How Bending Spoons Built a $20 Billion Compounder | Luca Ferrari

How Bending Spoons Built a $20 Billion Compounder | Luca Ferrari — Anish Acharya, Luca Ferrari

Anish Acharya, Luca Ferrari

AI-assisted summary of How Bending Spoons Built a $20 Billion Compounder | Luca Ferrari — original source. Check the original for full context.

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Key ideas

  • Bending Spoons has executed between 50 and 60 acquisitions, creating an exponential compounding flywheel by optimizing acquired software EBITDA, leveraging earnings up to 3x, and reinvesting proceeds into larger targets. (10:00)
  • To eliminate the risk of insolvency while compounding via debt, the company enforces strict balance-sheet limits: keeping leverage around 2.4x to 2.5x, hedging 100% of interest rates, and rolling maturities out past five years. (20:00)
  • Luca Ferrari rejects the premise that cheap AI-generated code will eradicate scaled enterprise SaaS, noting that moats depend on switching costs, network effects, brand awareness, and proprietary hyper-local data rather than raw technical complexity. (24:00)
  • Internal operations at Bending Spoons have shifted aggressively toward automation: 94% of code is now written by AI, front-line customer support is handled almost 100% by AI, and over 90% of basic data analysis is machine-executed. (35:28)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on November 1, 2026, by Anish Acharya and Luca Ferrari across RSS and web platforms, this episode captures an in-depth conversation recorded at the Wave by Vento conference. According to the show description, Bending Spoons CEO Luca Ferrari explains to a16z General Partner Anish Acharya how the company acquires tech assets, migrates them to a centralized operational platform, and levers cash flows for sustained multi-decade compounding, while also addressing why AI does not immediately threaten software moats.

## TL;DR Luca Ferrari outlines the operational engine behind Bending Spoons, explaining how acquiring plateaued digital products and migrating them onto a unified in-house stack turns incremental optimization into an exponential compounding vehicle. He breaks down the company's disciplined approach to debt, detailing strict leverage caps and rolling maturities that eliminate existential default risk while funding larger transactions. The discussion further examines the realities of modern software moats—such as network effects and proprietary datasets—demonstrating why cheap code cannot displace entrenched incumbents. Finally, Ferrari details Bending Spoons' aggressive internal adoption of AI, from autonomous agents resolving bugs to generating 94% of their production code, alongside key lessons on ambition and talent density for European founders.

## Atmosphere & style The conversation carries the pragmatic, cerebral energy of an insider corporate finance seminar blended with deep engineering rigor. Acharya acts as an inquisitive, admiring interlocutor who playfully prods at venture capital sacred cows, while Ferrari speaks in measured, highly analytical tones, methodically dismantling startup vanity metrics and market hype. The dialogue feels candid, disciplined, and intellectually clarifying, balancing cold mathematical realism with dry humor about Danish bureaucracy and human impatience.

## Bulletin - `10:00` Bending Spoons has executed between 50 and 60 acquisitions, creating an exponential compounding flywheel by optimizing acquired software EBITDA, leveraging earnings up to 3x, and reinvesting proceeds into larger targets. - `20:00` To eliminate the risk of insolvency while compounding via debt, the company enforces strict balance-sheet limits: keeping leverage around 2.4x to 2.5x, hedging 100% of interest rates, and rolling maturities out past five years. - `24:00` Luca Ferrari rejects the premise that cheap AI-generated code will eradicate scaled enterprise SaaS, noting that moats depend on switching costs, network effects, brand awareness, and proprietary hyper-local data rather than raw technical complexity. - `35:28` Internal operations at Bending Spoons have shifted aggressively toward automation: 94% of code is now written by AI, front-line customer support is handled almost 100% by AI, and over 90% of basic data analysis is machine-executed.

## Key takeaways - `00:00` Bending Spoons functions as a technology consolidator, migrating acquired companies onto a proprietary centralized platform to maximize long-term cash flow and lever earnings for future deals. - `02:08` True corporate re-acceleration from growth plateaus requires either step-change invention or sweeping macro tailwinds, both of which are rare and non-repeatable statistical outliers. - `03:45` Venture and public market investors routinely reward speculative multiples over fundamental discounted cash flow because their returns depend on selling equity in future liquidity events. - `05:18` Prioritizing massive fundamental cash flow over multiple expansion provides durable enterprise value, as significant earnings growth easily overcomes compressed exit multiples. - `10:00` While radical moonshots produce severe median downside, systematic incremental optimization compounds exponentially when paired with structured leverage and serial reinvestment. - `12:12` Founders frequently prioritize personal passion projects over genuine user needs; listening to customer pain points must be decoupled from letting customers architect product solutions. - `16:00` Multi-asset portfolio scale allows Bending Spoons to take calculated, positive expected-value bets without facing the existential personal ruin that single-product founders rationally avoid. - `18:58` Using debt to accelerate corporate returns is only rational under the strict condition that default risk remains negligible across adverse market conditions. - `26:30` Software moats are anchored in non-replicable dynamics like two-sided network density, crowdsourced proprietary data, and enterprise switching costs rather than the difficulty of writing code. - `30:00` The thesis that software firms trade below 'token value' for AI training data is flawed due to the steep diminishing returns of incremental training corpus data. - `31:18` Bending Spoons runs a suite of over 50 internal proprietary tools, enabling unified monolithic replatforming of acquired assets instead of integrating fragmented SaaS point solutions. - `33:55` Internal AI agents like 'Alt Spooner' compress engineering cycle times by inheriting employee permissions to autonomously investigate bugs, query databases, and write production fixes. - `37:25` Quantitative metrics and intuitive instincts should merely serve as hypothesis-generating inputs, with all strategic choices held to rigorous logical reasoning. - `41:17` Enduring tech companies require founders with intellectual independence, extreme ambition, strict first-principles rationality, and an uncompromising bar for day-one talent density.

## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` The Bending Spoons Compounding Playbook

At the Wave by Vento conference, Andreessen Horowitz general partner Anish Acharya introduces Bending Spoons co-founder and CEO Luca Ferrari, characterizing Bending Spoons as an “absolute monster company” that operates unlike traditional technology firms. Acharya jokes that working at Bending Spoons sounds uniquely compelling because it seems to combine the intellectual rigor and diversity of a McKinsey with the deep technological lean-in of a Google. When asked to provide the concise thirty-second overview of Bending Spoons' strategy before diving into technical mechanics, Ferrari explains that their core business model is straightforward on the surface: identify technology products that possess high potential, integrate them into a unified operational and technological foundation, optimize their economics over an extended time horizon, and reinvest the proceeds.

Ferrari explains that acquired assets are transitioned onto a single proprietary platform powered by Bending Spoons’ core infrastructure and central team, with an explicit goal of dramatically elevating their cash generation over a decade-long view. By taking the resulting earnings and layering on debt financing, the company systematically funds larger acquisitions. When Acharya asks about the scale of the portfolio, Ferrari notes that the firm has completed more than 50 acquisitions to date, counting major consumer and digital brands such as Vimeo, Eventbrite, Komoot, and WeTransfer among its public roster.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Bending Spoons Capital Allocation Flywheel accDescr: A cyclical flowchart illustrating how Bending Spoons acquires, optimizes, and compounds software assets. subgraph Engine["The Compounding Engine"] A["Identify & Acquire Tech Companies"] --> B["Integrate onto Shared Platform & Core Team"] B --> C["Transform Economics (10-Year Horizon)"] C --> D["Maximize Free Cash Flow Generation"] end D -->|"Leverage Earnings"| A ```

- Bending Spoons operates as a platform consolidator, migrating acquired software onto a unified foundational technology stack run by a centralized team. - The investment thesis hinges on transforming targets into highly cash-generative businesses evaluated over a 10-year holding period. - The generated cash flow is levered up to purchase progressively larger companies in a continuous cycle, with over 50 acquisitions executed so far. - As Luca Ferrari summarizes the flywheel: “And if we do that right, we take the extra earnings and lever them up and buy more bigger companies.”

`02:08` Bonds vs. Options: Can Plateaued Companies Re-Accelerate?

Acharya brings up a well-known framing by venture capitalist Marc Andreessen, who once quipped that equities do not truly exist: every company is either a “bond” that steadily yields cash over a long horizon, or an out-of-the-money “option” that may or may not hit a massive payoff. Acharya asks whether Ferrari agrees with this dichotomy, and whether software companies that have plateaued can ever genuinely reignite growth. Ferrari responds that while Andreessen’s phrasing is deliberately provocative, it reflects reality in broad strokes. True re-acceleration from a plateau does occur, but it typically requires radical invention or sweeping macro tailwinds, both of which are exceedingly rare.

To illustrate, Ferrari points to Apple’s launch of the iPhone as an extraordinary watershed invention that completely redefined the trajectory of a mature company. However, he cautions that such outcomes are extreme statistical outliers rather than repeatable patterns; run that counterfactual history ten times, and in eight of those alternate realities, Apple might never replicate that success or another player would beat them to it. Similarly, he cites NVIDIA’s transformation into a multi-trillion-dollar artificial intelligence juggernaut. While invention was essential, NVIDIA's explosive rise was propelled by massive external technological tailwinds, without which it might have simply remained a highly profitable, standalone graphics hardware business. For the vast majority of plateaued enterprises, relying on radical reinvention to save them is a low-probability gamble.

- Marc Andreessen’s market taxonomy reduces companies to cash-generating bonds or speculative venture options. - True corporate re-acceleration happens primarily through step-change invention (e.g., Apple creating the iPhone) or capitalizing on massive structural tailwinds (e.g., NVIDIA shifting from video game GPUs to AI infrastructure). - Ferrari cautions that counterfactual outcomes show how fragile breakthroughs are: “And if you run that history 10 other times, maybe eight times it doesn't happen.”

`03:45` The Rationality of Speculative Investor Math

The discussion turns to the underlying incentives of venture capital and public markets, exploring why investors routinely reward top-line growth over bottom-line operational cash generation. Ferrari acknowledges that while some investors genuinely miscalculate the underlying financial math and fail to understand the causal link between operational KPIs and durable enterprise value, many investors are actually highly sophisticated. Rather than behaving irrationally, they are incorporating market psychology into their valuation models: pricing assets based on what the next marginal buyer will pay in an upcoming round or M&A exit rather than discounting terminal cash flows.

Ferrari highlights how this dynamic creates a self-reinforcing equilibrium. If institutional investors operated under the strict constraint that they could never issue equity or sell their shares—relying solely on drawing down the organic cash flows of the business—they would direct management to make vastly different operating decisions. However, because value realization frequently hinges on subsequent financing rounds or secondary liquidity, optimizing for perceived valuation multiples becomes a rational strategy within that game. Even though this collective focus may lead to an inefficient equilibrium for the broader software economy, individual participants find it expensive and disadvantageous to deviate from the prevailing market paradigm.

- Investor decision-making often prices in the psychology of speculation rather than purely fundamental discounted cash flows. - Market participants optimize for subsequent funding rounds and acquisition multiples because liquidity events drive their returns. - Luca Ferrari argues that this incentive structure directly shapes governance: “If they were to assume to never sell a share, never issue equity, but just live off the cash flows from that business, I think they'll take different decisions than those they try to push management to take if they're assuming that most of the value creation will come from a sale or further rounds.”

`05:18` Compounding Cash Flows vs. Chasing Multiples

Acharya asks how founders and CEOs of single-product companies should navigate this tension: should they conform to market expectations of speculative growth, or should they focus on fundamental profit maximization even if it frustrates investors seeking outsized venture options? Ferrari frames this as an objective-function problem. Leaders must clearly identify their primary target, map the governing boundary conditions, and work backward to execute. If a founder's goal is to maximize immediate wealth via venture liquidity, playing along with speculative market multiples can be effective. However, founders can alternatively build an enterprise designed to compound durable cash flows and return capital through mechanisms like dividends or reinvestment.

Ferrari reflects that Bending Spoons chose the latter route, consciously resisting the pressure to optimize for short-term vanity valuations. On multiple occasions, the company could have acquired trendy assets or managed their balance sheet differently to satisfy transient venture or private equity appetites. Instead, management stayed disciplined around maximizing the compounding rate of free cash flow over decades. Ferrari points out that valuation is simply a mathematical product of cash flow and a multiple; if your underlying cash flow is ten times larger through operational excellence, the ultimate enterprise value will dwarf the alternative even if the prevailing multiple contracts. When Acharya observes how much alpha stems from adopting a long time horizon, Ferrari jokes that human biology works against patience, noting that modern media platforms like TikTok demonstrate how unnatural long-term thinking is for human beings.

- Strategic execution requires defining clear boundary conditions and determining whether the business is optimizing for equity sales or compounding cash. - Bending Spoons deliberately forfeited near-term valuation spikes to prioritize long-term free cash flow growth. - Mathematical scale in fundamentals outweighs multiple compression, as a tenfold increase in earnings offsets a lower exit multiple. - Remarking on the competitive advantage of patience, Luca Ferrari notes: “TikTok shows you how we're not exactly as a species inclined to being patient and attentive and long term oriented.”

`07:23` Radical Invention vs. Relentless Optimization

Acharya steers the conversation toward the operational decisions founders face post-acquisition. When Bending Spoons takes over an established company such as Vimeo or Evernote, leadership must decide at any given moment whether to allocate capital toward breakthrough invention or systematic optimization. Acharya asks whether Ferrari relies on a specific rule of thumb or framework to break ties between these two competing philosophies.

Ferrari responds that radical, step-change invention and continuous incremental optimization demand fundamentally distinct organizational qualities, cognitive mindsets, and execution skills. While continuous optimization can be intensely innovative in its own right, treating it as an either-or proposition is a mistake. Companies that go all-in on radical invention while neglecting operational efficiency end up fragile, whereas those that only optimize without any innovation eventually stagnate. Pointing to Apple, Ferrari notes that while the company built its brand on watershed inventions, it paired that creativity with extraordinary operational rigor, famously anchored by Tim Cook’s supply chain and operational discipline.

- Step-change invention and operational optimization require distinct cultural and intellectual mindsets within an organization. - Operational optimization involves substantial innovation of its own, rather than purely mechanical cost-cutting. - High-performing companies must avoid an all-or-nothing approach to either extreme, balancing inventive bets with rigorous operational execution. - Reflecting on organizational balance, Luca Ferrari observes: “I would say that any company that's all in on one at the expense of the other is probably not doing as well as it can.”

`10:00` Radical vs. Incremental Innovation and the Google Dilemma

Luca Ferrari argues that organizations must be deliberate about whether they pursue radical or incremental innovation because each path demands an entirely different culture and operational model. Radical innovation can produce astronomical peaks almost overnight—exemplified by Apple releasing the iPhone or Google pioneering internet search. However, Luca points out that even thirty years later, despite tens of billions of dollars poured into moonshots and acquisitions, Google is still roughly 80% search. While radical innovation yields massive wins when it hits, its median outcome is disastrous because the vast majority of bets lose everything. Incremental innovation, on the other hand, is dependable, measurable, and far more consistent.

While incrementally optimizing a single-product software-as-a-service (SaaS) business eventually hits a ceiling of diminishing returns, Luca explains that applying incremental optimization inside Bending Spoons turns it into an exponential engine. By doubling an acquired company's EBITDA from 100 to 200, leveraging up three times against those improved earnings, and reinvesting the proceeds into subsequent acquisitions, the strategy can compound into a 100x return over the long term. As Luca puts it: “So whether you choose radical innovation as your primary pursuit or incremental innovation depends on the broader strategy you're implementing, I believe.”

