币安运维电脑遭渗透引发数十亿美元盗案 Tether与Circle紧急冻结30亿

【Andrei Jikh】币安被盗63亿美元?你的加密资产还安全吗? — 浑水摸鱼清源

浑水摸鱼清源

这起系统性盗窃不仅暴露存放在交易所的加密资产本质只是平台借条,更凸显中心化机构随时冻结资金的权力风险,唯有依靠多重签名与离线冷钱包自托管才能真正规避单点暴雷。

AI-assisted summary of 【Andrei Jikh】币安被盗63亿美元?你的加密资产还安全吗? — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • 币安遭遇历史级黑客袭击,总受影响资产规模达约 63 亿美元,涵盖 ETH、BTC、Tron 及数十种代币,Tether 与 Circle 随后火速冻结了约 30 亿美元链上涉案资产。 (0:00)
  • 黑客并未破解金库私钥,而是入侵了一名币安 DevOps 工程师的笔记本电脑,渗透内部微服务并利用提现许可机制成功扫荡热钱包资产。 (7:03)
  • 扣除稳定币冻结部分后,币安预计实际净损失接近 10 亿美元;前 CEO 赵长鹏承诺平台将全额承担损失,价值约 12 亿美元的 SAFU 基金理论上可提供兜底支撑。 (12:05)
  • 稳定币发行方极速冻结 24 亿美元展现了中心化裁决能力,但也暴露了中心化机构随时能掌控用户资产的“双刃剑”风险,投资者被敦促使用多签名或官方直购硬件钱包自托管。 (15:08)

Detailed notes

## Background 本视频由B站UP主“浑水摸鱼清源”于2026年11月1日发布,搬运并译制了海外博主Andrei Jikh的分析内容。视频简介指出,全球最大的加密货币交易所币安遭遇高达63亿美元的史无前例黑客盗窃,内容围绕黑客攻击手法、幕后朝鲜黑客嫌疑、币安应对措施以及普通投资者如何保障加密资产安全展开。

## TL;DR 视频详细复盘了币安遭遇的63亿美元巨额黑客洗劫案,披露黑客并非直接窃取底层主私钥,而是通过入侵一名DevOps工程师的笔记本电脑,渗透内部微服务并批量生成50份提现许可,最终命中实时票号卷走热钱包资产。尽管Tether与Circle紧急冻结了约30亿美元使币安净损失降至约10亿美元,且币安凭借庞大资产储备与SAFU基金承诺全额兜底,该事件依然揭示了中心化交易所将资产变为“借条”(IOU)的系统性风险。同时,稳定币发行方一键冻结资金的能力展现了中心化控制的双刃剑本质,Andrei Jikh据此呼吁普通散户警惕钓鱼诈骗与供应链篡改风险,大额资产应优先采用多重签名或官方直购的硬件钱包进行自托管。

## Atmosphere & style 整期视频充满紧迫感与危机警示氛围,开篇便以主流币暴跌与数十亿美元蒸发的严峻现实紧紧抓住观众注意力。Andrei Jikh延续了其清晰生动的财经科普风格,用“DMV排队票号”等生活化比喻将复杂的链上智能合约漏洞讲解得通俗易懂,同时穿插个人在倒闭小交易所损失10多枚比特币的惨痛教训,使叙事极具警示力与说服力。随着话题从攻击细节抽丝剥茧延伸到机构集中化、稳定币中心化冻结权乃至朝鲜国家级黑客的阴影,全片情绪由最初的震撼恐慌逐步转变为冷静理性的防御指引,给加密投资者带来了一记沉重而清醒的安全警钟。

## Bulletin - [00:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=0s) 币安遭遇历史级黑客袭击,总受影响资产规模达约 63 亿美元,涵盖 ETH、BTC、Tron 及数十种代币,Tether 与 Circle 随后火速冻结了约 30 亿美元链上涉案资产。 - [07:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=423s) 黑客并未破解金库私钥,而是入侵了一名币安 DevOps 工程师的笔记本电脑,渗透内部微服务并利用提现许可机制成功扫荡热钱包资产。 - [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) 扣除稳定币冻结部分后,币安预计实际净损失接近 10 亿美元;前 CEO 赵长鹏承诺平台将全额承担损失,价值约 12 亿美元的 SAFU 基金理论上可提供兜底支撑。 - [15:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=908s) 稳定币发行方极速冻结 24 亿美元展现了中心化裁决能力,但也暴露了中心化机构随时能掌控用户资产的“双刃剑”风险,投资者被敦促使用多签名或官方直购硬件钱包自托管。

## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=0s) 币安发生涉案总额高达约 63 亿美元的黑客攻击事件,引发加密货币市场剧烈震荡并导致平台全面暂停提现。 - [02:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=123s) 本次被盗目标为高频流动的 Binance 14 热钱包,而存放交易所绝大部分资产的离线冷钱包并未受损。 - [02:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=123s) 黑客利用混币器 Tornado Cash 斩断资金来源,并设计自动化清算机器人以实现瞬间全额扫荡。 - [02:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=123s) 攻击利用了以太坊提现许可机制,黑客批量提交了 50 份不同排队票号的授权签名,仅凭 1 份命中便接管了热钱包权限。 - [05:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=300s) 黑客仅花费 93 美分矿工费便单次卷走价值 25 亿美元的资产,并恶意留下 1 枚 ETH 诱骗币安后台自动补仓系统持续输送资金。 - [07:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=423s) 调查证实本次攻击源自一名币安 DevOps 工程师的电脑被攻破,黑客借此侵入内部微服务而非直接盗取钱包主私钥。 - [10:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=600s) 提现审批权限失窃导致黑客能够跨链洗劫约 18,000 枚比特币和数亿美元波场资产,作案手法与此前涉及朝鲜黑客的 Bybit 盗窃案高度相似。 - [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) 币安代管客户资产达 1,440 亿美元,实际净损失约 10 亿美元不足总资产的 1%,前 CEO 赵长鹏承诺全部损失由平台自负。 - [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) 币安 12 亿美元的 SAFU 应急储备受阿布扎比合规监管等限制,本次赔偿大概率需从公司自有经营利润中垫付。 - [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) 存放在交易所中的加密资产本质上只是交易所开具的借条(IOU),中小型交易平台一旦遭遇黑客攻击极易因穿仓而破产倒闭。 - [15:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=908s) Tether 和 Circle 虽有效遏制了黑客转移资金,但其一键冻结能力也证明了中心化稳定币对普通持有人资产拥有的绝对裁决权。 - [16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) 防范系统性风险的首选方案是采用多重签名钱包,或将长期资产转入由个人保管私钥的冷存储硬件钱包。 - [16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) 硬件钱包必须直接从官方制造商订购,严禁使用第三方平台或二手设备,以防范供应链篡改攻击。 - [16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) 交易所账户必须停用脆弱的短信验证码(SMS),改用独立验证器 App 或物理安全密钥,并开启提现地址白名单。 - [16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) 安全自托管要求用户使用金属板冷备份助记词并配置第 25 词独立密码,同时警惕伪造客服私信以及历史记录中的恶意投毒地址。

