Sosin Shuns AI Infrastructure to Back Physical Moats, Carvana Stake
Colossus | Investing & Business Podcasts
Abundant intelligence will commoditize frontier models and trigger an infrastructure bust, shifting durable profits to physical distribution networks, proprietary data, and lowest-cost operators.
Pure artificial intelligence faces hard mathematical and physical limits due to chaos theory and compounding truncation errors, requiring real-world experimentation rather than pure compute to solve dynamic problems. (0:00)
As baseline intelligence cheapens toward zero, economic value shifts away from software towards scarce physical complements such as user attention, proprietary datasets, physical distribution networks, and complex manufacturing. (4:59)
Autonomous consumer agents will systematically dismantle businesses relying on customer cognitive lethargy, routing purchasing decisions directly to the lowest-cost, highest-efficiency producers. (32:01)
Sosin avoids direct investment in the AI infrastructure build-out due to severe capital cycle risks, predictable overbuilding, and the winner's curse in long-lead-time assets. (24:22)
CAS Investment Partners maintains an 80% portfolio concentration in Carvana, prioritizing the company's defensible physical logistics infrastructure over conventional academic diversification. (50:56)
Detailed notes
## Background
Published on October 27, 2026, by Colossus on the podcast 'Invest Like the Best' (EP.497), this episode features host Patrick O'Shaughnessy interviewing Cliff Sosin, founder of CAS Investment Partners. The episode explores why Sosin believes there are hard physical and mathematical limits to AI, why he avoids investing directly in the AI infrastructure build-out, and why he holds roughly 80% of his portfolio in Carvana.
## TL;DR
Cliff Sosin argues that intelligence is merely a tool for predicting dynamic systems rather than an infinite scalar, meaning that compounding errors and physical constraints will always limit pure computational reasoning. As raw intelligence rapidly cheapens and commoditizes software, value will shift decisively to scarce, physical complements—such as attention, proprietary datasets, and complex real-world logistics networks. Sosin details why he steers clear of the capital-intensive AI infrastructure race, how autonomous agents will dismantle traditional consumer inertia and Aggregation Theory, and why he relies on deep domain moats to justify an extraordinary 80% portfolio allocation to Carvana.
## Atmosphere & style
The conversation carries the tone of a rigorous, first-principles seminar driven by contrarian intellectual clarity. Sosin speaks with an unhurried, cerebral pragmatism, casually dismantling prevailing Silicon Valley dogma with colorful analogies ranging from weather simulations and house remodeling to 19th-century railroad booms. The rapport between O'Shaughnessy and Sosin feels collegial and deeply analytical, marked by candid self-reflection and a refreshing willingness to look past market consensus toward stubborn physical realities.
## Bulletin
- `00:00` Pure artificial intelligence faces hard mathematical and physical limits due to chaos theory and compounding truncation errors, requiring real-world experimentation rather than pure compute to solve dynamic problems.
- `04:59` As baseline intelligence cheapens toward zero, economic value shifts away from software towards scarce physical complements such as user attention, proprietary datasets, physical distribution networks, and complex manufacturing.
- `32:01` Autonomous consumer agents will systematically dismantle businesses relying on customer cognitive lethargy, routing purchasing decisions directly to the lowest-cost, highest-efficiency producers.
- `24:22` Sosin avoids direct investment in the AI infrastructure build-out due to severe capital cycle risks, predictable overbuilding, and the winner's curse in long-lead-time assets.
- `50:56` CAS Investment Partners maintains an 80% portfolio concentration in Carvana, prioritizing the company's defensible physical logistics infrastructure over conventional academic diversification.
## Key takeaways
- `00:00` Intelligence is an analytical tool to predict the universe from sparse inputs, but dynamic systems lack closed-form solutions and cannot be deduced through compute alone.
- `02:34` Minute truncations compound exponentially in complex dynamic systems, creating butterfly-effect divergence that sets a ceiling on purely synthetic forecasting.
- `04:59` Traditional software represents crystallized human intelligence, which general-purpose models will increasingly recreate dynamically on demand.
- `04:59` Investors should target complements to intelligence—such as proprietary data, attention, and physical scale—that become significantly more valuable as compute costs collapse.
- `07:33` Meta operates fundamentally as personalized television, where nearly all corporate expenses are direct purchases of intelligence that will yield expanding margins as compute commoditizes.
- `11:18` Frontier AI lab models risk rapid commoditization on solved tasks as open-source alternatives reach capability saturation behind the frontier.
- `15:00` Demand for frontier intelligence may narrow at ultra-high capability levels because real-world breakthroughs in fields like biology require slow, physical experiments.
- `20:39` Forecasting the returns of the AI infrastructure layer is impossible due to unknowable elasticity and aggressive, recurring capital cycle overshoots.
- `24:22` Nvidia's flat design files remain exposed to long-term synthetic engineering automation, whereas TSMC maintains a durable moat in tacit, illegible physical process engineering.
- `27:03` Autonomous AI agents will eliminate cognitive inertia in consumer behavior, systematically undercutting traditional aggregation theory and rewarding low-cost operators.
- `32:01` Human fundamental investors who price financial risk will eventually face technological displacement by quantitative and synthetic evaluation systems.
- `35:00` Price serves as an irreplaceable economic coordination mechanism that simultaneously transmits information and bundles an active incentive.
- `40:48` Higher long-term interest rates are the natural economic consequence of redeploying massive amounts of societal capital toward long-dated infrastructure builds.
- `41:45` Enterprise adoption of AI follows a four-stage pathway: company-wide hackathons, broad read-only data access, role-based write permissions, and safe automated system refactoring.
- `55:00` Extreme investment concentration in compounders like Carvana is justified when physical moats minimize catastrophic failure risk, despite short-term market volatility.
- `56:58` Education in the age of AI must turn bimodal, enforcing unassisted mastery of basic fundamentals while requiring students to tackle hyper-ambitious projects using advanced models.
## Detailed walkthrough
### `00:00` Why Intelligence Has Limits
Cliff Sosin challenges the prevailing cultural narrative of artificial intelligence—the notion that intelligence starts at an amoeba, progresses through a monkey, a human, an Einstein, and then suddenly goes “zoom” into a godlike entity. He considers that framing to be an intellectual mistake that misjudges the intrinsic boundaries of what intelligence can actually achieve. Sosin argues that intelligence should not be conceptualized as an unbounded scalar climbing infinitely like the height of a tree; instead, it operates more like a ratio, or the roundness of a ball. It is fundamentally a predictive gadget used to make guesses about the universe based on an otherwise thin scattering of known facts.
In domains governed by closed-form rules, like pure mathematics, intelligence can interpolate between facts all the way to perfection. However, most compelling real-world questions belong to complex dynamic systems—similar to the weather or cream mixing into coffee—where closed-form solutions do not exist. Any simulation inevitably suffers from truncated steps or minor errors in initial conditions that compound over time, rendering predictions wildly inaccurate. Therefore, a super-intelligent mind quickly reaches the limit of what can be deduced theoretically. Beyond that threshold, gathering further insight requires physical experiments and direct interaction with reality, which takes time. Consequently, one of the primary tasks to which intelligence is being turned is simply driving down the cost of intelligence itself. Society is moving toward a world where “really good enough” intelligence is virtually free and ubiquitous.
> “What you should really think about intelligence as is more like a ratio. Like the roundness of a ball. And intelligence is a gadget. And we use it to make predictions about the universe.” — Cliff Sosin
`02:34` Chaos Theory and the Butterfly Effect
To illustrate why even infinite intelligence cannot forecast complex adaptive or nonlinear dynamic systems, Sosin recounts the foundational discovery of chaos theory. In the early days of computing, a researcher ran a weather simulation model on a room-sized computer to predict atmospheric temperature and pressure over a multi-day horizon. Wanting to verify the output, the researcher reset the model and ran it again. Although the run began identically, by the third, fourth, and fifth days of the simulated forecast, the paths completely diverged; one model predicted 70 degrees and sunny, while the duplicate run predicted 20 degrees and pouring rain.
Believing a software bug had corrupted the machine, the team investigated and discovered that a technician inputting the second run's initial data had simply rounded off the initial pressure and temperature values by a single decimal place. Rather than generating a tiny, uniform error, that minute variation compounded across every iterative step of the calculation, producing a completely unrecognizable weather system. This phenomenon came to be known as the butterfly effect—the concept that a butterfly flapping its wings in Africa could ultimately trigger a hurricane in North America. Sosin explains that unless one possesses an exact 1:1 scale copy of the entire universe, simulations must truncate information. Because the universe contains fundamental unknowableness, pure computational intelligence hits a hard wall when modeling reality.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Compounding Error in Complex Dynamic Systems
accDescr: Diagram showing how a tiny initial truncation compounds over iterative simulation steps to cause complete divergence.
subgraph Input["Initial Conditions"]
A["Real-World State"] --> B["Truncated / Rounded Data"]
end
subgraph Iteration["Compounding Dynamic Steps"]
B --> C["Step 1: Negligible Error"]
C --> D["Step 2: Growing Divergence"]
D --> E["Step N: Uncorrelated Prediction"]
end
subgraph Divergence["Forecast Outcomes"]
E --> F["Model A: 70° & Sunny"]
E --> G["Model B: 20° & Pouring"]
end
```
> “One model said it was 70 degrees and sunny, and the other model said it was 20 degrees and pouring. People called it the butterfly effect because, at least in principle, a butterfly could flap its wings in Africa, and that could lead to a hurricane in North America or whatnot.” — Cliff Sosin
`04:59` A 200 IQ Team in Every Pocket
On a practical horizon, Sosin envisions a future where every individual carries a team of 200 IQ agents operating full-time in their pocket, backed by subsidiary teams deployed to handle granular micro-optimizations that humans are typically too lazy to execute. While enterprise tools will distribute equivalent synthetic intellects across every employee, Sosin warns this dynamic poses grave danger to certain legacy business models. Historically, businesses have extracted substantial profits from boundedly rational consumers who exhibit cognitive lethargy. For example, a bank customer accepts a modest interest rate without shopping around because they lack the mental bandwidth to monitor daily rate spreads to save $400 a year. Autonomous agents, by contrast, will continuously optimize transactions without fatigue.
Similarly, Sosin points out that many traditional software products are merely “crystallized intelligence”—hardened, static projections of analytical effort that general-purpose AI models can now synthesize on the fly. When skeptics protest that legacy software or operational problems are too complex and required thousands of brilliant engineers over decades, Sosin dismisses the objection by noting that all of it is “just intelligence.” The investing imperative, therefore, is to identify and own the true complements to intelligence—the assets that become more valuable when intelligence itself is reduced to a cheap, ubiquitous commodity:
- Proprietary data
- Human attention
- Love, affection, and emotional attachment
- Physical proximity and distribution
- Industrial scale
- Regulatory capture
> “And as I've been thinking about companies and investments, I found it helpful to assume everyone has really great intelligence and ask what's left. The pushback is often some version of, but you don't understand how hard this is, you don't understand how complicated this is, you don't understand how many smart people have had to think for so long about this. And my hand wavy and approximately right response is, OK, sure, but that's all just intelligence.” — Cliff Sosin
`07:33` Meta as Personalized TV
Turning to concrete equity examples, Sosin frames Meta as an enterprise that owns prime complements to intelligence, most notably consumer attention. Putting aside speculative bets on AI agents or the Llama ecosystem, Sosin evaluates Meta’s core operational machine. While historically categorized as a social network, Meta has effectively evolved into personalized television. Platforms like Instagram function as algorithmic entertainment feeds tailored to individual tastes; Sosin shares the personal anecdote that Instagram algorithmically surfaced his own unexpected affinity for dark British humor.
Looking at Meta from an aerial, macro perspective—what he calls viewing the company "from space" rather than from a 10,000-foot view—the financial engine is straightforward. Meta operates at an annualized scale of roughly $250 billion in revenue, against which it reinvests or spends roughly $250 billion across its combined cost of goods sold, research, operating expenses, and capital expenditures. Because Meta captures finite human attention and matches it with personalized engagement, commoditized intelligence functions as an engine to sharpen Meta's engagement algorithms rather than disintermediate them.
> “And the core business at Meta is personalized TV. It used to be social media, but now it's personalized TV. And it turns out that people really like watching Instagram or whatnot.” — Cliff Sosin
`10:00` Meta as a Pure Consumer of Intelligence
Examining Meta through an aggressive, first-principles reductionist lens reveals that practically every single dollar the company spends is dedicated to buying intelligence. When Meta invests billions of dollars into data centers, those facilities are fundamentally tools designed to manufacture machine intelligence. When they purchase compute for inference, they are buying intelligence directly. Paying elite engineers to design algorithms and write code is an expenditure on human intelligence, and even the infrastructure used to survey, catalog, and rank video feeds is intelligence-adjacent work. If the baseline cost of that core input falls by a factor of 100 over the next five years, their structural operating costs theoretically evaporate.
Yet Meta does not have to take its costs down to zero to win; instead, they can reinvest that collapsed cost base to deliver radically superior user and advertiser outcomes. On the creative side, content creators armed with intelligence that is 100 times cheaper and 10,000 times more effective will produce vastly higher-quality media. Meta can then leverage abundant compute to execute far more sophisticated recommendation algorithms, surfacing videos that are hyper-targeted and substantially more entertaining. For advertisers, cheap intelligence means generating exquisitely personalized creative assets paired with ultra-slippery conversion funnels.