Anish Acharya observes that once a company invents something as dominant as Google search, it is almost rational to do nothing but optimize it forever. Luca agrees that while Google is one of the most admirable companies in history, one could make a compelling mathematical case that shareholders would have been better off had Google simply maximized search and returned the excess capital to investors to redeploy elsewhere. Anish pushes back playfully, noting that Google's research also produced the seminal Transformer paper that underpins the entire modern artificial intelligence revolution.

```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Bending Spoons Compounding Flywheel accDescr: Diagram showing how Bending Spoons acquires, optimizes, leverages, and reinvests cash to buy more companies. subgraph CoreEngine ["Optimization & Leverage"] A["Acquire Tech Asset\n(Base EBITDA: 100)"] --> B["Systematic Optimization\n(Expanded EBITDA: 200)"] B --> C["Leverage Up 3x\nAgainst Cash Flow"] end subgraph Reinvestment ["Compounding Growth"] C --> D["Acquire Additional\nTechnology Companies"] D -->|"Reinvest cash flow"| A end ```

- **Google's Revenue Concentration:** Approximately 80% of Google's business remains driven by search, even decades later and after billions invested in other initiatives. - **The Compounding Formula:** Taking a target generating 100 in EBITDA, optimizing it to 200, borrowing at roughly 3x leverage, and rolling that capital into new targets enables continuous, multi-decade compounding.

---

`12:12` Listening to Customers vs. Founder Passion Projects

Addressing how Bending Spoons evaluates user sentiment across its portfolio, Luca emphasizes that customer feedback is foundational to everything they do. Products exist because customers pay for them, meaning listening to user needs is non-negotiable. He acknowledges the irony in Bending Spoons having a public reputation for being ruthless optimizers who occasionally anger vocal users, contrasting that perception with the reality of how they build. In his view, many startup founders do not actually build what customers need, choosing instead to chase intellectual curiosities or personal passion projects under the guise of customer empathy.

Luca draws a sharp line between listening to what customers want and letting customers dictate how a product should be built. Users understand their own pain points, what excites them, and what goals they want to achieve far better than any company ever could. However, customers are rarely product designers; they lack the specialized skills or perspective to architect the ideal user experience. By focusing intensely on the customer's end goal while retaining full ownership of the execution, teams avoid building vanity features that do not move the needle.

Anish echoes this sentiment, agreeing that founders frequently construct elaborate narratives about serving user needs when they are actually just pursuing problems they personally find intellectually compelling. Regarding whether his own taste in problems has evolved over time, Luca reflects that while he has learned from past successes and failures, his core orientation has stayed consistent: he cares about solving complex problems that generate substantial value, rather than chasing whatever the broader tech ecosystem considers prestigious or glamorous.

> “A lot of companies in my experience actually don't build things primarily because they think customers really need them, but because they think they are interesting, exciting, that are more passion driven.” — Luca Ferrari

---

`14:48` Taste in Unsexy Problems and the Power of the Portfolio

Luca explains that he has never been motivated by building or buying "sexy" brands. Instead, he is drawn to thorny, complex operational problems where finding a creative solution unlocks substantial economic value. Even when an asset is viewed by the broader public as an outdated legacy product, the underlying fundamentals can be deeply compelling. He highlights Bending Spoons' acquisition of AOL as an example: despite many viewing AOL as an ancient internet relic, Luca considers it one of the most exciting and promising transactions Bending Spoons has ever completed.

Anish highlights the sheer scale of the Bending Spoons portfolio, noting they have completed roughly 50 acquisitions. Luca clarifies that the total is approximately 50 to 60 acquisitions to date. This multi-asset scale grants Bending Spoons an institutional advantage that single-product CEOs simply cannot replicate: the capacity to make high-upside, positive expected-value bets without facing existential personal risk.

> “So my taste in companies, if that's what you mean, is not really ever being, oh, this is a sexy brand. But if the problem is complex and solving it would create a lot of value, then I get excited.” — Luca Ferrari

- **Acquisition Count:** Bending Spoons has completed approximately 50 to 60 company acquisitions. - **Legacy Assets:** Legacy platforms like AOL are viewed by Bending Spoons as prime opportunities because operational turnaround and modernization can unlock immense value overlooked by brand-conscious buyers.

---

`16:00` The VC vs. Founder Risk Asymmetry and Bending Spoons’ Acquisition Moat

Referencing Luca's appearance on David Senra's *Founders* podcast, Anish asks whether single-product founders irrationally overweight downside risk and whether Luca would approach running a single-product company differently today. Having previously co-founded a single-product startup that failed, Luca defends single-product founders, arguing that their caution is entirely rational. Venture capitalists manage a portfolio of 50 companies and actively want every founder to drive full speed into a wall because the few who make it through the narrow doorway yield 100x fund-returning outcomes, while the ones who crash are written off.

For an individual founder or executive team, however, that dynamic is inverted. Going slightly slower might forfeit a tiny probability of a 100x outcome, but it significantly protects their median case from dropping to zero. Because founders have only one life and one career, guarding against total ruin is a sensible calculation rather than a math error. Anish points out that this makes Bending Spoons a vital home for scaled, innovative products that hit a ceiling short of the stratosphere. Luca agrees, noting that their acquisition track record proves product-market fit in capital markets: whenever Bending Spoons extends an offer to acquire a business, the seller either decides not to sell at all or sells exclusively to Bending Spoons rather than a competitor.

> “And you may want each of these companies to go 100 miles per hour against the wall. And you know that the four or five who get to go through the door, which is very narrow, will win 100x. And the others will crash and burn.” — Luca Ferrari

> “Proof being that you know every time we have made an offer to someone to buy their company either they chose not to sell or they sold it to us not to someone else.” — Luca Ferrari

---

`18:58` The Mechanics of Using Debt to Accelerate Compounding

Anish shifts the conversation to Bending Spoons’ mastery of debt and credit markets, noting that while leverage has ruined many technology companies, Bending Spoons has weaponized it into a primary growth engine. He asks Luca to explain the principles behind utilizing debt strategically without exposing the organization to lethal downside.

Luca explains that leverage simply allows a business to do more things faster and sooner than equity or cash flow alone would permit. From a pure corporate finance perspective, borrowing is a rational choice whenever the expected return on invested capital comfortably exceeds the interest rate on the debt. However, Luca stresses that this logic holds true only under one strict condition: the risk of default must remain completely negligible. The moment the probability of defaulting becomes tangible, taking on additional debt ceases to be an obvious calculation and turns into a reckless hazard.

> “Sure. So, well, that helps you basically do more sooner, faster. And assuming your expected returns from those investments are higher than the cost of debt, it's always smart to take that with one big caveat, which is assuming the risk of defaulting on your debt remains negligible, because obviously if you become significant, then it's not a no brainer any longer that taking the extra risk makes sense.” — Luca Ferrari

`20:00` Disciplined Debt and the Paranoia of Survival

Luca Ferrari reflects on the fatal optimism of founders who rely heavily on debt, pointing out that everyone who eventually went bust seemed completely fine and bullish right up until the collapse. Unless driven by perverse incentives, most founders genuinely believed they were safe until market conditions shifted. Because boundary conditions can change abruptly, Ferrari argues that founders must remain paranoid when taking on credit, rather than underestimating downside probabilities.

To safeguard Bending Spoons against catastrophic downside, Ferrari enforces strict self-imposed balance-sheet limits:

- **Leverage Ratios:** Maintained well below 3x, sitting around 2.4x to 2.5x today and historically closer to 2x. - **Full Payback Capacity:** Sized to enable paying off 100% of outstanding debt before maturity, even under severely adverse economic scenarios. - **Maturity Horizons:** Refinancing most debt every 1 to 2 years to keep fixed maturities pushed at least five or more years out. - **Complete Hedging:** 100% of debt is hedged against interest rate fluctuations, making future interest expenses entirely predictable. - **Underlying Cash Engine:** Backed by high diversification, strong baseline profitability, and high cash conversion.

As Luca puts it: “Rule number one to win and be that huge success is not having failed in the meantime.” He emphasizes that building a massive, enduring company takes at least a decade, so it is far wiser to take two to three years longer with limited risk than to accelerate growth only to crash and burn.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bending Spoons Debt and Risk Mitigation Framework accDescr: Visual framework showing capital guardrails, portfolio fundamentals, and core risk outcomes.

subgraph Guardrails["Balance Sheet Guardrails"] L["Leverage Limits<br/>(Sub-3x, Target ~2x-2.5x)"] H["100% Hedged<br/>Interest Rates"] M["Rolling Maturities<br/>(Refinanced to 5+ Years)"] end

subgraph Fundamentals["Portfolio Fundamentals"] C["High Cash Conversion<br/>& Profitability"] D["Multi-Product Diversification"] end

subgraph Outcome["Core Objective"] S["Near-Zero Default Risk<br/>Decade-Plus Survival"] end

Guardrails --> S Fundamentals --> S ```

Anish Acharya agrees that founders should show high ambition in product bets while remaining cautious on credit. Luca notes that while diversification helps, it is not an absolute shield because seemingly distinct assets can exhibit unexpected correlations during systemic macro shocks. Still, when managed with sophisticated modeling and strict checks, debt provides immense compounding power, mirroring serial acquirers like Broadcom and TransDigm: “There's plenty of companies that have used debt consistently in history, you know, Broadcom, TransDigm, and have done incredibly well for many decades. And they wouldn't have done nearly as well had they not used debt.”

---

`24:00` The SaaSpocalypse, Multiple Resets, and Technical Replicability

Anish turns the conversation to the panic surrounding the "SaaSpocalypse"—sparked by fears over frontier models like Claude Opus—where public software stocks tumbled 40% before recovering. He asks where true software durability lies when AI makes creating code virtually effortless. Luca contends that historic SaaS valuations were already detached from reality, sustained only by speculative multiple expansion and the flawed assumption that 12% organic growth rates could persist for 15 years. Because organic growth almost always decays over time, the arrival of AI simply served as a convenient excuse for analysts to walk back unjustifiable assumptions and reset multiples to reasonable levels.

However, Luca rejects the narrative that cheap code spells immediate doom for scaled enterprise software. He argues that technically replicating software has been cheap for decades:

> “Writing software has been visibly cheap for a long time. And most of the companies that matter, you know, scale companies worth at least, I don't know, a billion dollars. The cost of replicating their product technically was negligible relative to the value of being a winner or gaining significant market share in that market, even five or ten years ago.”

He notes that replicating Salesforce is not rocket science; twenty strong engineers could build the core system. Similarly, five fresh college graduates working in a garage for three months could replicate 80% of Bending Spoons' WeTransfer—and dozens of teams have already launched identical file-transfer clones. Yet, clones fail to displace incumbents because technical complexity is rarely the moat. Digital products succeed due to first-mover status, embedded brand awareness, and psychological switching costs. An enterprise generating $1 billion in revenue will not risk breaking mission-critical workflows just to save $3,000 switching away from an established vendor.

---

`26:30` Moats That AI Cannot Replicate: Networks, Data, and Scale Economics

Luca illustrates enduring software moats through Bending Spoons’ portfolio companies, detailing why code replication fails to threaten their market positions:

- **Network Effects (Eventbrite):** Anyone can build an event-ticketing platform, but Eventbrite attracts 90 million monthly ticket-seekers. Event organizers list where attendees gather, and attendees browse where events are hosted. An AI generating millions of platform replicas cannot duplicate the buyer-seller audience. - **Proprietary Hyper-Local Data (Komoot):** Navigating outdoor trails relies on proprietary community intelligence. Komoot possesses years of granular user submissions—such as noting that a specific turn is muddy, an unmapped tree fell, or a dog is barking along a rural route—along with crowdsourced corner photos absent from satellite imagery. Competitors can recreate the routing algorithm, but they lack the underlying real-world data. - **Enterprise Scale Economics (Airtable):** Most large enterprise accounts pay Airtable under $20,000 annually. Even if a future AI agent can instantaneously regenerate Airtable's entire codebase, enterprise governance still requires internal oversight. Allocating even 0.2 full-time equivalent (FTE) of an internal software engineer to monitor, test, and maintain a synthetic, self-hosted clone costs more than the annual Airtable subscription. As Luca puts it: “As long as you have someone being responsible for things, even just a 0.2 FTE of a software engineer, it would still cost you more than paying Airtable for the same thing.”