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=0s) 史上最大加密劫案:币安遭黑客袭击与市场动荡

比特币等主流加密资产出现暴跌,整个加密货币行业刚刚遭遇了历史上规模最庞大的盗窃事件。Andrei Jikh 紧急发布视频指出,这次安全危机不仅关乎币安这一家交易所,甚至波及了整个行业硬件钱包的供应链。以太坊、比特币、波场(Tron)以及数十种不同代币在极短时间内被盗,在任何人反应过来之前,数十亿美元已经蒸发。根据币安初步披露的数据,此次安全事故的总影响规模已达约 63 亿美元。

作为全球最大的加密货币交易所,币安遭遇沉重打击,不得不紧急暂停所有加密货币的网络提现并启动内部调查。市场随之剧烈震荡,代币价格骤跌。大量在交易所存放了一生积蓄的散户投资者陷入极度焦虑与恐慌。尽管稳定币发行方 Tether 与 Circle 迅速响应并紧急冻结了约 30 亿美元被盗资金,但这依然引发了极其严肃的信任危机:用户的资金在中心化交易所究竟是否安全?这是否是一场精心策划的“内部人员作案”(inside job)?坊间甚至流传幕后黑手可能是朝鲜等国家级黑客组织,抑或是某种自主代理式人工智能(agentic AI)在幕后操作。Andrei 严厉警告称,这可能仅仅是一个开端,其他交易所未来同样会面临类似的系统性洗劫。正如 Andrei Jikh 所强调的那样:“Because in this new age of technology, I think anything that can be hacked will probably be hacked at some point or another.” 这也是给所有加密投资者的又一次惨痛警示——切勿将加密资产长期存放于中心化交易所。

- 涉案损失规模:币安确认的整体影响金额高达约 63 亿美元。 - 被盗币种涵盖:以太坊(Ethereum)、比特币(Bitcoin)、波场(Tron)及数十种其他山寨代币。 - 应急处置动作:币安全面暂停提现;Tether 与 Circle 第一时间冻结了约 30 亿美元与盗窃地址相关的资产。

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Binance Exploit Overview accDescr: High-level visual flow showing how funds were drained from Binance hot wallet to an attacker-controlled wallet.

subgraph Internal ["币安内部架构"] Vault["冷钱包 (Cold Wallet)<br/>离线金库/绝大多数资金"] HotWallet["Binance 14 (热钱包)<br/>连网收银机/高频出金"] AutoRefill["自动化补充系统<br/>自动归集用户充值"] end

subgraph Exploit ["攻击过程"] Slip["利用混币器生成工具<br/>伪造 50 份授权许可"] Robot["扫荡机器人脚本<br/>执行授权匹配单号"] end

subgraph External ["攻击者与链上处置"] Attacker["黑客全新钱包地址<br/>留存 1 ETH 维持运转"] Freeze["Tether & Circle<br/>紧急冻结约 30 亿美元"] end

Vault -.->|"大额隔离保障"| HotWallet HotWallet -->|"单次扫荡转出"| Robot Slip -->|"精准匹配实时票号"| Robot Robot -->|"转移 ETH、USDT 等"| Attacker AutoRefill -->|"持续补充流动性"| HotWallet Attacker -.->|"链上标记拦截"| Freeze ```

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[02:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=123s) 冷热钱包机制与“扫荡机器人”的致命许可

为了厘清黑客的手法,必须先理解交易所管理资金的基础逻辑。交易所的大部分资产存放在离线的“冷钱包”(Cold Storage Wallet)中,它相当于极难攻破的银行地下金库;但为了能够即时处理海量用户的提现请求,交易所必须维持一定流动性,将部分资金放置在联网的“热钱包”(Hot Wallet)中,其性质类似于柜台的收银机。本次遭遇黑客精准打击的目标正是币安最为繁忙的热钱包之一——“Binance 14”,该钱包历史处理交易笔数已高达约 3100 万笔。

黑客的攻击准备非常隐蔽且反常。首先,黑客动用了混币器 Tornado Cash。混币器的作用如同把一副牌彻底洗乱,使加密资产在进出后完全斩断原始来源与去向轨迹,形成链上现金般的不可追踪性;而正规交易所绝不可能通过混币器向核心业务钱包注资,这本身就是一个显眼的危险信号。随后,攻击者构建了一个自动化清算工具(类似自动化机器人),其专门设计用于一笔交易将目标钱包扫荡一空。为了确保万无一失,黑客甚至预先部署了多个测试钱包进行了实弹演练并取得成功。

这一攻击的核心机制依赖于以太坊的可编程性与特定提现“许可单号”(Ticket Number)。正如 Andrei 生动比喻的,Binance 14 钱包每次向外转账时,都需要按顺序领取一个号码牌,就像在车辆管理局(DMV)办事时电子牌上滚动的“正在服务 47 号”一样。随着柜台不断处理新客户,这个业务号码随时在发生递增变化。以太坊允许钱包将控制权委托给外部程序(类似签发一张允许机器人接管收银柜台的“许可条”),但该许可单要生效必须同时满足两个硬性条件: 1. 必须带有币安官方的有效加密签名; 2. 必须精确匹配该钱包在该具体毫秒时刻正在办理业务的排队票号。

因为外部人员无法提前百分之百预知瞬息万变的下一次确切票号,黑客极其狡猾地准备了 50 张带有连续或预测票号的授权签名许可。最终,前 49 张由于号码不匹配被智能合约直接拒绝,但恰恰有一张命中实时票号。就在匹配成功的这一瞬间,机器人瞬间取得了收银台的最高控制权。

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[05:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=300s) 链上闪电洗劫、自动化补仓陷阱与赞助插播

权限生效后,黑客立刻发动了闪电扫荡。在短短一笔交易中,黑客直接从 Binance 14 热钱包卷走了约 16.7 万枚以太坊(价值约 16 亿美元)以及 USDT 和 61 种其他代币,单次交易卷走的资产总值高达约 25 亿美元。而黑客完成这笔惊天大案所耗费的链上网络矿工费,仅仅只有 93 美分。

链上分析师在几分钟内便捕捉到资金异动并在社交平台上拉响警报,但此时黑客已经在分流资金: - 黑客将约 19.5 万枚以太坊迅速转移至一个全新的独立钱包地址; - 币安的另一个资金钱包在随后的一个小时内,又被转走了 7.8 亿美元的 USDC; - Tether 与 Circle 随后火速介入,锁定了链上被盗的 USDT 和 USDC,共计冻结了约 24 亿美元资产; - 币安前首席执行官赵长鹏(CZ)随即发文称这看起来像是一起黑客攻击,但安抚称“用户资金是安全的(SAFU)”;币安官方紧接着发表声明称正在调查潜在的安全隐患,起初并未立即官方定性为黑客入侵。

