Historian Kaldellis Redefines Byzantium as 2,200-Year Republican State
Lex Fridman
The long survival and ultimate collapse of the Eastern Roman Empire were driven entirely by its institutional system of universal taxation and civic consensus rather than military dictatorship or internal religious separatism.
## Background
Published on June 30, 2026, by Lex Fridman on YouTube, this episode features an in-depth conversation with historian Anthony Kaldellis, author of 'The New Roman Empire'. The discussion explores a comprehensive, 2,200-year history tracking the continuous evolution, structural resilience, and ultimate fall of the Roman and Byzantine Empires.
## TL;DR
The episode provides a sweeping chronological and thematic walkthrough of Roman civilization from its archaic roots to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD. Kaldellis refutes the historical artificiality of the 'Byzantine' label, arguing instead for an unbroken 'long Roman Empire' sustained by universal taxation, legal frameworks, and a shared civic consensus. The conversation spans pivotal milestones, including the Edict of Caracalla, Diocletian's bureaucratic overhaul, Constantine's strategic founding of New Rome, and the subsequent religious transformation under Christianity. It balances grand structural narratives with specific mechanics of power, exploring how internal political stability, civil wars, and institutional adaptations allowed the Eastern Roman state to survive centuries of relentless foreign onslaughts.
## Atmosphere & style
The dialogue strikes a compelling balance between rigorous Machiavellian realism and engaging, accessible storytelling, steering clear of dry academic preachy tones. Driven by Lex Fridman's steady curiosity and Kaldellis's sharp, authoritative, and occasionally cynical historical insights, the atmosphere feels intellectually vibrant and grounded. Listeners are treated to a narrative that feels like a detailed, birds-eye unpacking of human nature, filled with vivid anecdotes of 'sleepless emperors,' eunuch generals, and riotous Hippodrome crowds. The emotional arc transitions from the visceral chaos of ancient plagues and total war to a reflective, philosophical conclusion on modern superpower vulnerabilities and global human progress.
## Key takeaways
- [01:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=111s) The term 'Byzantine Empire' is an artificial historical construct; legally and culturally, it was the Roman Empire continuing unbroken, and its citizens referred to themselves as Romans until the end.
- [05:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=349s) The grand timeline of the Roman state spans over 2,200 years (753 BC to 1453 AD), transitioning through three distinct political phases: the Kings, the Republic, and the Imperial Monarchy.
- [05:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=349s) The empire's territorial collapse can be attributed to three specific historical flashpoints: the Arab Conquests (630s), the Seljuk Turk Conquests (1070s), and the devastating Fourth Crusade (1204).
- [30:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=1817s) The Roman emperorship possessed no inherent divine right to the throne, operating instead as a republican office that required consensus and left leaders facing a 'perpetual referendum' of power backed by the threat of violent overthrow.
- [47:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2847s) The Edict of Caracalla in 212 AD granted universal citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire, establishing a deep baseline of legal integration and shared identity that helped stabilize the state over the long term.
- [01:00:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3648s) The Crisis of the Third Century, characterized by severe hyperinflation, plague, and political fracturing, was resolved by Emperor Diocletian's total 'hard reset' of government administration and the implementation of universal taxation.
- [01:17:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4659s) Constantine established Constantinople as 'New Rome' due to strategic frontier logistics, placing it as a geographical clamp bridging the Balkans, Asia Minor, and Syria.
- [01:26:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5213s) Christianity was co-opted and captured by the highly developed Roman imperial state machinery rather than triumphing over it, taking five centuries to achieve full dominance over society.
- [01:47:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6429s) Byzantine identity was fundamentally anchored by three distinct pillars: Roman identity (state and law), Christian identity (Orthodoxy), and Greek identity (language and literature).
- [01:56:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6993s) The Western Roman Empire collapsed due to a compounding cycle of lost provincial territories and shrinking tax revenues, whereas the East survived by leveraging its dual continental layout and advanced defensive technologies like Greek fire.
- [02:15:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8129s) The Eastern Roman Empire functioned as a 'Monarchic Republic' (politeia), where the emperor was viewed as an executive officer duty-bound to serve the public interest, rather than acting as a pure military dictatorship.