Luca clarifies that while incumbents will feel marginal pressure—particularly as AI search agents alter discovery patterns and guide prospective buyers toward alternative tools—core enterprise software will not vanish overnight. Anish seconds this view, noting that enterprise software accounts for only 8% to 10% of total company spending. In enterprise IT budgets, pointing expensive AI compute and agent workflows at re-architecting baseline utilities like payroll is fundamentally “a high downside, low upside proposition.”

`30:00` The Rapidly Diminishing Returns of Proprietary Data

Anish Acharya asks Luca Ferrari about a prevailing theory in the market: whether many software companies are actually trading for less than their "token value"—the price they would command if acquired purely for their proprietary data to train AI models. Luca expresses skepticism about this thesis, arguing that the value of incremental training data drops off steeply over time. He draws an analogy to publishing on the web: while an AI lab might have paid substantial sums for the very first blog post ever accessed to build its foundational corpus, an incremental blog post written today adds almost zero marginal value.

Luca acknowledges that early movers who sell specialized data domains (such as project management workflows) might capture initial windfalls. However, because marginal training returns inevitably deteriorate, the long-term enterprise value supported purely by data sales quickly trends toward zero. As Luca Ferrari notes:

> “The first companies selling that maybe make a bunch of money, but I think over time that trends to zero as the, you know, the quality of incremental training, returns deteriorate for incremental training.”

---

`31:18` Bending Spoons’ Proprietary Operating Platform

When Anish inquires about the internal infrastructure Bending Spoons uses to systematically optimize acquired assets, Luca details their philosophy of building nearly everything in-house. Apart from universal commodities like Gmail, Slack, and Google Drive, Bending Spoons develops its entire operational stack internally. This proprietary suite spans over 50 distinct tools, covering data processing, A/B testing, marketing automation, lifetime value (LTV) prediction, credentials management, and recruiting.

While saving on third-party SaaS vendor subscriptions is an obvious side effect, Luca emphasizes that cost reduction is not the primary game-changer. The true strategic advantage stems from having bespoke tools tailored specifically to their operational playbooks, deeply and natively integrated with one another. When acquiring a business, this cohesive foundation allows Bending Spoons to execute a complete, monolithic replatforming in a single move. Replacing an entire operational foundation in one shot proves significantly faster and less prone to integration debt than piecemeal swapping and patching disparate off-the-shelf vendor solutions. As Luca Ferrari explains:

> “It’s actually much faster to change the entire thing in one, or more or less the entire thing in one shot than removing one piece, and then you place the alternative, and you need to plug it to everything else.”

- **Scale of Internal Tooling:** Over 50 proprietary tools built in-house. - **Scope:** Covers data pipelines, A/B experimentation, marketing automation, user LTV forecasting, identity/credentials, and recruiting. - **Integration Advantage:** Eliminates cross-vendor glue code and allows unified replatforming of acquired companies.

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`33:55` "Alt Spooner": The Autonomous Internal AI Agent

Luca highlights that while high-performing tools still rely heavily on the talent and culture of the humans operating them, Bending Spoons has developed autonomous internal systems that deliver massive leverage. The primary example is "Alt Spooner" (alternative Spooner), an internal agent embedded directly inside Slack. Alt Spooner inherits the exact permissions, GitHub repositories, and Google Drive access of the employee interacting with it, allowing team members to delegate complex multi-step tasks conversationally.

If Alt Spooner lacks clearance for a specific database or asset, it autonomously routes an escalation to internal credentials management and IT security before fetching the data, executing the analysis, and rendering charts and insights in minutes. Luca shares a concrete case study from Evernote to illustrate the dramatic compression of cycle times:

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Alt Spooner Evernote Bug Resolution Flow accDescr: Step-by-step workflow of Alt Spooner investigating a bug report, writing code, and tagging an engineering lead. subgraph Trigger ["1. Feedback Ingestion"] A["Evernote GM spots bug in Slack feedback channel"] --> B["Prompts Alt Spooner to investigate"] end

subgraph Investigation ["2. Context & Root Cause"] B --> C["Queries Moros (internal CS tool) for user reports"] C --> D["Inspects Evernote codebase for root cause"] end

subgraph Resolution ["3. Fix & Verification"] D --> E["Generates code fix"] E --> F["Pings Marco (Engineering Lead) for code review"] end ```

Luca Ferrari highlights the massive step-change in operational velocity achieved by this workflow:

> “And it got done, and that would... I mean, it was a hundred times better than what was possible before.”

---

`35:28` Automating Functions: Support, Data Science, and 94% AI-Generated Code

Turning to the question of whether AI will function merely as an individual copilot or completely absorb entire job functions, Luca states that several areas are already transitioning toward full automation. Customer support at Bending Spoons has evolved fundamentally: front-line ticket handling is handled nearly 100% by AI models and external residual vendors. Internal customer support managers no longer draft responses; instead, they operate like product managers, designing the rules, user experience, and architecture of automated support flows across email, phone calls, and WhatsApp.

Data analysis has undergone a similar transformation. Over 90% of manual data fetching, sanitization, and plotting is carried out by AI, freeing human data scientists to focus on higher-level architectural work, software development, and recurring financial/budgeting infrastructure. Software engineering has seen an even more dramatic shift. Two years prior, 0% of Bending Spoons’ code was written by AI; today, that number stands at 94%. Luca Ferrari states:

> “Last time I checked, I’m at 94%.”

Luca argues that any high-performing engineering organization should currently have between 70% and 99% of its code generated by AI models, adding:

> “There’s no point.”

Anish agrees with the sentiment, noting that engineering organizations everywhere should be rapidly converging toward 100%.

---

`37:25` Data vs. Instinct in Decision-Making

Anish asks how Luca balances analytics against intuition, particularly given that large language models often manufacture a sense of false precision. Luca rejects the idea that a leader must choose between being purely instinct-driven or purely data-driven. Instead, he treats both quantitative data and subjective intuition as mere inputs feeding into a single, rigorous reasoning framework.

A creative flash or gut feeling is valuable because it surfaces ideas or options that raw analysis might miss, just as a data point highlighting regional user behavior surfaces empirical facts. However, neither should dictate a course of action on its own without subjecting the hypothesis to strict logical examination. As Luca Ferrari emphasizes:

> “But then, I don’t think there’s ever any case in life where you should be deciding with anything other than logic and rationality.”

He explains that excitement or gut instinct should never serve as the sole justification for a business decision:

> “You want to ponder them and determine whether that excitement is justified and if so, yeah, go for it.”

---

`38:52` The Dilemma of When to Quit: Lessons from Evertail

Anish concludes by addressing the emotional dilemma faced by founders caught in the purgatory of "never winning and never quitting," asking how an entrepreneur can know whether to pull the plug or grind for another three months. Luca candidly admits that he struggles to offer neat advice because he experienced that exact failure firsthand.

Prior to founding Bending Spoons, Luca spent three years running a startup called Evertail. The company attempted to use early AI techniques to generate automated personal diaries for users. Despite pouring years into the concept, the product simply never gained traction. Reflecting on that prolonged struggle, Luca Ferrari admits:

> “We were trying to use AI way too early, clearly, to write diaries for people automatically.”

`40:00` Danish Red Tape and the Pivot That Created Bending Spoons

Reflecting on the painful early days before finding product-market fit, Luca Ferrari describes a protracted struggle where users were neither engaging with their product nor willing to pay for it. The team kept pushing forward by raising small amounts of additional capital and executing pivot after pivot. Eventually, the company reached a critical financial brink with only around $250,000 to $300,000 remaining on paper. A substantial portion of that remaining capital was tied up in an expected tax return from the Danish government, as the business was based in Denmark at the time.

Disaster struck when Danish authorities informed the team that the tax refund either was not due at all or would be delayed by twelve months—a timeline that effectively meant insolvency. Luca jokes that he is poorly qualified to advise founders on knowing when to quit or pivot, because external circumstances took the choice entirely out of their hands: “And so you could argue that red tape made the decision for us.” Anish Acharya quips in response, “Bureaucracy created Bending Spoons. You heard it here first.”

- The initial startup struggled with zero user traction and zero willingness to pay, requiring repeated pivots on scarce funding. - With roughly $250,000 to $300,000 left, the company relied on an anticipated Danish tax rebate to stay alive. - A sudden 12-month delay or denial of the tax refund forced an abrupt operational reckoning, ultimately clearing the path for the founding of Bending Spoons.

---

`41:17` Lessons for European Founders: Ambition, Rationality, and Talent Density

Turning to the broader ecosystem, Anish asks what prospective founders building the next great technology company in Italy or across Europe should take away from Bending Spoons’ journey. Luca emphasizes that founders must first and foremost be intellectually independent and take complete ownership of their choices. While subjective, he points to three foundational pillars that he considers universally vital for entrepreneurial success: extreme ambition, unyielding rationality, and unrelenting talent density.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Core Principles for Next-Generation Founders accDescr: Luca Ferrari's three primary recommendations for ambitious founders building durable technology companies.

subgraph Mindset["Foundational Mindset"] A["Intellectual Independence<br/>('Think with your own head')"] end

subgraph Pillars["The Three Core Pillars"] B["Extreme Ambition<br/>Aim exceptionally high"] C["Ruthless Rationality<br/>First-principles & logic"] D["High Talent Density<br/>Non-negotiable bar from day one"] end

Mindset --> B Mindset --> C Mindset --> D ```

Addressing ambition, Luca notes that life only allows an entrepreneur to pursue a finite number of endeavors, and aiming high inherently offers a higher likelihood of long-term fulfillment. While acknowledging that phrases like "shoot for the moon" have lost some luster due to crypto hype, he stresses that aiming exceptionally high remains essential. Second, he argues that passion and creativity must always be anchored in logic. Pointing to Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Elon Musk, and Jeff Bezos, Luca argues that while these leaders are celebrated for vision, their true superpower is rigorous, first-principles analysis rather than chasing ideas merely because they sound appealing. Finally, he warns founders never to compromise on talent density at the start, because elevating a team's caliber after beginning with a mediocre baseline is virtually impossible: “I've never seen a great entrepreneur, a great inventor, a great engineer, a great artist, a great anything who doesn't ultimately take responsibility for their own decisions and is intellectually independent.”

- **Intellectual independence:** Great builders cannot rely on consensus; they must think independently and bear the full weight of their conclusions. - **Ambition:** Because time is limited, aiming high is statistically and psychologically more rewarding than pursuing modest, incremental projects. - **Rationality over novelty:** Legendary tech pioneers evaluate empirical facts and first principles rather than chasing ideas just because they seem cool. - **Talent density:** The talent baseline established on day one sets the ceiling; attempting to fix low talent density retroactively is an almost insurmountable challenge.

## Notable quotes > `20:00` Rule number one to win and be that huge success is not having failed in the meantime. — Luca Ferrari

> `37:25` I don’t think there’s ever any case in life where you should be deciding with anything other than logic and rationality. — Luca Ferrari

> `41:17` I've never seen a great entrepreneur, a great inventor, a great engineer, a great artist, a great anything who doesn't ultimately take responsibility for their own decisions and is intellectually independent. — Luca Ferrari