更为恶毒的是黑客的后续策略。黑客在扫荡该钱包时并没有将资产全部归零,而是极其刁钻地故意留下了“恰好 1 枚 ETH”。正是因为这 1 枚代币的存在,该热钱包在系统判定中并未崩溃或处于休克关闭状态,依然处于有效运行中。币安后台未被关闭的自动化财务调度程序继续正常运转,源源不断地归集来自全球客户的新充值资金并向该热钱包进行补仓注资。而黑客留在后门的清算逻辑便得以守株待兔,对新流入的充值资金持续进行即时收割。

在解析黑客获取内部签名的深层原因之前,视频插入了一段金融工具赞助。Andrei 结合自己幼年从俄罗斯移民美国、一家人完全不懂英语且没有任何信用记录(Credit History)的窘境,介绍了信用构建工具 Kickoff。由于银行贷款利率(房贷、车贷等)直接挂钩信用分,而“没有信用就无法获得信用”是一个普遍的死循环。Kickoff 是一款无需信用审查、零利息且无隐藏费用的信用构建应用,月费方案最低 5 美元起。它通过设立专用于积累信用记录而非外部消费的额度,按时向三大信用局自动汇报还款记录,优化用户的还款历史与额度使用率(Utilization)。官方数据显示,信用分低于 600 分的用户首月平均可提升 25 分,一年最高可提升 86 分。视频为观众提供了首月低至 1 美元的 8 折专享链接(kickoff.com/andre)。

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[07:03](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=423s) 谜底揭晓:DevOps 工程师笔记本失陷

回到被盗事件的核心症结:黑客究竟是如何获取到带有币安合法数字签名的 50 份授权许可的?在事件发生之初,业内安全专家与分析人士普遍推测只有三种可能性: 1. **私钥直接失窃**:有人彻底窃取了币安核心钱包的 Master Key(主私钥)。 2. **系统欺诈签名**:黑客构建恶意构造的数据,欺骗了币安的自动化签名机,使其在不知情的情况下签发了提款请求。 3. **严重内鬼作案**:币安内部拥有高级管理权限的雇员参与了勾结。

根据币安刚刚发布的初步调查报告,真实路径现已水落石出:黑客并未直接破解金库,而是成功黑进了一名币安 DevOps(开发运维)工程师的个人笔记本电脑。作为负责维护币安庞大内部系统的核心工程师,这台电脑拥有极高的内部内网访问权限。

攻击者以此受害笔记本为跳板,渗透进入了币安的某项核心内部微服务,并滥用该服务向系统直接提交未授权的提款签名指令。这完美解释了此前黑客的作案手法——黑客根本没有拿到交易所金库的原始私钥,而是非法潜入了“使用钥匙的系统内部”。正如 Andrei Jikh 所分析:“So the attacker never really stole the keys to the vault. They just got inside the system that used the keys.” 这一事实也彻底闭环了解释:黑客正因没有底层私钥的完全掌控权,才必须以狂猜排队票号的方式,批量开具 50 张单号不同的许可凭证去碰运气。

[10:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=600s) 提现许可漏洞的多链蔓延与朝鲜黑客嫌疑

在以太坊链上,黑客利用系统权限提前批量生成并提交提现许可(permit slip)。如果攻击者能直接查看当前正在处理的序号,只需精准签署一张对应的许可即可完成提现;但由于黑客是潜入币安内部系统让其代为签名,无法直接锁定当下序号,便只能提前批量抓取 50 张不同序号的许可碰运气。公开区块链账本记录了这一过程:在提交的 50 张许可凭证中,整整 49 张均被标记为无效(invalid),仅有一张显示成功(success)——然而就是这区区一次命中,便彻底打开了资金外流的闸门。

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 提现系统渗透与多链资产盗取流程 accDescr: 展示黑客入侵工程师电脑后,跨以太坊、比特币与波场链窃取资产的过程。

subgraph Access["初始入侵阶段"] A["工程师笔记本电脑失陷<br>(恶意软件/钓鱼/虚假面试)"] --> B["渗入内部审批提现系统"] end

subgraph MultiChain["多链资产流出"] B --> C["以太坊网络 (ETH)"] B --> D["比特币网络 (BTC)"] B --> E["波场网络 (Tron)"]

C --> F["批量提交 50 张许可凭证<br>(49 张失败,1 张命中成功)"] D --> G["直接利用提现权限审批<br>提走约 18,000 枚 BTC"] E --> H["直接利用提现权限审批<br>提走数亿美元资产"] end ```

这种机制也解释了为何提现凭证的漏洞明明不适用于比特币或波场链,却依然有约 18,000 枚比特币和数亿美元的波场资产在相同时段内被洗劫一空。黑客并未局限于单个“收银台”,一旦他们接管了币安负责审批提现的核心系统,便能在多个区块链网络上同时发起提款操作。

关于这台工程师电脑究竟如何遭到入侵,外界普遍将目光投向了具有国家背景的朝鲜黑客组织。通过恶意软件、钓鱼链接甚至是虚假招聘面试诱骗员工下载木马,正是朝鲜黑客惯用的攻击手法。这与去年 Bybit 交易所遭遇的 15 亿美元盗窃案如出一辙:黑客同样没有直接窃取 Bybit 的私钥,而是入侵了 Bybit 所合作的钱包软件公司开发人员的电脑;当安全团队签署看似寻常的转账交易时,实际上直接拱手让出了 15 亿美元,该案随后被美国联邦调查局(FBI)正式归咎于朝鲜黑客。颇具讽刺意味的是,就在这起惨烈攻击发生的短短两天之前,币安才公开宣称其安全团队刚刚成功拦截了数起与朝鲜有关的针对性网络攻击。

- 链上证据显示黑客提交的 50 张以太坊提现许可中,仅有 1 张成功生效。 - 比特币网络上约 18,000 枚 BTC 以及波场(Tron)网络上数亿美元的资产在同一时间窗口被盗。 - FBI 曾确认去年 Bybit 遭遇的 15 亿美元盗窃案系朝鲜黑客所为,其手法同为入侵合作开发者设备。 - 币安在遭遇本次黑客攻击的两天前,刚刚宣布挫败了多起与朝鲜关联的网络攻击。 - Andrei Jikh 针对交易所的安全架构提出质疑:“A single engineer, compromised or not, should not be able to put $6 billion at risk.”

