Nate Silver Forecasts 90% Dem House Sweep as Newsom Fades

纽森势头减弱，Nate Silver预测民主党有90%概率横扫众议院 随着年轻选民放弃传统政党标签转向体制外民粹候选人，Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez有望在2028年赢得反建制选票。 Nate Silver分享了他对美国体育与政治的数据驱动分析，首先以统计数据为他钟爱的纽约尼克斯队近期的季后赛表现进行辩护。转向政治议题后，他探讨了加利福尼亚州迟缓的选举系统，将民主党选民划分为三大意识形态派系，并预测民主党将强力掌控众议院，而参议院角逐将十分胶着。展望2028年，Silver详细阐述了一套旨在应对年轻选民民粹焦虑与反资本主义情绪的获胜策略，最终预测加州州长Gavin Newsom的民调支持率将走低，并指出Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez将成为极具竞争力的体制外总统候选人。 党派偏见已成为美国政治的根本重力，基于极度固化的两极分化格局，分析人士目前已能以 97% 的把握预测 2028 年大选中 43 个州的归属。 (0:00) 加州极其拖沓的计票流程受到严厉抨击，相比于印度等能在 24 小时内完成全国计票的国家，加州复杂的选票处理机制效率严重滞后。 (9:37) 两党选民动员规律发生历史性逆转：民主党目前在低投票率的特别选举与中期选举中表现优异，而共和党则在极高投票率的大选中更具优势。 (15:36) 民主党内部已分化为三大意识形态阵营：激进左翼、注重市场机制与政府效能的“充裕自由派”（Abundance Libs），以及州长纽森所依靠的铁杆“抵抗自由派”（Resistance Libs）。 (21:10) 针对 2026 年中期选举预测，受现任反噬与经济焦虑影响，民主党重夺众议院的概率高达 85% 至 90%，但在参议院的胜算仅为 40% 至 45%。 (49:46)

Statistician Nate Silver argues that structural voter fatigue and deep partisan polarization favor Democrats in upcoming House contests while complicating their Senate map. Looking to 2028, Silver contends that establishment leaders like Gavin Newsom are faltering, creating an opening for insurgent candidates such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Partisan Gravity and Decentralized Voting Mechanics (0:00) Silver argues that partisanship operates as the ultimate gravity in American politics, enabling analysts to forecast 2028 presidential outcomes for 43 of 50 states with 97% confidence. Despite recurring public doubts over extended ballot processing, Silver finds no evidence of systemic fraud capable of altering national results. Verified fraud cases tracked by the conservative Heritage Foundation remain de minimis, and historical recount data shows net shifts rarely exceed 0.05%, well below typical 0.5% statutory triggers. However, Silver criticizes California’s multi-week counting process as unacceptable, contrasting it with India’s ability to tally nationwide ballots within 24 hours. The late "blue shifts" observed in California stem from predictable behavioral disparities rather than manipulation: Republican voters disproportionately cast ballots in person, whereas younger progressives rely heavily on late mail-in ballots. While Silver views standard voter ID rules as reasonable, he attributes declining public trust to decentralized, multi-track voting systems that create an appearance of impropriety. Demographic Realignment and Generational Divides (15:36) The long-standing political assumption that high voter turnout inherently favors Democrats has inverted. Silver highlights that Democrats now consistently overperform in lower-turnout midterms and special elections, while Republicans mobilize large turnouts during presidential years, particularly with Donald Trump on the ballot. Concurrently, Democrats face attrition among entrepreneurial minority cohorts, including Hispanic and Asian-American small-business owners who have shifted away from progressive governance models. Ideological alignment also reveals a stark age threshold at roughly 40. Unlike older cohorts who entered the workforce during the robust 1990s economy, voters under 40 experienced the aftermath of September 11th, the 2008 financial crisis, and heavy student debt burdens across 45 million recent graduates. This demographic context has fueled significant openness toward socialist branding. Silver observes power fracturing across three Democratic factions: the socialist-aligned Left, market-oriented "abundance libs" focused on fixing blue-state regulatory gridlock, and establishment "resistance libs." Midterm Forecasts and House-Senate Disconnect (49:46) Silver reports that prediction markets assign Democrats an 80% to 85% probability of winning the House of Representatives, though he estimates the true probability may reach 85% to 90%. This forecast is driven by standard structural forces: an unpopular incumbent administration, economic anxiety, and historical midterm backlash against the president's party. Conversely, prediction markets give Democrats only a 40% to 45% likelihood of retaining the Senate, where they face an unfavorable map requiring defense of seats in deeply conservative states. Silver emphasizes that the two chambers are strongly correlated, estimating only a 1% chance that Democrats win the Senate while losing the House. Any electoral wave strong enough to flip Senate seats in red territory would almost certainly deliver the House. At the macro level, Silver identifies retail gas prices as the most immediate psychological metric for voters, noting that unexpected economic disruptions—such as ongoing conflict involving Iran—represent the primary wildcards that could alter current baselines. The 2028 Cycle: Newsom's Slide and AOC's Opening (55:05) Silver characterizes modern American politics as a cycle of continuous "change elections," where voters routinely reject incumbents. In this volatile environment, California Governor Gavin Newsom’s presidential prospects have slipped, with primary polling falling from 25% to 15% and his Polymarket odds declining to 22%. Silver attributes this drop to Newsom's defense of the unpopular status quo and his lack of demonstrated appeal in battleground states, contrasting him with figures like Georgia Senator Jon Ossoff who have won in purple terrain. Instead, Silver identifies Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, eligible to run at age 36, as a formidable candidate to capture anti-establishment, "burn-it-down" energy in 2028, drawing parallels to Donald Trump’s 2016 takeover of the GOP primary. Because younger voters exhibit minimal loyalty to traditional party branding, Silver argues that candidates who combine outsider credentials with strategic moderation—such as Ocasio-Cortez’s recent outreach and nuanced policy stances—are best positioned to capitalize on pervasive voter discontent. Silver concludes that entrenched polarization and voter exhaustion with the status quo will continue driving electoral volatility. Sustainable political success will depend on moving beyond aging leadership and addressing the tangible economic stresses felt by younger generations, rather than relying on legacy partisan brand loyalty.

民调专家与统计模型分析师Nate Silver指出，党派极化已成为美国政治无法摆脱的绝对“重力”，在两党频繁轮替的“变革型选举”周期中，民主党虽在国会众议院选举中占据显著赢面，但加利福尼亚州州长Gavin Newsom等传统建制派影响力正大幅滑坡，代表反建制情绪的Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez与摇摆州温和派则成为重塑2028年大选格局的关键力量。 极化重力与选举机制争议 (9:37) Silver分析指出，强固的党派偏见构成了全美选举的底层逻辑，甚至现在就能以97%的置信度提前预测2028年大选全美50个州中43个州的最终归属。针对加利福尼亚州等地区计票迟缓所引发的欺诈质疑，Silver强调并无实质舞弊证据，保守派智库传统基金会的数据亦表明实际违规案例极其微小，无法撼动宏观选举走向。开票后期选情逆转的本质在于两党选民投票习惯的分化：在特朗普政治修辞影响下，共和党选民倾向亲自前往投票站，而年轻及激进的民主党人更偏好邮寄选票且投票时间偏晚，这种群体差异直接造成了系统性的“选票漂移”。 然而，Silver批评加州高度官僚化的慢速计票体系堪比“失败国家”，与印度乃至英法等在投票结束后数小时至24小时内出具结果的民主政体形成鲜明对照。他认为当前体系的核心隐患在于制造了强烈的“程序不当感”；与此同时，传统上“高投票率必然利好民主党”的认知已彻底颠覆，最新数据显示民主党反而在投票率偏低的特别选举和中期选举中持续超常发挥，而共和党在动员高投票率大选（尤其是特朗普在场时）方面的爆发力已远超以往。 中期选举：众院优势与参院僵局 (49:46) 结合历史规律与预测市场数据，Silver预计民主党在中期选举中夺回国会众议院的概率约为80%至85%，其实际概率甚至可能高达85%至90%；但在维持参议院控制权方面，其胜率仅有40%至45%。众议院的选情主要受宏观历史周期驱动：现任总统民意支持率低迷（特朗普后期支持率跌至38%）、公众对通胀和经济现状深感焦虑，加上中期选举对执政党天然的历史惩罚效应，均令民主党占据明显上风。选情面临的最大外部变量在于高可见度的汽油价格，以及受伊朗局势牵动的能源市场波动。 与众议院不同，参议院选举是一场严峻的席位数学防御战。Silver解释称，参众两院具备极强的统计相关性，预测市场上民主党“赢得参院却输掉众院”的极端概率仅约1%。由于本轮参议院选区图谱对民主党极其苛刻，即便全美处于偏蓝的大环境，民主党仍须在深红州艰难保席。例如在理论上占优的缅因州，挑战者Grand Platner在民调中仅领先现任共和党参议员Susan Collins两个百分点；而在得克萨斯等深红州，共和党即便遭遇候选人质量争议，依然能凭借强大的基本盘忠诚度守住阵地。 民主党三派分化与代际理念鸿沟 (21:10) Silver将当代民主党划分为三大意识形态阵营：其一是Bernie Sanders与Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez（AOC）领衔的“左翼进击派”，在深蓝根据地动员力强大；其二是以Ezra Klein思想为代表的“丰裕自由派”（Abundance Libs），作为亲市场的温和派，他们严厉批评加州在住房限制、治安和过度进步主义文化议题上的治理失效，警惕就业与人口持续外流；其三是以Newsom基本盘构成的“抵抗自由派”（Resistance Libs），这批极化忠诚者沿用强硬对抗且绝不认错的姿态，倾向将2024年的败局归咎于媒体偏见而非政策失误。 派系割裂的根源在于以40岁为界的代际观念鸿沟。Silver指出，40岁以上的群体见证了克林顿时代的经济繁荣与冷战落幕，在2008年金融危机前已站稳职业脚跟，对资本主义抱有基本信任；40岁以下的年轻选民则成年于9·11事件后并面临沉重的助学贷款压力，因而对“社会主义”标签展现出空前包容。与此同时，民主党在极具创业精神的西裔与亚裔小企业主群体中的支持率正大幅流失，而美国当前的经济活力在很大程度上仅由AI科技驱动的资本热潮支撑。 2028大选变局：Newsom颓势与AOC崛起 (55:05) 在选民对建制现状产生严重审美疲劳的“变革型周期”下，传统路线正加速贬值。Silver指出，加利福尼亚州州长Gavin Newsom的2028总统初选前景已显著走低，其党内初选民调支持率从25%跌至15%，在预测平台Polymarket上的胜率亦从33%降至22%。Newsom试图全盘继承拜登与哈里斯政治遗产的策略已沦为选战负资产，加之加州治理恶名在外，使其严重缺乏跨出深蓝选区的说服力。相比之下，来自佐治亚州等关键摇摆州的年轻参议员Jon Ossoff被视为更具实际战力的温和派替代人选。 与此同时，Silver预测年满36岁的Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez极具潜力在2028年大选中收割党内“彻底掀翻建制”（burn-it-down）的反叛选民，其崛起逻辑与当年特朗普瓦解共和党传统精英高度相似。当前年轻一代对传统党派毫无忠诚度，而AOC已展现出老练的战术调整：在保留反叛标签的同时，开始在亿万富翁税和极端文化议题上微调立场，甚至跨界参与保守派播客以拓宽受众。Silver认为，面向2028年的制胜路线必须将反寡头论调、扶持小微企业与文化温和主义结合起来，方能弥合中下阶层的现实焦虑。 Silver的推演表明，尽管党派重力与选举数学构成了美国政治的基本骨架，但宏观经济不确定性与公众对高龄建制政客的厌倦正在加速制度解体；若两党候选人无法跳出空洞的意识形态内耗，未能切实回应住房、就业与生活成本等民生议题，政权在每一次选举周期中被选民无情颠覆将成为长期的政治常态。

## Background 本期内容由知名播客频道 All-In Podcast 于 2026 年 7 月 27 日发布于 YouTube。节目邀请到统计学家与选举分析专家内特·席尔瓦（Nate Silver），围绕加州选票清点争议、民主党内部的三派内斗、社交媒体算法极化、2026 年中期选举预测以及加文·纽森民调受挫与 AOC 的 2028 年潜在崛起展开深入探讨。 ## TL;DR 内特·席尔瓦在节目中深入剖析了美国政治极化如同万有引力般的支配作用，指出加州计票系统严重拖沓但并无系统性舞弊证据。他将民主党划分为极左翼、富足自由派和抵抗派三大对立阵营，并认为在普遍求变的选举周期中，死守拜登政治遗产的纽森胜选前景并不明朗，反而像 AOC 这样具备局外人特质的政客可能脱颖而出。针对 2026 年中期选举，席尔瓦预测民主党有 85% 至 90% 的极大概率夺回众议院，而参议院则陷入胶着，汽油价格与中东局势将成为关键的宏观胜负手。 ## Atmosphere & style 整场对谈兼具硅谷精英播客特有的松弛幽默与硬核政治数据分析的冷峻理性。开篇嘉宾与主持人们借着纽约尼克斯队季后赛、高昂球票和体育博彩大肆开涮，随后无缝切换至高密度的选情推演与战术拆解，碰撞出极其犀利的政治洞见。席尔瓦以其标志性的概率思维与直率表达主导对话，毫不客气地解构两党神话，现场氛围既有好友相聚的拆台调侃，又充溢着对美国制度运转机能退化的审慎忧思。 ## Bulletin - [49:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2986s) 内特·席尔瓦预测民主党在 2026 年中期选举夺回众议院的概率高达 85% 至 90%，受特朗普民调低迷和执政党历史反噬驱动；参议院胜率则在 40% 至 50% 之间胶着。 - [55:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3305s) 加州州长纽森在 2028 民主党初选民调中已从 25% 暴跌至 15%，预测市场概率降至 22%；席尔瓦看好 36 岁的 AOC 成为类似破局者的最大黑马。 - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=0s) 全美 50 州中有 43 州的选举走向可凭 97% 置信度提前锁定，党派极化如物理引力般主导全美选情，导致深蓝州固化为低效的政党机器州。 - [34:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2076s) 2028 年大选的制胜公式被定义为：精准的“反寡头”经济叙事，配合在文化与觉醒（woke）议题上的大幅克制降温，以重新争取年轻男性与逃离左翼的小企业主移民。 ## Key takeaways - [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=0s) 党派极化已成为美国选举无法逃脱的万有引力，全美 43 个州的选情在 2028 年大选中已有高达 97% 的把握提前预测。 - [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=69s) 传统体育博彩对盈利玩家严苛限额，促使高水平交易员与资金大幅转向 Polymarket 等流动性更佳的预测市场。 - [10:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=610s) 加州选举的“迟到蓝移”并非舞弊，而是年轻选民偏好拖延邮寄的习惯所致，但拖延数周的计票系统凸显了公共体制效能的萎缩。 - [18:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1138s) 重新计票在全美统计研究中纠错翻盘的净变化极少超过 0.05%，选举争议更多源于程序漏洞引发的“不端行为观感”。 - [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1270s) 民主党在深蓝州奉行“选出最不易引起反感的中庸人选”的策略，导致其在近四次全国大选中实质落败三次，丧失全国说服力。 - [25:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1509s) 民主党内部裂变为三大对立派系：极具煽动力但难破圈的极左翼、注重民生与基建供给的“富足自由派”，以及死守建制机器的“抵抗派”。 - [28:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1733s) 当代绝大多数美国大选本质上都是“求变型选举”（change elections），纽森与哈里斯死守拜登政治遗产的做法面临结构性困境。 - [31:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1888s) 年轻世代因背负巨额学贷和直面大衰退而对资本主义幻灭，但民主党向激进社会主义倾斜的话语正将拉美裔等移民小企业主推向共和党。 - [41:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2464s) 对资本主义的认同以 40 岁为分水岭：40 岁以上享受了 90 年代繁荣红利，40 岁以下则从未切身感受过制度带来的正向反馈。 - [44:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2644s) 社交平台算法从纯时间流转向全推荐流，将复杂的政治光谱粗暴压缩为一维对抗，极大加剧了信息茧房和极端极化。 - [52:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3138s) 2026 年中期选举中，汽油价格与伊朗局势是共和党能否守住众议院的核心宏观变数，油价也是选民最直接的经济晴雨表。 - [58:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3492s) 加文·纽森身上的加州建制派烙印过深，中间选民难以相信一个白人男性身份就能化解民主党在摇摆州输掉 2 至 5 个百分点的加州品牌负资产。 ## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=0s) 党派极化：美国大选无法逃脱的“万有引力” 内特·席尔瓦（Nate Silver）在节目开篇一针见血地指出，党派偏好（Partisanship）就像万有引力一样，支配着美国的每一场选举。在这个高度极化的时代，民调预测者常常面临巨大的舆论压力——哪怕模型给出加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）或亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯（AOC）有 55% 的胜率，一旦最终落败，分析师就会遭受猛烈抨击。但不可否认的客观现实是，全美 50 个州中有 43 个州的选情几乎固若金汤，现在就可以带着高达 97% 的把握预测它们在 2028 年大选中会倒向哪一边。席尔瓦强调，这绝非选区操纵或系统作弊所致，而是因为政治极化和党派认同已经化为两股极其强大的社会力量，让整个国家深陷其中、无法自拔。 ### [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=69s) 尼克斯季后赛狂潮与现场见闻：从严苛安检到博彩盘口 主持人热烈欢迎内特·席尔瓦做客《All-In》。作为知名统计学家、播客主持人、职业扑克玩家以及 Substack 专栏《Silver Bulletin》的主笔，席尔瓦头戴一顶显眼的纽约尼克斯队球帽现身。他打趣道，这顶帽子虽然有点大、在播客镜头前显得不太搭调，但他大概还能再戴一周，毕竟尼克斯打出这样的成绩“在 53 年里乃至人生中都是难得一见的时刻”。谈到现场观赛体验，席尔瓦透露自己去了客场费城富国银行中心球馆（Wells Fargo Center）的多场系列赛，亲历了纽约球迷占领费城主场的名场面；此外，他还特意去了特朗普现场观赛的那场焦点战。尽管那场比赛入场堪称一场折磨，但他认为作为记录者必须去现场感受纽约在这场混乱中可能迎来的胜利时刻。 为了赶上一场晚上 8:30 开始的比赛，不以守时著称的席尔瓦破天荒地在傍晚 6:05 就赶到现场排队。当时安检队伍从第 33 街一直延伸到第 29 街和第 30 街的第六大道上。席尔瓦形容入场安检简直达到了美国运输安全管理局（TSA）的级别：安检人员不仅人工翻查每个人的钱包，还当场没收了所有打火机、签字笔和电子烟。比赛过程中，经历漫长排队的现场观众在下半场明显显出疲态，加上裁判几次争议判罚，场面一度极为滞涩。在赛前盘口方面，席尔瓦对尼克斯信心十足。他提前押注了尼克斯夺得东部冠军，并在东决尘埃落定后，追加押注尼克斯在总决赛击败俄克拉荷马雷霆（OKC）或圣安东尼奥马刺。他幽默地表示，虽然赢来的利润买不起像杰森（Jason Calacanis）那样顶级的场边席，但足够覆盖自己 200 层看台的球票花销。 谈及体育博彩与预测市场的运作机制，席尔瓦分享了专业投注者的痛点： - **传统博彩平台的限制**：诸如 DraftKings、MGM 等传统散户体育博彩公司一旦发现用户是能稳定盈利的“精明玩家”（sharp bettor），便会对其投注额度施加极其严苛的限制甚至封号。 - **预测市场的流动性优势**：以 Polymarket 为代表的预测市场（席尔瓦兼任其顾问）不会限制赢家下注，因而迅速吸引了大量高水平交易员、资深博彩玩家乃至对冲基金的入场。席尔瓦直言，自己如今越来越不愿去应付传统博彩网站“到底能不能把钱下进去”的繁琐限制，因而大幅转向了预测市场。 - **数据异象捕捉**：席尔瓦通过数据模型注意到尼克斯在东部被严重低估。比如对阵老鹰时一度打出 77 比 22 的悬殊比分，在统计学上这种在多轮系列赛中展现出的压倒性优势被称为具有“显著性标志”（signature significance），绝非随机噪音。 ### [04:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=271s) 尼克斯蜕变之谜：迈克·布朗的体系革命与季后赛经验的实证价值 针对尼克斯本赛季的剧烈转变，席尔瓦与主持人展开了深层战术剖析。赛季常规赛尾声时球队一度陷入低谷，甚至传出要拿卡尔-安东尼·唐斯（KAT）去交易扬尼斯·阿德托昆博（Giannis Antetokounmpo）的流言；但在 1、2 月间，迈克·布朗（Mike Brown）曾大胆尝试将唐斯推上“控球中锋”（point center）位置并打出惊人连胜，随后又将这一杀手锏雪藏直至季后赛。席尔瓦指出，尼克斯质变的两大核心变量正是迈克·布朗与唐斯。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 尼克斯防守与轮换体系演进 accDescr: 对比锡伯杜过度消耗主力的模式与迈克·布朗注重负荷管理及全员防守体系的区别。 subgraph OLD["锡伯杜时期 (2024及以前)"] A["常规赛极度消耗"] --> B["主力每场出战37+分钟"] B --> C["季后赛沦为重伤病房\n(阿奴诺比/哈特带伤血拼)"] end subgraph NEW["迈克·布朗时期 (体系重构)"] D["常规赛负荷管理\n(避免无意义消耗)"] --> E["体能支撑高强度轮转防守"] E --> F["唐斯与侧翼群构筑防线\n(布伦森专注进攻)"] F --> G["季后赛防守效率全联盟第一"] end ``` 在防守端，前主帅汤姆·锡伯杜（Tom Thibodeau）长年累月过度压榨主力，在常规赛打黄蜂这样的弱旅时依然让首发打满 37 分钟以上，直接导致 2024 年半决赛抢七对阵步行者时，全队伤痕累累、形同“战地医院”（阿奴诺比一瘸一拐、约什·哈特带伤死拼）。而布朗的体系彻底改变了这一点： - **防守资源整合**：杰伦·布伦森（Jalen Brunson）受制于身材劣势，并非顶级单防球员，但在新体系下，包括唐斯在内的其余防守人员均达到了联盟平均水准以上，依靠充沛的体能维持了极高强度的转换防守。 - **防守数据飞跃**：常规赛下半程尼克斯防守效率高居联盟第五，到了季后赛更是跃居全联盟首位。席尔瓦回忆在去年 12 月到 1 月球队 9 战 7 败的低谷期，他在尼克斯对阵篮网的同城德比中押注尼克斯大胜 15 分以上，结果尼克斯狂胜近 60 分并将对手限制在现代 NBA 历史级的超低分，随后全队触底反弹一举斩获 NBA 季中锦标赛冠军（NBA Cup）。 - **进攻多样性与无解中投**：布伦森在 16 至 22 英尺的中距离跳投命中率高达惊人的 53%，席尔瓦将其比作传奇终结者马里亚诺·里维拉（Mariano Rivera）的卡特球（cutter）——“明知道他要投，防守人就是防不住”。加上唐斯作为联盟排名前 15 级别的全能内线拉开空间、盘活全队转移球，尼克斯彻底摆脱了关键球阶段过分依赖单打的僵局。 席尔瓦最后特别强调了“季后赛经验”的实证价值。过去四年里，尼克斯打的季后赛场次超过了波士顿凯尔特人、雷霆和马刺等任何一支强队。这种经历对运动员心理有着极其关键的淬炼作用。