- [02:18:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8304s) Emperor Justinian organized the monumental codification of Roman law into the Corpus Juris Civilis, but his aggressive western conquest policy overextended the treasury and left the empire structurally vulnerable.
- [02:52:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10378s) The definitive, unrecoverable decline of the empire began between 1300 and 1350, primarily driven by the permanent loss of Asia Minor to the Turks which deprived the state of its vital resource-pulling capacity.
- [03:33:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=12788s) A primary lesson for modern nations, including the United States, is the danger of a widening gap between lofty geopolitical rhetoric and actual, concrete actions.
- [03:40:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13214s) Human nature exhibits identical psychological parameters across millennia, though individual culture acts as a mechanism that adjusts the specific behavioral dials.
## Detailed walkthrough
### The Dangerous Neighborhood of Empire and Instability
The history of the Roman state takes place in what is described as "the most dangerous neighborhood that you can possibly live in"—a major geographic corridor for empire building and the birth of new world religions. This proximity to constant threat bred extreme instability. During one chaotic 50-year stretch, 26 different emperors were murdered. Most of these rulers were military generals who met their ends at the hands of their own men. The norm of the era was defined by civil war, hyperinflation, economic collapse, and the devastating arrival of a plague.
Despite this baseline of violence and the fact that the military controlled the armies—often dictating who became emperor through civil conflicts—the Eastern Roman Empire should not be classified as a military dictatorship. The defining distinction is that the state "almost never, very, very, very rarely" utilized the army as an instrument of social control over its own population. Power dynamics were complex; sometimes highly competent eunuchs rose to extreme military prominence. For instance, Emperor Justinian’s general, Narses, was a tiny, very old eunuch. Though the opposing Goths openly laughed at his appearance, Narses proved to be a "total hardass," defeating them in a massive battle in Italy and getting the last laugh.
The Myth of the "Byzantine" Invention
The term "Byzantine Empire" is an artificial construct invented by historians long after the civilization had collapsed. In every legal, cultural, and historical sense, it was simply the Roman Empire continuing unbroken. The historical sources are entirely clear on this point, yet modern historiography suffers from a form of cognitive dissonance—knowing the truth but carrying on as if it were false.
The division of history often claims the Roman Empire fell entirely in the fifth century because the Western half collapsed. Western European perspectives intentionally minimized the eastern half to exclude it from their own cultural genealogy, long labeling it the "Empire of the Greeks" before switching to "Byzantine" for deeply political reasons. In reality, the subjects of the Eastern Roman Empire were Roman citizens who called themselves Romans until the very end of their history and beyond. Today, that artificial narrative is collapsing as modern historians shift toward a "long Roman Empire" model that recognizes a single, uniquely enduring polity stretching from the archaic period all the way to the 15th century.
The 2,200-Year Timeline of the Roman State
The grand scale of the Roman state spans over 2,200 years, traditionally dated from the legendary founding of Rome in 753 BC to the tragic fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD. This massive timeline breaks down into three broad, traditional political phases:
* **The Period of the Kings (753 BC – 510 BC):** A semi-legendary era where Rome was governed by local monarchs.
* **The Roman Republic (509 BC – 27 BC):** Initiated after the expulsion of the kings, this regime was governed primarily by an aristocracy cooperating in various shifting arrangements with the Roman populace.
* **The Imperial Monarchy (27 BC – 1453 AD):** Born out of the civil wars of Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar, establishing a millennium and a half of imperial rule. This phase is broadly divided into the era centered in Rome and the subsequent era centered in Constantinople.
The term "Late Roman Empire" is used by historians to describe both the East and West starting around the late third century AD—specifically marked by the reign of the great reformer Diocletian from 284 to 305 AD—and extending into the early seventh century. This late period was fundamentally characterized by a highly structured tax system and a massive administrative bureaucracy.
Major Milestones and Formative Traumas
A rapid walkthrough of Roman history highlights key turning points that dictated its cultural and strategic evolution:
* **390 BC:** The Gauls sack Rome. This event acted as a formative, deeply rooted trauma that hardened Rome's perpetual obsession with security and defense.