---

[12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) 币安的资金储备与交易所借条(IOU)的本质

面对超过 60 亿美元资产外流的巨大危机,普通散户短期内或许无需过度恐慌。这首先得益于稳定币发行方 Tether 和 Circle 的迅速干预,在事件发生后极短的时间内冻结了约 30 亿美元被盗资金。加密分析平台 DeFiLlama 的创始人估算,币安本次的最终实际净损失可能在 10 亿美元左右。币安前首席执行官赵长鹏(CZ)虽表示最终损失数字可能会略高一些,但郑重承诺所有损失将由平台全额兜底承担。

从体量上看,币安平台目前代管的客户资产总额约为 1,440 亿美元,10 亿美元的实际损失占其总资产比例远低于 1%,虽伤筋动骨,但绝不至于导致平台瘫痪。币安还设有专门应对突发黑客攻击的应急保障基金(SAFU)。该基金曾在 2019 年黑客盗走约 7,000 枚比特币时全额赔付用户,目前储备约 15,000 枚比特币,市值约为 12 亿美元,账面规模恰好足以覆盖此次损失。但该基金的使用存在若干复杂限制:部分资产据报道被作为阿布扎比监管机构要求的法定合规资本锁定,无法自由调配用于赔付;且币安过往的注资承诺主要针对比特币币价下跌导致储备缩水的情况,而非单纯为了填补被盗窟窿。因此,本次赔付款项极大概率需要币安自掏腰包,从公司的自有经营利润中垫付。

在内部调查期间,币安暂停了多个公链网络的提现功能。这种防御性举措虽完全合理,却给急于提现离场的用户带来了巨大的心理恐慌。这也揭露了中心化交易所残酷的底层逻辑:用户账户界面显示的资产数字并非属于个人,而仅仅是交易所开具的借条(IOU)。币安体量庞大能够抗住冲击,但对于抗风险能力脆弱的中小型平台而言,一次穿仓就足以致命。Andrei Jikh 现身说法提到,自己过去就曾在一家倒闭的小型交易所里彻底损失了 10 多枚比特币,付出了惨痛的学费。

- 币安总计代管约 1,440 亿美元的用户资产,约 10 亿美元的净损失占平台总资产比重不足 1%。 - 应急基金(SAFU)目前持有约 15,000 枚比特币,总价值约 12 亿美元,但部分资金因阿布扎比监管合规要求受限。 - 币安曾在 2019 年黑客盗取 7,000 枚比特币时,利用应急基金全额赔付用户损失。 - Andrei Jikh 直言将加密资产存放在交易所的风险:“When you keep crypto on an exchange, you don't actually own that crypto. Remember, you own an IOU.” - 结合自身血淋淋的爆仓亏损经历,Andrei Jikh 告诫道:“I've lost over 10 Bitcoin on a smaller exchange that went bankrupt. So that was a learning lesson to never keep money on an exchange no matter how much they entice you with interest.”

---

[15:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=908s) 稳定币中心化冻结权与机构自托管的阴谋论

在本次被盗案中,业内纷纷为 Tether 和 Circle 在一小时内迅速冻结 24 亿美元被盗资金叫好。但这种极端高效的中心化裁决能力同样是一把悬在所有人头顶的双刃剑:发行方既然能够一键封停黑客的数字钱包,也就意味着他们有能力在任何时候、出于任何理由,瞬间冻结链上任何普通用户的资金。

这种权力的集中与加密货币最初的去中心化愿景背道而驰。Andrei Jikh 表达了对宏观趋势的深切担忧:各大中心化机构正在利用市场中的恐惧、不确定性与怀疑(FUD)情绪,一步步迫使普通散户交出底层的比特币所有权。金融巨头们极力推销比特币现货 ETF 等证券化金融衍生品,承诺提供所谓的机构级安全保护,其真实目的则是将比特币现货集中囤积在极少数中心化规划者的金库中。在鼓励散户将财富转入由中心化监管所掌控的金融系统的同时,这些金融寡头自己却在极力推行底层加密资产的自我托管。

- Tether 与 Circle 在事件爆发后不到一小时的时间内,协同冻结了 24 亿美元的链上资金。 - 稳定币与中心化金融产品本质上具有可被任意冻结的中心化控制属性。 - 市场舆论倾向于引导散户购买合规受托的 ETF 资产,而弱化对底层加密资产私钥的自主掌握。 - 针对中心化机构收割散户底层代币的趋势,Andrei Jikh 指出:“Now, I think the goal is to centralize as much of it as possible into the hands of the central planners and put our money into their securities instead.” - 警惕稳定币一键冻结功能对所有持有人的潜在威胁:“Now, luckily for now, that power was used against a thief, but that same button works on everyone.”

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[16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) 资产自托管指南、硬件钱包供应链攻击与防范骗局

针对危机四伏的市场环境,保护加密资产最安全、最值得信赖的方案是使用多重签名钱包(Multi-Sig solution wallet)。对于持有可观资产的用户而言,资金绝不应该长期滞留在中心化交易所内,必须尽快转移到由自己牢牢掌握私钥的硬件钱包中。然而,如今即便是硬件钱包本身也不再绝对万无一失。市场中针对加密货币的攻击手段已极其精密复杂,此前 Coldcard Q 硬件钱包曾爆出安全事件,而市面上最主流的 Ledger 硬件钱包也曾出现过因供应链篡改导致用户资产被瞬间清空的报告。

用户在选购硬件钱包时,必须严格遵守铁律:务必直接从官方生产商处下单购买,切勿在亚马逊、eBay 等第三方电商平台购买,更绝对不可购买二手设备。若因日常高频交易需要必须在交易所保留资金,也应当只留存极小比例的活跃交易资金,并将其分散放置在不同的合规交易所中,避免单点暴雷。同时,必须开启交易所提供的所有最高级别防护,包括采用独立身份验证器(Authenticator App)或物理硬件安全密钥(如 YubiKey)进行双重认证(2FA),坚决停用极其脆弱的短信短信验证(SMS),并开启提现地址白名单功能。

与此同时,去中心化金融(DeFi)与去中心化交易所(DEX)同样蕴含着不可测的技术与黑天鹅风险。黑客事件爆发后的几天内往往是钓鱼欺诈的高发期,骗子会借机伪造币安官方客服私信、发送虚假的资产赔偿申报表。必须牢记没有任何正规机构会主动私信协助找回资产。此外,黑客还会利用伪造相似地址向用户钱包转入空投垃圾代币,用户切勿直接在钱包交易历史中复制转账地址。最后,即便是选择完全冷存储的自我托管,如果用户丢失了助记词同样无法挽回资产,因此必须使用防火防压的钛合金或不锈钢金属板冷备份助记词,并配置第 25 个单词(Passphrase)进行双重防御。

| 安全防护维度 | 推荐操作 | 严禁行为 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **私钥与大额资金** | 采用多重签名钱包(Multi-Sig)或冷存储硬件钱包 | 长期全额托管于单一中心化交易所(IOU) | | **硬件钱包采购** | 仅通过官方生产商直营官网下单订购 | 从亚马逊、eBay 或任何第三方非官方卖家购买二手/新机 | | **账户身份验证** | 使用独立验证器 App(Authenticator)或物理安全密钥 | 使用易被 SIM 卡劫持攻击的短信验证码(SMS) | | **提现与转账** | 开启交易所提现地址白名单;逐字核对目标转账地址 | 从钱包的历史交易流水记录中直接复制相似转账地址 | | **助记词备份** | 刻印在钛合金/不锈钢金属密封板上;添加第 25 词独立密码 | 截图存云端、在电脑留存明文备忘录或轻易泄露给他人 |

- 硬件钱包遭遇供应链攻击的风险正在加剧,Coldcard Q 与 Ledger 均曾面临相关安全挑战。 - 针对黑客事件后的诈骗风波,Andrei Jikh 发出严正警示:“Always remember, no one legitimate will ever message you to help you recover your money.” - 针对用户从交易记录中盲目复制地址的坏习惯,Andrei Jikh 明确警告:“And also never copy a wallet address from your transaction history because scammers are actively sending fake tokens from lookalike addresses, hoping that you'll copy the wrong one by mistake.”