Crucially, the bedrock assets that make this flywheel function cannot be wiped away by ubiquitous compute. As Cliff Sosin notes: “All of this is downstream of what they possess – which is not destroyed by ubiquitous intelligence, which is data and attention.” Meta commands an extraordinary repository of user data and monopolizes billions of hours of consumer attention. The advent of cheap intelligence will never stop human beings from wanting to consume entertaining, twenty-second video clips; if anything, heightened algorithmic quality allows Meta on the margin to steal even more time away from competing real-world and digital activities.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Meta's Abundant Intelligence Flywheel
accDescr: Diagram showing how falling intelligence costs compound Meta's moat of data and user attention.
subgraph Inputs["The Primary Input"]
Cost["Price of Intelligence<br/>(Falls by 100x)"]
end
subgraph MetaCore["Meta Core Moat (Indestructible)"]
Attention["Monopolistic Attention<br/>(User Time & Engagement)"]
Data["Proprietary User Data<br/>(Video behavior & tastes)"]
end
subgraph Upgrades["Abundant Intelligence Deployments"]
Creators["Creators make 10,000x<br/>better creative content"]
Targeting["Hyper-targeted video<br/>recommendation feeds"]
Ads["Personalized ad designs &<br/>frictionless conversion funnels"]
end
`10:48` The Constrained Balance Sheet: Grindr's Untapped Potential
This dynamic extends directly to smaller, attention-rich businesses that have historically lacked the scale or budget to fully exploit their position. While Cliff Sosin clarifies that he does not personally own shares in Grindr, he points to the gay dating app as an ideal thought experiment for how intelligence abundance alters corporate economics. Grindr captures vast amounts of user attention and sits on deep proprietary behavioral data, yet the company has remained structurally constrained by the reality of operating with a finite engineering team and a modest corporate balance sheet.
Because of those headcount limits, Grindr has been unable to build out the full suite of ambitious features, recommendation tools, and monetization layers imaginable for its ecosystem. Applying a mental model where a business suddenly gains the equivalent of 10,000 of Google's best engineers working continuously on its problem set for five years illustrates how cheap, ubiquitous software development could fundamentally unlock trapped value. For high-engagement platforms constrained purely by development capacity rather than user demand, cheap intelligence removes their most severe operational bottleneck.
`11:18` The Frontier Labs as Businesses: Moats, Distillation, and Commoditization
The conversation turns to whether the frontier artificial intelligence labs—such as OpenAI or Anthropic—can sustain generational enterprise value as businesses. Many prominent technology investors argue that frontier intelligence is decidedly not a commodity. While previous debates centered on the performance delta between open-source and closed-source models, the modern bull case focuses on the widening gap between what labs make publicly available via APIs and the private, internal frontier models they use to accelerate their own capabilities. Proponents believe these labs have successfully slowed down model distillation, are achieving escape velocity, and can selectively distill their own frontier models to dominate both high-end and budget-tier inference markets.
Cliff Sosin outlines the foundational requirement for that thesis to hold: “If they have models that are better and the ability to produce adequate intelligence at way lower cost than everybody else and nobody can copy it, then it's going to be a great business.” However, the mechanics of how models deploy across real-world tasks introduces a harsh counter-dynamic. Historically, every generation of frontier models unlocks a brand-new addressable market of difficult, high-value tasks at the top of the stack. But as soon as benchmark evaluations for a specific capability become saturated, the pricing power for that tier collapses rapidly. Sosin illustrates this dynamic plainly:
> “Once evals or whatever get saturated, you would never use a frontier model for a chat bot in a customer service application. You'd be an idiot. And so what's happening is those areas, they clearly commoditize. And so there's this wave of hard tasks where you really need a frontier model. And then behind that, you don't.”
While bulls argue that frontier labs will dominate the entire efficient frontier by pricing down-market tokens lower than anyone else, the historical pattern across technology has been rapid commoditization. The swift ascent and technical parity demonstrated by low-cost open alternatives and competitive Chinese models suggest that defending a durable pricing umbrella across the intelligence stack remains exceptionally difficult.
- **Meta's Spending Breakdown:** All major cost centers—data centers, raw inference compute, research scientists, software engineers, and video ranking pipelines—are fundamentally purchases of intelligence.
- **The Creator Flywheel:** Inexpensive, accessible intelligence tools empower content creators to dramatically elevate output quality, feeding higher engagement back into the discovery engine.
- **The Grindr Mental Model:** Illustrates the transformative potential of giving an attention-rich, data-rich, yet resource-constrained niche network the synthetic equivalent of thousands of top-tier engineers.
- **The Frontier Trajectory:** Frontier models continuously carve out new capabilities at the cutting edge, but trailing tasks commoditize immediately once performance benchmarks reach sufficiency.
`15:00` Jevons Paradox and the Limits of Demand
Cliff Sosin questions whether the total addressable market for frontier intelligence models will actually be as massive as the bull case suggests. While programming has proven to be an enormous initial application, the market could face diminishing addressable space as model capabilities climb higher. The prevailing bull thesis assumes that customers will pay astronomical sums for super-intelligence—such as a model that cures cancer. However, Sosin argues that solving physical problems like cancer requires direct physical contact with reality, which cannot be solved simply by stacking more raw IQ into a neural net. Without those endless high-value breakthroughs, demand may not expand infinitely; rather, it resembles a diamond-shaped frontier where utility broadens across common cognitive tasks before narrowing drastically into rarefied niches. As Sosin puts it:
> “How often do you really need a 300 IQ? One might start to ask.”
If super-elite intelligence has only a handful of viable real-world use cases, the vast majority of demand will settle on "good enough" intelligence. That tier of model performance is already facing fierce competition, rapid commoditization, and severe price deflation. When Patrick O'Shaughnessy counters with Jevons paradox—the economic principle that making a resource cheaper causes total consumption to surge—and the idea that intelligence might create its own open-ended demand, Sosin responds that Jevons paradox describes only a single segment along a broader curve. In reality, market size follows an inverted U-shape: when a technology is primitive, demand is negligible; as quality improves and costs drop, the market explodes; but eventually, further price declines fail to stimulate proportionate volume, and market revenues contract. Taken to the extreme, if the price drops to zero, the market size collapses to zero.
Sosin cites optical telecommunications as a historical analogue for this deflationary trap. Moving information once carried a prohibitive cost, but technological breakthroughs slashed prices, unlocked unimaginable volume, and caused the market to boom. Eventually, unit costs continued their downward spiral while revenue upside plateaued. Today, Cogent Communications routes roughly 30% to 40% of all global IP traffic through one of its units—which is not even its largest division—yet the entire business trades at a modest market cap of just a few billion dollars. Pure intelligence could follow an analogous trajectory:
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: The Elasticity Curve of Technological Markets
accDescr: An inverted U-shaped progression showing how market value moves from early high pricing to peak size and eventual deflationary contraction.
- Sosin does expect a golden age of rapid discoveries driven by large language models synthesizing existing academic research: “I think there's going to be this incredible time where there's going to be so many cool discoveries, which we're already starting to read about, where this paper was written and this paper was written and this paper was written. And if somebody had read all three papers and thought about it, they would have realized this, but nobody had.”
- Once the synthesis of historical literature is exhausted, progress will once again be constrained by human and technological capacity to formulate hypotheses and test reality.
- In his personal workflow, Sosin treats models as completely fungible commodities; he routes coding tasks through GrokBot and background servers, subscribing to multiple providers without paying attention to which foundation model processes the request on the back end.
`18:47` Automated Labs and the Speed Limits of Experiments
Patrick brings up the emerging wave of closed-loop experimentation companies—startups integrating automated bio wet labs, robotic synthesis, and AI planning to create autonomous scientific discovery loops. Sosin acknowledges that closed-loop physical automation is an incredible step forward that will accelerate the pace of learning, but he emphasizes that software intelligence inevitably hits hard speed limits governed by the laws of nature:
> “As I said, look, you're really smart. So you must understand being smart has limits. Being smart has limits. And so the ability to just think your way to solutions is limited.”
Sosin illustrates this barrier using a biological testing pipeline. An AI system might design a brilliant therapeutic hypothesis and route it to an automated bench, but if the scientific question requires breeding mice to evaluate mortality, researchers are bound to physical timelines:
> “That's awesome. But if that experiment requires breeding mice, and mice need a year to grow up and die, bad experiment, gonna take time.”
Physical throughput and capital constraints also remain stubborn bottlenecks. A physical lab can only run so many tests at once, forcing a team to select perhaps 20 candidates out of 5,000 algorithmic proposals. Even if an AI-guided experiment hits a 1% success rate—a tenfold improvement over the 0.1% baseline of an average human researcher—the underlying probability remains a steep 99% failure rate. While automating discovery is immensely valuable, Sosin cautions against the sci-fi expectation that an AI will gaze at reality and immediately conjure incomprehensible alternate physics.
`20:39` Why He Stays Away from the AI Build-Out
Patrick shifts the discussion to the market's heavy investment tilt toward supply-side infrastructure—such as data centers, chips, power generation, and compute hosting—rather than end-user demand applications. Sosin admits that he has chosen to be "willfully ignorant" about investing directly in the physical and infrastructural AI build-out, finding the underlying math impossible to underwrite with any confidence:
> “I can't forecast supply or demand within several orders of magnitude.”
Underwriting the supply layer requires projecting two wildly unpredictable variables simultaneously: how much inference demand will expand as intelligence becomes cheaper and smarter, and the rate at which the cost of providing that inference will deflate. Even if an investor could reliably forecast both ends of that equation, capturing economic rents requires finding and owning the exact bottleneck in a shifting value chain while navigating ruthless direct competition against rival capital providers. Sosin concludes that predicting which infrastructure player will retain durable margins across those shifting dynamics is simply too difficult a task.
`25:00` Price Elasticity and Why He Stays Away from the AI Build-Out
Cliff Sosin illustrates the fragile consumer economics of generative AI through personal examples. When helping his daughter with schoolwork, he can prompt an AI to produce a customized, 3Blue1Brown-style five-to-ten-minute video explainer about exponents, area, or circumference. It is an impressive capability, but he emphasizes that he simply would not use it if it cost five dollars every time. Similarly, he films his workout routines using an app that analyzes his form and delivers corrective pointers. He happily uses the service when it costs virtually nothing, but would abandon it if it carried a meaningful price point. Because he considers himself far less price-sensitive than the average consumer, he argues that overall AI demand is exceptionally elastic. This strong elasticity naturally constrains the total wallet share consumers will ever commit to AI services.
The host counters by pointing to the sheer volume of talent and capital rushing into infrastructure: if the demand and supply balance is so uncertain, why are world-class entrepreneurs—including Elon Musk, who framed SpaceX's Investor Day largely around data center and compute supply—dedicating their lives and billions of dollars to building out this pipeline? Sosin responds that causality is running in reverse. Massive infrastructure revolutions cannot occur without immense capital allocation and top-tier talent responding to price incentives. He explains that it is impossible to imagine a version of history where no notable figures built out the infrastructure:
> “Could you imagine a telling of the story where nobody interesting who'd made no money was building out the AI, right?”
Sosin acknowledges that these builders are undertaking a critical historical project and deserve to reap immense fortunes. However, picking winners on the supply side is extraordinarily treacherous from an investor's vantage point. Instead of trying to guess which infrastructure player will triumph, Sosin looks for the second-order equilibrium that emerges once the foundational technology is ubiquitous:
> “Instead of betting on which railroad tycoon is going to make money and how many railroads we need, I'm trying to think about, OK, once you have railroads, I'd love to have the foresight to figure out CPG brands come next.”
- Consumer willingness to pay drops precipitously for frivolous or marginal AI use cases (e.g., automated workout coaching or bespoke video tutorials) if prices shift above nominal rates.
- Sosin chooses to search for downstream beneficiaries—the modern consumer packaged goods (CPG) equivalents born of the railroad boom—rather than participating directly in the infrastructure wars.
---
`24:22` Lessons from Past Capital Cycles and the Winner's Curse
Sosin compares the current macroeconomic state of the United States to a household stretching its budget to construct a home. To erect this massive AI apparatus, society is actively pulling scarce labor and materials—such as electricians and plumbers—away from the broader economy, driving up baseline costs across other sectors. While society will undoubtedly harvest immense long-term value from the finished structure, the dynamics of capital cycles make overbuilding virtually guaranteed. Market participants will continue pouring resources into the cycle until supply radically overshoots demand, driven by extended project lead times and the psychological trap of the winner's curse:
> “And because things have lead times and because it's a winner's curse, invariably the last person to stop will regret it.”
What differentiates this cycle from historic railway or telecom booms is its extreme technical volatility. Sosin notes that in past infrastructure expansions, physical standards were relatively fixed, whereas AI technology changes continuously at every layer of the stack. With recursive self-improvement taking hold across software and hardware engineering, intelligence itself is actively commoditizing tasks that once seemed like durable advantages.
Even dominant hardware designers face this theoretical exposure. Sosin points out that Nvidia does not manufacture silicon itself; its actual output consists of sophisticated design files sent to foundries:
> “Nvidia quite literally makes flat files that they send to Taiwan. Their flat files are very hard to make, but what they have is a lot of people who think really hard about it.”
Because Nvidia's edge relies on concentrated human cognitive effort, AI-driven automation could theoretically compress the cost and complexity of designing competitive chips, especially for applications that do not strictly require cutting-edge frontier performance.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Capital Cycle and Winner's Curse in AI
accDescr: Flowchart illustrating how price signals divert economic resources into the AI build-out until overshooting triggers the winner's curse.
subgraph BuildoutPhase ["Build-Out Phase"]
A["Strong Price Signals & Investor Euphoria"] --> B["Massive Capital & Talent Flow into Infrastructure"]
B --> C["Real Resources Diverted<br/>(Electricians, Plumbers, Grid Capacity)"]
end
subgraph OvershootPhase ["Overshoot & Reckoning"]
C --> D["Long Construction & Chip Lead Times"]
D --> E["Recursive Improvement Lowers Barriers / Commoditizes Design"]
E --> F["Market Overbuilds Beyond Underlying Demand"]
F --> G["The Winner's Curse:<br/>Last Capital In Regrets It"]
end
```
---
`26:05` TSMC, Physical Moats, and Illegible Knowledge
When the host asks whether physical scale constitutes the only dependable defensive moat in such an environment—pointing to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)—Sosin agrees that pure physical manufacturing possesses far stronger defensive attributes than pure design. TSMC has spent decades mastering physical process engineering that is radically harder to automate or displace through digital intelligence alone.