> `05:18` TikTok shows you how we're not exactly as a species inclined to being patient and attentive and long term oriented. — Luca Ferrari

> `12:12` A lot of companies in my experience actually don't build things primarily because they think customers really need them, but because they think they are interesting, exciting, that are more passion driven. — Luca Ferrari

## Mentioned Airtable, Alt Spooner, Andreessen Horowitz, Anish Acharya, AOL, Apple, Bending Spoons, Bill Gates, Broadcom, Claude Opus, David Senra, Elon Musk, Eventbrite, Evernote, Evertail, Founders podcast, Gmail, Google, Google Drive, Jeff Bezos, Komoot, Luca Ferrari, Marc Andreessen, McKinsey, NVIDIA, Salesforce, Slack, Steve Jobs, TikTok, Tim Cook, TransDigm, Vento, Vimeo, Wave by Vento, WeTransfer, WhatsApp

## Video description Can relentless optimization create as much value as breakthrough invention? Bending Spoons CEO Luca Ferrari argues that radical innovation can produce extraordinary outcomes, but systematic improvement can be more dependable, especially when paired with a model designed to compound over decades. Speaking with a16z General Partner Anish Acharya at Wave by Vento, Luca explains how Bending Spoons acquires technology companies, integrates them onto a shared platform, improves their economics, and reinvests the resulting cash into new acquisitions. They discuss the tradeoffs between growth and profitability, how to use debt without putting the company at risk, and why long-term thinking can create an advantage. They also debate whether AI really threatens SaaS, why moats like brand, proprietary data, network effects, and switching costs still matter, and how Bending Spoons is already using AI across coding, customer support, and data analysis.

[Source](https://mgln.ai/e/1344/afp-848985-injected.calisto.simplecastaudio.com/3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8/episodes/be537ca6-f09e-4793-97fd-a93564022378/audio/128/default.mp3?aid=rss_feed&awCollectionId=3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8&awEpisodeId=be537ca6-f09e-4793-97fd-a93564022378&feed=JGE3yC0V)

中文简报

Bending Spoons如何打造200亿美元复合增长机器 | Luca Ferrari Luca Ferrari阐述了Bending Spoons背后的运营引擎,解释了收购进入瓶颈期的数字化产品并将其迁移至统一的自研技术栈,如何将渐进式优化转变为指数级的复合增长载体。他剖析了公司审慎的债务策略,详述了严格的杠杆上限和展期到期日安排,这些措施在为更大规模交易提供资金的同时,消除了关乎生死存亡的违约风险。讨论还进一步审视了现代软件护城河的现实情况——例如网络效应和专有数据集——阐明了廉价代码为何无法取代根基稳固的行业在位者。最后,Ferrari详细介绍了Bending Spoons在内部对AI的激进采用,从自主智能体修复漏洞到生成其94%的生产代码,并为欧洲创业者分享了关于雄心与人才密度的关键经验。 Bending Spoons已完成50到60笔收购,通过优化所收购软件的EBITDA、利用高达3倍收益的杠杆,并将收益重新投资于更大的目标,打造了一个指数级复合增长飞轮。 (10:00) 为了在通过债务实现复合增长的同时消除破产风险,该公司执行严格的资产负债表限制:将杠杆率保持在2.4倍至2.5倍左右,对利率进行100%对冲,并将债务到期日展期至五年以上。 (20:00) Luca Ferrari驳斥了廉价AI生成代码将彻底颠覆规模化企业SaaS的观点,指出护城河依赖于转换成本、网络效应、品牌知名度和专有超本地数据,而非纯粹的技术复杂度。 (24:00) Bending Spoons的内部运营已激进地转向自动化:目前94%的代码由AI编写,一线客户支持几乎100%由AI处理,超过90%的基础数据分析由机器执行。 (35:28)

Reading summary

Bending Spoons co-founder and CEO Luca Ferrari argues that software holding companies can compound long-term enterprise value by acquiring plateaued technology assets, integrating them into a shared operational and technical foundation, and funding larger transactions through conservatively managed debt. The Platform Compounding and Leverage Flywheel (0:00) Bending Spoons operates as a platform consolidator that migrates acquired technology products onto a proprietary, unified infrastructure managed by a centralized team. Ferrari explains that rather than chasing short-term venture valuations driven by speculative next-round pricing, the company evaluates businesses over a decade-long holding period. By focusing on fundamental cash flow, a business might double an acquired asset's EBITDA from 100 to 200, secure credit against the improved earnings, and redeploy that capital into progressively larger targets. The firm has executed between 50 and 60 acquisitions, including assets like Vimeo, Eventbrite, Komoot, and WeTransfer. Disciplined Credit Guardrails for Survival (20:00) While acknowledging that debt has ruined many software enterprises, Ferrari views credit as a compounding catalyst, citing companies like Broadcom and TransDigm that used leverage without defaulting. To prevent catastrophic balance-sheet shocks, Bending Spoons keeps leverage ratios below 3x—typically between 2x and 2.5x—and limits debt to amounts that could be repaid entirely before maturity even under severely adverse economic scenarios. Ferrari also hedges 100% of interest-rate exposure and refinances every one to two years to keep fixed debt maturities pushed at least five years out. Incremental Innovation Versus Step-Change Invention (10:00) Addressing the tension between breakthrough invention and operational optimization, Ferrari contends that true corporate re-acceleration through radical breakthroughs is an extreme statistical anomaly. Pointing to Google, he notes that despite tens of billions poured into speculative bets over decades, roughly 80% of its revenue remains search. While single-product SaaS companies eventually hit ceilings of diminishing returns through incremental optimization, applying that optimization across a diversified portfolio turns systematic efficiency into an exponential growth engine. Defensibility Beyond Code in the AI Era (24:00) Ferrari dismisses concerns that artificial intelligence will destroy incumbent software value simply by making code cheap to generate, arguing that software has long been inexpensive to replicate technically. Five engineers could replicate 80% of WeTransfer within months, yet clones fail because software moats stem from distribution, brand trust, switching friction, and scale economics. Defensible advantages include Eventbrite's two-sided marketplace of 90 million monthly ticket-seekers and Komoot's proprietary hyper-local trail data. Furthermore, enterprise governance hurdles mean self-hosting a synthetic clone often costs more in engineering oversight than standard enterprise software subscriptions. Proprietary Tooling and Internal Automation (31:18) Internally, Bending Spoons develops almost its entire operational software stack in-house—maintaining over 50 tools spanning A/B testing, marketing automation, LTV forecasting, and hiring—which enables monolithic replatforming of acquired companies in a single migration. The firm also deploys an autonomous internal agent, 'Alt Spooner,' within Slack to investigate codebases and resolve user bugs. Ferrari states that front-line customer support is handled nearly 100% by AI, data scientists offload over 90% of manual data prep to automated models, and approximately 94% of the company's software code is AI-generated. Ferrari attributes Bending Spoons' trajectory to intellectual independence, high talent density, and cold rationality over founder vanity projects, though he notes that systemic macroeconomic shocks can still challenge portfolio diversification models.

精炼阅读摘要

Bending Spoons 联合创始人兼首席执行官 Luca Ferrari 阐述了公司的资本复利模式:通过收购具有高潜力的成熟科技资产,将其迁移至统一的自研平台进行系统性优化,并借助高度自律的杠杆与 AI 自动化实现长期自由现金流的再投资。 资本复利飞轮与平台化整合 (0:00) Bending Spoons 的核心战略并非押注偶发性的颠覆式创新,而是系统性收购具备韧性的技术资产,并将其迁移到单一的自研底层技术平台和集中团队上。Ferrari 解释,公司以十年期持有视角重构标的资产的商业模式,目标是将收购标的的 EBITDA 从 100 提升至 200,随后以其产生的强劲现金流支撑约 3 倍杠杆,进而收购规模更大的企业。目前该公司已累计完成 50 至 60 笔收购,涵盖 Vimeo、Eventbrite、Komoot、AOL 及 WeTransfer 等品牌。 Ferrari 认为,虽然风险投资和公开市场常常为即时估值倍数与概念炒作提供溢价,但长期的企业价值本质上是基本面现金流与乘数的数学乘积。即便面临估值倍数压缩,只要底层自由现金流通过运营优化提升十倍,最终实现的资产价值仍将远超短期投机策略。这种以资本回报与复利为导向的框架,构成了其有别于传统单品型 SaaS 软件公司的底层逻辑。 审慎的债务杠杆与生存偏执 (18:58) 在科技行业中过度举债往往导致企业破产,但 Ferrari 认为,只要资本回报率显著高于借贷成本且违约概率保持在极低水平,负债就是加速复利增长的理性工具。Ferrari 强调商业生存的不可逆性,指出胜出的第一法则是在漫长的十年周期中不发生爆仓,因此公司实施了极为严苛的资产负债表风控纪律。 具体而言,Bending Spoons 将杠杆率严格控制在 3 倍以下(目前维持在 2.4 至 2.5 倍,历史水平接近 2 倍);债务期限每隔 1 至 2 年滚动再融资,确保固定到期日始终推迟在 5 年以上;同时对利率风险进行 100% 对冲,并确保即使在极端不利的宏观环境下,也有能力在到期前全额偿付本金。通过多资产组合的高现金转化率与分散度,公司借鉴了 Broadcom 与 TransDigm 等连续收购者的长周期资本运作模式。 技术复制的廉价性与非代码护城河 (24:00) 面对大语言模型引发的“SaaS 终结”恐慌,Ferrari 认为此前公开市场 SaaS 的估值泡沫本身就建立在不切实际的长期增长假设之上,AI 的爆发只是促使估值乘数合理回归的契机。他指出,技术代码的快速复制在行业内并非新鲜事,即便在数年前,开发出核心系统以复制 Salesforce 或 WeTransfer 这类产品的工程成本,相对于成为行业赢家的经济价值而言也微不足道。 决定软件资产真正壁垒的并非代码本身,而是双边网络效应、专有现实数据与企业的规模经济。以 Eventbrite 为例,其每月拥有 9000 万的购票受众,这是纯代码克隆所无法复制的双边流动性;Komoot 拥有用户多年累积的泥泞路况、倒塌树木及拐角实景照片等极具黏性的专有超本地数据;而像 Airtable 这种企业级应用,年费仅需数万美元,企业客户若自行指派 0.2 个全职工程师来维护 AI 生成的替代代码,其人力成本与治理风险也会高于订阅费本身。此外,Ferrari 对“数据资产出售”的商业逻辑持怀疑态度,认为增量训练数据的边际价值衰减极其迅速,长期很难支撑独立的企业估值。 自研基础设施与深度 AI 自动化 (31:18) Bending Spoons 拒绝拼凑第三方 SaaS 工具链,除 Gmail、Slack 和 Google Drive 等通用基础设施外,自主研发了涵盖数据流水线、A/B 测试、生命周期价值预测、权限管理及招聘等超过 50 款核心工具。这种高度集成的专有平台使公司在收购新资产时,能够以“整平台单次切换”的方式完成系统重构,极大削减了跨工具连接的技术债务与集成摩擦。 在日常运营中,公司深度部署了名为“Alt Spooner”的自主 AI 智能体,直接嵌入 Slack 并继承对应员工的系统权限与代码库访问权限,能够自主完成用户反馈归因、检索内部客服工单、生成代码修复补丁并交由工程主管审核。Ferrari 披露,公司的一线客服已近乎 100% 由 AI 及外部供应商承接,内部人员转型为流程架构师;90% 以上的手工数据抓取与制图由 AI 自动化完成;而在软件研发层面,全公司目前已有 94% 的代码由 AI 模型生成,两年前该比例为 0%。 Ferrari 认为,宏伟野心必须以严苛的第一性原理和理性逻辑为锚,过早的产品妥协往往无法带来长期复利。尽管其平台化聚合与高杠杆优化模型在过去十余年中展现出强劲的抗风险能力,但这一模式仍高度依赖于宏观信贷市场的平稳度,以及自研技术平台能否持续承载异构业务的整合速度。

Detailed notes — zh

## Background 本期内容由 Anish Acharya 与 Luca Ferrari 于 2026 年 11 月在播客平台发布。节目记录了 a16z 投资合伙人 Anish Acharya 在意大利 Wave by Vento 大会上对谈 Bending Spoons 联合创始人兼 CEO Luca Ferrari 的过程,重点探讨了 Bending Spoons 如何通过系统性优化、收购优质资产、平台化整合与债务杠杆打造一家估值数百亿美元的长期复利机器,以及 AI 时代下软件护城河的演变和内部组织革新。 ## TL;DR 对谈中,Luca Ferrari 深度拆解了 Bending Spoons 独特的商业闭环:以 10 年为周期收购具备潜力的科技资产,将其无缝迁入包含 50 余款自研工具的单一底层平台,利用极致运营提升现金流,再以极度克制的债务杠杆(净杠杆长年控制在 2.5 倍以下)进行滚雪球式再投资。面对“AI 终结 SaaS”的论调,他指出代码本身并非壁垒,网络效应、专有数据与品牌迁移成本才是真正的护城河,并披露公司内部已有 94% 的代码由 AI 自动生成,客服与数据分析亦被高度重构。最后,Ferrari 结合早年险些因税务拖延而破产的经历,告诫创业者必须坚守独立思考、追求极致的人才密度,并永远以冷峻的理性与逻辑作为决策的唯一基石。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对话洋溢着欧陆理性主义与硅谷务实雄心碰撞的智慧火花。Luca Ferrari 的谈吐冷静、克制而极具智识诚实,言语间没有任何浮夸的宏大叙事,而是以近乎外科手术般精准的财务与工程逻辑,剖析资本市场博弈与企业生死风控;主持人 Anish Acharya 则提问犀利且充满赞赏,两人在一问一答的推演与自嘲中形成了高度的认知共鸣。聆听过程宛如置身一场顶级商业架构师的内部战略闭门会,既有逆向投资的深邃定力,又有经历早期濒死挣扎后沉淀出的冷峻清醒。 ## Bulletin - `00:00` Bending Spoons 迄今已完成 50 多起并购(包括 Evernote、Vimeo、WeTransfer 等),通过整合底层平台、系统化提升现金流并施加 2-3 倍审慎债务杠杆,驱动几何级复利循环。 - `25:20` 针对 AI 摧毁软件护城河的论调,Luca Ferrari 认为低成本代码无法打破网络效应、用户心智、独家数据及运维权责成本构筑的壁垒;企业重新造轮子的边际成本往往远超软件订阅费。 - `35:28` Bending Spoons 内部软件代码已有 94% 由 AI 编写,基础数据分析与客服几乎全量转由 AI 或自动化流程接管,人工转向规则架构设计。 - `20:00` 公司通过净杠杆保持在 3 倍以下、全额利率对冲、债务滚动再融资锁定 5 年以上久期等风控纪律,使违约风险趋近于零,践行“活下来才能成为赢家”的核心法则。 ## Key takeaways - `00:00` Bending Spoons 的核心飞轮是收购具潜力的科技公司,迁移至自研底层平台改造并放大现金流,再以债务杠杆复利收购更大规模的资产。 - `02:30` 类似 iPhone 或英伟达的颠覆性发明重获二次加速极其罕见,多数公司在增长触顶后更应视为稳定产生现金的债券,而非虚值期权。 - `04:30` 资本市场追逐短期估值倍数是局部最优下的理性博弈,但坚守自由现金流这一“底数”复利扩张,最终收益将远超追求估值乘数。 - `10:00` 激进创新中位数回报极差,而渐进式优化具备高确定性,配合杠杆和复利飞轮能将企业价值放大百倍。 - `12:35` 做产品应严格区隔倾听客户痛点(What & Why)与技术方案设计(How),不应盲目听从客户的方案,更不该出于创始人自身兴奋而做“酷”产品。 - `15:00` 单产品创始人出于职业生涯风险拒绝正期望值激进下注是理性的,而多产品组合平台则能系统性承担此类风险并保持极高的并购撮合率。 - `20:00` 债务杠杆的第一法则是违约风险必须趋近于零;公司通过 3 倍以下低净杠杆、100% 利率对冲、拉长债务久期和强劲现金流筑牢防线。 - `23:40` 所谓“SaaS 大溃败”本质是回归自由现金流折现的估值挤泡沫,而非单纯由 AI 冲击所致。 - `25:20` AI 降低写代码门槛无法击穿成熟 SaaS 护城河,品牌习惯、双边网络效应、专有实地数据和系统运维的权责成本依然稳固。 - `30:00` 私有训练数据边际价值衰减极其迅速,售卖数据难以支撑超越公司基本面的企业价值估值泡沫。 - `31:18` Bending Spoons 自研了 50 多个内部系统,在并购后采用“连根拔起并整体换新”的单体平台迁移策略,效率远高于拼凑第三方软件。 - `33:45` 常驻 Slack 的自研智能体“Alt Spooner”能跨权限自主抓取数据、排查 Bug 并编写补丁,推动研发效率大幅提升。 - `35:28` 内部 AI 编码占比已达 94%,客服与基础数据清洗已实现 90% 以上由 AI 处理,员工转向高层级架构设计。 - `37:25` 直觉与分析数据都只是决策的信息输入原料,商业推演必须完全依托逻辑与理性第一性原理做最终判定。 - `40:00` 早期因技术过早押注 AI 导致项目失败,且面临退税延期的官僚死局,反而倒逼了团队商业模式的彻底重构与公司重生。 - `40:48` 新一代创业者应保持心智独立,兼备远大野心、极致理性与极高人才密度,从一开始建立精英壁垒。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### `00:00` Bending Spoons 的复利模型与收购飞轮 在意大利都灵举办的 Wave by Vento 大会上,a16z 风险投资合伙人 Anish Acharya 对谈 Bending Spoons 联合创始人兼 CEO Luca Ferrari。开场时,Acharya 盛赞 Bending Spoons 已经成长为一家“庞然大物般的巨头公司”(an absolute monster company),并感叹其组织文化结合了“麦肯锡的智力多样性与谷歌对技术的极度倾斜”。 谈到 Bending Spoons 的核心商业模式,Ferrari 给出了一套极度清晰且务实的飞轮机制: “表面上看很简单:我们收购那些我们认为有巨大潜力变得更成功的科技公司,把它们整合进统一的底层平台与核心团队中,以大约 10 年的长远眼光进行业务改造,使其具备极强的现金生成能力;一旦成功,我们就将这些额外的盈利加杠杆,去收购更多、规模更大的公司。如此循环往复。”(“Yeah, it's pretty simple on the face of it. We buy technology companies where we see an opportunity to make them a lot more successful. And then we integrate them into our platform, same foundational technology, same core team. and try to transform them so they're a lot more cash generative with a, say, 10-year view, so long horizon. And if we do that right, we take the extra earnings and lever them up and buy more bigger companies. Rinse and repeat.”) ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: Bending Spoons 收购与复利飞轮 accDescr: 展示 Bending Spoons 收购、平台整合、现金流生成与再投资的闭环飞轮 subgraph Acquisition["1. 资产收购"] A["筛选并收购科技公司<br/>(例如 Evernote, Vimeo 等)"] end subgraph Integration["2. 平台赋能"] B["整合至统一底层平台<br/>(统一技术栈与核心团队)"] end subgraph ValueCreation["3. 现金流释放"] C["以10年为周期深度重塑<br/>(大幅提升自由现金流)"] end subgraph Reinvestment["4. 杠杆复利"] D["结合债务杠杆再投资<br/>(收购规模更大的标的)"] end A --> B B --> C C --> D D -->|"滚雪球循环"| A ``` - **收购标的版图**:公司目前已完成超过 50 起收购,涵盖 Airtable、AOL(部分业务/资产)、Vimeo、Eventbrite、Komoot、WeTransfer 等知名产品。 --- ### `02:30` 债券还是期权:公司停滞后的“二次加速”神话 Acharya 引用 a16z 联合创始人 Marc Andreessen 的著名论点发问:Andreessen 曾调侃称“世上根本没有所谓的股票,任何公司本质上要么是债券(能长期稳定产生大量现金),要么是期权(极度虚值、可能成功也可能归零的赌注)”。Acharya 据此探讨:一家软件公司在增长触顶停滞后,真的能够实现“二次加速”(re-accelerate)吗? Ferrari 评价称,Andreessen 的话虽然带有为了传播效果的“标题党”意味(click-baity),但大方向是准确的。他承认历史上确实存在公司发生质变、重新加速增长的案例: - **苹果公司(Apple)**:推出 iPhone 是绝对的历史分水岭。但这属于极罕见的“颠覆性发明”(invention),“如果在平行宇宙里重演 10 次历史,可能有 8 次 iPhone 都不会诞生”,或许被他人抢先,或许彻底失败。 - **英伟达(NVIDIA)**:近期站在了 AI 浪潮的最前端。但在许多平行世界里,英伟达可能依然只是一家出色的游戏显卡硬件厂商,虽然是个好生意,但绝不可能达到数万亿美元的市值。英伟达不仅靠自身的发明,更享受了巨大的“技术顺风”(technological tailwinds)。 Ferrari 总结指出,颠覆性的重新加速“可能发生,但极其罕见”(it can happen, but it's rare),因此在整体判断上他同意 Andreessen 的观点。 --- ### `04:30` 资本市场的博弈心理与“局部最优”陷阱 随后,话题转向风险投资人如何为企业定价。Acharya 提出,投资人有时并不完全理解现金流数学,Ferrari 对此进行了深入剖析: 他认为,确实有部分投资人对底层财务数学模型缺乏精准理解(“understanding of the math is not necessarily 10 out of 10”),容易错误估计某些变量以及长期 KPI 之间的因果关系。然而,大多数顶尖投资人非常聪明,他们决策时不仅在算当下的基本面账,更把“市场上其他人对这家公司的预期”作为核心变量纳入模型中。如果投资人假设自己“永远不卖股票、不增发股权,只靠企业的现金流分红生活”,他们指导管理层做出的决策,将与“假设未来几年通过新一轮融资或并购退出来实现价值”截然相反。 因此,投资人追逐短期估值倍数并非盲目,而是一种理性的投机心理。Ferrari 指出,这反映了复杂系统的一种状态: “在包括资本市场在内的任何复杂系统中,往往会因为历史原因陷入某种均衡状态。从全局或通用视角来看,这些均衡是低效的;但要打破并跳出这些特定的局部最优(local optima),代价极其高昂且极难发生。”(“...sometimes there are equilibria in any complex system including the market that you get to for historical reasons and they are inefficient. globally, universally, but moving out of those particular local optima is actually expensive and unlikely to happen.”) 虽然整个世界陷入这种追求短期倍数的模式可能不是最理想的,但在现有规则下,投资人遵循这一逻辑行事是完全符合个体理性的。 --- ### `06:00` 创始人路线选择:追求乘数,还是做大底数? 