Robert Caro argues that modern regulatory bottlenecks like environmental reviews are not the sole cause of infrastructure stagnation; political figures with sufficient willpower and mastery of power have historically bypassed comparable institutional barriers in every era. (5:03)
Caro's first draft of 'The Power Broker' totaled 1,050,000 words, requiring editor Robert Gottlieb to cut approximately 350,000 words—roughly two full-length books—to fit the physical capacity limits of a single-volume binding. (45:00)
Caro turned down substantially higher monetary offers from out-of-state institutions like the University of Texas to place his extensive archives and over 700 interview transcripts at the New-York Historical Society to keep them accessible to local researchers. (50:00)
In his fifth and final volume on Lyndon B. Johnson, Caro utilizes digital archives to pinpoint battlefield oral histories and records from engagements like the Ia Drang Valley, though he maintains that finding documents represents only a tiny fraction of the labor compared to reading and absorbing them. (44:33)
Detailed notes
## Background
Published on October 30, 2026, by Dwarkesh Patel on his podcast platform and YouTube channel, this episode features an extensive interview with 91-year-old master biographer Robert Caro. The program explores Caro's biographical methods, his portraits of Robert Moses and Lyndon B. Johnson, the mechanics of power and state capacity, and his reflections on writing and loneliness.
## TL;DR
In this wide-ranging retrospective, Robert Caro reflects on his lifelong pursuit of understanding political power through his seminal biographies of Robert Moses and Lyndon B. Johnson. Caro breaks down how he extracted secrets from reluctant political operatives using granular archival evidence, examines how Moses evolved from an egalitarian reformer into an unaccountable evictor, and compares the historic legislative drive of Johnson to the limits of John F. Kennedy. He also discusses the editorial sacrifice of cutting 350,000 words from The Power Broker, why he chose to house his vast interview archives at the New-York Historical Society, and the profound, isolating discipline required to sustain his solitary writing life.
## Atmosphere & style
The conversation possesses an intimate, reverent, and quietly poignant tone, shaped by the host's palpable awe at interviewing his ultimate dream guest and Caro's seasoned, contemplative presence. Caro speaks with deliberate gravity and vivid recall, alternating between sharp forensic analysis of institutional leverage and genuine emotional resonance when describing the quiet tragedy of figures losing power or the loneliness of frontier women in the Texas Hill Country. Listening feels like being invited into the quiet sanctum of an exacting craftsman who has spent half a century bearing witness to the human costs and contradictions of ambition.
## Bulletin
- `05:03` Robert Caro argues that modern regulatory bottlenecks like environmental reviews are not the sole cause of infrastructure stagnation; political figures with sufficient willpower and mastery of power have historically bypassed comparable institutional barriers in every era.
- `45:00` Caro's first draft of 'The Power Broker' totaled 1,050,000 words, requiring editor Robert Gottlieb to cut approximately 350,000 words—roughly two full-length books—to fit the physical capacity limits of a single-volume binding.
- `50:00` Caro turned down substantially higher monetary offers from out-of-state institutions like the University of Texas to place his extensive archives and over 700 interview transcripts at the New-York Historical Society to keep them accessible to local researchers.
- `44:33` In his fifth and final volume on Lyndon B. Johnson, Caro utilizes digital archives to pinpoint battlefield oral histories and records from engagements like the Ia Drang Valley, though he maintains that finding documents represents only a tiny fraction of the labor compared to reading and absorbing them.
## Key takeaways
- `00:00` Documentary evidence is essential for cracking reluctant interviewees; confronting sources like John Connally with Johnson's handwritten notes in the margins forced open hidden political histories.
- `05:03` Building infrastructure has never been straightforward in a democracy; Robert Moses faced massive opposition and private landholdings in the 1920s before eminent domain powers existed, yet drove projects forward through sheer will.
- `10:00` Robert Moses was not inherently malevolent; his career began with genuine egalitarian idealism to create public parks and beaches for working-class New Yorkers before accumulating power hardened him to human suffering.
- `20:00` Moses insulated himself from democratic removal for decades by constructing an interlocking web of overlapping, unaligned terms across multiple state and city public authorities.
- `20:00` Nelson Rockefeller broke Moses's decades-long hold on power in 1962 by finally calling his bluff when Moses threatened to resign.
- `27:53` The devastation of the Great Depression was fundamental to Moses's rapid construction speed, providing vast pools of desperate, highly skilled architects and laborers at minimal cost.
- `32:51` Lyndon Johnson's renowned personal charm and persuasion were effective solely because they were backed by raw structural leverage—the certainty that he could grant or deny what a senator desired.
- `36:08` Caro believes John F. Kennedy could never have passed the landmark civil rights and anti-poverty legislation of 1964 and 1965 because Kennedy lacked Johnson's fierce, consuming drive to transform American society.
- `41:00` Caro's writing discipline requires condensing an entire multi-year biographical work down to a single sentence before drafting begins, anchoring the narrative across thousands of pages.
- `52:59` The frontier isolation of Johnson's youth in the Texas Hill Country, exemplified by the loneliness endured by his mother Rebekah Baines Johnson, profoundly shaped Johnson's character and worldview.
- `57:48` Caro views unbroken solitude and the refusal of day-to-day social distractions as an unavoidable, costly personal sacrifice required to sustain deep historical concentration.
## Detailed walkthrough
### `00:00` Relentlessness and the Art of Getting People to Talk
Dwarkesh Patel opens the conversation by quoting Lyndon B. Johnson’s defining aphorism: “If you do everything... you'll win.” Patel notes that across 50 years of chronicling Johnson's life, Robert Caro embodied this exact ethos—living on the fringes of the Texas Hill Country to experience the isolation of Johnson's youth, examining millions of archival documents across the United States, and tracking down everyone from the political operative who helped rig an election to the driver on Johnson's earliest campaigns. Patel asks whether Caro's ability to capture both Johnson and Robert Moses stems from sharing their core qualities. Caro clarifies that he hopes he does not share their darker traits, specifically their utter ruthlessness, yet he acknowledges the parallel when it comes to an obsessive drive. He recalls sifting through Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia’s papers stored three levels down in file cabinets lining the walls of the 79th Street Boat Basin along the Hudson River, realizing as he uncovered Moses’s handwritten notes that he was tracing the exact same footsteps.
Caro embraces Patel’s observation that he shares an absolute refusal to take no for an answer when pursuing historical truth. When key figures refuse to speak, Caro insists that giving up is not an option. For instance, with Johnson’s first secretary, who spent countless hours driving Johnson across Texas, Caro recognized that no other living person knew what took place in those private journeys: “I don't know what I have to do, but I have to get him to tell me honestly about this thing”. Patel asks how Caro succeeds in getting interviewees to open up when they clearly know that disclosing the truth runs against their personal or political interests.
Caro explains that the breakthrough comes from confronting them with concrete documentary proof. While investigating how Johnson amassed national influence through political money, Caro interviewed John Connally, who had served as the bagman collecting and dispensing cash at Johnson’s explicit direction. Having reviewed Johnson's written instructions on funding petitions from lawmakers, Caro noticed the margins: on a $1,500 request, Johnson might scrawl “okay, $1,500,” slash it to “500,” write “No,” or occasionally jot “No, never.” When Caro pressed Connally on what “No, never” meant, Connally explained that the politician in question was permanently cut off from Johnson's treasury. Pushing deeper into *why* Johnson harbored such absolute hostility toward specific congressmen opened the floodgates to previously hidden stories.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Caro's Interview Strategy Flowchart
accDescr: Process showing how documentary evidence is used to compel reluctant witnesses to reveal hidden history.
A["Sift through archives<br/>(e.g., boat basin notes, margin scribbles)"] --> B["Identify indispensable firsthand witness<br/>(e.g., John Connally, campaign chauffeur)"]
B --> C["Overcome initial refusal to talk<br/>('Refuse to take no for an answer')"]
C --> D["Confront witness with exact written notes<br/>('No, never' scrawled on cash requests)"]
D --> E["Extract core motivations and secrets<br/>(Why Johnson blacklisted specific politicians)"]
```
`05:03` Building, Veto Points, and the Necessity of Political Will
Patel turns the discussion to modern state capacity, contrasting the 20th century with contemporary paralysis. Today, governments struggle to build basic infrastructure: the Second Avenue Subway in New York took roughly 50 years and over $4 billion to open just 1.5 miles of track, while California spent roughly $15 billion over a decade on high-speed rail without completing a single operational mile. In contrast, authoritarian regimes like China build tens of thousands of miles of rail in a decade, albeit through mass displacement. Patel notes that many critics trace Western paralysis back to the backlash sparked by *The Power Broker*, which spurred the creation of environmental impact reviews, land use oversight, community boards, and lawsuits. When asked if the regulatory pendulum swung too far, Caro challenges the myth that building was easy before modern safeguards.
When Robert Moses began in the 1920s, contemporaries leveled the exact same complaint: that the age of the automobile had arrived, yet roads could never be built through Long Island because scores of private landowners and entrenched interests blocked every right-of-way. Moses had not yet secured eminent domain power, making the obstacle seem insurmountable. Yet Moses famously bypassed every institutional hurdle to construct the road out to Jones Beach, 27 miles from New York City. Caro argues that a political genius bent on public works will always find a path through whatever procedural obstacles exist in their era:
> “When Moses was building, they were saying the same thing. Nobody's ever going to build it. We need roads for the automobiles, but they'd have to go through hundreds, dozens of farms, scores of property. No one's ever going to be able to do it. But he comes along and does it. So today, someone would come along and do it.”
- Decades can elapse where democratic systems feel entirely stalled, waiting for an individual with the willpower and mastery of power to cut through institutional inertia.
- Caro draws a direct parallel between Moses ramming through roads and parks and Lyndon Johnson forcing civil rights legislation through an intransigent Senate: both achieved outcomes that prevailing consensus deemed impossible.
`10:00` The Tragic Evolution from Idealist to Tyrant
Patel asks whether Caro believes democratic societies currently "need a little Moses" to escape complete stagnation. Caro admits to wrestling with this tension: while a democratic society must reject the callous disregard for human lives and public opinion that Moses exhibited in his later years, it desperately needs figures who possess the sheer willpower to build in the face of widespread parochial opposition. When Patel points out that casual observers often mistakenly think *The Power Broker* depicts Moses as a villain from start to finish, Caro insists that anyone with that impression has simply not read the book.
The first hundreds of pages of *The Power Broker* describe an inspiring, uncorrupted young idealist. Early in his career, Moses focused on the technical reform of the civil service system, pouring his energy into creating merit-based promotion systems to stamp out political patronage and ward-heeler influence. When he turned to public works, his motivation was genuinely egalitarian: carving out beaches, recreation grounds, and green parkways so working-class city dwellers could escape sweltering tenements.
The tragedy of power, Caro explains, is how that idealism gradually metastasized into unchecked tyranny. Over decades of accumulating authority, Moses stopped listening to any outside voice, ultimately deciding that nothing mattered except his personal vision for construction—leading him to evict thousands of powerless families to drive expressways like the Cross Bronx straight through thriving neighborhoods. Caro summarizes this core transformation: “That to me... is the story of the—a big part of the story of *The Power Broker*.”
`15:00` How Power Hardens: From Idealist to Evictor
Robert Caro reflects on the dramatic transformation at the heart of *The Power Broker*. Robert Moses began his career as a young, idealistic reformer who genuinely wanted to improve people’s lives by creating public parks and opening up access to the beaches and the ocean. Over time, however, he morphed into a builder obsessed with construction for its own sake, utterly indifferent to public outcry or human cost.
Caro points to the Cross Bronx Expressway as the quintessential example: critics warned Moses before construction began that the highway would become a catastrophe, and “the minute this road opens, it's the world's longest traffic jam.” To build it, Moses did not merely displace hundreds or thousands of residents—tens of thousands of people were evicted from their homes without any relocation provisions. Reflecting on this evolution, Caro describes Moses’s trajectory as a cautionary tale of governance: “It's a story of how do you... give somebody... power... without the power in a way... I don't want to use the word corrupting him, but hardening him... to anyone who opposes him, to any opposition.”
`17:57` Watching Moses Lose Power
Dwarkesh Patel notes that Caro started writing *The Power Broker* around 1966 or 1967, while Moses was actively losing his grip on power. This meant the narrative's conclusion had to shift in real time, as neither author nor subject knew how the struggle would end. Caro recalls being young and feeling like he barely knew what he was doing, yet finding himself with a front-row seat to the collapse of an empire.
In the early interviews conducted at the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority headquarters on Randall’s Island, the aura of supreme power was palpable. The waiting rooms outside Moses’s office were packed with supplicants waiting on his decisions, and the moment Caro's interview sessions paused, a secretary would rush in with an urgent list of phone calls from powerful figures begging for favors. But during Caro's final long interview with Moses, the atmosphere had transformed entirely: the telephone never rang, and the secretary entered with nothing to report. Caro recalls the profound emotional contradiction of that moment—despite knowing the immense suffering Moses had caused across New York, “whatever you thought of Moses, you felt the poignance of, of someone losing power.”
- When Moses held total sway, his Randall's Island headquarters buzzed with officials awaiting his rulings and secretaries handing him constant call logs.
- By the end, the phones fell completely silent, leaving an aging titan isolated in an empty office.
- Caro emphasizes that even knowing the full devastation Moses had wrought, “you couldn't help feeling sales for him... you couldn't help feeling... oh, this is... in a way tragic. That no one's calling and asking him for a favor anymore.”
`20:00` Rockefeller Calls the Bluff: Why Mayors and Governors Failed to Fire Him
Patel brings up the turning point in 1962, when Moses tried to pull his long-standing trump card on Governor Nelson Rockefeller: threatening to resign if he did not get his way. Moses had used this ultimatum successfully against countless mayors and governors for decades, but Rockefeller simply responded, "I regretfully accept"—and Moses's bluff was permanently broken. Patel asks whether previous executives could have simply called Moses's bluff in the same manner.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Robert Moses's Institutional Armor
accDescr: Diagram showing how interlocking appointments and public popularity shielded Moses from being fired.
subgraph Defense["Moses's Entrenched Position"]
A["Vast Public Popularity\n('Idol of New York')"]
B["Interlocking Statutory Roles"]
subgraph Roles["Overlapping Appointments"]
B1["Triborough Bridge Authority"]
B2["State Power Authority"]
B3["Long Island State Park Commission"]
B4["NYC Parks Commissioner"]
end
B --> B1
B --> B2
B --> B3
B --> B4
end
C["Mayors & Governors\n(Pre-1960s)"] -->|"Held legal power to fire,\nblocked by politics"| Defense
D["Nelson Rockefeller\n(1962)"] -->|"Cracks in armor;\nbraved public blowback"| E["Calls Bluff:\nAccepts Resignation"]
```
Caro explains that while governors legally possessed the executive power to remove Moses, political reality made it impossible for decades: “The answer to the question at the bottom is, no, they couldn't, because he was simply too popular... That's like firing... some idol person who was the idol of New York.” Furthermore, Moses had engineered an unprecedented institutional web of overlapping, unaligned terms across distinct bodies:
- Chairman of the New York State Power Authority
- Chairman of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority
- New York City Parks Commissioner
- President of the Long Island State Park Commission
- Jones Beach State Parkway Authority Commissioner
Because these posts had staggered terms and distinct appointing authorities, no single official could strip him of all power at once. Only after decades did visible "cracks appear in the armor," allowing Rockefeller to take the risk of public and newspaper backlash to finally remove him.