Much of TSMC's true operational advantage rests in tacit, physical knowledge that remains completely opaque to AI models:
> “It is so physical and because it's all these little things, many of which aren't even legible to an AI. It's like some guy who is in the system kind of knows that you have to do this.”
However, Sosin identifies an ironic vulnerability born of TSMC's overwhelming dominance. Because demand for advanced chip production vastly outstrips TSMC's capacity, the company has inadvertently incentivized governments, competitors, and hyperscalers worldwide to pour untold billions into replicating its manufacturing capabilities. While its physical moat is far more durable than purely intellectual moats, forcing the entire global economy to find alternatives or copy its proprietary processes inevitably creates long-term competitive headwinds.
`30:00` AI Agents and the Low-Cost Producer
The discussion moves beyond the infrastructure build-out to analyze how businesses rooted in physical proximity, scale, and local density—such as DoorDash or Uber—serve as natural complements to ubiquitous machine intelligence. Cliff Sosin explains that when intelligence becomes free and accessible to every consumer through personal AI agents, mundane decision-making gets offloaded to optimize small sums of money that consumers normally leave on the table. He frames consumer choices along a wide spectrum: on one side lies purely transactional optimization, such as maximizing a bank deposit rate where one can defer entirely to an agent's calculation so long as the deposit is FDIC-insured; on the opposite pole sits deeply subjective taste, like selecting a favorite sweater, where an agent can retrieve possibilities, but the human must ultimately exercise personal judgment.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The AI Agent Adoption and Market Concentration Loop
accDescr: Diagram showing how consumers offloading friction to agents drives route density and cements low-cost dominance.
subgraph ConsumerLevel["Consumer Decision Layer"]
A["Consumer offloads friction<br/>to personal AI agent"] --> B["Agent switches service<br/>for marginal cost savings"]
end
subgraph MarketDynamics["Local Market Dynamics"]
B --> C["Low-cost operator gains<br/>initial customer density"]
C --> D["Operating efficiency rises<br/>(e.g., single garbage truck per street)"]
end
subgraph ScaleAdvantage["Compounding Moat"]
D --> E["Unit costs drop further"]
E -->|"Offers even lower prices"| C
E --> F["Winner captures massive volume<br/>at lower overall margins"]
end
```
To demonstrate how this shift fundamentally alters physical-world business models, Sosin uses the stylized example of local garbage collection. In the current economy, even if an operator offers a superior price and service, consumer inertia prevents switching because most people do not track what they pay or want to spend the effort to change providers. With an AI agent, the calculation collapses: one agent negotiates with another, verifies that the trash will be collected, and seamlessly switches providers to save 50 cents a month. The second-order consequence is a dramatic reorganization of route density. If multiple haulers currently service a single street, society operates inefficiently because neighbors fail to coordinate. Once automated agents actively hunt for efficiency, a hauler who already services two homes on a block can propose discounted rates to neighboring houses, capturing the entire street. Sosin underscores this dynamic: “That actually creates, in some sense, a better business where the low cost guy wins a bunch more volume at much lower margins.”
- Consumer decisions sit on a spectrum from pure mathematical optimization (e.g., FDIC-insured yield) to subjective personal taste (e.g., clothing).
- Inertia and customer acquisition friction historically protected fragmented, high-cost local physical operators.
- Automated agents collapse consumer coordination costs, consolidating local route density into the hands of the lowest-cost producer.
`32:01` Will AI Replace Investors?
When asked what role human portfolio managers will play in five years and whether an agent could construct a portfolio of Carvana, Hilton Grand Vacations, and Meta just as effectively, Sosin is candid about the structural limits of human longevity in the field. He believes that over the long horizon, human investors whose core function is pricing risk will inevitably be competed out. To illuminate the transition period, he draws a parallel to computer-assisted chess: after chess engines emerged, there was an extended era where "freestyle chess"—a human grandmaster working alongside a software program—consistently outperformed either a lone computer or a solitary human. That cooperative dominance worked because human cognition and computational brute force processed chess board states differently and generated strong analytical synergies.
Sosin argues that the investing industry is currently living through its own freestyle chess era. A human investor still retains experiential knowledge and real-world context gathered from living an embodied life, alongside critical facts and intuitions that are not documented anywhere on the internet. Pairing human judgment with machine capability yields better decisions today, but that relative advantage will erode over time as synthetic reasoning closes the gap. He stresses that models will never predict an intrinsically chaotic future with pinpoint certainty, but their probabilistic distributions will surpass human intuition: “Adding a human to the forecast would be kind of like adding my judgment to whether or not it's going to rain in seven days. You just kind of would be like, Cliff, I don't really care what you think. I'm using the forecast. This is going to be better.”
Eventually, models may reliably interview and evaluate management teams, identify market opportunities, and make optimal underwriting choices autonomously. Sosin describes a world where an aspiring entrepreneur looking to raise capital no longer pitches traditional allocators, but instead queries an AI system that identifies amusement park locations with a 51% chance of success and provides capital after directly evaluating the founder's commitment and capability.
- Freestyle chess demonstrates that human-machine teams outperform purely automated or purely human competitors until models absorb the requisite contextual data.
- Embodied human life experience and non-indexed real-world data currently provide human analysts with a persistent edge over modern models.
- The future role of capital allocation may involve AI agents pricing risk, vetting executive character, and funding business proposals based strictly on objective distribution curves.
`35:00` Price as a Signal Wrapped in an Incentive
Cliff Sosin reflects on how predictive modeling might steer personal ambitions. If an algorithm calculates that an individual has only a 51.2% chance of succeeding in a given pursuit because they are marginally below average, it might prompt the natural question of what they could do better—perhaps running a go-kart track instead. However, Sosin doubts this dynamic will disrupt his own investing career anytime soon because broad implementation will take considerable time.
When asked whether ubiquitous intelligence could ever displace price as the central coordinating mechanism of the economy, Sosin argues against the possibility. He describes price as an irreducibly elegant market mechanism that cannot be out-engineered, asserting: “Price is a miracle because it's a signal wrapped in an incentive.” As an incentive, rising or falling prices naturally prompt buyers and producers to demand or provide more or less of a resource. Simultaneously, as a signal, price conveys real-time information about scarcity, production costs, and relative value. Even with access to unlimited intelligence, inventing a superior coordination mechanism remains deeply improbable.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Price as a Dual Mechanism
accDescr: Diagram showing price functioning simultaneously as an economic incentive and an informational signal to coordinate the market.
subgraph PriceCoordination["The Market Coordination Miracle"]
P["Market Price"]
P -->|"Incentive Function"| I["Direct Action: Motivates buyers & sellers to consume or produce more/less"]
P -->|"Signal Function"| S["Information: Transmits relative value, scarcity & production cost"]
I --> M["Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Real Resources"]
S --> M
end
```
---
`35:46` Ubiquitous Agents and Dynamic Pricing
The host introduces a three-tiered framework conceived by his friend Dan to illustrate how the application of intelligence evolves:
- **Level 1 (Reactive Prompting):** Entering a prompt into an AI model and receiving a discrete output.
- **Level 2 (Scheduled Tasks):** Setting up an automated "watchtower" that runs routine scripts and tasks on an instinctual nightly schedule in the background.
- **Level 3 (Proactive Autonomy):** An always-on, proactive intelligence that independently determines how to deploy its capabilities continuously and without explicit instruction.
Considering Level 3 applied universally across the economy, Sosin believes it will sharply reduce traditional price stickiness. While modern commerce appears fiercely competitive, many everyday transactions are plagued by lazy pricing, such as bank deposit yields or residential garbage collection contracts.
In a world populated by autonomous agents, friction dissolves:
- Municipal waste companies will continuously model marginal costs and update bids in real time for every individual customer they can profitably serve.
- Autonomous consumer agents will systematically bounce contracts to whichever provider underbids competitors by a fraction of a cent.
- Rather than paying an unexamined flat rate—such as $60 a month followed by an automatic 5% hike to $63 the following year—garbage collection prices will fluctuate daily based on input costs, route logistics, and immediate capacity.
---
`37:05` America's Capital Markets and Dynamic Risk Allocation
Sosin marvels at the sheer resilience and adaptive capacity of American capital markets, particularly in mobilizing capital behind major technological inflection points. Despite prevailing concerns regarding a perceived decline in American dynamism, the domestic financial system managed to redirect an astonishing proportion of national resources into the AI infrastructure build-out almost instantly. Sosin emphasizes the scale of this rapid reallocation: “I think we just redeployed. What is it, 3% of GDP right into this highly speculative venture, basically on the turn of a dime?”
While historical parallels like the 19th-century railroad expansion were famously riddled with speculative excesses, waste, and fraudulent schemes, Sosin suspects that the modern AI build-out remains remarkably clean by comparison. The underlying institutional governance and capital mechanisms make it possible for everyday savers to purchase modest equity stakes in professionally run enterprises with virtually zero friction or transaction costs. This financial architecture ensures that capital flows rapidly into tangible physical projects across the country—such as workers reporting every morning to construction sites across Pennsylvania to erect large-scale data centers.
---
`39:24` The Cultural and Genetic Roots of American Risk-Taking
When addressing why the United States consistently outpaces the rest of the world in risk-taking and technological experimentation, Sosin offers a working thesis rooted in self-selection, institutional feedback loops, and culture:
> “My pet theory, and everyone has their own theories, is some sort of interplay between genetics, cultural evolution, and institutional evolution.”
Under this framework:
1. **Self-Selection:** Immigrants who historically settled the United States represented an intensely self-selected cohort willing to endure severe personal and financial risks.
2. **Genetic and Cultural Momentum:** Assuming risk tolerance carries a meaningful hereditary and social component, risk-seeking behaviors became disproportionately prevalent.
3. **Institutional Accommodations:** A society populated by risk-tolerant individuals organically created legal and financial infrastructure tailored to failure, including practical bankruptcy statutes, flexible labor arrangements, and early-stage venture capital.
4. **Reinforcing Feedback Loops:** High-profile entrepreneurial success stories continuously reinforce this environment, outstripping peer regions.
When the host quips that Sosin would likely be bullish on the economic output of a future off-world settlement, Sosin agrees: if a lunar colony is ever established, American culture will almost certainly drive its commercial development, even alongside formidable global competitors.
---
`40:48` What Higher Interest Rates Signal About Capital Cycles
Addressing the broader macroeconomic regime and the shift toward higher long-term interest rates, Sosin views rates through the lens of intertemporal resource allocation. Directing vast amounts of labor, materials, and power toward long-dated infrastructure inherently diverts resources away from present-day consumption.
A tradesperson currently laying pipe or installing electrical conduits for a greenfield data center is dedicated to building capacity that will pay dividends only in the distant future, rather than producing immediate consumer goods for today. In order to persuade an economy to sacrifice present gratification in favor of speculative future productivity, the market must offer a tangible incentive. From this perspective, elevated interest rates represent the necessary premium paid to induce society to save and defer consumption.
---
`41:45` Deploying AI Across the Portfolio: Sosin’s Four-Stage Enterprise Playbook
Given that Sosin’s portfolio is concentrated in a tight selection of roughly five core holdings—with Carvana alone accounting for approximately 80%—the host asks what strategic AI guidance Sosin provides to his executive teams.
Sosin outlines a sequential operational playbook that avoids theoretical strategy decks in favor of grassroots technical familiarity:
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Sosin AI Enterprise Integration Playbook
accDescr: A four-stage organizational progression from company-wide vibe coding to managing system-level code changes.
subgraph Culture["Phase 1: Cultural Buy-In"]
A["Company-Wide Hackathons & 'Vibe Coding'<br/>(From the Board & CEO to all departments)"]
end
subgraph AccessControl["Phase 2 & 3: Permissions Architecture"]
B["Universal Read-Only Access<br/>(AI agents query every enterprise internal system)"]
C["Role-Based Write Permissions<br/>(Empowering employees to write data back into workflows)"]
end
subgraph SystemsEngineering["Phase 4: Autonomous Modification"]
D["System Change Governance<br/>(Safe pipelines for AI-assisted code & system alterations)"]
end
A --> B
B --> C
C --> D
```
1. **Mandate Enterprise-Wide "Vibe Coding" Hackathons:**
Every layer of the hierarchy—from the board of directors and CEO down through non-technical operational units—must participate in internal hackathons (which Carvana affectionately refers to as "pizza parties"). The objective is not necessarily to deploy polished, enterprise-ready software overnight, but to permanently reset employee expectations regarding what software tools can be conceived and built on demand.
2. **Establish Universal Read-Only Integration:**
The CEO must task the technology leadership with an explicit mandate: grant an executive AI agent read-only access to every internal business database and tracking system. While engineering teams will inevitably protest that fragmented legacy infrastructure makes unified visibility extraordinarily difficult, achieving read-only access establishes the baseline starting line.
3. **Percolate Role-Based Write Permissions:**
Once executive leadership routinely queries corporate data through natural language interfaces, cross-functional teams will demand identical capabilities. Leadership can leverage that natural organizational envy to roll out role-based permissions, followed shortly by safe protocols that let users directly input and write data back into core company systems.
4. **Govern AI-Driven System Modifications:**
As frontline employees gain confidence through rapid prototyping, they will identify rigid legacy software that needs alteration. Enterprises must design rigorous change-management protocols that allow workers to safely modify operational software without risking system integrity.
Sosin stresses that while this transformation sounds straightforward when summarized as a high-level roadmap, executing it across large corporate enterprises represents years of grueling engineering and organizational friction. Incumbents without strong business moats risk losing ground to agile startups built natively around this operational architecture from day one.
`45:00` The Best Time to Start a Company and the Paradox of Enduring Moats
The conversation moves to entrepreneurship in the AI era. With low cost of capital and access to AI tools, a founder unburdened by legacy infrastructure can move faster than ever before. Cliff Sosin agrees, joking, “I mean, yeah, it's the best time to start a company until tomorrow.” From an operator's perspective, running an enterprise involves significant organizational friction because “people are such a... pain in the butt,” and AI agents suddenly allow an entrepreneur to execute far more work with far fewer humans.