他类比德州扑克与高尔夫运动：哪怕一名选手在世界扑克全球指数（GPI）排名第一，在初次打进世界扑克大赛主赛事（WSOP Main Event）时，神经系统依然会承受巨大的生理重压并出现波动。尼克斯经历过无数硬仗的洗礼，即便在季后赛中面对步行者或凯尔特人落后 10 到 15 分，全队也早已具备逆风翻盘的心理韧性，而这种心理操作系统是年轻球队无法迅速复制的。 ### [09:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=562s) 体育闲聊与加州选举争议的引出 节目从轻松的 NBA 话题开场，嘉宾与主持人们谈到纽约尼克斯队（New York Knicks）的势头，调侃全联盟如今都在绞尽脑汁研究该如何击败尼克斯，这与过去五六年大家苦思如何跨越波士顿凯尔特人队（Boston Celtics）的局面截然不同。随后话题迅速转入严肃政治领域。主持人 Jason 指出，Nate Silver 作为资深选举预测专家，正逢中期选举临近以及探讨 2028 年后特朗普时代格局的关键时刻。然而刚刚尘埃落定的一场选举引发了巨大争议——引用 David Sacks 的说法，虽然过程“并非违法，但感觉完全不像是一场真正的选举”。Jason 随即邀请 Nate 分析加州以及洛杉矶地方选举中，围绕计票延迟、邮寄选票以及舞弊指控背后的真实情况。 --- ### [10:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=610s) 洛杉矶选举的“迟到选票逆转”与加州落后的计票机制 针对洛杉矶市议会选举中尼西亚·拉曼（Nithya Raman）对阵对手时，在现场计票、早期邮寄选票与后期邮寄选票之间展现出的剧烈统计差异，David Friedberg 提出质疑：随着选举日后几天甚至几周内选票陆续清点，拉曼的得票率出现惊人暴涨并最终逆转获胜。在常规统计学直觉看来，现场投票人群、早期邮寄人群与晚期邮寄人群之间出现如此悬殊的政治倾向，似乎极不合理。 Nate Silver 对此给出了明确结论：简而言之，目前“没有任何选票欺诈的证据”（no evidence of fraud）。人们容易犯的一个统计错误，是假设每一张选票都是独立且随机送达的；但现实中，不同社会群体在何时投出选票存在显著的系统性差异。例如，民主党长期鼓励邮寄投票，而在特朗普屡次公开贬低邮寄选票后，这种按投票方式划分党派倾向的现象变得更加极端。 即便如此，Nate 也毫不客气地批评了加州的选举执行效率： - 加州的计票系统表现是“完全不可接受的”（completely unacceptable），这种数周无法出结果的拖沓甚至让它看起来像个“失败国家”（very failed state）。 - 相比之下，Nate 曾为印度大选提供咨询服务，印度即便需要在喜马拉雅山脉偏远地区设立投票站并分阶段投票，但在投票日结束后24小时内就能完成全国计票。 - 加州本届选举中民主党选民本身面临复杂的多人选择（如州长初选中埃里克·斯沃韦尔 Eric Swalwell、凯蒂·波特 Katie Porter 以及哈维尔·贝塞拉 Xavier Becerra 之间的摇摆），更倾向于拖延到最后一刻才寄出选票。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 加州选票统计时间差与蓝移现象成因 accDescr: 解释选民群体因投票习惯与决策迟疑导致的迟到选票党派偏移过程。 subgraph Inputs["选民行为分流"] A["共和党选民 / 传统选民"] -->|倾向现场投票或早期寄出| C["早期统计批次 (早偏红/稳健)"] B["年轻群体 / 进步派民主党选民"] -->|摇摆至最后时刻 / 晚期邮寄| D["晚期统计批次 (迟到蓝移)"] end subgraph ElectionSystem["加州计票系统瓶颈"] C --> E["开票首夜计票"] D --> F["持续数周的迟到邮寄选票核验"] end subgraph Outcome["最终统计结果"] E --> G["初期计票反映现场与早票偏向"] F --> H["后期出现剧烈统计反弹 (如 Nithya Raman 逆转)"] end ``` --- ### [12:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=721s) 加州政治生态：党纪森严的“机器州”而非摇摆摇篮 Nate 回忆了自己与加州的渊源。他的父亲来自洛杉矶，他自己在加州度过了大量时光，元旦假期还在圣地亚哥的海滩跑步、吃炸鱼玉米卷，非常理解加州昔日的魅力；同时他也承认，洛杉矶和旧金山等城市治理饱受诟病，尤其是洛杉矶在疫情后似乎从未真正复苏。 但从选举政治结构来看，加州是一个高度党派化的深蓝大本营（Capital-D Democratic state），是卡玛拉·哈里斯（Kamala Harris）和加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）这类典型建制派民主党人的发源地： - 它绝非像缅因州那样具有特立独行（heterodox）传统的摇摆州，而是一个彻底的“党阀机器州”（machine state）。 - 纽约历史上还会选出迈克尔·布隆伯格（Michael Bloomberg）、鲁迪·朱利安尼（Rudy Giuliani）甚至社会民主倾向的市长，但在加州，指望共和党人实现全面突围极不现实。 - 加州的选民意向即便在选区重划公投中，也完全与总统大选的党派得票率高度重合，曾经反杰利蝾螈（gerrymandering）的民主党选民如今也完全按党派利益站队。 --- ### [13:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=811s) 选民选票收割争议与选民身份法（Voter ID）的真实效应 David Friedberg 进一步追问深层疑点：拉曼逆转凯伦·巴斯（Karen Bass）时，后期选票的悬殊比例令人震惊，社区中流传着大量“选票收割”（ballot harvesting）的传闻，例如在洛杉矶贫民区（Skid Row）集中动员无家可归者填票、甚至用免费午餐换取选票的视频流传。这是否真正代表了选民的自主意志？ Nate 回应表示，围绕选民欺诈存在大量夸大的宣传，但全邮寄选票确实带来了验证难题。他个人并不反对最简单直观的投票方式——去线下投票站、在选民登记册签名，甚至出示有效身份证件（Voter ID）： - **关于 Voter ID 的迷思**：过去传统观念认为民主党必须靠最大化投票率取胜，因为低学历选民倾向投民主党，而共和党多为积极早起投票的郊区乡村俱乐部精英；但这种人口结构已经颠倒。如今民主党反而在补选（special elections）和中期选举这类投票率较低、高知选民集中的场景中大获全胜，而特朗普却能激发极高的平民投票率。因此，要求出示身份证件并不会从根本上压制民主党。 - **排队与渠道偏差**：Nate 借用麦迪逊广场花园（Madison Square Garden）的入场通道作比喻：如果你设立了 VIP 通道和普通街区大门，两支队伍里走进来的人群画像必定截然不同。加州允许五花八门的投票途径，年轻人和极左进步派天然倾向拖延到最后一天邮寄，导致数据在开票中后期必然产生剧烈的“蓝移”（blue shift）。 - **选举管理能力现代化**：Nate 吐槽道，连排位选择制投票（Ranked-Choice Voting）在纽约或缅因州居然也要额外多花两周去算，而事实上用现代代码工具（如 Claude Code）写一个解析脚本，即便处理数亿张选票也只需要七分钟。 针对个别被曝光的灰色边缘事件（如加州曾发生个别人以 3 美元现金或香烟为报酬代人登记选票），主持人们指出，这种漫长低效的清点过程极大破坏了选举的公信力，制造了“舞弊的表象”。但从保守派智库传统基金会（Heritage Foundation）多年的穷尽式追踪调查来看，真正被证实的选民舞弊案例在庞大基数中依然只是微乎其微的个位数，并未改变整体大盘的合法性。 ### [18:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1138s) 选票争议、重新计票的微小误差与美国计票体制的“系统性萎缩” 主持人和嘉宾探讨了选举欺诈指控的实际规模：哪怕把目前能抓到的违规个案放大10倍甚至20倍，在统计学上也根本无法撼动任何一场大型选举的结果，真正能被微小票数左右的往往只是几千到上万票的超小型地方选战。这让外界质疑，当前围绕选举公正性的喧嚣究竟是真实存在的系统性舞弊，还是程序漏洞堆积所引发的“不端行为的观感”（appearance of impropriety）。内特·席尔瓦（Nate Silver）坦言，作为一个在某种程度上反对权力过度集中的“老派自由主义者”（old school liberal），他从原则上非常赞赏美国去中心化的选举架构，但这种架构在操作层面上确实留下了微小的容错地带。 以2008年明尼苏达州联邦参议员选举中阿尔·弗兰肯（Al Franken）的微弱险胜为例（该选战最终仅差几百票），席尔瓦指出，绝大多数州的法定自动重新计票门槛是0.5%，但在历次实际重新计票的统计研究中，因核验纠错而翻盘的差距几乎从未超过0.05%，而且不同方向的人为失误在统计上往往会相互抵消。然而，席尔瓦也直言不讳地批评了加利福尼亚州选举官员的傲慢与盲目自满：选民无须亲自保管和提交选票即可由他人代投（选票收割），这种脱离物理监管的机制必然引发公众的不信任感；而加州官方以“我们需要逐一核验确保人人都能投票”为借口，导致计票工作拖延数周，是完全站不住脚的。在对比了全球各国的选举制度后，席尔瓦指出，哪怕是人口体量巨大、技术条件复杂的印度，或者法国、英国、日本，都能在投票结束几小时内出台准确结果。作为全球科技领头羊和自诩“民主灯塔”的美国，竟在计票效率上沦落至此，正是其公共体制机能退化（atrophy of the efficacy of the system）的鲜明病症。 - **重新计票的实际阈值**：全美各州通常将重新计票触发线设在0.5%，但历史上绝大多数纠错逆转的实际净变化幅度不超过0.05%。 - **国际计票对比**：英国、法国、日本以及选民基础极庞大的印度，通常均能在投票闭锁后数小时内公布结果，凸显加州数周计票周期的反常。 --- ### [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1270s) 党派极化的“引力场”：为何加州沦为政党机器而民主党屡丢全国选战？ 对话切入加州乃至全美政治格局的深层死结：如果加州不推行严格的选民身份认证（Voter ID）法、不改革邮寄选票与选票代收制度，共和党未来是否还有可能在加州拿下州长、联邦参议员或更多众议院席位？加州是否已经固化为一套不可逆的民主党建制派权力自留地？针对这一质问，席尔瓦给出了冷峻的政治学剖析：决定美国所有选举走势的根本力量，是宛如物理引力般的“党派极化”（Partisanship is the gravity that dictates every election in the US）。席尔瓦直言，在全美50个州中，他们团队现在就可以凭借97%的置信度，提前预测出其中43个州在2028年大选中的归属。加州共和党人之所以屡战屡败，根源不在于选举规则被蓄意操纵，而在于选民基本盘在极化撕裂下坚固的党派立场。 令人困惑的是，美国其他地区尚存跨党派治理的弹性空间——例如新英格兰的深蓝州能选出查理·贝克（Charlie Baker，马萨诸塞州前州长）和菲尔·斯科特（Phil Scott，佛蒙特州州长）等温和派共和党人，而深红的南方肯塔基州也能选出温和派民主党州长安迪·贝希尔（Andy Beshear）——但作为全美政治狂想与前卫思潮试验场的加州，却蜕变成了一个坚不可摧、高度固化的“政党机器州”（machine state）。席尔瓦推测，加州过于庞大的人口和幅员切断了选民与政客之间可感知的亲近接触。更危险的是，极端极化和不公正选区划分（gerrymandering）导致的“向下竞争”（race to the bottom），正在急剧拉低全美的治理质量。民主党在深蓝州奉行的“挑选最不坏候选人”（least worst nominee）的中间调和策略在本地稳操胜券，却在全美战场上节节败退：在过去四次全国大选中，席尔瓦认为民主党实际上输掉了三次（他将2024年拜登选情崩溃后交棒哈里斯同样计为实质性溃败），唯一获胜的2020年大选不过是因为赶上了百年一遇的全球疫情与1930年代以来最剧烈的经济动荡，那是特朗普白送给民主党的胜利。面对无党派独立选民，前总统奥巴马如今仍享有57%的积极评价，而拜登仅剩冰冷的20%；在当下的政治生态中，两党（尤其是特朗普治下的共和党）都已放弃跨党派说服与动员中间派，沦为纯粹的选票基数博弈（numbers game）。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 极化引力对地方与全国选举治理的影响机制 accDescr: 展示选区划分与党派极化如何导致深蓝州固化为政党机器，进而在全国大选中推出缺乏竞争力的候选人。 subgraph PolarGravity["极化引力与体制机制"] A["高强度党派极化与选区划分"] --> B["全美43州大选结果具备97%确定性"] A --> C["加州等深蓝州演变成绝对垄断的'政党机器州'"] end subgraph GovernanceNominee["选拔机制与治理后果"] C --> D["党内采取'最不坏候选人'的温和妥协路线"] D --> E["地方选区稳赢但缺乏实质治理能力与改革动力"] D --> F["全国大选候选人缺乏全国说服力与竞选活力"] end subgraph ElectionRecord["全国实战表现检验"] F --> G["近4次全国大选民主党实质落败3次（2016、2024及拜登弃选）"] F --> H["仅2020年因疫情与经济动荡拿下大选（白送局）"] end ``` --- ### [25:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1509s) 2026与2028大选前瞻：两党阶层大洗牌与民主党极左翼的真实战力 主持人和席尔瓦将焦点转向2026年中期选举与没有特朗普参选的2028年大选，分析两党阶层属性的戏剧性互换：曾经代表乡村俱乐部、商业精英和富裕阶层的共和党，如今已彻底蜕变为反精英的平民民粹党；而原本代表蓝领工人和工薪阶层的民主党，却演变为了充斥着学术精英、高科技新贵以及带有激进社会主义色彩的文化政党。面对这种阵营裂变，席尔瓦指出，表面上两党内部各存在不同派系，形成一个多方角力的博弈矩阵，但民主党内部的裂隙最为深刻，可以明确划分为三大截然对立的意识形态派系。 第一大派系是以伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）、亚历山大·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯（AOC）以及纽约州议员佐兰·马姆达尼（Zohran Mamdani）为旗手的“极左翼”（The Left）。席尔瓦客观评价称，这些极左翼政客在战术运用和政治造势上极其精明而老练。例如马姆达尼懂得如何通过支持纽约尼克斯队（New York Knicks）来打通与底层民众的情感纽带，其讲演极具亲和力与煽动性；AOC已经褪去了早期的青涩，进化成一个极具战术手腕的职业政客；而年逾古稀、来自佛蒙特小城镇的社会主义者桑德斯，更曾在2016年党内初选中横扫20个州，险些将希拉里·克林顿拉下马。尽管极左翼在扩大声量、搭建政治帐篷方面表现出色，但席尔瓦也指出其致命死穴：在政治历史与数据模型中，除了极少数深蓝选区之外，极左翼在全美层面的温和及摇摆战场上从未取得过重大选举突破。 --- ### [27:21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1641s) “富足自由派”对抗“抵抗派”：以太坊式治理幻觉与纽森的政治基本盘 席尔瓦进一步剖析了民主党内撕裂严重的另外两大派系。第二派是以《纽约时报》专栏作家埃兹拉·克莱恩（Ezra Klein）命名的“富足自由派”（Abundance Libs）。这一派系带有强烈的亲自由市场色彩，虽然他们极力否认自己是中间派，但席尔瓦认为他们骨子里就是不折不扣的中道理性主义者。富足自由派深切忧虑加州目前展现出的治理泥潭与制度性低效，将加州视为糟糕公共治理的典型负面教材。席尔瓦举例指出，在真正拥有健康治理水平的紫州（摇摆州）或部分红州，不仅人口持续净流入、就业数据稳健，而且基础设施运转高效，绝不会出现像洛杉矶国际机场（LAX）那样出站叫Uber需要排队20分钟转乘摆渡车的官僚折腾。富足自由派公开批评民主党在警务安全改革、跨性别权利等文化战议题上的过激立场，主张重回以住房供给、基建落地和经济增长为核心的民生务实治理。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 席尔瓦剖析的民主党三大内部派系 accDescr: 展示民主党内部由极左翼、富足自由派与抵抗派构成的三足鼎立格局及其核心主张与代表人物。 subgraph Faction1["1. 极左翼 (The Left)"] L1["代表人物: AOC、桑德斯、马姆达尼"] L2["特征: 极具民粹煽动力与战术手腕"] L3["局限: 战绩局限于深蓝选区，全国扩张受挫"] L1 --- L2 --- L3 end subgraph Faction2["2. 富足自由派 (Abundance Libs)"] A1["代表人物/思想家: 埃兹拉·克莱恩 (Ezra Klein)"] A2["主张: 亲自由市场、促基建、增供给、重视人口流动"] A3["反思: 严厉批判加州低效治理及警务、跨性别等文化战议题"] A1 --- A2 --- A3 end subgraph Faction3["3. 抵抗自由派 (Resistance Libs)"] R1["代表人物: 加文·纽森 (Gavin Newsom)"] R2["特征: 建制派狂热拉拉队、捍卫拜登/正统机器"] R3["心理: 执着于党派护短，拒绝认清全美舆论风向已变"] R1 --- R2 --- R3 end ``` 相比之下，第三大派系则是被席尔瓦称为“抵抗派自由主义者”（Resistance Libs）的群体。这批人自称对民主党建制派的平庸感到厌倦，但其行为却极其盲从且党同伐异，是民主党传统“蓝队”的狂热拉拉队。这部分群体在2024年甚至固执地认为拜登是被党内政变强行逼宫退选的受害者。席尔瓦明确指出，加州州长加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）的核心政治基本盘正是这群“抵抗派自由分子”。正因如此，在拜登无论在全国选民还是普通民主党人中都早已失去民心、全党上下迫切希望翻篇的大背景下，纽森却反常地不断高调跳出来为拜登家族护航与站台——这并非纽森政治嗅觉迟钝，而是他在精确地迎合那批构成了其权力底座的死忠抵抗派拥趸。 - **富足自由派关注的硬指标**：将人口净流入、跨州迁移与就业扩张作为衡量各州治理优劣的核心硬数据（Hard data），对蓝州过度规制导致的人口流失深感警惕。 - **纽森与抵抗派的共生纽带**：纽森力挺拜登并非出于政策考量，而是为了死守在初选中具备高投票倾向的建制派“忠诚抵抗派”基本盘。 ### [28:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1733s) 加文·纽森的“抗争派”打法与建制派的“求变”选举困局 加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）当前的政治姿态实际上是在向党内的“抗争派自由派”（Resistance Libs）释放强烈信号：“我有你们的后盾，我是一个斗士。”这种叙事背后的逻辑在于，他们将2024年的败选归咎于媒体对乔·拜登的不公，或是因为卡玛拉·哈里斯的非裔女性身份，因此纽森的策略就像是在推销：“选一个愿意为你们战斗、在社交媒体上全大写发推的白人男性，我们就能赢。”播客主持人将其总结为一种类似唐纳德·特朗普的“永不道歉、全盘进攻”的誓死效忠（ride or die）打法。内特·西尔弗（Nate Silver）认可纽森在选区重划（redistricting）上展现出了极佳的战术前瞻性，成功在民主党预计失利的大势下为加州守住了底线，展现了“滑向冰球将要到达的位置”的魄力，而非民主党传统的高风险规避。 然而，民主党建制派长期以来热衷于寻找“最不易引起反感的中庸人选”——从2004年的约翰·克里（John Kerry）、希拉里·克林顿到哈里斯。西尔弗指出，建制派根本没有看清一个根本事实：除了2012年的奥巴马是个例外，当下的绝大多数美国大选本质上都是“求变型选举”（change elections）。全球政治正处于频繁更迭的钟摆效应中，例如英国在9年内换了6位首相，选民对现状极度不满。哈里斯无法与拜登的政绩划清界限，而纽森又在极力捍卫同一套政治遗产，这在本质上是一种失败的策略。尽管民主党在2028年大选中有微弱优势，但特朗普的支持率已跌至38%，民众因伊朗局势、高油价以及长期以特朗普为中心所带来的政治疲劳感而受挫，共和党面临艰苦战斗，但民主党若继续充当现状的捍卫者，很可能亲手把赢面拱手让人。 - **求变大选的钟摆效应**：自2004年以来，几乎所有选举都由求变情绪主导，选民极度厌弃现状维护者；即使民主党在2028年获胜，也很可能在2032年重新沦为弱势方。 - **特朗普与共和党民调承压**：特朗普的净支持率滑落至38%，选民对中东冲突（伊朗）、能源价格高企以及长达数年的政治明星疲劳感积怨颇深。 - **纽森与哈里斯的困局**：两人均被牢牢捆绑在拜登时期的治理遗产中，无法通过自我革新来迎合大众对变革的渴望。 --- ### [31:28](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1888s) 代际鸿沟与“社会主义”品牌：移民群体的反向出走 当主持人追问，随着民主社会主义者（Democratic Socialists）在市级与州级选举中崛起，民主党是否会在民粹推力下一路向左、甚至在2028年推选出一名社会主义总统时，西尔弗从代际认知差异切入了分析。48岁的西尔弗经历过冷战后期并亲眼见证了柏林墙倒塌，对于他这一代及更年长的美国人而言，“社会主义”一词与共产主义紧密相连，代表着历史上多个国家经济崩溃的教训。然而，年轻一代民主党人对冷战毫无历史包袱，“社会主义”这一品牌在青年群体中拥有极其庞大的基本盘。 但在现实层面，美国依然是一个高度资本主义的国家。尽管西尔弗在书中常对科技巨头提出批判，但他坚信科技产业和当前的AI资本热潮正吸引着全球顶尖青年人才，支撑着美国股市与宏观经济的韧性。与此同时，民主党的选民基本盘正在发生危险的撕裂：流失最严重的正是拉美裔和部分亚裔选民。这些近期移民群体构成了美国最活跃的小企业主阶层，他们正是为了摆脱母国的社会主义体制与经济困顿，来到美国借助自由市场实现阶层跃升。民主党日益拥抱激进社会主义话语的倾向，反而在将这批最具企业家精神的移民群体推向共和党阵营。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 意识形态代际冲突与移民选民分流 accDescr: 展示年长与年轻选民对社会主义的认知差异，以及这一品牌对移民企业主的离心效应 subgraph IdeologicalDivide["意识形态与代际认知"] OldGen["年长选民 / 冷战记忆群体<br/>（视社会主义为低效与经济失败）"] YoungGen["千禧一代及Z世代民主党人<br/>（将社会主义视为解决不平等的灵丹）"] end subgraph RealWorldImpact["现实力量碰撞"] USCapitalism["美国资本主义底色<br/>（AI资本繁荣、全球顶级人才吸纳）"] ImmigrantGroup["拉美裔及亚裔选民<br/>（小企业主、重视经济自由与奋斗）"] end YoungGen -->|"推动政策左倾"| DemParty["民主党全国品牌"] DemParty -->|"言论与监管趋严"| ImmigrantAlienation["小企业主利益受挫"] ImmigrantGroup -->|"逃离母国左翼体制"| ImmigrantAlienation ImmigrantAlienation -->|"选票右倾流失"| GOPShift["倒向共和党 / 成为摇摆群体"] ``` --- ### [34:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2076s) 2028大选的制胜指南：反寡头叙事、年轻男性与实效治理 当被问及如果受聘为两党撰写2028年大选竞选策略白皮书时，西尔弗坦言自己与播客主持人都属于典型的“精英阶层”——能买得起纽约尼克斯队时隔25年进入NBA总决赛主场门票的人，通常在社会议题上持自由主义立场，而在经济上偏向温和、支持市场经济。但在如今的选举版图里，这种立场已不再是制胜法宝。美国当下被忽视最严重的选民群体，恰恰是“文化上偏保守、经济上偏民粹”的普罗大众：他们支持小企业、痛恨权力垄断。在这个诞生了人类首位万亿富翁、普通白领因AI技术颠覆而陷入极度就业焦虑的时代，最具选举穿透力的公式是：**精准的“反寡头”（anti-oligarch）经济叙事，配合在文化与“觉醒文化”（woke）议题上的大幅克制降温**。 ```mermaid flowchart LR accTitle: 2028最佳竞选纲领策略模型 accDescr: 结合反寡头民粹、文化温和主义与实际治理表现的选举获胜框架 subgraph CoreStrategy["2028 Winning Playbook 策略支柱"] direction TB EconPillar["经济层面：反寡头叙事<br/>• 对抗巨头垄断与白领AI替代焦虑<br/>• 扶持本地小商业"] CulturePillar["文化层面：向中间温和回撤<br/>• 淡化激进觉醒议题（Woke Stuff）<br/>• 赋予年轻男性掌控自身命运感"] GovPillar["治理层面：功能性与安全感<br/>• 基础设施焕新与低犯罪率<br/>• 强调实效而非空洞口号"] end EconPillar --> WinModel["凝聚跨党派选民联盟<br/>（文化偏保守 + 经济偏民粹群体）"] CulturePillar --> WinModel GovPillar --> WinModel WinModel --> Victory["赢得2028大选"] ``` 这种策略对年轻男性选民尤为关键。许多年轻男性感到对自己的前途失去了掌控力，他们需要的不是体制的“过度呵护”，而是重获自主拼搏的尊严感。与此同时，执政者必须提供“实用的政府效能”（functional performance）：以纽约为例，尽管西尔弗承认自己曾居住的宾夕法尼亚车站和麦迪逊广场花园附近并不光鲜，但犯罪率相对加州城市（如旧金山）依然可控，拉瓜迪亚等新机场的落成也体现了基础设施的改善。最后，西尔弗强调候选人必须重拾类似奥巴马时期的“乐观主义精神”（American optimism），去呼应大众在体育赛事（如世界杯、尼克斯队季后赛）和多元街区文化中所感受到的自豪感。在此框架下，西尔弗认为像佐治亚州参议员乔恩·奥索夫（Jon Ossoff）这样兼具年轻形象、进步底色但在表达上更具普适亲和力的人选，或许才是民主党最具胜选相的候选人标杆。 - **反寡头与小企业结合**：应对AI带来的白领失业焦虑，严打权力与资本高度垄断，同时给予小企业制度扶持。 - **年轻男性的心理诉求**：年轻人不渴望被当成弱者过度呵护，而是希望重新感受到能够“主宰自己的命运”（control their own destiny）。 - **城市治理的对比样本**：选民厌倦了空谈，旧金山的安全困境成为反面典型，而纽约在基础设施改造与公共安全上的基础运转能力则是底线要求。 - **乐观主义的选举价值**：在普遍充满愤世嫉俗的政治气氛中，能够反向展现积极乐观精神、重聚国家认同的候选人将极具吸引力。 ### [38:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2338s) 政治人物的代际危机与纽约的务实市政 内特·银（Nate Silver）指出，现任加州州长加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）试图将自己包装成一个好勇斗狠的街头斗士（brawler），但这种形象与传统的政治运作脱节，而当下政治生态中最荒谬的一点在于“代际断层”。他感慨道，看到美国政治中一位候选人试图执政到86岁，而另一位替代者也想干到82岁，这在现实世界的任何其他领域都不可思议。“如果是沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）竞选总统，或许我还会考虑投他一票，”但环顾全球或各大顶尖企业，几乎没有任何CEO或国家领导人是在82岁的高龄去管理世界上最庞大的超级大国。即便尊重年长者的贡献，让八十多岁的老人掌舵全球第一大国依旧显得脱离现实。 与之形成鲜明对比的是纽约等地方政治中涌现的新面貌。对谈中提到，像佐兰·曼达尼（Zohran Mamdani）这类新生代政治人物在纽约展现出了截然不同的基本执行力（blocking and tackling）。他专注于修补路面坑洞、清理垃圾、为本地体育赛事庆祝等切实关乎纽约市民生活品质（quality of life）的事务。与唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）那种通过高强度挑衅、让公众深感疲惫（burns people out）的对抗模式不同，曼达尼表现得更为积极正面，很少诉诸有毒的言辞对抗，却保持着极高的选民互动与黏性。 内特·银强调，纽约本质上是一座深度的资本主义城市，与加州那种西海岸特有的“淡水式激进主义”（freshwater progressive）大相径庭。纽约汇聚了来自全球各地的移民，周围充满着巨额财富，虽然有时表面上看起来像一场混乱的灾难，但其底色是极其务实的。尤其是在六月中旬气候宜人、游人如织的季节，纽约依然展现出一个运转良好的成功范式，而加州在很多方面却正在失去这种成功光环。 ### [41:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2464s) 年轻人对资本主义的幻灭与40岁代际分水岭 弗里德伯格（David Friedberg）随即提出了核心疑问：为什么在纽约这样一个资本主义、阶层跃升与机遇的坚固堡垒中，选民会去支持公开谴责资本主义制度、鼓吹集体主义的候选人？这是否意味着美国年轻人中正在爆发一场对资本主义真正幻灭的运动？弗里德伯格引用了一组关键数据指出，过去十年间全美约有4,500万大学毕业生，其中绝大多数背负着极其沉重的学生贷款债务。这种困境很大程度上归咎于联邦学生贷款项目极其扭曲的承销审核机制，将整整一代年轻人直接判入了难以通过经济增长实现脱困的死局。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 世代经验与对资本主义态度的分水岭 accDescr: 对比40岁以上与40岁以下人群的成长背景及其对制度的信任差异 subgraph OlderGen ["40岁至50岁出头世代（X世代中后段）"] A["90年代克林顿繁荣期成年<br/>西方与自由市场黄金时代"] B["大衰退前已步入职场并扎下根基"] C["坚信天道酬勤：美国制度大体可行"] A --> B --> C end subgraph YoungerGen ["40岁以下青年世代（千禧一代尾段及更年轻）"] D["遭遇9/11事件、反恐战争与巨额学贷"] E["踏入职场即直面2008大衰退危机"] F["经济焦虑深重：认为资本主义制度已崩塌"] D --> E --> F end ``` 内特·银认为，对资本主义制度认同的真正分水岭大致划在40岁左右。在去年的纽约市长选情预判中，数据分析团队几乎能够根据街区的人口年龄结构和进步倾向，极其精准地按街区预测出选情分布。这一现象的底层逻辑在于成长时期的历史大背景： - **40岁至50岁出头的人群**（主要为X世代后半段）：他们拥有相对理智健全的世界观。内特·银回忆自己1996年首次拥有投票权支持比尔·克林顿（Bill Clinton）时，正值西方体系和资本主义狂飙突进的黄金时期，经济蓬勃向上；在2008年大衰退来临前，这一群体已在社会和职场上站稳了脚跟，因此切身体会过“努力工作就能从美国制度中受益”。 - **40岁以下的年轻人**（9/11事件前后才读大学或更年轻的群体）：从成年伊始就面临巨额学生负债、金融危机和阶级固化，无论这种认知是否完全公允，他们从未体验过资本主义红利对普通人的正面反馈。 ### [44:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2644s) 媒介碎片化、心理叙事转变与算法驱动的极化 除了经济现实，内特·银还剖析了信息媒介演变与自由派文化变迁所带来的深远冲击。在过去的电视和广播时代，三大电视网或《纽约时报》（New York Times）等高度中心化的传统媒体掌握着绝对的议程设置权。内特·银回忆当年在《纽约时报》工作时，头版编委会每天开会亲自决定“什么是新闻，什么不是新闻”。