`24:01` Did Moses Realize He Was Changing?
Caro interviewed Moses seven times. The relationship ended abruptly during the seventh interview, when Caro revealed his knowledge of an improper donation made to Moses's commission by a golf-club-owning millionaire who had successfully lobbied to have Moses reroute a planned parkway around his private grounds. Patel asks what single question Caro would ask Moses if granted an eighth interview. Caro replies: “I think if I only had one question to ask him... I think I'd ask him, did you realize you were changing?”
Caro believes Moses never realized he had become a tyrant. In Moses's own mind, his grand vision for highways, bridges, and parks was an absolute good that had to be realized regardless of the hardships inflicted on everyday citizens. Having tasted early failure as an uncompromising young idealist who got nothing done, Moses resolved never to be rendered helpless again. He learned to identify the personal vices and vulnerabilities of his opponents—whether a hidden mistress or financial graft—and ruthlessly leverage them. When Bronx politician Henry Epstein begged Moses to shift the Cross Bronx Expressway route merely two blocks south to spare tens of thousands of working-class families, Moses refused to bend, instead setting out to destroy Epstein entirely. To Moses, the singular, uncompromising imperative became: “Anyone who stands in his way, if Moses has to destroy him, he'll destroy them.”
`27:53` Exploiting the Great Depression: Boundless Labor and Ruthless Power
Patel points out that Caro’s work chronicles an entire era, not just an individual biography. A critical driver of Moses’s unprecedented velocity in the 1930s was the Great Depression, which allowed the government to secure elite private-sector talent and immense labor pools at rock-bottom costs.
Caro confirms that the economic collapse was foundational to Moses's achievements. Private construction had evaporated, leaving elite professionals and manual laborers alike desperate for work. When Moses needed technical talent, thousands of unemployed architects lined up down Fifth Avenue, ready to work for meager government wages simply because they had nowhere else to go. Moses leveraged this desperation ruthlessly: he pushed construction crews around the clock through brutal winter conditions and fired anyone who faltered, knowing that in the depths of the Depression, every laborer could be instantly replaced.
`30:00` Why Architecture Used to Be More Beautiful
Dwarkesh Patel asks about the striking aesthetic divide in American building: Grand Central Terminal and the magnificent early-20th-century architecture of New York were constructed when the United States was a substantially poorer nation, whereas structures erected in the latter half of the twentieth century look far less beautiful. Robert Caro explains that the core difference came down to labor economics. In those earlier eras, builders had access to an abundance of out-of-work, highly skilled artisans who could be employed at extremely low wages.
To illustrate, Caro describes looking out from his own 15th-floor apartment at an opposing building of 15 or 16 stories. Up on the roofline sits intricate, beautiful stone carving that practically nobody can see, save for Caro and the neighbor in the adjoining apartment. In that era, builders were willing to pay for elaborate ornamentation on upper stories invisible from the street because master stoneworkers "came cheap."
`32:51` The Source of Lyndon Johnson's Power: Persuasion vs. Leverage
Turning to Lyndon B. Johnson's tenure as Senate Majority Leader in *Master of the Senate*, Dwarkesh asks Caro to weigh two distinct mechanisms of Johnson's effectiveness: was his dominance primarily driven by his sheer powers of personal persuasion, or was it the structural leverage he accumulated—the tangible promises he could make and the threats he could execute?
Caro makes clear that personal charm was merely the front edge of an iron fist. The raw power behind the personality was what gave Johnson's appeals their weight:
> "Behind his persuasion, was the power. When you were talking to him, if he asked something of you, you knew he had the power behind him to give you or deny you things that you wanted."
Whenever Johnson approached a reluctant senator for a vote, the senator understood the transactional stakes. Even if the senator disagreed on the merits of the bill, Johnson controlled committee assignments and determined whether other pieces of legislation would ever reach the floor. Caro emphasizes that when Johnson cornered a colleague—draping an arm around him and physically leaning in—the target was feeling far more than personality: behind that posture was the terrifying certainty that Johnson possessed the concrete leverage to advance or ruin their career.
`34:36` Coke Stevenson and the Tragedy of the 1948 Election
Dwarkesh turns to *Means of Ascent*, Caro's account of the contested 1948 Texas Democratic Senate primary between Lyndon Johnson and former Texas Governor Coke Stevenson—a book Dwarkesh calls his favorite of all time. Stevenson, known affectionately across the state as "Mr. Texas," is portrayed with profound reverence as an old-school frontier figure of genuine accomplishment and rectitude. Dwarkesh asks Caro whether, in writing Stevenson's portrait, a part of him wished Stevenson had won the race.
Caro answers directly and without hesitation:
> "The answer is yes. I think Coke Stevenson, although he was an idealist, he knew how to get things done."
Caro notes that Stevenson had already proved he could accomplish real things as governor of Texas and would have been an exceptional senator. The lingering tragedy of the 1948 race lies in how Stevenson lost. Stevenson was a man of an older code who simply could not fathom that someone was capable of doing what Johnson did to steal the election, and he never truly came to grips with the machinery Johnson deployed against him.
`36:08` Could Kennedy Have Passed Johnson's Legislative Agenda?
Dwarkesh poses an alternate history: suppose John F. Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election, but Johnson refused the vice presidency and stayed on as Senate Majority Leader. Could Kennedy, working alongside Majority Leader Johnson, have passed the landmark legislation of 1964 and 1965 earlier in his term?
Caro rejects the premise flatly. The historic domestic breakthrough required Johnson in the Oval Office because Kennedy lacked Johnson's visceral, consuming drive to reshape the nation:
> "No. Because Kennedy did not have the overriding desire to change America."
Caro acknowledges that Kennedy possessed great charm, served capably as president, and was strong on foreign policy—an arena where Johnson proved disastrous. But Kennedy never held the deep, burning vision to alter the social fabric that possessed Johnson. Caro traces Johnson's domestic crusades back to his youth teaching impoverished Mexican-American children in Cotulla, Texas. That experience left Johnson fiercely determined to reshape education and lift poor people out of destitution. Without that singular determination, the historic civil rights and anti-poverty bills of the Great Society would never have been enacted.
The great paradox of Johnson's life is that this domestic triumph was swallowed by the catastrophe of the Vietnam War. Caro observes that Johnson was actively on his way to transforming the country when his attention was diverted to Vietnam, causing his domestic dreams to crumble and wrecking his presidency. When Dwarkesh asks the core question—why Johnson kept escalating the war despite knowing the odds—Caro declines to give a definitive answer, noting that he is actively wrestling with that exact mystery in his fifth and final volume.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: Lyndon Johnson's Dual Legacy
accDescr: Chart contrasting Johnson's domestic mastery with his foreign policy tragedy in Vietnam.
subgraph Domestic["Domestic Vision & Drive"]
A["Formative Experience in Cotulla<br/>(Teaching impoverished children)"] --> B["Unyielding Will to Transform America"]
B --> C["Civil Rights Act & Voting Rights Act"]
B --> D["Anti-Poverty & Education Bills"]
end
subgraph Foreign["Foreign Policy Catastrophe"]
E["Vietnam War Escalation"] --> F["Presidential Attention Diverted"]
F --> G["Great Society Stalls & Presidency Ends in Tragedy"]
end
```
`39:27` The Will of Titans: Inexhaustible Energy
Dwarkesh highlights the superhuman endurance shared by both Robert Moses and Lyndon Johnson, both of whom routinely worked 16-hour days (or more) for decades, asking whether this stemmed from a unique physical constitution or pure willpower.
Caro credits unbending will:
> "I think it's just their will."
Caro notes that plenty of people possess raw physical stamina, but Moses and Johnson were fueled by an obsessive need to get their way. Fatigue simply never entered their calculations. Caro recalls that Johnson would routinely place high-stakes political phone calls at two or three o'clock in the morning. To illustrate Johnson's relentless schedule, Caro shares a favorite anecdote: Johnson called a senator at 5:00 a.m. to lobby for a vote, to which the weary senator dryly replied:
> "Oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call."
`41:00` Getting a Book Down to a Single Sentence
Dwarkesh asks about the solitary craft of writing: when Caro spends five to ten years on a single project—with only his wife, Ina, and his editor reading drafts along the way—how does he maintain confidence that the narrative will hold together without early public feedback?
Caro candidly responds, "The answer to that is you're not" sure. However, he relies on a strict structural discipline that he learned the hard way after struggling with *The Power Broker*, where he initially lacked this safeguard. Before writing a single line of a new book, Caro forces himself to conceptualize the entire work from start to finish:
> "You've got to get it down to one sentence. You say, well, you can't get it down to one sentence. Then you say, yeah, but Bob, you learned you better get it down to one sentence. Or three years from now, you're going to be writing and you're going to be saying, what am I trying to do?"
Caro spends weeks or months interrogating his material, asking what the book is fundamentally about until he can condense its thesis into a single sentence—or at most a short paragraph. That summary serves as an anchor across years of writing, ensuring that every chapter and piece of evidence hangs together around the central idea.
`44:33` The Impact of Digital Archives on the Vietnam Research
Dwarkesh observes that Caro wrote the bulk of his masterworks before the advent of the internet and digital archives, and asks how modern research tools are altering his process. Caro replies that digital archives are making a dramatic difference on the fifth volume as he reconstructs the military engagements of the Vietnam War. When he needs to recreate a battlefield action down to minute operational details, online documentation and digitized records allow him to track down exact accounts and combat records with an immediacy that was impossible in earlier decades.
`45:00` Researching the Ia Drang Valley and Cutting 350,000 Words from *The Power Broker*
Robert Caro illustrates how technology has changed modern research by pointing to a specific military engagement he wanted to examine in depth: the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in Vietnam. Using a computer, he can immediately identify which universities hold oral histories from soldiers who fought there and determine which primary documents are accessible across the country. Yet, when Dwarkesh Patel asks whether having computers would have accelerated his earlier volumes, Caro expresses deep skepticism about whether it would have saved time in any meaningful way. While finding records digitally is vastly faster, Caro notes that tracking down a piece of paper is a trivial fraction of the true labor compared to sitting down and thoroughly reading it.
Dwarkesh then poses a counterfactual: if someone had traveled back to the mid-1970s and told a forty-something Robert Caro that his planned Lyndon Johnson trilogy would consume more than four decades of his life, how would he have reacted? Caro pauses, sighs, and reflects on how his inability to compromise on thoroughness dictated that trajectory. He explains that the root of this dynamic became clear during the editorial process for *The Power Broker*. He handed his editor, Robert Gottlieb, an enormous manuscript totaling 1,050,000 words. Because Caro was adamant that the biography had to exist as a single physical volume, the printing press limitations meant the maximum capacity was roughly 700,000 words. Gottlieb had to excise approximately 350,000 words—the length of two substantial standalone books. Caro still laments the material that ended up on the cutting room floor:
> “And he has said, I cut a lot of the 'best stuff I ever read.'”
Even though Caro is acutely conscious while drafting that an account is becoming too long and will eventually have to be reduced, he admits that he simply cannot stop himself from writing everything he believes ought to be documented.
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: The Manuscript Pruning of The Power Broker
accDescr: Diagram illustrating the dramatic word count reduction Robert Caro and Robert Gottlieb undertook to fit The Power Broker into one volume.
subgraph Writing ["Manuscript Creation"]
A["Caro's Full Draft<br/>1,050,000 words"]
end
subgraph Editing ["Editorial Process"]
B["Physical Book Limit<br/>~700,000 words / 1 Volume"]
C["Excised Material<br/>350,000 words cut by Bob Gottlieb"]
end
subgraph Outcome ["Final Book & Lost Material"]
D["Published Volume<br/>The Power Broker"]
E["Unpublished Drafts & Notes<br/>Held in file cabinets"]
end
A --> B
A --> C
B --> D
C --> E
```
`50:00` The Unseen Archives and the Decision to Choose the New-York Historical Society
Dwarkesh points out the rows of filing cabinets sitting just outside the room, loaded with decades of unpublished research notes and interview transcripts that future historians will eventually consult. Caro shares his deep desire for these documents to find a purpose, noting that when modern news outlets analyze political history, they often lack critical context that had to be cut from his books. As a prime example, Caro points to Sam Rayburn. While Rayburn appears in Caro's work, there remains no comprehensive modern biography of the legendary Speaker of the House, who wielded immense control over the House of Representatives and passed Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal programs. The complete investigative trail needed to understand Rayburn is preserved in those drawers.
Caro’s archives contain roughly 700 fully typed interview transcripts for *The Power Broker* alone, alongside hundreds of interviews with U.S. senators and senior congressional aides. When deciding where these materials should reside permanently, Caro intentionally rejected far higher monetary offers from institutions such as the University of Texas because he did not want researchers to face the travel hurdle of flying across the country to examine them:
> “I took a lot less money, a great deal less money, an amount that mattered a lot to me, because I wanted them to be easily accessible. I wanted them to be in New York.”
- Caro estimates that an enormous percentage of what he uncovered about the internal mechanics of the United States Senate never made it into the published Johnson volumes.
- He chose to deposit his full archive at the New-York Historical Society so scholars could freely access the raw material documenting how New York City evolved and how mid-century power operated.
`52:59` Settling the Texas Frontier and the Heroism of Enduring Loneliness
Dwarkesh observes that Caro’s immersive scene-setting—whether describing the tenement neighborhoods and the Gold Coast of Long Island in *The Power Broker* or the harsh geography of the Texas Hill Country in the Johnson series—would remain compelling literature even if the protagonist had never risen to power. Caro heartily agrees, reflecting on his historical investigation into Lyndon Johnson’s ancestors who founded Johnson City. Moving a family out to the Texas frontier just one or two generations prior meant settling deep within Comancheria, where one faced the constant threat of a massacre alongside brutal economic hardship.
Lyndon Johnson himself was deeply marked by this isolation. Growing up on a ranch eighteen miles outside Johnson City, Johnson was shaped by an environment defined by stark quietude and vast distances. Caro recalls spending immense effort writing about Johnson's mother, Rebekah Baines Johnson, who lived in devastating isolation: she could walk to the top of a hill in the afternoon and see absolutely nothing in any direction except empty rolling ridges, without a single neighboring roofline in view. Caro experienced this frontier emptiness firsthand while doing field research:
> “You’d call an elderly woman and she’d say, ‘You drive out of Austin 22 miles and you’ll come to look on your left, you’ll find a cattle guard, you turn 22 miles to our farm.’ And you say, I drove 22 miles, I didn't pass another house. I didn't pass another person. And this woman is living there all her life. So I don't think, with all the wonderful books that have been written, I'm not sure that America understands the heroism of just being lonely.”
