爱马仕市值腰斩后PE仍达30倍 估值过高下行空间或达六成

【Value Investing with Sven Carlin, Ph.D】爱马仕腰斩 是抄底还是接刀 — 浑水摸鱼清源

浑水摸鱼清源

爱马仕基本面虽稳但此前泡沫受指数被动配置放大,在30倍市盈率下仍无安全边际,若按3%股息率回归合理估值股价需再跌六成。

AI-assisted summary of 【Value Investing with Sven Carlin, Ph.D】爱马仕腰斩 是抄底还是接刀 — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • 爱马仕股价较一年半前高点下跌逾50%,市值从2800亿欧元缩水至1400亿欧元,但最新半年报营收仍保持6%增长,净利润约20亿欧元且资产负债表几无负债。 (0:01)
  • 即便股价腰斩,爱马仕当前市盈率仍达30倍,股息率仅由0.65%回升至约1.3%至1.45%,估值仍属昂贵而非具备安全边际。 (3:01)
  • 若按价值投资标准将其视为低速增长分红资产,达到3%股息率意味着股价需再跌60%(约至500欧元),达到5%股息率则需再跌80%(约至320欧元)。 (3:20)
  • 欧洲指数权重机制在此轮涨跌中起到推波助澜作用,被动资金与养老金的机械化买入和撤退放大了市值的大起大落。 (5:04)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on Bilibili by 浑水摸鱼清源 on October 27, 2026, this video features value investor Sven Carlin analyzing whether Hermès' 50% stock price collapse represents a bargain or a falling knife. According to the page description, while Hermès' business remains fundamentally sound with 6% revenue growth and negligible debt, its valuation had simply become unsustainably inflated by passive index flows, leaving it still expensive at a 30x P/E ratio.

## TL;DR Hermès has seen its share price and market capitalization cut in half from their peak, falling to €140 billion even as revenue grew 6% and net profit held steady around €2 billion. Value investor Sven Carlin examines the company's disciplined capital allocation and growing dividends, concluding that despite pristine balance sheets and strong Asian demand, the stock is still not cheap at a 30x P/E and a 1.3% dividend yield. He demonstrates that if Hermès shifts to mature growth, achieving a standard 3% to 5% dividend yield would require the stock to tumble another 60% to 80%. Ultimately, Carlin attributes the historical run-up and crash to mechanical index fund weighting rather than collapsing consumer appeal, warning investors that the shares have merely transitioned from wildly overpriced to very expensive.

## Atmosphere & style The presentation carries the measured, unhurried, and contrarian clarity characteristic of Sven Carlin's quantitative value investing approach. Carlin cuts through luxury market prestige with dry wit, playfully telling investors that if they want to bet on secondary market handbag premiums, they should flip physical scarves rather than buy overvalued equity. The atmosphere feels like a sober, patient reality check, grounding viewers in mathematical balance-sheet realism while acknowledging—and calmly defying—the prevailing consensus.

## Bulletin - [00:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=1s) 爱马仕股价较一年半前高点下跌逾50%,市值从2800亿欧元缩水至1400亿欧元,但最新半年报营收仍保持6%增长,净利润约20亿欧元且资产负债表几无负债。 - [03:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=181s) 即便股价腰斩,爱马仕当前市盈率仍达30倍,股息率仅由0.65%回升至约1.3%至1.45%,估值仍属昂贵而非具备安全边际。 - [03:20](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=200s) 若按价值投资标准将其视为低速增长分红资产,达到3%股息率意味着股价需再跌60%(约至500欧元),达到5%股息率则需再跌80%(约至320欧元)。 - [05:04](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=304s) 欧洲指数权重机制在此轮涨跌中起到推波助澜作用,被动资金与养老金的机械化买入和撤退放大了市值的大起大落。