如今媒体体系被彻底去中心化，伴随而来的是智能手机和社交媒体对年轻群体心理满意度的巨大侵蚀。与此同时，自由主义文化逐步抛弃了以往隐忍沉着的斯多葛主义（stoic culture），转向以宣泄委屈和怨怼（grievance）为主导的话语体系。 谈及新兴的技术力量，内特·银讽刺地指出，人工智能或许能起到反向的缓冲作用。现有证据表明，大语言模型（如 Claude 或 ChatGPT）往往倾向于聚拢于主流专家的共识意见，尽管有时会产出带有幻觉的过度平滑版本，但比起 Bluesky 或 Twitter 这种极具煽动性的平台，AI 的极端极化属性要弱得多。 随后，杰森·卡拉卡尼斯（Jason Calacanis）切入社交媒体产品机制的剧变：平台生态已经从用户自主构建关注列表、精心筛选信息源的旧时代，彻底转向了由 TikTok 的“For You”推荐页、YouTube 以及现在的 X（原 Twitter）所主导的“全算法喂饭”时代。用户即使拥有庞大粉丝量，也无法保证展现量和互动度；甚至在埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）接管推特后，大量名人和自由派退场，平台算法将信息茧房（filter bubble）推向了极致——只要用户随手点赞两三条内容，一整天的信息流就会被同一类极端言论彻底霸占。 内特·银与杰森对此表达了强烈的共鸣与批评： - **政见绑架与单维极化**：在健康的政治思考中，一个人在税收、堕胎权、加沙局势和自由市场上的立场不应存在绝对绑定，但算法社交媒体强行将极其复杂的政治光谱压缩成“红与蓝”、“左与右”的一维对抗。哪怕表达最符合公众常识的异见——例如公开指出“拜登实在太老了，民主党如果不换人必输无疑”——即便是得到了80%实际选民认同的真理，在推特算法下也会立刻被扣上异教徒的帽子遭到全网围剿。 - **时间线剥夺与算法驯化困局**：杰森抱怨如今在 X 上必须不断手动点赞才能勉强在信息流中留住特定账号，他曾向推特团队建议增加“展示此人所有推文”的绝对开关。内特·银亦表示极度反感取消纯关注列表权重的改动，但他承认，如果用户足够坚决地频繁点击“对此类内容不感兴趣”，算法在压制某些垃圾内容（例如令人生厌的街头斗殴吸睛视频）上仍具备一定的响应敏锐度。 ### [48:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2911s) 社交媒体算法的弊端：时间流信息流的消亡与平台价值的流失 Nate Silver 谈到自己对社交网络的使用偏好，坦言自己现在只想在 X（原 Twitter）上浏览关于世界杯的推文、关注字母哥（Giannis Antetokounmpo）是否会被交易的体育八卦，或是看一点纽约和加州的选举动态。他极其反感那些自以为“比用户更聪明”的推荐算法：“如果我登录平台或者关注了某个人，只要我没屏蔽他，你就直接展示他的推文。”平台当然可以穿插推荐一些用户可能喜欢的内容，但打破纯时间序（Chronological feed）极其令人恼火。例如在观看世界杯直播时，信息流里突然冒出一条六小时前别人发的“天哪太神了”的推文，让人完全摸不着头脑，根本无法按正确的时间线呈现突发事件。 内特指出，Twitter 历史上或许从未成为一家能够获取暴利的公司，但对于像他以及 Jason 这样的重度新闻成瘾者来说，它曾是一个不可替代的独特资讯阵地。尽管破坏时间流功能早在埃隆·马斯克接手前就已开始，并在随后持续深化，但这一核心功能的弱化依然让习惯获取第一手快讯的用户感到十分惋惜。 --- ### [49:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2986s) 2026 年中期选举预测：民主党夺回众议院概率极高，参议院陷入胶着 话题随后转向即将到来的 2026 年中期选举预测。内特表示，由于近期忙于关注世界杯以及选区重划问题，他的选举预测模型推迟了数周发布，但很快将在 Silver Bulletin 上线。参考当前的预测市场与民调数据： - **众议院**：预测市场给出民主党有 80% 至 85% 的概率夺回众议院，内特认为这个数字甚至偏保守，实际概率可能高达 85% 到 90%。当前一切宏观基本面均对执政党极其不利：特朗普的支持率低迷、选民对经济充满焦虑，外加历史上极其顽固的“中期选举执政党必遭选民反噬”规律。即便共和党在选区重划上略微占优，也难以抵挡强大的历史反噬引力。 - **参议院**：预测市场认为民主党夺回参议院的概率约为 40% 至 45%，内特认为这基本合理，甚至共和党还略占优势（约 50/50 到 60/40 之间）。由于参议院选举依赖深红州的席位争夺，这是一场残酷的“数字与资金游戏”。 ```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: 2026 Midterm Election Dynamics accDescr: Visualizing the contrasting forces driving the House and Senate races in the 2026 midterms. subgraph MacroFactors["宏观与历史引力"] direction TB A["特朗普低支持率 & 经济焦虑"] B["中期选举在任党历史反噬"] C["伊朗局势与汽油价格波动"] end subgraph HouseRace["众议院格局 (435 席)"] direction TB D["民主党全面顺风"] E["夺回几率: 85% - 90%"] end subgraph SenateRace["参议院格局 (关键摇摆州)"] direction TB F["红州防守与翻盘难度极高"] G["缅因州风险 vs 德州挑战"] H["胜选几率: 40% - 50% (胶着)"] end MacroFactors --> HouseRace MacroFactors --> SenateRace ``` 在参议院的具体选区博弈中，内特特别提到了几个关键看点： - **缅因州**：在一个整体偏蓝（D+8 到 D+10 环境）的州，民主党候选人格雷厄姆·普拉特纳（Graham Platner）目前仅领先共和党老牌参议员苏珊·柯林斯（Susan Collins）2 个百分点，内特认为该场对决是 50/50 的五五开局面，民主党在这里冒了不必要的风险。 - **德克萨斯州**：民主党派出特莱里科（James Talarico）挑战陷入争议的共和党候选人肯·帕克斯顿（Ken Paxton）。尽管帕克斯顿远非理想人选，但共和党利用深红州的底色，采用下三滥的人身攻击手段（例如攻击其性取向等），在现有政治体制下往往依然管用。 --- ### [52:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3138s) 宏观变数与两院胜率关联：油价、中东局势与席位联动 面对“是否有任何宏观变数能帮共和党守住众议院”的提问，内特直言最关键的变量是**汽油价格**。加油站的油价招牌是选民每天路过都能肉眼看到的经济晴雨表，而油价能否回落几乎完全取决于美国是否会深陷伊朗冲突这一战争泥潭。如果 10 月前局势没有戏剧性转机，特朗普固化的负面评价很难扭转。对于对民主党现状不满但视特朗普为体制威胁的泛蓝选民而言，闭着眼睛投给一名“泛指的民主党人（generic Democrat）”是毫无心理门槛的。 内特进一步解释了统计学上的相关性机制： - 参议院与众议院的结果呈现**几乎完全正相关**。市场预测民主党拿下参议院却输掉众议院的概率仅有 1% 左右。 - 如果民主党能够拿下参议院，意味着全美掀起了一场席卷俄亥俄、爱荷华乃至阿拉斯加的巨大“蓝色海啸”。在这种情境下，多米诺骨牌将全面倒向民主党，不仅众议院十拿九稳，州长与地方议会选举也将全面大胜。内特呼吁选民多关注拥有实际行政权力的地方选举与市议会，普通人的捐款在这些地方能产生深远影响。 --- ### [55:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3305s) 加文·纽森的光环破灭与 AOC 的 2028 崛起逻辑 讨论进入 2028 年总统大选展望，主持人抛出加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom）是否正凭借光鲜外表和精湛口才持续上升的话题。内特当场给出了否定答案，并透露 Silver Bulletin 刚刚完成的新分析显示，纽森在民主党初选民调中已经从 25% 暴跌至 15%，在 Polymarket 上的胜选概率也从 33% 跌落至 22% 左右。内特指出，纽森过去只是吃到了全美知名度的红利，但在实战层面存在致命短板： - **选战资质缺乏说服力**：纽森从未在摇摆紫州证明过自己的胜选能力，相比之下，像佐治亚州的联邦参议员乔恩·奥索夫（Jon Ossoff）这类年轻帅气且真正在摇摆州打赢硬仗的政客更具吸引力。 - **治理与路线包袱沉重**：纽森一直试图绑定卡玛拉·哈里斯和乔·拜登，走建制派延续路线，甚至把亨特·拜登请上自己的播客。但在拜登路线已被证明在选举与治理上遭遇挫败的当下，这一策略完全处于被动防守态势。 内特随即抛出了一个大胆的预判：**他看好 AOC（亚历山德里亚·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯，Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez）成为 2028 年民主党提名的最大黑马**。AOC 届时年满 36 岁，完全具备参选总统资格。内特将其比作民主党版的“特朗普式局外人”： - 选民对建制派彻底厌倦，宁愿选择更极端的改良派或更左翼的破局者，也不愿再接受换汤不换药的传统政客。 - 历史规律表明，过去的共和党初选曾长期被乡村俱乐部建制派把持，边缘煽动者往往拿到 40% 选票便触顶出局；但当选民的不满与代际脱节积聚到临界点时，旧秩序就会被瞬间冲垮。年轻一代选民对所谓的“民主党老字号党派品牌”毫无忠诚度，他们渴望的是能够彻底打破僵局的魅力型人物。 ### [58:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3492s) 政治人物的品牌困境：从奥巴马范式看纽森的加州软肋 内特·银（Nate Silver）深入剖析了总统候选人的品牌化策略与民主党当前的困境。他指出，最顶尖的政治人物往往擅长调和看似矛盾的立场。以2008年的巴拉克·奥巴马（Barack Obama）为例，奥巴马堪称具有代际魅力的超级候选人，他一方面在伊拉克战争等议题上精准卡位在希拉里·克林顿（Hillary Clinton）的左翼，另一方面却以高超的“超越党派”修辞团结大众，大谈无论红州蓝州都有打少棒联赛的家庭、都有同性恋姐妹，将进步主义诉求包裹在强大的共识话语之中。最有效的候选人必须具备这种平衡能力。 谈及加州州长加文·纽森（Gavin Newsom），内特·银承认纽森确实做出了向中间派靠拢的尝试：他曾在播客中邀请保守派青年领袖查理·柯克（Charlie Kirk）对谈，公开反对加州的“亿万富翁税”，并试图在部分文化战议题上降低对抗调门。然而，纽森身上的体制化烙印过深。内特·银强调，民主党刚刚在2024年提名了一位来自加州的建制派候选人（卡玛拉·哈里斯），尽管离胜利不算太远，却在所有摇摆州以2到5个百分点的差距全面落败。他不认为民主党选民和中间选民最终会被说服去相信：仅仅因为纽森是个拥有不同生理构造的白人男性，就能彻底摆脱2024年让所有民主党人胆战心惊的加州建制派品牌包袱。 - **奥巴马的胜选范式**：在左翼核心议题（如反伊战）上展现坚定姿态，同时以超越红蓝分裂的全民团结修辞化解保守派与中间选民的抵触心理。 - **纽森的温和化努力**：邀请右翼评论员 Charlie Kirk 对谈、公开反对亿万富翁税以示亲商，但其作为“加州建制派化身”的标签依然难以洗脱。 - **摇摆州的结构性劣势**：加州体制派政客在全美大选摇摆州普遍面临2至5个百分点的阻力，民主党很难仅仅依赖性别和肤色的更替来逆转这一负面品牌印象。 --- ### [59:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3562s) 节目尾声与大选夜之约：尼克斯球票、Silver Bulletin 与 Polymarket 告别 随着长达一小时的深度对话接近尾声，主持人杰森·卡拉卡尼斯（Jason Calacanis）向内特·银表达了感谢，并热烈邀请他在即将到来的大选开票夜重返节目参与现场直播。好友们随即互相打趣拆台，调侃内特·银在真正的大选夜“出场费极高”，恐怕根本不屑于来上《All-In》。杰森笑着圆场说内特是播客家族的老朋友，第二天再来复盘也行，只要他不忙着四处“大把捞钱”，好为下赛季多囤几张纽约尼克斯队（New York Knicks）的主场门票。 现场还展开了一段关于内特·银 Substack 专栏《Silver Bulletin》（白银公报）订阅费用的幽默互动。杰森呼吁所有听众立刻掏出一张百元大钞（Hyundai）去订阅，内特随即纠正实际订阅价格是每年95美元。杰森风趣地回应道，他是给看门人留了5美元小费才凑成整整100美元，还打趣说精通统计学的内特肯定早就精确算好了94.97美元这种临界定价策略。最后，主持人们向长期合作伙伴 Polymarket 致谢，并在热闹欢乐的倒彩与掌声中结束了本期专访。 - **大选直播邀约与尼克斯球票调侃**：主持团队戏谑内特在重大选举之夜身价暴涨，四处赶场赚钱正是为了支付昂贵的纽约尼克斯季票。 - **专栏《Silver Bulletin》定价风波**：杰森号召听众掏100美元订阅，内特现场辟谣年费实为95美元，引发了关于“门童小费”与心理定价模型的幽默交锋。 - **预测市场 Polymarket 推荐**：作为内特·银与《All-In》节目的共同合作伙伴，去中心化预测平台 Polymarket 在节目收尾时再次获得力荐。 ## Notable quotes > [00:00](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=0s) 党派偏好（Partisanship）就像万有引力一样，支配着美国的每一场选举。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=69s) 在53年里乃至人生中都是难得一见的时刻 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [01:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=69s) 虽然赢来的利润买不起像杰森那样顶级的场边席，但足够覆盖自己200层看台的球票花销。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [09:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=562s) 并非违法，但感觉完全不像是一场真正的选举 — David Sacks > [10:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=610s) 加州的计票系统表现是“完全不可接受的”（completely unacceptable），这种数周无法出结果的拖沓甚至让它看起来像个“失败国家”（very failed state）。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [13:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=811s) 即便处理数亿张选票也只需要七分钟。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [21:10](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1270s) 在全美50个州中，他们团队现在就可以凭借97%的置信度，提前预测出其中43个州在2028年大选中的归属。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [28:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=1733s) 选一个愿意为你们战斗、在社交媒体上全大写发推的白人男性，我们就能赢。 — 播客主持人 > [38:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2338s) 如果是沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）竞选总统，或许我还会考虑投他一票 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [48:31](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=2911s) 如果我登录平台或者关注了某个人，只要我没屏蔽他，你就直接展示他的推文。 — 内特·席尔瓦 > [52:18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc&t=3138s) 民主党拿下参议院却输掉众议院的概率仅有 1% 左右。 — 内特·席尔瓦 ## Mentioned Nate Silver（内特·席尔瓦）, All-In Podcast, Jason Calacanis（杰森·卡拉卡尼斯）, David Sacks（大卫·萨克斯）, David Friedberg（大卫·弗里德伯格）, Chamath Palihapitiya, New York Knicks（纽约尼克斯队）, Boston Celtics（波士顿凯尔特人队）, Oklahoma City Thunder（俄克拉荷马雷霆）, San Antonio Spurs（圣安东尼奥马刺）, Mike Brown（迈克·布朗）, Tom Thibodeau（汤姆·锡伯杜）, Karl-Anthony Towns（唐斯）, Jalen Brunson（杰伦·布伦森）, Giannis Antetokounmpo（扬尼斯·阿德托昆博）, Silver Bulletin, DraftKings, MGM, Polymarket, Nithya Raman（尼西亚·拉曼）, Karen Bass（凯伦·巴斯）, Gavin Newsom（加文·纽森）, Kamala Harris（卡玛拉·哈里斯）, Joe Biden（乔·拜登）, Donald Trump（唐纳德·特朗普）, Barack Obama（巴拉克·奥巴马）, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez（AOC）, Bernie Sanders（伯尼·桑德斯）, Ezra Klein（埃兹拉·克莱恩）, Zohran Mamdani（佐兰·马姆达尼）, Jon Ossoff（乔恩·奥索夫）, Susan Collins（苏珊·柯林斯）, Ken Paxton（肯·帕克斯顿）, James Talarico（特莱里科）, Charlie Kirk（查理·柯克）, Elon Musk（埃隆·马斯克）, X（Twitter）, TikTok, Claude, ChatGPT, Northwest Registered Agent, PLAUD ## Video description (0:00) Nate Silver joins the pod! (10:02) California's ballot counting problem: Raman's late-mail surge, ballot harvesting claims, and why the US counts slower than India (25:18) Democrats' three-way civil war: The left, the abundance libs, and Newsom's "resistance lib" base (34:48) The winning 2028 playbook: Anti-oligarch messaging, why young men want control, and immigrants fleeing the Dems (45:48) How algorithmic social media entrenches polarization: Elon's X, filter bubbles, and the death of the chronological feed (50:01) 2026 midterm predictions: 85-90% Dem House takeover, Senate toss-up, and the Iran/gas price wildcard (55:20) Newsom is collapsing in polls: Nate's 2028 Dem bet is AOC   Thanks to our partners! Northwest Registered Agent — Starting a business? Northwest Registered Agent gives you everything you need to build a complete Business Identity including free tools and built-in privacy. Get more at https://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/ALLINFREE PLAUD — If your work depends on conversations — meetings, deal flow, interviews, customer calls — Plaud helps you capture and organize everything with highly accurate AI-generated notes that are not just simple summaries, but also highlight pain points, key decisions, next steps, and customizable summary templates. Check out Plaud at http://plaud.ai/allin and use code ALLIN for up to 20% off! Which is also available on Amazon: ⁠https://amzn.to/43URLff (Code: ALLIN20X) Follow Nate: ⁠https://x.com/NateSilver538⁠ Follow the besties: https://x.com/chamath https://x.com/Jason https://x.com/DavidSacks https://x.com/friedberg Follow on X: https://x.com/theallinpod Follow on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/theallinpod Follow on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@theallinpod Follow on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/allinpod Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://x.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://x.com/TheZachEffect #allin #tech #news [Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihq_ngvKKmc)

[0:00] 内特·席尔瓦: 党派偏好（Partisanship）就像万有引力一样，支配着美国的每一场选举。 [1:09] 内特·席尔瓦: 在53年里乃至人生中都是难得一见的时刻 [1:09] 内特·席尔瓦: 虽然赢来的利润买不起像杰森那样顶级的场边席，但足够覆盖自己200层看台的球票花销。 [9:22] David Sacks: 并非违法，但感觉完全不像是一场真正的选举 [10:10] 内特·席尔瓦: 加州的计票系统表现是“完全不可接受的”（completely unacceptable），这种数周无法出结果的拖沓甚至让它看起来像个“失败国家”（very failed state）。 [13:31] 内特·席尔瓦: 即便处理数亿张选票也只需要七分钟。 [21:10] 内特·席尔瓦: 在全美50个州中，他们团队现在就可以凭借97%的置信度，提前预测出其中43个州在2028年大选中的归属。 [28:53] 播客主持人: 选一个愿意为你们战斗、在社交媒体上全大写发推的白人男性，我们就能赢。 [38:58] 内特·席尔瓦: 如果是沃伦·巴菲特（Warren Buffett）竞选总统，或许我还会考虑投他一票 [48:31] 内特·席尔瓦: 如果我登录平台或者关注了某个人，只要我没屏蔽他，你就直接展示他的推文。 [52:18] 内特·席尔瓦: 民主党拿下参议院却输掉众议院的概率仅有 1% 左右。

[1:09] Nate Silver: New York City Takeover [1:09] Nate Silver: non-homer bets [4:31] point center [4:31] Nate Silver: infirmary ward [9:37] Nate Silver: no evidence of fraud [9:37] Nate Silver: failed state [9:37] machine state [9:37] capital-D democratic state [15:36] If you're at MSG and you have like a VIP line, the cohort that arrives through the VIP line is going to be different than the one that arrives through like the main gates on 7th Avenue. [18:19] appearance of impropriety [21:10] laboratory of weird and eccentric political ideas [21:10] abundance libs [21:10] resistance libs [29:11] The establishment doesn't seem to have an understanding of the fact that like almost every election now... is a change election. [34:37] Nate Silver: By most definitions am an elite as are you guys [34:37] Nate Silver: anti-oligarch rhetoric [41:04] Nate Silver: the only sane people in the US [52:18] democracy on the line [55:05] Nate Silver: insurgent, burn-it-down vote

[0:00] Partisanship is the gravity that [0:03] dictates every election in the US, [0:05] right? Like my job, don't worry, I will [0:07] get criticized if if we say, "Oh, [0:10] whatever Gavin Newsome or AOC is a 55% [0:13] favorite," and they lose. But like, but [0:15] 43 of the 50 states, stated, we could [0:17] probably predict right now with 97% [0:20] confidence who they'll vote for in 2028. [0:23] And it's not because of rigging. Because [0:25] polarization and partisanship are very [0:28] powerful forces that we can't seem to to [0:30] escape from. [0:37] >> Starting a business usually means [0:38] juggling a bunch of different services [0:40] just to look legit. Not anymore. With [0:43] Northwest Registered Agent, you get a [0:45] complete business identity all in one [0:47] place. a business address, domain, [0:50] website, phone number, and more with [0:52] privacy protection built in from day [0:53] one. Don't spend hundreds or thousands [0:56] on services you can get from Northwest [0:59] for free. Visit northwestregistered [1:01] agent.com/allinfree [1:04] and start using free resources to build [1:06] your business today. [1:09] >> All right, everybody. Welcome back to [1:10] the All-In interview program. We are [1:13] delighted today to have the one, the [1:16] only Nate Silver on the program. [1:18] Gambler, statistician, podcaster, [1:22] Substacker. Go subscribe right now for a [1:24] Hyundai. Quick Hyundai at Silver [1:27] Bulletin over at Substack. It's a great [1:30] Substack. How you doing, brother? Nice [1:32] to see you with your Nicks hat on. [1:34] >> I'm good. You know, I think I have like [1:35] one more week to wear the Knicks hat. [1:37] It's a little bulky, not super podcast [1:40] video friendly, but I I you know, once [1:42] in 53 years, once in my lifetime at [1:44] least. [1:45] >> Did you go to any of those games? [1:47] >> I went to a bunch of the Philly series. [1:48] I went to um I think as Jason did, I was [1:51] in Philly for like the [1:53] >> New York City Takeover of Wells Fargo or [1:55] whatever the hell it's called now, [1:56] Infinity or something. Um I went to the [1:59] Trump game, which was not the right game [2:01] to go to, but I wanted to be there. I [2:03] wanted to