`57:48` The Solitary Labor of Writing and Closing Reflections
In the final minutes of the conversation, Dwarkesh connects the profound physical loneliness of the Hill Country pioneers to the intellectual isolation of Caro’s own working life. For decades, Caro and his wife, Ina Caro, have worked alone without research teams or institutional committees. Caro acknowledges that an intense, unbroken solitude is the mandatory price of his craft. Arriving at his office every morning, he switches off his telephone to guard his mind against outside disruption.
Caro concedes that maintaining this severe focus has taken a personal toll on his social relationships. Naturally gregarious, he finds it difficult to deny himself the simple pleasure of answering the phone to chat with a friend, yet he knows that doing so fractures the concentration required to construct his books:
> “I think it's impacted my entire life, you know. Some people understand, but some people don't understand that you don't call them back. You know, I mean, if people call me, I'm not going to call them back till the end of the day. So I have friends who understand that, but a lot of people don't understand that. So that's a fact of my life.”
Dwarkesh concludes the interview by telling Caro that across six years of hosting the podcast, Caro had consistently been his dream guest whenever anyone asked who he most hoped to interview, thanking him for the discussion. Caro warmly replies, calling it a “terrific interview” and expressing his gratitude.
## Mentioned
Robert Caro, Dwarkesh Patel, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert Moses, Fiorello LaGuardia, John Connally, Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Epstein, Coke Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, Robert Gottlieb, Sam Rayburn, Rebekah Baines Johnson, Ina Caro, The Power Broker, Means of Ascent, Master of the Senate, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, New York State Power Authority, Long Island State Park Commission, Cross Bronx Expressway, Jones Beach, New-York Historical Society, University of Texas
## Video description
<p>The Robert Caro interview.</p><p>Watch on <a target="_blank" href="https://youtu.be/7lSOI21E68g">YouTube</a>; read the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/robert-caro">transcript</a>.</p><p>Sponsors</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://antithesis.com/dwarkesh">Antithesis</a> lets you run thorough simulation tests on every PR your coding agents ship. That’s because Antithesis is FAST. On a recent project, it packed fifteen hours of simulation into each fifteen-minute run: every change could be tested in thousands of hostile worlds before being merged. Every minute your software spends in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours it will ever experience. Learn more at <a target="_blank" href="http://antithesis.com/dwarkesh">antithesis.com/dwarkesh</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://workos.com/airlock">WorkOS</a>’s Airlock is a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your most important tools. When an agent makes a request, Airlock evaluates it against your company’s policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. If it allows it, Airlock takes action on behalf of the agent, which means your agents never see your API keys or other credentials. Airlock is in early access. If you’re interested, go to <a target="_blank" href="http://workos.com/airlock">workos.com/airlock</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://janestreet.com/dwarkesh">Jane Street</a>’s mystery ASIC puzzle is over, and they’ve published a blog post that reveals the chip’s purpose. You can read it here:<a target="_blank" href="https://blog.janestreet.com/asic-puzzle-results/"> blog.janestreet.com/asic-puzzle-results/</a>. More importantly, there’s another challenge live now! For this one, you have to design a protocol-emulator ASIC that can be used to test chips outside of a live system. Jane Street will pay to fabricate their favorite submissions. The competition is open until January 18th. Get started at <a target="_blank" href="https://janestreet.com/dwarkesh">janestreet.com/dwarkesh</a></p><p>Timestamps</p><p>(00:00:00) – How Caro gets people to talk</p><p>(00:05:03) – Does America need a little more Moses today?</p><p>(00:12:42) – Moses the young idealist</p><p>(00:17:57) – Watching Moses lose power</p><p>(00:24:01) – Did Moses realize he was changing?</p><p>(00:27:53) – Building during the Great Depression</p><p>(00:32:51) – The threats and promises of Lyndon Johnson</p><p>(00:36:08) – Could Kennedy have passed Johnson’s laws?</p><p>(00:41:00) – Getting a book down to one sentence</p><p>(00:46:21) – All the material that never made it into the books</p><p>(00:52:59) – Loneliness</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.dwarkesh.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1">www.dwarkesh.com</a>
Robert Caro argues that monumental political achievement requires an obsessive willpower backed by structural leverage, though unchecked authority inevitably hardens leaders into callous disregard for the human costs of their ambitions.
Political Will and the Hazards of Tyranny (5:03)
Caro challenges the modern assumption that building public infrastructure was straightforward prior to modern regulatory veto points. When Robert Moses began in the 1920s, critics likewise insisted that private property owners and entrenched interests made highway construction across Long Island impossible; Moses nevertheless bypassed procedural hurdles to build the road to Jones Beach. Caro draws a direct parallel between Moses ramming through public works and Lyndon Johnson forcing civil rights legislation through an intransigent Senate, arguing that a determined political genius will always find paths through institutional inertia.
However, Caro underscores the tragedy inherent in accumulating authority. Moses began his career as an idealistic civil service reformer and egalitarian creator of public parks, but decades of unchecked power hardened him into a tyrant who evicted tens of thousands of families for projects like the Cross Bronx Expressway. Moses fortified his position through an interlocking web of staggered, unaligned appointments across bodies like the Triborough Bridge Authority and Long Island State Park Commission, rendering him politically unassailable until Governor Nelson Rockefeller finally accepted his routine resignation threat in 1962.
Structural Leverage Behind Personal Persuasion (32:51)
Examining Johnson's mastery as Senate Majority Leader, Caro emphasizes that Johnson's renowned powers of personal persuasion were effective only because they were backed by raw institutional power. When Johnson leaned in to lobby colleagues, senators recognized that he controlled committee assignments and floor access, possessing the explicit ability to advance or crush their legislative priorities.
Caro traces Johnson's domestic legislative breakthrough—the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and anti-poverty bills—to his formative experience teaching impoverished Mexican-American schoolchildren in Cotulla, Texas. Caro asserts that John F. Kennedy could not have passed these domestic measures even with Johnson as Majority Leader, because Kennedy lacked Johnson's visceral, consuming drive to reshape the nation's social fabric. Yet Johnson's domestic triumph was ultimately diverted and ruined by the catastrophe of the Vietnam War.
Documentary Evidence and Interview Breakthroughs (0:00)
Caro's historical discoveries rely on an absolute refusal to abandon dead ends, combined with deep archival legwork. To convince reluctant witnesses to disclose details that run counter to their personal or political interests, Caro confronts them directly with archival evidence.
While investigating how Johnson directed political money, Caro interviewed Johnson's distributor of funds, John Connally. Having discovered Johnson's margin notes on cash petitions—where Johnson slashed requests or penned 'No, never'—Caro pressed Connally on the exact phrase. Confronted with the written record, Connally admitted that 'No, never' meant a politician was permanently blacklisted, unlocking the underlying motivations behind Johnson's operations. While modern digital archives now speed up the discovery of battlefield records for Caro's research on the Vietnam War, he maintains that locating files is trivial compared to the slow, manual labor of thoroughly reading and analyzing them.
The Solitary Discipline of Narrative Craft (41:00)
To prevent sprawling, multi-year research projects from losing coherence, Caro forces himself to distill a book's thesis down to a single sentence or short paragraph before drafting. Even with this discipline, his commitment to exhaustive detail yields immense text: editor Robert Gottlieb had to cut roughly 350,000 words from the 1,050,000-word draft of *The Power Broker* to fit within the physical manufacturing limit of a single 700,000-word volume.
Decades of vital research material—including approximately 700 typed interview transcripts and extensive files on figures like House Speaker Sam Rayburn—remained unpublished. Caro chose to place these archives with the New-York Historical Society, accepting substantially less money than out-of-state institutions offered to keep the papers accessible to researchers. Sustaining this work required extreme personal isolation, with Caro switching off his phone daily—a discipline he compares to the profound, quiet endurance of early pioneers in the Texas Hill Country.