面向单品公司的创始人与 CEO,Acharya 追问:他们究竟应该顺应资本市场对期权叙事的扭曲追捧,还是应当专注于纯粹的利润最大化? Ferrari 认为这只是一个界定目标与边界条件的问题: 1. **顺水推舟路线**:如果创始人的首要目标是在短时间内赚尽可能多的钱,那么顺应资本市场的估值游戏完全合理,只要“清楚自己在做什么以及为什么这么做”即可。 2. **长线现金流路线**:创始人完全可以选择不依赖发股稀释或卖掉股份,而是将企业打造成长期产生强劲现金流、通过股息为自身创造巨大价值的组织。 Ferrari 直言 Bending Spoons 正是后者的典型代表。在公司发展历程中,曾多次面临可以迎合投资人以换取当期更高估值的选择——比如去买某种特定风格的热门资产、或是以迎合资本偏好的方式来运营公司。但他和团队极其笃定地抵制了这种诱惑,坚持以自由现金流的复利复合增速为唯一最高指标: “就算估值倍数最终可能会变低,但归根结底,倍数不过是乘法里的一个因子而已。如果另一个因子(现金流规模)比别人大上十倍,那么毫无疑问,最终的乘积也必定会更大。”(“...even if the multiple were to turn out to be lower, you know, ultimately the multiple is just one factor in a multiplication. If the other factor is ten times bigger, then, you know... Rest assured, the overall result is going to be bigger, too.”) Acharya 赞同地指出,在这个时代,采取长期主义思维能够产生巨大的超额收益(alpha)。Ferrari 幽默地借 TikTok 作比打趣道:“TikTok 的风靡充分说明,我们人类这个物种生来就不擅长保持耐心、专注与长期导向。因此,如果你能做到这一点,你就已经超越了绝大多数人。” --- ### `08:30` 突破性发明与渐进式优化的权衡 在面对收购后的资产(如 Miro 或 Evernote)时,管理层往往需要在“押注全新发明”(invention)与“极致精细优化”(optimization)之间做抉择。Acharya 询问 Ferrari 内部是否存在明确的决断准绳。 Ferrari 分析认为,追求“激进的颠覆性发明”(radical invention)与追求“渐进式优化”(incremental innovation / optimization)所需的组织特质、人才禀赋与思维方式完全不同: - 专注于优化同样可以具备极高的创新性,但属于渐进性质; - 颠覆性创新追求的是阶跃式的跳跃。 Ferrari 强调,任何一家完全偏废其一、走极端路线的公司都不可能达到最佳状态。他以苹果公司为例:乔布斯时代的苹果在历史上更偏向于大开大合的重大发明,但这从未以过度牺牲运营效率为代价——Tim Cook 长期以来正是以无与伦比的供应链与运营优化效率著称,从而为苹果奠定了稳固的基本盘。因此,企业必须认清自身的能力边界与思维模型,在激进突破与精细化运营之间维持动态的战略平衡。 ### `10:00` 激进创新与渐进优化的路径抉择 企业文化与组织能力的构建在很大程度上取决于路径的选择。Luca Ferrari 强调,企业必须在“激进创新者”(radical innovators)与“渐进创新者”(incremental innovators)之间选边站,并坚持到底:“我认为你需要选好你的阵营。比如,我们到底更像激进创新者,还是更像……渐进创新者?我认为两者都没问题,只要选定一边并坚持下去即可。”激进创新一旦成功,其天花板极高且能以极快的速度重塑企业格局,如同当年的 iPhone 或 Google 搜索。即便 30 年过去、历经数以百亿计的各类业务与收购投资,Google 搜索依然贡献了其约 80% 的体量。然而,激进创新的中位数结果极其糟糕,绝大多数尝试都会输得一干二净。 相对而言,渐进式优化更具确定性、可衡量性。对于单一 SaaS 产品而言,单纯做渐进优化的天花板有限;但在 Bending Spoons 的复合飞轮模式下,这种确定性能够带来几何级数的放大。Luca 解释道,将 1 亿美元的 EBITDA 优化提升至 2 亿美元,随后进行 3 倍杠杆借贷去收购更多资产,假以时日便能复利扩张成原本的 100 倍。 Anish Acharya 顺此提出思考:既然像 Google 搜索这种级别的大发明难以复制,企业理性上是否应该永远只专注于优化它?Luca Ferrari 对 Google 表达了极高的钦佩,但也指出从股东资本回报的角度来看,这完全是一个合理的争论点:“你可以提出一个合理的论点:如果公司完全专注于搜索并将搜索优化到极致,整体而言股东的处境会不会更好?”因为这必须与股东将这部分冗余资本重新配置到其他领域所能达到的回报进行对照。尽管 Anish 补充称,正是由于 Google 内部的研究探索,才诞生了催化当前 AI 浪潮的 Transformer 论文。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 两种创新路径的资本与回报模型 accDescr: 对比激进创新与 Bending Spoons 的渐进式复利杠杆模式 subgraph Radical["激进创新路径 (Radical Innovation)"] R1["高风险探索 (极低中位数成功率)"] --> R2{"极罕见突破?"} R2 -- 否 --> R3["全盘沉没 / 损失一切"] R2 -- 是 --> R4["百倍级飞跃 (如 iPhone / Google 搜索)"] end subgraph Incremental["Bending Spoons 渐进式复利模型"] I1["收购优质资产 (例如 $100M EBITDA)"] --> I2["系统性精细优化 ($200M EBITDA)"] I2 --> I3["引入适度债务杠杆 (如 3x 杠杆)"] I3 --> I4["再投资收购新资产"] I4 --> I1 end ``` ### `12:35` 倾听客户与做“酷”产品的分歧 在谈及产品组合管理时,Luca Ferrari 强调倾听客户反馈是至关重要的基石。虽然外界对 Bending Spoons 的刻板印象往往是“冷酷无情地压榨优化、有时还会惹恼部分用户”,但 Luca 认为他们反而在深度倾听客户需求上投入了比多数企业更多的心力。 业界许多创始人往往不是因为客户“真正需要”而构建功能,而是出于自身智识上的兴奋或个人热忱。Bending Spoons 则严格区隔了价值创造与商业化变现: - 价值创造:全力弄清客户想要实现的目标(What & Why),永远倾听客户的痛点; - 方案实现(How):绝不盲目照搬客户提出的解决方案,因为普通客户通常缺乏产品与体验设计的专业技能,不知道最理想的交互应当如何设计; - 商业变现:作为独立环节系统化推进。 Anish 赞同这一观点,指出很多创业者往往是将自己觉得有趣的智识挑战,包装成了“为客户而做”的叙事。当被问及多年来挑选问题的“品味”是否有变化时,Luca 表示自己对社会大众眼中的“性感品牌”毫无兴趣。比起外表光鲜,他更容易被底层复杂、且一旦解决就能释放巨大价值的问题所吸引,哪怕收购的对象是像 AOL(美国在线)这种外界看来陈旧的遗留资产,他也觉得其潜力令人无比兴奋。 ### `15:00` 单产品 CEO 的中位数困境与风险不对称性 Bending Spoons 迄今已完成了大约 50 到 60 笔公司并购。这种庞大的产品组合让公司能够去承担“单产品 CEO”完全不敢碰的正期望值(Positive Expected Value)风险。对于是否认为单产品公司 CEO 存在“非理性过度担忧下行风险”的问题,Luca 结合自己曾经联合创办单一产品初创公司并遭遇失败的经历,给出了否定的回答。 Luca 认为单产品团队拒绝冒某些风险是完全理性的,其核心原因在于风险偏好与中位数收益的不对称: - **风险投资人(VC)的视角**:投资 50 家公司,VC 追求的是整套投资组合的总回报。VC 理性上希望每一家被投公司都以“时速 100 英里冲向一堵墙”,即使大部分粉身碎骨,只要有四五家穿过极其狭窄的门缝取得 100 倍回报,基金就能大获全胜。稳扎稳打的谨慎路径对 VC 而言反而是糟糕的。 - **单产品创始团队的视角**:时速 100 英里冲刺虽然期望值高,但其中位数结果将从“勉强拥有一家还不错的可持续企业”直接跌落到“一无所有并丢掉饭碗”。“终归到底,他们只有一次生命和一段职业生涯。” Luca 强调道。 Anish 指出,这正是 Bending Spoons 在创新生态系统中的独特价值所在:让那些完成过创新、建立了一定规模但无法冲入平流层的优秀公司,有机会在 Bending Spoons 的平台上继续运转并创造价值。Luca 透露,Bending Spoons 在收购要约上保持着极高的成功率——每当他们发出收购邀约,对方要么选择不卖,要么就只会卖给 Bending Spoons,这说明这种并购模式在解决卖家痛点上具备极强的产品市场契合度(PMF)。 ### `18:40` 资本市场与适度债务杠杆的艺术 除了清晰的战略以及对人才的极致关注,高效利用信贷与资本市场是 Bending Spoons 取得规模化成就的另一大关键支柱。针对如何避免像其他企业那样陷入债务泥潭、并战略性地使用债务,Luca 总结了其底层逻辑。 借债的核心效用在于帮助企业“以更低的时间成本、更快地做更多事情”。在投资的预期回报高于债务成本的前提下,使用债务杠杆始终是一项明智的举措,但必须伴随一个核心前提:“假设违约风险依然微不足道,因为一旦违约风险变得不可忽视,那么承担这种额外风险就不再是一个显而易见的好决策了。”Luca 坦言,任何在商业长河中因债务而遭遇危机的企业,在最初举债时往往也认为风险在可控范围内,因此保持理性的智识诚实与风险把控至关重要。 - **并购规模**:截至当前已完成约 50 至 60 笔公司收购; - **发盘成功率**:在达成出售意向的标的中,几乎百分之百选择售予 Bending Spoons; - **杠杆公式**:预期投资回报率必须显著高于债务融资成本,且整体违约风险必须压制在极低甚至可忽略不计的水平。 ### `20:00` 债务杠杆的纪律:如何做到违约风险趋近于零 关于企业使用债务,Luca Ferrari 强调,许多破产的企业在出事之前也自我感觉良好,甚至表现得极为乐观。因此,即便 Bending Spoons 从未遭遇过债务困扰,他也始终坚持保持极度审慎和偏执: > “破产的人在借债时可不觉得自己会破产……因此我认为,在承担任何大额债务时,保持偏执(be paranoid)至关重要。” —— Luca Ferrari 为了确保资产负债表的绝对安全,Bending Spoons 设立了一套极其严苛的自设底线: 1. **严格控制杠杆倍数**:将净负债与 EBITDA 比率(Leverage Ratio)长期控制在 3 倍以下,目前约为 2.4 至 2.5 倍,历史均值更接近于 2 倍; 2. **极端逆境下的还款能力**:确保即使在极度恶劣的情景假设下,公司依然有能力在债务到期前 100% 偿清本息; 3. **拉长并锁定久期**:每隔一到两年就对大部分债务进行再融资,使债务的实际到期时间始终维持在 5 年以上; 4. **100% 利率对冲**:对全部债务实施全额对冲,完全消除利率波动风险,提前锁定未来的确切利息支出; 5. **依托高盈利与高现金转化**:高度多元化的产品组合、极高的利润率和强劲的自由现金流转化,为债务提供了坚实的安全垫。 基于这些防护措施,Luca 判断目前公司的违约风险“极其低下,几乎为零”。他给创业者的首要告诫是:想要打造伟大的事业往往需要十年以上的长跑,而“获胜并取得巨大成功的第一法则,就是在此期间不要死掉(Rule number one to win and be that huge success is not having failed in the meantime)”。宁愿多花两三年稳步推进,也绝不要盲目激进最终落得粉身碎骨。 Anish Acharya 对此深表认同,并补充道,创始人往往会鼓励产品端大胆下注,却极易低估信贷和债务违约的概率,尤其是对于单一渠道、单一市场的业务,一旦宏观边界条件骤变,脆弱性就会迅速暴露。尽管 Luca 指出 Broadcom(博通)和 TransDigm(泛德美)等行业巨头正是依靠长达数十年的审慎举债实现了惊人的复利回报,但他依然提醒大家不可掉以轻心,因为看似多元化的资产在特定极端事件冲击下可能呈现高度正相关。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 债务风险防护机制 accDescr: 展示 Bending Spoons 规避债务风险的五大控制手段 subgraph DefenseMechanism["Bending Spoons 债务风控体系"] L["严格控制杠杆比率<br/>(净杠杆长期保持在 2.0x-2.5x)"] H["100% 利率波动对冲<br/>(锁定未来利息支出)"] R["滚动再融资<br/>(每 1-2 年再融资,久期锁定 5 年以上)"] C["极端压力测试<br/>(确保恶劣环境下 100% 具备还款能力)"] end CF["高度多元化组合<br/>+ 超强现金流转化率"] --> DefenseMechanism DefenseMechanism --> Safe["违约风险趋近于零<br/>(为持续复利收购提供弹药)"] ``` --- ### `23:40` 重新审视 SaaS 估值与所谓的“SaaS 大溃败” 话题转到硅谷当下最热门的讨论:AI 时代软件的护城河与持久性。一年前,伴随着新一代 AI 模型的突破,市场上充斥着“SaaS 灭顶之灾”(SaaSpocalypse)的恐慌情绪,主流 SaaS 标的估值一度遭遇 40% 的大幅下挫,但随后又逐步收复失地。 Luca 认为,此前许多传统 SaaS 公司的估值本身就高得离谱,但这并不是因为 AI 出现才导致其不合理,而是因为它们从自由现金流折现的角度来看本就站不住脚。 > “在大多数情况下,这些估值之所以成立,完全是建立在一种投机假设之上——假设你未来能以同样的估值倍数将公司转手卖给接盘侠,而在此期间公司增长了 50%。” —— Luca Ferrari 过去分析师在建模时,常常盲目假设一家公司现有的 12% 内生增长率可以持续 15 年不变,但现实中内生增长率往往随着基数增大而逐年下滑。在 Luca 看来,AI 浪潮只是给了投资人一个名正言顺的借口,让他们回到财务模型前调低预期。因此,估值的理性回调本身是合理的挤泡沫过程。 --- ### `25:20` 为什么“AI 让写代码变便宜”不会摧毁头部软件的护城河? 对于市场上“AI 降低了软件研发门槛,因此现有软件公司必死无疑”的论调,Luca 并不买账。他承认低成本编码会在边际上挤压软件公司的微观利润,但绝不足以让规模化企业瞬间消亡。 Luca 指出,早在 AI 爆发之前,纯粹的软件技术复制成本就已经微不足道了。对于任何一家估值达到 10 亿美元以上的软件企业,其技术复制成本与成为行业龙头所带来的商业价值相比完全微不足道: - **技术复制本身并不构成门槛**:“复制一个 Salesforce 并不是什么登月工程。” - **克隆品早已有成百上千个**:以 Bending Spoons 旗下的 WeTransfer 为例,找 5 名优秀的应届毕业生在车库里花 3 个月,就能做出一个功能达到 80% 的类似产品,市场上也有无数个克隆版,但这并没有动摇 WeTransfer 的地位。 真正的护城河来自技术代码之外的核心壁垒: | 护城河类型 | 对应旗下/知名产品 | 核心机制与防御本质 | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **先发优势与心理迁移成本** | WeTransfer / 基础工具类 | 品牌已经深入人心,用户形成了行为习惯。对于一家营收 10 亿美元的企业而言,为了省几千美元而去切换一个未知的替代品,在风险与精力投入上极其不理性。 | | **双边网络效应** | Eventbrite | 平台聚集了 9000 万月度活跃购票用户。AI 可以复制一万个出票工具,但根本无法凭空复制 9000 万真实消费者与庞大的活动主办方生态。 | | **独家专有数据** | Komoot (户外导航) | 平台沉淀了数百万用户实地走出来的泥泞小径、转角照片、天气变化与路况细节。这些微观数据连卫星测绘都无法获取,仅凭技术框架根本无法生成。 | | **规模经济与运维权责成本** | Airtable | 大多数大客户年付费不足 12,000 美元。即使企业员工用 AI Agent 一键复制了一套 Airtable 代码,只要分配 0.2 个人力的工程师去盯防代码合规与日常运维 Bug,所消耗的成本就已经远超每年付给 Airtable 的订阅费。 | Luca 总结道,在全面由 AI 运转、人类无需工作的遥远未来到来之前(这至少在未来 5 年内不会发生),只要企业还需要人类工程师来为系统安全与稳定性负责,出于理性的财务算计,他们就不会自建轮子来替代现有的成熟软件。 Anish Acharya 对此补充了关键行业数据并表示赞同:企业在软件上的整体开销通常仅占其总支出的 8% 到 10%。因此,企业将宝贵的 AI 研发预算和 Token 算力消耗在重新克隆一套薪酬系统(Payroll)或基础工具上,完全是“高风险、低收益”(high downside, low upside)的极不明智之举。 ### `30:00` 专有数据的价值与“数据估值泡沫” 针对当前市场上“许多公司的市值甚至低于其训练数据 token 潜在价值”的论调,Luca Ferrari 持强烈的怀疑态度。他坦言自己虽然没有深入研究该假说,但这种主张“听起来具有潜在的误导性”。原因在于,新数据池所蕴含的边际价值衰减速度极其迅速。 Luca 举了一个通俗的例子:如果在今天写一篇新的博客文章并设为私密,然后跑去问 OpenAI 要不要买,对方根本不会给一分钱。“世界上第一篇可供抓取和访问的博客,他们或许愿意支付一千美元;但现在一文不值,因为在增量层面,它对训练 AI 模型所需的知识库没有提供任何额外价值。”尽管现阶段针对“人们如何做项目管理”等具体工作流的垂直数据可能存在短期需求,先发卖数据的企业或许能赚到一笔钱,但随着增量训练带来的收益递减,这些数据的商业价值最终都会趋向于零。 - **边际效益递减规律**:AI 训练对同质或相近领域数据的需求满足后,新增数据的边际贡献迅速归零。 - **关于数据套现企业价值的判断**:Luca 认为目前没有任何确凿证据表明,一家公司仅凭售卖私有数据就能换取超越其自身企业价值(Enterprise Value)的溢价。 --- ### `31:18` Bending Spoons 的自研技术底座与整体替换优势 谈到赋能与改造被收购企业的底层工具平台时,Luca Ferrari 透露,除了 Gmail、Slack 或 Google Drive 这种通用度极高的外部工具外,Bending Spoons 几乎把运营一家数字化企业所需的一切系统全部自研了一遍。这套内部基础设施涵盖数据处理、A/B 测试平台、营销自动化系统、用户生命周期价值(LTV)预测、凭证权限管理、招聘工具等,自研工具数量超过 50 个。 Luca 指出,自研这套系统的收益绝非仅限于削减 SaaS 采购账单。“这虽然节省了相当可观的供应商成本,但我认为这还称不上颠覆性的改变(game-changer)。”真正带来质变的核心优势在于两点:第一,每个工具都百分之百契合自身业务痛点,且各模块原生互通,其组合协同所释放的效能远超拼凑第三方商业软件;第二,正是由于拥有这种庞大的单体底座(monolithic foundation),Bending Spoons 在完成收购后,能够迅速将标的企业旧有的零散技术栈“连根拔起并整体换新”。Luca 解释说,把所有底座一次性全部替换掉,反而比一块块拆解、逐一替换再打补丁重新对接外部系统要快得多。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 被收购企业技术底座替换模式对比 accDescr: 对比传统逐一模块替换与 Bending Spoons 单体自研平台一次性整体替换的高效差异 subgraph Conventional["传统逐个替换模式(低效/高耦合摩擦)"] A1["移除旧系统 A"] --> A2["接入新第三方工具 A"] A2 --> A3["修补与旧系统 B/C/D 的 API 接口"] A3 --> A4["移除旧系统 B...(陷入泥潭)"] end subgraph SpoonsWay["Bending Spoons 模式(单体底座一次性整体换装)"] B1["被收购企业杂乱业务/工具栈"] -->|"一次性拔除并移植"| B2["自研单体平台底座 (50+ 模块原生互通)"] B2 --> B3["A/B 测试 + 营销自动化 + LTV 预测 + 数据处理等全部原生运转"] end ``` - **50+ 内部自研工具**:全方位覆盖业务链条,规避割裂的商业软件生态。 - **单体平台整体迁移动能**:Luca 强调整体换装的工程交付速度显著快于多方软件渐进式拼接。 - **文化与人才的关键放大器**:拥有好工具只是前提,能发挥出全部威力的关键在于使用工具的人才密度与组织文化。 --- ### `33:45` 内部超级智能体“Alt Spooner”:从分析到自动改代码 在这一庞大自研生态中,最具生产力颠覆性的代表是一款名为“Alt Spooner”的内部自主智能体。它直接常驻于 Slack 之中,继承员工拥有的所有访问权限,包括 GitHub 代码仓库、Google Drive 文档以及各项内部工具,能够端到端执行复杂的复合任务。例如,员工让它做一份数据分析,智能体便会自动抓取数据;若缺少权限,还会自动向凭证管理团队和 IT 安全团队发起权限申请工单,审批通过后提取清洗数据,并在 5 分钟内生成可视化图表与见解说明。 Luca 现场分享了一个令他深受震撼的真实案例:Evernote(印象笔记)业务线的总经理在内部产品反馈频道里发现了一个 Bug,她随即给自己的 Alt Spooner 智能体发了一条指令:“我发现了这个 Bug,请去我们的客服系统 Moros 查看是否有其他客户反馈;然后调取代码库找出根本原因,编写修复补丁(fix),并 Ping 我们该产品的工程负责人 Marco 进行审查合并。” “最终这件事情被完全搞定了。这比过去的处理方式高效了一百倍。”Luca 充满信心地断言,这种深度串联上下文与公司内部权限的智能体工作流,将成为所有公司未来巨大的颠覆性驱动力。 --- ### `35:28` AI 对核心职能的重塑:客服、数据科学与 94% 的代码自动生成 Anish Acharya 询问在不久的将来,是否有岗位会被 AI 100% 接管,还是说 AI 只是个人生产力的杠杆。Luca 斩获性地回答:“100%。”他将 Bending Spoons 内部受冲击与改造最深的三大职能进行了深度拆解: 1. **客户支持(Customer Support)**:传统的工单人工客服模式已被彻底颠覆。目前 Bending Spoons 几乎 100% 的客服工单都由 AI 或外包团队处理,而留在内部的“客服经理”职能全面转型为类似“产品经理”的架构师角色,专门设计客服系统的响应流程、规则逻辑和交互体验,并正向全自动电话支持与 WhatsApp 渠道演进。 2. **数据科学与分析(Data Science)**:传统“提取数据、清洗数据、绘制图表”的基础工作,目前在公司内至少有 90% 完全由 AI 自动完成。数据分析师从脏活累活中抽离,转而从事偏架构层面的软件工程工作,例如搭建预算系统架构或固化监控面板逻辑。 3. **软件编码(Coding)**:Luca 披露了一个极为惊人的跨越:“两年前,我们公司由 AI 编写的代码比例是 0%;而在我最近一次统计时,这个数字已经达到了 94%。” 面对这一断崖式变化,Luca 评价道: > “根据激进程度的不同,如果是一家优秀的公司,这个比例可能在 70% 到 99% 之间;但在我看来,现阶段没有任何一家优秀公司的这一比例应该低于 70%,低于这个数没有任何意义。” Anish 对此完全赞同,并补充所有优秀团队最终都会向 100% 收敛。 --- ### `37:25` 决策哲学:直觉与分析只是“输入”,唯有逻辑与理性才是“内核” 针对理性决策与数据驱动的边界,Anish 提到了大模型容易产生的“伪精度(false precision)”问题,并询问 Luca 在哪些场景下凭借直觉做决策反而比依赖数据分析的结果更好。 Luca 明确反对将直觉与分析割裂对立的观点。他阐明:“分析和直觉都是‘输入项’(inputs)。”无论是客观分析跑出来的数据,还是脑海中闪现的“这事不对劲”或“这个点子很酷”的本能直觉,其本质都是输入给大脑的信息原料。在做决策时,应当在合理范围内尽可能搜集多的输入项;但绝不能因为数据给出了某个结论(如“法国用户更有可能购买某产品”)就机械照搬,也不能因为一时直觉兴奋就拍脑袋决定。 Luca 给出了一句极为坚定的底层准则: > “在人生的任何阶段,我都不认为除了逻辑与理性之外,还有任何其他东西可以作为你决策的依据。” 在休闲娱乐场景下人们可以完全凭心情行动,但在严肃商业决策中,哪怕是极致的创造力与想象力,也仅仅是用来生成此前未曾设想过的可选方案;方案生成之后,必须经过冷静的审视、论证与推演,确认兴奋感背后的逻辑切实成立后,再毫不犹豫地全力推进。 --- ### `38:58` 创始人的退出困局与早年 Evertail 的失败教训 在进入尾声时,Anish 为那些陷入泥潭的创业者提问:创业中最残酷的炼狱状态莫过于“既无法取胜,又不愿放弃”,创始人究竟该如何判断当下是该果断止损离场,还是离下一次业务爆发其实只差三个月? Luca 坦诚地自嘲自己在这个问题上或许给不出什么高明答案,因为自己在创办 Bending Spoons 之前的前一家初创公司——Evertail,就是执拗死撑的典型反面教材。他和团队整整耗费了长达三年时间,在那款产品上苦苦挣扎直至最终失败。“显然它根本行不通。我们当时太早地试图利用 AI 去为用户自动撰写个人日记,现实非常明确地表明,那根本行不通。”这段过早押注未成熟技术而陷入僵局的经历,让他深切体会到了在沉没成本面前客观审视现实有多么艰难。 ### `40:00` 濒临破产的早期创业与“官僚主义造就的 Bending Spoons” 回顾早期创业经历时,Luca Ferrari 坦言他们曾开发过无人问津的产品——用户不用,更谈不上付费。为了活下去,团队咬牙筹集了少许额外资金,在一次又一次痛苦的转型(pivot)中苦苦挣扎。走到最艰难的关口时,公司账面上名义上只剩下大约 25 万到 30 万美元,而这笔残存资金的大部分,实际上还要仰赖当时公司所在地丹麦政府的一笔税费退款。 然而,致命的打击接踵而至。丹麦政府发来通知,表示这笔退税要么根本不符合退税资格,要么必须延期整整 12 个月才能到账。在生死攸关的现金流节点上,这一推迟足以直接宣判初创团队的死刑。谈到当时被逼上绝路的窘境,Luca Ferrari 自嘲道:“And so you could argue that red tape made the decision for us.”(所以你甚至可以说,是繁文缛节帮我们做出了决定。)主持人 Anish Acharya 顺势打趣称,原来是官僚主义孕育出了今天的 Bending Spoons。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Bending Spoons 早期转型催化流程 accDescr: 展示 Bending Spoons 在丹麦创业早期因退税受阻而被迫彻底转型的关键节点 subgraph Survival_Crisis ["早期存亡危机"] A["早期产品缺乏用户与付费意愿"] --> B["多次被迫转型 (Pivot)"] B --> C["账面仅剩约 25-30 万美元"] end subgraph Bureaucracy_Shock ["突发税务阻碍"] C --> D["资金高度依赖丹麦政府退税"] D --> E["政府通知:退税不符或需延迟 12 个月"] end subgraph Forced_Pivot ["破局与诞生"] E --> F["现金流断裂危机倒逼彻底重组"] F --> G["催生全新业务模式与 Bending Spoons 崛起"] end ``` --- ### `40:48` 走向全球的欧洲创业者必修课:独立思考、野心与理性 针对 Anish Acharya 提出的问题——下一个来自意大利甚至整个欧洲的顶尖科技公司应该从 Bending Spoons 身上学到什么,又该如何走自己的路,Luca Ferrari 给出了一套极度强调“第一性原理”与“独立思考”的经营哲学。他首先指出,创业者最核心的素质就是独立思考,绝不能盲从任何所谓的权威或既定经验。 在 Luca 看来,世上所有杰出的人才都有一个共性: > “I've never seen a great entrepreneur, a great inventor, a great engineer, a great artist, a great anything who doesn't ultimately take responsibility for their own decisions and is intellectually independent.”(我从未见过任何一个伟大的企业家、发明家、工程师或艺术家,最终不是自己为决定承担责任,并在心智上保持高度独立的。) 在具备独立思维的前提下,Luca 提炼出三条对商业创业具有普适意义的核心准则: - **极高的野心(Ambition)**:人的生命与精力极其有限,能做的事情屈指可数。既然投入同样的精力,瞄准更高、更难的目标反而拥有更大的概率带来长期的丰厚回报。尽管“目标直奔月球”(aim for the moon)这种词眼在加密货币热潮后有些被滥用,但创业者依然必须敢于树立极高的志向。 - **极致的理性(Rationality)**:创业者固然需要激情、创造力与想象力,但在拍板决策的瞬间,逻辑与事实才是唯一的罗盘。Luca 强调,史上的传奇人物——无论是乔布斯、比尔·盖茨、埃隆·马斯克还是贝索斯,虽然都以宏大构想闻名,但他们绝不是因为“听起来很酷”就盲目行事;相反,他们严格根据第一性原理与所有客观事实做推演与决策。 - **高人才密度(Talent Density)**:千万不能低估打造高人才密度团队的重要性。Luca 特别告诫初创团队,如果在创立初期容忍了较低的人才密度,后续想要再往上提升,其阻力与难度几乎是不可逾越的。从一开始建立精英壁垒,是企业能否持续滚雪球的根基所在。 ## Notable quotes > `20:00` 破产的人在借债时可不觉得自己会破产……因此我认为,在承担任何大额债务时,保持偏执(be paranoid)至关重要。 — Luca Ferrari > `37:25` 在人生的任何阶段,我都不认为除了逻辑与理性之外,还有任何其他东西可以作为你决策的依据。 — Luca Ferrari > `06:00` 就算估值倍数最终可能会变低,但归根结底,倍数不过是乘法里的一个因子而已。如果另一个因子(现金流规模)比别人大上十倍,那么毫无疑问,最终的乘积也必定会更大。 — Luca Ferrari > `25:20` 复制一个 Salesforce 并不是什么登月工程。 — Luca Ferrari ## Mentioned Bending Spoons, Luca Ferrari, Anish Acharya, a16z, Marc Andreessen, Apple, Tim Cook, Steve Jobs, NVIDIA, Google, TikTok, Evernote, Vimeo, Airtable, AOL, Eventbrite, Komoot, WeTransfer, Miro, Broadcom, TransDigm, OpenAI, Salesforce, Alt Spooner, Evertail, Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos ## Video description Can relentless optimization create as much value as breakthrough invention? Bending Spoons CEO Luca Ferrari argues that radical innovation can produce extraordinary outcomes, but systematic improvement can be more dependable, especially when paired with a model designed to compound over decades. Speaking with a16z General Partner Anish Acharya at Wave by Vento, Luca explains how Bending Spoons acquires technology companies, integrates them onto a shared platform, improves their economics, and reinvests the resulting cash into new acquisitions. They discuss the tradeoffs between growth and profitability, how to use debt without putting the company at risk, and why long-term thinking can create an advantage. They also debate whether AI really threatens SaaS, why moats like brand, proprietary data, network effects, and switching costs still matter, and how Bending Spoons is already using AI across coding, customer support, and data analysis. [Source](https://mgln.ai/e/1344/afp-848985-injected.calisto.simplecastaudio.com/3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8/episodes/be537ca6-f09e-4793-97fd-a93564022378/audio/128/default.mp3?aid=rss_feed&awCollectionId=3f86df7b-51c6-4101-88a2-550dba782de8&awEpisodeId=be537ca6-f09e-4793-97fd-a93564022378&feed=JGE3yC0V)

Source quotes