* **264 BC – 146 BC:** The Punic Wars and Rome's desperate survival against Hannibal transformed the state into a Mediterranean superpower.
* **49 BC – 31 BC:** Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, leading to his assassination and the subsequent Battle of Actium. This civil war dismantled the Republic, concentrating total power under Octavian (Augustus), who founded the Principate in 27 BC as a low-key monarchy, initiating the peaceful *Pax Romana* (27 BC – 180 AD).
* **284 AD:** Diocletian rebuilt the state apparatus, prompting emperors to drop the traditional political "mask" of being merely the first citizen (*princeps*).
* **312 AD:** Constantine defeated Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge, becoming the sole ruler of the West, later founding Constantinople in 330 AD.
* **395 AD:** The empire split into East and West, followed by the Visigoths sacking Rome in 410 AD, and the ultimate deposition of the last Western emperor in 476 AD.
* **6th – 15th Century:** The Eastern timeline moved through the monumental reign of Justinian in the 500s; Heraclius's victory over Persia and subsequent losses to the Arabs in the 600s; the failed Arab siege of Constantinople in the 700s; the golden era of the Macedonian dynasty; the destruction of the Fourth Crusade; and finally, the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD.
The Three Catastrophic Crises
While Roman history features gradual evolutionary processes, its territorial collapse can be pinned to three incredibly swift, highly destructive flashpoints where massive amounts of land were permanently lost to foreign invaders:
* **The Arab Conquests (630s):** A devastating single decade where the war was lost, permanently altering the empire's map.
* **The Seljuk Turk Conquests (1070s):** A rapid takeover of Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey) that was only partially reversed by later Roman rulers.
* **The Fourth Crusade (1204):** Western European armies, mostly from France, shockingly turned on the Christian East, sacking and conquering Constantinople while dismembering the empire.
Though the Romans eventually regrouped, recovered, and reclaimed their capital, these three swift crises caused metric tons of irreversible damage. Outside of these violent anomalies, the day-to-day reality of the Roman state was actually one of slow but steady economic growth, consolidation, and small-scale territorial expansion.
Historians must constantly balance discrete historical dates with long, fluid macro-processes. For instance, the famous imperial division of 395 AD was not a hard, immediate split, but rather a standard bureaucratic allocation of administrative jurisdictions between two sons. The halves subsequently reunited and divided multiple times. Similarly, the "fall" of the Western Empire in 476 AD is merely a convenient final marker for a decay that took several decades to unfold.
The Ship of Theseus and Roman Identity
To understand what constitutes the baseline "soul" or through-line of Rome across 2,200 years, one can look to the philosophical metaphor of the Ship of Theseus. If a ship is out at sea and every single wooden plank is gradually replaced over time until no original parts remain, it is still fundamentally the same ship because of its continuous, unbroken narrative. Roman history operates exactly like this. Unlike Christian history (which belongs to a religion unbound by borders) or Greek history (which long belonged to a shared culture of elite prestige, poetry, and philosophy rather than a single unified state), Roman history is explicitly the history of a distinct political community and its citizens.
> "The name should say it all."
While everything within the empire changed over two millennia, the shifts happened so gradually that no individual living through them felt a sudden rupture or believed they were no longer part of the ongoing Roman story. A powerful sense of Roman pride absolutely existed to reinforce this. In the sixth century, a Roman ambassador negotiating a treaty with a skeptical Persian court boldly declared, "let me just tell you, you're making a deal here with the Romans. The Romans. The name should say it all."
However, historians cannot analyze the survival of the entire society based solely on elite pride found in written texts, as literature only reflects the top literate tier of the population. For the average person, the empire survived due to a deep, unwritten civic consensus: the subjects and citizens agreed to be taxed and ruled by a centralized authority specifically because of the security and infrastructure they received in return. To evaluate the health of the state, historians look at concrete behavioral metrics rather than assumed patriotism—tracking whether everyday people paid their taxes or if they actively tried to rebel and break away from the empire.
