卖错了产品，在挨打中摸索出了真正对路的产品； - 至于“死藤水静修会”所占的比例，Rob 开玩笑称其占比为 100%，因为这是接受他咨询辅导的“强制先决条件”。 --- ### [34:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2086s) 冷启动拓客法则：“创始人魔法”与制造对话好奇心当创始人有了一个基于拉力的假说后，接下来的生死关头就是获取客户对话。Rob 的目标是让创始人做到每天与潜在客户进行 2 到 3 场深度沟通。在没有任何人脉引荐（Warm Intros）的冷启动阶段，必须依靠 LinkedIn 私信或冷邮件（Cold Outreach）。 Rob 严厉警告创始人不要套用网上的标准化销售模板，那些充满“您是否有某某痛点，想不想试试我们颠覆性的解决方案”的说辞，换来的结果只有被直接拉黑。在这个阶段，唯一的破局点是**“创始人魔法（Founder Magic）”式的沟通**：其核心逻辑是“你很有趣，我也很有趣，不如聊聊看”。这类信息压根不需要在正文中兜售产品价值或罗列痛点，它的唯一目标就是促成一次会面。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Founder Magic Cold Outreach Concept accDescr: Cold outreach should not pitch value proposition but simply spark curiosity to book a call. subgraph WrongWay["常规错误做法 (Standard Pitch)"] W1["长篇大论罗列痛点"] --> W2["推销颠覆性方案"] --> W3["被对方视作垃圾销售 / 拒回"] end subgraph RightWay["创始人魔法 (Founder Magic)"] R1["抛出高好奇心亮点 (有趣背景/独特背书)"] --> R2["极简邀约 '觉得挺有意思，想聊聊吗？'"] --> R3["成功敲定会面 (在通话中探寻拉力)"] end ``` Rob 分享了几个极具杀伤力的真实开场范式： - **名人背书型：** 某初创公司给潜在客户发消息：“嘿，Snoop Dogg 刚刚投资了我们，我想你可能也会觉得这事挺有意思。方便抽空聊聊吗？” - **反差点缀型：** “嘿，我刚从博士退学，目前正在专门为内容营销人员做一款工具……” - **光环资历型：** “我之前是 Sam Altman 的幕僚长（Chief of Staff）……”（Rob 笑称只要发出这句话，后面写什么都不重要了，回复率必定极高）。 Rob 特别强调，背景亮点必须精准适配你的目标客户群体。如果你去向传统暖通空调（HVAC）或管道工程老板推销，说自己是 Sam Altman 的前幕僚长，对方只会觉得莫名其妙、不知所云；但如果你换成接地气的表达：“我高中时在自家开的管道维修公司干过很多年，现在正在做一件针对这个行业挺有意思的事，不知你是否有兴趣聊聊？”效果就会立竿见影。正如 Rob Snyder 所指出的，千万不要在信里硬塞价值主张： > “拉力本来就客观存在于他们的待办清单之上，因此你的消息根本不需要去制造拉力，它唯一的作用就是让他们愿意坐下来和你聊聊。” ### [38:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2289s) 冷启动外联策略：为什么不推荐 AI 个性化邮件在探讨冷启动外联时，Lenny 询问 Rob Snyder：是用 AI 给潜在客户批量群发个性化邮件更好，还是为每个人量身定制专属信息更有效？Rob 明确表示，在验证 PMF 的极早期阶段，他从未见过 AI 个性化外联奏效。原因在于，AI 邮件往往只是把收件人自己早已心知肚明的信息复述一遍，对方一眼就能看穿“这像是 Claude 写出来的”。 Rob 甚至认为，这个阶段的深度个性化根本没有那么重要。一个极其简单的模板（例如直接说“你好，我正要去参加某某大会，我们会在现场做路演，你是否有空聊聊？”）就足以打动目标群体，完全不需要花哨的个性化包装。Lenny 对此表示认同，指出 Rob 之前分享的所有有效文案范式都出奇地简洁，核心在于抛出一个真正有趣的角度，而不是试图在第一封信里直接推销。外联的唯一目的就是促成一次通话。对此，Rob Snyder 精辟地指出，销售通话本身就是验证市场拉力的试金石：“如果我们之间存在拉力，你会把这次交流变成一场销售沟通；如果没有，我做什么也改变不了这一点。”（“And on the call, we'll see if you have pull. If you do, you're going to turn it into a sales call. If you don't, nothing I do is going to change that.”） ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 冷启动外联漏斗与转化指标 accDescr: 展示从每周发出好友申请到获得有效销售通话的漏斗转化阶段与基准指标。 subgraph Outreach ["领英外联漏斗基准"] A["每周发送 100-150 个好友请求\n(每天约 20 个)"] B["通过好友申请\n(目标转化率: 30% - 40%)"] C["收到消息回复\n(通过者中的 30% - 50%)"] D["敲定 30 分钟初次通话\n(大多数回复者表示同意)"] A --> B B --> C C --> D end ``` - **获客主阵地**：Rob 偏好从 LinkedIn 起步，因为高质量的目标客户通常都拥有维护良好的 LinkedIn 主页，个人背景一目了然，能省去许多背景调研成本。 - **发送节奏**：建议每天发送约 20 个好友请求，每周累计发送 100 到 150 个，并在对方通过好友后立即发送简短跟进消息。 - **健康转化基准**： - 好友申请通过率应在 **30% 至 40%**； - 成为好友后的消息回复率应在 **30% 至 50%**； - 在回复的人群中，绝大多数人都应该爽快答应聊一聊（“Yeah sure, why not”）。 - **异常诊断排查**：如果好友通过率远低于该指标，问题往往出在个人 LinkedIn 主页的专业度和可信度上；如果通过率正常但无人回复，则说明外联文案没有抛出真正吸引人的问题或切入点。 --- ### [41:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2487s) 如何驾驭第一次销售通话：从探索拉力到获取提问权当创始人终于敲定一次潜在销售通话时，Rob 强调，整场通话的核心逻辑不是靠高谈阔论去“说服”对方购买，而是去探测市场拉力。他观察到很多创始人带着过度亢奋的推销心态入场，拼命想要成交；但现实中，“如果你真有拉力，对方会从我手里把东西抢过去”（“if you have pull, you're going to rip the thing out of my hands”）。因此，创始人应该抱着放松、后倾、乐于交流的心态（“leaned back”），看看到底能不能帮到对方。 Rob 给出了一套极其精准的销售通话开场话术与流程结构。很多创始人一上来就陷入审讯式的提问，导致潜在客户产生抵触心理。要避免这一点，必须先通过议程确认来“赢得提问权”： 1. **破冰与反常识提问**：“非常感谢你抽时间沟通。我很好奇，平时应该有很多人联系你，为什么你今天愿意接我这通电话呢？” 2. **捕捉自然流露的拉力**：如果客户说“你之前提到了 AI Agent，我最近正好在琢磨这个，也看了你们网站”，这就意味着对方主动为你填补了完整的 PULL 框架；但大多数情况下，对方会坦白说“我也没多想，因为是你主动找的我，我想听听你有什么要说的”。 3. **顺势锁定通话议程**：借力对方的回答顺水推舟：“太好了，那我们就把这些作为今天的议程，你看这样可以吗？” 4. **获取提问授权（Earn the right to ask）**：在得到对方确认后，立刻跟进关键过渡句：“太棒了。在进入这些议程之前，你介意我先提几个小问题，以便更好地了解你们目前的具体背景吗？” 通过这种方式铺垫，接下来的问题在对方眼中就变成了量身定制方案的必要背景了解，而非生硬刺探，对方才会敞开心扉提供真实的业务信息。 - **日程时长设置**：通话时长严格建议设定为 **30 分钟**。Rob 发现如果设置成 15 或 20 分钟的小时间块，对方往往在日历上一扫而过容易忽略，导致极高的爽约率。 - **初次通话是否做演示（Demo）**：早期阶段无需急于展示产品演示，因为很多创始人此时甚至连成熟的产品 Demo 都没有；初次通话的首要任务是厘清对方的拉力状态。 --- ### [44:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2661s) 以学习为目的的销售：5 次通话判断法则与极简 Pitch Lenny 询问如何判断一场通话是否成功，以及究竟该做多少次通话才能断定某个方向毫无拉力。Rob 回答，一场成功通话的标志并非当场签单，而是清晰摸清客户是否具备 PULL 要素：要么彻底挖出对方迫切想要解决的项目和阻碍，感知到对方倾身向前（lean in）的热情；要么彻底搞清楚为什么这个方案与他们无关，弄清他们真正关心的到底是什么。 Rob 提出了极具实战意义的“5 次通话法则”：如果连续进行了 5 次通话，所有客户都神态冷淡后倾、毫无拉力，且团队没有学到任何有价值的洞察，那就说明当前的假设完全跑偏了。创始人不需要盲目做上百次无效沟通，而应该每 5 次就复盘一次。他分享了一个生动的案例： > 一家由 Rob 指导的初创公司起初尝试向银行业（Banking）推销产品，连续做了 5 次通话后，客户反应极其冷淡，没有任何拉力。然而在最后一次通话中，一位银行业受访者虽然表示该方案与自己无关，但随口给出了一个线索：“你可以考虑去找防务公司聊聊。”团队随即拿到引荐。他们原本对防务领域一无所知，但在与第一家防务公司沟通时，对方听到产品构想后惊呼：“天呐，你是认真的吗？（Holy, are you serious?）”强烈的拉力瞬间涌现，促使团队立即果断重塑了 PULL 假设。 Lenny 指出，这种方法最强大的地方在于逼迫创始人对自己保持“残酷的诚实”（brutally honest），打破创始人容易陷入的自嗨滤镜。Rob 总结道，早期销售的真谛是“通过销售来学习，而不是为了硬推”（“we're selling to learn, not really to push”）。 Rob Snyder 提醒，一旦创始人在对话中察觉到自己在费力“说服”或者“推动”，那就是一个巨大的危险信号：“你也可以感知到自己：我此刻是否觉得自己在硬推？我是否觉得自己在费力说服对方？那是一个红灯信号，表明你的思维方式或者这场对话在某些地方已经脱轨了。”（“And you can also tell like, do I feel like I'm pushing right now? Do I feel like I'm convincing? That's a red flag that something either in your mind or in the conversation is off…”）当真正的拉力被挖掘出来之后（例如客户抱怨“我想建个网站，但市面上那些点选式的建站工具实在太费劲了”），随后的 Pitch 往往变得极其简单，根本不需要兜售宏大的产品愿景或长篇大论的问题哲学，只需直截了当地告诉对方如何搬开那个挡路的巨石。 ### [47:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2865s) 精简提炼的宣讲与在通话中动态运用 PULL 框架在销售通话中，一旦潜在客户表达了痛点，创业者绝不能直接展开宏大的产品演说，而应极尽克制、用极简的方式做反向陈述。Rob Snyder 举例，当对方抱怨做网站太麻烦时，你的回应应当是：“听起来你是在寻找某种无需复杂拖拽点击就能生成网站的工具，大概是这样吗？”把产品描述得极其简单收敛，对方反而会被激发好奇心，主动反问：“对，就是这种感觉！这到底是怎么运行的？能跟我多讲讲吗？”当客户开始主动向你“索取”（Pull）信息时，才说明你切中了真正的需求。在沟通过程中，Rob 会在脑海中不断对照 PULL 框架的要素进行动态诊断。如果对方在开头没有明确说明参会原因，他就会抛出兼顾框架要素的问题，比如：“在 QA 流程方面，有没有什么是你们一直想做、但现有工具、方法或团队完全搞不定的？”一旦对方透露具体卡点（例如“想做端到端自动化测试，但现有工具做不到”），Rob 便会提出那个让大多数创始人提心吊胆的问题：“如果你们现在不做这件事，会有什么严重后果吗？为什么一定要现在做，换个时间做不行吗？” 最让创始人恐惧的往往是对备选方案的追问。Rob 指出，最扎心但也最有价值的提问是：“你们肯定已经考察过其他选择了，那些方案不够用吗？”如果客户回答“其实我们自己内部也能搞定，目前凑合着够用了”，虽然当头一棒，但能立刻阻止创业者陷入“强推市场不需要的产品”的泥潭。Rob 打趣道：“这就是为什么我才 35 岁看起来却像 60 岁的原因，千万别去强推。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 销售对话中的 PULL 诊断路径 accDescr: 展示创始人如何在销售通话中通过层层提问验证客户购买拉力 subgraph Listen["1. 发现卡点"] A["抛出开放问题：现有工具卡在哪里？"] --> B["客户透露未满足的诉求"] end subgraph Test["2. 压力测试 PULL 属性"] B --> C["测试不可避免性：为什么必须现在做？"] C --> D["测试备选方案：现有方案不够好吗？"] end subgraph Outcome["3. 决策分流"] D -->|"够用了 / 不急"| E["果断放弃，避免徒劳强推"] D -->|"现有方案严重受阻"| F["激发客户主动拉动，进入方案共创"] end ``` - “很多创始人甚至会在通话时打开一个文档，照着框架逐项实时填写，确认客户是否真的卡住了。” - 敢于主动询问“为什么现在不解决也没关系”，能最快筛除虚假需求，省去数年盲目推销的沉没成本。 --- ### [49:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2999s) 真的必须“比现有产品好 10 倍”吗？行业内常有一种观点，认为新产品必须比现有方案好上 10 倍，用户才愿意打破现状进行迁移。Rob 对此持有不同看法。他认为，关键不在于抽象的“好 10 倍”，而在于现状是否已经让客户无法忍受：“改变确实很难，所以你寻找的应当是那些已经在主动寻求改变、根本不需要你去说服的人。” 以服务财务顾问的 AI 会议记录工具 Jump 为例，它究竟比市面上通用的 AI 记录工具好多少倍？Rob 强调：“如果那些通用的记录工具根本无法完成任务，而我们能够做到，那么我们对于客户来说就是无限倍地更好，因为我们帮他们清除了阻碍。”在面对潜在客户时，Rob 不去纠结 10 倍这一数字，而是观察客户是否像一根“被紧紧压住的弹簧”——一旦有人带着解决方案出现，他们会立刻弹起并抓住不放。 Lenny 以 Linear 挑战 Jira 为例提问：Linear 很多时候靠极致顺滑的工艺与优秀体验取胜，这是否符合 PULL 框架？Rob 解释道，如果用 PULL 框架来拆解，必然存在某类特定人群，Jira 糟糕的体验切实阻碍了他们推进问题追踪的核心目标，因此 Linear 优异的交互体验对他们而言具有决定性的业务相关性。Rob 坦言自己曾踩过这个坑：“我曾以为只要带着远超同行的优秀用户体验杀入一个行业就能大获全胜，我把这套逻辑搬到了人力资源软件上，结果发现 HR 软件的买家根本不在乎体验好坏，就算系统界面看起来像上世纪的 COBOL 语言他们也无所谓，买家完全没有这种需求拉力。” - 当阻碍极其明确、拉力足够强劲时，交易推进速度会极其惊人；许多初创企业在 AI 浪潮下迅速爆发，正是因为抓住了客户急不可耐的拉力痛点。 - Rob 透露他曾亲眼目睹一笔企业级大单在短短两周内完成签约：“在我刚入行那会儿，企业级软件销售周期往往要 18 个月，如今完全不同了。” --- ### [54:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3248s) 闭单与无产品阶段的方案共创（利用 PULL 锚定价格）对于早期创业者来说，第一次销售通话的下一步往往就是闭单，但此时产品可能连原型都还没有。Rob 指出，这时需要带着一个清晰的概念和执行方案返回客户面前。 Rob 举了前面提到的向制药企业高管做冷启动销售的案例：创始人与制药高管首次沟通，抛出一个试探性问题，对方立即大吐苦水，抱怨现有的市场研究流程又慢又差。创始人手头连一份演示文档都没有，便直接基于对方的诉求做摘要确认：“听起来你想要的是更快速的市场研究，成果形式与现有的研究报告类似，但在特定环节更敏捷，是这样吗？”得到确切肯定后，创始人顺水推舟：“那我过几天带一份设想的方案原型来找你，我们一起讨论这是否符合你的实际需求，再决定要不要往前推。”创始人随后用 AI 工具快速生成了一个粗略界面并获取反馈，随即发问：“基于这个原型，要决定是否引入你们机构，你还需要了解哪些信息？”对方给出的核心问题就是报价。在定价策略上，PULL 框架同样提供了极其自然的定价边界。价格可以锚定在“完成该项目的整体业务价值”或“客户当前使用的备选方案成本”上。如果在 PULL 框架中梳理出客户每年向市场调研咨询公司支付 5 万美元，创始人就可以直接提议：“如果我们每年收费 5 万美元——和你们现存的咨询公司花费完全一致，怎么样？”这种基于替代方案成本的锚定方式，能让潜在客户在心理上更容易接受，从而顺利推动交易从“意向匹配”转向具体的“签约项目管理”。 > “如果那些通用的记录工具根本无法完成任务，而我们能够做到，那么我们对于客户来说就是无限倍地更好，因为我们帮他们清除了阻碍。” —— Rob Snyder ### [57:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3421s) 大单与小单的推进逻辑：倒推交付时间表与拒绝“设计伙伴” Rob Snyder 指出，销售流程因交易规模的不同而存在巨大差异。对于大型企业级交易（Enterprise deals），即使业务负责人（Champion）感受到了强烈的拉动力（Pull）并决定购买，流程依然冗长复杂：“在大型交易中，Champion 感受到了拉动力并决定‘是的，我想要这个’，随后你不得不去开大约 17 次演示会议，向四个委员会屈膝陈述，有一大堆必须做的事情。”而在面对初创或小型企业时，情况则简单直接得多，可能对方 CEO 会当场表态：“太棒了，下一步就是你把 Stripe 付款链接发给我，然后我们安排一次上线对接会。” 针对大型组织的推进管理，Rob 建议将买方的最终考核节点作为硬性倒推工具（Forcing function）。创始人应当直接向 Champion 询问：“既然这是你待办清单上的重点项目，它最晚需要在什么时候拿出成果？”当对方给出具体时间点（例如“明年的第一季度”）后，创始人便可以以此为锚点倒推所有前置步骤：“既然我们需要在第一季度正式上线，那么从现在到那个时间节点之间，必须依次完成哪些具体步骤，才能保证届时完成部署并展现成效？”这种做法能直接成为驱动整个销售流程各个阶段向前迈进的抓手。对于许多创始人习惯在此阶段建立“设计合作伙伴”（Design Partnership）——即承诺共同打磨产品、暂不收费的做法，Rob 持强烈反对态度，直言“何必开枪打自己的脚”： > “如果对方处于那种状态，这基本上就把性质从‘我现在必须立刻解决这个问题’变成了‘好吧，我现在在帮你做产品’。所以对于真正拥有强烈需求拉动力的人来说，这是一个负面信号；而对于那些根本没有拉动力的人来说，这反而成了一个正面信号。” 与其提供免费的设计合作，Rob 建议创始人即便在平台尚未完全成型时，也可以先以“服务型”（Service-shaped）的形式来直接收费销售。例如对外承诺提供一个能够处理特定业务流程的“AI 产品经理”，前端由团队手工交付一部分，后台系统逐步自动化运转。这样既能在客户心智中合理管理预期（不奢望下周就交付一个成熟的企业级平台），又能验证真实的购买拉力，摸清真正需要构建的产品核心。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 大型交易与小型交易的推进机制差异 accDescr: 对比大型企业交易中倒推交付节点推进，以及小型交易中直接发付款链接的路径。 subgraph LargeDeals["大型企业交易推进（倒推法）"] L1["确认 Champion 拥有真实 Pull"] --> L2["询问成果考核节点 （例：Q1 必须见成效）"] L2 --> L3["以考核节点作为倒推抓手 （Forcing Function）"] L3 --> L4["反向排期：委员会审批 / IT演示 / 部署节点"] end subgraph SmallDeals["小型/初创团队推进"] S1["决策者拍板确认"] --> S2["发送 Stripe 付款链接"] S2 --> S3["预约客户上线对接会 (Onboarding)"] end ``` ### [01:00:43](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3643s) 早期定价策略：从“支付意愿”转向“交易意愿”，用案例作掩护抛出高价在讨论首次销售中的定价策略时，Lenny 提到许多创始人往往因心虚而不敢报高价。Rob 解释称，在面对前几个种子客户时，核心目标不是为了榨取利润，而是“验证交易意愿（Willingness to transact），而非测试支付意愿的上限（Willingness to pay）”。因此，在最早期阶段，价格本身并不是决定性因素。然而，如果初创公司面临 Demo Day 等特殊节点，必须尽快展示尽可能高的客单价与营收数据，Rob 推荐了一种避免直接报价引发反弹的“第三方案例投石问路法”： > “在这种情况下，你抛出一个数字的方式要确保自己不会被当场扇耳光。我特别推荐的做法，差不多就是把案例研究当成一个‘嘿，你对这个案例怎么看’的反应测试。你会说：‘我们在跟其他人沟通时，发现每家公司的定价方式都不太一样。有时候对于一个小项目大约是 8 万美元，而其他时候根据不同杠杆，最高能达到 100 万美元，多数人最终会落在中间某个区间。你觉得呢？你们是怎么考虑这个预算的？’这样一来，就不是‘我站在这边向对面的你报价’，而是‘我们俩一起看着一个半真实的案例，看其他人是如何思考定价的’，然后让他们对这个数字做出反应。” - **早期定价重心**：重点在于让客户产生实际付费交易的闭环动作，而非在头两三个客户身上寻求最优价格。 - **锚定与缓冲机制**：通过展示外部同行的采购区间（如 8 万至 100 万美元），将销售谈判从面对面的利益博弈，转变为共同审视外部市场标准的合作讨论。 ### [01:02:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3751s) 第一批电话复盘与“哥布林模式”（Goblin Mode）当第一批销售通话（通常建议以 5 场左右为一个测试周期）结束后，业务走向往往会产生分化。如果客户表现出强烈的需求拉动，创始人只需交付成果并逐步将流程自动化。但 Rob 指出，绝大多数情况下创始人会收到意料之外的怪异反馈：你原以为“如果不买就是脑子有病”的用户，实际接触后才发现“如果他们真买了那才是脑子有病”。当数据证实假设落空时，创始人必须复盘所有通话记录，确认究竟是哪一环判断失误，随后重新提出假设并再次启动测试。如果陷入完全摸不着头绪的绝境，Rob 提到了他在极端情境下使用的破局方式——“哥布林模式”（Goblin Mode）： > “我就见过一两次拉动力从一开始就存在的情况，那感觉太神奇了，当你第一次就押中时你会觉得自己像个英雄。但很多时候，我们彻底想偏了、走反了，以至于自己都毫无知觉。于是你要么抛出几次‘绝杀提问’（Hail Mary question）来找回正确路径，要么就得做一些近乎疯狂的事。比如我有个朋友直接跑去一个行业大会，连约了 20 场面谈，然后两手一摊说：‘我不知道该做什么了，你们告诉我该给你们做点什么吧。’我把这称作‘哥布林模式’——就是你彻底豁出去，做一些常人看来不健康的疯狂举动，只为了看看现在到底有谁愿意从我手里买点东西，进而从中提炼出你的新假设。” Lenny 询问这种模式究竟是好是坏，Rob 回答道：“这是一种‘紧急情况下砸碎玻璃’的应急手段。”他将其比作狗突然在房间里疯狂乱窜发癫的状态（Zoomies）。有些年轻创始人能够持续维持这种状态，比如为了见潜在客户，得知欧洲第二天有行业大会就当晚直接买机票飞过去；而对于年长的创始人，这通常是偶尔动用一次的极端战术。 Rob 举了一个典型案例：一位朋友创办了牙科诊所卫生员人力匹配平台 Tiro，在早期完全找不到切入点时，该创始人的“哥布林模式”是让自己的父母直接跑到各大牙科诊所挨家挨户敲门拜访，硬生生帮他拉来了第一批愿意坐下来沟通的客户，最终成功跑通了业务。这种不讲道理的极端手段，往往能在逻辑推演失效时撞出真实的行业隐秘需求。 ### [01:05:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=3954s) 验证失败后的应对路线与“绝杀问题” 在聊到如果前几通电话均未发现市场拉动力（Pull）时，Rob Snyder 梳理了创始人的两条应对路线。最理想的情况是，创始人已经在对话中抛出了“绝杀问题（Hail Mary question）”，并从中挖掘出了值得深入探究的新线索。Lenny Rachitsky 补充指出，这个绝杀问题本质上就是询问对方：“当前你的待办事项清单上，到底有没有什么事情是我们现在能帮上忙的？”通过这种方式获取新信息后，创始人便可以拿着新的切入点再去约 5 通通话。如果绝杀问题没有问出任何价值，Rob Snyder 强调创业者就必须退回原点，重新去获得第一手实践经验（firsthand knowledge），然后从头再试。Lenny Rachitsky 随即对这一闭环方法论进行了凝练总结： 1. 建立拉动假设（Pull hypothesis）并填写模板； 2. 撰写让人眼前一亮的出海冷邮件（cold outbound），安排约 5 通沟通电话； 3. 判断是否存在真实的拉动力； 4. 若无拉动力，抛出绝杀问题，必要时开启“哥布林模式（goblin mode）”寻找线索； 5. 形成新的假设并重复上述过程，直到发现真正的拉动力。 Rob Snyder 赞同道：“这就正式起跑了（There we go. Off to the races）。” ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: PMF假设验证与迭代循环流程 accDescr: 展示从提出假设、冷启动外联、5通电话验证，到根据拉动力判断是进入交付还是通过绝杀问题迭代的完整闭环。 subgraph HypothesisStage["假设与外联阶段"] A["提出拉动假设 (Pull Hypothesis)"] --> B["撰写抓人眼球的冷邮件"] B --> C["完成约 5 通客户沟通"] end subgraph DecisionStage["拉动力验证与分支"] C --> D{"是否存在强拉动力?"} D -- "是" --> E["进入成交流程并交付产品"] D -- "否" --> F["抛出绝杀问题 (Hail Mary)"] end subgraph PivotStage["复盘与迭代"] F --> G{"是否有新线索?"} G -- "有新线索" --> H["形成新假设，再约 5 通电话"] G -- "无新线索" --> I["回归一线获取一手经验 / 哥布林模式"] H --> C I --> A end ``` --- ### [01:06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4016s) 交付与留存：设计直达“不流失节点”的高铁当客户终于表现出“我现在立刻就要”的拉动力并成单后，交付（Delivery）与客户留存成为了全新考验。Rob Snyder 坦言，自己早期做创业公司时完全不懂成单后的逻辑：“我感觉自己就像一只终于追到了汽车的狗，只能把软件直接从围栏上扔过去，然后说句‘祝你好运’。”但惨痛教训让他认识到，留存极其重要且绝非理所当然。在 Rob Snyder 看来，交付的核心认知可以概括为一个公式：每一个购买产品的客户注定都会流失，直到他们跨过了某个临界点 $X$；一旦达成 $X$，他们要是还流失反倒显得极不正常了。交付团队唯一的使命，就是找到这个关键行为 $X$，并打造一条确保每位客户都能快速抵达的“高铁（bullet train）”。 - 很多人误以为 $X$ 是高 NPS（净推荐值）或常规活跃度，但事实往往并非如此。 - 这类似于 Mark Rober 提及的“留存前置指标（leading indicator of retention）”——例如 Slack 团队发现，如果一个团队在初期发送了 10,000 条（或 1,000 条）消息，这个团队就极难流失。 - 在 Rob Snyder 针对餐馆员工留存的创业项目中，关键节点是：餐馆在购买后的前两周内，收到一条能帮他们挽留住某位即将离职员工的预警通知。一旦餐馆体验到这一幕，“他们简直会为之疯狂，会告诉身边的所有朋友，此时他们要是还流失就真见鬼了”。团队所有的入职引导流程（onboarding）也全都是为了尽快触发这一刻而设计的。针对新成单的客户，Rob Snyder 告诫创始人切勿直接扔一个登录账号过去就听天由命，而是必须亲身介入交付过程。在这一阶段要持续自问：“他们现在会流失吗？现在呢？”直到捕捉到客户觉得“天呐，我离不开这套产品了”的转折瞬间。 > Rob Snyder：“我对于售后的思考方式是：基本上每一个购买的人都注定会流失，直到达成 X 为止——只要跨过 X，他们要是再流失那就太奇怪了。所有的交付、所有的一切，都在于搞清楚 X 是什么，并设计一条让所有客户都能抵达那里的一站式高铁。”（“And the way I think about like delivery post sale is that basically everybody who buys is guaranteed to churn until X, in which case they're weird to churn. And all delivery is all everything is about figuring out what is X and how do you design a bullet train so every customer gets there.”） --- ### [01:09:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4168s) 客户大量流失时的诊断与聚焦转型 Lenny Rachitsky 询问，如果在这一阶段发现客户都在流失，创始人该如何判断是产品真的不行，还是其他环节出了偏差。Rob Snyder 严肃地强调：“如果所有人都在流失，你若搞不清楚背后的原因，那是绝对不能接受的（it is unacceptable for you to not figure out why）。”虽然面对 90% 以上的流失率时，创业者往往会在凌晨 4 点满身大汗地惊醒，但这恰恰是倒逼出业务真实面貌的契机。 Rob Snyder 以一家做通用型横向 AI 工作流（horizontal AI workflows）工具的初创公司为例进行了剖析： - 这家公司一开始定位极其泛化，结果陷入了行业常见的低价和惨烈流失。 - 但创始人穿透流失数据后发现，在绝大多数人离开的同时，有一两个细分群体的留存率高得离谱。 - 经过排查，他们锁定了货运代理商（freight forwarders），这群客户正在用该工具处理一项特定的工作流。 - 团队随即果断将整个公司转型，放弃低价泛用工具路线，转型为针对货运代理商的高溢价专业软件，从而彻底扭转了流失局面。 Lenny Rachitsky 补充道，即使是像 Databricks 这样如今估值极其庞大的巨头，其创始人曾透露，在公司 ARR 达到 1 亿美元时，他们对于这门业务是否能长久维系依然感到非常不确定。Rob Snyder 笑着表示，听到这点让人宽慰不少，因为大家总在焦虑“这东西怎么才能变成一门大生意”，而真实的创业过程永远是走一步看一步，逐级确立确定性。 --- ### [01:11:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4297s) 建立“客户案例工厂”：将单点验证化为可规模化飞轮进入业务扩张阶段，Rob Snyder 提出了他认为整个创业方法论中最为核心、却最容易被外界听得“眼神呆滞”的概念——“客户案例工厂（case study factory）”。创始人必须为公司建立一个清晰的心智模型，来指引业务以最快速度增长。在 Rob Snyder 看来，创始人的职责绝不是去东拼西凑出 100 个完全不同的案例，那种定制化的做法毫无规模化和可重复性可言。初创公司的本质极其纯粹：“它就是一个将同一个客户案例重复无限次的系统（a startup is just a thing that repeats one case study infinite times）。” ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 客户案例工厂三大运转环节 accDescr: 展现从销售管线到销售转化再到履约留存的案例工厂流水线，通过寻找瓶颈应用约束理论提升系统产出。 subgraph CaseStudyFactory["客户案例工厂流水线"] P["管线环节 (Pipeline) 如何让目标客户主动对话"] S["销售环节 (Sales) 如何将意向客户转化为付费客户"] D["交付环节 (Delivery) 如何让买单客户不流失变奇怪"] P -->|"推进拉动"| S S -->|"推进拉动"| D end subgraph Optimization["瓶颈突破 (约束理论)"] direction TB B1["管线不足? -> 专注破局获客"] B2["转化率偏低? -> 专注攻克销售转化"] end CaseStudyFactory -.->|"定位唯一瓶颈"| Optimization ``` Rob Snyder 拆解了“客户案例工厂”的三大流水线环节： 1. **管线环节（Pipeline Step）**：如何让具备痛点的目标客群主动与你对话； 2. **销售环节（Sales Step）**：如何将这些意向潜在客户转化为正式付费客户； 3. **交付环节（Delivery Step）**：如何让成交的客户达成前置留存指标，达到“流失了才奇怪”的状态。引入这一工厂模型后，创始人便可借鉴制造领域的“约束理论（Theory of Constraints）”来指导经营。在任何特定时刻，全公司只应该聚焦于唯一的瓶颈： - 如果获客管线是瓶颈，那么此时解决获客就是唯一重要的事情； - 解决了管线后，若发现成交转化率（close rate）不达标，那么这个销售环节就成了新瓶颈，团队全员再集中兵力攻坚转化率。通过将复杂的初创公司抽象为一座不断打磨单个极佳案例的工厂，创始人能够彻底摆脱杂乱无章的事务干扰，在任何发展阶段都能精准识别核心矛盾并全力突破。 > Rob Snyder：“我的工作不是去制作一百个截然不同的案例研究，因为那不可规模化，也不具备可重复性。我要打造的是这样一个案例：客户在购买前和购买后都高呼‘太棒了’，然后我把这个案例重复一百万次。……初创公司就是一台将单一案例研究重复无限次的机器，我所做的一切，都是为了建造一台用来重复生产该案例的工厂。”（“My job as a founder is not to produce a hundred different case studies, totally different case studies, because that's not scalable. That's not repeatable. I'm looking to build one case study where a customer says hell yes before they buy and after they buy and just repeat that a million times.... a startup is just a thing that repeats one case study infinite times and all the stuff that I do is to build a factory for repeating that case study.”） ### [01:14:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4474s) 打造“案例研究工厂”与逆向推导 Rob Snyder 提出了一种独特的 GTM（走向市场）思维方式：销售流程实际上应当从终点的“客户案例研究（Case Study）”开始逆向推导。这与亚马逊从新闻稿开始逆向推导产品的思路类似，但在销售场景中，团队应该思考的是：“针对我们正在沟通的这家公司（比如 SpaceX），最终写出来的案例研究应该是什么样的？”这一过程必须在不同客户之间保持高度的一致性。销售人员不再只是空泛地推销功能，而是直接向潜在买家出示标准化案例并询问：“这是我们能为客户交付的成果案例，它对你来说相关吗？”如果对方表示这正是自己想要的结果，交易就会迅速推进；如果对方的情况与案例大相径庭，销售端就能果断将其取消资格（Disqualification），从而极大节省彼此的时间。 Lenny Rachitsky 指出，当前科技行业都在热议让产品自我构建的“软件工厂（Software Factories）”，而 Rob 所描述的本质上是一个更广泛的“案例研究工厂（Case Study Factory）”。Rob Snyder 非常赞同这个比喻，并强调初创公司不应该觉得自己是在单纯写代码，正如他所断言的那样：“我们这里不生产软件，我们生产案例研究。”这种认知并不是要求团队非得正式发表公关文稿，而是提供了一种构建可复制销售动作的心智模型。一旦有了清晰的 PULL 框架，团队只需平铺直叙地描述自己如何协助客户解决了不可避免的项目以及他们最终达成的成果，一个极具说服力的案例研究便自然成型。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 案例研究工厂循环 accDescr: 展示从定义标准化案例研究、进行客户资格甄别、交付成果到复制下一个案例的完整闭环。 subgraph DEFINE ["定义标准"] A["明确 PULL 框架 定义客户项目与限制"] --> B["设计目标案例研究 逆向推导交付成果"] end subgraph QUALIFY ["资格甄别"] B --> C{"与潜在客户对齐 这是否符合你的需求？"} C -->|"不匹配"| D["果断取消资格 避免沉没成本"] C -->|"高度吻合"| E["推进销售与落地"] end subgraph SCALE ["交付与复制"] E --> F["交付验证成果 产出真实案例"] F -->|"形成飞轮"| B end ``` - **逆向销售流程**：从最终要写的成果故事出发，倒推获客方式、成单逻辑和交付标准。 - **资格甄别工具**：将案例研究作为一把尺子，用以明确界定谁是目标客户、谁不是目标客户。 - **统一的交付叙事**：在 PULL 框架支撑下，清晰记录客户原本面临的瓶颈与最终达成的成效，使销售动作高度可复制。 --- ### [01:16:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4573s) 识别“Hell Yes”客户与拒绝免费试点在谈及产品与市场匹配度（PMF）的验证阶段时，Rob Snyder 重点阐述了何为“Hell Yes 客户”。这类客户在购买前会主动展现出强烈的拉动力（Pull），迫不及待地想要把产品从你手中“抢过去”；而在购买后，他们使用产品的黏性极高，仿佛上了瘾一般。正如 Rob Snyder 所总结的：“最关键的是，他们如果不买会显得很反常，如果流失了也会显得很反常。”这种强劲的自然拉力与创始人费尽心思的强行推销（Push）截然相反。创始人的核心任务不是去迎合所有人，而是找到这种完美契合的客户，并在市场上寻找更多他们的“克隆体”。对于早期销售策略，Rob Snyder 给出了一个非常坚定但反常识的建议：坚决不要主动提供免费试点（Pilots）、概念验证（POC）或所谓的“设计合作伙伴（Design Partners）”机制。团队应当直接以正式销售和全面上线的姿态推进交易。Lenny Rachitsky 询问，如果客户主动提出“我们公司的采购流程硬性规定必须先做试点”该如何应对，Rob 表示此时可以接受客户的要求，但创始人绝对不要在谈判中主动抛出试点的选项，因为这往往会稀释客户的购买承诺和紧迫感。 - **极度反常的流失率**：优质客户在试用后不仅不愿离开，甚至会将该产品视为日常工作无法割舍的一部分。 - **避免主动妥协**：不主动推销试点或概念验证，要求客户以实际购买的姿态建立合作，除非对方大企业的合规机制严格限制。 - **寻找客户克隆体**：聚焦于服务那批买得干脆、用得狂热的早期核心用户群体，以此为模板进行人群放大。 --- ### [01:17:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4644s) 大公司与成熟业务线如何套用 PULL 框架针对社区提出的疑问——这套方法论是否只适用于从零起步的创业公司，Rob Snyder 和 Lenny Rachitsky 明确表示它完全适用于成熟企业内部探索第二增长曲线或开发新功能。Rob 透露，他目前正在协助数家成熟公司发布第二款核心产品，那些公司的创始人采取的策略就是“重来一遍”，直接向现有的存量客户预售尚未正式构建的新功能。Lenny 也分享了一位产品高管的亲身经历：该团队所有 whiteboard（白板头脑风暴）出来的新构想最终全部折戟，而所有成功的业务线无一例外来自销售通话中客户的原生需求——客户会在通话中说“你们做 X 很棒，但能否顺便帮我们把另一个项目也做了？” 对于成熟组织内的团队，正确的推进路径依然是提炼出一个精准的 PULL 假设，直接与 5 家现有客户展开深度对话，观察他们是否表现出强烈的采购拉力。Lenny 强调，在创业早期这类工作必须由创始人亲自披挂上阵，但在大型企业中往往是由非创始人的产品经理或业务负责人主导。Rob 对此提醒，即便你不是公司创始人，在负责 0 到 1 的内部孵化业务时，也必须将核心精力放在“亲自尝试卖出产品”并“在销售过程中学习”，否则团队极容易在庞大的组织架构中迷失方向、做出脱离市场真实拉力的自嗨型产品。 - **白板构想与现场需求的对比**：脱离客户一线的头脑风暴往往收效甚微，最具生命力的二次创新几乎都萌芽于真实销售沟通中的边缘请求。 - **未建先售（Selling before building）**：利用已有客户关系的信任基础，用两页纸的假设验证新功能付费意向，再投入研发资源。 - **0 到 1 负责人的销售职责**：不论职位是否是创始人，主导新项目的管理者都必须走到最前线直接承担销售角色，通过真金白银的反馈来驱动产品迭代。 --- ### [01:19:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4766s) 绝境中的“哥布林模式”与金属探测器隐喻当团队尝试了常规路径却依然找不到任何牵引力时，Rob Snyder 建议果断启动所谓的“哥布林模式（Goblin Mode）”或使用“冰雹玛丽（Hail Mary）”式的极限策略。0 到 1 的摸索阶段往往被称为创业过程中最痛苦的“痛苦洞穴（Pain Cave）”，长时间困在原地不仅消磨士气，更是在浪费极度宝贵的生命。正如 Rob Snyder 所警告的：“如果你正处于 0 到 1 的痛苦洞穴中，那简直是一生中最糟糕的时光，你绝不能去延长这种痛苦。”在这种紧急关头，创始人必须打破所有常规框架：立刻订机票飞往目标客户所在的城市，冲进客户办公室安排 20 场面对面的深度访谈，哪怕像哥布林一样毫无章法地胡乱尝试，也要逼迫自己抓取哪怕一丝微弱的市场真实反馈。在进入快问快答环节之前，Rob 总结道，寻找 PMF 的整套框架其实非常质朴：提炼 PULL 假设，拿给人们看，检验他们是否会主动抢购；不要试图在脑海中提前算尽所有变量，在实战中少一点内耗空想，反而能更快突围。Lenny 对此打了一个精妙的比喻：这套方法并不能保证你每次都能挖到金子，但正如 Rob Snyder 所形容的：“可以把它想象成海滩上的金属探测器。这只是交给了你一台金属探测器。你在当前探寻的地方可能找不到金属，但至少我没有给你一把勺子让你去筛沙子。” - **摆脱虚假希望**：利用客观验证机制快速打破幻想，避免创始人耗费数年生命在根本没有市场拉力的伪需求上。 - **高密度线下接触**：在遭遇阻滞时通过出差面谈、密集拜访等高强度举措，强行打破死局。 - **认知减负**：警惕过度思考与脑内推演，尽早把假设推向市场让客户用资金投票。 --- ### [01:21:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4896s) 闪电问答：推荐书单、电影与 AI 工具访谈最后进入了经典的闪电问答环节，Rob Snyder 分享了自己的个人偏好、生活信条以及对一些经典创业陷阱的见解： - **最常推荐的书籍**：Rob 极力推荐建筑理论家 Christopher Alexander 的四卷本巨著《秩序的本质》（*The Nature of Order* 系列），他盛赞这是“有史以来最棒的著作”。 - **最喜欢的电影/剧集**：Rob 透露自己会在两个极端之间反复重温两部截然不同的电影——新版《傲慢与偏见》（*Pride & Prejudice*）与动画喜剧《马达加斯加的企鹅》（*Penguins of Madagascar*）。 - **近期最喜爱的 AI 产品**：Rob 提到了 Muse，并自嘲说如果这款工具对他这种人都能起作用，那它适用于任何人。 - **人生座右铭**：Rob 给出了一句朴素而有力的格言：“生活全凭你自己的造就（Life is what you make of it）。” - **关于焦油坑概念（Tarpit Ideas）**：Lenny 在结尾前抛出了 YC 合伙人 Dalton Caldwell 提出的“焦油坑”概念——即那些看似诱人、导致无数创业者前赴后继投入却几乎注定失败的糟糕创意，邀请 Rob 就此分享他的独到观察。 ### [01:23:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4985s) 创业的“沥青陷阱”：盲目抄袭已有赢家的赛道当被问及有哪些“沥青陷阱（tar pit ideas）”创业想法是创业者屡试不爽却注定失败、需要极力规避的时候，Rob Snyder 指出，最普遍的陷阱就是在一个已经出现明确赢家的成熟领域里创业，却没有任何关于“自身有何不同”的核心理论。创业者往往看到市场上某个标杆企业做得风生水起，比如 Lemlist 凭借一款销售自动化工具实现了自给自足（bootstrapped）并且实现极其迅猛的增长，便理所当然地认为自己也能做出一个一模一样或极其相似的产品。 Rob Snyder 强调，盲目跟风的创始人常常会陷入一种抓狂的状态：“既然别人走通了，那我到底做错了什么？”问题在于，前人已经赢下了那个市场并解决了该痛点。除非你发现了某一类特定客户群体目前仍处于“受阻（blocked）”状态，并且你能够专门为他们打造针对性的差异化解决方案，否则这类同质化项目几乎注定无法成功。Lenny Rachitsky 补充道，许多创始人面对质疑时的第一反应通常是“但我的产品更好”，然而仅仅“好一点点”根本毫无意义。Rob Snyder 更是用了一个生动的极端例子来拆解这种误区：“就算你为我的家里提供一台好 100 倍的打印机，我也不会买，因为我根本没有被卡住（unblocked）。”买家只有在真正遇到阻碍、迫切需要解法时，才会产生真实的采购拉力。 - 致命误区：进入已有明确赢家的红海市场，却缺乏差异化理论支撑。 - 创始人的错误心智：以为复制成功者的功能即可复制其商业增长，却忽略了先发者已吃下主流拉力。 - 购买的核心驱动：产品不能仅靠“更好”取胜；如果潜在客户的生活或工作没有被现有问题阻碍，哪怕产品好上 100 倍也不会有人掏钱。 ### [01:24:30](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=5070s) 结语、未来探索与资源指引在完成了长达 86 分钟的深度拆解后，两人感叹终于顺利录制完毕。关于听众能够为 Rob Snyder 做些什么，Rob 表达了非常开放和持续迭代的态度。他表示，PULL 框架是一套仍在不断发展演进的理论模型，他觉得自己目前也仅仅是“触及了表面（scratching the surface）”，而完善这套创业物理学体系将是他未来 10 到 20 年全力以赴的事业。他鼓励大家在实际业务中使用这套框架并向身边的人推荐，如果有任何改进意见或反馈，随时都可以联系他。 Lenny 盛赞了 Rob 的 Substack 专栏《The Physics of Startups》（创业物理学），称其内容极其精彩，持续分享着关于 PMF 与初创公司物理法则的各种新思考与细微洞察。最后，Lenny 推荐听众阅读 Rob 的新书《The Power of Pull》，并引导听众关注其 Newsletter 与播客，正式为本期对谈画上圆满句号。 - 行动建议：在实际业务中落地 PULL 框架并持续验证反馈。 - 核心理念展望：Rob Snyder 将“创业物理学”视为未来 10 至 20 年的长期研究课题。 - 推荐资源：新书《The Power of Pull》以及 Newsletter 专栏《The Physics of Startups》。 ## Notable quotes > [04:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=250s) The pull framework describes a person who will pull your product out of your hands... someone who's weird not to buy your product. — Rob Snyder > [13:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=833s) It turns out this pull, this project on their to-do list exists before and independent of me, which means I just have to go out there and find it. I don't have to convince people to have pull. — Rob Snyder > [18:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1136s) The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them? — Rob Snyder > [31:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=1861s) 如果你仔细想想，那些手头真正有极度重要的事情要赶着办完的人，根本不想当什么设计伙伴，他们只希望把那件事情搞定。 — Rob Snyder > [34:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2086s) 拉力本来就客观存在于他们的待办清单之上，因此你的消息根本不需要去制造拉力，它唯一的作用就是让他们愿意坐下来和你聊聊。 — Rob Snyder > [49:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=2999s) 如果那些通用的记录工具根本无法完成任务，而我们能够做到，那么我们对于客户来说就是无限倍地更好，因为我们帮他们清除了阻碍。 — Rob Snyder > [01:12:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4357s) 初创公司就是一台将单一案例研究重复无限次的机器，我所做的一切，都是为了建造一台用来重复生产该案例的工厂。 — Rob Snyder > [01:06:56](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc&t=4016s) 基本上每一个购买的人都注定会流失，直到达成 X 为止——只要跨过 X，他们要是再流失那就太奇怪了。所有的交付、所有的一切，都在于搞清楚 X 是什么，并设计一条让所有客户都能抵达那里的一站式高铁。 — Rob Snyder ## Mentioned Rob Snyder, Lenny Rachitsky, Bob Moesta, Nan Yu, Emily Choi-Greene, Sara Blakely, Josh Woodward, Sam Altman, Snoop Dogg, Mark Rober, Christopher Alexander, Dalton Caldwell, SpaceX, Jump, Spanx, Clearly AI, Linear, Jira, Tiro, Slack, Databricks, Lemlist, Muse, Floodgate, OpenAI, AWS, The Power of Pull, The Physics of Startups, The Nature of Order ## Video description Rob Snyder is the author of The Power of Pull and writes the newsletter The Physics of Startups. He has advised more than 50 startups on growing from zero to $1 million in ARR, drawing on his own experience as a founder who spent two years pushing a product the market didn’t want before accidentally stumbling onto what actually works. In this episode, we walk step by step through his framework for finding product-market fit, from coming up with an idea to closing your first handful of deals. *We discuss:* 1. The PULL framework: Project, Unavoidable, List of options, Limitations 2. Where the best startup ideas come from 3. Tactics for cold outreach and running your first sales call 4. Why Rob advises against design partners 5. Goblin mode: what to do when nothing is working 6. How to apply the PULL framework inside larger companies *Brought to you by:* https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf WorkOS—Make your app enterprise-ready, with SSO, SCIM, RBAC, and more: https://workos.com/lenny DX—Engineering intelligence for the AI era: https://getdx.com/?utm_source=lenny&utm_medium=sponsorship&utm_campaign=q42026 *Episode transcript:* https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf *Archive of all Lenny's Podcast transcripts:* https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fo/yxi4s2w998p1gvtpu4193/AMdNPR8AOw0lMklwtnC0TrQ?rlkey=j06x0nipoti519e0xgm23zsn9&st=ahz0fj11&dl=0 *Highlights:* https://lennyspodcast.com/mostreplayedmoments *Where to find Rob Snyder:* • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rsnyder1 • Newsletter: https://thephysicsofstartups.substack.com • Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4Cic56E1UEbU25P3v14Vkq • Website: https://robsnyder.org *Where to find Lenny:* • Newsletter: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com • X: https://twitter.com/lennysan • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lennyrachitsky/ *In this episode, we cover:* (00:00) Introduction to Rob Snyder (01:13) The PULL framework: what makes customers buy (07:30) The “PULL” acronym (09:44) How Jump found pull with financial advisors (13:53) Why pull is discovered, not created (16:10) Selling to a person, not a company (17:13) Finding startup ideas through firsthand experience (22:34) Testing your pull hypothesis with two slides (26:41) Recognizing real buying intent (27:24) When solving your own problem works (29:02) The Hail Mary question that can unlock a pivot (31:01) Common traps to avoid (32:50) Quick recap (34:46) Landing your first customer conversations (39:18) Outreach benchmarks and diagnosing what isn’t working (41:27) How to run your first sales call (46:56) Successful pitch tactics (49:59) Does your product need to be 10 times better? (54:08) Closing the deal (01:00:41) Using the PULL framework to set pricing (01:02:22) Revising your hypothesis and going into goblin mode (01:06:56) Designing onboarding to make customers stay (01:09:28) What churn can teach you about your ideal customer (01:11:37) Building a repeatable case study factory (01:16:15) Applying the framework inside established companies (01:20:03) Lightning round and final thoughts *Referenced:* • The PULL framework: https://thephysicsofstartups.substack.com/p/the-pull-framework • The ultimate guide to JTBD | Bob Moesta (co-creator of the framework): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/the-ultimate-guide-to-jtbd-bob-moesta • How to find work you love | Bob Moesta (Jobs-to-be-Done co-creator, author of “Job Moves”): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/how-to-find-work-you-love-bob-moesta • Jump: https://jump.ai • Linear’s secret to building beloved B2B products | Nan Yu (Head of Product): https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/linears-secret-to-building-beloved-b2b-products-nan-yu • Josh Woodward on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/joshwoodward/ • Clearly AI: https://clearly-ai.com • Emily Choi-Greene on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/emilycg • Spanx: https://spanx.com • Floodgate: https://www.floodgate.com • Snoop Dogg on X: https://x.com/SnoopDogg • Jira: https://www.atlassian.com/software/jira • Linear: https://linear.app • “Sell the alpha, not the feature”: The enterprise sales playbook for $1M to $10M ARR | Jen Abel: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/the-enterprise-sales-playbook-1m-to-10m-arr • How to close $100K+ enterprise deals, step by step | Jen Abel: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/how-to-close-100k-1m-deals-step-by • Teero: https://www.teero.com ...References continued at: https://www.lennysnewsletter.com/p/an-86-minute-guide-to-finding-pmf _Production and marketing by https://penname.co/._ _For inquiries about sponsoring the podcast, email podcast@lennyrachitsky.com._ Lenny may be an investor in the companies discussed. [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=19qrLchbQEc)

Source quotes

[4:10] Rob Snyder: The pull framework describes a person who will pull your product out of your hands... someone who's weird not to buy your product. [13:53] Rob Snyder: It turns out this pull, this project on their to-do list exists before and independent of me, which means I just have to go out there and find it. I don't have to convince people to have pull. [18:56] Rob Snyder: The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them? [31:01] Rob Snyder: 如果你仔细想想，那些手头真正有极度重要的事情要赶着办完的人，根本不想当什么设计伙伴，他们只希望把那件事情搞定。 [34:46] Rob Snyder: 拉力本来就客观存在于他们的待办清单之上，因此你的消息根本不需要去制造拉力，它唯一的作用就是让他们愿意坐下来和你聊聊。 [49:59] Rob Snyder: 如果那些通用的记录工具根本无法完成任务，而我们能够做到，那么我们对于客户来说就是无限倍地更好，因为我们帮他们清除了阻碍。 [72:37] Rob Snyder: 初创公司就是一台将单一案例研究重复无限次的机器，我所做的一切，都是为了建造一台用来重复生产该案例的工厂。 [66:56] Rob Snyder: 基本上每一个购买的人都注定会流失，直到达成 X 为止——只要跨过 X，他们要是再流失那就太奇怪了。所有的交付、所有的一切，都在于搞清楚 X 是什么，并设计一条让所有客户都能抵达那里的一站式高铁。

Source quotes

[71:37] Rob Snyder: A startup is just a thing that repeats one case study infinite times, and all the stuff that I do is to build a factory for repeating that case study. [0:00] Rob Snyder: You're not selling to SpaceX. You're selling to the head of legal at SpaceX who has a project on her to-do list that they can't do themselves. [50:00] Rob Snyder: You're looking for the people who are already trying to change who don't need convincing. [18:56] Rob Snyder: The whole point of building a company is to serve somebody to help them do something. And so if you don't have firsthand experience, how are you going to make the thousands of decisions it takes to actually build something that serves them?