kind of cover it for my [2:05] readers. I felt like it was a moment [2:07] where New York might triumph out of this [2:09] [ __ ] show that it was to get into the [2:11] arena. Um [2:13] >> it was a [2:13] >> You had to show up what 2 hours early to [2:15] get in 3 hours. [2:16] >> I am I am not a particularly prompt [2:18] person. No, I got I'm not wasn't going [2:20] to miss. So I got there at like 6:05 [2:23] for an 8:30 game. [2:25] >> Lined up. You're supposed to get in on [2:26] 6th Avenue and 33rd and I was like on [2:29] 6th and 30th or 29th. It wasn't the [2:31] worst. [2:32] >> It wasn't the least efficient process [2:34] I've ever seen. New York has a way of [2:35] getting things done and you just kind of [2:37] like [2:37] >> follow people and and once you get in, I [2:40] mean, it was like literally TSA [2:41] security. They like literally like look [2:44] at your wallet by hand and they take [2:45] your lighters and and and your pens and [2:48] your vapes and everything like that. And [2:50] uh once you get in it was pretty normal. [2:52] I did feel like the crowd was a little [2:54] bit fatigued by the second half, which [2:56] was a choppy second half where there [2:58] were some questionable officiating [3:00] decisions. Yeah, I actually did you bet [3:02] any of the games and like did you find [3:03] the odds were off anywhere? [3:05] >> I had the Knicks to win the Eastern [3:07] Conference Finals and then after they [3:08] wrapped up their series, I bet them uh [3:11] to win the finals against either OKC or [3:13] San Antonio. So, I actually I the ticket [3:15] was not cheap. I paid it would not cover [3:18] Jason's tickets, but I was able to cover [3:21] uh cover my 200 level bull seat with the [3:24] profits from from those non-H homer [3:26] bets. I thought the Knicks were [3:27] legitimately overlooked in the East. And [3:29] when you see a team that wins like that [3:32] game against Atlanta where we were up [3:33] like literally like 77 to 22 [3:35] >> at some point or something like I'm like [3:37] as somebody who like studies this stuff [3:38] and builds models to see that kind of [3:41] signature significance for that level of [3:43] dominance over whatever it was four [3:45] rounds of the playoffs like that's [3:47] that's real. That's like not noise. [3:50] >> Do you bet prediction markets or how do [3:52] you bet [3:53] >> big Tony? If if you are I don't bet [3:55] through big Tony. If you are someone [3:58] who's pursued so I've been limited by [4:00] draft kings and and MGM a lot of the uh [4:04] traditional retail sports books limit [4:05] you the prediction markets do not I can [4:07] solve for poly market I should say. So [4:09] if you're a sharp better I have other [4:11] issues believe me with the prediction [4:12] markets but if you are a sharp better [4:14] then it becomes easier to just [4:15] concentrate your activity on the [4:17] prediction markets where you know you [4:18] have very smart people you have hedge [4:20] funds who are probably making bets in [4:21] these markets more and more but yeah [4:23] more more and more I don't want to go [4:25] through the rigma roll of like can I [4:26] even get my money down so I' I will [4:28] admit I've gravitated toward toward [4:30] those yes [4:31] >> and uh when you look at this team what [4:34] do you attribute because obviously [4:35] during the season it was up and [4:38] We were 15 games from the end of the [4:40] season. People were like, "Hey, we got [4:42] to trade for Giannis. We got to get Cat [4:44] out of here." But in January, February, [4:45] we had this incredible run where we had [4:48] used Cat as the point center. And then [4:51] we backed off of it and I was on Knicks [4:53] Fan TV talking with like the real deep [4:55] folks and there was speculation like [4:57] they figured it out and they're like, [4:59] "Let's hold this play." Mike Brown said, [5:01] "Let's hold cat at the point from, you [5:04] know, until the playoffs because we know [5:06] it works so good." But what makes this [5:07] team so special? Is it the the wings? Is [5:10] it just Brunson's grit? Is it the [5:12] three-point shooting across the team? [5:14] Selflessness, ball movement? There's so [5:15] many things people talk about here with [5:17] this team. [5:18] >> I think it's Mike Brown and Cat. I'm not [5:21] saying the most important components of [5:23] the Knicks. I'm saying they're those are [5:24] the deltas where things changed the [5:26] most. Um [5:28] >> on defense, a couple of things. Number [5:30] one, you have I love Jaylen Brunson. [5:32] Might be my favorite player. Um, he's [5:34] not a terrific one-on-one defender. He [5:36] gets a few seals, but like he's [5:38] undersized. The low center of gravity [5:39] somehow doesn't work on defense as well. [5:41] But like every other defender of the [5:43] Knicks, including Towns, which is a [5:45] descent descended point of view, are are [5:48] at least average, if not better. And so [5:50] like kind of figuring out that system. [5:51] By the way, when you rely on a defensive [5:54] system that requires high effort and [5:56] transition play, not playing your guys [5:58] 37 minutes per game against like the [6:00] Charlotte Hornets in the regular season, [6:02] probably a smart move. Um [6:04] >> yeah, this is why Tibs had to go when [6:05] you look back on it. Tibs going who [6:07] ground these guys into submission for [6:09] three seasons and they were [6:11] >> Yeah, it was like we were down one, two, [6:14] or three starters for every round of the [6:16] previous playoffs. Yeah. [6:17] >> Yeah. I remember going uh to the Indiana [6:19] I guess game seven of the semi-finals [6:21] against Indiana in 2024 and you kind of [6:22] see like OG was hobbling around out [6:26] there. I guess Josh Hart kind of [6:27] valiantly played and you're like these [6:29] guys are like an infirmary ward. [6:31] >> Um and especially because you're relying [6:33] on smart higheffort defense. So that [6:36] part on defense and low key they became [6:39] like a much better defensive team in the [6:41] second half, right? Um, I remember also [6:43] going this year to the Knicks Nets game [6:45] in December, January, not the most fun [6:48] part of the year in New York where um [6:51] where they had lost like seven out of [6:53] nine games and there was all the talk [6:55] about like cap being traded and I just [6:58] wanted to go and check out the vibe. [7:00] actually bet on the Knicks to win by [7:03] like 15 points or more because I thought [7:04] this is either going to be like the [7:06] beginning of the end for this regime or [7:09] it's going to be a turnaround game [7:10] against you know a team that's trying to [7:11] lose frankly a cross town rebels trying [7:13] to lose and the fans were like pretty [7:16] tolerant of cat they wound up winning by [7:18] like 60 points or something totally [7:20] absurd or held the nets of one of the [7:22] lowest scorers in the modern NBA era and [7:24] like that team from there they by the [7:26] way they won the NBA cup [7:28] >> yep [7:28] >> but like in the second half they had [7:31] something like the fifth best defense in [7:33] the NBA. They had the best defense in [7:35] the NBA in the playoffs. Maybe not [7:37] sustainable, but like but that on [7:38] defense and then Cat presenting look [7:40] again like I love Jaylen Brunson. The [7:43] offense can be a little bit predictable [7:45] maybe in clutch possessions. [7:47] >> And it's amazing that Jaylen Brunson I [7:49] mean he shot like 53% between 16 and 22 [7:52] feet which is kind of insane given that [7:55] you know it's coming. It's like Marian [7:56] Rivera's like cut fast ball. You know [7:58] it's coming. Um, but just to have more [8:00] optionality and variety in the offense [8:03] and to have more ball movement. So to [8:05] have those two spontaneous things [8:07] happen, the coaching system led [8:10] improvement on defense plus like Cat [8:12] having a revelation like I think he's [8:14] like one of the [8:15] >> 15 best players in the league. He was [8:18] rated as like [8:19] >> yeah, he's a really good player. And so [8:22] those two things combined, you know, a [8:25] little bit unusual for a veteran team, [8:26] granted, but spontaneous improvement on [8:28] both sides of the ball. Um, coupled with [8:30] the Knicks, by the way, have the most [8:32] playoff games out of any team in the [8:34] past four years, more than Boston, more [8:37] than OKC, a lot more than San Antonio. [8:39] There is empirical evidence that playoff [8:42] experience does matter. Um, this comes [8:44] up in in poker, too. If you are in [8:47] your first big tournament and maybe [8:48] you're rated the GPI number one player [8:51] and you're playing in the main event of [8:52] the World Series of Poker, nerves are a [8:55] thing. Even in golf, nerves are a huge [8:57] thing. It's a physical ordeal almost and [8:59] like you're operating on a different [9:01] operating system. And to have had [9:02] experience in a lot of high stakes [9:05] games, not all of which were wins, but [9:06] like it really does it really does help. [9:09] and and [9:10] >> those two comebacks from the Pacers game [9:13] from the Boston games where we just [9:15] broke their backs last year that I think [9:17] made it obvious to anybody when we're [9:20] down 10 15 points that's not a lead [9:22] against the Knicks. The Knicks are going [9:23] to come back. We're just that good. Um [9:26] and it's just fantastic now that the [9:28] entire league has to plan how do they [9:31] beat the Knicks. We've spent the last [9:32] like five or six years how do we get [9:34] through Boston? How do we get through [9:35] this team? Now the entire league has to [9:37] do that. All right, we should get [9:39] started here. We got so much to talk [9:40] about and obviously you specialize in [9:42] elections. We got the midterms coming [9:44] up. We're going to talk about 2028 [9:46] postTrump world, all of that. But we [9:48] just concluded an election. An election [9:51] which I don't want to speak for Dave, [9:53] but you may have seen or heard the [9:54] podcast where he was like, "Hey, this is [9:57] not illegal, but it doesn't feel like a [10:00] real election." take us through what [10:03] happened in your estimation in [10:05] California with Spencer Pratt fraud just [10:09] mailing ball. [10:10] >> That was just Yeah, that was just the LA [10:11] election, Jason, just to be clear. [10:13] >> Yeah, just to go with LA, but go ahead, [10:14] build on it. Yeah. The question that I [10:16] wanted to talk to you about, Nate, is [10:17] when you look at the in-person return [10:20] data and then you look at the early [10:22] mail-in data and then the late mailin [10:24] data where suddenly Nipia Ramen has this [10:27] massive surge and there's this huge [10:29] statistical difference as the ballots [10:31] start to get counted in the days and [10:33] weeks that follow. She wins. it seems [10:36] very improbable that there's a true [10:38] statistical difference in the population [10:40] that might you know be in person mail in [10:44] early and mail in late and I just wanted [10:45] to get your read on that. So I'd say I [10:48] think there's no evidence of fraud is [10:50] the short summary version. The mistake [10:52] that can be made is to assume that each [10:55] ballot like comes in independently when [10:58] there are systematic differences between [11:00] groups and when they tend to cast their [11:01] ballots. So, Democrats have long been [11:04] encouraged to vote by mail. Actually, it [11:06] used to be more of a Republican thing, [11:07] but like under Trump who discouraged [11:09] mail voting in 2016 and 2020 um and 2024 [11:13] to some extent, like that shifted. So, [11:16] look, I think California's system is [11:19] completely unacceptable. I've done um [11:22] some consulting work on like the Indian [11:25] election where you like literally have [11:27] polling stations in the Himalayas and [11:29] they actually stagger their elections. [11:30] But once election day happens, they [11:32] count their vote within 24 hours. I [11:34] think it's ridiculous and very failed [11:37] state that California takes longer than [11:39] that. But if you have one party who [11:41] systematically tends to vote later, also [11:43] Democrats in both the LA race and the [11:46] governorhip had more of a choice to [11:48] make. Uh you know, it wasn't clear. You [11:50] know, for a while it looked like Eric [11:52] Swallwell was going to was going to win [11:54] and then Katie Porter and then and then [11:56] and then you know, Basera finally [11:57] emerges. Bera like look my dad is from [12:01] LA. I spent a lot of time in California [12:04] and I am all on board with the [12:05] criticisms of how the state is being [12:07] governed at least in parts of the state. [12:09] I was in um San Diego for New Year's and [12:14] beautiful time of year to be in San [12:16] Diego and like you can like literally [12:17] run on the sand in the beach and [12:18] everyone's kind of like hot and you have [12:20] good fish tacos and everything else like [12:22] that. I kind of understood the [12:25] California of like my youth or my dad's [12:28] youth or whatever else and understand [12:30] the appeal of the state and I understand [12:31] why LA and SF I think LA in particular [12:35] kind of never really recovered from the [12:36] pandemic. We can talk about that. At the [12:38] same time, it's a very partisan state. [12:41] We have very partisan Democrats like Kla [12:43] Harris and Gavin Newsome who emerged [12:45] from the state. We saw in the [12:47] redistricting referendum, I guess it was [12:48] in 2025, how like you can debate whether [12:51] it's a good idea or not, but like that [12:53] traced with the Democratic margin in [12:55] presidential years very strongly, even [12:57] though for many years Democrats had been [12:58] the party against gerrymandering. Um, [13:01] it's a capital D democratic state. It's [13:05] not an idiosyncratic blue state like [13:07] Maine or something. And like so like to [13:11] expect even a very talented Republican [13:14] like Spencer Pratt to win the mayorship. [13:16] I mean even in New York we have a bit [13:18] more heterodoxy historically. We've had [13:20] a a you know