However, low friction creates its own strategic trap: if any founder can spin up software overnight, their competitors can too. In a world where AI agents dynamically switch vendors every day to maximize consumer utility, finding sustainable lock-in or proprietary data becomes extraordinarily difficult. Sosin points out the deeper paradox of venture creation: if an idea has an obvious, visible path to enduring economics, swarms of well-funded competitors will pursue the exact same wedge, eroding all returns. Thus, “the really great outcomes are the ones that make no sense. You shouldn't do it at all. But then it turns out there is a path or the world turns.”
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Venture Viability Paradox in the AI Era
accDescr: A comparison showing how obvious business ideas trigger intense competition while counterintuitive bets yield durable value.
subgraph Trap["The Obvious Idea Trap"]
A["Obvious Path to Value"] --> B["Low Barriers via AI Agents"]
B --> C["Massive Influx of Competitors"]
C --> D["Erosion of Pricing & Moats"]
end
subgraph Breakthrough["The Counterintuitive Wedge"]
E["'Makes No Sense' Idea"] --> F["Ignored by Crowds"]
F --> G["World Shifts / Path Emerges"]
G --> H["Enduring Asymmetric Value"]
end
```
`46:42` Corporate Margins, Aggregation Theory, and Full Vertical Stacks
When asked whether traditional competitive advantages—such as regulatory capture, attention, proprietary data, or physical proximity—are being mispriced, Sosin turns to a macroeconomic question: do aggregate corporate margins go up or down as intelligence becomes cheap and ubiquitous? The intuitive response is down, because the elimination of friction transfers value away from businesses and directly into consumer surplus.
While analysts in the 1990s incorrectly predicted the early internet would destroy corporate margins, Sosin argues they were only wrong because they failed to anticipate Ben Thompson's Aggregation Theory—where platforms captured enormous rents simply by owning digital distribution. But AI agents may fundamentally dismantle Aggregation Theory itself:
> “And I do think that a lot of aggregation theory breaks down because that basically relies on the idea that consumers only look at the first thing on Google. But it turns out if your agent looks at everything on search, then being ranked first doesn't matter. And all the core things like quality and price and everything else, service become more salient.”
On the other hand, corporate margins might actually expand because cheap, ubiquitous intelligence enables founders to build complex, vertically integrated companies that were previously unmanageable. Historically, industries organized into horizontal layers because the operational complexity of managing upstream and downstream suppliers overwhelmed human management. By automating coordination and solving principal-agent problems, AI allows a single entity to operate an entire vertical stack—such as a unified pet care enterprise spanning pet food manufacturing, veterinary clinics, hospitals, and pet insurance. Sosin notes that Carvana pulled off this vertical integration in used cars before AI made it easy, and if other verticals follow suit, those businesses could achieve higher margins, greater operational efficiency, and superior consumer surplus simultaneously.
`48:48` AI and the Income Distribution: Leveling Rents vs. Supercharging Ambition
Sosin explores two contradictory narratives regarding how AI will alter the distribution of wealth and income. The popular bear case is extreme concentration: immense wealth accrues solely to a handful of frontier lab founders, data centers, and Nvidia shareholders, accelerating inequality through increasing returns to capital.
Yet Sosin sees a compelling counterargument where cheap intelligence acts as a massive leveling force:
- **Exterminating Rent-Takers:** AI tools commoditize niche software providers that extract rents from main-street operators (such as vertical software sold to bowling alleys). Wiping out those software margins lowers the consumer cost of bowling, directly expanding the real income of everyday consumers who spend a larger share of their earnings on leisure.
- **Redistributing Capitalist Profits:** If consumers stop bleeding small fees to financial intermediaries like Bank of America, corporate profits drop, and the average consumer wins.
- **Commoditizing the Professional Class:** Sosin observes that the white-collar elite earns its premium essentially by acting as high-priced intelligence: “They take big corpuses of information and apply them to certain circumstances in a fairly straightforward way.” Once machine intelligence can perform these tasks ubiquitously, consumers receive top-tier legal, medical, and financial analysis for free, while credentialed professionals lose their monopoly rents and must accept their next best economic alternative.
Conversely, the counterargument is that AI operates like a “bicycle for the mind on steroids,” creating runaway returns for ambition and initiative. Sosin jokes about his own ambivalence: “Truman asked for a one-handed economist. I seem to very distinctly have two hands on everything.” He experiences this exact tension in his own workflow: on one hand, he burns through a massive number of tokens, sees infinite enterprise use cases, and can easily construct a thesis where AI infrastructure is chronically undersupplied. On the other hand, the utility delivered per token is skyrocketing, the cost per token is collapsing, broader enterprise adoption may move slowly, and the current infrastructure build-out could easily end in a massive overbuild.
`50:56` AI Portfolio Construction vs. The 80% Carvana Bet
The host introduces an investing experiment conducted by a close friend: the investor keeps picking the assets to own, but splits portfolio construction into two distinct lanes. Lane one uses traditional, sophisticated human construction; lane two delegates the weighting entirely to an automated AI harness trained on Kelly Criterion, quantitative optimization, and portfolio management literature. The AI harness has drastically outperformed the human. Given that Sosin runs an extreme portfolio with roughly 80% of his capital concentrated in Carvana, the host asks what Sosin thinks an AI optimizer would do to his portfolio.
Sosin deadpans:
> “I'm underweight.... Should be 90.”
Turning serious, Sosin reflects on how AI will systematically encroach upon investing, arguing that machine adoption depends heavily on feedback loops and time horizons:
- **The Verification Loop Problem:** Sosin notes that short-horizon experiments cannot prove AI's superiority across long cycles: “One of the challenges is that there's no verification loop. Your friend's ability to say that is based on results over, I mean, certainly not 20-year results.”
- **Shorter vs. Longer Time Scales:** Quantitative encroachment will inevitably start where feedback loops are instantaneous—moving outward from sub-seconds to minutes, hours, weeks, and months—before it can effectively tackle multi-year fundamental bets.
- **The Trailblazers:** Sosin remarks that elite quantitative firms like Renaissance Technologies likely pioneered these core machine-learning architectures far ahead of the public: “It wouldn't shock me if... they might have discovered the Transformer before everybody else. It's like, I'm not kidding.”
- **Hybrid Ensembles:** Sosin envisions an asset management landscape where algorithmic systems ingest human qualitative insights, blending quantitative model execution with discretionary analysis.
`55:00` Extreme Portfolio Concentration and the Carvana Thesis
Patrick O'Shaughnessy highlights how quantitative strategies increasingly integrate qualitative data and asks Cliff Sosin to justify running an exceptionally concentrated portfolio—specifically holding roughly 80% of his fund in a single stock like Carvana—despite conventional portfolio theory and academic literature labeling that approach reckless. Sosin explains that most portfolio research is grounded in the short-term statistical price movements of securities rather than the mindset of a long-term business owner. His willingness to concentrate so aggressively stems from a fundamental conviction about the underlying asset: its physical infrastructure, logistics network, and brand are so defensible and differentiated that the probability of catastrophic failure is extraordinarily low.
Sosin draws historical parallels to foundational retail compounding stories, noting that conventional diversification would have prevented an investor from fully capitalizing on early investments in companies like Walmart, Home Depot, or Fastenal. While he acknowledges survivorship bias—admitting that history often ignores the concentrated bets that failed—he points out that exceptional historical returns were almost universally built on high concentration. Literature advocating broad diversification makes complete sense for retail investors or managers targeting index-like returns, but that is not Sosin's objective. He views the position through a pragmatic lens of asymmetric risk and return:
> "It's just more of a trade-off between expected returns and knowingly taking an unusual risk."
- Traditional academic portfolio models prioritize volatility management over operational asset quality and competitive moats.
- Extreme concentration relies on identifying business models with massive asymmetry where structural downside scenarios are structurally limited.
- Sosin remains comfortable with holding an outsized position, while conceding he would gladly diversify if significant price appreciation compelled him to rebalance.
---
`56:58` Educating Kids in the Age of AI: A Bimodal Framework
Turning to the future of education and child rearing, O'Shaughnessy asks Sosin how human development and educational institutions must evolve in an era where AI models provide virtually unlimited baseline intelligence. Sosin dismisses the notion that native human intelligence and rigorous education become obsolete when artificial intelligence is ubiquitous. While someone might argue that a 50 IQ individual can navigate an AI-saturated world just as well as a 150 IQ individual, Sosin emphasizes that crystallized intelligence and domain knowledge are essential prerequisites for directing and steering frontier models effectively.
Sosin illustrates this with a personal example: without deep domain knowledge in quantum physics, any attempt he makes to design breakthrough experiments using an advanced AI model will fail, because the AI will be forced to explain things in simplistic "Crayon and Nerf" terms. Conversely, in fields where a user possesses deep subject-matter mastery, they can direct the model with surgical precision. To prompt an AI to simulate a stochastic process, an individual does not necessarily need to crunch the manual calculations, but they must understand what a stochastic process represents; relying on the model to teach foundational definitions on the fly introduces crippling friction.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Bimodal Model for Education in the AI Era
accDescr: A two-pillar framework dividing learning into foundational mastery without tools and high-ambition execution using models.
subgraph Foundational ["Pillar 1: Screen-Free Foundations"]
A["Basic Drills & Math"] --> B["Conceptual Principles"]
B --> C["Mental Models"]
end
subgraph Application ["Pillar 2: AI-Amplified Execution"]
D["100x More Ambitious Tasks"] --> E["Active AI Prompting & Synthesis"]
E --> F["Rigorous Defense & Justification"]
end
Foundational -->|"Enables Precise Direction of"| Application
```
Sosin advocates for a strictly bimodal educational structure:
1. **Unassisted Foundational Learning:** Children must master core concepts—such as basic arithmetic, linear algebra, logic, and reading comprehension—entirely isolated from AI models. While they may not perform these operations by hand in their adult careers, they need the underlying mental scaffolding to comprehend what the model is executing under the hood.
2. **Hyper-Ambitious Tool Integration:** Rather than attempting to ban AI over fears that students will cheat on essays, educators should assign projects that are "a hundred times harder and more ambitious" by requiring full AI utilization. Students must then present their work in person, defend their logic, and explain why the output makes sense to guarantee genuine ownership of the ideas.
> "The kids are cheating on a Shakespeare essay. Give them something harder to do. Give them something a hundred times harder and more ambitious and have them use models to their fullest extent. Have them bring the work product back and then make sure that they didn't just give a prompt to the model, do the homework and make sure they own it."
- Domain knowledge acts as the primary interface for directing AI agents; lower human competence degrades the ceiling of the model's output.
- Foundational skills must be acquired without AI assistance to build the intuitive understanding necessary to supervise automated workflows.
- Classrooms must transition from testing simple regurgitation to demanding rigorous oral defenses of complex, AI-assisted deliverables.
---
`59:44` Concluding Thoughts on the Demand for Intelligence
O'Shaughnessy wraps up the interview by emphasizing that Sosin’s thesis offers a vital, disciplined counter-narrative to prevailing consensus narratives. While the tech and venture capital ecosystem often assumes unbounded demand for intelligence, limitless compute build-outs, and universal obsolescence of traditional corporate moats, Sosin’s framework grounds intelligence within the boundaries of physical constraints, capital cycles, and foundational complementary assets.
- The conversation presents a structured alternative to the prevailing Silicon Valley paradigm of limitless compute scaling.
- Sustainable value accrues to the physical complements and domain-specific orchestrators rather than commoditized baseline intelligence.
## Notable quotes
> `35:00` Price is a miracle because it's a signal wrapped in an incentive. — Cliff Sosin
> `25:00` Instead of betting on which railroad tycoon is going to make money and how many railroads we need, I'm trying to think about, OK, once you have railroads, I'd love to have the foresight to figure out CPG brands come next. — Cliff Sosin
> `04:59` And as I've been thinking about companies and investments, I found it helpful to assume everyone has really great intelligence and ask what's left. — Cliff Sosin
> `45:00` The really great outcomes are the ones that make no sense. You shouldn't do it at all. But then it turns out there is a path or the world turns. — Cliff Sosin
## Mentioned
Cliff Sosin, Patrick O'Shaughnessy, Meta, Instagram, Llama, Grindr, Google, OpenAI, Anthropic, Cogent Communications, GrokBot, Elon Musk, SpaceX, 3Blue1Brown, Nvidia, TSMC, DoorDash, Uber, Carvana, Hilton Grand Vacations, Dan, Bank of America, Ben Thompson, Harry S. Truman, Renaissance Technologies, Walmart, Home Depot, Fastenal, William Shakespeare
## Video description
Cliff Sosin is the founder of CAS Investment Partners, which he started in 2012. Roughly 80% of his portfolio is in Carvana.
We discuss why Cliff thinks there are hard limits to what even the smartest AI can predict, which businesses benefit as intelligence gets cheap, and what that means for Meta and the frontier labs.
We also cover why he avoids investing in the AI build-out, how AI agents will push customers to the lowest-cost provider, and why he is comfortable with 80% of his portfolio in one stock.
Please enjoy my conversation with Cliff Sosin.
For the full show notes, transcript, and links to mentioned content, check out the episode page here.
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Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant.
Timestamps:
(00:00:00) Why Intelligence Has Limits
(00:02:34) Chaos Theory and the Butterfly Effect
(00:04:59) A 200 IQ Team in Every Pocket
(00:07:33) Meta as Personalized TV
(00:11:18) The Frontier Labs as Businesses
(00:14:59) Jevons Paradox and the Limits of Demand
(00:18:47) Automated Labs and the Speed Limits of Experiments
(00:20:39) Why He Stays Away from the AI Build-Out
(00:22:28) Why the Best Entrepreneurs Are Building Supply
(00:24:22) Lessons from Past Capital Cycles
(00:26:05) TSMC and Physical Moats
(00:27:03) AI Agents and the Low-Cost Producer
(00:29:44) Will AI Replace Investors?