Original transcript

[0:00] The theory behind a sales call is if you [0:03] have pull, you're going to rip the thing [0:06] out of my hands. So, I have a very [0:07] specific structure of a sales call for [0:10] getting into discovery and then [0:12] transitioning out of discovery. How can [0:13] people use this framework to help them [0:15] come up with ideas that are more likely [0:16] to actually be successful? [0:18] >> One of the main mistakes people make is [0:20] thinking that pull is a thing that a [0:23] company has. It's a thing a person has. [0:26] You're not selling to SpaceX. You're [0:27] selling to the head of legal at SpaceX [0:30] who has a project on her to-do list that [0:33] they can't do themselves. [0:34] >> You have this idea of the Hail Mary [0:36] approach. You're talking with people and [0:38] they're like, "Oh my gosh, this is [0:39] exactly what I need." A lot of the time [0:42] that's not going to happen. That's also [0:43] an opportunity to what I call throw the [0:45] Hail Mary, which is is there anything on [0:48] your to-do list that you would pay me to [0:50] do right now? We're seeing if they try [0:52] to buy. If they don't, cool. We've [0:54] learned something. We can kind of keep [0:55] iterating from there. If they do, okay, [0:58] great. Now we might have something. [1:00] Let's see if it repeats. [1:01] >> Say you actually found something, [1:03] something [music] that is pulling and [1:05] people are like, I need this now. What [1:07] comes next? [1:07] >> Retention is super important [music] and [1:10] it's not obvious. And so what I [1:11] recommend is [1:16] >> Rob, thank you so much for being here [1:18] and welcome to the podcast. [1:20] >> Hello. Thank you. You are the author of [1:23] The Power of Pull. I've got the book [1:25] right here. You have a newsletter called [1:26] The Physics of Startups. I don't think I [1:29] told you this, but the way I learned of [1:31] you is a very unusual way. Uh I have [1:33] this Slack community for my paid [1:35] subscribers. And in the Slack, just in [1:37] the past month, two different people [1:40] started threads where they're like, [1:41] "Lenny, uh you need to get Rob on the [1:44] podcast. I have been reading his book [1:46] and it's extremely useful to what I've [1:48] been doing." And these are some [1:49] founders, some product people, and I'm [1:52] just like, well, who is this guy? I got [1:53] to find out. And so I reached out and uh [1:56] that's how this came to be. Essentially, [1:59] what you've written in this book and [2:00] what you do in your newsletter is you've [2:02] basically created a very pragmatic guide [2:05] to finding product market fit and [2:07] basically going from zero to one and [2:09] then one beyond. And to give people a [2:12] reason to believe you, other than what [2:14] I've already said about people uh saying [2:16] how useful this has been, I know you've [2:18] helped something like 50 different [2:20] startups get from zero to over a million [2:23] in AR. Speak to just where this insight [2:25] and advice comes from. [2:27] >> Yeah. Yes. I did not expect to be [2:29] writing a book or doing anything like [2:31] this. Uh, I I got punched in the face as [2:33] a founder trying to go 0ero to one and [2:36] then randomly figured it out and then a [2:38] bunch of my friends started pulling me [2:39] in to help their startups go 0ero to one [2:42] and just kind of got obsessed with this [2:44] stage. It's super interesting, super [2:47] weird. I feel like there's not a lot of [2:48] good stuff written about it and uh and [2:51] so I've just gotten strangely obsessed [2:53] with doing 0ero to1 as many times as [2:54] possible and I love that. I'm going to [2:56] read a couple quotes actually from my [2:58] community to reinforce the things you [3:00] just said of why of what people have [3:01] been saying about what you've done. And [3:03] this is really unusual. There's like [3:04] even though you just said there's not a [3:06] lot, there is a lot of content for [3:07] founders. Here's how to find idea. [3:09] Here's how to find product market fit. [3:11] So, it's really it it's a big signal to [3:13] me if people are saying this is in [3:15] particular extremely useful to them more [3:16] than anything else out there. So, a few [3:18] things that uh people told me in my [3:20] community. One, I remember reading the [3:22] first chapter of his book and feeling [3:23] the weight lifted off my shoulders that [3:26] I'm not some silly clueless outlier and [3:28] that this is a normal part of the [3:30] process. [3:32] Another besides all the very tactical [3:34] stuff, personally, I found I'm [3:35] normalizing just how painful, lonely, [3:39] weird it is to go through fighting mark [3:41] fighting product market fit. [3:44] Finally, we ran into the same zero to [3:46] one traps uh Rob describes building [3:49] based on what prospects said they wanted [3:51] rather than what actually got them to [3:52] say yes. [3:54] >> Wow. [3:56] You have very nice people in your [3:57] community. That's that's uh [3:58] >> that's true. [3:59] >> That's super kind. [4:00] >> That's true. That's true. All right. [4:01] Anyway, so there you go. Just to give [4:03] people Okay, let's pay attention. Um [4:06] okay, give us a uh an overview of the [4:09] pull framework. [4:10] >> Yeah. So the pull framework describes a [4:13] person who will pull your product out of [4:14] your hands. Um someone someone who's [4:17] weird not to buy your product. So we [4:20] like know what pull feels like is it's [4:23] the thing that's written about with [4:25] startups, you know, it's the thing the [4:26] startups that take up you your [4:28] newsletter had insane pull. You grew [4:30] like that, right? And everybody wants [4:32] that. And most of us are in the [4:34] situation where it feels like we are [4:36] pushing. We're trying to convince people [4:37] to care or convince them to buy and [4:40] they're it's like kind of maybe working. [4:43] And so pull describes a person who would [4:45] be weird not to buy. The question is [4:47] just like what causes somebody to pull a [4:51] product out of your hands. And for that [4:54] I found a lot of the traditional [4:56] descriptions of things like when I was a [4:58] founder I went out and found hair on [5:00] fire pain points big problems offered a [5:03] differentiated solution that provided [5:06] real value. We had design partners using [5:08] our product every single day. And so I [5:11] was like okay cool check check. This [5:14] thing's going to the moon. and then [5:16] tried to sell it and just got smashed [5:19] into a wall for 2 years pivoting around [5:21] aimlessly, not having no clue why. And [5:24] then we randomly pivoted. It took off [5:26] and I realized that it wasn't the thing [5:28] that causes people to pull a product out [5:30] of your hands. It's not pain points or [5:32] value props or things like that. it um [5:35] because realize that people can [5:37] basically just say uh yeah like great [5:41] this you know it's great that your [5:43] product solves our pain points problems [5:45] offers a ton of value but I'm not going [5:47] to drop my priorities to buy it and so I [5:50] realized it's about priorities a certain [5:52] kind of priority where somebody's trying [5:55] to do something they got a project on [5:57] their to-do list trying to do it right [5:59] now but they can't do it with their [6:01] existing tools methods or options In [6:04] that case, they're like a coiled spring, [6:07] right? Trying to do something stuck and [6:10] you show up and just offer something [6:12] that gets them unstuck, that helps them [6:14] get that priority done. That's when they [6:17] rip it out of your hands. And the pull [6:19] framework is just an acronym for that. [6:21] This episode is brought to you by our [6:23] season's presenting sponsor, Work OS. [6:26] What do OpenAI, Anthropic, Cursor, [6:29] Replet, Sierra, Clay, and hundreds of [6:31] other winning companies all have in [6:33] common? They are all powered by work OS. [6:36] If you're building a product for the [6:37] enterprise, you've felt the pain of [6:38] integrating single sign on, SKIM, [6:41] arbback, audit, logs, and other features [6:43] required by large companies. Work OS [6:46] turns those deal blockers into drop-in [6:48] APIs with a modern developer platform [6:50] built specifically for B2B SAS. [6:53] Literally every startup that I'm an [6:54] investor in that starts to expand up [6:56] market ends up working with Work [music] [6:58] OS. And that's because they are the [7:00] best. Whether you are seedstage startup [7:02] trying to land your first enterprise [7:04] customer or a unicorn expanding [7:06] globally, work OS is the fastest path to [7:08] becoming enterprise ready and unblocking [7:10] growth. It's essentially Stripe for [7:12] enterprise features. Visit [music] [7:14] works.com to get started or just hit up [7:16] their Slack where they have actual [7:18] engineers waiting to answer your [7:20] questions. Work OS allows you to build [7:22] faster with delightful APIs, [7:24] comprehensive docs, and a smooth [7:25] developer experience. Go to works.com to [7:28] make your app enterprise ready today. [7:31] Let's talk it through the the acronym of [7:33] pull because that goes deeper into this [7:35] idea. [7:35] >> Yeah. So, acronym PL, [7:39] there's a P project. They have a project [7:42] on their to-do list. You can think of a [7:43] project like a job to be done. It's um [7:47] you know, Bob Mesto, you've had him on. [7:48] He's amazing. Um project is not like I [7:52] want to buy recruitment software. It's I [7:54] want to hire more employees kind of [7:57] thing. You is the second one is [7:59] unavoidable. [8:01] This is a thing that I have to do right [8:03] now. Why now? Why not later? There's [8:05] some reason why you have to do it now. [8:08] First L is list of options I consider [8:11] for doing the project. Could be again [8:14] hiring somebody. Could be having our [8:15] existing team do it. could be using the [8:18] tools I already have or the tools out on [8:20] the market. And the second L is [8:22] limitations. Why are those options not [8:25] good enough for getting me getting my [8:28] project done? Amazing. So the first two [8:31] are really important there and um it's [8:32] interesting the second two feel less [8:34] important. I'm curious why they're so [8:35] important. So the first two are [8:36] essentially like I have a problem. I [8:38] need to solve a job to be done and this [8:40] is an urgent problem. So in a sense this [8:42] is the hair on fire problem very [8:44] concretely defined. Here's what hair on [8:46] fire looks like. I have like a to-do my [8:48] boss is waiting for me to do and it [8:50] needs to happen now. It's not just like [8:52] a general thing that I need to solve. [8:54] >> Yes. [8:55] >> Why are the second two so important? [8:57] This idea of other options and why those [8:59] are not working. [9:00] >> Yeah. So you can you can imagine a case [9:02] where like a product team for example um [9:05] they have a really important thing that [9:08] the that has been mandated down. they [9:10] have a really important feature they [9:11] need to build or something that's an [9:12] unavoidable project on their to-do list, [9:15] but they're going to do it themselves. [9:17] So, they don't need anything. They they [9:20] won't buy anything unless they their [9:22] existing options aren't good enough. And [9:25] so, it really really is important that [9:27] it's not just I'm trying to do something [9:29] and I can do it myself or I can do it [9:31] with a with a kind of category leader. I [9:34] can do it with whatever tool is is out [9:36] there. It has to be something where my [9:38] existing options are not good enough. So [9:41] I am like stuck. I'm I'm blocked. [9:44] >> Let's do an example to make this even [9:46] more real. What's like a product or a [9:47] company that gives us a sense of what I [9:50] basically use this as a template. It's [9:51] like a mad libsy thing where it's just [9:52] like pull l and you fill it out. So [9:55] let's go give us an example. [9:56] >> Yeah. So my friends are at a company [9:58] called Jump which is an AI noteaker for [10:01] financial advisors. Very interesting [10:04] space. They did the same thing I did, by [10:06] the way. They spent 18 months just like [10:08] hitting their head against the wall, and [10:09] then finally found pull, tried to sell, [10:12] and and figured it out. But what they [10:14] found was that financial advisors have a [10:18] project on their to-do list that is to [10:21] minimize the amount of time they spend [10:23] taking notes for client meetings and [10:25] putting those notes into their CRM. It's [10:28] a project on their to-do list. the U, [10:31] the unavoidable is if they don't take [10:33] notes and put them into their CRM, they [10:36] could go to jail. Uh, so they have to [10:38] take those notes, but when they're [10:40] taking the notes, they don't want to be [10:42] doing that. And so, so they want to [10:44] minimize the amount of time because they [10:46] don't enjoy doing that. It's just not a [10:48] not a fun thing. So, the list of options [10:51] they considered to minimize the amount [10:53] of time were uh, you know, like a [10:55] generic AI notetaker. you're you're kind [10:58] of there's a list of of all of those out [11:00] there, but those AI notetakers were not [11:04] good enough because they didn't [11:05] integrate with the financial advisor CRM [11:09] and it wasn't clear if they were [11:11] compliant with the SEC's regulations on [11:13] this. And so there's a list of options [11:16] they they really couldn't use. And so [11:19] when Jump showed up and found that poll, [11:21] people ripped the product out of their [11:23] hands. Well, I think one person [11:24] literally said, uh, this must be how [11:26] Alexander Graanbell felt when he [11:28] invented the telephone. Like, that's a [11:30] weird thing to say about a product for [11:32] financial advisors. [11:34] >> Amazing. That's a great testimonial to [11:36] stick on their website. [11:37] >> Yeah. [11:37] >> Okay. What would be like a bad version [11:39] of this? Like, what would it look like [11:40] if it wasn't if there wasn't Paul? [11:42] >> Yeah. So, fun conversation with the with [11:45] the Jump team about they they said, [11:47] "Okay, cool. Financial adviserss. They [11:49] have this project. You know who else [11:50] meets with clients all the time? [11:52] Insurance agents. So maybe we just go [11:55] and talk to them. And it turns out they [11:57] also have the project on their to-do [11:59] list of minimizing the amount of time [12:00] they spend taking meeting notes. But the [12:03] U isn't there because they don't have [12:06] to. They're not required to put meeting [12:09] notes into their CRM. So their existing [12:12] options, the first L are not taking [12:15] meeting notes, which they were already [12:17] doing. And so you can see the framework [12:19] kind of doesn't fill out for them or it [12:22] doesn't there's not the force isn't [12:23] there. They're fine. That unavoidable [12:25] piece uh I see why that is so important. [12:27] And this is an example. Basically [12:29] basically you need all four here. Yes. [12:31] So that's a good lesson here is all four [12:33] need to exist for real pull. In the [12:35] first example that to-do to me doesn't [12:39] feel like it's like a to-do that just [12:40] wrote down. It's kind of this general [12:41] to-do just like generally save time. Is [12:44] that an okay P for a project for to be [12:47] able to do just a or is or is was this [12:49] like specifically on every financial [12:50] advisor's to-do list? [12:52] >> Yeah. So, it was a thing that I wouldn't [12:55] say it's like actually something they [12:56] wrote down on their to-do list, but it [12:58] was like a thing they were doing all the [13:00] time. It was a part of their workflow [13:02] and while they were doing it, they were [13:04] trying not to do it. Like I think [13:06] there's like a the action I'm doing [13:08] right now on my calendar and then the [13:11] project is my intention while I'm doing [13:13] it. And so while I'm doing it, the [13:15] project on my mental to-do list was like [13:17] spend the least amount of time doing [13:18] this annoying thing. [13:19] >> Got it. And so if a founder or product [13:22] team is listening to this and they're [13:23] struggling with their product, it's [13:24] probably one of these four is not there. [13:28] >> Yeah. You need all four at once. If you [13:30] find P without U and in the L's, so you [13:34] find something that somebody's trying to [13:36] do kind of, but they're not actually [13:38] trying to do it right now and their [13:40] existing options aren't good enough, [13:41] what they'll do is they'll complain and [13:42] they won't buy. If they have P and U, [13:45] but their L's are good enough, they're [13:48] going to say, "Yeah, that's exactly what [13:49] we're doing right now and working with [13:51] cloud code on it. We're going to figure [13:52] it out." [13:53] >> Something along these lines that you [13:55] talk about is that this pull exists. [13:57] It's like this thing that's already [13:58] there and you're just kind of this like [14:00] I don't know hunter looking for the pull [14:03] and discovering it. Talk a bit about [14:04] that. [14:05] >> Yeah, this was super liberating when I [14:08] like realized this because I always [14:10] thought that I was incompetent. I wasn't [14:13] good at convincing the market to want my [14:15] product. And it was from that [14:17] perspective of okay, I'm building [14:19] something that's really valuable and [14:21] people aren't buying. How do I convince [14:23] them to want it to buy? And it turns out [14:25] this poll, this project on their to-do [14:27] list exists [14:29] before and independent of me, which [14:32] means I just have to go out there and [14:34] find it. I don't have to convince people [14:37] to have pull. And it's like I haven't [14:40] quite figured out how to do that, but I [14:42] think it's very very hard to do if it's [14:44] possible at all. That feels very [14:45] familiar just trying to convince people. [14:47] Look, this is so great. It's going to [14:48] solve so many of your problems. Uh, and [14:50] I love these idea this like I just love [14:52] how very specific and concrete it makes [14:55] all of these general pieces of advice [14:57] around finding product market fit, [14:59] coming up with ideas. It just tells you [15:00] exactly here's what it looks like. Um, [15:03] something else you talk about, you [15:04] mentioned this earlier, this idea that [15:05] it it needs to feel weird for them not [15:07] to buy it. That's like the sign that [15:10] this is right, that it's like it's [15:11] weird. Why aren't you buying this? Talk [15:13] a bit about that. [15:14] >> Most people most of the time are like [15:17] fine. It would be weird if they bought [15:19] our product given what's on their to-do [15:21] list, given what they have, given their [15:23] options, like so it'd be weird if they [15:25] bought. But a person with pull is weird [15:28] not to buy. They should actually pull [15:30] the product out of your hands because [15:32] they are like that coiled spring. And so [15:34] if you talk to somebody who has pull, [15:37] the conversation should basically go [15:38] like, "Wait a second, you can do what? [15:41] Okay, how do we get started? Does the [15:43] product exist yet? Like how do how do we [15:44] get on board?" where basically every [15:46] other conversation you have with [15:48] somebody who doesn't have pull can have [15:50] anything other than that. They can be [15:52] enthusiastic and nice and say, "Wow, [15:54] that's amazing. That's super [15:55] interesting. That's totally the future [15:57] of our industry. Wow, I can see how that [15:59] would save us so much money, but they're [16:01] not saying, "I need this right now." And [16:04] that's how you know they actually have [16:06] pull. Those conversations sound very [16:08] familiar. [16:10] Okay. So before we get into the kind of [16:12] the whole journey of the startup process [16:13] and how you can use this framework in [16:15] that journey, anything else around just [16:17] the general idea of the pull framework [16:19] that's important to share? One of the [16:21] main mistakes people make is thinking [16:23] that pull is a thing that a company has. [16:27] It's a thing a person has. Even if [16:29] you're selling enterprise software, [16:31] you're selling not to the company. [16:33] You're not selling to SpaceX. You're [16:35] selling to just going to your genable [16:38] conversation. you're selling to like the [16:40] head of legal at SpaceX who has a [16:43] project on her to-do list that that they [16:46] can't do themselves. [16:48] >> That is really useful. So, it's not like [16:50] SpaceX needs this. It's like say Jen [16:52] >> Yes. needs this. Uh and you're saying [16:56] that that's often a mistake people make. [16:57] They don't think about the specific [16:58] person with this need. [17:00] >> Yeah. Yeah. It's it's super common to [17:01] say we sell to right like mid-market [17:04] private equity companies. It's like you [17:07] don't you sell to a partner or an [17:09] operating partner in there who's [17:10] specifically trying to do X, Y, and Z. [17:13] >> Awesome. Okay. So, through the lens of [17:15] this framework, let's go through kind of [17:18] the key moments of an early stage [17:20] startup, finding product market