[20:00] Luca Ferrari: 破产的人在借债时可不觉得自己会破产……因此我认为,在承担任何大额债务时,保持偏执(be paranoid)至关重要。 [37:25] Luca Ferrari: 在人生的任何阶段,我都不认为除了逻辑与理性之外,还有任何其他东西可以作为你决策的依据。 [6:00] Luca Ferrari: 就算估值倍数最终可能会变低,但归根结底,倍数不过是乘法里的一个因子而已。如果另一个因子(现金流规模)比别人大上十倍,那么毫无疑问,最终的乘积也必定会更大。 [25:20] Luca Ferrari: 复制一个 Salesforce 并不是什么登月工程。

Source quotes

[20:00] Luca Ferrari: Rule number one to win and be that huge success is not having failed in the meantime. [37:25] Luca Ferrari: I don’t think there’s ever any case in life where you should be deciding with anything other than logic and rationality. [41:17] Luca Ferrari: I've never seen a great entrepreneur, a great inventor, a great engineer, a great artist, a great anything who doesn't ultimately take responsibility for their own decisions and is intellectually independent. [5:18] Luca Ferrari: TikTok shows you how we're not exactly as a species inclined to being patient and attentive and long term oriented. [12:12] Luca Ferrari: A lot of companies in my experience actually don't build things primarily because they think customers really need them, but because they think they are interesting, exciting, that are more passion driven.

Original transcript

[0:00] Vending Spoons has built a very different kind of technology company. Buy great products, improve them, generate more cash, and use that cash to do it again at a larger scale. At Wave by Vento, A16Z general partner Anisha Charia sits down with Vending Spoons co-founder and CEO Luca Ferrari to unpack the thinking behind that model. over short-term valuation. and how Bending Spoons approaches acquisitions, debt, and risk. They also get into whether AI really makes established software easier to disrupt, why Luca thinks many SaaS modes remain durable, and how AI is already doing the vast majority of coding and data analysis inside Bending Spoons. All right. Luca, thank you for saying yes to this. Welcome. Thank you for having me. My pleasure. Amazing. Okay, so just to contextualize for everyone, I'm sure we're all familiar with Bending Spoons. It's an absolute monster company. I think my favorite thing about the Bending Spoon story is how cool it sounds to work there. It feels like it's got the kind of intellectual diversity of a McKinsey with the technology sort of lean in of Google. So congratulations on building a phenomenal company. Well, thank you. Those are flattering comparisons. Just for the few that may not be familiar, do you want to give the 30-second overview of what it is exactly that you guys do? And then let's get into some advanced topics. Yeah, it's pretty simple on the face of it. We buy technology companies where we see an opportunity to make them a lot more successful. And then we integrate them into our platform, same foundational technology, same core team. and try to transform them so they're a lot more cache generative with a, say, 10-year view, so long horizon. And if we do that right, we take the extra... earnings and lever them up and buy more bigger companies. Rinse and repeat. Incredible. And do you want to note a couple of the companies that you guys have acquired? Yeah, so Airtable, AOL, Vimeo, Eventbrite, Komoot, WeTransfer, more than 50 acquisitions at this point, but this would be some of the better known ones. Extraordinary. So you've had a really interesting sort of insider view as to how companies get built. how they plateau and then how they start growing again. Mark Andreessen has quipped before that there's no such thing as equities. Every company is either a bond, which means it generates a lot of cash for a long period of time, Or it's an option, you know, it's a sort of out of the money thing that may or may not happen. Do you agree with that, Luca? Do you think companies can re-accelerate once they've plateaued? What do you think? Yeah. I think Mark likes to make statements that are um, a bit click-baity, and I mean it in a good way. I'd say that's a bit simplistic, but directionally true. I mean, there have been examples of companies that have dramatically changed their profiles or re-accelerated For example, Apple with the iPhone, clearly that was a watershed moment. And that was invention. and I don't think anybody expected that. And if you run that history 10 other times, maybe eight times it doesn't happen. You know, someone else does it earlier or they never succeed. or NVIDIA recently with being at the forefront of AI. there are different worlds where NVIDIA keeps being a basically a video game hardware, graphics hardware company. which is a great business, but obviously not something that would be worth trillions of dollars. And And that was, yes, invention, but a lot of, let's say, technological tailwinds. So it can happen, but it's rare. So I agree, broadly speaking, with Mark with that statement. the total size of the business. It depends. So I think there are investors who's understanding of the math is not necessarily 10 out of 10. And so they do miscalculate the value of some of these things. and not just the math but the the causality between different, let's say, KPIs in the long run. But a lot of investors are actually very smart, and what they're doing is they are including as a variable in the equation also what everybody else wants. will think about the business. If they were to assume to never sell a share, never issue equity, but just leave off the cash flows from that business, I think they'll take different decisions than those they... try to push management to take if they're assuming that most [5:00] - The value creation will come from a sale or for the rounds. So there is an element of psychology of speculation, which is very rational. um, And if you account for that, then they're not necessarily irrational in their in their weighing of the different factors. You could argue that the fact that broadly the market thinks that way is irrational, but sometimes there are equilibria in any complex system including the market that you get to for historical reasons and they are inefficient. globally, universally, but moving out of those particular local optima is actually expensive and unlikely to happen. So I think if you're probably worse off with overall the world thinking this way, but now that we're here, it may be rational for a lot of investors to play by those rules. How about founders? If you're the founder of a single product company or the CEO, How much do you think you should sort of adhere to this? sort of distorted view of where value accrues. versus focus on simple profit maximization, even if the investor doesn't feel like they get their full option on a potential sale. It's just a problem to solve, like old problems. You want to understand what your objective is. what the boundary conditions are, and then once those are clear, you creatively list all the options and pick the best one. If your goal is to uh... say make much as much money as possible then uh... It may be smart to, again, accept the or play along with those expectations. um As long as you know what you're trying to accomplish and why you're doing it, then you're fine. But there are alternatives and they may not necessarily lead to the greatest financial outcome. or sometimes they may, it depends on the specifics. So you could choose to run a business without necessarily relying on issuing equity or selling your stake and trying to make it in the long run a great cash generative enterprise that will ultimately create value for you through, for example, dividends, um, or alternatively, you may work to maximize free cash flow free cash flows in the long run in a way that does not get you the biggest valuation today, but will in the very long run. I think you could argue this is a little bit what we did with Bennispools. There have been multiple instances where... We knew that we could do it things differently to get a better valuation in the moment. do things that would please investors more. buy a certain type of asset. manage that asset in a different way. But we knew, at least we were very confident, and I think so far history has proven us right, that if we continue to optimize for the rate of compounding of free cash flows, in the long run, those would be much higher than they would have been following the other path. And then even if the multiple were to turn out to be lower, you know, ultimately the multiple is just one factor in a multiplication. If the other factor is ten times bigger, then, you know... Rest assured, the overall result is going to be bigger, too. So, again, just trying to understand what you're trying to accomplish, understand the boundary conditions, and then work backward from those. Yeah, it's interesting how much alpha there tends to be in being long-dated in your thinking. Oh, yeah. I mean, TikTok shows you how we're not exactly as a species inclined. to being patient and and attentive and and long term oriented. So, If you can do that, that already sets you apart, I think. So I've got a few other questions for you, maybe on behalf of our CEO founders out there. At any incremental moment, you can sort of bet on invention or optimization. When you guys acquire something like Amiro or an Evernote... How do you decide? Do you have a rule of thumb? How do you tie break? et cetera. Yeah, so I think that the... The type of qualities and the mindset you need to max out innovation. or at least radical invention, because I think you can be very innovative as you optimize, but I think, you know, like more radical. step change, innovation versus innovation. optimization, incremental innovation. are quite different I would say that any company that's all in on one at the expense of the other is probably not doing as well as it can. I think Apple, for example, historically has tried to be more of the... on the big invention sort of things, but, but, but not to the detriment of optimization excessively. I mean, famously, you know, Team Cook was great at making sure operations were efficient, Um, So you want to know, but because the qualities that you need and the mindset and the [10:00] culture need are different. I think you need to choose your camp. Like, are we more like the radical innovators or more the... incremental innovators, and I think both are very fine. Just know pick one side and stick to it more radical innovation will lead to higher peaks, um, faster potentially, if you come up again with the iPhone, and you can deliver on it, it could transform your company close to overnight. or Google search back in the day, Still, to this day, Google is vastly Google search. It's unbelievable. I mean, we're talking 30 years later and it's still... 80% that's still what it is, and they've invested tens of billions of dollars in all sorts of staff acquisitions, and it's still mostly searched. That's right. So that's how powerful radical innovation is when it works, but it's highly, it's not dependable. It's very difficult to, Like the median case is super awful, basically you lose everything, but occasionally you're right and you win massively I think incremental innovation is more dependable, more measurable, more And if applied with the right strategy in the right context, like I think, Banishpool's can compound over a very long period of time. So if you, for example, run a single product SaaS, I think incrementally optimizing, Ultimately, there's only so much you can do. But if you do it in the context of bending spools where you get 100 in EB die, you turn it into 200. and then you lever up three times, and then you buy more, that compounds exponentially into potentially... 