By the way, to unlock the full functionality of all Apps, enable [Gemini Apps Activity](https://myactivity.google.com/product/gemini).
[19:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=1177s) The Roman "Blind Taste Test": Identity Across Millennia
When considering what drives a society to function—whether it is a soldier defending a capital or a citizen paying taxes—the question of shared identity becomes paramount. Lex Fridman poses a hypothetical "blind taste test" of history: if a Roman from the legendary kingdom period, one from the Republic, and one from the early Empire were placed in a room together, would they recognize each other as belonging to the same civilization? Anthony Kaldellis notes that people often ask him an even more radical version of this question, imagining a meeting between a Greek-speaking Roman subject from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and a Latin-speaking citizen of the ancient Republic. While they would eventually find common ground, Kaldellis cautions against flattening the immense diversity that existed even among Romans living concurrently. A wealthy senator from the age of Cicero and a slave’s son living in the slums of Rome might have struggled just as much to find something in common.
The transformation of Roman identity was a cumulative process, eventually resulting in Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in Constantinople who, on the surface, shared almost nothing with the pagan, Latin-speaking republicans of early Rome. Historians routinely accept that the Emperor Hadrian—a cosmopolitan second-century ruler who wore a Greek beard, traveled with his Greek lover, and wrote poetry—belongs to the same historical continuum as a fourth-century BC Roman warrior "chasing down cattle from the Samnites." Yet, standard historical narratives abruptly create a "rupture between Roman and Byzantine," treating later emperors who shared Hadrian's exact bilingual and cosmopolitan traits as part of an entirely separate civilization.
[23:57](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=1437s) Oaths, Legal Rights, and the Power of Imperial Law
One effective way to track the continuity of Roman civilization is by analyzing specific professions and societal roles across time. For instance, Roman soldiers throughout the centuries were bound by a sacred oath. Although the exact wording evolved—later incorporating Christian formulas—the fundamental pledge to protect the emperor, the empire, or the *res publica* remained a universally recognizable institution that any Roman soldier across a thousand-year gap would instantly understand.
A similar continuity existed for women engaging in business. Throughout the empire's history, women were uniquely empowered by the highly sophisticated framework of Roman law regarding property, marriage, and inheritance. This legal backing provided protections that were virtually non-existent in neighboring cultures.
* In the 10th and 11th centuries, Jewish women living within the Eastern Roman Empire frequently chose to bypass rabbinical courts entirely, taking their property disputes to Roman courts instead.
* This preference arose because Roman law treated estate and business disputes strictly as property matters rather than religious ones, granting women significantly more rights than they enjoyed under contemporary rabbinical legal traditions.
[26:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=1573s) The Imperial Persona: Accountability and the "Sleepless Emperor"
The late Roman government went to great lengths to project a highly consistent "persona" to its citizens, broadcasting how power was being used and on whose behalf. This message was meticulously woven into imperial rhetoric, public decrees, and laws that were openly posted or read aloud in churches. It was also deeply embedded in the empire's extensive petition system. Any subject who felt wronged or unjustly treated could petition local officials, imperial bureaucrats, or the emperor himself. The government operated under a strict expectation that every single petition would be read, addressed, and answered.
The projected imperial persona emphasized that the authorities were deeply accountable, proactive, and entirely dedicated to the public good while "renouncing any kind of private interest." Emperors continuously claimed to be planning ahead to solve problems before their subjects ever experienced them. A central cliché of this public relations campaign was the image of the tirelessly hardworking, "sleepless" ruler.
* The Emperor Justinian was universally known as the "sleepless emperor."
* While a notorious contemporary rumor claimed his sleeplessness was due to him being a literal demon whose head detached and floated around the palace at night, even his bitterest enemies conceded the reality of his workaholism.
* Justinian routinely stayed up all night, hauling officials into meetings at any hour to micromanage architecture, legal reforms, foreign wars, and theological disputes.