socialist mayor. We've had [13:23] Michael Bloomberg and Rudy Giani in [13:25] recent years too. California is not that [13:28] way. It's much more of a a machine [13:30] state. [13:31] >> But when you look at that statistical [13:33] difference, I I get the idea that [13:35] Democrats mail in ballots and they show [13:37] up late. But when you look at the [13:39] overwhelming votes for NPIA Ramen over [13:42] Karen Bass that happened late in the [13:45] counting cycle versus early in the [13:47] counting cycle and the statistical kind [13:49] of shift over that happened and you look [13:52] at the difference between in person and [13:54] mail in being so statistically different [13:56] and I get your point about Republicans [13:57] are more likely to go in person and [13:59] maybe you can make that leap there but [14:01] the difference in accounting that [14:02] happened over time the ratio just seems [14:05] so different between ramen and bass and [14:07] then People bring up this idea of ballot [14:09] harvesting where there were homeless [14:11] people from Skidro and the number of [14:12] ballots that came from that particular [14:14] region in the late mailin was kind of [14:17] concentrated for NPIA Ramen. Do you get [14:19] a sense that that actually is a true [14:22] representation of individual voters and [14:24] how they individually voted in that [14:26] election? [14:27] >> I think the California vote count is an [14:29] accurate tally of the votes that were [14:31] cast. So, I mean, yeah, look, [14:34] >> mail in. [14:35] >> Were they cast by the individuals that [14:36] were supposed to cast them? Right. This [14:37] is one of the theories is that there's [14:40] ballots that are getting filled out on [14:41] mass in these ballot harvesting efforts [14:44] or people walk around and they say, [14:45] "Hey, fill out this ballot for this [14:47] person and here's a free lunch or I [14:49] don't know what's going on, but like [14:50] there's all these videos. I don't know [14:51] if they're true or not." [14:52] >> I think there is propaganda around this. [14:54] I also think that like mail and voting [14:57] provides some verification challenges in [15:00] different ways. uh you know I don't [15:02] inherently see anything that wrong with [15:05] a system where you go to a physical [15:07] place to vote and you sign um you sign [15:10] your voter log and and whether you show [15:13] ID or not and then if you have like a [15:15] disability or you're really in bad [15:17] straight you're traveling in Albania or [15:18] something then you can [15:19] >> that makes sense but I want to ask I [15:21] just want to ask you the empirical [15:22] question what is the difference in [15:24] states or districts or cities that don't [15:27] have voter ID and those that do [15:29] politically like is that basically [15:31] create a huge overweighting for [15:33] Democrats. Can you just help us [15:34] understand the politics behind this from [15:36] an empirical perspective? Not putting on [15:38] a spin hat or anything. So the theory [15:41] used to be that Democrats benefit from [15:43] higher turnout by kind of any means at [15:47] all. And that was an era when Democrats [15:49] tended to dominate among non-olucated [15:52] voters whereas Republicans were like the [15:54] the you know country club kowanas club [15:57] people who like show up in the first day [15:58] of voting. that has shifted. Look where [16:01] Democrats have really, really [16:02] overperformed. It's in special [16:04] elections. It's in midterms as opposed [16:08] to high turnout races like like when [16:10] Trump's been on the ballot. Um and so [16:12] like I think if Trump like look I think [16:15] voter ID would be pretty reasonable. I'm [16:18] not against voter ID. You show your ID [16:20] to do you know if you show ID even at [16:23] mid-40s to get into a bar, you can [16:24] probably show it to vote. Um, but like [16:27] at the same time, um, I don't think that [16:30] explains what we saw in California. I [16:31] think it's a system that is much too [16:33] slow where you have different branches [16:34] of ballots that are kind of differently [16:36] and where younger people that might be [16:39] more progressive tend to vote later [16:41] andor by mail. And again, it's not like [16:44] this happened in Alabama or something. [16:47] The the prior on Pratt advancing [16:50] probably would be pretty low [16:51] potentially. And I wish that people were [16:54] were less partisan. I, you know, I have [16:57] been um critical on on the newsletter [17:01] Silver Bullion about Graham Platner, for [17:03] example, um because I think he's [17:06] somebody who has not proven a reliable [17:08] figure, so to speak. And I was critical [17:11] of of Joe Biden. And I'm not even [17:13] registered as a Democrat, by the way, [17:14] despite what people assume. Um, but if [17:18] you're going to have five different ways [17:20] to vote, and I say this to someone with [17:22] experience, like actually trying to [17:23] build election night models and being on [17:26] national TV on election nights, these [17:28] blue shifts or red shifts are somewhat [17:30] predictable and are going to be a [17:32] notable consequence of of having [17:35] different mechanisms to vote where you [17:36] have like different cues in the line. [17:38] Right? If you're at MSG and you have [17:41] like a VIP line, the cohort that arrives [17:43] through the VIP line is going to be [17:44] different than the one that arrives [17:45] through like the main gates on on 7th [17:47] Avenue or whatever. And I think the [17:49] system should be simplified. By the way, [17:51] also things like rank choice voting, [17:53] which I again, as an election wonk, I [17:56] support giving voters more choice. You [17:58] shouldn't need like Maine or New York [18:00] City take um an extra two weeks to count [18:04] rank choice voting where I could claude [18:07] code. Yeah, [18:08] >> a a rank choice voting algorithm that [18:12] would resolve itself in seven minutes [18:14] even with 100 million votes in Maine or [18:17] half a million or whatever it was Nate [18:19] that we have the appearance of [18:21] impropriety and we have a highly [18:23] politicized system. I don't want to lead [18:25] the witness here too much but we do find [18:28] isolated cases like this woman Anakah [18:31] Brenda Lee Brown Armstrong. [18:33] was paying people three bucks or giving [18:35] them cigarettes to register them. You [18:38] have these on the margin fraudulent [18:41] looking behaviors and then if it takes [18:43] this long that gives another appearance [18:46] of impropriety but I keep bringing up [18:48] the Heritage Foundation. I'm sure you've [18:50] looked at their data. They have a lot of [18:51] people trying to figure out where fraud [18:54] exists investigating it and it's [18:56] dimminimous. It's couple of thousands of [18:58] cases they can find. So even if you [19:01] extrapolated them 10x or 20x, pick your [19:04] multiple, it would never swing a major [19:06] election. In fact, the number of [19:07] elections that have been swung based on [19:09] what they told me is like the most local [19:13] smallest election where there's tens of [19:15] thousands of votes or thousands of [19:16] votes. So is that the issue that we're [19:18] seeing here? This collection of [19:20] appearances of impropriy? [19:23] >> Yes. Look, the you the American election [19:25] system is very decentralized. [19:28] um which you know as kind of like a a [19:32] old school liberal in some ways who I'm [19:34] kind of against centralized power I [19:35] think is quite brilliant in some [19:38] respects but yeah the scale there is [19:41] certainly there are certainly cases of [19:43] fraud when Al Franken won what was it [19:45] 2006 right that came down to like a [19:47] recount of like 200 votes we're never [19:49] going to know that with any degree of [19:51] certainty there is like a margin of [19:53] error but in practice and we know this [19:55] too when you do have recounts again and [19:57] I've studied this a [19:58] You have an 0.5% recount threshold in [20:02] most states. Almost never have you had a [20:04] margin larger than 0.05% [20:07] or so overturned. The errors can also [20:10] cancel out. Again, you know, the notion [20:12] that someone can vote without physically [20:16] being like the ward of their ballot. [20:18] Understand why that bothers people. And [20:19] I think California has been [20:22] complacent about this. And I think [20:24] perception does matter. And I think you [20:26] can there's a kind of certain arrogance [20:29] I guess is a term that comes to mind um [20:32] about saying well we want everyone to [20:34] vote and so we're just gonna do things [20:35] our way and it takes a long time because [20:36] we're like taking time to verify things. [20:38] Again you know having studied elections [20:41] all around the world that's very [20:42] unusual. Most countries would count much [20:44] much faster than the US. It's probably [20:47] because we have an electoral college [20:48] system. it's decentralized but like in [20:51] most elections in France or the UK where [20:53] they keep having elections or wherever [20:54] else or Japan or India even you know the [20:58] result of the vote within a few hours [21:00] and the fact that the United States the [21:01] technological leader of the world and [21:03] the supposed like beacon of democracy [21:06] can't do that I think is is a sign of [21:08] atrophy of of the efficacy of the system [21:10] >> or is it by design Nick let me ask you a [21:13] question if voter ID laws don't change [21:15] and mail and ballot laws don't change [21:17] and the system doesn't change. Is there [21:20] a chance, do you think, from the data [21:22] you've seen for Republican governor to [21:25] be elected again in California or for [21:27] Republicans to win more seats in the [21:29] House or have a shot at winning a Senate [21:31] seat in California? I mean, [21:33] fundamentally, does this system not get [21:35] set up in such a way that it creates a [21:37] irreversible model for Democrat [21:39] establishment to maintain its control [21:42] over elected seats in the state? I mean, [21:45] Democrats have lost plenty of elections [21:47] recently, but not in California. [21:49] Partisanship is the gravity that [21:51] dictates every election in the US, [21:54] right? Like my job, don't worry, I will [21:56] get criticized if if we say, "Oh, [21:59] whatever Gavin Newsome or AOC is a 55% [22:02] favorite and they lose." But like, but [22:04] 43 of the 50 states, we could probably [22:07] predict right now with 97% confidence [22:09] who they'll vote for in 2028. And it's [22:12] not because of rigging. It's because [22:14] polarization and partisanship are very [22:17] powerful forces that we can't seem to to [22:19] escape from. You know, again, I would [22:21] love um you see a little bit of this in [22:23] New England actually, right? You see [22:24] like a Charlie Baker or as Phil Scott in [22:27] Vermont, right? You see a little bit of [22:29] like crossartisanship in New England. [22:31] You see even in the South like Basher in [22:34] Kentucky is a moderate but Democratic [22:37] governor. Um, for some reason you don't [22:39] see it as much in California. I don't [22:42] know why. California has like always [22:43] been like the laboratory of weird and [22:46] eccentric political ideas, but it's come [22:48] it's become a machine state. Maybe [22:49] because it's so large that voters can't [22:52] kind of touch the candidates up close [22:55] and don't have a lot of like directly [22:57] relatable experience. Um maybe [23:00] California is just kind of like too [23:01] large in general. But I look I am very [23:03] concerned about polarization and [23:06] partisanship. I think it leads to lower [23:09] quality of governance. I think it's [23:11] exacerbated by gerrymandering. This [23:14] gerrymandering kind of war to the [23:16] bottom. Um and Democrats have paid the [23:19] price where like the triangulation you [23:21] pick the least worst nominee works [23:24] perfectly fine in blue states. They're [23:26] going to win the general election. um it [23:29] hasn't given the Democrats very [23:30] effective general election nominees, [23:32] right? Between um you know, I consider [23:35] like, you know, they're one out of the [23:36] last four. I consider Biden to have lost [23:38] in 2024 before Harris lost instead. Um [23:42] you know, the one election that did win [23:43] was during a once in a century pandemic [23:46] that although I have my critiques of [23:48] liberal handling of COVID, was kind of [23:50] objectively handled well. I don't know. [23:52] You can talk about Operation Worksheet. [23:53] I understand why voters were very [23:55] unhappy with 2020, the 2020 version of [23:58] Trump and and the greatest economic [24:00] disruption since the 1930s. Um, so they [24:03] kind of won the gimme. They haven't won [24:05] the close elections recently except for [24:07] Obama who conspicuously at least kind of [24:10] made rhetoric to trying to bridge a [24:13] divide between the parties. Um, you [24:16] know, Obama still has a I looked at this [24:18] today a 57% approval rating postfacto [24:20] with with independence. Biden is at 20%. [24:24] Um, and like look, I think a lot of [24:26] Democrats and Republicans, certainly, [24:28] maybe even more so, Republicans, [24:29] frankly, under Trump feel as though you [24:31] don't even have to try to turn out the [24:33] other side or persuade people. It's just [24:35] a numbers game. And in California, if [24:37] you're Democrats, you win the numbers [24:38] game. [24:44] >> You run backtoback calls all day. [24:46] Decisions get made, then the details [24:48] slip. Plaude fixes that. Clip Plaude [24:50] Note Pro to your phone, hit record, and [24:52] stay in the conversation. Claude [24:53] Intelligence captures every word and [24:55] turns it into structured notes, action [24:57] items, and follow-ups, not a transcript [25:00] you'll never open. The actual work done [25:02] for you. Capture more, miss nothing. [25:04] Find Claude Note Pro at Claude.ai. [25:09] I think we want to really get to 2026 [25:11] and 2028 and talk about what you were [25:14] alluding to, which is the polarization [25:18] and how these parties have changed. The [25:20] Republicans used to be, you know, this [25:22] country club group, uh, elites, rich [25:25] people, business owners. Now they're the [25:27] populist party. Then the other side, [25:30] which used to be the working man and the [25:31] working women's party, they've become [25:33] this liberal weird socialist party. and [25:36] that seems to be playing. [25:38] >> They're both parties. [25:38] >> What's going on with the vibes, I guess, [25:42] between these two parties? And how do [25:44] you look at them? Because it does feel [25:45] like inside of each of those parties, [25:47] you have two subp parties. So, you [25:49] really have like some sort of 4x4 matrix [25:51] here or 2x2 matrix with four different [25:53] groups. How is that going to play out in [25:56] 2026, which still feels like the [25:59] anti-Trump vote? Like, hey, I'm not [26:00] happy about Trump. But 2028, there's [26:02] Trump's not going to run a third time in [26:04] all likelihood. So, let's take those two [26:07] buckets as well as the vibes and these [26:10] parties fracturing a bit. [26:11] >> Yeah, I think Democrats really have [26:13] three factions as I've described them. [26:15] Um, one is the left, the avatars might [26:18] be Zoron, um, might be AOC, might be [26:22] Bernie Sanders, all of whom, by the way, [26:24] are quite effective politicians in their [26:28] own way. I mean, Zaren understood how to [26:32] like be a Knicks cheerleader, for [26:34] example. [26:34] >> Oh, God. Yeah, [26:36] >> he speech was like almost perfect. [26:39] Whoever wrote it for him is a Knicks [26:40] fan. [26:42] >> But look, I'll be honest. I I didn't [26:43] vote for him, but like I think find [26:45] anyone who's like trying to like bridge [26:47] gaps and expand a tent, even if it's [26:50] from a direction that I might not agree [26:52] with. I find that like somewhat [26:54] appealing, I suppose. You know, AOC, you [26:57] can take or leave. She has become a more [26:59] effective tactical politician. you know, [27:01] Bernie, what he's built with um with [27:03] being a freaking old guy from Vermont, [27:06] the socialist mayor of Burlington, [27:07] Vermont, coming within not a hair's [27:10] breath, but coming, you know, quite [27:12] close and beating Clinton in 20 states [27:14] in 2016 or whatever was quite [27:16] impressive. But like that's one [27:17] constituency and historically the left [27:19] has not had a lot of big wins outside of [27:21] the bluest states. On the other side, [27:23] there are the abundance libs kind of [27:25] named after Ezra Klein, right? They are [27:27] more pro- free market. They sometimes [27:29] deny that they're centrist. I think [27:31] they're pretty centrist. They are the [27:32] ones who are very concerned with [27:34] California as a case study of poor [27:36] governance. And whenever you think about [27:38] parties at the national level, um, [27:40] generally speaking, it's the purple [27:43] states, sometimes the red states where [27:46] things are more are more functional, [27:48] where there's more housing, where when [27:50] you get out of the airport to catch an [27:52] Uber, there's not some convoluted system [27:54] where you have to wait 20 minutes in [27:56] line to go to some shuttle like an LAX [27:58] or whatever else, right? Um, where [28:01] there's population growth. I mean you [28:02] want to talk about like hard data, [28:04] population data in the US and jobs data [28:06] is pretty good and those are states [28:08] where people have moved to and the [28:09] abundance lies are critical of [28:11] democratic governance and critical of of [28:15] um culture war issues on policing and [28:18] trans rights and and you have what I [28:20] call the resistance lib faction. They're [28:25] the ones who say they really fit up with [28:26] the Democratic establishment, but are [28:28] still often very partisan and often very [28:31] like cheerleading for the blue team. [28:34] They're the ones who thought that Joe [28:35] Biden was railroaded out of the 2024 [28:38] race, for example. They're really Gavin [28:40] Newsome's constituency. Um why is Gavin [28:43] Newsome going out of his way to support [28:46] and endorse kind of the Bidens when [28:48] Biden, even among Democrats, is not all [28:50] that popular anymore? Everyone else [28:52] wants to move on. And well, it's because [28:53] it's a signal to like the resistance [28:55] libs that like I have your back. I'm a [28:57] fighter. The reason why we didn't win in [29:00] 2024 was because the media was unfair to [29:02] Biden andor because Kla Harris was a [29:05] black woman. So, pick a white guy who [29:08] will fight for you and tweet in all caps [29:10] and you'll win. I don't. [29:11] >> So, it's kind of like ride or die. We're [29:13] going to just our team, our team, our [29:15] team's going to win. It doesn't matter. [29:17] We never apologize. Kind of the Trump [29:19] playbook. Never apologize. Go on the [29:20] attack. seems to be what Gavin's doing, [29:22] right? [29:23] >> Absolutely. And he had some some proof [29:26] of concept. I mean, the redistricting [29:28] thing was a genuinely smart tactical [29:30] move. Democrats are going to wind up [29:32] losing seats, but like without [29:33] California, they probably lose even [29:35] more. And so, he did skate where the [29:36] puck was going there instead of the [29:39] party's like usual risk version that [29:40] I've critiqued before. Um, but at the [29:44] same time, the triangulating [29:47] spirit of like, let's pick Kla Harris [29:49] cuz she she's like the least [29:50] unacceptable candidate or Hillary or or [29:54] John Kerry if you want to go back to [29:55] 2004. Um, the establishment doesn't seem [29:58] to have an understanding of the fact [30:00] that like almost every election now, [30:02] Obama in 2012 was, I guess, the [30:04] exception, almost every election now is [30:07] a change election. We might pingpong [30:08] back and forth for many cycles. Like I [30:11] think Democrats are slight favorites to [30:14] win in 2028. It wouldn't shock me if AOC [30:17] or Newsome or Shapiro or Assaf or [30:20] whoever wins. If they're underdogs again [30:22] in 2032, look what's happening in the UK [30:24] where I mean it's kind of become like a [30:25] running joke, but we're going to be [30:27] through like what like six prime [30:28] ministers in 9 years or something and [30:31] they're probably the US's like closest [30:33] comp. Um it's not a good time to be a [30:36] defender of the status quo. And I do [30:39] think candidates like Kamla Harris who [30:42] was unable to distance herself kind of [30:43] literally unable or unwilling to [30:44] distance herself from from Biden or [30:47] Newsome who's kind of like defending [30:49] that legacy in the same way. Like to me [30:51] that seems like a a failed strategy. But [30:55] like in a lot of these World Cup games [30:56] sometimes, you know, sometimes you win [30:58] on penalties. You know, I I don't think [30:59] that any of the GOP nominees look to be [31:02] particularly strong. Donald Trump and [31:04] our approval ratings now is down to 38%. [31:07] People are upset about Iran. They're [31:09] upset about gas prices. They're upset [31:11] about just fatigue of having, you know, [31:14] a singular [31:16] center star of politics over the past. [31:18] You know, Trump kind of is like it's [31:20] fatiguing a little bit. And so, like, [31:22] it's an uphill battle for the GOP. [31:23] Democrats might do their best to to give [31:26] Republicans a fighting chance despite [31:27] that. So just to extrapolate from that [31:29] like the point about needing change, [31:33] driving change on the progressive side, [31:36] we are seeing socialists getting elected [31:39] as mayor, socialists starting to rise at [31:42] the state level and many of these [31:44] candidates that you've mentioned are [31:45] self-declared socialists at the national [31:47] level. We may potentially have a [31:50] Democratic socialist as president 2028 [31:53] based on what you're saying. Is that [31:55] ultimately where this goes where the [31:58] populist movements drive the left [32:00] further left and everyone in that party [32:03] now seems to be jumping on this [32:05] bandwagon proclaiming socialist [32:07] principles as the only way to solve [32:09] inequity and unfairness in this country [32:11] and you know kind of jumping on what we [32:13] were from empirical kind of history [32:16] shown doesn't work as a governing system [32:18] as a economic system but suddenly [32:21] everyone's kind of been swept away by it [32:22] and seems to think it's it's the the [32:24] only way forward. Does that kind of the [32:27] the output of the conditions that you're [32:28] describing that the left the democrats [32:31] basically become a socialist party and [32:32] they embrace socialism fully and [32:34] fullthroated? I think there are huge [32:36] generational divides where you know so I [32:39] grew up I'm 48 um so I still remember [32:44] the kind of not lastes but like I still [32:46] remember the cold war I still remember [32:49] the Berlin wall following right so for [32:51] me the connotations are of socialism are [32:54] close adjacent to communism [32:58] are a long history of failure of [33:00] economic development in countries that [33:02] adopted that system I think people who [33:04] are a a little bit older don't realize [33:06] that like the socialism brand is much [33:09] more popular among younger Democrats. By [33:11] the same token, America is still a [33:14] supremely capitalist country. You know, [33:17] if not for and again I in my book I have [33:20] lots of critiques of the tech sector. We [33:22] still are attracting the best and [33:24] brightest young talent from all around [33:26] the world. You know, I personally think [33:28] the AI capital boom, whatever becomes of [33:30] it, is responsible for keeping our [33:32] economy, at least the stock market, in [33:35] relatively good shape. Um, and you know, [33:38] also things like where have Democrats [33:40] lost support? Well, actually, the [33:43] biggest differences are concentrated [33:44] among Hispanic and to some extent [33:46] Asian-American voters. You know, who do [33:48] you think are the most likely people to [33:50] own small businesses in the US? It's a [33:53] cliche, but 100% true that like recent [33:56] immigrant groups are very [33:57] entrepreneurial. It's one thing that I [33:59] believe makes the United States great [34:01] and one thing that makes me very [34:02] pro-immigration. Um, but you have seen [34:05] shifts in those groups and the most [34:07] entrepreneurial groups away from [34:08] Democrats. [34:09] >> Yeah. Because I mean they they all [34:11] escaped socialist countries and [34:12] socialist backgrounds and the economic [34:15] mobility that's afforded by free markets [34:17] and capitalism and the degree of true [34:19] liberalism we provide in this country is [34:21] what's given folks opportunities that [34:23] don't exist elsewhere. [34:26] But the second and third generation of [34:28] the American middle class are probably [34:31] you know more likely as you point out to [34:33] kind of be convinced of the benefits of [34:35] socialism. This isn't your wheelhouse, [34:37] Nate, but if you were hired to give a [34:39] playbook to either party for 2028, what [34:44] would be in that playbook? What would [34:45] you tell them is the right platform for [34:49] this moment in time, a postTrump era, [34:51] and with socialism, wealth disparity, [34:55] healthcare, this there's a group of [34:57] issues here that keep coming up. The [34:59] support of Israel, foreign wars. What's [35:02] the perfect platform for either party, [35:04] an independent or left-leaning or [35:06] right-leaning? What are on going to be [35:08] on the top of Americans minds if you can [35:11] look that far out? [35:13] >> Yeah. Look, I by most definitions am an [35:16] elite as are you guys. You can afford [35:18] tickets to game three of the [35:20] >> first NBA Finals game in New York in [35:22] whatever 25 years and you're probably an [35:24] elite. And most elites like me say [35:27] they're, you know, socially liberal, [35:29] economically moderate, econ, you know, I [35:32] use the term liberal, meaning the way [35:34] liberals use in Europe, meaning some [35:37] role for the state, but pro- market in [35:39] general. And that's probably my view. [35:41] Um, I'm not sure that view is actually [35:44] an electoral winner as much, right? Um, [35:48] the most neglected voters in the US are [35:51] people who are culturally a little bit [35:53] more conservative, but like economically [35:56] more progressive potentially, but not [35:58] quite in the same way that you get from [36:00] like a an AOC. They support small [36:04] business. They are wary of [36:06] conglomerations of power. Or maybe I'm [36:07] putting that with with too generous a [36:09] brush. But like I do think that like [36:12] when you have the worst world's first [36:13] trillionaire when people have a lot of [36:16] anxiety. Maybe the anxiety is not the [36:18] right shape of anxiety but [36:20] understandable anxiety about AI. When [36:22] you have AI leaders saying things like [36:25] it's going to displace all these white [36:27] collar jobs. I look I think a [36:30] electorally I'm not saying morally or [36:33] righteously whatever else, right? I [36:35] think combining a little bit of the [36:37] right kind of anti- oligarch rhetoric um [36:42] with moderation on some of the issues um [36:46] you know on the woke stuff. I get that [36:48] term already feels like it's becoming [36:50] outdated. Um but like still supporting [36:52] small business especially for men right [36:55] um young men still want to feel as [36:59] though they control their own destiny. A [37:02] lot of them feel like they don't do that [37:03] anymore, but I don't think they [37:04] necessarily want like all that much [37:06] handholding. But no, it's a difficult [37:07] thing to to triangulate. And the US is [37:11] not alone in having a lot of resistance [37:14] and dissatisfaction with with the status [37:17] quo. You know, I mean, again, this is [37:19] part of why, and I'm sure about 2% of [37:21] your audience will be sympathetic to [37:23] this, why I have like been more [37:26] defending of Zoran Namani living in New [37:28] York is because like he's at least [37:30] getting the ins and outs. We'll see what [37:32] happens in in after 4 years of like New [37:35] York being like a a basically functional [37:38] city, right? We have really nice new [37:41] airports. It's not Zoran's doing. That's [37:43] quo and a hell of a lot of money spent. [37:45] But like our crime is like relatively [37:48] low compared to to California. I used to [37:51] live right near Penn Station Madison [37:53] Square Garden. Not the nicest [37:55] neighborhood, not the nicest block, but [37:56] like I never walked around feeling [37:58] unsafe there when I visit SF. Um then [38:02] you have to be more careful, right? And [38:03] so I I think like combining functional [38:06] performance in government with whatever [38:09] message you want is part of it. I think [38:10] maybe even like having like a little bit [38:12] more like optimism too. I'm I'm kind of [38:15] always a fan of like zigging where other [38:17] people zag Obama presented a more [38:21] optimistic take about like kind of like [38:23] the American spirit, right? You know, [38:25] look, I see um all the enthusiasm around [38:29] the World Cup and the Knicks. I I don't [38:31] want to sound like cliche, but you know, [38:34] tonight after we tape, which is taping [38:35] on a Monday night, New York time, right? [38:37] I can like wander around the streets of [38:40] New York and there'll be some like [38:42] Norwegian bar that has Norway game on [38:44] and like that does make America great [38:46] and like rediscovering those values. I [38:49] don't know. I mean maybe somebody like a [38:51] you know I think maybe the most [38:52] electable Democrat might be somebody [38:54] like a a John Oaf who is who is younger [38:57] who is pretty progressive if you look at [38:58] his voting record but like but isn't [39:00] like a brawler in quite the same way [39:03] that that Nuome is trying to be. I mean, [39:05] the generational part is a lot of this. [39:08] Uh, you know, I think it's insane that [39:11] we had a candidate who was trying to be [39:14] president until he was 86 and the [39:16] alternative is someone who's trying to [39:17] be president until he's 82. Like I I [39:19] don't you don't see very many Warren [39:21] Buffett fine. If Warren Buffett ran for [39:23] president, maybe I'd vote for him, [39:25] right? But like you don't see very many [39:27] leaders in the parts of the world. You [39:28] don't see very many CEOs or leaders [39:30] otherwise. I, you know, I very much [39:32] value the contribution of my older [39:33] friends, right? But like to run the [39:36] biggest country in the world um as an [39:38] 82y old to me seems kind of insane. [39:41] >> And so there's some basic level of [39:43] competence that Mandami is showing in [39:45] New York. He's positive. He's fixing [39:47] potholes. He's making it, you know, a [39:50] celebration of whatever the sports teams [39:52] are. He's fixing garbage. Like there are [39:54] some basic things that New Yorkers very [39:56] much appreciate in quality of life. And [39:58] that's not something you expect from a [40:00] Democrat or a socialist. Um and it those [40:03] kind of like blocking and tackling and [40:05] the high level of engagement [40:07] um which Trump you mentioned kind of [40:10] burns people out with that high level of [40:12] engagement seems like Mandami comes just [40:14] under that. He's a little more positive. [40:16] He doesn't use like the toxicity that [40:18] much but he's he's engaging right and [40:21] that seems to be working in New York and [40:23] with the voter base. No, [40:26] >> he's pretty popular here so far. And [40:28] again New York is a New York is a [40:30] capitalist [40:31] >> city. I think I think it's different [40:32] than somewhere like California. It's not [40:34] kind of as West Coast uh freshwater [40:37] progressive. New York is a pragmatic [40:39] place that people from all around the [40:40] world migrate to. It's a place where [40:42] there's a lot of wealth all around you. [40:45] It's also a place that despite seeming [40:47] like a chaotic [ __ ] show at times. I [40:49] mean, it's look, it's easy to be [40:50] optimistic about New York in in mid June [40:52] when we have like the most beautiful [40:54] weather of the year and everyone's [40:55] coming to visit and everything else, but [40:57] like but New York is a success story in [40:59] a way that I think California has become [41:03] less of one maybe. [41:04] >> Sorry, let me just ask you a question on [41:05] this capitalism. Have you seen data that [41:09] underscores [41:10] this mainline that everyone's talking [41:12] about that the youth are kind of [41:14] disillusioned by capitalism and don't [41:16] believe in capitalism? I mean to see [41:18] this happen in a city like New York to [41:20] your point, a city that is a bastion of [41:21] capitalism and progress and opportunity [41:24] for people for people to put in place a [41:26] candidate as mayor that denounces the [41:29] capitalism as a system and talks about [41:31] collectivism just seems to indicate that [41:34] maybe there's a real movement with the [41:35] youth. I mean, one of the statistics I [41:37] always quote to people [41:38] >> is I think 45 million people graduated [41:41] college in the last decade in the United [41:43] States that have all of them or a large [41:47] percentage of them I should say have a [41:49] pretty significant debt burden that they [41:51] feel is going to be very hard to get out [41:52] of. And I would argue that that's a [41:54] function of the federal student loan [41:56] program and its underwriting processes [41:57] and it really condemns people to a life [42:00] that is going to be very hard to grow [42:02] your way out of. But what does the data [42:05] tell you about capitalism and what that [42:07] says about the next cycle here? [42:09] >> Yeah. Where the cut point is is probably [42:12] around age 40, I'd say. Obviously, it [42:16] kind of ages by a year every year. And [42:18] like, you know, we saw I saw before the [42:20] New York Mel race last year, people who [42:23] were able to make incredibly accurate [42:25] almost blockbyb block, neighborhood by [42:27] neighborhood projections based on where [42:29] Zoran would be good versus Cuomo, just [42:30] based on knowing the city and where [42:33] younger people, younger, more [42:34] progressive people live. I would say, [42:37] you know, I think part of it might have [42:38] to do with economic anxiety for sure. I [42:41] think it's also your experience like [42:44] growing up and exactly when you kind of [42:45] came of age, right? Again, I grew up in [42:47] like um I guess the first election I was [42:50] old enough to vote in was Clinton in [42:52] '96. This is like the triumph of the [42:55] West and capitalism. You had a very [42:58] robust economy in the 1990s. You had a [43:01] lot of growth. Um and by the time you [43:05] get to your, you know, when the great [43:06] recession hit, you know, I already had [43:08] by a year, right? I already had a job. I [43:10] already had a foothold. I think the [43:11] people kind of like born [43:14] if you were in college when September [43:18] 11th happened like that might be kind of [43:19] the the cut point roughly speaking. It [43:22] doesn't cut quite cleanly from Gen X [43:24] through millennials. It goes a few years [43:27] into the millennials. Um but like [43:29] sometimes I kind of joke it seems to be [43:30] like people like in their [43:32] 40s through early 50s are like the only [43:34] like sane people in the US, right? that [43:37] kind of like second half of of Gen X in [43:40] particular, although we've never had a [43:41] Gen X president. Kl Harris would have [43:44] been a boomer too, technically speaking. [43:46] Um, but they're the people who are like, [43:47] okay, we grew up and we worked hard and [43:50] we still felt like more or less the [43:53] American system worked for us. I I think [43:56] people wrongly or rightly that are half [43:59] a generation younger don't have that [44:02] experience. Also, we should talk about [44:04] like as much as I think that in certain [44:07] ways the media is an overrated story [44:09] line, how people consume their news, um [44:12] you know, you look now at what's [44:13] happening at CBS and Paramount or CNN or [44:16] whatever else, right? We had an era [44:18] where you had very centralized news [44:21] delivery systems under TV and radio. I [44:24] know I sound like I'm dating myself. The [44:26] internet's been around for for a long [44:28] time, but when you have three or four [44:30] major networks that have a huge amount [44:32] of editorial control over the message [44:35] and I used to work at the New York [44:36] Times, right? You know, when I first got [44:38] there, you would still have like the [44:39] page one meeting every day where it's [44:41] like we are the people the editors of [44:42] the New York Times like deciding like [44:44] what is news and what's not. And now [44:46] it's become very decentralized. [44:49] Obviously, social media plays a role in [44:50] that too. I think the evidence is pretty [44:52] decent that like uh phones and social [44:54] media affect youth satisfaction a lot. [44:57] You know, you also have a culture I [45:00] think among liberals where um where it's [45:03] like no longer a stoic culture. It's a [45:06] culture where maybe you might express [45:08] your grievance. Ironically, maybe AI [45:11] will change this a little bit. there's [45:13] some initial evidence that like the [45:15] models actually gravitate toward [45:18] consensus views, expert opinion, [45:20] sometimes a a jaded or hallucinated [45:24] version of what the consensus really is. [45:27] Um, but you know, Claude or Chat GPT is [45:30] probably less polarizing than Blue Sky [45:32] or Twitter. [45:33] >> Let's talk about social media for a [45:35] second. It used to be a paradigm of you [45:37] follow people, you build your filter, [45:39] you have your list, you spend a lot of [45:40] time curating that and then Tik Tok [45:43] comes out with their for you page FYP. [45:46] YouTube goes full algorithm and now X [45:48] has gone basically full algorithm. You [45:50] can follow whoever you like, but your [45:52] follower count is not your viewer count [45:54] and engagement count. And obviously [45:56] after Elon took over Twitter, libs, a [45:59] lot of celebrities decided to leave. [46:02] Business people stayed. Lots of [46:04] anonymous accounts. It's the free speech [46:06] platform of all free speech platforms. [46:08] It's chaotic. But what impact just in [46:11] that very tiny nuance of followers [46:14] to algorithm has changed and impacted [46:18] politics because it feels like the [46:19] filter bubble is becoming incredibly [46:22] pronounced man. You you give two or [46:24] three things alike and now that's the [46:26] rest of your entire day. [46:28] >> Yeah. Look, for me, I don't think a [46:30] person should have a correlated stance [46:32] on taxes and abortion and and Gaza and, [46:37] you know, the free market and whatever [46:38] else. Um, partisanship is a very [46:41] powerful force to squish this very [46:45] complicated array of political issues we [46:46] have in the United States on into into [46:48] just one dimension, blue versus red or [46:51] left versus right. And social media, [46:54] Twitter in particular, I think, is a [46:55] very effective mechanism for that. And I [46:57] get I get totally yelled at for um any [47:01] bit of heterodoxy like in particular [47:02] like saying Biden is obviously too old. [47:05] Democrats you're going to you're going [47:06] to lose unless you replace him. Like [47:09] that even though it's a stance that like [47:12] literally 80% of voters agree with will [47:14] make you like seem like a heretic on [47:16] Twitter. I've been critical by the way [47:17] of of parts of what Elon has done. [47:21] Although some of the things predate him [47:22] like the algorithmic feed um wasn't [47:25] purely invented by email on it was [47:27] improved or perfected or worsened [47:28] depending on your point of view by the [47:30] current regime. You know I do think it's [47:32] a problem that like look if I choose to [47:34] follow an account you Jason or the New [47:36] York Times or whatever else or Nick's [47:38] account I want to see their tweets [47:39] without having to give the algorithm an [47:41] additional signal like that part bothers [47:42] me. I don't like the depreciation [47:44] Twitter debates about. [47:45] >> That's incredibly frustrating. Like, you [47:47] literally have to favorite or like [47:49] things in order to keep them in your [47:50] feed. And I told the Twitter team, you [47:52] should have a little button on the [47:53] follow. Show me every post from this [47:56] person. Like, if I want to get my Ski [47:58] Mountains reports or I want my Knicks [48:00] fan TV, I want every single post. And [48:02] there's no way to do that except like [48:04] every post and then your feed just goes [48:06] off the rails. [48:07] >> Mhm. Yeah. I mean, it's very I look, I [48:10] actually think the for you algorithm is [48:12] pretty decent for what it is. You do [48:14] have to train it. Like, you know, for a [48:16] while, I got a bunch of like fight [48:17] videos cuz they're compelling. You see [48:19] like a fight of teenagers and like, oh, [48:20] I'm I spent 8 minutes watching this or [48:23] whatever else, right? [48:25] >> If you click don't show me this anymore, [48:28] it is pretty responsive and is pretty [48:30] good. Like the algorithm knows right [48:31] now, I just want to read tweets about [48:33] the World Cup and is Jiannis getting [48:35] traded, right? and maybe a little bit [48:37] about the New York and California [48:38] elections. Um, but I wish there were [48:41] like, you know, I I don't like any [48:44] algorithm that like presumes it's like [48:46] smarter than the user and if I if I log [48:48] in or if I subscribe to somebody and I [48:50] want to see their tweets and I haven't [48:52] muted them, then show me