(00:32:01) Price as a Signal Wrapped in an Incentive
Cliff Sosin argues that artificial intelligence is fundamentally a predictive tool constrained by chaos and physical reality, which will rapidly commoditize baseline cognitive tasks. Consequently, enduring economic returns will accrue not to frontier model developers or speculative compute infrastructure, but to scarce complements such as human attention, proprietary data, and physical distribution scale.
Physical Boundaries and the Limits of Intelligence (0:00)
Sosin refutes the narrative that machine intelligence scales infinitely into omnipotent problem-solving. Instead, he characterizes intelligence as a predictive gadget operating in complex dynamic systems where initial conditions inevitably suffer from truncation errors, causing forecasts to diverge rapidly over time through the butterfly effect. Beyond theoretical deduction, solving real-world challenges requires direct physical experimentation governed by the laws of nature—such as the time needed to breed mice in biological testing—which cannot be accelerated simply by stacking neural parameters.
Sosin also challenges assumptions of infinite demand for frontier models. Drawing parallels to optical telecommunications, he notes that demand follows an inverted U-curve where extreme deflation can ultimately contract total market revenue. Because few real-world tasks require a "300 IQ," the bulk of demand shifts toward "good enough" intelligence. As benchmark evaluations saturate, pricing power for frontier capabilities collapses, driving rapid commoditization across lower-tier inference tasks.
Capital Cycles and AI Infrastructure Risks (20:39)
Sosin avoids direct investment in artificial intelligence infrastructure, such as data centers and compute hosting, citing the impossibility of forecasting supply and inference demand within orders of magnitude. He warns that reallocating roughly 3% of U.S. GDP toward speculative AI infrastructure—pulling specialized trades like electricians and plumbers from the broader economy—mirrors historic capital cycles where long project lead times lead to severe overbuilding and the "winner's curse." Higher interest rates represent the necessary premium to convince society to defer immediate consumption for long-dated capacity.
Technical volatility heightens this fragility. Dominant hardware designers like Nvidia produce cognitive flat files sent to foundries, an intellectual advantage that automated AI tools could theoretically compress. In contrast, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) maintains a resilient physical moat rooted in tacit, illegible process engineering. However, TSMC's supply constraints have simultaneously created a vulnerability by incentivizing global competitors and governments to pour billions into replicating its manufacturing capabilities.
Value Shifts to Attention, Data, and Physical Density (4:59)
As software intelligence becomes a cheap commodity, Sosin argues that value concentrates in complementary assets: proprietary data, finite human attention, physical proximity, scale, and regulatory capture. For instance, he analyzes Meta as "personalized TV" whose multi-billion-dollar operating and capital expenditures are dedicated to buying human and machine intelligence. Because Meta commands billions of hours of consumer attention and vast behavioral data, cheap compute simply reduces operating costs and sharpens engagement algorithms without threatening its core distribution.
In the physical economy, autonomous personal agents will eliminate consumer friction and inertia. Boundedly rational consumers currently tolerate uncompetitive bank deposit yields or unexamined service contracts out of cognitive lethargy. Proactive AI agents running continuous micro-optimizations will dynamically bounce contracts to the lowest-cost provider. In route-dense businesses like local garbage collection or delivery logistics, this dynamic funnels marginal volume directly to the lowest-cost operator, expanding route density, lowering unit costs, and reinforcing an unassailable physical scale advantage.
Organizational Transformation and the Investing Landscape (46:42)
Ubiquitous AI agents also threaten digital distribution models like Ben Thompson's Aggregation Theory: if personal agents survey an entire market rather than clicking top search results, digital placement moats erode in favor of pricing, quality, and service. Concurrently, cheap intelligence lowers internal coordination overhead, allowing highly integrated vertical stacks—such as Carvana's reconditioning and logistics network—to outperform fragmented horizontal supply chains. For enterprises deploying AI, Sosin advises a four-stage playbook: company-wide "vibe coding" hackathons to reset expectations, universal read-only internal system access, role-based write permissions, and governance for autonomous system code modification.
Regarding asset management, Sosin views modern investing as a transient "freestyle chess" era where human real-world intuition complements machine processing. While probabilistic models will eventually outperform human discretionary underwriting on longer horizons, fundamental investing lacks the short-cycle verification loops that enable rapid algorithmic takeover. Defending his fund's roughly 80% concentration in Carvana, Sosin argues that conventional diversification prioritizes short-term price volatility over operational asset quality and extreme asymmetric upside.
Sosin's thesis frames artificial intelligence as an engine of cost deflation rather than unconstrained digital power. The critical unresolved challenge for market participants is navigating the capital cycle's inevitable infrastructure overbuild while securing the scarce physical assets, proprietary attention feeds, and dense distribution networks that machine intelligence empowers but cannot replicate.
[35:00] Cliff Sosin: Price is a miracle because it's a signal wrapped in an incentive.
[25:00] Cliff Sosin: Instead of betting on which railroad tycoon is going to make money and how many railroads we need, I'm trying to think about, OK, once you have railroads, I'd love to have the foresight to figure out CPG brands come next.
[4:59] Cliff Sosin: And as I've been thinking about companies and investments, I found it helpful to assume everyone has really great intelligence and ask what's left.
[45:00] Cliff Sosin: The really great outcomes are the ones that make no sense. You shouldn't do it at all. But then it turns out there is a path or the world turns.
Original transcript
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What people have wrong there is they're missing what are the real limits of what intelligence can do. And maybe another way to put it, if you're thinking about intelligence as like an unbounded scaler at the height of a tree, isn't correct. What you should really think about intelligence as is more like a ratio. like the roundness of a ball. And intelligence is a gadget. And we use it to make predictions about the universe. And so we start with this thin scattering of facts about the universe where we have relatively few of them, and the universe is complex. And we use intelligence to interpret it between them. So as your intelligence goes up, your ability to color in the spaces gets better. And some domains are really amenable to that. In mathematics, you can solve it, those sorts of things. And in those areas, you get to perfect. But for most of the interesting stuff that is most of the questions in the world, the mathematical term is they're a complex dynamic system. So what that basically means is they're kind of like weather in the sense that you can't just guess your way. You can't make a closed form answer. You can try to simulate it, but if you simulate it, invariably your simulation will have some degree of error in your initial conditions or in each step going forward, because at a minimum your steps, for example, are going to be truncated. And so what happens is your error will build and invariably after the simulation runs for some period of time, you'll be off by some amount. And so for mixing cream into your coffee or predicting the weather or thinking about how groups of people who are all very complicated are going to interact with each other, intelligence just isn't that powerful. And so my sense is that what you get is this increasing... Intelligence. to the point where you are making all the predictions as something that SuperSmart could make, which it turns out is a relatively small set of all the interesting things you'd want to know about the world. To get past that, you then need to go out and get more information about the world, and that just takes time. You have to do experiments, you have to touch reality. One interesting corollary to that is that the Zoom actually becomes one of the things you can turn your intelligence to is reducing the cost of intelligence, which we're seeing. So what you actually end up getting is everyone gets unlimited, really great, very round ball, so to speak, intelligence for essentially free. And obviously that's a limit statement. It won't actually be free. But the point is that what we're seeing is that really good enough intelligence is rapidly falling in price. And it turns out really good enough intelligence will solve the vast majority of questions where people need to answer. Yeah. Can you say more about why this notion of a complex adaptive or dynamic system exists? means that actually even perfect intelligence or whatever intelligence we have in a bottle. 10 years from now or Pick Your Horizon, will still be limited in its applications. Yes, nonlinear dynamic systems. The famous story here and how these were discovered is came into the branch of mathematics became chaos theory is back in the day, there was a guy who was building a weather forecasting model back on big computers that took up rooms and that sort of thing. So he runs the model and it makes predictions of pressure and temperature over some span of some forecasting period. And he's like, cool. And so then, just to make sure it's still working, they reset it and they run it again. And it starts out basically the same results. But then the results start to diverge and by the
[5:00] third, fourth, fifth day of the forecast. the results were entirely different. And the guy thought some version of, darn, I must have a bug in my system, and begins the process of trying to figure out why the computer isn't producing the same results correctly. in repeated runs. And it turned out that the technician who had loaded the data into the computer... in the second run had rounded off at some decimal, like one decimal less, all of the initial conditions for pressure and temperature and such. And you would have thought that, OK, maybe that would have produced a small but consistent error over the whole forecast period. But what had actually happened was that small error through all of the repeated steps. You take your current conditions, you calculate your next set of conditions, they compound, and you had an entirely different forecast by some small distance into the forecasting period in the unrecognizable weather. One model said it was 70 degrees and sunny, and the other model said it was 20 degrees and pouring. People called it the butterfly effect because, at least in principle, a butterfly could flap its wings in Africa, and that could lead to a hurricane in North America or whatnot. And it just turns out that many systems that we're interested in have this characteristic. You can know everything about pressure and temperature, but you can't necessarily write down an equation that you can solve easily that would tell you that there's going to be a hurricane. You have to model it. And the model entrant is going to be greened at some level, unless you actually go to the step of actually having... the whole universe. And so ultimately, in the limit, if you want to simulate the whole universe, what you actually need is the whole universe. If you don't actually do that, there are many, many circumstances where simulation is super useful for approximations. And in those circumstances, you can use intelligence to solve them. But there are many more where it doesn't work. And so intelligence is limited in that fundamental unknowableness, I guess, about the universe. So back to this notion of it's just intelligence. Yeah. What does that mean about where you think we're going from a more practical standpoint? We're all going to have a team of 200 IQ people. people working full-time in our pocket, and that team will have a team that it can deploy many more. And they're going to be trying to figure out all the little optimizations that we're too lazy to do. And every company will make similar teams available to their employees in order to do their jobs. There's just a lot of businesses where that's not good for them. Consumers are boundedly rational at present. They only have so much cognitive space. And so you go to a consumer and you say, look, we'll take your money. We won't steal it. We'll pay you a decent interest rate. You don't have to think about it. And you can go about your life. And the consumer doesn't say, look, if I think about this every day, I could save $400 a year. So therefore, I'm going to think about this every day. The consumer says something like, sounds good enough. I'm going to move on. But with an agent, you would think the agent will continuously optimize for them. Then there's also companies where what they produce fundamentally is some sort of artifact that is just some sort of crystallized intelligence. I'm by far not the first person to realize that AI could be bad for certain software companies. But just this idea that what an AI model is, is it's kind of like this general purpose intelligence tool. And what many software tools are, are crystallized and hardened pieces like projections of intelligence. And so as I've been thinking about companies and investments, I found it helpful to assume everyone has really great intelligence and ask what's left. The pushback is often some version of, but you don't understand how hard this is, you don't understand how complicated this is, you don't understand how many smart people have had to think for so long about this. And my hand wavy and approximately right response is, OK, sure, but that's all just intelligence. And to follow this logic all the way through to the end is if intelligence becomes cheap and ubiquitous. What you want to own are the complements to intelligence. And so the complements to intelligence are – their data, attention, love, affection, whatever sort of emotional attachment you want. It's physical proximity, it's scale. It's a little cynical, but it's regulatory capture. It's these sorts of things where for some businesses, what happens is their finite ability to deploy intelligence, be it economics, just the cost of it. They're only a certain size company and they don't have access to 10,000 of Google's best engineers for 10 years. or be it just the organization is behind or whatever, the ability to deploy way more intelligence to your business and your competitors to deploy more intelligence to their business and your customers to use lots of intelligence. It can work out to be better for you, or if intelligence is a barrier to you serving your customers, the lack of it. Or it can be bad for you if your customer is lethargy is the fundamental element of your economic value. Maybe pick Meta or something as the perfect example of a company that I think you believe owns perfect complements to ubiquitous cheap intelligence, just to bring the example to life. I'm actually going to set aside for a moment Muse and agents and that whole thing and focus on business. And the core business at Meta is personalized TV. It used to be social media, but now it's personalized TV. And it turns out that people really like watching Instagram or whatnot. Discovered that I love dark British humor and it's great. People talk about the 10,000 foot river. Let's talk about meta from space. the highest view. They have $250 billion in revenue. And they spend $250 billion a year. Some of it gets accounted for its cost, some of it gets accounted for its capex, it doesn't really matter. Just, they spend it all.