## Key takeaways - [00:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=1s) 爱马仕股价自一年半前高位腰斩超50%,但公司最新上半年营收仍维持6%的稳健增长。 - [00:40](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=40s) 除中东地区销售略有下滑外,全球其余市场依然保持增长态势,基本面并未发生结构性损坏。 - [01:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=61s) 亚洲消费者贡献了主要销售额,买包往往承载着身份象征的需求,但宏观预期转弱可能使这部分客群最先动摇。 - [01:40](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=100s) 公司资产负债表极为健康,净利润约20亿欧元且几乎无债务负担,运营引擎完好。 - [02:20](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=140s) 资本开支仅占净利润约20%,管理层避免大型并购,家族股东更偏好现金分红而非大规模股票回购。 - [03:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=181s) 股价暴跌使股息率从极端的0.65%回升至1.3%左右,但这一收益率在全球资产中仍缺乏足够的吸引力。 - [03:20](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=200s) 以3%的目标股息率倒推,爱马仕股价还需再跌约60%至500欧元左右,当前价格买的是品牌信仰而非估值折扣。 - [03:40](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=220s) 若以5%的保守股息率要求衡量,股价对应跌幅高达80%至320欧元左右。 - [04:20](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=260s) 二手市场手袋溢价虽证明了终端定价权,但并不能作为在二级市场高价买入股票的合理解释。 - [05:04](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=304s) 指数被动配置机制放大了波动,市值膨胀曾迫使被动资金不断追高,而退潮时被动减仓同样加剧了股价下跌。 - [05:20](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=320s) 当前30倍市盈率表明爱马仕只是从“疯狂昂贵”回落到“非常昂贵”,投资者不宜急于抄底接刀。

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=0s) Stock Price Crash vs. Resilient Fundamentals

Hermès has been one of the most frequently requested tickers among investors trying to figure out whether the broader luxury downturn presents a rare bargain or a falling knife. Sven Carlin notes that the stock price has plunged by over 50% from its all-time high set a year and a half ago. This severe sell-off has unfolded against a backdrop of geopolitical conflict in the Middle East, tariff concerns, and widespread anxiety over global luxury spending. Carlin compares this to his recent analysis of LVMH, concluding that while LVMH remains somewhat too expensive, Hermès demands a rigorous look to see if the severe price cut has created an attractive margin of safety. Looking at the operational reports, the disconnect is immediate: company revenue is still expanding at a 6% growth rate even as the equity has been halved. Pointing out this divergence, Sven Carlin remarks, “We still have growth rates, 6% growth, but the stock is 50% down.”

The underlying sales numbers show virtually no signs of structural decay. Geographically, sales softened slightly across the Middle East, but the rest of the world continues to expand. Carlin highlights that Hermès is fundamentally anchored by Asian luxury consumers. Even when purchases happen in Europe or elsewhere, roughly half of those global sales are driven by traveling Asian shoppers purchasing iconic leather goods as indispensable status markers. As Carlin observes with a touch of irony, these bags serve as proof that someone has "made it" in society, and customers eagerly buy them even if they haven't. Half-year financial results show a slight deceleration compared to the explosive post-pandemic boom, but net income remains formidable at approximately €2 billion (or €2.5 billion before accounting adjustments). The balance sheet remains pristine with negligible debt relative to shareholder equity, demonstrating that the operational engine of Hermès is fully intact despite macroeconomic headwinds.

- Hermès equity declined more than 50% from its peak achieved 18 months prior. - First-half corporate revenue increased by 6%, defying the severe drop in equity valuation. - Net income reached roughly €2.0 billion (up to €2.5 billion prior to exceptional items). - Balance sheet health remains exceptional, characterized by very low leverage relative to shareholder equity. - Asian consumers drive a decisive portion of global sales, both domestically and as tourists buying status symbols abroad.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Hermès Market Disconnect and Valuation Pressures accDescr: Diagram illustrating how resilient operational metrics contrast with passive index dynamics and valuation compression.