Caro leaves unresolved the core enigma of why Lyndon Johnson persistently escalated the Vietnam War despite privately recognizing the adverse odds, an unanswered historical question he is currently confronting in his fifth and final volume.
精炼阅读摘要
传记作家 Robert Caro 在访谈中指出,政治权力的本质在于凭借具体抓手打破制度阻碍,然而绝对的意志力既能成就非凡的公共建设,也往往伴随着走向专制与冷酷的悲剧性代价。
档案考证与突破证人沉默的技艺 (0:00)
Dwarkesh Patel 提及 Lyndon B. Johnson 的信条“倾尽全力者必胜”,并指出 Caro 历经五十年研究,同样以偏执般的专注深入得克萨斯山区的边缘地带、翻阅数以百万计的档案。Caro 坦言自己希望避免传主身上的冷酷无情,但承认在追寻真相上绝不接受拒绝。面对拒绝透露真相的当事人,Caro 的核心策略是以无法辩驳的文献记录进行对质。例如在调查 Johnson 的政治献金运作时,他向关键经手人 John Connally 出示 Johnson 在议员拨款申请上写有“不,绝不(No, never)”等批示的手迹,以此作为切入点,促使知情者打开话匣,交代出被长期隐匿的政治封杀内幕。
否决点、国家能力与政治意志的必要性 (5:03)
针对当代西方基础设施建设陷入漫长审查与停滞的现状,Caro 反驳了现代监管建立前“建设轻而易举”的说法。在 1920 年代 Robert Moses 规划长岛公路时,社会舆论同样认为面对无数私人地块与既得利益,道路绝无建成的可能;但 Moses 甚至在尚未获得土地征用权的情况下,就凭借其政治手腕和穿透制度惯性的意志力建成了通往 Jones Beach 的道路。Caro 认为,正如 Moses 强行推进道路公园建设、Johnson 在阻力重重的参议院推动民权法案一样,制度陷入停滞的民主社会往往需要具有绝对政治意志的领袖来破局。
权力的异化:从理想主义者到无情建造者 (10:00)
Caro 澄清,将《The Power Broker》中的 Moses 视作彻头彻尾的反派是对该书的误读。早期的 Moses 是一位充满理想的改革者,致力于建立基于考核的公务员晋升制度,并为工薪阶层开辟海滩与公园。但随着权力的膨胀,其追求逐渐异化为对建造本身的偏执,彻底对公众呼声与人道代价麻木不仁。以 Cross Bronx 高速公路为例,Moses 不仅无视通车即陷入严重拥堵的警告,更在未提供任何安置保障的情况下强行驱逐了数以万计的居民。Caro 认为 Moses 从未意识到自身的蜕变,他认定自己的宏图是绝对的正义,凡有阻拦者皆可予以摧毁。
权力的制度堡垒与最终瓦解的苍凉 (17:57)
Moses 之所以能数十年稳坐高位并屡次以辞职威胁历任纽约市长和州长,是因为他享有崇高的公众声望,并精巧地构建了跨越不同机构、任期交错的法定职位网络,包括同时担任纽约州电力局主席、三区大桥及隧道管理局局长、纽约市公园专员以及长岛州立公园委员会主席等职务,没有任何单一官员能一次性罢免他。直到 1962 年其声望出现裂隙,州长 Nelson Rockefeller 才抓住机会正式接受其辞职。Caro 回忆在 Moses 失去权力后的最后一次采访中,以往拥挤着请托者的办公室陷入死寂,电话不再响起,展现了权力消逝时难以掩盖的苍凉与落寞。
Johnson 的统治手段与历史假设的局限 (32:51)
在分析 Lyndon B. Johnson 掌控参议院的机制时,Caro 强调所谓的个人说服力不过是铁腕的外在形式,其核心在于其掌控委员会任命与立法排期的切实杠杆,同僚们深知 Johnson 有能力成就或断送其仕途。对于历史假设,Caro 断言即便 John F. Kennedy 连任且由 Johnson 留任参议院多数党领袖,也绝不可能达成 1964 年和 1965 年的划时代立法。因为 Kennedy 缺乏改变美国底层命运的狂热决心,而 Johnson 在得克萨斯 Cotulla 教书的早年经历让他对扶贫与教育抱有偏执的国内愿景;然而,越战的升级最终转移了 Johnson 的精力,摧毁了“伟大社会”的构想并终结其政治生涯。
传记创作的严苛纪律与学术遗产 (41:00)
在写作方法上,Caro 坚持在动笔前必须将整部著作的主旨浓缩为一句话或一小段话,以此作为数年漫长写作中的核心锚点。《The Power Broker》在出版时因印刷机物理限制,由编辑 Robert Gottlieb 删去了约 35 万字;而 Caro 始终坚持不可妥协的穷尽式研究。为了让学者更容易查阅未公开的档案,Caro 拒绝了得克萨斯大学等机构开出的丰厚报酬,选择将包含约 700 份《The Power Broker》完整访谈实录和大量参议院访谈的全部档案留在纽约历史学会(New-York Historical Society)。Caro 坦承,这种对研究的严苛追求要求长年隔绝外界干扰的极端孤独,这种工作方式对个人的社交生活造成了不可逆的代价。
关于 Lyndon Johnson 为何在深知胜算渺茫的情况下仍执意升级越南战争,Caro 表示这正是他正在撰写的第五卷著作所试图解答的核心谜题,尚无定论。
Detailed notes — zh
## Background
本期内容由主持人 Dwarkesh Patel 于 2026 年 10 月 30 日在其同名播客频道发布,采访了时年 91 岁的当代传记大师罗伯特·卡洛(Robert Caro)。节目页面说明显示,本期为卡洛的深度专访,回顾其数十年来为罗伯特·摩西(Robert Moses)和林登·约翰逊(Lyndon Johnson)作传的心路历程。
## TL;DR
卡洛在访谈中分享了自己长达半个世纪的非虚构调查与写作方法,包括如何撬开关键政客的心理防线并追寻被尘封的历史档案。他深入剖析了权力的硬化机制与制度困境,对比了罗伯特·摩西打破常规的基建意志与现代基建的延宕,以及林登·约翰逊在参议院运用硬权力推动民权法案的政治手腕。卡洛还回顾了《权臣》中被迫删减的 35 万字珍贵文献,并探讨了得克萨斯拓荒史中被世人遗忘的“孤独英雄主义”与自己终生伏案写作的孤寂心境。
## Atmosphere & style
整场对话沉静、庄重且饱含深意,充满了跨越世代的敬意与知性共鸣。卡洛以一位历经沧桑的历史见证者口吻娓娓道来,既有描绘政坛角力与巨人迟暮时的苍凉宿命感,又有谈及拓荒者孤绝生存时的深沉悲悯。主持人怀揣多年的敬意细致追问,使得整场对谈既像是一次对权力本质的冷峻哲学解剖,又像是一位九旬老人对自己漫长孤独写作生涯的真挚告白。
## Bulletin
- `27:53` 91岁高龄的传记大师罗伯特·卡洛在专访中剖析了罗伯特·摩西与林登·约翰逊的权力机制,指出大萧条时期的廉价顶尖劳工军团与绝对政治意志是创造工程奇迹的核心条件。
- `05:03` 针对现代美国基建因过度制衡与审查陷入停滞的困境,卡洛指出摩西崛起的1920年代公众同样抱怨政府一事无成,真正破局的并非规制松绑而是罕见的政治意志与手腕。
- `45:00` 卡洛坦言《权贵通才》原稿长达105万字,因出版物理装订极限被迫忍痛删去35万字,包含大量未公开采访记录与第一手档案。
- `50:00` 为了让后世研究者更便捷地查阅参议院运作与约翰逊时代真相,卡洛放弃得克萨斯大学的高额出价,决定将毕生档案完整捐赠给纽约历史学会。
## Key takeaways
- `00:00` 卡洛采访突破心理防线的关键在于做足功课,通过出示隐秘档案细节(如约翰逊批注的“永远不给”)彻底瓦解受访者的防线。
- `05:03` 1920年代的长岛基建同样面临无征用权与地主阻挠,摩西是凭借超常政治意志强行打开局面,现代即使出现同等政治天才依然能突破复杂的规制网。
- `10:00` 民主社会在“基建完全停滞”与“冷酷强拆”之间极难找到完美平衡点,超大规模工程往往必须依靠打破常规的政治强人推动。
- `15:00` 权力的膨胀让摩西从为底层市民开辟海滩的年轻理想主义者,硬化为无视数十万居民流离失所与交通堵塞的跨布朗克斯高速公路建造者。
- `17:57` 即使目睹曾带来苦难的强人失势,看到兰德尔岛办公室里终日无人来电求助的冷清,依然会感受到权力流逝带来的深沉凄凉。
- `20:00` 摩西通过犬牙交错、任期各异的十几个法定职务构建了坚固的权力堡垒,历任市长州长无可奈何,直到洛克菲勒利用其辞职威胁顺水推舟将其拔除。
- `24:01` 摩西通过挖掘政敌致命弱点无情摧毁对手,这种残酷手段源于其早年理想受挫后形成的工程绝对执行逻辑。
- `27:53` 大萧条时期的经济崩溃为摩西提供了超乎寻常的红利:海量破产失业的顶尖建筑师与不得不日夜连轴转施工的庞大廉价劳动力。
- `30:00` 昔日繁复宏伟的建筑雕饰本质上是建立在手工艺人大量失业与极低薪资的残酷劳动力现实之上。
- `32:51` 林登·约翰逊的游说与施压之所以无可撼动,是因为其背后掌握着委员会席位与法案生杀大权的绝对硬权力。
- `36:08` 约翰·肯尼迪缺乏约翰逊那种源自底层教学经历的执念与强硬立法手腕,若无约翰逊,民权与反贫困法案绝无可能在国会破局。
- `41:00` 史诗级巨著的写作法则在于正式动笔前必须将全书的核心命题提炼为一句话,以此作为穿越数年档案浩海的定海神针。
- `45:00` 现代数字化检索虽然极大加速了定位史料的效率,但传记写作无法缩短的核心在于逐字研读每一份原始档案的硬功夫。
- `52:59` 得克萨斯山地边陲的极端孤绝造就了约翰逊家族的坚韧性格,美国人往往低估了仅凭忍受漫长孤独本身所具备的英雄主义。
- `56:08` 半个世纪以来每天白天切断电话、置身完全孤独的专注工作模式,是卡洛维持写作沉浸与终生高强度产出的立足之本。
## Detailed walkthrough
### `00:00` 传记作家的执念与采访秘诀
主持人 Dwarkesh Patel 以林登·约翰逊(Lyndon Johnson)的处世格言“只要全力以赴,你就会赢”(“If you do everything, you'll win”)开场,介绍了嘉宾罗伯特·卡洛(Robert Caro)。在过去超过 50 年为约翰逊作传的岁月里,卡洛曾长年居住在德克萨斯丘陵地区(Texas Hill Country),切身体会约翰逊早年的贫困与孤独;他翻遍了全美各地的参议院档案和总统图书馆中的数百万份文件,甚至跨越数十年寻找采访对象——从帮助约翰逊通过舞弊赢得选举的前打手,到在第一次绝望竞选中为约翰逊开车的专属司机。
Dwarkesh Patel 问卡洛,他之所以能把约翰逊和罗伯特·摩西(Robert Moses)写得如此入木三分,是否因为他本人身上也有这些传主的气质?卡洛回答道,自己首先希望没有继承他们身上的那些恶劣品质,特别是“冷酷无情”(ruthless):
> “只要全力以赴就能赢,这是他们‘伟大’的一部分,但我希望自己没有继承这些特质。”
卡洛回忆起自己最初调查罗伯特·摩西时的一个生动细节:为了查阅前纽约市长菲奥雷洛·拉瓜迪亚(Fiorello LaGuardia)的档案,他天天跑到哈德逊河畔第 79 街游艇码头(79th Street Boat Basin)地下三层的纽约市档案馆仓库。在昏暗的地下仓库里,面对一整排靠墙的文件柜,卡洛一页页翻阅。偶尔看到罗伯特·摩西当年亲笔手写的小便条,卡洛突然强烈地意识到:“我正在沿着他当年走过的轨迹一步步走下去。”
谈到两人的相似之处,Dwarkesh Patel 指出卡洛在调查中的执念与坚韧——绝不接受别人的拒绝,为了弄清真相掘地三尺。卡洛欣然将此视作夸赞。他提到,约翰逊在早期竞选时身边有一位司机兼秘书,两人整天待在车里穿梭于德克萨斯广袤的乡间道路上。卡洛心想,全天下唯有这个人清楚约翰逊在无数个小时的长途驾驶中究竟在谋划什么,因此无论付出何种代价,也必须找到他并让他开口吐露实情。
面对那些明知吐露真相对自己不利、却最终依然全盘托出的受访者,卡洛是如何突破心理防线的?卡洛分享了一个关键采访案例:约翰·康纳利(John Connally,曾任约翰逊亲信、后任德克萨斯州长)。康纳利是帮约翰逊收受资金并按约翰逊指令向外分发政治献金的关键人。当其他议员向约翰逊请求政治资金(例如申请 1,500 美元)时,约翰逊有时会批复“可以,1500 美元”,有时批“500 美元”,有时写“不”,但有时会严厉写下“不,永远不给”(No, never)。卡洛拿着这些密档记录去追问康纳利:“‘永远不给’到底是什么意思?”康纳利回答,这意味着那个人从今往后休想从约翰逊手里拿到一分钱。卡洛进一步追问约翰逊为何对某位特定议员怀有如此深刻的偏见与敌意,受访者的防线随即瓦解,许多原本尘封的内幕故事便由此喷涌而出。
---
### `05:03` 今日美国是否缺少一个“罗伯特·摩西”?
访谈话题从约翰逊转向罗伯特·摩西(Robert Moses)。Dwarkesh Patel 提出,过去一二十年里公众普遍抱怨政府极度缺乏建设能力,大型基建项目举步维艰。比如纽约市的第二大道地铁线(Second Avenue Subway),规划施工了近 50 年,耗资超过 40 亿美元,却只开通了区区一英里半。许多人认为,《权贵通才》(The Power Broker)当年出版后造成了巨大的制度震荡,人们为了防止权力集中在摩西这样的超级官僚手中,设立了繁琐的环境审查(environmental review)、土地使用审查、社区委员会听证程序以及无休止的诉讼机制;大家担忧这种制度防范是否已经“矫枉过正”(overcorrected)。
卡洛对此给出了不同的历史观察。他指出,许多人认为在今天严格的安全防范与监管下,摩西根本无法施展拳脚,但事实是:**在摩西崛起的 1920 年代,人们同样在抱怨“政府什么都建不成”**。当时正值汽车时代来临,人人都买了车,道路却依然破旧狭窄。修建一条长途公路需要穿过数十上百家私人农场和地产,绝大多数地主根本不愿出让土地,所有人都断言新公路永远造不起来。然而摩西一出现,他凭借惊人的政治手腕与纯粹的个人意志,冲破了重重体制障碍。
卡洛以琼斯海滩(Jones Beach)和相关长岛公园大道系统的建设为例:摩西发现长岛这片距离纽约市区仅 27 英里的壮丽海滩后,立志要让纽约市的普通大众享受到这片海滩。尽管沿途的地主誓死反对让公路穿过农田与庄园,而且当时摩西甚至还没拿到土地征用权(eminent domain),摩西依然宣称“我一定会把它建出来”。卡洛感叹道:
> “看到他克服重重阻碍,然后海滩突然建成并向纽约市民开放,这不仅是一次政治天才的展现,更是纯粹意志力的壮举。”
卡洛断言,即使在今天,如果出现摩西这种量级的政治天才,他同样能找到方法绕开现代复杂的规制网,把大工程落实落地。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 基础设施建设困境与政治意志
accDescr: 对比现代过度制衡下的基建停滞与强人主导的高效建设
subgraph modern["现代民主制度下的基建困境"]
A["重大基建需求"] --> B["繁琐的环境审查与诉讼机制"]
B --> C["社区利益冲突与地主抵制"]
C --> D["工程严重延宕与预算严重超支<br/>(如第二大道地铁、加州高铁)"]
end
subgraph moses["罗伯特·摩西式的突破方式"]
E["宏大公共工程构想<br/>(如琼斯海滩、长岛道路网)"] --> F["突破无土地征用权与地主阻力"]
F --> G["集中政治权力与超凡个人意志"]
G --> H["工程迅速落地并向公众开放"]
end
```
---
### `10:00` 理想主义的异化:权力如何吞噬摩西
Dwarkesh Patel 抛出了民主治理中的核心困境:加州在过去十年斥资约 150 亿美元修建高铁,却连一英里的铁轨都没建成;而在另一个极端的制度体系下(例如当代中国,类似 1940 至 1950 年代的纽约),政府拥有类似摩西的强势态度,在短短一二十年间铺设了数万公里铁路,但代价是造成了大量民众被迫搬迁与无视民意。民主社会究竟该如何在“完全建不成”与“冷酷强拆”之间找到平衡点?
卡洛直言,他并不确定是否存在一个两全其美的“最佳平衡点”(“I'm not sure there is a good spot”)。建设超大规模的公共工程,必然会与成百上千阻碍施工的土地所有者产生冲突。正常情况下,几十年里可能都见不到一个有能力破局的人,公共建设陷入长期停滞;直到某一天,一个政治天才横空出世,以打破常规的手段把事情硬生生做成。在这一点上,卡洛研究的两位主角高度一致:摩西在公共工程上做到了别人认为不可能的事,而约翰逊在民权法案(civil rights)立法上也打破了国队长达数十年的僵局。
Dwarkesh Patel 顺势推论:“听起来你认为当今的时代可能需要一点‘摩西’?”卡洛坦陈自己有时也思考过这个问题,但他并不希望出现一个完全无视民意与残酷无情的摩西,可现实又确实需要有担当的人去设法战胜阻力、把基建落实。
针对许多没通读全书的人误以为《权贵通才》将摩西完全刻画为一个十恶不赦的恶魔,卡洛纠正道:凡是认真读过该书前几百页的读者,都会看到一个年轻而纯粹的理想主义者。年轻时代的摩西是文官制度(civil service)的技术专家,耗尽心血试图改革考核机制,让公职人员凭才华与功绩晋升,彻底根除政治分肥与人情依附。初入公共工程领域时,摩西一心想为被困在纽约闷热公寓里的底层大众提供能够奔赴海滩休养生息的道路。然而随着权力的膨胀,他彻底蜕变了:
> “当他在克罗斯布朗克斯高速公路(Cross Bronx Expressway)工程中认为‘这里必须有一条高速公路’时,无论别人说什么,无论路上阻挡了多少千平民百姓,他都会毫不留情地强行驱逐。他确实变了,这正是《权贵通才》核心探讨的悲剧。”
### `15:00` 权力的硬化:从青年理想主义者到跨布朗克斯高速公路的建造者
卡罗回顾了罗伯特·摩西(Robert Moses)早年与晚期的剧烈反差。在最初阶段,摩西是一个怀揣极高理想主义抱负的年轻人,一心只想通过建造公共设施来改善普通大众的生活,让生活在拥挤都市里的纽约市民能够亲近大海与海滩(如著名的琼斯海滩)。然而随着权力的扩张,他蜕变成了一个“仅仅因为自己认为该建就必须去建”的人。他彻底无视外界的所有反对意见,无论需要强拆多少家庭、驱逐几万甚至几十万平民,哪怕方案本身存在巨大缺陷,他也绝不妥协。
一个最典型的灾难性案例就是跨布朗克斯高速公路(Cross Bronx Expressway)。早在该项目动工之前,无数专家和居民就反复警告他绝不可行,但摩西置若罔闻。结果这条高速路一通车,立刻沦为“全世界最长的交通大堵塞”。更为悲惨的是,摩西在没有提供任何妥善安置方案的情况下,无情地强拆驱逐了数万名无辜市民。卡罗强调,这绝非单纯的“权力导致腐败”,而是一个更为复杂的命题:权力如何在不必然贪污腐败的情况下,使一个人面对反对意见时彻底“硬化”(hardening),对哪怕最合理的抗议也完全关闭耳目。
- 青年摩西:致力于公共利益,为市民开辟海滩、公园与林荫大道。
- 晚期摩西:为追求工程落地而不惜一切代价,甚至强行摧毁成熟社区。
- 跨布朗克斯高速公路的代价:数万人流离失所,通车首日即造成全城瘫痪级别的世纪拥堵。
---
### `17:57` 亲历巨人黄昏:特赖伯勒桥管理局办公室里的凄凉沉默
卡罗开始动笔撰写《权力经纪人》(The Power Broker)是在1966至1967年左右。当时摩西并未完全退出历史舞台,卡罗以一个二十多岁、初出茅庐的年轻记者视角,亲眼见证并记录了这位统治纽约近半个世纪的“造王者”如何一步步大权旁落。这一创作现实导致整部传记的故事走向和结局随着真实历史的发展而不断重构,卡罗不得不一边调查,一边目睹摩西权势崩解的全过程。
卡罗回忆起在特赖伯勒桥管理局(Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority,位于兰德尔岛 Randall's Island)顶层办公室采访摩西时的强烈对比。在摩西大权独揽的极盛时期,整个走廊挤满了苦苦等候其决策与批示的各路政要、富商与官员;只要采访一暂停,秘书就会立刻快步走进来,递上一长串在卡罗采访期间打进来的求助电话名单。然而在撰写传记的尾声,在卡罗对摩西的最后一次长谈中,整场采访期间电话一次都没有响起过,秘书进来时手里空空如也,没有任何人再打来电话索要恩惠或请示指令。
卡罗感慨道:“无论你对摩西的所作所为持何种看法,目睹一个曾经权倾天下的人失去权力,你都会由衷地感受到那种深沉的凄凉。”即便知晓摩西曾给无数底层平民带来苦难,在那个瞬间,看到再也没有一个人打电话找他求情帮忙,任何人都会不可避免地感到一种近乎悲剧性的落寞。
---
### `20:00` 晚年摩西的孤立与洛克菲勒的“反将一军”
面对德瓦尔凯什(Dwarkesh)关于“摩西是否意识到自己已经失势”的提问,卡罗认为摩西晚年其实并未真正清醒地意识到这一点。当时年过八旬的摩西已经耳聋,平日深居简出,身处兰德尔岛那个高度封闭的小圈子中。他的身边全是跟随数十年的忠诚心腹(“Moses Men”),这些老部下依然像几十年前一样对他唯命是从、毕恭毕敬。尽管摩西也察觉到许多新项目推进变得举步维艰,但他深信自己只要像过去半个世纪那样继续强力施压、横冲直撞,就必定能像以往每一次一样赢得最终胜利。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 摩西的权力堡垒与洛克菲勒的破解机制
accDescr: 展示摩西如何通过交叉职务与极高声望让历任州长市长无可奈何,最终被洛克菲勒利用辞职威胁击破的机制
subgraph Defense ["摩西不可动摇的黄金年代"]
A["公众偶像与极高民望<br/>媒体盛赞为城市总建设师"]
B["交错重叠的法定职位<br/>(公园委/电力局/特赖伯勒桥)"]
C["惯用杀招:以辞职要挟<br/>逼退历任州长与市长"]
A --> C
B --> C
end
subgraph Fall ["权力裂隙与终局(1962年)"]
D["年事已高、争议缠身<br/>盔甲出现公众裂痕"]
E["向纳尔逊·洛克菲勒<br/>再次发出辞职威胁"]
F["洛克菲勒出乎意料反击:<br/>'我深表遗憾地接受'"]
D --> E
E --> F
end
C -.->|"长达数十年有效"| D
```
德瓦尔凯什指出,在1962年,摩西故技重施,试图以惯用的“辞职”来要挟新任州长纳尔逊·洛克菲勒(Nelson Rockefeller),结果洛克菲勒当场顺水推舟回答:“我深表遗憾地接受你的辞职。”导致摩西瞬间失去核心职位。德瓦尔凯什询问:在此之前的历任纽约市长和纽约州长,难道就不能同样顺水推舟罢免他吗?