[10:00] The question you might ask is, what do they spend it on? And a really reductionist view is that they spend it all on intelligence. What do I mean by that? Well, they're buying data centers. What is a data center? Well, it's kind of an intelligent producing tool. What else are they doing? Well, they're actually literally buying inference. That's just intelligence. What else are they doing? Well, they're paying really smart people to write algorithms. That's intelligence. They're writing code, also intelligence. They're surveying videos. That's intelligence adjacent. Sure, it's intelligence. And so in some highly reductionist sense, and you shouldn't take these things literally, but I'm just trying to highlight the really big directions here. All they buy is intelligence. And if You think forward with the fact that the price of intelligence is falling by a factor of 100 or something over the next five years. First principles... their costs kind of go away. And That's just thinking about the cost side of things. On the revenue side of things, there are all of the creators. You are a creator. How much more... quality creative can every creator that makes content for meta make? If they have access to intelligence, that's one one hundredth the cost and 10,000 times more effective. The point is probably better. And then meta in turn, maybe they don't take their costs to zero. Maybe they spend more or more than zero, and they do a far better job of picking the videos to show people next. which should make the content better targeted and more enjoyable. And then, of course, on the ad side, Advertisers could make far better designed, far better targeted, personalized ads that then meta in turn can target much better and advertisers can also build much more slippery funnels or whatever to convert. The whole point of all this is that maybe instead of taking their cost to zero, With much better intelligence at much lower prices, maybe they can sell a few more apps. All of this is downstream of what they possess – which is not destroyed by ubiquitous intelligence, which is data and attention. They just have this enormous amounts of data about all these people and how they view videos and whatnot. And they have an enormous amount of attention and these things compound each other. And so I don't think that the availability of cheap and ubiquitous intelligence is going to cause people not to be interested in watching funny 20 second videos. And so if anything, they can win some time on the margin from other things people do with their time. I don't actually own it, but a company that benefits... in theory from having a lot more intelligence is Grindr. Basically, Grindr is the gay dating app, but it has been constrained over its life by the fact that it's just not that big of a company. And it turns out they've got lots of attention. And they've got lots of data. But their ability to build all the things that you could imagine building on what ultimately amounts to... A finite size team and budget and ability to create things has meant in some ways that Grindr can't be all the things you could imagine it could be. And again, I don't actually own any Grindr. I study lots of companies and that just sort of occurred to me. This is another example of something where here, this mental model is what if you had 10,000 of Google's best engineers to go work on your problem for five years? What could you do? And Grindr is one where maybe they could do more. I want to talk about the labs. So back to the original point, I think lots of great investors would say intelligence, specifically frontier intelligence, is not a commodity. Historically, the conversation has been about the gap in intelligence between closed source and open source. Increasingly, the conversation is about the gap between what's publicly available from the labs and what's privately used by them inside their own businesses. They seem to have figured out how to stop or slow distillation. Lots of people would say that there's this escape velocity thing happening and that the frontier token is going to be way more valuable and useful and that the labs themselves can then distill their own models and provide the best version of the chief intelligence to. I'm curious for you to riff on the labs as companies, through this mind of an investor. If they have models that are better and the ability to produce adequate intelligence at way lower cost than everybody else and nobody can copy it, then it's going to be a great business. I guess I have a couple of thoughts. One is, as I've watched models get deployed, It feels like one way to think about it is you start out with these very inadequate models that are basically able to do a very small subset of jobs. And what happens is the models get better and they work their way up the stack. And with each successive step up, The frontier model has unlocked a larger, call it, addressable market. But behind it, what's happening is that once evals or whatever get saturated, you would never use a frontier model for a chat bot in a customer service application. You'd be an idiot. And so what's happening is those areas, they clearly commoditize. And so there's this wave of hard tasks where you really need a frontier model. And then behind that, you don't. So the friends I have who are big frontier labs companies, bulls or whatever, and obviously these companies' financials aren't public and they might have an information advantage over me. But- would say something like, don't worry, we can also, along the whole efficient frontier, produce cheaper tokens. And maybe they can right now, maybe they can't right now, maybe they will in a few years, maybe they won't. I find these very hard to think about. Certainly the trend has been rapid commoditization of these things. If you were to look at the rise of Chinese models and everything,
[15:00] Three steps. And at a minimum, the cost has been collapsing. even if they do have a position where the tokens necessary to do tasks that are well behind the frontier. It might not be a very big market. because it just doesn't cost that much in the scheme of things to deliver and It is competitive. even if they are a cost leader in the shrinking commodity market. And then the other thing is that I think that programming was this huge use of models. As you push forward, the question becomes, for the next, next, next layers of intelligence. Do you still have bigger and bigger places to go after? And the bull story would be some version of, yes, people will pay anything for a model that can figure out how to cure cancer. Maybe that's true, but to go to our prior conversation, I think figuring out how to cure cancer requires touching reality, and I'm not sure that more IQ gets you that. If you don't believe that there's some super incredible use cases where you can just charge an enormous amount for more intelligence. Then you start getting to this point where the next step up in terms of you go coding and then maybe something else, but you get into smaller niches. It's like this diamond-shaped demand frontier where initially you get wider and wider uses, and then actually it starts to get more and more rarefied. How often do you really need a 300 IQ? One might start to ask. And look, we're going to find out. And I don't want to be too dogmatic. But it strikes me as totally reasonable that what we end up with is some version of there are very few use cases for super elite intelligence. There are lots of use cases for very good intelligence. That very good intelligence is highly competitive and commoditized. And if these frontier labs can somehow become cost leaders in doing that, there's a margin to make in being a cost leader. But then there's also just rampant deflation. And then this question becomes a lot like, How big is the market if good enough intelligence is very, very cheap? then how much good enough intelligence are people going to buy? I'll just keep playing the devil's advocate. So the two things people might say in this case are Javon's paradox that actually gets cheaper. We're just going to want to use more of it. I'm curious what you think about that. The second would be Historically, the new uses of intelligence have typically been discovered by highly intelligent people. My good friend says intelligence creates its own demand. What about that? What about the fact that maybe it's diamond-shaped for humans if humans are driving the new questions that the intelligence is set after to answer? But what if the thing itself is creating the new questions? And we train it to do that really effectively and just explore in an open-ended way in the way that all of humanity would be doing, led by the people with 150-plus IQ or something historically. - Shevins Paradox is just a narrow example of price elasticity and demand. In general, all markets are U-shape. So initially, when the product is terrible, There's no demand. And then the product gets better. and people will pay a lot. but they won't buy very much. And then as the price goes down, the size of the market will rise. because it becomes Jevin's paradox, essentially. But then you get to a point... where further price decreases don't actually drive enough demand and the market shrinks. And eventually, of course, if you take the price to zero, then the size of the market goes to zero. One example that I've thought about is the cost of fiber optic communication or just communications. The cost of moving information used to be super high and people moved very little of it. And then through a whole series of innovations, the cost of moving information went down a lot. And the amount of information moved went up a ton. And the market grew a lot for a long time. And then the market stopped growing. And the cost of moving information kept falling and the market kept shrinking. And nowadays, Cogent Communications, I think, routes 30 or 40 percent of all IP traffic across the Internet. And it's through one of its divisions, which is not even its biggest division, and Cogent Communications is... a few billion dollar market cap company, which is not a very big industry. Now, I'm not saying that we're going to get quite that small. in terms of intelligence. But Jevons Paradox is a statement about a particular spot on a curve, which doesn't necessarily have to be true. And as your other question about can more intelligence create more desire for intelligence, I mean, I have a couple of thoughts on that. Certainly, maybe. I started out by saying you need to touch reality to answer questions. And so if you had a model and it was going to think more about physics, it could certainly think lots of interesting thoughts about physics, but eventually it's going to need to do experiments. And that's not to say we couldn't also do experiments, but now we're bound by our ability to physically do experiments. I think there's going to be this incredible time where there's going to be so many cool discoveries, which we're already starting to read about, where this paper was written and this paper was written and this paper was written. And if somebody had read all three papers and thought about it, they would have realized this, but nobody had. But it turns out the models read all the papers and they'll figure that out. There's going to be all kinds of great stuff that falls out of that. But at some point, we're going to finish that. And then it's going to be about like, hey, there's some way to think about things that are outside of what we know. And we have a hypothesis, but a model, even a super smart model, won't be better at guessing that necessarily. We'll be better at guessing that than the smartest person. But the smartest person's odds are super low anyway. So it'll be able to come up with great ideas for experiments to do, and they'll be worth doing. But that will limit our ability to expand. The other thing I just think about is my own use of AI on a lot of levels. One, just to go back to the commoditization thing, I've totally commoditized my use of models for it.
[20:00] It's because I'm lazy about how I do a lot of my building for stuff. I'll tell a GrokBot, to build things because I don't want to use up all my GrokBot wheat tokens. I then have it run all of them. I subscribe to all the things. and I'll have it build using those subscriptions. on a server. And so I actually don't know what model I'm using anymore. I used to know this model is better, this one's worse. I no longer know. All of this is being optimized on the back end for me. And all I know is that stuff is getting built. and it's not using up my subscriptions and so we're good. Vanta automates compliance so your team can spend less time on security reviews and more time getting customers. Vanta cuts audit prep by 82% and gives you instant up-to-date proof of trust without all the manual work, so you can close deals faster and with less friction. Customers report a 526% return on investment, and more than 16,000 companies use Vanta, including Ramp, Harvey, and Snowflake. Ridgeline is the first end-to-end system of record with embedded AI for investment management firms running portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, and compliance on one unified platform. Firms are moving off legacy technology and on to Ridgeline because of how far ahead Ridgeline's AI features are compared to anything else in investment management software. Thank you. There's this batch of companies that I'm curious what you think about, which is effectively real world experimentation companies that create... a loop that's automatic. There's this happening in robotics, there's this happening in several places in bio labs and automated wet labs, automated testing labs. There's, Any commentary on that land of company? Yeah, super great idea. Closing the loop in the physical world is going to be great and it's going to accelerate the process of learning. And this is a great idea. But again, there are speed limits. The thing I keep coming back to is some version of This is amazing. And I'm super, in a sense, AI-pilled in the sense of what I think these are things are going to do and they're useful for. But I'm also cognizant of the idea that things bump up against the way I like to tell this to people. As I said, look, you're really smart. So you must understand being smart has limits. Being smart has limits. And so the ability to just think your way to solutions is limited. And so if you're going to build an automatic biology testing laboratory, and you're going to connect it to a computer, and the computer is going to come up with an idea... and then it's gonna run an experiment, and it's gonna iterate. That's awesome. But if that experiment requires breeding mice, and mice need a year to grow up and die, Bad experiment, gonna take time. And it might be a great experiment. You might learn a lot. And that's great. Still going to take time. And the lab's only so big. And so you might have 5,000 great ideas. You're going to pick 20. And the model may be better. Your odds of that experiment marking might even be 1%. Turns out that might be 10 times better than the average researcher, and that's amazing. It's still 1%. None of this is to be pessimistic. This is super amazing. Discovering all the things that we should know because it's already in our corpus that we forgot is awesome. Discovering all the things and better directing our research is awesome. Automating that research to move faster is awesome. We will learn, it will push the frontier. But this is not like suddenly the model looks around and says, you guys missed it. Here's some new world that you guys can't comprehend or whatnot. I don't think that's where we're headed. It seems like the market has been, especially in private markets and the leading edge of investors thinking about AI, very focused on investing in supply related stuff, like how are we going to build and serve all the intelligence? versus what I'll call demand-related stuff. someone watching their personalized TV on their meta app or whatever. What do you think about that first batch of companies as investments? Super hard. I've joked I've been willfully ignorant about them and probably I'm sort of worse off for it. But there's this big buildup. And then you're trying to forecast inference demand. I can't forecast supply or demand within several orders of magnitude. This idea of how much more inference will people use as intelligence gets better and cheaper is a really, really hard thing. And equally hard is how much better and cheaper inference is going to get. And then even if you could somehow guess at those things, then there's the whole value chain and you need to be at the bottleneck in order to capture the rents. And then, of course, finally, you get to your actual competition with your competitors in that particular piece of the value chain. It's just a super hard thing. As I think about my use of AI as a consumer, increasingly I'm doing stuff like instead of having the AI chatbot talk to my daughter or text with my daughter about how to do metastatic,
[25:00] Now I have it make a three blue, one brown style video explainer so that she can see a nice five minute or 10 minute video on powers or area circumference or something. It's super cool. I don't think I would do that if it was going to be $5. And so there's this thing where there's real pricey elasticity. The point I'm trying to make is I'll film myself working out with my Muse app and it'll show me tip pointers on my form. And I'll do that for very little money. But I won't do that if the price point is real. And I'm probably much less sensitive to the price than most people. AI demand is going to be really sensitive to the price. which intrinsically I think does limit in some sense the amount in total consumers are going to be willing to spend on this. Maybe this is a time to talk about capital cycles or something. It sure does seem like the smartest people in the world and many or most of the best entrepreneurs in the world are heavily personally invested in this supply build out thing. If you watch SpaceX's Investor Day yesterday, this is basically the theme of it. Arguably, maybe the greatest entrepreneur of all time is dedicated to effectively doing this, building out the data center supply, et cetera. This is just a historical question. If that's all true, and there's so much uncertainty about supply and demand, And there are other ways to go build businesses, products, make money. Why do you think so many of the best entrepreneurs, the smartest people, are so completely dedicating their lives to the build out of the supply. This is a huge infrastructure build out of a huge and important technology. And it would be impossible for there to be a huge infrastructure build out. of a huge and important technology. if there weren't a strong price signal. and a ton of talent going at it. So you may have your causality backwards. Obviously, these things work both ways. Could you imagine a telling of the story? where nobody interesting who'd made no money was building out the AI, right? That's probably the best answer. And to be clear, this is a huge and important project. It's only happening because super smart and talented people are focusing their lives on it. It's great that they are. They will have and deserve to make lots of money. It's just very, very hard. from where I sit. And there are probably people who are smarter and figured it out. From where I sit, it is very, very hard to figure out where one would invest along this and whether or not you'll give me money doing it. It's not to say that there isn't plenty of opportunity there. I've just sort of decided to focus my attention more on the longer term equilibrium results that come from what the world goes to. Instead of betting on which railroad tycoon is going to make money and how many railroads we need, I'm trying to think about, OK, once you have railroads, I'd love to have the foresight to figure out CPG brands come next. That's the way I've been trying to think about it. Can you riff a little bit about what you've learned about capital cycles and innovation cycles like this? I would love your perspective on having studied so much market history. if we're in the middle of one of these, maybe the biggest one ever, What does history teach us about these cycles and how they work that's interesting to you? You could think about American society right now as a household that's saving money for a house. We're building a house and we're all kind of feeling pinched because all these resources are dedicated to building out this big AI infrastructure. All these electricians and plumbers and everything else are going to do these tasks. And as consequence, there's higher costs elsewhere in the economy. And undoubtedly, we're going to get a lot of value for it. and we're going to keep pushing it. Because no one really knows. We're going to keep pushing it until eventually we overdo it. And... Along the way, people have to make tons of money. because otherwise people won't keep pushing it. And because things have lead times and because it's a winner's curse, it's a winner's curse. invariably the last person to stop. will regret it. And it's just so hard. It's just so hard. And then you combine that with the fact that there's just so much dynamism in the technology here, which is... I think was less true for other historic infrastructure buildouts. There's just so much change in terms of how you do these things. I mean, other people have made the point, I don't think it's necessarily wrong, that we talked about the models, but even at the chips level or whatever, that the potential for AI to commoditize even things like NVIDIA or... Recursive self-improvement everywhere at the... Everywhere. And a lot of it ends up being just intelligence. Like NVIDIA quite literally makes flat files that they send to Taiwan. Their flat files are very hard to make, but what they have is a lot of people who think really hard about it. And so in theory, you could make them. And also, then the question becomes, what if you step back a little from the frontier? Then the cost of making something comes way down. In that world, would your model be that physical and scale are the things that you'd want in a business that you were to back on the supply side of this equation? DSMC. I don't want to carry myself around as some sort of TSMC expert. I mean, certainly what they do has better attributes. I think in that regard, they've also got this sort of interesting problem where they did this super hard thing that requires all this process power built over many years and is super hard to replicate. and much less amenable to an AI just because it is so physical and because it's all these little things, many of which aren't even legible to an AI. It's like some guy who is in the system kind of knows that you have to do this. Because there's so much demand and because they haven't met it, they basically cause everyone in the world to seek to copy their moat. That's not a great fact, but I