fit. So, [17:22] I want to talk about coming up with an [17:23] idea, getting your first sales call, [17:25] closing your first deal, and then kind [17:27] of scaling from there. So, let's start [17:29] with coming up with an idea. [17:31] >> Yeah. How how can people use this [17:33] framework to help them come up with [17:35] ideas that are more likely to actually [17:36] be successful? As a founder, I I have a [17:39] notebook of ideas that are all like, [17:41] "What if we built an API for APIs kind [17:44] of thing like they're there all these [17:45] like product ideas and the product ideas [17:49] all sound unhinged?" And so I can never [17:52] tell between product ideas, what's a [17:54] good idea and what's a bad idea. Well, [17:56] fortunately, the pull framework is a is [17:59] a thing that's upstream of your product [18:01] idea that says, I believe there is a [18:04] person who is trying to do X right now. [18:06] We who basically weird not to buy. And [18:09] so, what I found to be helpful is to use [18:11] the pull framework to stake out a claim [18:13] and say, I believe for whatever idea I [18:16] have, I believe this specific person is [18:18] stuck. And so I'm going to go and talk [18:21] to them and see do they want to do they [18:24] try to buy from me even before we have a [18:26] product. And so for me the the idea of [18:29] the the um the poll framework is is to [18:33] come up with a hypothesis of who has [18:35] pull and then go and test that. And then [18:39] the question becomes okay how do you [18:42] find this pole idea this pole hypothesis [18:45] what do you do for that? I have some [18:48] fairly strong opinions on this. Like I [18:50] don't think we take this stage seriously [18:53] enough. Like if your life depended on [18:56] it, how would would you would you be [18:58] doing like 10 customer interviews for [19:00] like 30 minutes on Zoom? No. You would [19:03] go all out. You would go in person. And [19:06] I have like a couple stories of friends [19:08] who have done crazy things to go and [19:12] like do the job with the potential [19:14] customer to feel it firsthand to find [19:17] that pull firsthand and they've either [19:18] built something that they would buy [19:20] themselves or they've like embedded with [19:23] people to find that like that moment [19:25] when someone will is like trying to do [19:28] something and stuck. [19:29] >> Amazing. Uh so the advice here is don't [19:32] sit around and brainstorm. Don't uh just [19:36] look for big markets and figure out [19:38] where there might be something massive. [19:40] What you're saying here is uh almost [19:42] like this lens of if your life dependent [19:44] on how would you find a problem that is [19:46] likely to be a real I guess have real [19:49] pull and what I'm hearing here is get [19:51] like in the weeds get your hands dirty [19:54] like get in the way this reminds me of a [19:56] quote um Naan who is the head of product [19:59] at linear now he just went to open AAI [20:01] described what he looks for when he's [20:03] trying to find opportunities is he he [20:05] describes I want to feel the pain of the [20:07] person the same way they feel the pain. [20:09] >> Yeah. [20:10] Yeah. [20:11] >> And what you're saying is the way to do [20:12] that is get in there with people [20:14] building the thing. Is there an example [20:15] of of of doing that? [20:17] >> Yeah. So, a friend from uh from school, [20:21] he had no idea what he wanted to build. [20:24] He had no product idea. He wasn't he [20:26] didn't have my notebook. He didn't have [20:27] any of that. He just said, you know, I [20:29] like serving small businesses. I like [20:30] small business. I'd like to just find [20:33] somebody I like to serve and I'll figure [20:34] out the idea from that. And so he wrote [20:36] out a list of industries that he thought [20:39] might be interesting. And then he went [20:41] and shadowed them and like worked with [20:43] them for like wrote along with them for [20:46] days at a time. And so he started with [20:48] solar panel installers and uh he hated [20:51] them and they hated him. So he moved on [20:53] to the next one. He eventually worked [20:55] his way to like independent physical [20:56] therapists and he went and spent days [20:59] with them. He loved them. They loved [21:01] him. And it was like okay cool. What am [21:02] I what is the poll here? what what [21:05] should I do? And so he watched over [21:06] their shoulder days on end. He even [21:09] tried to buy a physical therapy [21:11] franchise to like was able to see the [21:13] P&L and was actually considering it. And [21:16] in that process, he came up with [21:18] something like, wait a second, you're it [21:20] looks like you're trying to do X and and [21:22] are stuck there. And so it's it's um [21:25] firsthand experience is is what you what [21:28] you should do there. [21:30] >> Awesome. So like live it yourself and [21:32] live it. And is the reason you need to [21:34] do that is it part is it because people [21:37] would have discovered if it was easy [21:39] basically somebody else would have found [21:40] the idea. Uh why do you think that is so [21:42] important approaching it this way? [21:45] >> Yeah I'd say I I'll I'll give two [21:48] reasons. One is you know these things [21:51] don't really emerge from a whiteboard. [21:53] Like it would be weird if his idea came [21:56] to him that he eventually wound up [21:58] finding from brainstorming. like think [22:00] of how many different ideas he could [22:02] have come up with. Um, and it wasn't [22:04] something that like it it was something [22:06] he saw only by observing where it's [22:09] unclear that that would have emerged in [22:10] an interview either. But I say the [22:12] second thing is like more of a [22:14] philosophical thing which is you're [22:16] building a company to serve this kind of [22:19] person. The whole point of building a [22:21] company is to serve somebody to help [22:23] them do something. And so if you don't [22:26] have firsthand experience, how are you [22:28] going to make the thousands of decisions [22:30] it takes to actually build something [22:32] that serves them? [22:34] >> And is the idea once you have this [22:35] insight, say with this physical therapy [22:37] company, you write it out through the [22:39] pull framework to kind of pressure is [22:41] that is that you call it the pull [22:42] hypothesis. Is that right? [22:44] >> Yep. [22:44] >> So talk about that just like say you [22:45] have this insight and I'm curious what [22:47] he actually found with his physical [22:48] therapy business and how to kind of [22:50] start to think about it through the pull [22:51] framework. [22:52] >> Yeah. So you then take that and say okay [22:54] this is this is the kind of idea I [22:56] believe this kind of person is this [22:58] physical therapist is trying to cut some [23:00] specific cost on their on their P&L I [23:02] can't actually remember what it was [23:03] unavoidable for XYZ reasons and um their [23:07] existing options of getting a consultant [23:09] to come in and do this wasn't good [23:11] enough for some specific reason it was [23:13] too expensive it was too slow wrote out [23:15] that pull hypothesis and then what he [23:18] did next was super important which was [23:20] he said he showed it to that person said [23:22] Is this you? Person said, "Oh my god, [23:25] yeah, that's exactly the thing." Said, [23:27] "Okay, great. Uh, would you buy [23:29] something if I helped you get this [23:31] done?" Yeah, totally. Okay, great. And [23:34] then he said, "I need to go talk to five [23:36] other physical therapists and just make [23:39] sure this repeats." [23:41] And then he did that and they also [23:44] pulled, which was the really important [23:46] thing to make sure he wasn't just [23:47] building a product for one person. What [23:50] is it that he showed this companies that [23:51] this the four bullet points with here's [23:54] the project, here's why it's unavoidable [23:56] or is something else? [23:57] >> Yeah. So, I actually like recommend [23:58] having two slides. One slide, one slide [24:01] is the basically the pole framework. You [24:02] don't have to show them the poll [24:03] framework because no one's going to [24:04] understand it. You can just say uh [24:06] here's what I hear. You're trying to do [24:08] X right now because of Y and you've [24:12] considered this but it's not good enough [24:14] for this reason. You say is do I have [24:17] that roughly right? And then the second [24:19] slide is a kind of conceptual overview [24:22] of how I can help. So it sounds like [24:25] you're looking for a way to cut this [24:27] line item that's faster than a [24:29] consultant. [24:31] We could offer that for XYZ with does [24:33] that kind of fit what you're looking [24:35] for? And you're looking for the first [24:36] slide them to say, "Oh my god, yes." And [24:39] the second slide, yeah, how does it [24:40] work? How exactly how, you know, how do [24:42] we move forward? What I love about your [24:44] stuff is it's like very plug-and-play [24:47] uh pragmatic. So, we'll actually show a [24:50] slide of the actual template you have [24:52] people use to fill this out. So, the [24:54] phrasing, I'll read it from this slide, [24:55] too. Uh there's a project on your to-do [24:58] like this is the project in your to-do [24:59] list and it's unavoidable right now [25:01] because of this and options you looked [25:03] into are this and they're lacking for [25:05] this reason. Amazing. I love this. So [25:08] the idea is you have this little slide [25:09] that you just create and to kind of run [25:10] by people and the idea is this is the [25:12] hypothesis and what does it look like [25:15] when there's poll once you show it to [25:17] them. Is it like they're ready to send [25:19] you money? Is it their pupils dilate? [25:21] What do you look for? [25:22] >> Yeah, you look for a couple things. The [25:24] the thing that really really matters is [25:27] that they actually try to buy. They say, [25:30] "Okay, cool. How do we get started?" [25:32] And they will do that. I have a friend [25:34] who was selling into he he kind of [25:37] pivoted around for a while but he knew [25:38] he found pull when someone an exec in [25:41] pharma before he had a product said if [25:44] you can do that I will pay you right now [25:47] so okay that's the signal you are [25:49] looking for what you're looking for as [25:51] well as they're leaning in wait a second [25:53] you can do what [25:55] you're not looking for is kind of like [25:56] leaned out enthusiasm okay well tell me [25:59] more well let me yeah we'll we'll think [26:01] about it could you send more information [26:03] so our team can review that like you [26:05] know and and any of those kinds of [26:07] things anything that is not like okay [26:08] how do we actually move forward on this [26:10] is just not worth your life force going [26:12] after it's interesting how much body [26:15] language and just like the physical [26:17] experience of getting excited about an [26:19] idea is is a sign that it is good I just [26:22] had Josh Woodward on the podcast head of [26:24] Google Labs and he's similarly like you [26:26] see a twinkle in their eyes and their [26:27] eyes just light up [laughter] and it's [26:29] so interesting that that's a sign of of [26:31] pull [26:32] >> yeah Yeah. Yeah. It's is what you're [26:34] seeing is is it weird for them not to [26:36] buy right now? Are they like are they [26:38] behaving as if it's weird for them not [26:40] to buy? [26:42] >> Is what's is there like a li like a you [26:45] know there's like the I will buy this [26:47] idea like they say they will buy it [26:49] versus a sign they will actually buy it. [26:51] Is it the body language? Like how do you [26:53] know they're serious about it? [26:55] >> So I call it like a pullshaped action. [26:57] not a good good uh uh term but but a [27:00] pull-shaped action is like I need this [27:05] right now. How do like I am pulling it [27:08] out of you. How do how do we move [27:10] forward right now? It is not like a oh I [27:14] could totally see us using this in Q4 [27:18] kind of thing. That's a that's a not [27:21] pulling towards me. That's a kind of [27:22] pushing out into the future [27:24] >> like the urgency of like I need those [27:26] now. [27:27] >> There's always this advice of solve your [27:29] own problem which is different from what [27:30] you described. Is that a path you [27:33] recommend or would you recommend against [27:34] that? [27:35] >> So a friend um so like Emily at a [27:38] company called Clearly AI she was in [27:40] security engineering at AWS [27:43] and she found something there that she [27:47] would have paid somebody to solve but [27:49] there was nobody out there. And so in [27:52] that case it's solve your own problem. [27:54] Yes, 100%. Where the solve your own [27:56] problem falls kind of flat a lot of [27:59] times is um it's a thing that you [28:03] wouldn't have paid somebody to do for [28:05] you but you just think should exist, [28:08] right? If it's and so you have to be [28:09] honest with yourself. I have done things [28:12] where I've built things that like oh I [28:14] think the world needs this. I ran into [28:15] this problem but if I looked myself in [28:17] the mirror I wouldn't have said yeah buy [28:20] this right now. along those lines. Is [28:22] this advice mostly for B2B SAS sort of [28:24] software or is this applicable to say [28:27] consumer app? So, I am mostly in the B2B [28:29] space, but I have seen quite a few [28:32] people I've been kind of surprised that [28:33] a lot of people from the consumer space [28:35] have have used this as well. And someone [28:37] sent me the story of like Spanx, which [28:39] was basically she she did the same thing [28:41] of of um uh like selling one-on-one with [28:45] people, seeing how they reacted to [28:47] figure out all the different pieces of [28:49] of what became specs. [28:51] >> Yeah. And she solved her own problem [28:52] famously. [28:53] >> Yes. Just tore off her pantyhoser. I [28:55] think that's the story. just because she [28:57] needed it now. I think it was like yeah, [28:58] she's going to event. So that's that's a [29:00] cool example. You [clears throat] have [29:02] this we're going to talk more about [29:03] this, but you have this idea of the Hail [29:04] Mary approach. Talk about that. So the [29:08] Hail Mary, so we've been talking about [29:10] the happy path here. You find something, [29:12] you're talking with people and they're [29:13] like, "Oh my gosh, uh uh yeah, this is [29:16] exactly what I need." A lot of the time [29:19] that's not going to happen. You're going [29:20] to get that kind of lukewarm feel. And [29:23] so what I've tended to find is that's [29:25] also an opportunity to what I call throw [29:28] the Hail Mary, which is okay, this [29:31] doesn't seem to be a thing. Is there [29:33] anything on your to-do list that you [29:35] would pay me to do right now, like that [29:36] you would pay somebody to take off your [29:38] plate? And that's just an open-ended [29:40] Hail Mary. I've actually seen quite a [29:43] few startups totally pivot and take off [29:46] from the Hail Mary, which has been [29:47] really interesting. There's one startup [29:49] they were trying to sell an applicant [29:51] tracking system into governments and [29:54] they had a call with somebody and the [29:55] person was like, "Yeah, that's kind of [29:58] interesting." [30:00] But after the Hail Mary question, yeah, [30:01] what I'd actually pay you to solve is [30:03] this like job description thing right [30:05] now. And that became their first [30:07] contract. That became their first [30:08] customer and they've grown super fast [30:09] since then. [30:10] >> That's awesome. So the advice here is [30:12] just sometimes feel free to just ask [30:14] what problem can we solve for you? [30:16] >> Yeah. Yeah. And that like leads to how [30:18] to think about sales. Well, I'll just [30:20] give a little and we can dig into this [30:22] if it's interesting, but like I always [30:24] was kind of nervous to sell as a mega [30:27] introvert and overthinker. Like it just [30:29] feels like a lot of pressure. Um, and it [30:32] like I need to convince you to buy. And [30:35] so that question feels uncomfortable. [30:38] But if you kind of reframe it in your [30:40] own head of I'm just seeing if they need [30:42] help with anything that they are stuck [30:44] on. And if they don't, that's fine. But [30:47] if they do, cool. We can explore if it [30:49] if I can help. Then uh it kind of [30:52] changes your orientation towards sales. [30:54] >> I I am in the same boat as you. And [30:56] that's a really nice way of thinking [30:57] about it. I'm just trying to solve [30:58] someone's problem. Why is it so hard? [31:01] Before we get to the next step, which is [31:03] getting your first sales call, finding [31:05] basically finding someone to talk to [31:07] that you don't already know, are there [31:08] any anti- patterns or just kind of [31:10] signals or just like uh traps people [31:13] fall into when they're coming up with [31:14] ideas? [31:15] >> Yeah, the infinite, but the [laughter] [31:19] but the main ones that I have seen that [31:21] are like really really brutal are [31:24] feeling like you need to build it [31:26] yourself first. So, you come up with an [31:29] idea and you're like, I don't think this [31:30] is ready for prime time or I think [31:32] people have to see it to get it and then [31:35] you go heads down and build it. Now, now [31:37] with AI, you can kind of get that out of [31:39] your system in a in hopefully a couple [31:41] weeks instead of, you know, months or [31:43] not. But, uh, you do not you you want to [31:47] face the cold wind of reality as soon as [31:51] possible. And so don't delay the [31:53] customer conversations where you can [31:55] actually find pull. [31:58] >> You're also not a fan of design design [32:01] partners which is okay. Say more because [32:03] this is typically very standard advice [32:06] to find design partners. [32:07] >> Yeah. The I don't know maybe in some [32:11] context it's helpful. I have yet to see [32:13] it help be helpful. What I've seen in [32:15] basically every single time I've seen [32:17] somebody with a design partner is that [32:19] you recruit a design partner who quote [32:20] unquote buys into your vision for the [32:23] product and they give a bunch of [32:24] feedback and never buy from you. They [32:27] never buy and you realize that all of [32:30] their feedback was just like them [32:32] playing Steve Jobs and there's like I'm [32:35] going to help this startup versus I have [32:38] something I'm actually trying to get [32:39] done. And if you think about it, like [32:41] the people who actually have something [32:43] really important they're trying to get [32:44] done, they don't want to be a design [32:47] partner. They just want that thing done. [32:49] >> I love that. Okay. So, so your advice is [32:53] don't set up a bunch of design partners [32:54] and we'll go through kind of the process [32:55] you actually recommend. Okay. So, I [32:58] guess just to think about this coming up [33:00] with an idea step. The core [33:03] moment is some insight based on being [33:07] hands-on living with the people that you [33:09] will be helping. The the term I've heard [33:12] describe to describe this idea um I [33:14] think it was um uh a VC floodgate that [33:18] uses this um you're basically looking [33:20] for an earned secret. Yes. [33:23] And your advice here is the way to find [33:25] veteran secret either it's you have [33:27] lived it at a company say Amazon gave [33:30] this AWS example or you're on the ground [33:33] working side by side with the people [33:35] dealing with it and just looking for [33:37] problems that they have. [33:38] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And you can like the [33:40] method kind of doesn't matter. It might [33:42] come to you in an IASCA retreat. Like I [33:44] you get you could get that secret from [33:46] anywhere, but the things that are most [33:48] likely to actually work are like getting [33:51] your hands dirty and and learning it [33:53] from reality versus from theory. [33:55] >> So just to follow that thread, say [33:58] there's like a pie chart of of the say [34:00] 50 companies you've worked with where [34:01] their idea came from. What would be like [34:03] the biggest chunks of the pie chart? I [34:06] would say 10% um own experience, [34:11] 90% [34:13] going and getting firsthand uh uh like [34:16] experience and within that it's been a [34:19] bit of like some some of them sold the [34:21] wrong product to figure out what the [34:23] right product was. Um but most of them [34:26] actually go and do the thing firsthand. [34:28] >> And then what percentage I retreat? [34:30] There's no room for that. [34:30] >> 100%. That's that's mandatory as part of [34:32] of me advising you. [laughter] [34:35] That's the the pull hypothesis. [34:38] >> Okay, sweet. Okay, so say at this point [34:41] you've got a pull hypothesis. There's [34:43] signs that maybe there's something [34:45] really good here. The next phase in my [34:48] eyes is finding someone to talk to and [34:51] sell it to. So basically landing a first [34:53] sales call. [34:55] talk about how you go about landing that [34:58] call and what happens kind of and then [35:01] we'll talk about actually running the [35:02] call. But before we get there, just like [35:03] finding people to talk