100x over time, right? So whether you choose radical innovation as your primary pursuit or Incremental innovation depends on the broader strategy you're implementing, I believe. It's interesting because we lionize radical innovation, but to your point about Google, it's almost as if once you've invented Google, it's so hard to do that. It's rational to just optimize it. Forever, actually. Oh yeah, you could make, I think Google is one of the best, overall one of the most impressive companies to, to, to, to. to have her have been created. So, you know, we start from a place of incredible admiration. You could make a... reasonable argument that Overall, shareholders would be even better off had the company focused fully on search and optimized search to the max? Because obviously, Google is bigger and better because it's done more, but you have to compare that with the what the different shareholders would have been able to accomplish by redeploying the excess capital into other pursuits. And I don't know that you can make... I did the math a couple years ago. I think it was at least... a debate which of the two would have been better. - Yeah, really interesting. Though we got the transformer paper out of Google, - Oh yeah. - Which is the foundation of everything that's happening now, so I could definitely take the other side. As you think about managing your product portfolio, how much does customer feedback and customer love play into your thinking? I mean, it's critical ultimately... um you know you build products for customers and that's you know it's customers who pay you and give you a business so um Listening. to what customers want is paramount. uh... Ironically, I think that Benny Spoons does so more than most companies, while our reputation often it's more like we're more ruthless in optimizing and sometimes doing things that piece off some customers. Um, A lot of companies in my experience actually don't build things primarily because they think customers really need them, but because they think they are interesting, exciting, that are more passion driven. We try to be 100% focused on creating value for users and customers, and then monetizing, as a separate, let's say, pursuit, obviously. I think you're never going to be wrong if you spend time with customers and really understand what they're trying to accomplish and try to… To give them that, it doesn't mean that you take the how from them. Because sometimes customers haven't put a lot of thought into it or they don't have the skills to tell you what the ideal user experience would be like. But their goals... what excites them, what they need, they tend to know better than you do if you ask and listen carefully, I think. - Yeah, really interesting. I agree. A lot of things tend to get built. The story gets told as if they're built for customers, but in truth, founders build things that are intellectually compelling to them. Has your taste in problems changed over the years or taste in opportunities, the type of company you want to acquire your intuition for it? Maybe. I mean, I suppose so. We'll learn... as we go through life and do things and reflect and reflect, on what we fail at and what we succeed at. and Yeah, I guess not in any extremely concrete way that I can think of. Right now, I tend to get excited about problems in general and [15:00] and in creative solutions to problems. I'm not as motivated by what, let's say, broader society may perceive to be cool. So my taste in companies, if that's what you mean, is not really ever being, oh, this is a sexy brand. But if the problem is complex and solving it would create a lot of value, then I get excited. Even if the company itself, like AOL, feels old and legacy, I actually find the AOL acquisition incredibly exciting. One of the most exciting, frankly, for us. Amazing. Well, let's talk about the portfolio. You had mentioned acquiring 50 companies. Is that right? Yeah, 50 acquisitions approximately, maybe 60 at this point. Incredible. And obviously, the portfolio lets you do things that any single product CEO can't do. You talked on the David Senra podcast about being able to take these expected value bets where the payoff is outsized, but the sort of downside is you may lose your job as the CEO of a single product company. Do you think that CEOs of single product companies irrationally overweight the probability of things going wrong? I mean if you were to go back and do your single product startup again would you change the way that you approached your investments So like I said I did co a single product startup and we failed, so clearly we took a lot of risk. I think the short answer is no. I think there are probably executive teams that substantially miscalculate risks, but I think primarily the reason why they don't take some risks isn't because they got them wrong by 20% but because they hate the median case and they should it's like if you're a VC and you may be better positioned than me to elaborate on this but ultimately you invest in say 50 companies What you care about is the overall returns from the portfolio. And you may want each of these companies to go 100 miles per hour against the wall. And you know that the four or five who get to go through the door, which is very narrow, will win 100x. And the others will crash and burn. Whereas if they had taken it more slowly they would have lost the opportunity of winning but they probably would have had better chances of being somewhat sustainable decent businesses For you as a VC the more cautious approach is bad because your expected outcome gets worse and your median outcome doesn actually get much better But for an individual company, while their expected outcome would be better if they went 100 miles per hour, their median outcome would be massively worse. It could go from I end up with something to I end up with nothing. And so it's not irrational for some of these teams, whether it's entrepreneurs, professional managers, to try to protect against the downside a little bit. Because ultimately, they only have one life and one career. I mean, that's what I appreciate so much about what you guys do, Loco, which is that for extraordinary companies that have been innovative and have achieved scale, but perhaps haven't gone all the way to the stratosphere, they have an opportunity to keep building and creating value with betting spoons. Yeah, I think we are a very important and perhaps missing up to now element of a healthy innovation ecosystem. Proof being that you know every time we have made an offer to someone to buy their company either they chose not to sell or they sold it to us not to someone else So when you have such overwhelming call it success rate it means you're really finding great product market fit in a way, like you're really solving a problem that people have. Yeah, absolutely. So you've talked a bunch about sort of bending spoons in terms of the focus on clear strategy and extreme focus on talent. It feels like credit and capital markets has been a key part of what you guys have achieved as well. Can you talk about some of the lessons from leveraging debt effectively? Because some companies have gotten in trouble and yet you guys have benefited and been so strategic in how you use debt and debt markets. Sure. So, well, that helps you basically do more sooner, faster. And assuming your expected returns from those investments are higher than the cost of debt, it's always smart to take that with one big caveat, which is assuming the risk of defaulting on your debt remains negligible, because obviously if you become significant, then it's not a no brainer any longer that taking the extra risk makes sense. Now, as an intellectually honest disclaimer, I think if you take companies that at some point [20:00] went bust but hadn't had issues up to a certain point and you asked them they would all come across as very bullish about their usage of that. So we have been doing fine and have not even come remotely close to having issues with it, but It's still important to remain cautious because It's not the people who embossed thought they would as they raised the debt. I mean, I guess in some cases there were some perverse incentives to still raise the debt, but in most cases they thought they were fine, and then things turned and they had issues. So I think it's important to be paranoid in general when taking on any significant amount of debt. We have a stringent, we have a stringent limits we self-impose, trying to keep leverage ratio, well below 3x. It's currently about 2.5, 2.4. Historically, it's been closer to 2 than to 3. Always been in a position to be able to pay back 100% of our debt before maturity, even under severely adverse scenarios. We try to refinance most of our debt every year or two to keep maturity fixed. five plus years out. We hedge 100 percent. over debt against interest rate fluctuations. So we know exactly how much interest we will pay in the future. We're highly diversified. We have a very high level of profitability and high cash conversion, So there are all sorts of things that mitigate the risks associated with leveraging app. And my assessment right now is that our risk of defaulting on our debt is... It's close to zero. It's extremely, extremely low. And so we're better off having that than not. But again, Be cautious. Don't overdo it, particularly if you're not sophisticated and you don't fully understand the cash flow consequences of it. Start small, develop knowledge, good modeling, good processes and checks and balances, and then maybe take a little bit more. Any project that could be huge, would probably require a decade plus to get there. Rule number one to win and be that huge success is not having failed in the meantime. And so I think often it's better to take two, three years longer, but take no or very limited risk. than speeding up and then crashing and burning. I mean, I think these are great rules of thumb, you know, perhaps encouraging a bit more ambition in product and the size of the swings and a bit more caution in credit and debt. We've seen many situations where founders tend to underestimate the probability of things going sideways with debt. particularly if you rely on one segment, one market, one product, one revenue stream, because boundary conditions can change quite abruptly. You're still not fully insulated if you have a diversified portfolio, because diversification, is a complex concept and it depends on the Whether you're diversified or not, it depends on against what particular phenomenon and your different supposedly diversified assets could be highly correlated when it comes to… response to that particular phenomenon, but So again... Handle we care. It's tricky. But if done properly, it's a massive boon. I mean, there's plenty of companies that have used that consistently in history, you know, Broadcom, Transdime, and have done incredibly well for many decades. And they wouldn't have done nearly as well had they not used that. So, yeah. Yeah. Yeah, interesting. My theory is that everything is correlated, but that's a subject for a different talk. Well, I tend to agree. I mean, but not necessarily to the same extent. That's right. Okay, let's quickly talk about durability and moats as a favorite topic in Silicon Valley right now. You know, a year ago was Sasspocalypse around Opus 4546. All those names traded down 40% in backup, so I don't know what folks accomplished with the SaaSpocalypse. It seems like it was a little overblown, but it has brought about this discussion of where durability lies in a world where you can trivially create software with AI. How do you think about it? I never fully... So I think the valuations for SaaS historically were for the most part absurdly high. but not because AI was not a risk, because they didn't make any sense from, at least from the perspective of someone, going back to what we were talking about earlier, someone who values assets based on reasonable expectations of free cash flows in the long run, In most cases, I think you could only justify those valuations based on the speculation that you'd be able to sell them to someone for, say, the same multiple down the line, but in the meantime you've grown 50% or something, right? Because they were based often on assuming that the current 12% organic growth would last for... 15 years. And it's like, sure, but, you know, the world changes so quickly, that's insane, right? Organic growth almost never goes up, by the way. I mean, very rarely. Again, going back [25:00] marks. It typically goes down and so those assumptions made no sense. Now, I think AI gave people an excuse to go back to their models and say, maybe I don't fully believe in those assumptions, let me be more cautious. And the reset valuations... Where I think, broadly speaking, reasonable. I mean, you could always argue plus minus 20%, but they were more in the range of reasonable, in my view. Now, I never... really bought too much into the risk of now writing software is cheaper, therefore these companies are screwed. I do buy in the idea of it's going to be much cheaper, therefore they'll suffer on the margin, but now they're screwed. And the reason is I think writing software has been... Visibly cheap for a long time. And most of the companies that matter, you know, scale companies worth at least, I don't know, a billion dollars. The cost of replicating their product technically was... negligible relative to the value of being a a winner or gaining significant market share in that market, even five or ten years ago. Yeah, maybe you needed 20 good engineers, but replicating Salesforce is not rocket science. We own WeTransfer. If you had five great engineers, new graduates who want to spend three months in a garage, they could probably build a product that's 80% as good. And in fact, guess what? 100 teams have done that. There's plenty of clones, right? So mostly Software or digital products do not succeed because it's very expensive to replicate them. They're now SpaceX. Um, They mostly succeed because of other factors. First mover advantage, sometimes you start You build a brand simply because people know you and nothing else. And then there is a lot of habits people don't, you know, the actual switching costs, but just also the psychological switching costs. People don't want to bother switching if it means, you know, our company making a billion in revenue, you're saving thousands $3,000 for that. Who wants to even bother taking the time and risk? And it's rational not to do so. Two, it could be network effects. We own Eventbrite. People don't go to Eventbrite because nobody among all homo sapiens has managed to replicate a ticketing platform. But it's because on Eventbrite, You have 90 million people who go monthly look for... for tickets, and so you sell more basically, right? And so AI can replicate that a million times, but they don't have the audience. And people go there because everybody posts events there, right? Or something like Komoot, you have proprietary data, With Komoot, because of the history with all these users, we know that that particular path is muddy and, you know, it rained and there is a dog barking. And we have photos of those corners and trees and whatnot and turns that are not available. They're not available on satellites. They're nowhere to be found. And so, again, it's not… It's actually, Komoot is quite sophisticated actually, the routing, but still, you know, smart people can build that over time, but they don't have the data. Or scale advantages, you know, Airtable, our most recent acquisition. Most customers pay your table less than $1. $20,000 a year. Mostly they're large enterprises. Even if you get to a point where you can ask your agent, AI agent, you press a button and it replicates... the code for Airtable pretty much perfectly. which were very far from, but we'll get there, I think, you know, soon enough, probably in the next few years. Supposedly, you'll still want to have someone at the company who's responsible to make sure that that code seems legit, that if something breaks, goes to the agent and asks the agent to fix it and whatnot. I think there's a far future where AIs run our lives and companies, nobody works any longer, which is interesting. But, you know, it's not. I think most people will agree it's not in the next five years. That's right. As long as you have someone being responsible for things... even just a 0.2 FT of a software engineer It would still cost