[30:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=1817s) Machiavellian Realism and the Vulnerability of Absolute Power
Applying a core political lesson from Niccolò Machiavelli, Kaldellis argues that leaders and states must be judged entirely by their actions rather than their words. While a gap between rhetoric and action usually implies empty propaganda, research indicates that the Eastern Roman state was remarkably sincere; the emperors generally executed the policies they promised. This alignment was driven less by pure altruism and more by systemic vulnerability. Despite wielding seemingly absolute power, Roman emperors were intensely anxious to keep their subjects content because, unlike many neighboring empires, the Roman political matrix featured no inherent, divine right to the throne.
In contrast to the Ottoman Empire, which was built around a singular conquering dynasty that served as the heart of the state, the Roman emperorship was an office born out of a republic. When Augustus established the empire, he could not simply declare himself a dictatorial monarch without sparking further bloodshed. Instead, he had to carefully maintain a delicate facade, flattering the Senate and pretending to be nothing more than a "first citizen" holding a collection of traditional republican offices. This foundational necessity to govern via consensus and maintain public satisfaction persisted for over a millennium.
[35:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2149s) Civil War as a System Feature: The Mechanics of Rebellion
In the Roman system, violent riots and civil wars functioned as a feature rather than a bug. The constant threat of an uprising served as the ultimate check on imperial behavior, acting as the "stick" that forced emperors to govern responsibly. Over the course of the millennium studied by Kaldellis, the empire witnessed roughly 120 civil wars. Unlike modern conflicts, these rebellions were remarkably swift and entirely devoid of competing ideologies. Every faction shared the exact same worldview regarding the role of government; the battles were fought exclusively over "who's the best man to do the job."
This volatility meant that every ruler lived in a state of perpetual insecurity. The historical data underscores just how perilous the position was, driving home the reality that acting like a tyrannical Caligula or Nero was a surefire path to an early grave. The most effective way to survive was to keep the populace happy enough that they would refuse to back a usurper.
* Approximately 46% of the emperors in Constantinople were violently overthrown during their reigns.
* Rebellions within the capital city of Constantinople followed a remarkably standardized civic ritual. A challenger would march down the *Mese*—the city's central boulevard—while his supporters attempted to rally the public to join them.
* The goal was to gather a massive crowd, march to the Great Church of Hagia Sophia, and formally call for the deposition of the sitting emperor.
* If the emperor was popular, the bid would fail in real-time. As the aspiring rebel marched down the boulevard, the observing citizens would simply refuse to join and gradually melt away, leaving the completely isolated usurper to awkwardly walk into the Hagia Sophia alone to beg for religious asylum.
[38:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2329s) The Perpetual Referendum of Power
Anthony Kaldellis explains that Roman and Byzantine emperors lived in a state of "perpetual referendum" rather than relying on modern institutions like elections that grant four- or five-year mandates of legitimacy. In Constantinople, the check on imperial power was raw and literal: assassination, blinding, or having one's nose cut off. To prevent these brutal ends, emperors relied on maintaining public goodwill. They constantly gauged public opinion by appearing before mass gatherings where the crowd was expected to chant slogans and acclamations like "Worthy" or "Many years for you, Augustus." If the crowd's response was sullen or tepid, it signaled an underlying policy crisis, such as a disruption in the grain supply, requiring immediate imperial intervention.
[41:26](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2486s) The Hippodrome and Spaces of Popular Consultation
While the Hippodrome was famous for entertainment, Lex Fridman notes it functioned as a vital democratic connection where the populace could directly interact with, insult, or vent at their leaders. Kaldellis adds that this dynamic applied to any large assembly point, including military mustering grounds, the Hagia Sophia church, and public spaces like the Forum of Constantine. The army, acting as a decisive faction of the Roman people, could trigger massive political shifts if they decided they wanted a different ruler. Kaldellis highlights this interplay with a historical example from the 1190s involving Emperor Alexios III. Threatened with an invasion by the German emperor unless he paid an extortionate sum, Alexios proposed a new "German tax" in the Hippodrome. The resulting public uproar was so severe that the emperor immediately backtracked, claiming it wasn't his idea.