## Notable quotes > [10:00](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=600s) A single engineer, compromised or not, should not be able to put $6 billion at risk. — Andrei Jikh

> [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) When you keep crypto on an exchange, you don't actually own that crypto. Remember, you own an IOU. — Andrei Jikh

> [16:08](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=968s) Always remember, no one legitimate will ever message you to help you recover your money. — Andrei Jikh

> [12:05](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ?t=725s) I've lost over 10 Bitcoin on a smaller exchange that went bankrupt. So that was a learning lesson to never keep money on an exchange no matter how much they entice you with interest. — Andrei Jikh

## Mentioned Andrei Jikh, 币安 (Binance), 赵长鹏 (CZ), 以太坊 (Ethereum), 比特币 (Bitcoin), 波场 (Tron), 泰达币 (Tether / USDT), Circle (USDC), Tornado Cash, Bybit, 联邦调查局 (FBI), DeFiLlama, SAFU (用户安全资产基金), Kickoff, Ledger, Coldcard Q, YubiKey

## Video description 【Andrei Jikh】 币安被盗63亿美元?你的加密资产还安全吗? North Korea Suspected In Crypto Heist

|币安巨额被盗,损失高达数十亿美元 最近,全球最大的加密货币交易所币安遭遇了一场史无前例的盗窃案,价值高达63亿美元的以太坊、比特币、波场等数字资产被盗。尽管泰达币和Circle公司及时冻结了约30亿美元的被盗资金,但币安的实际损失仍接近10亿美元。币安创始人赵长鹏表示,所有损失将由公司承担。目前,币安已暂停部分网络的提现,并正在调查这起事件。

|黑客如何绕过安全防线? 这次攻击并非直接窃取了币安的“金库钥匙”,而是通过入侵一名开发运维工程师的笔记本电脑,进而访问了币安的内部系统。黑客利用一个名为“Tornado Cash”的混币服务,创建了一个无法追踪的钱包,并制作了50份带有不同“票号”的提现许可。最终,其中一份许可与币安热钱包的实时票号匹配,使得黑客成功清空了币安14号热钱包,卷走了约16.7万枚以太坊,总价值约25亿美元。由于热钱包保持开放,币安的自动化系统在被盗后仍持续向其补充资金,导致黑客持续盗取。

|幕后黑手疑是国家级黑客组织 尽管币安尚未公布具体细节,但有传言称这次攻击可能与朝鲜有关。此前,朝鲜黑客曾通过类似手段攻击其他加密货币平台,例如去年Bybit的15亿美元被盗案就被联邦调查局归咎于朝鲜。讽刺的是,就在这次攻击发生前两天,币安还宣布成功阻止了几起与朝鲜相关的网络攻击。这起事件也引发了对加密货币交易所安全机制的质疑:一个工程师的电脑被入侵,为何能让数十亿美元的资产面临风险?

|你的加密资产真的安全吗? 如果你在币安持有加密货币,目前可能相对安全,因为币安拥有约1440亿美元的客户资产,且设有12亿美元的SAFU(用户安全资产基金)应急储备金,足以覆盖这次损失。但这次事件再次敲响警钟:将加密货币存放在交易所,你拥有的只是交易所的“欠条”,而非真正的所有权。小型交易所一旦破产,用户资金可能血本无归。此外,泰达币和Circle等稳定币公司有能力瞬间冻结数十亿美元的资金,这把双刃剑在保护用户资金的同时,也意味着中心化机构对你的资产拥有绝对控制权。

|如何保护你的加密资产? 如果你持有大量加密货币,多重签名钱包是目前最可靠的选择。如果你不频繁交易,应将资产转移到由自己掌握私钥的硬件钱包中。购买硬件钱包时,务必直接从制造商处购买,避免二手或第三方渠道,以防供应链攻击。在交易所交易时,只存放少量活跃交易的资金,并分散到不同的交易所。开启所有安全功能,如双重认证(使用APP或物理安全密钥,而非短信),并将提现地址加入白名单。同时,警惕各类诈骗信息,不要点击不明链接,不要复制交易历史中的钱包地址。

接下来建议的操作指引: 1. 如果持有大量加密货币,考虑使用多重签名钱包,确保资产安全,避免单点风险。 2. 购买硬件钱包时,务必通过官方渠道直接从制造商处购买,以防供应链攻击导致资产被盗。 3. 在交易所进行交易时,仅保留少量活跃交易资金,并开启双重认证和提现地址白名单功能。

[0:02] 币安被盗63亿美元,加密货币行业面临信任危机 [1:02] 交易所安全漏洞频发,用户资金面临风险 [2:03] 币安热钱包被攻击,黑客利用混币服务和许可漏洞 [3:03] 黑客精心策划,利用“票号”机制盗取巨额资产 [5:03] 攻击过程细节披露,黑客持续盗取新流入资金 [7:03] 币安工程师电脑被入侵,引发内部安全质疑 [9:03] 攻击手法揭秘,黑客利用系统漏洞而非直接窃取私钥 [11:04] 幕后黑手疑与朝鲜有关,国家级黑客威胁日益严峻 [12:05] 币安承诺覆盖损失,但用户资产安全仍是核心问题 [14:06] 交易所并非保险箱,用户应掌握加密资产所有权 [15:08] 稳定币的中心化风险,冻结资金的能力是一把双刃剑 [16:08] 如何保护你的加密资产:多重签名和硬件钱包 [17:10] 购买硬件钱包注意事项,警惕供应链攻击和诈骗 [18:10] 稳定币的本质与风险,自我保管并非绝对安全 [19:11] 保护加密资产的最终建议:备份助记词和25词密码

[Source](https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DFxy63EdQ)