to. Yeah, this is [35:05] a fun one. So my goal is actually like I [35:07] want to have two to three conversations [35:09] per day with potential customers. But to [35:12] get there, you have to first get your [35:13] first conversation. So you can do warm [35:16] intrus, you can do all that kind of [35:18] stuff. We'll just talk about if you [35:19] don't have any of that and you need to [35:21] get people to talk to you cold. The way [35:23] I typically recommend founders start is [35:25] to just reach out to your potential [35:28] customers on LinkedIn or via email and [35:32] it's with a very specific kind of [35:34] message that is not a hey do you have [35:37] XYZ pain points would you like to buy [35:40] our gamechanging solution like no [35:42] template you get online is going to get [35:44] you any responses except for like leave [35:46] me alone and so I call it founder magic [35:49] kind of outreach at this stage which is [35:52] basically like you're interesting, I'm [35:55] interesting. Let's chat and see. And [35:57] this is totally acceptable. Like I one [35:59] of the startups that I helped, their [36:00] message was, uh, hey, Snoop Dogg [36:03] invested in us and I thought you'd find [36:04] it interesting, too. Would you be open [36:06] to chat? [36:08] That's a fun message. Everyone has their [36:10] own version of that. Like everyone who [36:12] listens to this or everyone who's a [36:13] founder like has an interesting message [36:15] you can send and you don't have to [36:18] convince them in the message to buy your [36:20] product. You just get them to talk with [36:22] you. This pull exists out there on their [36:25] to-do list. And so the message doesn't [36:28] do anything about that. It just it's [36:31] just to get them to talk to you. So just [36:33] say something interesting to cause them [36:34] to meet with you. Okay, this is really [36:36] helpful. So your advice here is don't [36:38] craft like a whole value prop pitch [36:40] problem identification. Don't tell them [36:43] how much pain you're going to solve. [36:44] It's just like get their attention with [36:46] something interesting. Yes. Uh the Snoop [36:49] Dog example is awesome. any other any [36:51] other examples? Any other kind of ways [36:52] of thinking about what might be [36:53] interesting to someone? [36:55] >> There's there's been a variety of ones [36:57] that I've seen. Um [37:00] random ones that are like, "Hey, I [37:02] dropped out of my PhD and I'm now [37:03] working on something for content [37:05] marketers, right?" Like something [37:07] something that's just kind of [37:08] interesting enough there that's not [37:11] super magical. Um, you can have there's [37:14] a variety of different things I've seen [37:15] from um I, you know, I was, you know, [37:20] Sam Olman's chief of staff, right? That, [37:22] you know, if anybody sends that message, [37:24] that will work quite well. It doesn't [37:27] matter what the rest of the message [37:28] says. I thought you'd be interesting and [37:30] open to chat. And so, it's finding [37:31] something interesting that's like worth [37:33] a conversation uh with them. Yeah. Like [37:37] what I'd say is it really depends on [37:38] your end customer too because if you're [37:42] doing outreach to like for example HVAC [37:45] companies saying hey I'm Sam Alman's [37:48] former chief of staff thought you might [37:50] find it interesting we're going to say [37:51] buddy I have no idea what the words in [37:53] this message mean. So it could be like [37:55] hey I was at my dad like I worked at my [37:57] family's plumbing company in in high [38:00] school and now I'm do working on this [38:02] kind of uh interesting thing. Thought [38:04] you might find it interesting. Would you [38:05] be open to chat? [38:06] >> Uh, an implicit element of this is keep [38:08] it very short. Sounds like it's just [38:09] like a sentence or two. [38:10] >> Yeah. [38:11] >> Okay. And then what's your take on uh AI [38:15] emailing a bunch of people versus [38:17] individually reaching out and thinking [38:19] about some unique message per person? [38:21] >> I uh have not seen AI personalization [38:25] work at this stage. Usually what it does [38:28] is it tells them something they already [38:29] know about themselves and they're like [38:31] that looks like Claude wrote it. And so [38:33] I don't usually recommend that. I also [38:35] don't haven't seen personalization be [38:38] super important here. The these messages [38:41] that I like I said the entire message [38:43] that I would send. You don't need to [38:45] actually have a ton of personalization [38:47] in it or like hey I'm going to X [38:49] conference. We're going to be pitching. [38:50] Would you be open to chat? Like [38:51] something like that can be good enough [38:53] without any personalization at all. All [38:55] the examples you shared are very simple [38:57] and don't have anything to do with them [38:59] and just say something interesting [39:00] basically. Uh, and what you what you [39:04] don't recommend is is basic. Yeah. The [39:07] idea, you're not trying to sell them [39:08] immediately. You just want to have a [39:09] call. [39:10] >> Yeah. And on the call, we'll see if you [39:11] have poll. If you do, you're going to [39:14] turn it into a sales call. If you don't, [39:16] nothing I do is going to change that. [39:18] [laughter] [39:19] >> Okay. How many emails slash LinkedIn [39:22] posts should you start with? Say you're [39:23] just getting started to try to find some [39:25] calls. [39:26] >> Yeah. So, I tend to start on LinkedIn [39:27] because the kind of person who you and I [39:30] like talk to, they have interesting [39:32] LinkedIn. And so, if you're reaching out [39:34] to someone, they're going to say, "Oh, [39:35] okay. That so that's going to do a lot [39:36] of lifting. You can just get started." [39:38] And so, you can add 100 150 people on [39:42] LinkedIn per week, go for that. Add 20 a [39:45] day and then message them when they [39:47] accept the connection request. And if [39:50] you're sending like if you're connecting [39:52] with I don't know let's say you connect [39:54] with a 100 people per week or you you [39:56] send 150 um my typical targets for that [39:59] are like 30 to 40% of them should accept [40:02] your connection request and then of them [40:05] 30 to 50 should% should reply and a [40:08] subset of them should say yes the [40:10] majority of them should say yeah sure [40:12] why not. [40:13] >> Okay that's an awesome benchmark. So if [40:15] you're not at that level, basically your [40:17] interesting email is not is not working. [40:19] You should find some more interesting [40:20] >> is is it's could be your profile if [40:22] people aren't accepting your request. [40:24] Like they might look at you and say, [40:25] "You don't look like somebody I should [40:27] accept this requesting [40:33] if you're dead 30 to 40% accepts and [40:36] then people aren't replying." [40:37] >> This season's supporting sponsor is DX. [40:40] Now that everybody at your company is [40:42] finally using AI, the question that [40:45] engineering leaders face is no longer [40:47] are we using AI, but is it paying off? [40:50] With DX, you can measure and benchmark [40:52] the impact [music] of AI adoption across [40:54] your full product life cycle. DX shows [40:57] you where AI is helping developers and [40:59] where it's creating new bottlenecks. You [41:01] can also use it to evaluate AI vendors, [41:04] monitor costs and licenses, and see [41:06] exactly what's limiting your agents. [41:09] That's why hundreds of enterprises, [41:11] including Snowflake, Sony, and BNY, use [41:14] the DX platform to measure AI's impact [41:17] on developer productivity. Visit [41:19] getdx.com/lenny [41:22] to get a demo of DX. That's [41:24] getdx.com/lenny. [41:28] So, say you've landed a call and you're [41:30] going to do a sales call, say your first [41:32] one. What is your advice for doing a [41:35] great job on the on the sales call? [41:37] mostly two steps in a sales call. [41:39] There's the pull discovery step and then [41:43] there's the kind of conceptual pitch of [41:45] how we might help step. And so the uh [41:50] the theory behind a sales call is again [41:52] it's like if you have pull you're going [41:56] to rip the thing out of my hands. I [41:59] don't come into this call like wired up [42:02] ready to try to convince you to buy like [42:04] super ant. No, it's just if you have [42:06] pull, you're going to convince me to let [42:08] you buy. [42:09] >> And so I approach this with the vibe of [42:12] just like waned back, [42:14] >> excited to chat. Let's let's see if I [42:16] might be able to help you. And so I have [42:17] a very specific structure of a sales [42:19] call that I recommend for getting into [42:22] discovery and then transitioning out of [42:24] discovery. Basically that you start the [42:27] call, hey, thanks so much for taking the [42:29] time. I'm curious. I'm sure you get a [42:31] bunch of people reaching out to you. [42:32] like why did you take the call with me [42:34] today? That's a chance for them to say, [42:36] you know, you mentioned AI agents and [42:39] I've been thinking about this and I've [42:41] just been waiting and I looked at your [42:42] website. I whatever whatever it winds up [42:44] being and they they fill out the entire [42:47] poll framework for you right there. [42:49] That's ideal. And then you can say, "Oh, [42:50] that's interesting. Let me can I ask a [42:52] couple follow-ups?" But most of the time [42:54] they'll say, "I don't know. You reached [42:55] out to me. Excited to hear what you have [42:57] to say." Say, "Great." You use what they [43:00] have just told you and say, "Okay, [43:02] great. That sounds like a great agenda [43:03] for today's call. We can do that. That [43:06] does that sound good to you?" Get their [43:08] thumbs up on the agenda. And then you [43:10] earn the right to ask them some [43:12] discovery questions about their poll by [43:14] saying, "Great. Okay, before we get to [43:16] those items on your, you know, on our [43:19] agenda, um, do you mind if I ask you a [43:21] few questions to better understand your [43:23] context?" And that way you've earned the [43:26] right to ask questions. it does not feel [43:28] like an interrogation to them because if [43:30] it does uh they're not telling you [43:32] anything. [43:32] >> Okay, a few tactical questions. One is [43:34] just how long should you try to make [43:36] this call? How long should your invite [43:38] be for? And then where does where does a [43:40] demo fit in? Do you recommend demo on [43:42] this call or doing a separate call for [43:43] that? Yeah. So, this is almost always a [43:46] 30 minute call on the calendar. Just um [43:49] I found smaller calendar blocks uh they [43:52] don't see on their calendar and so they [43:54] don't show. Um and so 30 minutes and [43:57] then iffy on doing a demo. So if you're [44:00] super early, you probably don't have a [44:02] demo to show. And so um but later on you [44:06] might have a very short demo in in your [44:09] first call. I I guess because I'm [44:10] thinking about the Jen conversation I [44:12] had and her advice is wait to do the [44:14] demo but that's an enterprise sales sort [44:16] of product not like an early stage just [44:18] full hypothesis phase. [44:19] >> Yeah totally totally [44:21] >> okay got it. What's a sign that the this [44:23] meeting went well? Is it this kind of [44:25] leaning in pulling it from you feeling? [44:28] >> Yeah. So so it's kind of you're able to [44:30] surface pull [44:32] or you're able to say okay you don't [44:34] have pull at all. help me understand why [44:38] this isn't relevant to you, what is and [44:40] so you come away with a either filled [44:43] out poll framework of okay, I understand [44:45] this person's poll and they are trying [44:47] to pull or you understand why they don't [44:50] have pull. [44:51] >> How many of these calls should you do [44:53] before you're like okay there's no pull [44:54] here time to move on. I don't have a [44:56] hard like what I tend to do is if you [44:58] have five calls [45:01] and everybody's leaned back and you [45:03] learn nothing then there's a sign that [45:05] something's wrong. If you have and I've [45:08] seen people do like hundreds of calls [45:11] where they still don't like they so do [45:14] five and then check in and see what [45:16] you've learned from the calls. Was there [45:18] any pull there? Did we learn anything [45:20] interesting? Like I a startup I was just [45:21] helping out, they had done like five [45:24] calls into banking and they just felt [45:26] nothing. But they got an intro from one [45:29] of the people said, "Yeah, this doesn't [45:30] seem relevant to me, but you might [45:32] consider defense companies." And they [45:34] got an intro into that. They know [45:35] nothing about defense. And in the first [45:37] conversation, defense, the person's [45:38] like, "Holy, are you serious?" And [45:42] they're like, "Okay, maybe there's [45:43] something here." And they changed their [45:44] poll hypothesis. It feels like a big [45:46] part of this of your of your framework [45:48] and approach is to just like be brutally [45:50] honest with yourself whether there's [45:51] something here. I imagine a lot of [45:53] founders are just like so excited and [45:55] convinced this is real and your approach [45:58] is just like here's here's a way to [46:00] validate that and be really real with [46:02] what's working or not. [46:03] >> Yeah. I think it's thinking of it as [46:05] we're selling to learn, not really to to [46:09] like push something. Yeah. Not not to [46:11] push. We're we're going to learn and [46:13] we're seeing if they try to buy. If they [46:16] don't, cool. We've learned something. We [46:18] can kind of keep iterating from there. [46:20] If they do, okay, great. Now we might [46:23] have something. Let's see if it repeats. [46:25] >> The whole idea of calling this pull is [46:27] so smart because you always hear product [46:30] market fit is you're feeling pull. [46:31] You're feeling pulled. This boulder is [46:33] pulling you down. The wind is pushing [46:34] you. [46:35] >> Yeah. [46:35] >> Um and so not only is it this acronym of [46:38] what you look for, but it's this [46:39] reminder. What you're looking for is [46:41] pull. something pulling. [46:43] >> Yeah. And you can also tell like, do I [46:45] feel like I'm pushing right now? Do I [46:47] feel like I'm convincing? That's a red [46:49] flag that something either in your mind [46:51] or in the conversation is off and like, [46:54] "Okay, cool. Let's figure out what that [46:56] is." [46:56] >> Is there an example that comes to mind [46:58] when you think about a good sales call, [47:00] what that kind of feels like, looks [47:01] like, what a pitch would be? [47:03] >> Yeah. So, so what you're trying to do is [47:04] you're trying to get again the poll out [47:07] of them. And so they say, um, you know, [47:10] uh, I'm trying to I'm trying to make a [47:13] website, but one of those like, you [47:16] know, those typical point-and-click [47:18] website design things are just like too [47:20] much effort for me, right? So, you have [47:23] something about pull there. You've kind [47:25] of pulled that out of them. They they [47:27] they've described that. And so, the kind [47:29] of interesting thing is that once you [47:31] have pull, your pitch is like quite [47:34] simple. What you're not trying to do [47:37] here is you're not trying to describe [47:38] this massive product vision or your [47:40] theory of the problem. You know that [47:42] they're trying to do X but blocked [47:45] because of Y. And so your pitch in that [47:48] case is okay. So it sounds like you're [47:50] you're looking for something to make a [47:52] website without all the hassle of a [47:55] point-and-click thing. Is that roughly [47:57] it? And you describe it in a really [47:59] really small and simple way. Not a [48:01] really big way. you describe it in a [48:03] small way and they say yeah that's that [48:05] sounds like it. How exactly does that [48:07] work like tell me more? They're pulling [48:09] more information out of you and that's [48:11] when you know you're like starting to be [48:14] on to something. And are you in your [48:15] head thinking through the pull framework [48:18] of these four points and just thinking [48:19] through like okay is this actually a [48:21] something they need right now and [48:23] unavoidable are there what are their [48:25] alternatives and kind of thinking [48:26] through all that. Yeah, those are like [48:27] actually the questions I will ask too, [48:29] which is like um if I if they don't tell [48:32] me at the very beginning when I say [48:33] why'd you take the call, then I'm asking [48:35] a question that's kind of like [48:37] >> is there anything as it relates to I [48:39] don't know your QA process that you're [48:42] trying to do but you've been unable to [48:44] do with your existing tools, methods, [48:47] team, whatever, right? And so that [48:48] question has all the elements of poll in [48:50] it so that they can then say oh yeah [48:53] actually we've been trying to automate [48:54] endtoend testing but can't do d with you [48:58] know with our existing tools and so and [49:00] then if they kind of give me some [49:02] element there then I have the framework [49:04] in my mind and I know a lot of people [49:06] actually have the framework in like a [49:07] doc during the call and they're filling [49:10] it out live and it's like I don't think [49:12] I have the you and then you ask a [49:14] question you're like okay but like is Is [49:17] it okay if you don't do that now? Like [49:20] can you is there some reason you have to [49:23] do this now or is this okay to do [49:24] another time? [49:26] >> And you're like scared to almost ask [49:28] you're like oh no it's not going to [49:29] work. [49:29] >> Oh and the scariest one is to say well [49:31] what have you I'm sure you've looked [49:33] into other options. Are they good [49:35] enough? Right. And uh to hear that one [49:39] uh where they're like actually yeah we [49:40] can do it ourselves and that's good [49:42] enough. But it prevents you from again [49:44] pushing a product the market doesn't [49:45] want [49:46] >> and just spending years of your life [49:47] trying to make it work. [49:49] >> Yeah. There's a reason I look like I'm [49:51] 60 and I'm 35, right? Like [laughter] [49:53] don't push. [49:54] >> You look great, Rob. You look great. [49:56] Filters. [49:58] [laughter] [50:00] >> Oh man. So this [clears throat] touches [50:01] on a like we haven't actually addressed [50:03] the specific challenge which is that [50:06] there's a lot you have to get over for [50:08] people to decide to try something new [50:10] and to buy something new. the status quo [50:12] is generally fine. They have so many [50:14] priorities. They have so many things [50:15] they're dealing with. Just like the bar [50:17] to get over for people to be like, I [50:19] want this. I'm going to buy it now is [50:21] really high. And the idea here of this [50:23] framework is to get over that hump. [50:25] Well, it's to find the people for whom [50:26] stat the status quo is not okay, right? [50:29] It's to find the people, you know, [50:31] everyone says like change is hard and [50:32] all this kind of stuff. Well, you're [50:34] looking for the people who are already [50:35] trying to change who don't need [50:38] convincing. There's this idea that your [50:40] product has to be 10 times better than [50:42] the existing solution for anyone to [50:43] care. Do you feel like like how do you [50:46] think about okay this is better they [50:48] tried alternatives none of them do it or [50:50] some of them do it okay like how much [50:52] better does this have to be for them to [50:54] care or is it okay if it's just like you [50:56] know just a little bit better the [50:58] example with with jump I think again the [51:00] AI noteaker for financial advisors is a [51:02] good one how much better are they than [51:04] the other generic AI note takers well if [51:07] those notetakers don't get the job done [51:10] and we do they are infinitely better [51:13] they unblock something. And so that's [51:16] kind of how I think about how stuck are [51:17] they with their existing options. And so [51:20] I don't know I don't know about 10x like [51:21] I that thing that doesn't quite register [51:23] in my head. It's really are they a [51:25] coiled spring and how do they respond [51:27] when I show up? [51:28] >> So I think about a company like linear [51:31] who competes with Jira. I don't know if [51:32] you know do you know linear? [51:33] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. [51:35] >> So just I'm curious if it applies [51:37] through this framework. So in my [51:40] understanding, linear wins over Jira [51:42] often because the experience is is just [51:44] better. It's just like a beautiful [51:46] smooth uh you know well-crafted uh [51:50] experience and so they win a lot of [51:52] customers because it just feels nice and [51:54] engineers really like using it. Do you [51:56] feel like that works through the pull [51:57] framework or is there something else [51:58] going on there? Again, if we use the [52:01] poll framework to to analyze that [52:03] situation, what would have to be true is [52:05] there's a certain kind of person who is [52:08] trying to do their issue tracking, but [52:10] like they are blocked from they're [52:13] trying to do