卡罗对此作出了深刻的政治权力结构剖析:
- **理论上的权力**:摩西并非民选官员,法理上历任州长和市长确实随时拥有开除他的权力。
- **现实中的不可行**:在全盛期,根本没有人能动得了他。一方面,他是纽约全民顶礼膜拜的“建设英雄”,解雇摩西等同于政治自杀;另一方面,摩西凭借非凡的制度设计天才,同时兼任纽约州电力局局长、特赖伯勒桥管理局局长、纽约市公园专员、长岛公园专员、琼斯海滩专员等十几个职位。这些职位的任期犬牙交错、终止时间完全不同,且部分职位州长根本无权直接免职。
- **神话破灭的时刻**:直到数十年后摩西的盔甲上终于裂开了缝隙,媒体与公众的批评声浪渐起,洛克菲勒才敢冒着舆论风暴彻底将他拔除。
---
### `24:01` 最后的质问:“你是否意识到自己在改变?”
卡罗一生共面对面采访了摩西七次。在第七次采访中,卡罗当面提起了某位百万富翁通过向摩西的委员会大额捐款,从而让原本规划穿过其私人高尔夫球场的高速路悄然绕道改线的内幕,摩西勃然大怒,从此彻底切断了与卡罗的联系。
德瓦尔凯什询问:“如果你能获得第八次采访摩西的机会,你最想问他的一个问题是什么?”
卡罗毫不犹豫地回答:“我想问他:你是否意识到自己正在改变?”(“Did you realize you were changing?”)
卡罗进一步解释,他坚信如果真有机会问,摩西内心的答案肯定是否定的。在摩西眼中,自己的宏伟蓝图——在何处筑路、何处造园——从始至终都是无比正确的真理,必须被坚定执行;为了修通公路,无论驱逐几万人、给多少普通人带来苦难都在所不惜。
摩西这种极端的残酷无情并非与生俱来,而是在极年轻时因理想受挫后悟出的权力逻辑。卡罗举了一个触目惊心的例子:
- **亨利·爱泼斯坦(Henry Epstein)事件**:布朗克斯政客亨利·爱泼斯坦当时坚决反对跨布朗克斯高速公路的原定路线,恳求摩西只需将路线往南平移两个街区,就能将必须强拆驱逐的家庭从数万人缩减到区区几百人。
- **摩西的毁灭手段**:摩西的应对方式是彻底毁掉爱泼斯坦。他动用一切情报手段深挖政敌的致命弱点——不论是情妇、暗账还是任何隐私劣迹,只要被摩西抓住软肋,就会毫不犹豫地将其彻底摧毁,直到所有阻挡工程落地的人彻底屈服或出局。
---
### `27:53` 大萧条时期的超级利好:廉价顶尖智力与无休止的劳工军团
德瓦尔凯什指出,摩西之所以能在传记描写的特定历史阶段以超乎想象的速度完成如此庞大的工程群,很大程度上离不开宏观时代的特殊红利——大萧条(The Great Depression)。在那段经济大崩溃时期,政府反而成为了极少数拥有真金白银的庞然大物,能够以极其低廉的“白菜价”从市场上吸收最顶级的私营部门人才,并调动海量劳工日夜赶工。
卡罗完全赞同这一历史分析,并指出大萧条对摩西早期神话般的奇迹起到了决定性支撑作用:
- **第五大道的失业建筑师长队**:在某个重大公共工程启动时,摩西需要大量建筑师绘制图纸,数以千计破产失业的顶尖建筑设计师在第五大道排起看不到头的长龙,摩西得以用极低的薪资把最杰出的专业人才收入麾下。
- **劳动力市场的绝对支配权**:面对海量别无出路的失业工人,摩西拥有了毫无制约的雇佣与解雇权力。他强令成千上万的劳工在刺骨的寒冬中每周七天、每天24小时连轴转施工;由于大萧条导致工人们离开这里就无处可去,摩西可以肆意开除任何达不到他严苛进度要求的工人和工程师,将这股无情的行政意志转化成了无与伦比的建设效率。
### `30:00` 建筑之美与劳动力成本:昔日宏伟工程的代价
Dwarkesh Patel 与 Robert Caro 探讨了城市建筑风格在时代变迁中的落差。在上个世纪初乃至更早,像纽约大中央车站(Grand Central Terminal)这样宏伟精致的建筑拔地而起;然而到了 20 世纪下半叶,新建的建筑在美感上却大打折扣。Patel 指出,昔日那些更美丽、更具艺术性的杰作,恰恰是由一个经济远不如今日富裕的国家建成的。
Caro 从经济与劳动力的残酷现实解释了这种反差。过去之所以能建造出如此繁复精美的建筑,核心原因在于当时存在大量失业的手工艺人与石匠,建筑商可以用极其低廉的薪资雇佣他们雕琢石雕与外部装饰。Caro 举了自己住所的生动例子:他的公寓位于一栋大楼的 15 层,从窗户望向对街一栋 15 或 16 层高的建筑,能看到屋顶石壁上有着极为繁复华丽的雕花。这些隐藏在高空的杰作,除了自己和邻居家窗前的人,几乎没有行人能够看到。Caro 感叹:“建筑商之所以愿意花这笔钱,是因为他们能以如此低廉的工资雇佣到熟练工,让他们在高层做出根本没人能看到的装饰,仅仅因为那时候人工极度便宜。”
```mermaid
flowchart LR
accTitle: 建筑雕饰背后的劳动力成本驱动机制
accDescr: 解释20世纪初手工艺人低成本如何促成高空隐蔽石雕艺术
subgraph Cost["劳动力经济条件"]
A["大量失业的精巧手工艺人"] --> B["极度低廉的劳工薪资"]
end
subgraph Result["建筑艺术成果"]
B --> C["高空屋顶精雕细琢"]
C --> D["极致美感却无人可见"]
end
```
---
### `32:51` 林登·约翰逊的权力机制:威逼、利诱与绝对实权
谈及《国会山庄之主》(*Master of the Senate*),Patel 剖析了林登·B·约翰逊(Lyndon B. Johnson)作为参议院多数党领袖时展现出的惊人领导力:约翰逊不仅擅长面对面交谈时的语言游说,更深谙如何将自己置于拥有绝对筹码的位置——无论是许诺利益还是施加威胁。Patel 提问,在这两者之间,究竟哪一个才是约翰逊力量的真正源泉?
Caro 明确指出,说服力与权力不可分割,真正的驱动力是说服背后无可撼动的硬权力。在参议院的日常交锋中,当约翰逊向某位参议员争取关键选票时,即便对方政见不同甚至内心反感,但议员心知肚明自己的政治前途系于约翰逊之手:
- 参议员渴望进入某个关键委员会,而约翰逊掌握着席位分配权;
- 参议员迫切需要通过某项地方提案,而约翰逊拥有决定法案能否提交表决的生杀大权。
Caro 生动刻画了著名的“约翰逊特招”(Johnson Treatment)背后的压迫感:“当约翰逊跟你说话,他一把搂住你的肩膀,整个人逼近压向你时,那绝不仅仅是他带给你的个性压迫感;在那股个性力量背后,你很清楚他拥有直接对你施加报复或施予恩惠的绝对权力,你最好认清这一点。”
---
### `35:00` 1948 年得州参议员选举的悲剧宿命:科克·史蒂文森之败
Patel 提到 Caro 的《晋升之路》(*Means of Ascent*),该书聚焦 1948 年林登·约翰逊与前得克萨斯州州长科克·史蒂文森(Coke Stevenson)之间残酷的得州参议员初选。Patel 称赞该书为自己的挚爱之作,并询问 Caro 在描摹史蒂文森这一充满尊严与旧式风骨的“得州化身”时,内心深处是否曾暗自希望史蒂文森能赢下那场选举。
Caro 直言不讳地承认:“答案是肯定的。”他认为史蒂文森虽然是个恪守原则的理想主义者,但他在担任得克萨斯州州长期间展现了极强的实干履历;如果当年能进入参议院,他必将成为一名卓越且功勋卓著的联邦参议员。Caro 回忆写下这一段历史时的痛心感受:这场落败之所以令人唏嘘,在于约翰逊团队动用了史蒂文森做梦都想不到的下作手段与选举舞弊,而这位恪守老派传统的政治人物直到尘埃落定,都无法真正理解并接受对手竟能做出如此不择手段之举。
---
### `36:08` 约翰·肯尼迪与林登·约翰逊的治国雄心之别
Patel 抛出一个假设性反事实推论:如果约翰·F·肯尼迪在 1960 年当选总统,而约翰逊拒绝接受副总统提名并继续执掌参议院多数党席位,那么肯尼迪政府能否在约翰逊的参议院协助下,更早通过后来 1964、1965 年的一系列标志性法案?
Caro 断然否认了这种可能性。他分析,尽管肯尼迪魅力四射,在外交事务上表现坚决,但他内心根本没有约翰逊那种近乎偏执的社会变革意志:
- 约翰逊早在青年时期于得州科图拉(Cotulla)贫困小学任教时,就亲身体验了底层墨西哥裔儿童的苦难,这铸就了他日后倾尽全力推动教育与扶贫的执念;
- 民权法案、投票权法案及“向贫困开战”(Great Society)计划,其在国会的破局完全依赖约翰逊那种“为达目的不惜一切代价”的立法手腕与政治决心;
- Caro 评价道:“我们能拥有这些民权法案与反贫困法案,若没有林登·约翰逊是根本不可能实现的。”
约翰逊人生的戏剧性正在于此:正当他在内政立法上高歌猛进、重塑美国社会风貌之际,越南战争的深渊彻底吞噬了他的精力,导致他后期的伟大愿景全盘崩解。当 Patel 追问约翰逊明知深陷泥潭却为何不断升级越战时,Caro 表示自己正在撰写这一部分,目前仍在艰难探寻其根本原因,暂不便提前下定论。
---
### `40:00` 惊人的精力与绝对意志:莫西斯与约翰逊的共同密码
Patel 指出罗伯特·莫西斯与林登·约翰逊两人身上都有一个极度罕见的共同特质——深不可测的充沛精力,两人每天工作长达 16 个小时甚至更久。Patel 询问 Caro,这种不知疲倦的状态究竟源于异于常人的生理体魄,还是极度强大的精神意志?