中文简报

币安运维电脑遭渗透引发数十亿美元盗案 Tether与Circle紧急冻结30亿 这起系统性盗窃不仅暴露存放在交易所的加密资产本质只是平台借条,更凸显中心化机构随时冻结资金的权力风险,唯有依靠多重签名与离线冷钱包自托管才能真正规避单点暴雷。 视频详细复盘了币安遭遇的63亿美元巨额黑客洗劫案,披露黑客并非直接窃取底层主私钥,而是通过入侵一名DevOps工程师的笔记本电脑,渗透内部微服务并批量生成50份提现许可,最终命中实时票号卷走热钱包资产。尽管Tether与Circle紧急冻结了约30亿美元使币安净损失降至约10亿美元,且币安凭借庞大资产储备与SAFU基金承诺全额兜底,该事件依然揭示了中心化交易所将资产变为“借条”(IOU)的系统性风险。同时,稳定币发行方一键冻结资金的能力展现了中心化控制的双刃剑本质,Andrei Jikh据此呼吁普通散户警惕钓鱼诈骗与供应链篡改风险,大额资产应优先采用多重签名或官方直购的硬件钱包进行自托管。 币安遭遇历史级黑客袭击,总受影响资产规模达约 63 亿美元,涵盖 ETH、BTC、Tron 及数十种代币,Tether 与 Circle 随后火速冻结了约 30 亿美元链上涉案资产。 (0:00) 黑客并未破解金库私钥,而是入侵了一名币安 DevOps 工程师的笔记本电脑,渗透内部微服务并利用提现许可机制成功扫荡热钱包资产。 (7:03) 扣除稳定币冻结部分后,币安预计实际净损失接近 10 亿美元;前 CEO 赵长鹏承诺平台将全额承担损失,价值约 12 亿美元的 SAFU 基金理论上可提供兜底支撑。 (12:05) 稳定币发行方极速冻结 24 亿美元展现了中心化裁决能力,但也暴露了中心化机构随时能掌控用户资产的“双刃剑”风险,投资者被敦促使用多签名或官方直购硬件钱包自托管。 (15:08)

Reading summary

加密博主 Andrei Jikh 针对币安遭遇约 63 亿美元规模黑客袭击的事件展开剖析,指出本次事故源自内部运维工程师设备失陷而非底层私钥被盗,并严厉警告投资者警惕交易所资产借条本质与中心化权力风险。 黑客渗透路径与批量许可漏洞 (7:03) 本次安全事件的核心失陷点并非冷钱包金库主私钥,而是黑客成功入侵了一名币安 DevOps 工程师的个人电脑,以此为跳板渗透至币安内部审批微服务。攻击者并未直接获取底层私钥,而是滥用系统生成合法提现签名的能力。由于无法实时预知高频变动的提现排队单号,黑客利用以太坊的可编程性,提前准备了 50 份不同票号的提现授权许可凭证进行狂猜碰运气。链上记录显示,前 49 份申请均被合约判定无效拒绝,仅有 1 份成功命中实时单号,但该次命中随即打开了提现闸门。 在成功接管权限后,黑客对繁忙的 Binance 14 热钱包实施闪电扫荡,单笔交易卷走约 16.7 万枚以太坊(价值约 16 亿美元)、USDT 及 61 种代币,网络矿工费仅耗费 93 美分。极具战术性的是,黑客故意在热钱包内保留了 1 枚 ETH,使得内部自动化财务系统未触发休克熔断,持续归集全球新充值资金并向该钱包注资补仓,任由黑客后门脚本持续即时收割。同时,因审批系统失陷,攻击在极短时间内蔓延至其他公链,导致约 18,000 枚比特币和数亿美元波场资产被提走。业内结合钓鱼手段及去年 Bybit 开发者电脑被攻破遭窃 15 亿美元的先例,普遍怀疑幕后黑手关联朝鲜黑客组织。 平台偿付能力与资产借条本质 (12:05) 尽管整体受影响资金高达约 63 亿美元,但稳定币发行方 Tether 与 Circle 在一小时内迅速响应,紧急冻结了约 24 亿至 30 亿美元被盗资产。DeFiLlama 估算币安的实际净损失约为 10 亿美元,前首席执行官赵长鹏(CZ)表示损失可能略高,但承诺由平台全额承担。币安代管用户资产总规模约 1,440 亿美元,实际净损失占比不足 1%;其应急保障基金(SAFU)虽持有约 15,000 枚比特币(约 12 亿美元),但因部分资金受阿布扎比监管合规限制,本次赔付款项极大概率需由币安自有经营利润垫付。 事件发生后币安紧急暂停提现以做内部防御,但也引发了市场对资金安全的广泛焦虑。Andrei Jikh 指出,存放在中心化交易所的加密资产在法理与技术上并非用户真正所有,而仅属于交易所开具的借条(IOU)。币安作为巨头尚能依靠庞大资产池消化冲击,但抵御风险能力薄弱的中小型交易所极易因类似事故走向破产;他以自身早年在破产小型交易所损失超过 10 枚比特币的经历,告诫散户切勿因利息诱惑而将大额资金长期存放于交易所。 稳定币中心化冻结权与机构收割隐忧 (15:08) 稳定币巨头能够在一小时内协同冻结巨额资产,虽在本次事件中阻击了盗窃资金的外流,但在 Andrei Jikh 看来,这种不受约束的中心化干预权是一把双刃剑。既然中心化机构可以一键封停黑客的链上地址,同样意味着他们具备在任何时刻、出于任何理由冻结普通散户钱包资金的绝对技术能力,这与加密货币主打的抗审查与去中心化初衷截然相悖。 视频进一步指出,主流金融体系正在利用市场恐慌情绪,诱导散户放弃对底层加密资产私钥的直接掌控,转而购买现货 ETF 等受合规监管的衍生证券。金融机构将实际代币集中锁入中心化实体的金库之中,普通投资者获得的仅是被监管系统牢牢掌控的金融权益;这种散户持币证券化、机构巨头垄断底层现货自托管的演变态势,正在使加密资产的去中心化愿景被逐步侵蚀。 资产自托管防护与防诈骗防线 (16:08) 为抵御中心化系统风险,Andrei Jikh 建议大额资产持有者转向硬件冷钱包或多重签名(Multi-Sig)方案,但强调自托管工具同样面临严峻安全考验。目前 Ledger 与 Coldcard Q 等硬件设备均曾面临供应链篡改或安全漏洞挑战,因此用户必须仅从制造商官网采购,严禁通过亚马逊、eBay 等第三方平台购买或使用二手设备。若因交易需要必须留存资金,应分散存放于多家合规平台,并强制配置物理安全密钥(如 YubiKey)或独立身份验证器,坚决弃用易被 SIM 卡劫持的短信验证。 重大安全事件后往往伴随密集的二次诈骗。骗子常伪装成官方客服私信发送虚假理赔表格,或向用户钱包空投带有相似伪造地址的垃圾代币以诱骗复制。用户应建立提现白名单并逐字核对地址,牢记正规机构绝不会主动私信协助追讨资产。对于冷存储设备,助记词应使用防火防水的钛合金或不锈钢金属板保存,并加配第 25 个独立密码(Passphrase),以规避物理介质损坏与单点泄露风险。 币安被盗案暴露出单点运维权限足以威胁数十亿美元资金的架构软肋。随着机构化与托管中心化趋势加强,投资者在依赖平台赔付能力的同时,更需警惕稳定币一键冻结机制与硬件钱包供应链风险,在资产自主掌控与技术防护门槛之间寻求平衡。

Source quotes

[10:00] Andrei Jikh: A single engineer, compromised or not, should not be able to put $6 billion at risk. [12:05] Andrei Jikh: When you keep crypto on an exchange, you don't actually own that crypto. Remember, you own an IOU. [16:08] Andrei Jikh: Always remember, no one legitimate will ever message you to help you recover your money. [12:05] Andrei Jikh: I've lost over 10 Bitcoin on a smaller exchange that went bankrupt. So that was a learning lesson to never keep money on an exchange no matter how much they entice you with interest.