subgraph Operations ["Operational Fundamentals"] REV["H1 Revenue: +6% Growth"] NET["Net Income: ~€2B"] DEBT["Pristine Balance Sheet (Near-Zero Debt)"] end

subgraph ValuationGap ["Market Valuation Realities"] PE["P/E Ratio: 30x"] DIV["Dividend Yield: 1.3% (from 0.65%)"] TARGET3["3% Yield Target: -60% Further Drop"] TARGET5["5% Yield Target: -80% Further Drop"] end

subgraph PassiveMechanics ["Index Weighting Feedback Loop"] CAP_HIGH["Market Cap Peak: €280B"] INDEX_BUY["Pension / Passive Funds Forced to Overweight"] CAP_LOW["Market Cap Plunge: €140B"] OUTFLOW["Forced Index De-allocation Amplifies Crash"] end

Operations --> PE PE --> TARGET3 TARGET3 --> TARGET5 CAP_HIGH --> INDEX_BUY INDEX_BUY --> CAP_LOW CAP_LOW --> OUTFLOW ```

---

[02:16](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=136s) Capital Allocation and the Dividend Valuation Reality

When examining capital allocation, Hermès operates with disciplined restraint rather than empire-building. Capital expenditures absorb only about 20% of net income, and management avoids large, speculative acquisitions. Because Hermès is closely held by family shareholders who prioritize cash distributions over aggressive buybacks, the majority of excess cash flow is returned through high regular dividends, accompanied by only modest share repurchases and slight dilution. Carlin stresses that while the brand equity and financial discipline are unassailable, value investing always comes down to the relationship between the price paid and the underlying cash value received. Prior to the crash, Hermès was trading at an ultra-low dividend yield of 0.65% to 0.70%; the 50% drop in stock price has merely dragged the yield back up to 1.3%–1.45%.

Carlin argues that if Hermès is transitioning from hyper-growth into a mid-to-slower growth phase, investors must evaluate it as a dividend asset where tangible cash return dictates fair value. In such an environment, demanding an entry yield of 3% to 5% is standard practice. Working through the quantitative reality, Carlin shows that achieving a 5% dividend yield would imply a share price of roughly €320—representing an additional 80% collapse from current levels. Even adopting a more forgiving requirement of a 3% dividend yield (a price around €500), the stock would still need to plunge another 60%. Anticipating the pushback from enthusiastic retail and luxury investors, Sven Carlin defends his conservative valuation stance: “Call me crazy but I'm used to that I would go crazy if I would be normal okay let me give you some normality 3% dividend yield 16 times 3 500 the stock price still just 60% down.”

- Capital expenditures stand at roughly 20% of net income, leaving major cash flows open for distributions. - Family ownership prioritizes cash dividends over large-scale share repurchase programs. - Dividend yield recovered from an extreme 0.65% at the market peak to approximately 1.30%–1.45% post-crash. - A 3% dividend yield threshold implies an additional 60% share price drop (to roughly €500). - A 5% dividend yield threshold implies an additional 80% share price drop (to roughly €320).

---

[04:01](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM?t=241s) Moats, Secondary Market Distortion, and Index Fund Bubbles

Carlin directly addresses the classic arguments made by Hermès bulls: the artisanal hand-stitching, manufactured scarcity, unrivaled pricing power, and the seemingly impenetrable competitive moat. He counters that every brand and industry inevitably faces economic cycles; once a business reaches a massive scale, sustaining explosive compounding becomes an impossibility. Investors frequently point out that second-hand Birkin and Kelly bags sell on the secondary market for more than retail prices as definitive proof of pricing power. Carlin dismisses this as an investment thesis for the public equity, jokingly pointing out that if someone wants to capitalize on that anomaly, they should physically buy a scarf or a handbag and flip it down the road rather than holding overvalued stock. As Sven Carlin quips, “If I had to invest in something then buy a scarf or a bag and then sell it later for more.”