Caro 坚定地认为是意志力的驱动:“许多人都有充沛的体力,但当你看到罗伯特·莫西斯为了贯彻意志、完成目标而几乎不睡觉时,疲倦在他们的世界里根本不是一个需要考虑的变量。”约翰逊同样如此,他为了拉票可以在凌晨两三点连环拨打电话。Caro 分享了一则有趣的政坛掌故:有一次约翰逊在凌晨清晨 5 点打电话吵醒一位参议员争取选票,被从睡梦中叫醒的参议员只能哭笑不得地在听筒里调侃道:“哎,林登,我刚才就这么直挺挺躺在床上,正专程等着接你的电话呢。”
---
### `41:00` 传记大师的写作法门:落笔前凝练成一句话
面对动辄耗费 5 到 10 年写就一部巨著、成书前只有编辑与妻子看过手稿的漫长孤独过程,Patel 询问 Caro 如何确保整部书的结构在数年漫长写作中不走偏。
Caro 坦言在《权力经纪人》(*The Power Broker*)的创作初期自己曾吃过大亏,随后摸索出一套严苛的构思法则:在正式动笔写下一个字之前,必须把整本书从头到尾的框架彻底想透:
- “在动笔之前,我必须强迫自己回答:这本书到底关于什么?你必须把它浓缩成一句话。”
- 如果一句话无法穷尽,最多压缩为一个段落;
- 只有确立了这一句坚不可摧的核心命题,未来三到五年陷入浩瀚史料的海洋时,作者才不会迷失方向、反问自己究竟在做什么。整本书的材料与叙事细节,最终都要紧紧围绕这一句话的重心凝聚展开。
随后在回答数字档案与互联网工具对传记写作的影响时,Caro 透露,海量数字化档案给正在撰写越战部分的他提供了过去难以想象的细节支持,使他能够以前所未有的精度重建当年的越战战场细节。
- **核心观点总结:**
- **建筑艺术**:繁复精美的古典石雕是低廉人力成本与手艺人失业困境的产物。
- **权力本质**:精湛的说服技巧只有以“掌控对方前途与立法生杀权”的威慑为后盾才具有决定性力量。
- **肯尼迪 vs. 约翰逊**:民权与伟大社会立法的通过取决于约翰逊独一无二的激进意志与底层执念,肯尼迪缺乏此种驱动力。
- **巨作结构法**:一部历时数年的史诗传记,在动工前必须能提炼为“一句话”的核心骨架。
### `45:00` 档案检索的现代化与写作无法缩短的本质
罗伯特·卡洛(Robert Caro)谈到自己在撰写新书时选择详细剖析的一场战役——德浪河谷战役(Battle of the Ia Drang Valley)。他指出,过去从来没有人对这场战役做过如此细致入微的记录。如今,他只需坐在电脑前,就能轻松查出参战士兵的口述历史保存在哪所大学、有哪些档案文件可供查阅,这种检索效率在以往是不可想象的。
德瓦凯什·帕特尔(Dwarkesh Patel)随即询问,如果当年在写前几卷时就拥有现在的技术,是否会带来巨大改变。卡洛果断回答不会。尽管现代化检索能让找资料的速度变快,但以他本人的性格,即便能快速定位,他也必须亲自把每一份文件逐字读完。“Certainly you could find the documents faster. But finding them is a small thing compared to reading them, you know.”(找到文件当然更快了,但跟通读它们相比,找到它们只是一件微不足道的小事。)
帕特尔提出一个假想:如果能穿越回1975年左右,告诉当时四十多岁、正准备开启《林登·约翰逊传》(The Years of Lyndon Johnson)三部曲写作的卡洛,这项工程将耗费他四十多年的光阴,当年的卡洛会感到高兴还是恐惧?卡洛叹了口气,坦言自己当年写《权臣:罗伯特·摩西与纽约的衰落》(The Power Broker)时就被迫删去了太多珍贵内容,而这种无法遏制详尽叙述冲动的特质早已注定了他的人生轨迹。
- 当年卡洛交给编辑鲍勃·戈特利布(Bob Gottlieb)的《权臣》初稿长达 105 万字。
- 由于卡洛坚持只出一卷本,出版社在物理装订极限下最多只能容纳约 70 万字(约 700 页篇幅)。
- 卡洛与戈特利布最终被迫删掉了整整 35 万字;戈特利布曾感慨,自己删掉的是“我读过最好的文字”(Best stuff I ever read)。
- 卡洛感叹许多被删掉的内容至今无人知晓,每当有人问起某些历史细节,他只能遗憾地说自己当年写过,但读者无缘得见。
- 即使在写作过程中他明知篇幅超标、未来难逃大删减的命运,他依然无法克制自己把该写的事情全写出来的冲动。
---
### `50:00` 档案柜中的未刊宝藏与向纽约历史学会捐赠
卡洛的书房和隔壁房间里摆满了整排整排的文件柜,里面装载着他整个职业生涯积累的采访速记、工作笔记和一手文献。帕特尔问及,当未来历史学家研究这些从未公开发表的材料时,卡洛希望他们能产出什么样的学术成果。卡洛表示,书中删减掉的海量内容如果能被世人所知,很多历史事件在媒体和公众眼中的面貌将会完全不同。
他以众议院议长萨姆·雷伯恩(Sam Rayburn)为例:雷伯恩是美国历史上的巨人,长期掌控众议院,推动了罗斯福新政等无数关键法案的通过,但全美至今没有一部优秀的雷伯恩传记,而关于他的详实资料就静静躺在卡洛的档案柜里。仅《权臣》一书,卡洛就积累了大约 700 场采访的详细打字记录;在研究参议院期间,他采访了无数参议员及其助手,所获材料有极高比例未能写入书中。
为了让这些珍贵的一手史料流传后世,卡洛最终决定将全部个人档案捐赠给纽约历史学会(New-York Historical Society)。他透露,得克萨斯大学等机构曾开出远高于此的丰厚报酬,但他宁愿放弃巨额收益,也要把档案留在纽约。他希望任何想要了解纽约演进史、参议院运作机制或约翰逊时代真相的研究者,不必特意搭乘飞机飞往得克萨斯,而在纽约就能极为便捷地查阅这些资料。
---
### `52:59` 边疆拓荒与被遗忘的“孤独之英雄主义”
谈到卡洛在《权臣》中对长岛黄金海岸与贫民窟的刻画,以及在约翰逊传记中对得克萨斯山地(Hill Country)拓荒岁月的描写,帕特尔认为,即便约翰逊最终没有当上总统,卡洛笔下那段关于普通拓荒者的历史画卷本身也极其迷人。卡洛对此深有共鸣,并回忆起自己当年探寻约翰逊城(Johnson City)开拓者历史时的震撼。
卡洛指出,约翰逊的祖辈在仅仅一两代人之前,带着全家老小迁徙到蛮荒的印第安边疆,时刻面临全家被屠杀的凶险与极端艰苦的环境。他在采访老一辈居民时,聆听了大量由祖辈亲口传下的真实拓荒记忆。约翰逊成长于距离约翰逊城还有 18 英里之遥的偏僻牧场,这种边疆环境对人格塑造产生了决定性影响,而其中最核心的体验就是“孤独”。
```mermaid
flowchart TD
accTitle: 得克萨斯山地边疆环境对人格与叙事的影响
accDescr: 展示拓荒时代恶劣的地理与心理环境如何塑造了约翰逊家族,并成为卡洛挖掘的核心主题。
subgraph Geography["地理隔离"]
A["得克萨斯山地边陲<br/>(距离最近市镇 18-22 英里)"]
B["举目皆是荒山<br/>看不见任何邻舍房屋"]
end
subgraph Reality["生存威胁与日常"]
C["印第安边疆冲突风险"]
D["漫无边际的极端孤独"]
end
subgraph Impact["历史与文学映射"]
E["约翰逊母亲推门见荒丘的孤绝"]
F["塑造约翰逊坚韧而复杂的性格"]
G["卡洛发掘的‘孤独英雄主义’"]
end
A --> B
B --> D
A --> C
D --> E
D --> F
E & F --> G
```
卡洛回忆,自己曾写过一篇关于约翰逊母亲的长篇文字(最终被迫压缩至三页左右),描绘她在午后走上山丘,举目四望除了连绵起伏的山丘空无一物、周围没有任何邻居的孤寂。当年卡洛在奥斯汀周边寻找与约翰逊同辈的老人做采访,一位老妇人指引他开车出城 22 英里,在左手边看到牲畜围栏后再开 22 英里。整整 22 英里的路程中,卡洛没有看到任何一所房屋、遇见过任何一个人,而那位老妇人就在那样的环境中生活了一辈子。卡洛由衷感慨:“I'm not sure that America understands the heroism of just being lonely, forgetting Indians and raids, just being the loneliness of what life was like for these people.”(抛开印第安人和突袭不谈,我不确定美国人是否真正理解仅仅忍受孤独所包含的英雄主义,理解孤独对那些拓荒者而言意味着什么。)
---
### `56:08` 传记作家的长年孤寂与终生专注
对话尾声,帕特尔将“孤独”这一命题引向卡洛自身的生活。虽然卡洛身处繁华的纽约市,但他与妻子伊娜(Ina Caro)半个多世纪以来几乎是在完全封闭、孤立的状态下并肩工作。帕特尔询问,这种长期的孤独对卡洛的作品和个人生活造成了怎样的影响。
卡洛承认孤独对自己的人生影响巨大。他每天早晨来到办公室的第一件事就是关掉电话,一整天不与任何人交谈。卡洛坦言自己其实是个性格随和友善的人,有时内心也非常渴望拿起电话与朋友闲聊几句,但他必须强迫自己停下来,因为闲聊会彻底打碎写作所需的专注力。这种工作方式并不总能被外界理解,很多人对他白天从不回电话感到不解甚至介意,只有少数真正理解他的挚友才能接受他在一天工作全部结束后才回复联络。
在访谈结束之际,帕特尔深情表示,自己的播客开办六年来,每当被问及最想邀请却未能邀请到的嘉宾是谁时,他的回答每一次都是罗伯特·卡洛。帕特尔向卡洛致以最诚挚的感谢,卡洛也对这场深入的对话表达了谢意与赞赏。
## Notable quotes
> `41:00` 在动笔之前,我必须强迫自己回答:这本书到底关于什么?你必须把它浓缩成一句话。 — Robert Caro
> `17:57` 无论你对摩西的所作所为持何种看法,目睹一个曾经权倾天下的人失去权力,你都会由衷地感受到那种深沉的凄凉。 — Robert Caro
> `36:08` 我们能拥有这些民权法案与反贫困法案,若没有林登·约翰逊是根本不可能实现的。 — Robert Caro
## Mentioned
Robert Caro, Dwarkesh Patel, Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert Moses, Fiorello LaGuardia, John Connally, Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Epstein, Coke Stevenson, John F. Kennedy, Sam Rayburn, Bob Gottlieb, Ina Caro, The Power Broker, Master of the Senate, Means of Ascent, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Jones Beach, Cross Bronx Expressway, Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, New-York Historical Society, Second Avenue Subway, Battle of the Ia Drang Valley
## Video description
<p>The Robert Caro interview.</p><p>Watch on <a target="_blank" href="https://youtu.be/7lSOI21E68g">YouTube</a>; read the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dwarkesh.com/p/robert-caro">transcript</a>.</p><p>Sponsors</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://antithesis.com/dwarkesh">Antithesis</a> lets you run thorough simulation tests on every PR your coding agents ship. That’s because Antithesis is FAST. On a recent project, it packed fifteen hours of simulation into each fifteen-minute run: every change could be tested in thousands of hostile worlds before being merged. Every minute your software spends in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours it will ever experience. Learn more at <a target="_blank" href="http://antithesis.com/dwarkesh">antithesis.com/dwarkesh</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://workos.com/airlock">WorkOS</a>’s Airlock is a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your most important tools. When an agent makes a request, Airlock evaluates it against your company’s policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. If it allows it, Airlock takes action on behalf of the agent, which means your agents never see your API keys or other credentials. Airlock is in early access. If you’re interested, go to <a target="_blank" href="http://workos.com/airlock">workos.com/airlock</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://janestreet.com/dwarkesh">Jane Street</a>’s mystery ASIC puzzle is over, and they’ve published a blog post that reveals the chip’s purpose. You can read it here:<a target="_blank" href="https://blog.janestreet.com/asic-puzzle-results/"> blog.janestreet.com/asic-puzzle-results/</a>. More importantly, there’s another challenge live now! For this one, you have to design a protocol-emulator ASIC that can be used to test chips outside of a live system. Jane Street will pay to fabricate their favorite submissions. The competition is open until January 18th. Get started at <a target="_blank" href="https://janestreet.com/dwarkesh">janestreet.com/dwarkesh</a></p><p>Timestamps</p><p>(00:00:00) – How Caro gets people to talk</p><p>(00:05:03) – Does America need a little more Moses today?</p><p>(00:12:42) – Moses the young idealist</p><p>(00:17:57) – Watching Moses lose power</p><p>(00:24:01) – Did Moses realize he was changing?</p><p>(00:27:53) – Building during the Great Depression</p><p>(00:32:51) – The threats and promises of Lyndon Johnson</p><p>(00:36:08) – Could Kennedy have passed Johnson’s laws?</p><p>(00:41:00) – Getting a book down to one sentence</p><p>(00:46:21) – All the material that never made it into the books</p><p>(00:52:59) – Loneliness</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.dwarkesh.com?utm_medium=podcast&utm_campaign=CTA_1">www.dwarkesh.com</a>
[Source](https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/222791845/56a1d43c065b8f432a85b78b449d6b1f.mp3)
Source quotes
[41:00] Robert Caro: 在动笔之前,我必须强迫自己回答:这本书到底关于什么?你必须把它浓缩成一句话。
[17:57] Robert Caro: 无论你对摩西的所作所为持何种看法,目睹一个曾经权倾天下的人失去权力,你都会由衷地感受到那种深沉的凄凉。
[36:08] Robert Caro: 我们能拥有这些民权法案与反贫困法案,若没有林登·约翰逊是根本不可能实现的。
Original transcript
[0:00] If you do everything... You'll win. That is the maxim by which Lyndon Johnson lived his life. My guest today is Robert Caro. And over the 50 years that he has spent writing about Lyndon Johnson, he has lived in the edges of the Texas Hill Country to understand the poverty and loneliness of Johnson's youth. He has sifted through millions of documents in the Senate and presidential libraries of the entire nation. And he has chased down for interviews the former goon who helped Johnson steal an election to the chauffeur who drove him on his first desperate campaign. In other words, My guest today is a man who understands Johnson's aphorism. If you do everything. You'll win. Mr. Carrot, it is such a huge honor to have you on the show. It's great to be here. So my first question is, is just this that I hinted in the introduction. How much do you... see yourself represented. in Johnson or in Moses. It's part of the reason you're able to write so compellingly about them, that you share some of their qualities. Well, Let me say first, I think I hope they are qualities that I don't share in both these stories. Among other things, they are so... I'll use the word ruthless, you know. You say they do anything to win. That's part of their... of greatness. You know, I remember when I started learning about Robert Moses, I went to the LaGuardia papers. which were in a They were kept in the boat basin. They were stored by the municipal archives. Literally in the 79th Street boat basin on the Hudson River, three levels down, there were this row of file cabinets, you know, against the wall. So I'm sitting there day after day going through these documents. And occasionally I'd come across a note that Robert Moses wrote. I realized... I'm following the same path he was. So that's... Fascinating, actually. Well, obviously, not all the qualities. But the quality I'm referring to here is that Just like Johnson, or just like Moses, You refuse to take no for an answer. If somebody says I won't give you an interview. You don't stop there. You refuse to leave a stone unturned. And so there is a relentlessness. that you share with these subjects. I'm going to take that as a compliment. Yes. Well, you feel... There are certain people... that you have to interview And if they don't want to give you an interview, you can't, I feel. You can't say no. Like... You say Lyndon Johnson's first secretary. the one who rode in the car with him. on the campaigns. I said, there's no other human being on earth who knows what Lyndon Johnson is doing all these hours driving back and forth across Texas. I don't know what I have to do, but I have to get him to tell me honestly about this thing or something. So, This raises another question that I wanted to ask you, which is, you're interviewing all these people and in many cases, They know... They must know that it's not good for them to tell you what you want to know. In many cases, they tell you Anyways. How do you get people to tell you things that they know they shouldn't tell you? You ask terrific questions. Sometimes you're sitting there... And you know this person doesn't want to talk to you about what you... want to get... Like John Connolly on how Johnson used money to get political power. And I'm thinking, but I've been through the notes. Connolly collected the money and gave it out at Johnson's instructions. So he's the only guy who can tell me how Johnson... did this, you know, how he judged who to give money to. Sometimes Johnson would write on a request for money. If the guy asked for $1,500, Johnson would write, okay, $1,500. Sometimes he'd write it. 500. Sometimes he'd write No. But sometimes he'd write, No, never. And I asked Connolly... What does that mean? He said, This guy was never going to get money from Lyndon Johnson. So then when you ask why... he felt this way about this particular congressman, that's when they really...