[30:00] More generally, stepping outside the AI build-out. If you think about businesses, we talked about the meta example. Just the idea of businesses that have physical proximity or physical scale might benefit if they can use intelligence to serve their customers better or have lower cost as a consequence. I want to go back through the natural compliments to intelligence. Just have you explain why it's a compliment to intelligence so that people can go away and think about, OK, what companies have this feature that might be interesting? Good example to go talk about physical proximity. How would you think about DoorDash or Uber or these businesses that have local density effects that matter a lot? Does intelligence being ubiquitous sort of naturally magnify all of the scale winners of this type where physical proximity is some sort of key advantage? Well, so if you're the low-cost producer of something... I'll give a sort of stylized example. So if everyone has an AI agent, then what happens is many decisions get offloaded to the AI agent because the AI agent helps you optimize, helps you pick up all the pennies and dollars and nickels and stuff that you were leading on the ground. So I think about consumer choices in a spectrum. On the one hand, it's maximizing my bank deposit. This is something where I think I can almost entirely defer to the highest judgment. As long as it's FDIC insured, I just want the highest rate. On the other hand, this end of the spectrum might be picking my favorite sweater. This is something where it's just all of my judgment. The AI can source me things to look at, but in the end, I need to decide it. I can't really delegate that judgment to it. And there's a spectrum. And so let's just pretend for a moment that garbage collection is something where I can defer the judgment. You might say, no, I really care about the guy and I trust the service and there's driving to my house or whatever. But let's just set all that aside for a second. So right now, if I'm in the waste collection business, I might be great at it. But it's still really hard to get people to bother to switch. I doubt you know what you pay for garbage collection off the top of your head. Many people do, but I doubt you do. And so what happens is you have to do all this work to get people to pay attention. to bother to switch garbage collection companies, even if you're offering a better service at a lower price. You could imagine that the air agent could talk to my agent and be like, hey, I'll save you 50 cents a month. And the agent will say, will the garbage go away? And I'm like, yes, the garbage will go away. And no problem, and I'll change. So the first order effect is that you move to the low-cost provider. But the general market effects are actually sort of interesting, too, because now let's say that there's a street. And before, it would be more efficient for society if all of the people on my street had the same garbage collector, because if I could drive up the street, pick up the trash, and he could offer all of us a lower price and make more money. But it's really hard for us to coordinate that because what happens is all of us are just lazy about switching garbage collectors. And so we all have one. And the guy with two guys on the street can't call everyone else up and say, hey, I've got two guys on the street. Everyone else has just one. I'm a low-cost producer. Let me roll this up. So a second order effect might be that The guy who has two people on my street can go to everyone else on the street and say, hey, I'll offer you a lower price on the garbage and everyone will switch. And so everyone moves the low-cost producer who in turn gets to be the lower-cost producer. That actually creates, in some sense, a better business where the low cost guy wins a bunch more volume at much lower margins. As you study them, a lot of companies have mixed effects that point in different directions because of these things. What do you think the impact of agents is going to be on your world? What will be your role? How will it be different in five years? Will the best agent be able to build a portfolio of Carvana and Hilton Grand Vacations and Meta in the same way that you would because you trained it how you think? Well, hopefully better. In terms of what I do, I think that in the long term... will probably get competed out. Right. Basic pricing risk as the thing you do. Yeah. Yeah. When computer-aided chess came along, there was this long span of time. where freestyle chess was better, where the human working with the computer program was able to outcompete either the human or the computer by itself. And this is just because humans thought about things differently and computers thought about things differently and they were synergistic. And I think in investing for a while, we're in that era now. We're in that era. And that's because there are things that I understand in the world in ways that the model just doesn't. by virtue of being a person and having lived a life. And there's information I have about the world that just isn't in the world. models, because as much information is on the internet, not everything is actually on the internet. While that's true, which is going to, I think, be a while. the ability of me to use models to assist me and then make judgments. We'll make better judgments working together. You could imagine a circumstance, though, in the future where that gap diminishes to the point where it doesn't matter anymore. And then I don't think models will be able to predict the future. As we talked about, the future is in some ways very intrinsically unpredictable. But the model's distribution of outcomes may be the best that you can do. And that adding a human to the forecast would be kind of like adding my judgment to whether or not it's going to rain in seven days. You just kind of would be like, Cliff, I don't really care what you think. I'm using the forecast. This is going to be better. However you fudge it, it's just going to make it worse. That day may come instead of an interesting moment there. There's a lot to investing. Think about judging management or something, but maybe the models will be able to judge management. They'll be able to interview them. They'll be able to figure it out. And then It gets really interesting. How do you raise capital? You'll be like, you know, I'd like to run an amusement park. And models say, sure, here are six locations that have a 51% chance of an amusement park working. And as long as you're really committed to it, and I've assessed you and you
[35:00] a 51.2% chance of succeeding because you're actually slightly below average. You're like, okay, well, what can I do better than average? And I say, well, you know, have you thought about running a go-karting park? Fortunately, I don't think it's going to affect my career that much because I think it'll take a while. What about replacing price as the organizing principle and signal? that coordinates economic activity. Price is a miracle because it's a signal wrapped in an incentive. What does that mean? Price... is an incentive. It causes you to want to buy more or less of something because it goes up or down. And it's also a signal because it says something about the relative value of something and the scarcity of something and the cost to produce something. It's a miracle of a mechanism to coordinate things. And I think you'd be really hard pressed to find a better system, even with unlimited intelligence. It'd be pretty hard. Maybe another way of asking the question is kind of like investing. If ubiquitous intelligence gets so much better and so much cheaper, And in some way, it can replicate what you do, and you're really good at pricing risk. A friend of mine, Dan, was saying there's three levels to this. There's I put in a prompt and I get something back. That's level one. Level two is I set up a watchtower. My instinct every night runs like a set of tasks and it happens in the background on a schedule. And Level 3, which produces the most use of intelligence, is just always on proactive figuring out its own way to use its own intelligence. And that just goes on forever and it's unlimited in how much it can do. If I think about that level three applying to everything, what things should be priced, efficiencies, optimization, all this kind of stuff, does that add something interesting to the price of the price? sharpens markets. There's a lot of stickiness to prices. It's a well-known macroeconomic phenomenon, this price stickiness. There's a lot of lazily priced stuff. Think about deposits and such. I mean, it's a really competitive world out there, but it's actually not as competitive as in theory it could be. So I think... If everyone has agents who are working on their behalf and constantly optimizing, then I think the price of garbage collection will move around a lot more. As all the input costs to garbage collection evolve, and every garbage collecting company is constantly rerunning its financials and trying to figure out its true marginal cost and bid every customer where it could serve for more than marginal cost. And every agent is switching to the lowest cost provider. You won't just pay $60 a month for 12 months and then have the guy come back to you and say it's a 5% increase. It's going to be 63 next year. And you don't even notice they're just picking up your garbage. your garbage collection will vary by day. And, One week, it'll be whatever. There was all this interesting, much more accurate, much more rapidly moving prices, I would imagine. Have you seen anything interesting in capital markets innovation? There was this awesome economist story talking about the behemoth that is American capital markets and how good it is at adapting to new stuff and creating new instruments, new ways of financing things. and that that's been as much a part of the American story as the technology innovation. There's this amazing interrelationship between Wall Street and Silicon Valley would be one way of thinking about it. Anything interesting percolating for you in markets, in capital markets, in ways of financing things, things like this? Well, I mean, it's fun to take a moment to pause and maybe congratulate ourselves as capital markets for what we're doing with AI. People were worried about this decline in American dynamism. I think we just redeployed. What is it, 3% of GDP right into this highly speculative venture, basically on the turn of a dime? It's just this remarkable thing. Of course, who knows? Maybe it should be two, maybe it should be six. But it is amazing that we can redeploy resources at this scale. this quickly and there's no one else in the world that's been able to do it. And certainly... the inability to move investment in productive resources, can be a binding constraint. on productivity growth, even with, especially with rapid technological progress. And so at least with regards to capital, and obviously we talk about capital, that the capital investments are tied to people doing different things. Americans are doing different things today. Every day, people are waking up and going to someplace in Pennsylvania and building a data center. And that wouldn't be happening if it wasn't for this whole infrastructure we have that's somehow been able to move this enormous amount of capital. It's incredible. As deep innovation, I think the fundamental idea that people are taking risk on speculative ventures and slicing up the pie in different ways is irreducible. I think people come up with lots of different names for what are essentially the same things over time. I don't think that's deeply different, but it is incredible. I should also note that I'm sure we'll discover all kinds of fraud and bad behavior and stuff eventually when the water goes out. But I think given the magnitude of this, I suspect it's so clean. It's amazing. If you read about the railroad build out or something, the amount of waste and fraud, invariably there is something. But there's a lot of people trying to basically do the right thing here. And the governance parts that we just take for granted, it's incredible. America's capital markets and the capital markets in general, I think, are just incredibly underappreciated. The idea that any person can buy $100,000 of stock and get a portfolio of well-run, well-motivated teams, building companies that are
[40:00] mostly the right things, then do it basically instantly and basically no cost, and then sell it as soon as they're done is amazing. And then the fact that all those companies and other ways people invest can then allocate society's resources really well in the scheme of things is just incredible. The whole system is just very underrated. Why has America so dominated this, do you think? My pet theory, and everyone has their own theories, is some sort of interplay between genetics, cultural evolution, and institutional evolution. So basically, the people who came to the United States were the subset of people who were most interested in taking risk because going to the United States was very risky. And I think that risk-taking has a meaningful genetic component. And so I think that tendency is just more common amongst Americans. When you're in a place where risk-taking is more the norm, there's also a whole bunch of other things that come from that. It's more the norm. And then that leads to buildups of cultural institutional things that reinforce that. It's understood that people can take risk and fail. That leads to bankruptcy laws that make sense That leads to labor laws that support that That leads to venture capital that supports that And all of those things reinforce that And then that leads to success stories get this whole soup But that my pet theory. So if there's a moon base at some point, you're going to be bullish on that community's ability to do really well economically. Yeah, actually, that's a great way to put it. The United States has been persistently innovative in a very amazing way. So if there's a moon base, I wouldn't be shocked if it's ours, even though the Chinese are brilliant and numerous and the Europeans exist. When you see rates go up, you see that great long-term chart of rates, let's say the 10-year rate in the US. And it just looks like this forever, missing our whole lives. And I was going, oh, comment on that chart. Well, I mean, there's so much. And I'm certainly no macroeconomics expert, nor I spend too much time thinking about it, but I'll make a couple of observations. One, obviously, is just in general, when you're a society and you're building it, you're making a giant investment in the future, means you're going to have to consume less today. Fundamentally, all of the resources going into this AI build out are about the future. Are about the future. And fundamentally, the plumber building that today is not making consumption today. He could be making today's present consumption. Instead, he's making a data center which is future consumption So one piece of a very complex puzzle that I thought a bit about is this idea that rates are higher because we inducing people to save for the future And the way you do that is you pay them People would kill me if I didn ask about your portfolio a little bit, which is so interesting to me. It's 80% Carvana, vacations, 5% meta is basically your portfolio. Rough justice, it's like five things. Sure. And one thing is 80%. So if you think about your portfolio and those companies, which obviously you know extremely well, and you were advising them on how to think about using AI to transform their businesses. What's that speech look like? Well, it starts by making sure that everyone is vibe coding. Starting at the board and the CEO, everybody needs to have hackathons. And of course, I brought this to Carvan and they said, yeah, we call them pizza parties. I don't mean the developers. I mean, everybody needs to have hackathons. And it's not so much that you're going to build hugely useful software necessarily, that comes out of these hackathons, but it's that you're gonna teach everybody what can be done. And that's going to change their expectations, I think, for what can be done. And then the second thing which I tell them is the CEO needs to basically turn to the head of IT and say something to the effect of, so I want my Grokbot, Metamuse, agent, whatever, to be able to access every system in the company on a read basis Everything I could look up if I asked somebody I want to be able to get that in a prompt And the guy going to say that really hard We have umpteen trillion problems with that And he going to say that my point I want that And that's a big process and it's system by system and all the rest. But if you can get to that, then that gets you read-only access. To the starting line. Yeah, to the starting line. That gets you read-only access. And then the next logical thing as a CEO needs to use this everywhere and everyone is going to get jealous. And you're going to say, oh, you can have it too, but we need to work out your permissions. And then that in theory percolates down and now you've got permission to read only access. And then invariably someone is going to say something like, I'd really like to put data into the system. And you're going to say, that's fantastic. We got to work out right permissions. And then someone's going to say, I'd love to change a system because we just did this vibe coding thing and I'm confident we could do it. And you're going to say, that's also fantastic. We need to work out a process by which we're going to manage changes to the system. And what I just described, sure, it's four bullet points. That's like years of work. It's impossibly hard. So the question is, are you in a business where you have time for that to happen before someone who starts- Or the jump ball, someone else that starts from go. Exactly. And so it's good to have a really good business. It seems like one of the conclusions from that is it's the best time ever to start companies, both because of capital market conditions that-