The fundamental problem behind Hermès' boom and bust lies in passive market mechanics rather than the popularity of its leather goods. Over the course of the run-up, Hermès' market capitalization swelled to an astonishing €280 billion before deflating to €140 billion. Carlin explains that as market capitalization climbs, the stock’s weighting in European benchmark indices expands automatically. This forces passive vehicles and pension funds to mechanically pour capital into the stock regardless of valuation, which in turn attracts retail momentum traders and inflates an unsustainable bubble akin to the AI frenzy. When momentum reverses, that exact mechanism operates in reverse, exacerbating the sell-off. Carlin concludes that even after losing half its market value, Hermès still trades at 30 times earnings with a tiny 1.3% dividend yield, meaning the stock has merely moved from outright insanity to being exceedingly expensive.

- Market capitalization dropped from an all-time peak of €280 billion down to €140 billion. - Mechanical European index reweighting forced pension funds and passive ETFs to chase the stock upward, inflating the price bubble. - Secondary market premiums on physical leather goods do not justify paying an excessive premium for the corporate equity. - Valuation multiples post-crash remain stretched at a price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple of 30x alongside a modest 1.3% dividend yield.

## Mentioned Sven Carlin, Hermès, LVMH, Birkin, Kelly

## Video description 【Value Investing with Sven Carlin, Ph.D.】 爱马仕腰斩 是抄底还是接刀 Hermes Stocks is Not Yet Cheap, Despite The Quality!

|半年跌掉一半 生意却没坏 爱马仕股价从一年半前的高点跌超50%,市值从2800亿欧元缩到1400亿欧元,可最新半年报营收还在涨6%,净利润20亿欧元上下,资产负债表几乎没负债。中东销售有点回落,全球其他地区照常增长。生意没出问题,出问题的是价格——市场之前把它捧得太贵,现在只是往回还债。

|30倍市盈率 还不算便宜 跌了一半之后,市盈率仍有30倍,股息率1.3%。按3%股息率倒推,股价还得再跌六成;按5%股息率算,要跌八成。这不是说它一定会跌到那,而是说现在这个价,买的是品牌信仰,不是安全边际。同样做奢侈品,LVMH之前也被嫌贵,爱马仕只是从「疯贵」回到「很贵」。

|分红在涨 但撑不起估值 股息率从0.65%一路升到1.45%,股价越跌分红越显眼,对追求现金回报的资金有吸引力。可1.4%左右的收益率,放在全球资产里并不突出,只有在增长明显放缓的情形下才显得值钱。家族股东看重分红,回购规模很小,资本回报主要靠派息,别指望回购托底。

|中东和关税 只是导火索 中东局势、关税、亚洲买家情绪,这些是触发下跌的故事,不是根本原因。亚洲客群贡献了大量销售,买包买的是身份符号,一旦经济预期转弱,这部分需求最先松动。但半年报里除中东外其他市场仍在增长,说明品牌力还在,跌的是估值不是基本面。

|指数被动买入 涨跌都被放大 市值越大,在欧洲指数里权重越高,养老金等被动资金被迫买得越多,股价被推得越高;散户跟风进场吹大泡沫,然后泡沫破了。这套机制上涨时助涨,下跌时也助跌。爱马仕从2800亿跌到1400亿,一部分就是权重资金撤退的结果,跟包包好不好卖关系不大。

接下来建议的操作指引: 1. 爱马仕(RMS)现价对应市盈率30倍、股息率1.3%,等股息率回到3%再考虑分批建仓,对应股价还有约六成下行空间,别急着接。 2. 若想现在建仓,别一次接满,等股息率向3%靠近时再分批加,中间任何反弹都不追。 3. 盯半年报营收增速,6%是底线,一旦掉到3%以下说明亚洲需求真松了,届时股息率再高也别碰。