Original transcript

[0:00] So Bitcoin is crashing because we just experienced the biggest heist in crypto's history. And I wanted to put this out as an emergency video because this is not just finance. This is happening to supply chains of hardware wallets across the whole industry. Coins like Ethereum, Bitcoin, Tron and dozens of different tokens were stolen from Binance. By the time anyone could react, billions were gone and Binance now says the total impact is around $6.3 billion. A security incident impacting billions of dollars of funds has hit the world's largest crypto exchange, Binance, triggering emergency asset freezes and shop losses in the price of digital tokens. Overall, very bad for the crypto industry. And as a result of this, of course, Binance has frozen all withdrawals pending investigation. There's a lot of questions of customers who say their life savings are on these exchanges. And Tether and Circle have also frozen about $3 billion of the stolen money, which is good news. That also leaves a lot of questions, like whether our money is safe on these exchanges at all, and was this possibly an inside job? There's even rumors that it could have been a nation state, like North Korea, or maybe it was the work of some agentic AI, and that this is all just the beginning. This is coming to a lot of other exchanges as well. So there's a lot to go through. So in this video, I want to walk you through exactly what we know happened and how you might want to protect yourself going forward. Because in this new age of technology, I think anything that can be hacked will probably be hacked at some point or another. So with that said, let's get into it. Hi, my name is Andre Jick. Hope you're doing well. a yearly reminder to never keep your crypto on exchanges. So the reason I wanted to make this video, besides explaining what's happening, is to hopefully help you understand how to think about security in the future. So the first thing we need to understand is how an exchange like Binance actually holds our money. See, exchanges keep most of their crypto in what's called a cold storage wallet. think of it like a bank vault it's offline and it's very hard to break into but because they're an exchange they also need money on hand to process everyone's withdrawals and that needs to work instantly which is also why they keep some of it in what's called a hot wallet. Now, a hot wallet is more like a cash register. It's connected to the Internet, and money is going in and out of it constantly. In this instance, that wallet that was attacked was called Binance 14. Apparently, it's one of Binance's most busiest wallets because it's processed something like 31 million transactions. Now, here's how the heist works. Tornado Cash Tornado cash is what's called a mixer. A mixer is where you put crypto in and it comes out the other side with no trail back to where it came from. It's kind of like taking a deck of cards and then shuffling it in all sorts of crazy ways, thus losing the playing card. It's basically the crypto equivalent of paying in cash that's untraceable. Typically, no legitimate exchange funds its wallets in this way. So that was kind of like the first red flag. Now that same wallet also built a tool to designed to empty a wallet of everything it holds in one sweep. So think of it as kind of like a robot. In fact, after they built it, the attacker did a test run using this technique. They set up a few wallets of their own and they practiced it and it actually worked. Now this is where it gets kind of technical, but here it goes. Every time Binance 14, that wallet sends money out, it takes a ticket number. Kind of like how it says, now serving number 47 when you're at the DMV, right? It is constantly serving new customers. So that number is always changing. Now, Ethereum is because it's programmable money, has a feature that lets a wallet give its control over to a program, like a permission slip that says, let this robot run my counter. Now that slip only works if two things are true. It has to be signed by Binance and it has to be printed with the exact ticket number being served at that exact moment in time. Now, the attacker somehow managed to get Binance's signature on these permission slips. But because they couldn't know ahead of time which number would come up, they brought 50 different slips. [5:00] all with different numbers. Now, 49 of those got rejected, but one of them was a match. And with that one match, the robot was running the cash register. That's how they were able to sweep Binance 14 and take about 167,000 Ethereum, worth about $1.6 billion in Tether and 61 other tokens, all in just one transaction that was in total worth roughly $2.5 billion. At the low, low cost, by the way, of just 93 cents. Now, moments later, the Internet started to notice that something was off. An on-chain analyst spotted this and he posted about it. But the attacker was already moving the coins. See, by that point, they had already moved about 195,000 Ethereum to a brand new wallet. Then another Binance wallet sent $780 million in USDC to the attacker again within the hour. Tether locked up the stolen USDT, Circle locked up the USDC, and about $2.4 billion was frozen. It was at that point when CZ posted that it looked like a hack and that user funds were safe. Binance then issued a statement saying it's investigating a potential security issue, still not confirming a hack. The hack did not stop there. In fact, the attacker did something... Very interesting. It allowed them to continue stealing as this was developing. See, When the robot emptied the wallet, it didn't take everything. It left exactly one ETH behind, which was just enough for the wallet to keep working so that when new money was deposited, The wallet was instantly swept. Because it stayed open, Binance's automated systems kept doing what they always do. which is collecting customer deposits and refilling the hot wallet. So that is, in a nutshell, the technical version of what happened. Now, the obvious question is, Hold on. How exactly did the attacker get Binance to sign those slips in the first place? And was that possibly an inside job? So governments everywhere are paying more to borrow, but so are you. And unlike a government, you can't print the difference. The rate you get on a mortgage, a car, and pretty much everything comes down to your credit, which brings me to the sponsor of today's video, Kickoff. When my parents moved us to the U.S., I didn't know anyone, I didn't speak English, and we had zero credit history, and that's the catch-22 nobody talks about, which is that you need credit to get credit. Kickoff is a credit-building tool designed for exactly that problem. There's no credit check to apply, no interest, and no hidden fees, and you can sign up in a few minutes. You pick one of their monthly plans, which start at just $5 a month. You make your payment on time, which is easy with auto pay, and Kickoff reports those on-time payments to all three credit bureaus. It's designed around two key factors in your credit, payment history and utilization. And to be clear, this is a line that exists only to build credit, not for spending money elsewhere. Kickoff users with credit under 600 who made on-time payments increased their credit by an average of 25 points in just their first month and up to 86 points after their first year. And it's the number one credit building app on the App Store. And better credit generally means you pay less interest, and that's money that stays in your pocket instead of the bank's. So if your credit is holding you back, Kickoff is giving my audience 80% off your first month, which works out as low as $1. kickoff.com forward slash Andre. Thank you to kickoff for sponsoring this segment. And now let's get back to it. So here's how the attacker was able to get those slips signed. Now going into this at first, There were only three ways it could have happened. The first way is that someone stole Binance's private key, which is basically the master password to their wallet. Possible. The second way is that someone tricked Binance's system into signing something that they shouldn't have. Or the third way, it was an inside job and someone helped the attacker. But how this actually happened, according to Binance's initial investigation that they just released, is that a DevOps engineer's laptop was compromised. And this is basically one of the people who maintains Binance's internal systems. And from his laptop, the attacker got into one of Binance's internal services and then used it to submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. So the attacker never really stole the keys to the vault. They just got inside the system that used the keys. which I think is exactly what those 50 permission slips were all about because If they had Binance's master key, they would not need to use up all those 50 guests. [10:00] You would just look