something around issue [52:14] tracking and something about Jira's [52:16] experience is blocking them from doing [52:18] the way such that linear's way better [52:22] experience is actually relevant to them. [52:25] Right? like I've done. So I've made the [52:27] mistake of taking that analogy and being [52:30] like, "Okay, so I can just come into a [52:32] category with way better UX, way better [52:35] experience, and I'm going to crush it." [52:37] And like try that in HR software and uh [52:41] I try I tried it in HR software and it [52:44] turned out the user experience was not [52:46] relevant to the buyer and so they didn't [52:49] have P. They didn't care that their [52:51] systems look like they're still on [52:53] Cobalt or whatever it is. So it wasn't [52:55] relevant there. But again, the poll [52:58] theory would say that basically in in uh [53:00] the case of Jira Jira versus uh linear [53:03] that there was a kind of person who was [53:05] kind of blocked by Jira's experience. [53:08] And I imagine the stronger the pull the [53:10] faster all this stuff happens. It grows. [53:12] I know linear took him a long time to [53:14] get get people using it to trust it to [53:16] switch and so maybe the pull because of [53:19] maybe there wasn't as much of that [53:21] blocking and it was more of just like [53:23] okay I can just move faster be happier [53:25] uh it took longer is that do you find [53:26] that just like the stronger the pull the [53:28] faster the company grows that yeah I've [53:30] seen a bunch of startups where like they [53:31] go zero to whatever like everyone now is [53:33] going zero to infinity super fast and [53:37] and it's like not it's because they have [53:39] found these like pockets of pull where [53:42] people will rip a product out of their [53:43] hands. Um, and it's like people will see [53:47] these AI pitches now and it's like, wait [53:48] a second, it can do X and buy basically [53:52] instantly. And I've seen I've seen that [53:54] happen in like enterprise. I saw an [53:55] enterprise deal close in like two weeks [53:59] and it's just like that thing did. When [54:01] I was growing up, enterprise deals took [54:03] 18 months. Like what what the heck? When [54:06] I was growing up, I like that. [54:08] [clears throat] Okay, so let's move on [54:10] to the next step. So, at this point, we [54:12] you had your first sales call. Uh, I [54:15] imagine the next step is closing the [54:16] deal. And I interesting because it's [54:18] still early. You may not even have a [54:19] product. What does that look like going [54:21] from, okay, I want to buy it now. What [54:22] do you What do you do next? [54:24] >> Yeah. So, it kind of going to depend on [54:26] the size of the deal, but you want to [54:28] come back with some sort of a concept [54:30] and some sort of a plan. And so, uh, [54:32] examples of this, so the pharma company [54:34] that I mentioned, uh, earlier, the [54:36] company selling into pharma, he showed [54:38] up and just threw a Hail Mary on a on an [54:40] intro to a pharma exec. Pharma exec was [54:42] like, "Oh my gosh, thank you so much for [54:44] asking. Our current market research is [54:46] da da da da. We're trying. It's just so [54:48] bad. It's so slow." And the founder was [54:51] like, "Okay, I don't even have slides [54:53] here. I'm just hearing this for the [54:54] first time." And so it sounds like [54:56] you're looking for faster market [54:58] research that that looks like the [55:01] current research you're getting but kind [55:02] of I don't know like it it's just better [55:05] in these kinds of ways. Is that roughly [55:06] right? And the exec was like yes that's [55:09] exactly it. And so the founder is like [55:10] okay let's do this. What if I come back [55:13] to you in a couple days with a kind of [55:15] mockup of what I think that could look [55:17] like and then we can we can discuss if [55:19] that fits what you're really looking for [55:21] and then decide if we want to move [55:22] forward. And so in that case, no slides, [55:25] no nothing. Goes and vibe codes a kind [55:28] of rough layout of what this would look [55:31] like, gets some feedback on it, says, [55:32] "Okay, based on that, is there anything [55:35] else you need to know to decide whether [55:36] this is a fit that you want to bring [55:38] into your organization?" [55:40] Says, uh, like, "Yeah, what's the [55:42] price?" And then there's a there's a [55:45] talk track you can use for price, but [55:46] that's basically it. [55:48] >> Okay. Tell me more about this price talk [55:50] track. [55:51] >> Yeah. So the interesting thing about the [55:53] poll framework is that it can help you [55:55] set the bounds for pricing. So what's [55:58] the value of getting the project done or [56:00] what are the cost of the alternatives? [56:03] So uh the the L's so what's the value of [56:06] getting this market research faster or [56:09] what is the cost you're currently [56:11] spending with your um with your market [56:15] research consultants? Both of those can [56:16] tell you, okay, the value of market [56:18] research is like X. The cost with [56:21] consultants is, I don't know, $50,000 [56:24] per per year. And so that gives me a [56:27] rough boundary to say, okay, what if we [56:30] charged $50,000 a year, the same price [56:32] as your current market research [56:33] consultants? It it kind of gives a frame [56:35] on price that um that makes it intuitive [56:39] to your potential customers. [56:41] >> Awesome. Okay. Um, so the way you've [56:44] kind of written about this closing step, [56:46] there's kind of like two parts. There's [56:47] the fit of just like is this a fit and [56:50] then it's just a bunch of project [56:51] management to get the deal closed. Um, [56:53] so we've spent a lot of time I think on [56:55] the fit the project management. Is there [56:56] anything there important to talk about? [56:58] >> Yeah. So this is you did a great episode [57:01] uh with Jen a great couple episodes with [57:03] Jen on the like sales process. [57:07] And so in bigger deals, enterprise [57:10] deals, there's like the champion [57:13] has pull and decides, yes, I want this. [57:16] And then you have to do a set of like 17 [57:18] demos. You have to genulect in front of [57:20] four committees. Like there's all of [57:21] these things that you have to do. For [57:23] smaller deals, you like don't have to do [57:25] that kind of stuff. It might just be the [57:27] CEO who's like, "Yeah, cool. Next step [57:29] is you send me the stripe plank and we [57:31] schedule an onboarding call." And so the [57:33] project management step will depend. My [57:36] typical recommendation for project [57:37] management in larger organizations is to [57:41] have a conversation with the buyer with [57:44] the with the champion to say kind of [57:46] okay cool this is the project on your [57:47] to-do list when does this need to be [57:49] showing results by they'll say oh [57:52] definitely Q1 next year okay cool that's [57:54] a forcing function you work backwards [57:57] from there to say okay given that we [57:59] need to be live Q1 what are the set of [58:02] steps that need to happen between now [58:04] and then so we can be deployed and [58:06] showing results by then and that is a [58:09] forcing function for all of the pro [58:11] steps in the sales process. [58:12] >> Awesome. So basically asking when do we [58:14] need to show success for this to be a [58:16] thing that you all roll out and then [58:17] working backwards from that. Okay. Um at [58:20] this point a lot of people would create [58:22] basically design partnership [58:24] arrangements where they're like okay [58:25] cool we'll build this with you. We'll [58:26] figure it out as we go. We won't charge [58:28] you. Uh per your earlier point you were [58:31] not into design partnerships. Uh, I [58:33] imagine your advice here is just like [58:34] sell it directly. Don't try to give them [58:36] to for free. Don't set up some kind of [58:38] partnership thing. [58:39] >> Yeah. Yeah. Why? Well, why shoot [58:41] yourself in the foot? [58:43] >> And again, the reason not to is because [58:45] it just you find that doesn't lead to [58:47] the best to stuff that actually sells [58:49] and works. Building this kind of design [58:51] partnership relationship. [58:52] >> Yeah. If they're like it it basically [58:54] takes something from I need to to solve [58:56] this right now [58:58] >> to like okay now I'm helping you build [59:01] your product. like where what are we [59:02] doing here? So it it's a negative signal [59:05] to the most to people with who actually [59:07] have pole and it's a positive signal to [59:09] people who don't. [59:10] >> Awesome. Okay, that totally makes sense. [59:12] Like if there's pull just go [laughter] [59:14] with it, you need to Yeah. [59:16] >> Yeah. And you can sell something that's [59:18] like, you know, you might not have a [59:19] full platform ready. You can sell [59:20] something that's more servicehaped early [59:22] on. I've seen a bunch of startups do [59:24] that where they sell, you know, okay, [59:26] we're going to have an AI product [59:27] manager who can do XYZ kind of thing. [59:30] For now, it's delivered by us while this [59:34] thing is working behind the scenes. And [59:36] so you can kind of frame it so they're [59:39] not expecting a full platform that like [59:42] enterprisegrade platform ready next [59:44] week. They expect something more [59:46] service-shaped and you kind of validate [59:48] that there's real pull there and you [59:50] figure out what the actual thing to [59:52] build is. while delivering it a mix of [59:54] manually and automated. [59:55] >> Okay, that's really interesting. That's [59:56] come up a lot on the podcast, especially [59:58] with go to market sales conversations. [60:00] This idea of services being a great [60:02] place to start, which historically has [60:04] been a terrible idea because uh the fear [60:07] is you never actually get to a place [60:08] where you can automate it and you're [60:10] just running a consulting business [60:12] forever with terrible margins. So, [60:14] you've seen this work, this idea of [60:15] starting with basically like humans [60:17] doing the thing and then slowly building [60:18] a product around it that increases [60:20] margins. Yeah, it definitely has [60:22] downsides, right? You definitely can get [60:24] stuck in a kind of service businesses [60:28] kind of thing, but everything has [60:30] downsides. [60:32] >> Awesome. Yeah. And the idea is AI kind [60:34] of does more and more of this stuff. And [60:35] part of it is you learn more and more of [60:36] what uh what the problem opportunities [60:38] are and things like that with people [60:39] doing the work. Okay. Um going back to [60:43] price real quick. Uh classically [60:45] founders are afraid to ask for big [60:47] numbers and throw out, you know, high [60:49] prices. uh knowing that the stuff [60:51] changes and you'll learn as you go. Any [60:53] advice for that first price pitch of [60:55] what number to throw out? [60:57] >> Yeah. So early on I'm really more [60:59] testing willingness to transact versus [61:02] willingness to pay. And so I don't care [61:04] about pricing a ton in the early couple [61:07] of customers. That said, I was just [61:10] working with a company that's their [61:11] first deal is enterprise and they've got [61:13] a big demo day coming up and so they're [61:15] like, "How do we get the most possible [61:17] revenue out of this so we can look like [61:19] that for demo day?" Totally valid thing [61:21] to do. In that case, what you do is you [61:24] throw out a number in a way that doesn't [61:27] like get you slapped. And the specific [61:31] approach that I'd recommend for that is [61:33] um almost like using a case study as a [61:36] hey react to this kind of case study. [61:38] And so you'd say yeah when we talk to [61:40] others the way they everyone's kind of [61:42] done pricing differently. Some of them [61:44] have been you know it's been sometimes [61:46] it's been a small project for 80,000 [61:49] other times it's been up to a million in [61:50] terms of right and these are kind of the [61:52] levers here and some people a lot of [61:54] people wind up in the middle. You tell [61:56] me how are you thinking about this? And [61:58] so what you're doing is you're not like [62:00] me on this side proposing pricing to you [62:02] on this side. It's both of us looking at [62:05] like an example, a kind of semi-real [62:08] example of what you've heard from others [62:10] as how they think about this and letting [62:12] them them throw up on that. [62:15] [laughter] [62:16] Throw up on that. I like that. Um I know [62:18] this case study concept is is actually [62:20] an important part of this whole [62:21] framework. I'm going to come back to it, [62:23] >> but okay. So let's talk about the next [62:25] step. So say you have the sales call in [62:27] BF2. what kind of comes next after this [62:29] first batch of sales calls that you're [62:30] doing. [62:31] >> Yeah, this is where the paths might [62:33] diverge. So hopefully you're right and [62:37] uh these people have pull. Great. You [62:40] now have customers time to deliver and [62:42] start repeating this and try start [62:44] figuring out how to automate things and [62:46] and just systematize this. You're on the [62:49] right path. A lot of the times you get [62:52] kind of a weird set of responses. you [62:55] you learn that the people you thought [62:57] were weird not to buy are actually weird [63:00] to buy. It'd be weird if they did buy. [63:02] They're not behaving in a way where they [63:03] have pull. And in that case, what I tend [63:06] to recommend is you just analyze. You go [63:08] back and review the calls and you say, [63:10] "Okay, did one actually have pull? Did [63:13] zero like what have we learned here?" [63:15] And then you craft a new hypothesis and [63:18] run it again. Got it? And imagine most [63:21] of the time it's not it's not there. And [63:24] is that your experience or what's kind [63:26] of the pie chart of yes success versus [63:28] not at this stage? [63:29] >> Yeah, I've seen like maybe once or twice [63:32] where it was there [63:34] >> uh from the beginning and that's magical [63:36] like you feel like a hero when you when [63:38] you get it right the first time. Uh a [63:40] lot of times it is uh it is like we're [63:45] so wrong and backwards that we don't [63:47] know and so you just ask a Hail Mary a [63:49] couple times and that gets you on the [63:51] right path or you like do something [63:53] crazy where a friend just uh like went [63:56] to a conference and scheduled 20 [63:57] meetings and just was like I don't know [63:59] what to do. You tell me what to build [64:00] you or something like that. I call that [64:02] goblin mode where you just just going [64:04] all out and doing unhealthy things to [64:07] see like who will buy something from me [64:09] right now to then generate your [64:11] hypothesis out of. [64:12] >> Say more about goblin mode. This is [64:14] amazing. [64:14] >> Yeah. You know like when when dogs do [64:16] that like get the zooies right and they [64:18] just like that's that's the thing I have [64:20] in my mind for what goblin mode is as a [64:22] founder where it's like [64:23] >> and this is a good thing or not a good [64:25] thing? [64:25] >> It's a it's a break glass in case of [64:27] emergency thing. uh where it's um and I [64:31] think some founders actually operate [64:32] like this all the time where it's like [64:34] okay there's actually a conference [64:35] tomorrow in Europe that has these [64:40] potential customers there I can't get [64:42] them to talk to me so looks like I'm [64:44] going to get on a plane right now and go [64:46] there right it's just doing uh kind of [64:48] somewhat crazy things with the goal of [64:51] getting in front of customers right now [64:53] and uh yeah like some people can do this [64:55] all the time uh others like me who are [64:58] get an old like I can I can pull this [65:00] out once in a while. [65:03] >> Get that goblin mode out sometimes. So [65:05] the idea there's and you're saying this [65:06] sometimes this can work just like going [65:08] nuts just like going talking to everyone [65:10] looking for these earned secrets. [65:12] >> Yeah. And one example of this, like it's [65:13] kind of a crazy example, but a friend's [65:16] building a a company called Tiro, which [65:18] does dental staffing uh for for dental [65:20] hygienists. And he his version of goblin [65:23] mode was his parents went doortodoor to [65:26] different dental offices to just get [65:29] people to to talk to him about about [65:30] being customers. And that worked. And so [65:33] it's just like weird stuff like that can [65:35] work. [65:36] >> Amazing. Okay. So you say do a couple [65:38] sales calls, say do five. Is that is [65:40] that kind of the idea? do like five and [65:41] assess. Is that rough heristic? Okay. [65:44] So, say to your point, most times you'll [65:46] find, okay, this is not there's no pull [65:48] here. Sorry. [65:49] >> What do you do? Do you go back to the [65:51] beginning, go hands hands-on with some [65:53] other small business sort of thing or [65:54] what do you recommend? [65:55] >> Yeah. So, different pathways there. [65:57] Hopefully, you've asked the Hail Mary [65:59] question and you've learned something [66:02] there that's like worth double clicking [66:03] into. [66:03] >> And the Hail Mary question is just like [66:05] what is there anything that we can do to [66:07] with Yeah. right now that is a problem [66:09] on your to-do list. [66:10] >> Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And it's and so [66:12] you've generated some new information [66:15] that you can then use to like [66:16] >> do another set of five. [66:19] >> If not, then yeah, you just go back, get [66:21] some firsthand knowledge, try it again. [66:24] >> Awesome. Okay. So, so this process is [66:27] very straightforward. Have a pull [66:28] hypothesis, fill out this template, [66:31] schedule basically cold outbound with [66:33] this surprising message that'll get [66:35] people's attention, think you're [66:36] interesting. Uh, do five calls roughly, [66:39] get a sense, is there pull or not? If [66:40] there's not pull, throw out some Hail [66:42] Mary questions, maybe enter goblin mode [66:44] to look for something. Uh, come up with [66:46] another pull hypothesis, do five more [66:48] calls, and repeat until you're like, [66:50] "Oh, wow. We've got this poll." Yep. And [66:52] then you have a business. [66:54] >> There we go. Off to the races. Okay. So, [66:58] say you've actually found something, [67:00] something that is pulling and people are [67:02] like, I need this now. What comes next? [67:04] What do you kind of the there's kind of [67:06] like the building onboarding process and [67:08] then just keeping them happy? What's [67:10] that process like? What advice do you [67:11] have there? [67:12] >> Yeah, so I found that I didn't really [67:13] have a good way to think about what [67:15] happens after people buy and so I felt [67:17] like the dog who got a car and I just [67:19] kind of like threw the software over the [67:21] over the over the fence and like good [67:23] luck. Um what I've learned since then [67:25] the hard way obviously is that like [67:27] retention is super important and it's [67:30] not obvious. And so the way I think [67:32] about like delivery post sale is that [67:35] basically everybody who buys is [67:37] guaranteed to churn [67:40] until X [67:44] in which case they're weird to churn. [67:47] And all delivery is all everything is [67:50] about figuring out what is X and how do [67:53] you design a bullet train so every [67:55] customer gets there. And so X is, you [68:00] might think of it as, oh, they're using [68:01] the product or they have high NPS or [68:04] whatever it is. It's almost never those [68:06] things. Mark Rober has this kind of [68:09] leading indicator of retention, which [68:11] for Slack was like you sent 10,000 [68:14] messages or a thousand messages in your [68:15] first X amount of time. If you hit that, [68:19] it's like it'd be weird if you churned. [68:21] You It's the leading indicator of [68:23] retention. For my startup, we gave [68:25] retention software to restaurants. If [68:27] they got a notification that somebody [68:30] was going to quit that they could [68:32] prevent within the first two weeks uh [68:35] after purchase, they would like go [68:37] insane. They would tell all of their [68:40] friends about it and they it would be [68:41] weird if they churned. And so we just [68:43] designed the onboarding process to that. [68:44] And so what I recommend is once you have [68:47] a couple people who are saying yes, [68:48] don't just like throw the product over [68:50] and like send them a login and pray. go [68:53] deliver firsthand as well and you're [68:55] going to learn a ton from that and keep [68:57] asking the question like are you going [68:59] to turn now? Are you going to turn now? [69:00] Like what and try to find the moment [69:02] when when they're like oh okay cool I [69:05] can't live without this. I love how your [69:07] mind works where it's these formulas and [69:09] these templates and just everything is [69:11] this and obviously it's not like this [69:13] cleancut but it's really helpful I think [69:15] for people to just think of it in these [69:17] very structured ways uh to take these [69:20] general ideas of what it looks like when [69:21] things