[0:01] 爱马仕股价从高点跌超50% [0:20] 营收仍增长6% 市场却疯狂抛售 [0:40] 中东销售小幅下滑 其他地区正常 [1:01] 亚洲买家贡献大量奢侈品销售 [1:20] 半年报营收略降 属疫情后正常回落 [1:40] 净利润约20亿欧元 负债极低 [2:01] 资产负债表漂亮 长期趋势仍在 [2:20] 资本开支占净利润20% 无大并购 [2:40] 高分红 少量回购 家族股东在场 [3:01] 股息率1.3% 股价跌一半后回升 [3:20] 按3%股息率算 股价还要跌六成 [3:40] 按5%股息率算 还要跌八成 [4:02] 品牌护城河再深也有周期尽头 [4:20] 二手包比新包贵 说明定价权仍在 [4:40] 市值从2800亿缩到1400亿欧元 [5:04] 指数权重资金助涨助跌放大波动 [5:20] 市盈率30倍 股息率1.3% 仍然贵

[Source](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1cAHF6oEJM)

中文简报

爱马仕市值腰斩后PE仍达30倍 估值过高下行空间或达六成 爱马仕基本面虽稳但此前泡沫受指数被动配置放大,在30倍市盈率下仍无安全边际,若按3%股息率回归合理估值股价需再跌六成。 爱马仕的股价与市值自高点腰斩,即便营收增长6%、净利润稳定在约20亿欧元,其市值仍跌至1400亿欧元。价值投资者斯文·卡林(Sven Carlin)考察了该公司严谨的资本配置与持续增长的股息,认为尽管其资产负债表极佳且亚洲需求强劲,但在30倍市盈率和1.3%的股息率下,该股依然不便宜。他指出,若爱马仕转向成熟期低速增长,要达到3%至5%的常规股息率水平,股价还需再跌60%至80%。卡林最终将此前的暴涨和暴跌归因于指数基金机械化的权重配置,而非消费吸引力崩溃,并提醒投资者,该股目前仅是从极度高估转变为非常昂贵。 爱马仕股价较一年半前高点下跌逾50%,市值从2800亿欧元缩水至1400亿欧元,但最新半年报营收仍保持6%增长,净利润约20亿欧元且资产负债表几无负债。 (0:01) 即便股价腰斩,爱马仕当前市盈率仍达30倍,股息率仅由0.65%回升至约1.3%至1.45%,估值仍属昂贵而非具备安全边际。 (3:01) 若按价值投资标准将其视为低速增长分红资产,达到3%股息率意味着股价需再跌60%(约至500欧元),达到5%股息率则需再跌80%(约至320欧元)。 (3:20) 欧洲指数权重机制在此轮涨跌中起到推波助澜作用,被动资金与养老金的机械化买入和撤退放大了市值的大起大落。 (5:04)

Reading summary

Sven Carlin contends that despite Hermès' stock plunging over 50% while underlying sales remain resilient, the company remains significantly overvalued rather than an obvious value investing opportunity. Resilient Fundamentals Amid Share Price Halving (0:00) Hermès' equity has halved over the 18 months following its all-time high amid macroeconomic headwinds, tariffs, and geopolitical conflicts. However, Carlin identifies a sharp divergence between stock performance and business execution: corporate revenue grew by 6% in the first half of the year, net income reached roughly €2.0 billion (or €2.5 billion before accounting adjustments), and the balance sheet remained pristine with negligible debt. Global sales continue to be anchored by Asian consumers—both domestically and while traveling abroad—who treat iconic leather goods as essential status markers, indicating no structural decay in core consumer demand. Dividend Realities and Capital Allocation (2:16) Hermès operates with disciplined capital management, directing only about 20% of net income toward capital expenditures while avoiding speculative acquisitions. Controlled largely by family shareholders who prefer regular cash distributions over major buybacks, excess cash is primarily distributed through dividends. Carlin argues that as growth moderates from post-pandemic highs, investors should evaluate the company based on tangible cash yield rather than momentum. While the 50% price cut raised the dividend yield from roughly 0.65% to between 1.30% and 1.45%, reaching a traditional 3% yield would require an additional 60% price drop to around €500, and a 5% yield would imply an 80% collapse to roughly €320. Passive Index Distortions and Secondary Market Arguments (4:01) Carlin rejects the bullish argument that secondary market premiums for Birkin and Kelly bags justify a high stock valuation, remarking that investors wishing to exploit resale premiums should trade physical goods rather than corporate shares. He attributes the rapid inflation and subsequent collapse of the stock to passive market dynamics: as Hermès' market capitalization surged toward €280 billion, passive exchange-traded funds and benchmarked pension funds were mechanically forced to purchase shares, fueling an unsustainable momentum cycle. Even after market capitalization halved to €140 billion, Carlin notes the stock still trades at a demanding multiple of 30 times earnings. Carlin concludes that despite Hermès' pristine balance sheet, strong brand moat, and resilient operational execution, the stock has merely moved from irrational euphoria to being excessively expensive, leaving an insufficient margin of safety for fundamental value investors.