at the number being served, you would sign the perfect slip, and then you'd be done. But if you get inside Binance's system, getting it to sign things for you, then you'd have to grab them ahead of time and hope one of them works. And because all of this happens on a public blockchain, every one of those 50 slips is just sitting there for us to look at right now, which is why. 49 of them are marked invalid, and only one of them is marked success. And that is all it took. It also actually explains why around 18,000 Bitcoin and hundreds of millions of dollars on the Tron network also left Binance's wallets during this window too. Because the permission slip trick I just explained, it does not work on Bitcoin or Tron. But once they were inside the system that approved the withdrawals, they were not limited to just one cash register. They could do it for multiple blockchains. Okay. Now, what Binance has not told us yet is how that laptop got compromised in the first place. And that's where the North Korea rumors come in. Compromising an employee's computer through malware or a phishing link or even a fake job interview is exactly what North Korea has done in the past. It is almost exactly what happened with Bybit last year. The hackers did not steal Bybit's keys either. They compromised a developer's machine at the wallet software company that Bybit used so that when their team signed what looked like a normal transfer, they were actually giving up $1.5 billion. In fact, the FBI attributed that attack to North Korea. Ironically, just two days before this attack happened, Binance said its security team blocked several North Korea-linked cyber attacks. Now, as of right now, this is all speculation because nobody's officially attributed this to anyone. But, But I think either way, this raises a much bigger question. A single engineer, compromised or not, should not be able to put $6 billion at risk. How is it that one laptop was able to do this much damage? Binance says it'll publish a full technical breakdown once the investigation is complete. But either way, all of this really brings me to the most important question in this video, which is, Is our money even safe in crypto anymore? So the good news about all of this is that if you have money on Binance right now, you're probably going to be okay. Because even though over $6 billion left Binance's wallets, about $3 billion of that was already frozen, thanks mostly to Tether and Circle. And the founder of something called DeFi Llama, which tracks all of this, estimates that the real loss is probably going to be closer to about a billion dollars, which CZ actually the loss might be slightly higher, but that it will be fully covered, which is great news. By the way, to put a billion dollars in perspective, Binance holds roughly $144 billion in customer assets. So even a billion dollar loss is way under 1% for them, which hurts, but it's not going to break them. In fact, Binance also has an emergency fund for events like this one. We used it back in 2019 when hackers stole about 7,000 Bitcoin and Binance covered the whole thing. Today, that fund holds roughly 15,000 Bitcoin. roughly about $1.2 billion. So on paper, about the same size as this loss. There's only a couple caveats though that you should know about. Part of that fund is reportedly being held as required capital for regulators in Abu Dhabi. So not all of it might be free to use, and Binance's promise to top the fund back up only applies if it drops because Bitcoin's price falls, not because they had to pay out a hack. So realistically, if Binance does cover this, which I think they will, it's probably going to come out of their own pocket, not just the emergency fund, but either way, user funds should be safe. Now, in the meantime, Binance has paused withdrawals on several networks as a precaution while they investigate, which is totally understandable. But if you're someone who's trying to get your money out right now and you can't, that is scary. And that brings me to the point of this whole video. When you keep crypto on an exchange, You don't actually own that crypto. Remember, you own an IOU. You own a promise from that exchange that they will give it back when you ask. Now, thankfully, Binance is big enough to cover the loss, but a smaller exchange might not be able to. And I say this because I've lost over 10 Bitcoin on a smaller exchange that went bankrupt. So that was [15:00] learning lesson to a never keep money on an exchange no matter how much they entice you with interest. Now, There's also one more element to the story that I think people are kind of missing. Everyone is celebrating the fact that Tether and Circle froze $2.4 billion in under an hour. And in this case... That's a good thing, right? But what that also means, is that those companies behind these stablecoins can also freeze billions of dollars almost instantly whenever they decide to. Now, luckily for now, that power was used against a thief. but That same button works on everyone. And that's something you have to be careful of. So the question is, how do you actually protect yourself? It's crazy because about a year ago, I made a video where I said, I thought they would be coming for our Bitcoin. Now, I think the goal is to centralize as much of it as possible into the hands of the central planners and put our money into their securities instead. They would love us to buy the ETF versions of Bitcoin so they can hold it and promise us protection. I also said that we'd most likely see more and more attacks and they would give us more incentives to hold their products. And while they incentivize us to move our money into their ecosystems, they would want to self-custody their coins for themselves. And we're seeing all of this play out with fear, uncertainty, and doubt in the meantime. So the question is, how do you actually protect yourself? And here's how I do it. If you have a sizable amount of crypto at this point, the only thing I really trust is what's called a multi-sig solution wallet. Now, I'm not going to go into the technical details here. If you're interested, I'm sure I'll have a video of that explaining it soon in the premium member section. something. Your money does not need to be on an exchange. Move it to a wallet where you hold the keys, like a hardware wallet. Now, unfortunately, nowadays, even that is risky. There was an incident with a wallet called Cold Card Q. There are also reports of ledger wallets being drained because of supply chain attacks. There is now so much money in crypto. We are seeing extremely sophisticated attacks on our money. So if you do buy a hardware wallet, please buy it directly from the manufacturer. Never buy a used wallet, obviously, but never buy from a random seller or an Amazon or eBay. keep money on exchanges and I know a lot of people do and I understand that for trading please only keep what you're actively using and spread it out don't put everything on one exchange no matter how big that exchange is And also turn on every security feature that they offer, including two-factor authentication with an authenticator app or a physical security key, not text messages, please. And while you're at it, you can also withdraw whitelist addresses so your crypto can only be sent to the addresses that you've approved. Now, this is just me personally. But I also do not trust DeFi or decentralized exchanges because they're safe until they're not. And then we get some headlines saying, AI broke the website and drained all the wallets somehow. So in the meantime, please be very careful in the next few days because – Scammers love these kinds of events. After every major hack, there's an influx of fake support messages and fake compensation forms. Always remember, no one legitimate will ever message you to help you recover your money. And also never copy a wallet address from your transaction history because scammers are actively sending fake tokens from lookalike addresses, hoping that you'll copy the wrong one by mistake. And lastly, also understand what you're holding. Stable coins like USDT and USDC are also IOUs. And as we just saw, they can be frozen too. Now, in this case, they predicted Binance, but it's worth knowing that this same feature applies to everyone. Now, to be fair, self-custody is not risk-free either. If you lose your recovery phrase, no one can help you get it back. So please make backups on things like those titanium plates and steel plates, and also add those 25th word passphrases to make it extra secure. I'm sure I will make videos about this in the future in the premium member section, but if you're interested, all of that will be down there. I post my extra thoughts, and I also post a day early. sponsors and make more videos like this. If that's useful to you, the link is down below. Thank you so much for watching. I'd love to see you back here next week. Stay safe and I'll see you soon. Bye-bye.