[5:00] fascinating stories emerge. Before we get more into Johnson, I want to first start with Moses. Sure. So, In the last... decade or two People have been complaining. that it's become too hard and too difficult to build things. Yes. Especially for the government to build things. Yes. So if you look at the Second Avenue subway, They've been building it for around 50 years. They've opened up a mile and a half. It costs more than $4 billion. And people have been saying... We were concerned, The Power Broker came out. It was an immensely influential book. And we were concerned about so much power being centralized. and given, delegated to one person so they could build. And we wanted to prevent that, and so we made environmental review and land use review and community boards and litigation. And people say... We've overcorrected. We've gone too far in the other direction. What do you think of that? They also say, because of all these safeguards, Robert Moses could not operate in the same way today. But the fact is, when Robert Moses started, there were also safeguards. People were also saying, you can't build anything. This was in the 1920s. The people were saying government can't build anything. There are too many blocks there. Nothing's getting built. We need highways. It's the age of cars. Everyone's getting automobiles. But we have the same old roads, and nobody can build them because the property owners don't want the roads built through their land. Robert Moses comes along, and all of a sudden, those things vanish because he, despite all the safeguards and everything else, he just builds. the power broker, it was just fascinating to me to see how he gets around everything. But it doesn't matter what it is, he's going to build a beach at Jones Beach. He sees it one day, he says, this is the greatest beach I've ever seen. It's only 27 miles from New York City. If I can build a road out here, I will give the people of New York City this great beach. But it seems impossible to build that road because the property owners don't want the road going through their buildings. forms and property. But he basically says, I'm going to build it. And to watch him do it, to overcome each obstacle, there's so many. And then all of a sudden, it's open. And you have Jones Beach and you have it accessible to New York. It's an act of political genius. And it's also an act of will. that I'm going to do it. That's fascinating to learn about. Mm. And so you think today... If there was a Moses-type figure, they would figure out a way to work around Everything that's been set up. Well, yes. Till there. um, is When Moses was building, they were saying the same thing. Nobody's ever going to build it. We need roads for the automobiles, but they'd have to go through hundreds, dozens of farms, scores of property. No one's ever going to be able to do it. but he comes along and doesn't. So today, Someone would come along and do it. this I think is a Profound question. for democracies which is How do we end up in a place... which is not the extremes of 50s or 60s Moses. but not also where we are now. So where I live in California, We've spent, I don't know, $15 billion over the last decade And we haven't gotten a single new line. or a single new mile of railway that those $15 billion have spent a bill. Whereas... A different system, you could say China today is like New York City in the 40s and 50s, where they have a very Moses-type attitude, and they put up tens of thousands of miles of railways over the last 10, 20 years. But of course, at the cost of similar amounts of displacements of people, and recklessness. So how do we land in a good spot. between either extreme i'm not sure there is a good spot hmm Um, What you just said is the situation. To build anything on a large scale, Um, you're confronted with dozens or scores or
[10:00] perhaps hundreds of property owners who don't want it built there. So the question is, how does anything get built? Then someone comes along. and can do it. All right. Now, when Moses, when Robert Moses started, It seemed impossible, actually impossible, to build roads out into Long Island, because a road would have to cross scores of properties. Most of which the people didn't want the road coming and had the power to stop them then because he didn't have the power of eminent domain then. But Moses said basically... I'm going to build it. And he would find a way... to overcome each difficulty. Now you say... What am I trying to say by that? trying to say that Every once in a while, someone comes along. who's sort of a genius, if that's the right word, at getting big things built for the public. Decades may pass when there's no one like that. And you say everything's stalled, nothing big is ever going to be built again. And then someone suddenly comes along. And all of a sudden, Things get built. That's the nature of political genius. I happen to be writing about two guys, Lyndon Johnson and Robert Moses, who in both cases, Johnson with civil rights and Moses with public works, where people were saying you can't do this and can't, but they didn't. But they did it. Correct me if I'm putting words in your mouth. But... If I... may attempt an interpretation. Of what you said? Yes. It sounds like you think we... Need a little Moses today. Oh A great insight. I sometimes wonder about Just what you said. Okay. And the answer is... Well, I certainly don't want Someone who's ruthless... and disregarding public opinion. as a Robert Moses... But at the same time, you need someone... who's going to find a way to get things built. And he's going to have to find a way despite the fact... that so many people don't want it built. A lot of people who haven't read the book have this impression that you think everything Moses did was bad. and that we need to make sure that we can never have a Moses again. And so it's interesting to hear you say, that we need a little Moses again. Well, when people say to me everything was bad that he did, what I say is you didn't read the book, because certainly the first parts of the book. Well, hundreds of pages are about a young idealist who sees this great need for recreation, for beaches on Long Island, for the city people. And it's going to get away from to make them accessible to people in the city. You say, and it's an act of genius and willpower, the way he does it. And that's great. Now, Does it become... Does it? evolve. into where Moses listens to nobody, and the only thing that matters is, is what he wants to get built. It does evolve into that. He does change. But the young Moses, the idealist, who before he's building is an expert in civil service, technicalities of civil service and devotes all his energies to trying to reform the civil service and make it that people get promoted on merit instead of political pull. And he works so hard in that. You see a real idealism. And you see an idealism in his early works, you know, when you say, I want to make these beaches accessible to New York. Now, does that evolve into where... I think there ought to be a highway here. No matter what anybody says, no matter how many thousands of people are in the way, like the crosswalks, I'll evict them. It does. He changes. That to me... is the story of the A big part of the story of the power
[15:00] broker. guy who's In the beginning, a young idealistic guy who wants to build... to make lives better for people, to give them access to the ocean, beaches and all, changes into someone who just wants to build because he thinks something should be built, no matter what anyone else says, and is going to do it no matter how many thousands of, Hundreds, thousands of people have to evict, no matter how bad an idea it is, like the Cross Bronx Expressway. People are telling him not to do that before he does it. The minute this road opens, it's the world's longest traffic jam. Not thousands, but tens of thousands of people were evicted, thrown out of their homes by him without any... relocation provisions. So you say... In a way... It's a story of how do you... Give somebody... Power. without the power in a way... I don't want to use the word corrupting him. but hardening him... to anyone who opposes him, to any opposition. Coding agents work best when they get fast, detailed feedback. My sponsor, Antithesis, gives your agents some of the richest feedback there is by running every change they make through thousands of hostile simulations. This usually isn't feasible. Simulation testing is hard. It normally requires rebuilding your software around a fake networking clock, among other things. So most teams don't bother. Even if they do, getting enough coverage typically takes hours. So they run these simulations overnight. day's changes are jumbled together, and it's harder for the agents to tell which PR broke something. Antithesis solves both problems. It runs your software inside a fully deterministic simulated computer, so you don't have to rebuild anything yourself. And it explores fast enough that you can test every PR. On a recent project, it packed 15 hours of simulation testing into each 15-minute run. That speed comes from both parallelism and branching. Because it's deterministic, it can save that exact moment and branch off hundreds of different futures. It never wastes time replaying events, hoping to stumble across that state again. And it doesn't just explore randomly. Antithesis systematically injects faults and tweaks your system in the ways most likely to break. So every minute in Antithesis is one of the unluckiest hours your software will ever experience. Learn more at antithesis.com slash Dwarakash. Thank you. Thank you. You're writing the book. You start writing it in 66, 67. Yes. You're writing it While Moses... is losing power. His career is not over yet. Yes. And so the story changes. Yes. While you're writing it. Yes. And I don't know if you've talked about that, but presumably the conclusion changes because. Yes. You don't know whether he's going to lose that power or not. No. And I watch. Oh, that's a great question. And I watched that happen. And I'm a young I'm whenever I was young. I was young. And whatever my age was, I didn't really know what I was doing. And I watched him lose power. And I learned enough about him. to know how fair this was going to be. Um... If I could think a moment, there's a moment that this happened. Yo. Thank you. His office was still up at the Troyborough Bridge Authority. When he was in power... I interviewed him in that office several times. You felt his power. You felt outside. There were all these people waiting for his decisions, sitting around waiting for his decisions. As soon as I finished, the secretary would come in with a list of telephone calls of people who had called asking for, you know, wanting something from him while I was talking to him. Right. Right. By the time I finished... I remember I realized I had one long interview with him. Maybe it was my last one. And I realized that there had been no calls the secretary had nothing to tell him So whatever you thought of Moses, you felt the poignance of, of someone losing
[20:00] Power. Yeah. That's fascinating. That's what I was wondering about. Yeah. You couldn't help feeling sales for him. No matter, even though you knew... what he had done. You couldn't help feeling... Oh, this is... In a way tragic. That no one's calling and asking him for a favor anymore. Yeah. you Did he realize that was happening? I don't think he really... I don't think... In a way, I'm sure he did. Thank you. But by that time, he was so, remember, he was so insulated. He was so, whatever his age was, he was up in the 80s. He was deaf, you know. Um, He still had, at the Triborough headquarters on Randall's Island, were all these Moses men who were loyal to him and treated him with the same deference they always had. He knew he wasn't getting his projects done, but he felt, I know he felt he was just going to keep pushing like he always did, and he was going to win again. So the answer to the question is no, I don't think he did ever realize that. That's fascinating. Yeah. In... I think 62, as you say. Mm-hmm. He... Tries to pull a trick on Nelson Rockefeller that he had pulled on countless previous mayors and governors, which is to threaten to resign. If he didn't get his way. Yes. Yes. And Rockefeller, says, I regretfully accept. And nothing happens. And that made me wonder as I was reading it. Could all of those previous governors and mayors... who are getting threatened, have done the same thing? Great, great question. Yeah, the answer is yes. Well, you say, could they have done the same thing? So the first part... The answer is yes, they had the power to fire him. He wasn't an elected official. Thank you. But... They couldn't, there wasn't really a possibility. The answer to the question at the bottom is, no, they couldn't, because he was simply too popular. you know, you could fire Robert Moses, you know, that was That's like firing... some idol person who was the idol of New York. But in addition, He had, with his genius, he had created in all his different ways, posts. Chairman of the State Power Authority, Chairman of the Tri-Rural Bridge Authority, Parks Commissioner, Long Island Parks Commissioner, Jones Beach Commissioner. He had created such an interlocking, you couldn't fire him from everything, because the terms ended in different ways, and some you didn't have the power to fire him from, that he had really made it impossible. Well, Almost impossible because at the end If you wanted to do it, Rockefeller did it. I'm not. But by that time, cracks had appeared in the armor, I think, for... decades, the answer to your question is decades. You couldn't do it. But then as he got older, crocs appeared in the armor... And you could, if you if you wanted to brave criticism in all the newspapers and public criticism and everything else, you probably could have done. Hmm. Good question. which leads into the next question I want to ask you. So you interviewed him seven times. And the seventh time you mentioned... Your awareness. of a donation that was made to his commission by a millionaire whose golf course was spared by the new route for his parkway. And after that, he didn't talk to you again. Yes. If you had gotten an eighth interview with Robert Moses, What is the one question you would most want to ask him? Oh, God, what a great... Great question. Well, you know, off the top of my head... I think if I only had one question to ask him, So I think I'd ask him
[25:00] Did you realize you were changing? Mm-hmm. That's a great question you asked. uh, But that's the answer I'll give for now. That's all I, that's, that's something I always wanted, would like to have a yesterday, you know. Do you think you realized? that he was changing? No. I think he felt from the beginning that he had this vision for building roads here and their parks here. - Right. That was the best thing to do. And it was going to get done and it should get done. No matter how many hardships he had to inflict on people, no matter how many thousands he had to evict, no matter what he had to do, he was going to get the roads built. And you see this increasing... ruthlessness, this utter ruthlessness of him. If someone stood in his way, he was going to find a way to remove that person as an obstacle. I mean, I'll give you an example of that if you want. There's a a politician in the Bronx named Henry Epstein. Henry Epstein is opposing the Cross Bronx Expressway. He's saying to Robert Moses, you're putting it right through a neighborhood where you have to evict tens of thousands of people. You can just move it two blocks to the south and you only have to evict a couple of hundred people. Moses sets out to destroy Epstein and basically Thank you. If he can find a weakness in somebody, that he has a mistress, that he's taking money or something, he'll use it. He'll use whatever he has to to get things done. He learns that In my opinion, by failing to get things done when he's very young. He has things that he wants to get done, And they don't get them. Yeah. And the awareness comes on him, and we can see it in the book. or in my learning about him, I try to show how he learns that he has to find ways weaknesses in people. He has to use it. If he has a weakness, he's going to use it. He's going to get things done. There's a hard line. And increase... ruthlessness. We're the only thing that matters... is to get the thing done. Anyone who stands in his way, if Moses has to destroy him, He'll destroy them. As you say... You're writing not the history of one man, but of an era. in America. And One of the most interesting things about The power broker... is... especially in the period in which he's able to accomplish so much so quickly What's happening, and you talk about this, is Thank you. The Great Depression, He's hiring thousands of architects, tens of thousands of linemen for pennies on the dollar to do big public works for the city. And so I wonder how big... a part of Moses's early achievements. It's just that The government... Because of the Great Depression... could compete. with the private sector, for The top talent. and for lots and lots of labor, working 24-7 through the winter, moving fast. Yes, and the answer to your question is, that played a big role, because like... He needed architects for something. I don't remember what it is. It's in the power broker. And they lined up on Fifth Avenue thousands of out-of-work architects, you know, that he could hire. for very low wages, but more than the wages, they were available, you know, because... They didn't have anything to do. He was able to hire so many people. and hire and fire them in a ruthless way, you know, making the workmen work hard. You know, he could just fire them. It was the Depression. They didn't have other jobs to go to. I think that was He used that, yes. So, As somebody who has... studied urban development so deeply. Here is one thing. I'm curious about it.