you more than... than paying Airtable for the same thing. Sure, it's an interesting philosophical point, but ultimately you're not going to do it rationally. It's dumb. So there are all sorts of reasons why I think most, not all, but most digital products are reasonably well protected. Again, they will suffer on the margin level new customers, you know, maybe people search for products through their agents and agents are have a different set of criteria they follow to choose. And so before people tended to choose product A, now it's more product B. That will certainly hurt product A, but... but not to the point that they melt away overnight, you know, because of this. - And those are natural market evolutions, right? Like web to mobile and preferences change, and maybe it's agents instead of humans that are searching, but, Our data shows that the enterprise spends 8% to 10% of total spend on software. So as you think about where you want to point your AI and your token budget, it's probably not in replicating payroll. That just seems like a high downside, low upside proposition. I agree, yeah. Excellent. Hey, so you mentioned proprietary data, which I think is actually under-discussed these days with everything happening in models. You know, there's a quip that... [30:00] many companies are sort of trading for less than the value of their tokens, which is the value that they would have if they were simply acquired for training data by models. Do you think that's true? Do you think proprietary data has changed? So I haven't thought enough about this and I don't know enough about it, but I will say that… Claim... strikes me as potentially a little bit misleading, meaning the value of data within new are pools declines pretty rapidly. It's like if today I write a new blog post, on the internet, nobody's gonna give me money for that. It's private and I'll go to open it. I'm about to, you know, I may publish it, I may not, do you want it, do you give me it on top? You know, the first walk past they ever got access to or could ever access it, would probably have paid a thousand dollars for it. But now zero, because incrementally it doesn't add anything to the corpus of knowledge that you can train AI models. So yes, maybe there's now a need for plenty of data on how people do project management or whatnot. The first companies selling that maybe make a bunch of money, but I think over time that trends to zero as the, you know, the quality of incremental training, uh, uh, uh, you know, returns deteriorate for incremental training. But I'm in no position to determine whether, you know, companies could sell data for more of their enterprise value. I'm not certain about that. Interesting. Let's double click on the kind of operating system you use within Bending Spoons to help improve and optimize all of the companies. Can you talk about some of the key components of it, and which of the components do you think would have been most useful to you as a single product founder versus specific to what you do with the portfolio? Thank you. So there's pretty much everything that you need to run a digital business. We built in-house with the exception of highly... I think, universal tools like Gmail or Slack, these sort of things for you. or Google Drive, we're happy to to use those that others build. We don't have... Highly. specific or personalized needs. But everything else from data processing, the A/B testing platform, all the marketing automations, user lifetime prediction, um, credentials management, recruiting tools. The list goes on and on. Depending on how you count, it's over 50 different in-house tools. We build them ourselves, and the reason why this has been valuable for us is, well, the obvious way is we save on vendor costs. Quite a lot, actually, but it's not something I'd say is a game-changer. Mm-hmm. The two game changers are, one, we make them super fit for purpose and very specific purposes. to our needs and these tools are natively integrated with one another. The sum of the parts is much greater than what you could possibly accomplish by buying these different tools from different vendors. Because each is better for what we exactly need to do, and they also work in a more harmonious way together. Also because we can, there are this big monolithic foundation, we can swap out the foundation as an acquired business quite rapidly. It's actually much faster to change the entire thing in one, or more or less the entire thing in one shot than... removing one piece, and then you place the alternative, and you need to plug it to everything else. Then remove another piece, plug it to everything else. Actually, swapping the entire thing out tends to be faster. Now, of course, this is not particularly relevant to a single product company because they don't need to buy new companies, so that's not what they need. But they could probably benefit from a bunch of these tools financially. A lot of the value is unlocked by having the right culture and the right talent because every tool, ultimately, the user makes a ton of difference. So depending on what company we're talking about, they could be able to take advantage of it or not. Some are more... Let's say... autonomous and they don't require a lot of effort and quite powerful. For example, We built something called a... an old ALT alternative spooner that's a It's basically an agent that lives in Slack and you talk to an ass, automatically has access to all the same tools and assets as you do, the same GitHub repos, same folders drive and whatnot. And you can task it to do things for you. Anything you could do in theory you could do, and increasingly it can do and does. So you can tell it, for example, to run a data analysis for you and it will go fetch the data. If it doesn't have access, it will escalate a request to our credentials management team and potentially our IT security team if relevant. Get the data, process it, show your graph and commentary. You don't have to ask anybody else. You get it in five minutes, say many, many hours, and certainly a lot of delay in the exchange of information. I experienced an interesting situation where a general manager of Evernote for us in a channel where we post feedback. [35:00] On the product she wrote to her agent, I've seen this bug. Can you please go to Moros, which is our customer support tool to check whether other customers have reported it, then go to the code base. find a root cause, CodeAFix and PingMarco, which is our engineering lead on that product, to review the fix and fix it. And it got done, and that would... I mean, it was a hundred times better than what was possible before. So that's maybe a tool that I think could be... Collosal game changer for all the companies. That sounds really powerful. As you think about the way models get deployed within the company, do you think there are any job functions where the model will be doing 100% of the work in the near future? Or do you imagine... it being a kind of lever for individual productivity, as you just described. 100%. So customer support, for example, we have evolved all of our customer support managers from being more of like Agents answering, you know, responding to tickets. Now we are, for that we pretty much 100% use either AI or for the residual portion of the tickets, external vendors. And our customer support managers are more and more similar to, say, a product manager trying to architect the ideal product. response process, response rules, and user experience. And this is just the beginning, you know, we're investing heavily in this to make it much better. We'll include at some point support via phone calls, via WhatsApp. So that's an obvious strength for LLMs because it's mostly about digesting a body of knowledge and exchanging - Okay. communications with people and LLMs have been trained on data that's quite similar to this and already today are pretty good at it. Um, Another area where we have seen the percentage of tasks taken by AI increase massively as data science, data analysis. Now our data scientists are doing much more here too, architectural work, building technology, writing software and building tooling and processes for, say, the budgeting process or a recurring dashboard. But the actual fetching data, cleaning data... Plotting data type of work is done I don't have a precise figure, but I'm pretty confident at least 90% by AI. And then coding, of course. We were at 0% written by AI two years ago. Last time I checked, I'm at 94%. Wow. some companies, depending on how aggressive you want to be, you could be, if you're a good company, you could be at 70 and 99, but no good company should be, I don't know, below 70 right now, in my view. There's no point. I agree. Everyone should be converging to 100. Okay, I've got a couple more questions here, Luke, and then we'll wrap it out. So, you know, one question is, you've talked about how within Bending Spoons, every decision should be able to make with maximum rationality, but that doesn't necessarily mean always being led by data and analytics. And LLMs can also often create a sort of false precision. Is there a type of decision where you found being instincts-led versus analytics-led? has led to better outcomes. So I think analytics and instincts are inputs. So, Data is an input. My instinct that something is off or this could be cool. is an input. You want to get as many inputs as possible within reason. But then, I don't think there's ever any case in life where... you should be deciding with anything other than logic and rationality. Again, it doesn't mean that simply because an analysis shows... that people in France are more likely to buy this, then we do that and we do it in France. It's just, again, one input in a broader discussion. But I don't think there's ever a good reason to say we'll do this because I feel like it. Unless we're talking leisure, which is all about feeling a certain way. Um, Even if you are the most... You want to be as creative and imaginative as possible, but again, those are just inputs. Those were produce ideas or options that you wouldn't otherwise have considered, but you don't pick those simply because you got them in the spur of a moment and you're super excited about them. You want to ponder them and determine whether that excitement is... is justified and if so, yeah, go for it. Absolutely. That makes sense. So maybe one question on behalf of founders who feel like they're stuck. You know, the definition of hell is never winning and never quitting. How should founders know when it's time to kind of move on versus, and of course, this is a difficult question, versus, hey, maybe you're three months away from the next increment. Yeah, I wish I had a good answer. You know, I'm probably awful at that because my... My startup before Bending Spoons Evertail, we were... Worked at it for three years and... You know how we failed? So it clearly wasn't working. We were trying to use AI way too early, clearly, to write diaries for people automatically. Clearly it wasn't working. [40:00] People weren't using it, certainly weren't paying for it. Um, And, uh, and, but we kept pushing, we raised a little extra money to keep going and pivoted and pivoted and pivoted. And then, uh. At some point we were left with maybe... Something like... Ugh. Maybe $250,000, $300,000. But much of that was meant to be through a tax return from the Danish government at the time we were based in Denmark. I don't remember exactly the bureaucratic aspects of it, but something like that. And then we got a message from the government that refund either wasn't due ultimately or was due 12 months later, something that would basically put us out of business. And so you could argue that red tape made the decision for us. So I'm not very good at that. I feel I can't advise. Bureaucracy created bending spoons. Yeah. You heard it here first. Okay, final question. Look, for the next rate technology company that comes from Italy or even from the region, what do you think they should learn from bending spoons and what do you think that they should think about for themselves? Yeah, they should definitely think with their own heads. 100%. I've never seen a great entrepreneur, a great inventor, a great engineer, a great artist, a great anything who doesn't ultimately take responsibility for their own decisions and is intellectually independent. But some things that I feel are almost universally useful, at least in entrepreneurship and business, are ambition. I feel, look, ultimately it's very subjective. Personally, I think that you... You can only do so many things. And almost anything is more interesting is a greater likelihood of ultimately being rewarding if you aim high. So just aim for... Now, aim for the moon. That's lost all its flavor because of the crypto guys, but aim high. Aim very high. To again, try to be rational. be as creative, imaginative, passionate as you can be, but ultimately try to make decisions using... using logic, that will get you much further. And by the way, some of the biggest inventors in history do that pretty well. I think Jobs did that well. Certainly Bill Gates did that well. Elon Musk clearly, you know, does that well. Bezos, they're all guys with big ideas, but ultimately they don't pick them because they say, well, that sounds so cool. Let's do it. They look at the facts and all the facts. at the first principles and ultimately comes a decision of those. So I'd say ambition, rationality, and then going lower by one level, but really do not underestimate the. how important it is to have a talent-dense team, and how impossibly hard it is to... improve talent density if you started with very low talent density. For a bunch of reasons we probably don't have time to discuss, but most of those should be fairly intuitive. Luka, you built one of the most unique and successful companies in the world. Congratulations and thank you for spending time with us today. My pleasure. Thanks for listening to this episode of the A16Z podcast. Like, comment, subscribe, leave us a rating or review, and share it with your friends and family. For more episodes, go to YouTube, Apple Podcasts, and Spotify. Follow us on X at A16Z and subscribe to our Substack at a16z.substack.com. Thanks again for listening, and I'll see you in the next episode. 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