their tweets. [48:54] You can mix in things that you think [48:55] I'll like. Breaking the algorithmic or [48:58] the time, the chronological feed is also [49:00] annoying to me, right? Like I want um if [49:03] I'm watching the World Cup and there's a [49:05] tweet about a match from 6 hours ago, [49:08] someone's like, "Oh my god, amazing." [49:09] Right? I'm like, "What just happened?" [49:10] And like it's not surfacing things in [49:12] quite the right order. Um look, I think [49:15] a lot of companies kind of make the [49:16] mistake of uh Twitter was I'm not sure [49:19] if Twitter was ever going to be like a [49:21] hugely profitable company. It was a very [49:24] unique resource for following the news [49:27] if like I am and like you guys are at [49:30] least you Jason are a like total news [49:32] addict like it was a very unique [49:34] platform and [49:35] >> I wish that functionality had been [49:38] preserved again to be fair [49:41] >> um this started before Elon although has [49:44] been continued since [49:46] >> let's wrap on 2028 and in particular [49:48] Gavin Newsome [49:49] >> oh no predictions for the midterms [49:51] predictions for the midterms Lightning [49:53] prediction for the [49:53] >> midterms house and senate predictions. [49:55] What does the data tell us right now? [49:56] >> So we'll have a model out within a few [49:58] weeks. Been a little bit delayed by the [50:00] World Cup and the redistricting stuff. [50:02] Prediction markets say Democrats are [50:04] around I think 80 or 85% to take the [50:06] House and 40 or 45% to take the Senate. [50:10] Those both seem pretty reasonable to me. [50:11] I think if anything it's a little bit [50:12] low on the House. Um I think it might be [50:15] more like 85 or 90. My models surprise [50:18] me sometimes, but like look, we have [50:20] been through a lot of elections that are [50:21] inherently hard to forecast. The House [50:24] is the one where everything kind of [50:26] points in the same direction. Democrats [50:28] um are facing a very unpopular [50:30] president, an economy that voters have a [50:32] lot of anxiety about. Trump, no new [50:35] Middle Eastern wars. On top of that, the [50:37] very very long history of the [50:40] president's party drawing a backlash and [50:42] performing poorly at the midterms, the [50:45] more recent history of incumbent [50:46] backlash in the US and all around the [50:48] world, the good results Democrats in [50:51] like New Jersey and Virginia last year [50:52] and special elections. You know, look, [50:56] the redistricting thing helps the GOP a [50:58] little bit in the end, but you're [50:59] fighting against a lot of gravity, [51:01] whereas the Senate is more of a more of [51:04] a numbers game. Even in a pretty blue [51:06] environment, Democrats have to win some [51:08] seats in red states. It seems to me that [51:12] taking a big risk in Maine, which is a [51:15] state that by all rights they ought to [51:17] win in a D plus8 year and a D plus 10 [51:19] state, but Grand Platner is only two [51:21] points ahead of Susan Collins. I think I [51:23] take that polling at face value. I think [51:25] he is I take him in at 50/50, but like [51:27] that's a unnecessary risk potentially. [51:30] Um but look um the GOP will be able to [51:34] in these red states a candidate like [51:35] Terar Rico who is also probably in [51:37] roughly a toss-up race and and Paxton is [51:40] a far less than ideal Republican nominee [51:43] like partisanship is still a powerful [51:45] force. people are saying why are they [51:47] kind of attacking Telerico on I think [51:50] things that are are not above board you [51:52] know critiquing his sexuality or [51:54] whatever else cuz Texas is like a really [51:56] red state like Trump's not popular so [51:59] you're like you're kind of going for [52:00] like the lowest common denominator but [52:02] in our system that works a fair amount [52:05] of the time so it's just a a a polling [52:07] and math and numbers game in the Senate [52:09] we're going to see more money spent than [52:11] ever whereas the house 435 seats I think [52:15] the partisan gravity is more likely than [52:16] not just too much for Trump to overcome. [52:18] >> Is there anything that Trump can do or [52:22] that could change in a macro out of our [52:25] control perspective that could shift [52:27] things more significantly for the House [52:29] back to the Republicans [52:30] >> if he can get gas prices down? It's such [52:33] a visible indicator. You drive by the [52:35] Chevron station, whatever else, right? [52:38] You you literally see it. You know, I [52:40] think if you look at forecast, there is [52:41] supposed to be some abatement, but very [52:43] contingent on how long the conflict war [52:47] in Iran persists in this quagmire. Um, [52:51] you know, look, maybe if we uh maybe if [52:53] we have a a right by by in October or [52:57] something, who knows what happens then? [52:59] But no, it's his unfavorable ratings are [53:02] very entrenched and Democrats are very [53:06] enthusiastic despite their misgivings [53:08] about their own party and as much [53:10] difficult as I think they'll have in [53:11] 2028 nominating a candidate to vote for [53:14] your generic Democrat against a generic [53:16] Republican is a pretty easy ask for for [53:19] Democrats who feel like democracy on the [53:20] line and like and like so I think that's [53:23] fairly baked in as someone who builds [53:25] models. I don't been on poss. I've been [53:27] on sports, but I'm always aware that [53:28] like, yeah, there's the 10% chance that [53:31] the underdog you never see coming [53:33] prevails. You know, Cape Verie ties with [53:36] Spain or something. But like that's [53:39] pretty fundamentally driven. Whereas on [53:41] the on the flip side, needing to pick up [53:44] four Senate seats when you might blow [53:46] the opportunity in Maine, it's a toss [53:48] up. probably probably slight edge to the [53:51] GOP with maybe gas prices and Iran [53:54] determining whether it's more truly [53:55] 50/50 or maybe maybe 60% GOP [53:58] >> the chance of winning both is that you [54:00] know 80 time 40 type situation and [54:02] you're or is it different because of [54:04] politics and and the way the statistics [54:06] work [54:08] correlated? Yeah. [54:08] >> Yeah. [54:09] >> They're they're almost perfectly [54:10] correlated. So if the odds of Democrats [54:13] winning the Senate but not the House are [54:14] like are like 1%. And if you go to Cali [54:17] or Poly Market, whatever else, they have [54:18] to be like around 1%. So condition on [54:20] Democrats winning the Senate, they'll [54:23] almost certainly have won the House. [54:26] They'll almost certainly have won [54:28] governorships, which by the way, these [54:30] things are important. You know, I think [54:31] people probably focus too much on the [54:33] national picture and not enough on on [54:35] what happens at the state level where [54:36] people actually have executive power and [54:38] you're picking the the candidates and [54:39] the policies for the next generation. [54:41] State legislatores are important. If I [54:43] were talking to all the listeners, [54:46] right, I'd say look for like a a city [54:49] council candidate for whom your [54:51] contribution might make a lot of [54:52] difference. But like no, if Democrats [54:53] win the Senate, that means it's a really [54:55] blue year to overcome the fact that [54:57] you're winning in places like Ohio, [54:59] Iowa, Alaska, and if that happens, [55:01] therefore probably the rest of it. All [55:03] the dominoes fall that way. [55:05] >> All right, Gavin Newsome in 2028. He's [55:07] an enigma of a politician, worstrun [55:10] state in the union as far as I'm [55:12] concerned, but he's so polished and he [55:14] speaks so well and people seem to like [55:17] him with that great hair. What should we [55:19] take from Gavin Newsome's, [55:22] you know, continued ascension? Am I [55:24] correct that he's still, you know, on [55:26] the up? [55:28] >> He's not. So, we have an article up on [55:29] Silver Bulletin, which we'll publish [55:31] shortly after we finish this podcast. [55:33] Newsome has fallen in Democratic primary [55:35] polls from around 25% to 15%. He's [55:39] fallen on poly market from like 33% to [55:42] 22% or something. I think he was [55:45] benefiting from some degree of name [55:47] recognition. Whereas now Democrats see a [55:49] candidate like John Oaf in Georgia um [55:53] another good-looking young guy but like [55:56] actually has a credential which will [55:58] never have of having won an election in [56:00] a purple state. Um and being a younger [56:04] fresher face like whatever you say about [56:06] Graham Platner and Janet Mills in Maine [56:09] I think Mills in the abstract might have [56:10] been the face safer choice. I think it's [56:13] good that Democrats are showing a bias [56:16] toward younger candidates, right? Like [56:18] that's a lot of what happened with [56:20] Zoran, too. You know, I wouldn't [56:21] discount, by the way, someone like an [56:24] AOC. I'm not sure if she'll run. Someone [56:26] like Chuck Schumer might be very [56:28] vulnerable in the 2028 primary, for [56:30] example, she has a lot of time to wait, [56:32] but like I could see like I again in New [56:35] York, it's New York, so therefore you [56:36] can't extrapolate too much from New [56:37] York. However, people saying we are sick [56:39] and tired of the Democratic [56:40] establishment. I'll take a more septous [56:43] version or a more leftwing version, but [56:45] not the same. I think ultimately Nuome [56:46] has like a a hard argument to make. He's [56:49] argued for continuity with Kla Harris [56:52] and Joe Biden. He's embracing Joe Biden [56:55] when that strategy has failed [56:57] electorally. I would argue in California [56:59] governance-wise as well. It to me it's [57:01] like a I think Newsome is actually [57:04] >> in a pretty defensive position and [57:06] that's why you see him [57:08] >> having Hunter Biden or something on his [57:10] podcast. Yeah. Yeah. And AOC is now 36 [57:13] years old, so she qualifies. You're [57:15] you're saying it's not a zero chance [57:17] that she could become the equivalent of [57:20] Trump, the outsider or the burn it down, [57:22] the I'm sick and tired vote. [57:25] >> She's my She's my bet. Yeah. [57:27] >> That's your bet. Okay. What do you [57:28] think, Nate? Let's talk about AOC. She [57:30] got that possibility with her charisma. [57:32] >> We've seen in states like Maine, we may [57:34] see this in Michigan as well, where [57:37] Yeah. I mean, um, look, for many years [57:40] in the Republican primary, the notion [57:41] was that the establishment always won [57:44] out. That you'd have like the Rick [57:45] Santorums or Sarah Palins or Herman [57:48] Kanes or whatever else who would get 40% [57:50] of the vote, but the same country club [57:53] establishment types we talked about at [57:54] the top of the show would prevail at the [57:56] end of the day. And then it doesn't take [57:58] that much of perpetually growing [58:01] dissatisfaction or generational ter like [58:04] young people in general like don't [58:05] understand like why the would I care [58:07] about like a party brand anyway like the [58:10] Democratic party brand is like a a lame [58:12] brand as certainly the GOP is. Um, [58:15] interesting. And so if you're an avatar [58:17] for that brand then like you know I look [58:20] I think the best candidates even Obama [58:23] in 2008 obviously not even Obama Obama [58:25] was a highly effective one of the you [58:27] know generationally charismatic [58:29] candidate but even he combined on the [58:32] one hand positioning to the left of [58:34] Clinton on issues like Iraq. On the [58:37] other hand, he had a whole whatever we [58:39] have gay sisters in blue states and red [58:41] states and we play little league in the [58:43] blue states and like that whole like [58:44] postpartisan rhetoric. I think the most [58:46] effective candidates can exactly what he [58:48] is. He has made some efforts. I mean he [58:50] had Charlie Kirk on his podcast. I think [58:52] it was last year, right? He has tried to [58:54] moderate. I mean he's against the [58:56] billionaire tax. Um he's tried to [58:59] moderate on some of the culture war [59:00] issues like nominated a institutional [59:03] candidate from California. She didn't [59:06] come that far from winning, but she lost [59:07] all the swing states by by, you know, [59:09] two to five points. And like I don't [59:12] believe at the end of the day, the [59:13] Democrats will be persuaded that like, [59:14] oh, just cuz you're white and you have [59:16] different anatomy like that that that [59:18] one that every Democrat was terrified by [59:20] in 2024. [59:22] >> All right, an hour with our guy Nate [59:24] Silver. Let us know what you think in [59:26] the comments. We will have you back on [59:29] when we do our live election coverage [59:31] for sure if you're available. And the [59:33] audience always loves when you go. [59:34] >> He gets paid a lot on that night. J I [59:36] don't think he's coming on all [59:37] >> whatever. I mean he's a fan of the He's [59:39] a fan of all win. Everyone's like he's [59:41] part of the family. Oh, come in the next [59:42] day. Whatever. Whenever you're not [59:44] securing the bag to secure more Nicks [59:46] ticket for our repeat next year. [59:48] Everybody go right now if you hear my [59:50] voice to the silver bulletin. Pop out a [59:52] Hyundai and subscribe. You're going to [59:54] love [59:55] >> 95 bucks. Jason, [59:56] >> that's what I round it up to a Hyundai. [59:58] But yeah, listen. I know that you've [60:00] probably done the metrics. 94.97 [60:03] is the right number for the guy at the [60:04] door. Five bucks for the guy at the [60:05] door. [60:06] >> Whatever. A little bit off the top. It's [60:08] all good. And uh yeah, everybody go to [60:10] Poly Market, place some bets. Our [60:12] favorite partner, Nate's favorite [60:13] partner. And uh yeah, we'll see you all [60:16] next time on the All-In Interview Show. [60:18] >> Thanks. [60:19] >> Great job, Nate. You rock. Thank you so [60:20] much. That was awesome. [60:37] I'm going all in.