精炼阅读摘要

投资分析师 Sven Carlin 认为,尽管爱马仕(Hermès)股价自历史高点回落超过 50% 且底层财务基本面保持坚挺,但在当前 30 倍市盈率与仅 1.3% 的股息率下,该股并未显现出足够的安全边际,其实质是从极度疯狂的估值泡沫回归到依然昂贵的区间。 股价腰斩与稳健基本面的显著脱节 (0:00) 受中东地缘政治动荡、关税顾虑以及全球奢侈品支出疲软预期的拖累,爱马仕股价自一年半前的历史峰值大幅下挫逾 50%。Carlin 将其与 LVMH 对比后指出,尽管市场普遍承压,爱马仕的基本面却展现出极强的韧性:上半年公司营业收入依然实现 6% 的正向增长,净利润维持在约 20 亿欧元(会计调整前达 25 亿欧元),资产负债表近乎零负债,财务结构相当稳健。 在区域表现方面,除中东市场略有放缓外,全球其余市场销售额持续扩张。Carlin 强调,爱马仕的收入支柱深度绑定亚洲高净值群体;即便部分交易发生在欧洲或其他旅游目的地,全球约半数销售额仍直接由出境游历的亚洲买家贡献。消费者将经典手袋视作彰显社会地位的关键象征,这使得爱马仕的商业引擎在宏观逆风中并未出现结构性恶化。 资本分配特征与股息估值考量 (2:16) 在资本分配上,爱马仕保持了高度克制,资本支出仅占净利润的约 20%,且长期避免进行大规模投机性并购。由于控股家族倾向于通过现金分红实现收益分配,公司将绝大部分富余现金流用于派发常规高额股息,辅以微量的股份回购,甚至存在轻微的股权稀释。Carlin 表示,当超高速增长逐步收敛为中低速常态增长时,理性投资者必须依据确定的现金回报率来衡量该资产的合理买入价。 在股价崩盘前,爱马仕的股息收益率仅为 0.65% 至 0.70%,即使股价腰斩后,当前股息收益率也仅回升至 1.30% 至 1.45%。Carlin 测算认为,若按照稳健派息资产通常要求的 3% 至 5% 股息收益率评估:实现 3% 的股息率对应股价约为 500 欧元,意味着现价还需进一步下跌约 60%;若要求 5% 的股息率,股价对应约 320 欧元,意味着需要在当前基础上再跌约 80%。 护城河逻辑误区与指数基金被动泡沫 (4:01) 针对多头强调的手工缝制工艺、饥饿营销机制以及二手市场溢价等“护城河”论据,Carlin 明确提出质疑。他指出,二手市场上 Birkin 和 Kelly 手袋价格高于专柜零售价的现象,并不能构成买入上市公司高估股票的理由;若投资者意在捕捉二手溢价,直接交易实体手袋或丝巾比持有权益资产更为合理,且任何品牌在达到庞大体量后都无法摆脱经济周期的制约。 爱马仕估值巨震的核心驱动力在于被动投资工具的机械机制。在其市值从历史峰值 2800 亿欧元萎缩至 1400 亿欧元的周期中,欧洲基准指数根据市值变动机械上调其权重,迫使被动 ETF 与养老基金不计估值大举配置,进而吸引动量资金入场推升泡沫;当上升趋势逆转后,被动撤资同样加速了股价杀跌。Carlin 强调,目前 30 倍市盈率的水平表明该股依然缺乏估值吸引力。 Sven Carlin 总结表示,爱马仕虽然具备顶级品牌壁垒与健康的现金流表现,但目前的下跌仅挤出了此前由被动指数资金推高的流动性泡沫,并未跌入价值投资的安全区间。不过,市场是否会如他所预期的那样继续回调至 3% 以上的股息率门槛,仍取决于未来宏观流动性与奢侈品行业溢价体系的长期演变。