[45:00] People will fund... at fairly low cost of capital, highly experimental things. but also just because with these tools, if you start without the baggage, you can go so far so fast. Do you think that's roughly right? I mean, yeah, it's the best time to start a company until tomorrow. So I agree. It's amazing. I'd also just say that just thinking from my perspective. People are such a... Pain in the butt. If you're running a company, there's such a pain in the butt. And the idea that you have all these agents and stuff, it makes it so you can do so much more. with so many fewer people. Of course, one of the challenges always is if you can easily do something, then so can everybody else. So there has to be some wedge by which the thing you build... produces enduring value. Does it have a path where you end up with some sort of lock-in or proprietary data in this world where all the agents are happily changing providers every day. What gives you any enduring economics? But then, of course, then there's the further thing is that obviously if you do the thing where it seems like there's an obvious path to enduring economics – then that's a bad thing to do because everyone is trying to do that. So it's very competitive. And the really great outcomes are the ones that make no sense. You shouldn't do it at all. But then it turns out there is a path or the world turns. Your finance team isn't losing money on big mistakes. It's leaking through a thousand tiny decisions nobody's watching. Ramp puts guardrails on spending before it happens. Real-time limits, automatic rules, zero firefighting. Try it at ramp.com slash invest. As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk. Learn more at vanta.com slash invest. away the complexity across portfolio accounting, reconciliation, reporting, trading, compliance, and more, all at scale. Schedule a demo at Ridgeline.ai. Every investment firm is unique, and generic AI chatbots don't understand your process. Rogo is built by finance professionals. It's connected to your data, learns your process, and quickly produces client-ready outputs. Check them out at rogo.com slash invest. The best AI and software companies from OpenAI to Cursor use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight, not in months. Visit WorkOS.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product. What do you think are the most underrated sources of future competitive advantage then? If ultimately... Good businesses need sustainable edge, sustainable competitive advantage to have great profits. Anything underrated? Underrated. We talked about attention and data and physical proximity. These are examples of things that might be super or more valuable in the future than they are today because of cheap intelligence. Is there any type of it? Maybe it's regulatory capture. Are there any types of edge that you think are underrated? I get the sense that a lot of these are appropriately weighted. I guess one interesting question I've had, two of these, one is, if you think of corporate margins in aggregate, do they go up or down? Like this. Right. Do they go up or down? And I think everything we're talking about, are you down? There's many businesses where they make margin because more consumer surplus, more consumer service everywhere, everywhere. What's interesting is if you go back and read a lot of the research reports from the 90s when the Internet was coming along, they said the same thing. So the base rate here might not be great. Maybe we're wrong. But I think the main reason they were often wrong was this aggregation economics, the Van Thompson aggregation economics. So maybe absent that, maybe it wouldn't have been so wrong. And I do think that a lot of aggregation theory breaks down because that basically relies on the idea that consumers only look at the first thing on Google. But it turns out if your agent looks at everything unsearched, then being ranked first doesn't matter. And all the core things like quality and price and everything else, service become more salient. But the other thing is that maybe another downstream effect of this is you'll be able to build more complicated businesses. Right now, a lot of industries are more horizontal in structure because the complexity of running your slice is very high. And that makes it hard to do what's above and below you and not have undue complexity. With AI agents and basically cheap and ubiquitous code and intelligence, you could build the whole vertical stack. People are trying to do this, I think, in other countries, but you can have a full stack pet care business that does everything from make pet food all the way up through pet insurance and pet hospitals and pet vets and all these things that historically were multiple layers. But now, because you can solve the coordination and reduce the principal agent problems, it's a big deal. By having AI do it, maybe those sorts of businesses are possible. And then maybe those businesses are higher margin in the end, more efficient and more consumer surplus. Carvana is an example of that built before this was easy to do, but maybe people can do it in other verticals. In which case, maybe margins go up and there's consumer surplus. The other one is one other thing there is just how this affects wealth and income distribution. I can tell two stories. On the one hand, I think a lot of people have talked about this idea that it concentrates income distribution. You've got all these people who made money on various labs and whatever data NVIDIA. And this idea that there are increasing returns to small groups of people But the counter argument is if
[50:00] We have cheap and ubiquitous intelligence. a couple of things happen. One is there's all these rent takers in the economy. Think you're the software company that charges bowling alleys, And those guys all get smoked, which sucks for them, but it does lower the cost of bowling. And so then that increases living standards for everyone who bowls. And that's flattening because my spending on bowling is small proportion to my income, but people who make less money spend more proportion to their income on bowling. And so that's a flattening effect on income. if all these little rent... pieces go away. the decline in corporate profits, all the money that the average American is giving to Bank of America goes away from Bank of America, the capitalists lose. the average consumer. wins sets leveling. The other piece is there's a whole professional class who basically you could define their role as intelligence. Intelligence. They take big corpuses of information and apply them to certain circumstances in a fairly straightforward way. And if those all get commoditized, one, everyone gets the best ubiquitous, which is one, good for everybody, but two, particularly good for people who can't afford the best right now or any. But then three, those individuals, they earned these extra rents because they were... smarter. They then have to drop to their next best alternative. And in theory, then that might flatten the curve. Now, the counterargument to that might be something like, well, yes, but returns to initiative and ambition and intelligence could go up. Because now I can do so much more because these models are like a bicycle for the mind on steroids. They give people who are smart and have initiative the ability to accomplish so much more. Maybe that actually causes increasing returns to that subset of people and it steepens the curve. Truman asked for a one-handed economist. I seem to very distinctly have two hands on everything. I think that's a big, interesting question. They're super interesting questions. And I find that a lot of situations I look at, there's a lot of cross-currents. We've started the conversation with the AI build. On the one hand, I can see all these incredible ways to use AI. And I use a gajillion tokens. And I can see how I could use a gajillion more. And obviously, I'm in the far right end of the distribution. Everyone uses as many tokens as me. We are so short. It's going to be this huge thing that's going on forever. And everyone who's in the build is going to make a fortune. On the other hand, the amount I get per token is like going to the moon. And it turns out I'm a pretty unusual guy in a lot of senses. And people are going to adapt more slowly. And the cost per token is going to collapse. And so maybe actually we're totally overbuilt. I can tell both stories with equal certainty. I have a good friend who has been running this very cool experiment where If you break investing down into picking what to own, And then how much to own of each thing that you've picked. Overly simplified, but interesting way of thinking about it. He's been running this experiment where he continues to pick the things to own. but then runs his own portfolio construction as he would have in the past in one lane. And in a second lane is just completely handing that off to an AI harness thing that he's built and says, you do all the portfolio construction, but stick with the stuff that I've picked. And what he's found so far is that that is drastically outperforming his version of portfolio construction, which itself is quite sophisticated. And the simple argument that he would make is, well, AIs are just really good at optimization. And they've read every paper on portfolio construction and all this kind of stuff and bet sizing and Kelly Criterion. They know it all. And that in the future, perhaps we make that transition where the investor's job is just picking what to own and not how much of each to own. And I ask you this question, what you think about this idea and the future, because you have such an unusual portfolio where. Again, 80% of it is in one specific asset. And my guess is if you were in lane two, AI would weight your portfolio very differently than you have chosen to do it. I'm underweight. So I'm just I'm dying to know what you think about this idea. That's clever. Underweight Carvana. Should be 90. Time scales probably are interesting on that to think about, too, because I think about how AI is going to encroach into this business. I think it's going to start at shorter time scales and work its way up to longer time scales. Because one of the challenges is that there's no verification loop. your friend's ability to say that, is based on results over, I mean, certainly not 20 year results. I strongly suspect that the march of AI into markets, and I mean, it already started. I don't know how Renaissance Technologies did it, but I assume... Seems like they might have discovered the Transformer for everybody else. It's like, I'm not kidding. It wouldn't shock me if... People who invest over shorter timescales, starting with seconds and working their way out to minutes, hours, weeks, months. find themselves delegating more and more to models. Makes perfect sense. And that you could definitely imagine bifurcating that between trying to enrich the model. I think other people do things like this already. And this is just a more sophisticated version, but you can have a fully quantitative strategy and then you can enrich it with what you think is qualitative human designed analysis. And then you can have
[55:00] quantitative strategy to incorporate the qualitative. I think many of these multi-strat do these sorts of things. And what he's doing is just a slightly different flavor of that. Makes perfect sense. There are so many ways to be successful and models have just added more dimensions of freedom. But what about your own portfolio or more about how you feel comfortable having a position? Forget the company that it is. Sure. That's that big in the face of so much research that would suggest that's a crazy way to Build a portfolio. A lot of that research, I think, is more looking at price changes in terms of securities prices. and less focused on thinking about it the way someone who owns a company might think about it. I mean, we're talking about Carvana. We're not, for my sense, that Carvana's infrastructure and brand and everything else is just so differentiated that there are few scenarios where it works out. really badly. then I wouldn't feel so comfortable owning so much of it. It might just be as simple as that. That portfolio approach would have worked absolutely. Certainly, if you discovered Walmart or Home Depot or Fastenal or something back in the day, you wouldn't have taken full advantage of it. And that's kind of my sense with Carvana. If you read history, of course, all the people who did really great tended to be very concentrated. But of course, the history is literally... The driver should buy a sale. Yeah, or the history of the deal didn't. I also think that a lot of that literature is what most people who are looking for average or slightly better than average results should do. And it's totally the right thing to do. But that's not what I'm looking for. I like Carvana a lot. "'It wouldn't upset me, Annie, if—' Stock went up a bunch and I felt compelled to diversify it. That would also be okay. It's just more of a trade-off between expected returns and knowingly taking an unusual risk. What do you think about education? You and I have kids of roughly similar ages. Comment a little bit on how you're thinking about their educations, the institutions that have driven education in this country that have been really important in that whole path dependent story you've described. What do you think the present and future of education looks like or should look like? I've been talking to the head of my kid's school about this, and more and more it seems to be that his thinking... and my thinking are heading in this direction of the way you're educating kids is getting more bimodal in terms of what you're looking for. Let me step way back. What is the benefit of intelligence? personal intelligence, like your own intelligence, in a world where there's infinite intelligence for models. You might say, oh, it's useless. Doesn't matter. Someone with a 50 IQ can navigate the world just as well as someone with a 150 IQ. And I don't think that's quite right. And intuitively doesn't feel right. But I think to nail down where it is, is that the more intelligence you have and the more crystallized intelligence you have, which would be sort of education. the better you are at communicating with a model and telling a model what you want. I would have a very tough time having a deep conversation with a model to create leading quantum physics experiments because I don't know anything about quantum physics. And the model could try very hard to explain things to me, but in the end it would be explaining things in Crayon and Nerf. And it would just be very hard to get to the leading edge and get the best out of what the model has to offer. Whereas in an area where I do have some expertise, the model and I can communicate effectively and I can direct the model to my will much better. And so to direct the model, to do your will, which I think is going to be an important skill in the future. You do have to understand something about the world. And smarts help for that. And education helps for that. You can't ask it to assume it's a stochastic process unless you know what a stochastic process is. It could teach you what one is, but that's a lot of friction in figuring this all out. You don't have to work out the math, but you have to know what it is. And so when I've been thinking about education, there's this idea that you're teaching your kids a bunch of foundational skills that build on one another. Where I think in the end, the sum total of those, they have to do them without models, not because they're going to do them without models in the future, but because if they don't know how to do multiplication, it's going to be really hard to understand matrix multiplication. And if they don't know what matrix multiplication is at a high enough level. They don't have to be able to do it really well, but they have to be able to understand what the model is doing when it's doing it. And that's so they can direct the model. And so – Increasingly, I'm of the view that we should spend a bunch of time with kids basically separated from these models. Teaching them basic skills that we think are important and what those are is a really hard thing. But the idea being that, yes, model can do it, but you need to know it so that you can tell the model what to do. And then on the flip side, some English teacher is like, I don't like models because the kids just cheat on their Shakespeare essays. I'm like, you're not being ambitious enough. The kids are cheating on a Shakespeare essay. Give them something harder to do. Give them something a hundred times harder and more ambitious and have them use models to their fullest extent. Have them bring the work product back and then make sure that they didn't just give a prompt to the model, do the homework and make sure they own it. Ask them why it's like this. Force them to justify it. And I think that's another really important thing because kids need to be good at using them. And they also, frankly, just need to be taught that they can do anything. You and I get to talk every so often on the phone every time I wish it was recorded so that other people could hear it because I learned so much and... I think in this particular conversation today, which is sort of a version of a call we had several months ago, It's just such a valuable set of food for thought about.
[60:00] the future of intelligence and what that means for markets and companies, and is a little bit, not in opposition to, but A different perspective than the most common one that you're hearing which is unlimited build out forever, short everything forever, no cap on the demand for intelligence. And I've loved talking to you about it both on the phone and today. So thank you so much for your time. Thank you. If you enjoyed this episode, visit Colossus.com. You'll find every episode of this podcast complete with hand edited transcripts. You can also subscribe to Colossus, our quarterly print, digital and private audio publication featuring in-depth profiles of slash subscribe. Patrick O'Shaughnessy is the CEO of Positive Sum. All opinions expressed by Patrick and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Positive Sum. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions. Clients of Positive Sum may maintain positions in the securities discussed in this podcast. To learn more, visit PSUM.VC. Outro Music. You know how small advantages compound over time? That's true in investing and just as true in how you run your company. Your spending system is your capital allocation strategy. Ramp makes it smarter by default. Better data, better decisions, better economics over time. See how at ramp.com slash invest. As your business grows, Vanta scales with you, automating compliance and giving you a single source of truth for security and risk. Learn more at vanta.com slash invest. The best AI and software companies from OpenAI to Cursor to Perplexity use WorkOS to become enterprise ready overnight. not in months. Visit WorkOS.com to skip the unglamorous infrastructure work and focus on your product. Ridgeline is redefining asset management technology as a true partner, not just a software vendor. They've helped firms 5x in scale, enabling faster growth, smarter operations, and a competitive edge. Visit RidgelineApps.com to see what they can unlock for your firm. Every investment firm is unique and generic AI doesn't understand your process. Rogo does. It's an AI platform built specifically for Wall Street, connected to your real outputs. Check them out at rogo.ai slash invest.