are going well and how to find an [69:23] idea to just like okay here's what you [69:24] plug in talk about the specific thing [69:26] it's working adjust so this is great on [69:30] the churn piece is there what's like a [69:32] sign okay shoot everyone's turning just [69:33] like a sign of like okay they thought [69:35] they in but that it's not working. [69:37] Anything there of just like what's a [69:38] sign at this stage? Okay, maybe it's not [69:40] working versus it is. [69:42] >> Yeah. So, if everybody's churning the it [69:45] is unacceptable for you to not figure [69:46] out why. And so, uh what I've actually [69:50] seen is in a lot of cases like for a lot [69:52] of horizontal products, you're going to [69:54] have a lot of like user drop off. So, [69:56] one one startup I know like they they [69:58] were a horizontal AI workflows product. [70:01] Cool. Join the club, right? But they [70:03] found through being a horizontal AI [70:05] workflows product that like one or two [70:07] kinds of customers kept using it while [70:09] everyone else was churning. And so if a [70:11] bunch of people are churning, 90% plus [70:13] of your c your you customers are [70:15] churning. First of all, I'm sorry it [70:18] sucks. It really, you know, you wake up [70:20] at 4 a.m. every morning just sweating. [70:23] But in that you often can figure out [70:26] why. And is it something that you're [70:28] doing or is it something about them? And [70:30] that can tell you, okay, who actually [70:32] had pull that we can sell, deliver, [70:35] retain and and for like that horizontal [70:37] workflows product, they found that [70:39] freight forwarders were using it for one [70:42] specific workflow. And so they pivoted [70:44] the entire company to focus on that. And [70:47] so they went from being this horizontal [70:48] product with massive turn, low price to [70:51] a very premium product for freight [70:53] forwarders. [70:54] >> There's no point at which like, okay, we [70:55] figured it out. We're going to be a [70:57] massive success. Like every moment of [70:59] the startup journey is a uncertain [71:01] moment but what's great about this [71:03] process so far is every mo step you get [71:05] it's more and more certain there's [71:06] something here at least and then there's [71:08] like the in forever in doubt of like how [71:10] big can this get I remember talking to [71:12] the founder of data bricks which is now [71:14] like a bazillion trillion dollar company [71:16] and he said something like even at 100 [71:18] million RR they were still very unclear [71:20] if this was a thing that will last and I [71:23] think that's very common so that's like [71:24] its own topic of just like [71:26] >> that's nice to know That's nice to know [71:28] because everyone Yeah. Everyone's like, [71:30] "How will this become a big thing?" It's [71:32] like, I don't know. We'll figure it out. [71:34] >> Yeah. It's just kind of one step at a [71:35] time and and so so in this conversation, [71:39] the final step in my mind is this idea [71:41] you have of this um use user case study [71:44] factory, which kind of takes you from [71:46] things are starting to work to okay, now [71:48] we can create a repeatable system that [71:50] helps us grow. So talk about that, what [71:52] that looks like, what that's about. [71:53] >> Yeah. So this is the thing that whenever [71:55] I talk about everyone just like [71:57] everyone's eyes glaze over and so I [71:58] haven't found found a useful way to talk [72:00] about this yet. So just pre-warning I [72:02] think it's the most important thing in [72:03] in all of this which is how do you think [72:05] about your startup? What's your [72:06] conceptual model for your startup and [72:09] like you need to have a way to think [72:11] about your startup to know how to grow [72:12] it as fast as humanly possible. So what [72:15] winds up happening is you find somebody [72:17] who has pull you give them a product or [72:20] service or whatever that they pull out [72:22] of your hands. So, it turns out they [72:24] were trying to do X, their existing [72:26] options weren't good enough for Y, and [72:29] you offer Z that helps unblock them. [72:31] That sounds a lot like a case study that [72:34] you would feature on your website. And [72:37] it's a helpful thing because, okay, my [72:40] job as a founder is not to produce a [72:43] hundred different case studies, totally [72:45] different case studies, because that's [72:46] not scalable. That's not repeatable. I'm [72:49] looking to build one case study where a [72:52] customer says hell yes before they buy [72:54] and after they buy and just repeat that [72:57] a million times. And so that model [73:00] helped me go from thinking that startups [73:02] were a bunch of different things. I need [73:04] to know all these different things to [73:05] like no a startup is just a thing that [73:08] repeats one case study infinite times [73:10] and all the stuff that I do is to build [73:13] a factory for repeating that case study. [73:16] And if I do this right, there's a case [73:18] study where customers say, "Hell yes." [73:20] And they pull themselves through each [73:22] step of the factory. The steps are the [73:25] pipeline step, how do we get people to [73:26] talk to us? Sales step, how do we turn [73:29] potential customers into actual [73:30] customers? And the delivery step of the [73:32] case study factory, which is how do we [73:34] get people who are customers to be [73:36] weird, not to churn. And so everything [73:39] we do kind of fits into this case study [73:41] factory. And if you see this in your [73:42] mind, it radically simplifies like a [73:44] startup how it works. And then you can [73:47] use like the theory of constraints. [73:49] We're going to get really nerdy for a [73:51] second from manufacturing to like look [73:53] at your case study factory and say, [73:54] "Okay, where is our where is the [73:56] bottleneck to our growth? Is it that [73:59] we're not like we don't have enough [74:02] pipeline?" Okay, cool. If that's the [74:03] bottleneck, then that's the only thing [74:05] that matters right now. Let's solve that [74:07] bottleneck and then we'll move to the [74:09] next one. The next one is our close rate [74:10] is lower than it should be. Okay, cool. [74:12] That's our bottleneck. Now we're going [74:13] to go all in on that. And so it lets you [74:15] go like the case study factory model [74:17] gives you a way of thinking about your [74:19] startup and knowing exactly where to [74:21] focus at any one point in time. [74:23] >> It's a really interesting way to think [74:25] about it where instead of we are trying [74:26] to just get more customers closed and [74:29] more deals closed instead we're looking [74:32] we're building a case studies like you [74:34] almost like working backwards from [74:35] what's the case study going to be of [74:36] this company we're talking to. Say we're [74:39] talking to SpaceX just like we want it [74:41] to look consistent across all the [74:43] companies we're talking to. People talk [74:45] about call this repeatable sales [74:46] motions, but I like the idea of thinking [74:48] of like it's almost like working [74:50] backwards from the press release, but [74:52] for sales, [74:52] >> what is the case study we're going to [74:54] write about SpaceX? Okay, here's how we [74:55] got them. Here's how we got sold them. [74:57] Here's how we delivered it. [74:58] >> And then here is just like create like [75:00] consistent repeatable case studies that [75:02] you will later be able to share. And [75:03] yeah and ex exact and then and then what [75:05] sales becomes is it becomes kind of like [75:08] hey this is the case study that we [75:09] deliver on is this relevant to you or [75:12] not and it becomes actually like you you [75:15] can show the case study to people they [75:17] say yeah that's actually what I want as [75:18] well and so it becomes this kind of tool [75:20] and you can say yeah you don't look like [75:22] our case study so it's probably going to [75:24] be a lot of work and it might not be a [75:26] good fit and you can use it for [75:27] qualification disqualification and for [75:29] people to understand what you do. That's [75:31] that's funny. There's this whole theme [75:32] now of building software factories um [75:35] where you know product build itself but [75:37] um this is really another version of a [75:39] factory you're building which is even [75:41] the broader version of just the sales [75:42] the user the case study factory. [75:45] >> Yeah. Yeah. We don't make software here. [75:46] We make case studies. [75:48] >> So is that is that is that your advice? [75:50] Just like think of it that way like we [75:51] make we make case studies here. Yeah. [75:53] It's interesting. And it's not like you [75:56] need to actually share and write up a [75:57] case study. It's just a mental model for [75:59] how to think about what you're trying to [76:00] build as an a sales go to market or [76:02] work. [76:02] >> Yeah, totally. And and the good news is [76:04] if you have the poll framework, then you [76:06] just describe here's how we helped them [76:09] and what they accomplished and you have [76:10] a case study. [76:13] >> Amazing. Okay, there's a couple things I [76:16] want to touch on because this is the end [76:17] of the process basically. Um there's a [76:19] few things I want to touch on uh that [76:21] came out of the community and things you [76:23] mentioned real quick. One is you you [76:25] have this term hell yes customers. Say [76:27] more about that is um you mentioned of [76:29] like when you're looking for someone to [76:30] buy it and then use it there's this idea [76:32] of they want them to be hell yes. Yeah. [76:34] It's it's basically somebody who pulls [76:36] the product out of your hands before [76:38] they buy and then afterwards they use it [76:41] as if it is addictive. And so they they [76:44] might literally say hell yes. But what [76:47] matters is they're weird not to buy and [76:49] weird to churn. And that process is [76:52] mostly them pulling versus you pushing. [76:56] That's your perfect fit customer. Your [76:58] job is just to find more who are [77:00] basically clones of them. [77:01] >> Okay. Uh the other kind of point I want [77:03] to reinforce is you recommend no pilots, [77:06] no point proof of concepts, no design [77:08] partners. Just go straight to we're [77:10] going to sell this to you and roll it [77:11] out and it's going to be amazing. [77:12] >> Yep. And and like sometimes you're going [77:14] to do that and they say, "Okay, but the [77:16] way we buy here is we actually need to [77:17] pilot it." [77:18] >> Okay, cool. But don't proactively I see [77:22] offer. Awesome. Okay. Another big [77:24] question that came out of the community [77:26] is from an external perspective. This [77:28] feels like this just for startups and [77:30] founders, but this actually applies for [77:32] and we mentioned this at the beginning, [77:33] but just to reinforce this point for [77:35] larger companies that are working on new [77:37] feature, new business line sort of [77:38] thing. Uh talk about just if there's [77:41] anything that you would think about [77:42] differently through this process if [77:44] you're at a mature company building a [77:45] new product. I'm I'm helping a couple [77:47] companies launch their second product. [77:49] And what they are doing is actually the [77:51] founders are like, "Cool, we're doing it [77:53] again. We're running it back." And the [77:55] founders are taking this approach to [77:59] existing customers because they're going [78:00] to try to upsell them. And they are [78:02] actually selling new features before [78:04] they've built them. Another example at [78:06] at uh existing companies is um I can't [78:10] share the name but a company was a new [78:12] product leader at a company was telling [78:13] me hey yeah the way we get our ideas all [78:16] of the ideas that have worked have come [78:18] from sales calls where they said cool [78:20] yeah you can do X but could you also do [78:23] this other thing for us and the products [78:25] that came out of the customer in the [78:27] sales calls asking for something that [78:30] could do that project for them uh all [78:32] worked all the ones they whiteboarded [78:34] never worked. So the idea here is you [78:36] have a product, you're hearing, you're [78:39] basically look finding these little [78:40] nuggets of this could be a thing. And [78:42] what I'm imagining is then you go [78:44] through this whole pull hypothesis step [78:46] by step. Just like put up that [78:47] hypothesis, talk to five of your [78:49] existing customers, look for that poll, [78:51] uh see if they're going to actually buy [78:53] it, and then kind of go through the same [78:55] process. And an important wrinkle here [78:57] that we haven't reinforced enough maybe [78:59] is that it's the founders that should be [79:00] doing this, especially in a startup. But [79:03] it's interesting you said even at a [79:05] mature company if it's a new product the [79:07] founders ideally are doing that sailing. [79:10] >> Yeah. Ideally not always the case. There [79:12] there are people who who are doing zero [79:13] to one stuff but I just recommend if [79:15] you're in that situation and you're a [79:17] non-founder [79:19] >> really focus on trying to sell the thing [79:21] and learning through selling because [79:24] there's a lot of ways to get lost in [79:25] zero to one. [79:26] >> Awesome. And then again, if things [79:28] aren't working, uh there's this idea you [79:32] should of goblin mode of just like, [79:33] okay, just try a bunch of stuff, talk to [79:34] as many people, get on planes, go have [79:36] 20 meetings, and just look for [79:38] something. [79:38] >> Yes. Yeah. Hail Mary, goblin mode. Like [79:41] all of these things are just the your [79:43] break class in case of emergency. Time [79:45] is really valuable. And like staying [79:48] suck stuck is awful. If you're in this [79:51] like pain cave of 0ero to one, it's like [79:54] the worst time of your life and you just [79:56] don't want to prolong that. So just get [79:58] on a plane, go to the office, go in [80:00] person, do whatever it takes to find [80:02] something. Rob, we did it. We went [80:05] through everything. That was amazing. Is [80:07] there anything else that you think is [80:08] important to share or anything you want [80:10] to I don't know, double down on before [80:12] we get to our very exciting lightning [80:14] round? Hopefully [80:16] what's come across is kind of how simple [80:19] this is. Pull a framework, show to [80:22] people, see if they pull. There's a lot [80:25] of ways to like over complicate this. [80:27] And there's a lot of ways where we try [80:29] to solve every variable in our head in [80:30] advance. And I've found that just pull [80:34] framework, sell, see if they try to buy [80:38] uh and think less in that process uh it [80:42] will get you there. Awesome. That sounds [80:45] very simple. And I think it's important [80:46] to know like this is very actually not [80:49] like it's hard to find an idea that [80:51] actually works. And this is all uh here [80:53] to help you save a lot of pain and [80:55] suffering and building and be kind of [80:57] being uh disillusion not disillusioned [81:00] mis uh feeling like there's something [81:02] there wasting a lot of your life doing [81:04] something that's not going to work. [81:05] >> Yeah. Think of it as like a um you know [81:07] like a metal detector on a beach. Like [81:09] this is just giving you a metal [81:11] detector. You might not find metal where [81:13] you're looking right now, but at least [81:15] I'm not giving you a spoon. [81:16] >> At least I'm not giving you a spoon. [81:18] Meaning [81:19] >> for the beach, right? Like to look for [81:21] metal. [81:22] >> You're not Oh, I see. You have a metal [81:24] detector versus looking through all the [81:25] sand with a spoon. Wow. I love that [81:28] metaphor. [81:29] Uh and then sometimes you may find a [81:31] thing that and then you realize it's not [81:33] worth anything. Yeah. [81:34] >> Okay. Wow. That's a great metaphor. [81:36] >> Well, Rob, with that we reached our very [81:39] exciting lightning round. I've got five [81:41] questions for you. Are you ready? Let's [81:42] do it. First question, what are two or [81:45] three books that you find yourself [81:47] recommending most to other people? [81:49] >> Oh gosh. The um my favorite one is the [81:53] four volume nature of order series by [81:55] Christopher Alexander. It's book on [81:57] architecture, series of books on [81:58] architecture. Best thing ever. [82:00] >> Never heard that recommendation before. [82:02] Those are my favorite. Uh favorite [82:04] recent movie or TV show you've really [82:06] enjoyed? I have two favorite movies that [82:08] we watch repeatedly. One is the Pride [82:11] the most recent Pride and Prejudice and [82:12] the second is the Penguins of Madagascar [82:14] movie. Don't know why we're in both ends [82:17] of the spectrum there. [laughter] [82:20] >> Favorite or most interesting AI product [82:23] that you recently discovered or use or [82:25] love? [82:26] >> I've been using Muse and it's like if it [82:29] works for me, it can work for anyone. [82:31] >> Yeah. Very hot right now. Uh amazing. [82:34] Okay. favorite life motto that you often [82:38] come back to in work or in life. [82:43] >> Uh life is what you make of it. [82:46] >> So true. Final question. I'm curious to [82:50] get your thoughts on this. So there's [82:51] this idea of tarpit ideas. Uh so I had [82:55] Daltton Caldwell on the podcast. He was [82:57] a partner at YC and he has this term [83:00] tarpet ideas which are ideas that people [83:01] constantly have that are just terrible [83:03] and don't work and people keep having [83:05] these ideas and they keep trying it and [83:07] they're just like okay does not work. Is [83:09] there are there any tarpet ideas you [83:11] just find people keep coming to you and [83:12] you're like don't do that it's not going [83:14] to work. Oh that's interesting. the the [83:17] category is of ideas is to go after a [83:20] space when there is already a clear [83:22] winner in that space without any theory [83:25] on being different. I just keep seeing [83:27] that it's just like, oh wow, Lemless [83:30] just built a sales automation tool and [83:32] they're bootstrapped and they're growing [83:33] really fast, so let me just build the [83:35] exact same thing as them or something [83:36] very close. And you know, it's like, [83:39] okay, but they they've already they've [83:41] already won that or they've they've [83:42] already they've already done that thing. [83:44] Um, and so, uh, unless you're like, "Oh, [83:47] but this kind of customer is unblocked, [83:49] and so we're going to build something [83:50] kind of different for them," those ideas [83:53] almost always don't work. And you feel [83:56] like you're going crazy because you're [83:57] like, "Well, it worked for them. What am [83:58] I doing wrong?" [83:59] >> And I imagine everyone answers, "But [84:02] it's better." And as we know, it can't [84:05] just be a little bit better. And [84:07] basically, you're saying like, "Okay, [84:08] this is unblocking them." [84:09] >> Yes. [84:10] >> And it's better than all the [84:12] alternatives. They're just going to go [84:12] with that thing. But I guess then, you [84:14] know, this goes into a whole other [84:15] conversation like what if it's like two [84:16] times better? And I guess your advice [84:18] there is it's it's probably not good [84:20] enough. [84:20] >> There are many things, right? You could [84:22] give me a a 100x better printer for my [84:24] house and I won't buy it because I don't [84:26] I'm not blocked. [84:28] >> That's a great example. [84:30] Oh man, Rob, we did it. [84:33] >> We did it. Holy cow. [84:34] >> We did it. Holy cow. Um, okay. How can [84:37] listeners be useful to you? That's our [84:39] final question. [84:40] >> Oh gosh. If you like the framework, use [84:42] it. tell other people about it. Um, [84:45] >> check out the book if it's useful and [84:48] uh, reach out if you have any thoughts, [84:49] ideas or this is a kind of this is a [84:53] theory framework model that is just in [84:56] development. I still feel like I'm kind [84:58] of scratching the surface on this is [84:59] kind of like what I'm what I'm going to [85:00] be doing for the next 10 20 years. So, [85:02] if you have ways to improve it, like [85:04] reach out and tell me. [85:05] >> Awesome. And your newsletter is an exact [85:07] is exactly that is you just I don't know [85:09] how often you're publishing, but just [85:10] like cool here's like another way to [85:11] think about this. Here's a wrinkle here. [85:13] >> Yeah. [85:13] >> Uh just the idea of calling it physics [85:15] of startups is is is an awesome idea. [85:17] >> Thanks. [85:18] >> So point people to the newsletter. Uh [85:20] Rob, thank you so much for being here. [85:21] >> Thank you. [85:22] >> Bye everyone. [85:24] >> Thank you so much for listening. If you [85:26] found this valuable, you can subscribe [85:27] to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, [85:30] or your favorite podcast app. Also, [85:32] please consider giving us a rating or [85:34] leaving a review as that really helps [85:36] other listeners find the podcast. You [85:38] can find all past episodes or learn more [85:40] about the show at lennispodcast.com. [85:43] See you in the next episode.