Original transcript

[0:00] Good day, firm investors. One of the most requested stocks constantly is Hermes. Cheap! luxury getting hit, is it a great time to buy it? And if you look at the stock price, it's down more than 50% from the peak A year and a half ago, of course, Middle East tariff situation, luxury. Let's check whether this now is bottom bargain buying. We discussed LVMH recently, another stock that you are very interested in. Still a little bit too expensive. Let's see if Hermes is better. Of course, we'll always be looking at beautiful presentations. And this is now very interesting. We still have growth rates, 6% growth, but the stock is 50% down. That's insane. What's going on? If we look at the sales, everything good. a little bit down in the Middle East, of course, but the rest of the world is still growing, Nothing wrong. How can the stock be down so much? Of course, this is an Asian luxury purchasing stock, and likely half of the sales in the rest of the world are from visiting Asians, that can buy as a status symbol in Asia, because when you have one of these bags, you made it. Perhaps they buy it even if they didn't make it, but you can see here, leather goods, the bags, situation. If we look at sales, this is the half year sales, a little bit down since the post pandemic boom, that is OK. However, if I look at the sales, the net income in billions to two and a half billion, If we exclude the exceptional contribution, okay, 2 billion a little bit down, but sales still okay. Everything looks good, very little debt compared to shareholder equity, great, staggering balance sheet. The outlook is mixed because we, of course, all know about the situation in the world. However, as an investor, I look at this long-term trend. It's an absolutely staggering trend. faster growth, explosive growth. And now the question is, what will the company be priced for slower or mid or explosive. If we look at the capex, they do some capex, but okay, 20% of net income, no acquisition, little bit, nothing staggering there. They are paying huge dividends, huge capital returns, little bit of repurchases, perhaps some dilution. And likely still there, everything. But when it comes to investing, brand everything looks great but it's the price you pay versus the value you get. Dividend yield now 1.3%, 50% down and 1.3%. That means that the dividend was 0.7% just a while ago. And then I look at it, yes, 0.65%. Now that the stock is down, we are up to 1.45%. It's a dividend stock. The dividend is the value. For this company, at least, especially if we are medium to slower growth scenario ahead, 3 to 5% yield. 16 times 20 for the 5% yield, the price 320. That's still 80% down. call me crazy but I'm used to that I would go crazy if I would be normal okay let me give you some normality 3% dividend yield 16 times 3 500 the stock price still just 60% down. But Sven, the stitches, the scarcity, the pricing power, the moat that they built, yes, but Like everything, everything must end at some point. Slower cycles, longer cycles, faster cycles. Once there is there so much, it's hard to continue to grow. This was market craziness for sure. This might be fairly priced even if I would not see it like that. Sven, secondhand things cost more than the new things that shows pricing power. If I had to invest in something then buy a scarf or a bag and then sell it later for more. You will make more money than... - This. It might be super quality, but if you pay too much of a price, it's crazy. Call me crazy, well, tell it to those that paid 100% more. But if we look at this market cap, 140 billion, which means while [5:00] it was 280 billion. So the nature of the market is that as the market cap goes higher, the market weight capitalization in the European indices goes higher, the stupid pension funds buy more and you get the higher and higher stock price, which is insane. Retail and everything rushes to it, creates a bubble, and then it crashes. Typical for the stock market craziness, AI bubble or so. But still, a P-E ratio of 30, a dividend of 1.3%, still craziness.