[30:00] Look at the things that were built. At the beginning of the last century. before the beginning of the last century. Grand Central Station and all the beautiful architecture in New York versus the things that are built... In the second half of the century, They look a lot less beautiful. Yeah. And the earlier, more beautiful things were built by a much poorer country. Yeah. Yeah. What changed? Why were you able to build more beautiful things before? Well, one thing that changed is you had all these out-of-work artisans who could... We'll just say carve stonework on buildings. Like my apartment is on the 15th floor of an apartment house. uh... across the street is a building... That's 15 stores or 16 stores high. And you say, look at all the beautiful carving that's done in the stonework of that building up on the roof. I said, the only person who can see it is the people in my apartment and the people in the apartment next to someone, someone. was willing to spend that money because the builders who built that could hire skilled people at such low wages, that they could... Make them... do the decorations to make a building beautiful up on floors that nobody is going to see them, because people came cheap. If you want your agents to do real work, they need to be able to use the tools that your company runs on. Things like email or Slack or Stripe. But giving them unfettered access is risky because they can send confidential information to a customer or refund a bunch of payments that they shouldn't have. Of course, you could just review every request manually, but that doesn't typically last. That's why my sponsor, WorkOS, built Airlock. It's a judgment layer that sits between your agents and your tools. request to Airlock, which evaluates it against your company's policies and decides whether to allow it, block it, or escalate it to a human. Whenever a request is allowed, Airlock takes the relevant action for the agent, hitting the necessary endpoints and passing along the response. That way, your agents never see your API keys, and so they can't leak them or use them for unauthorized purposes. Since Airlock holds the keys to all your tools, it has to be rock solid. decade building auth and permissions products, and they're battle-tested. More than 3,000 companies rely on WorkOS, including OpenAI and Anthropic. Airlock is an early access. If you're interested, go to workos.com slash airlock. I want to ask you about Johnson now. Okay. Mass of the Senate. You make... Two points about how Johnson is effective, or at least this is the way I read it. One is that He is very persuasive. If you're talking to him. Yes. The other is... He's put himself in a position... of leverage. such that he has things to promise you or things to threaten you with. So it's not that he's convinced you of anything. but you know that you need his favor. If you want to be successful. Exactly. And of the two... I'm curious which was really the source of his power. his leverage or his persuasion? Behind his persuasion, was the power. When you were talking to him, if he asked something of you, you knew he had the power behind him to give you or deny you things that you wanted. Say he's asking a senator something for a vote on a specific issue. The senator might not agree with him, might not want to give him the vote, but he would know he wants a committee assignment. Johnson has the power to give him that or not. Or he would know he wants a specific law, and Johnson has the power to get that law passed or not. everything, when Johnson is talking to you and he puts his arm around you and he leans into you, it's not just the force of his personality that he's bringing to bear on you. Behind that personality, you know he has the power to do things to you or for you. That you better be aware of. means of ascent The book about the election... With Coke Stevenson. The 1948 Senate election. Yes. That is my favorite book ever. Perhaps ever. And you paint such a compelling... Portrait. of this, um, person, Coke Stevenson, you know, governor of Texas, they called him a
[35:00] Texas. Yes. As you were writing his profile, and writing this book. Did part of you wish that he had won the Senate election? you couldn't help And that's, you couldn't help Well, I'll answer you directly. The answer is yes. I think Koch Stevenson, although he was an idealist, He knew how to get things done. When he was governor of Texas, he really accomplished things, okay? I think if he went to the Senate, he would have been a great senator and accomplished things. So you wish that he had... on One. you feel the tragedy, that he lost. because of the way he lost, you know. The things about Koch-Stevens, and he really didn't realize someone could do all the things To him. And in the election that Lyndon Johnson did, he didn't come to grips with that. Suppose that Kennedy wins in 60. But Johnson... refuses the vice presidency. So he's still a majority leader. How different do you think... The Bills... that Kennedy would pass under Johnson's majority leader would be from... the laws that Johnson is president. was eventually able to pass. That is to say, the things that happened in 64 and 63 and 65, Would they have just happened earlier? No. because Kennedy did not have the overriding desire to change America We see, though, that John Kennedy was... Utterly charming. He was a good president. He was good in foreign policy, where Johnson certainly was not. Okay. But what he did not have... was this to vision, desire. To change America. that Lyndon Johnson had. Lyndon Johnson comes back from his year teaching the poor kids in Ketula, determined could change the education system. to help poor people more. to do all these other things to help poor. poor people. That determination is something that's really unique. It's what made him domestically such a great president, that we have all these civil rights laws, these anti-poverty laws, that we wouldn't have had without Lyndon Johnson. His presidency ends in tragedy because of foreign policy, because of Vietnam. But he has this... this ideal, this desire to get things done... to help... people in America That's almost unique. You say... He's, gee, he's determined to do this, you know. He's going to find a way to do it. You watch him doing it. Then you say, he was doing it. When he... his attention turns to Vietnam And everything falls apart. And he makes it, that's all he... his presidency is ruined. The things he started out to do domestically don't get done in the way he would have done them. But he starts out after the election with the education laws, with the anti-poverty bills to change the country. And he's on his way to doing it. That's the great tragedy of Johnson in Vietnam. If I can ask about that, And it's OK if you don't want to talk about this because it's in the next book. But if you're willing to talk about it, fundamentally, Why did Johnson... keep escalating even when oh you know the answer to your question is i'm still trying to figure that out right now so i'm not gonna that's fine that's fine Because that's quite a miss for it, you know. Okay. One of the things that's true of both Johnson and Moses... Is this... inexhaustible energy working 16 hours a day sometimes even more than that. And I wonder how much you think that is... The fact that they had a different constitution, that they were just... had different reserves of energy? Or do you think it was just their will was so strong? I think it's just their will. Yeah.
[40:00] I mean A lot of people have their energy. You know, when you see... Robert Moses. sleeping very little. Showing. that he'd do anything to get... his way to get things done. Being tired or something doesn't even seem to figure in. into the equation. Sometimes I'm looking at, you know, I can't remember one off the top of my head, and you say he's making this call, and Johnson's making this call at two and three o'clock in the morning. He's up making these calls to get his way. In fact, there's a funny anecdote. One Senator Johnson calls him at 5 a.m. to ask him for his vote on something, and the senator says, Oh, Lyndon, I was just lying here waiting for your call. so it's their will um I want to ask you a little bit about... Writing biography now. Okay. One question I have is you spend five years... 10 years writing a single book, And... Through that process, Maybe your editor... and your wife are the only people who have seen... The manuscript. So, How do you make sure you're on the right track? Because You know, you had to wait so long from when you start to when you get public feedback. How do you make sure that Everything's going to hang together. and you're pursuing... the message that way you want to. Well, part of your question is how do you be sure you're on the right track? The answer to that is you're not. Okay. But how do you try to stay on the right track? I do have a device for that. Mm-hmm. Before I start a book, I learned this the hard way with the power broker because I didn't do it with the power broker. Thank you. Before I start a book, I think through... what I want the book to be. The whole book. People say, you mean you think it through to the end? Well, the answer is yes. And then you say, well, what is this... book about. I said that that's sometimes for a long time before I start right when I'm thinking about the book, just asking myself in one way or another, What is this book about? You've got to get it down to one sentence. You say, well, you can't get it down to one sentence. Then you say, yeah, but Bob, you learned you better get it down to one sentence. Or three years from now, you're going to be writing and you're going to be saying, what am I trying to do? So before I start a book, I try to get it down to I send a sentence or at most a paragraph and say, really, what is this book about? And I try to make everything hang together around that point. Back in August, my sponsor, Jane Street, released the design files for a mystery chip and challenged my audience to figure out its true purpose. The challenge is over, and Jane Street has released a blog post highlighting some of their favorite submissions. They also reveal the ASIC's purpose. I won't spoil it here, but if you're curious, I've linked to it in the show notes. Anish, who helped design the puzzle, walked me through some of the best write-ups. I think my favorite submission was probably this We started by showing in 3D how a chip is made from standard cells, how all of the metal layers fit together to actually comprise the logic of the chip, and then showed each component of our puzzle design, what it does, and how they reverse engineered it before then showing how it all fits back together into the puzzle. Don't worry if you missed this challenge. There's a new one live right now. And as a bonus, we're going to pay to fabricate our favorite submissions and you'll actually get your chip back mounted on a board ready for you to test in real life. The competition is open till January 18th. Go to Janestreet.com slash Larkash to get started. A lot of your books you've written before... We had... digital archives at the internet. and all the resources that made available. How much of a difference... have those resources made. Well, they're making a big difference right now. In the book I'm doing now, I'm writing about Vietnam. Um, Let's say I want to do a battle. I want to write in detail. Well, this just happened. I want to write about it.
[45:00] I picked a battle that I wanted to do in detail. It's called the Battle of the Yadrang Valley. Nobody's written about it in detail. But I could go to my computer And I could look up where are the oral histories from soldiers who fought in that battle. And you just what colleges... or the oral histories at, what documents are available, in a way you couldn't do it before. Do you think it would have made a big difference when you were writing... The earlier volumes? No. Well, it might have made things faster, but it wouldn't just the way I am. I would look at the documents anyway. Things would go faster now. But I think about what you just asked. I was thinking about it the other day. And it's difficult for me to explain it. But I don't think it would have gone any faster. I can't quite tell you why. But, um... Certainly you could find the documents faster. But finding them is a small thing compared to reading them, you know. A question just occurs to me, and I'm curious to get your answer. If... If we were able to time travel... Back to 75%. And I could tell... Robert Caro then. that This new three volumes... on Lyndon Johnson he's about to embark on. will take more than 40 years. How do you think 40-something-year-old Robert Curo would have reacted to that? Would he have been happy? Would he have been afraid? Yes, terrific questions. Thank you. *sigh* Well, You know, the realization came to me when I was thinking about it. Johnson. You know, the power, I'll give you a long answer, but this is the accurate answer. I had to cut so much out of the power broker. And I cut out I So much stuff that shouldn't have been cut out. that I didn't like I gave Bob Gottlieb my editor a manuscript that it was 1,050,000 words long and the most they could fit in, and he really worked at those things. into one volume, because I was determined to It will only be one volume. ...were 700 pages... or about 700,000 words. Instead of 1,050,000 words, which meant we had to cut 350,000 words. And he has said, I cut a lot of the "'Best stuff I ever read.' Thank you. And I felt a lot of the stuff... that I cut out. It's tragic that no one knows it. To this day, people, they ask me about things. I said, oh, I wrote that. And then they said, well, no one ever read it. But the way I am, I don't know that I would have changed anything. Because as I'm writing the book, I'm saying, oh, this is too long. This is going to be too long. I'm going to have to cut so much. But I... don't seem to have the ability not to write the stuff that I think should be written, even though I know... So much of it is going to have to be cut. Was Viking a wretch? You have... In the other room here, Cabinets and Cabinets. of notes on interviews. notes as you're working, things which have never been published before. Eventually, historians, other historians will be able to study those notes and those documents that you have compiled over your career. Yes. What is it that you hope... they do with it what is what is it that you hope what kind of scholarship do you hope uh You know, I cut out so much stuff from the books that I wish people knew, okay? I mean, sometimes you're reading something And you're saying, oh, if I had written about that, the newspapers wouldn't be covering it the same way. There'll be a different understanding of it. I'll give you an easy example. Sam Rayburn. Now, I have a brief chapter on Rayburn in my books, but Rayburn is a great figure in my book.
[50:00] American history. There's no good biography of Sam Rayburn, yet he controlled, he ran the House of Representatives, he passed so many of Roosevelt's bills and... other bills. He did so much for America that it's a tragedy for me that nobody knows it. And the material to know it. is in those cabinets, okay? And there's a lot, there happen to be a lot of examples of things. I said, well, that didn't make your stuff into the books, but they're there. Like I have hundreds of interviews, you know? I think I have 700 interviews for the power broker alone. The notes for those interviews are in the file canvas, detailed, you know, the detailed typed up notes. So the material... There... There's a lot there that I think would... how people understand How New York Evolved the Way It Did. And with Johnson, a lot of Well, I'm writing about it now. Things that happened under his presidency... There's more understanding of it and it's not going to make its way into my books. But they're going to be there. That's why I gave my archive. to the New York Historical Society. Now, I have to say, I was offered a lot more money by other places, okay? I took a lot less money, a great deal less money. an amount that mattered a lot to me. Because I wanted them to be easily accessible. I wanted them to be in New York You know, I didn't want him to be at the University of Texas where you have to fly, you know. fly down there. I wanted to be in New York. The material is there For a lot of stuff... that I never got to put in my books. But it's there if somebody wants it. I'll give you an example. I wrote so much more, and I interviewed so many senators, so many assistants to senators to try and write about the Senate. And then I had to cut out or not write and even go into it. The Vegas. I don't want to say 90%, but I don't really know a percent of what I learned is not in the books, but they are in the file cabinets. So they are there for someone to look at. That's why my archives are in New York. It's great to know that that research will pay dividends. Well, how many generations of scholars? Because obviously it will not be possible to interview The folks you interviewed. In the 70s and 80s and 60s again. Yes. This makes me wonder... In order to paint... picture of the era that you're writing about and the eras which shaped Moses and Johnson. You talk about in the power broker, the the Gold Coast in New York and the tenements and The Johnson biographies, you talk about what the hill country was like when the frontier was being settled. Yes. Yes. And One thing that's interesting is that even if Johnson had not become president, It would still be fascinating. the story of what was happening in the Hill Country. And it's an odd thought, but it makes me wonder if You could spend 10 years or 20 years writing the biography of a totally ordinary person. Because in doing so, you'd still... a lot of what was true about Johnson would have still been fascinating. Even if his career didn't end up where it did. Well, the example that you give, what was the Hill Country like? You know, we see all these Western movies and all. But when I started to learn about the people who settled Johnson City, Lyndon Johnson's ancestors. but only the generation before him. or most two generations before me say... God, is this fascinating? What it was like? What was it like? I mean, I wanted to do this book. What was it like? to take your family. and move them to the frontier, to move them on one level to Indian country, where you might Thanks. Find your family massacred one day. And if even with all these other difficulties and all. Well, that's sort of in my books because in my notes, because when I was talking to people, they would talk about their grandkids.
[55:00] Fathers or what their grandfathers told them, you know, and when I'm talking to them about Johnson, I'm learning all about what life was like in that era. What an amazing, amazing story this is. And you say, well, there's a lot of books on it. I happen to think they're not enough. What's also so amazing is... Just how different of a country... You think about Johnson growing up in Johnson City. in this tiny little lonely town, and even then being... on a ranch that is tens of miles away from the city, versus America in the 60s. It's such a different place. Yeah. And I wonder if Johnson ever felt some shock of... how different his upbringing was. From the... country he was leading. Oh, the answer is yes. He was very aware... OF THE FRONTIER of what his grandfather, you know, the land, what it was like. See, when he grew up in Johnson City, in the outskirts on the Johnson Ranch, which after all was 18 miles beyond Johnson City, what it was like to grow up on a ranch like that. In so many ways, it was different than it formed your character. in a different way. Loneliness is a big deal. I wrote a... and And then I had to cut it down to like three pages on his mother. on how lonely she was, what it was like for people to settle their farms and ranches where there was nobody around you. I think I have a line where, you know, she could walk out in the afternoon, walk up on a hill, and there was nothing to see but more hills. And there were no other houses near there. I myself was shocked. Sometimes you would go to see, to interview people, And I was trying to interview everybody who grew up with Lyndon Johnson, so they were elderly people, okay? So you'd call an elderly woman. And she'd say... you go You drive out of Austin. of 22 miles and you'll come to look on your left you'll find a cattle course cattle guard you turn 22 miles to more farm. And you say... I drove 22 miles. I didn't pass another house. I didn't pass another person. And this woman is living there all her life. So I don't think, with all the wonderful books that have been written... I'm not sure that America understands the heroism of just being lonely, forgetting Indians and radians, just being the loneliness of what life was like for these people. So I want to close... on that, on loneliness, because... Obviously, you're not living in a ranch in the middle of nowhere. You're living in New York City. But You and Ina have... together basically been working alone Um, for... So long. How has loneliness... affected your work. and also your life. Oh, great question. Well, a lot. Let me... Think how I can say this. Thank you. Well, you know, I come here in the morning. I turn off my telephone. Um... I'm not going to talk to anybody all day. I'm a friendly guy. sometimes at very factors Hard, as a matter of fact. You know, you'd like to pick up the phone and chat with somebody. But you say I'm concentrating on the book. You know, I can't do that. It's going to break the concentration, you know. Well, that sounds like such a phony thing.
[60:00] But you say, I can't really do that. I'm trying to think about this other thing. And I think it's impacted my entire life. you know, people don't Some people understand. But some people don't understand that you don't call them back. You know, I mean, if people call me, I'm not going to call them back till the end of the day. So I have friends who understand that. But a lot of people don't understand that. Um... So that's a fact of my life. Robert Caro? I can't tell you how much of an honor it's been for six years that I've had this podcast. People will ask me, you know, who is the person you most want to have on? that you haven't had on the podcast and every single time i've said robert carrow oh and so it's a huge huge honor Thank you so much for doing this. It was a terrific interview. Thank you very much.