[43:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2620s) Architectural and Social Force of the Hippodrome
Lex uses Perplexity to verify the physical scale of the Hippodrome of Constantinople, describing its U-shaped racecourse and an estimated capacity ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 spectators. Kaldellis counters that 30,000 is a severe underestimate, noting that satellite photos today still trace the massive structure in Istanbul's Sultanahmet district, with its southern *sphendone* wall still walkable. Because the arena directly adjoined the imperial palace, emperors had immediate access to the people. During crises, such as the succession debate of 491 AD when an emperor died without an heir, the crowds filled not just the tiers but the arena floor itself. The space also hosted rival circus factions—the Blues, Greens, Reds, and Whites—which evolved into powerful social and paramilitary forces.
[47:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2847s) The Edict of Caracalla and Universal Citizenship
Shifting focus to historical turning points leading up to Constantine, Lex introduces the Edict of Caracalla issued in 212 AD. Prior to this, the Roman government under Augustus viewed itself primarily as a protector of full Roman citizens, who constituted a minority compared to the vast provincial populations. Kaldellis contextualizes this as the culmination of a long-term process where Rome historically bestowed citizenship on allies or conquered elites to stabilize local rule. By the early third century, only about a third of the free inhabitants were formal citizens. Emperor Caracalla—reigning as Marcus Aurelius Antoninus—issued the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, or "Divine Decree," extending full citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire.
[51:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3095s) Radical Equality and the Crisis of the Third Century
What sets the Roman Empire apart from modern empires like the British Empire, Kaldellis argues, is that they "did it, and they meant it." While the British would never have granted full citizenship to colonized populations in India or made the throne in London accessible to them, Rome opened the highest echelons of power to everyone. Within a single generation, the most powerful officials and the emperors themselves were provincials. This deep baseline of legal integration helped stabilize the empire over the long term, creating a shared "Romanness" in the East long before Constantine founded Constantinople. Despite this revolutionary unification, the immediate aftermath of the edict was highly volatile. It led directly into the Crisis of the Third Century, a 50-year maelstrom of civil war and total instability where 26 emperors—mostly generals turned on by their own men—were violently murdered.
- **Historical Significance:** The Edict of Caracalla expanded Roman citizenship from roughly one-third of the free population to 100% of free inhabitants.
- **Onomastic Shift:** The edict caused an immediate explosion of provincials adopting the imperial family name "Aurelius."
- **Surviving Evidence:** The original text of the edict survives only as a mutilated Greek papyrus fragment containing a single key paragraph.
[57:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3462s) The Crisis of the Third Century
The mid-third century was characterized by a "perfect storm" of existential threats to the Roman Empire. Civil war became the norm, hyperinflation gripped the economy, and the devastating Plague of Cyprian raged from 249 to 262 AD. Likely an outbreak of smallpox or an Ebola-like filovirus, this pandemic killed up to 5,000 people a day in Rome alone, crippling the imperial tax base and shrinking the army recruitment pool. Under these extreme pressures, the empire fractured into three pieces: the breakaway Gallic Empire in the west, a Palmyrene Empire in the east, and the central Roman state. Remarkably, the chaos was temporarily halted by Emperor Aurelian, who miraculously reconquered the splinter states in a mere five-year period.
Lex Fridman highlights the sheer scale of the political instability by pointing out that 26 emperors died in a span of just 50 years—an average of one dead emperor every other year. Anthony Kaldellis agrees that while political instability at the top was undeniable, the lived reality for the average provincial citizen was often quite different. For instance, thousands of surviving papyrus documents from Egypt reveal that ordinary people there went about their daily lives largely unaffected by the high-level imperial chaos. A similar dynamic applies to later figures like Constantine; though he was historically "murderous" toward his own family to secure power, his rule was perfectly fine for the average citizen in the provinces.
* **The Plague of Cyprian:** Lasted from 249 to 262 AD, killing up to 5,000 citizens per day in the capital.
* **Imperial Turnover:** 26 recognized emperors lost their lives over a 50-year span due to assassinations and civil wars.
* **Gallic Empire:** Included modern France and Britain, existing as a separatist Roman state for roughly a decade and a half.
* **Provincial Stakeholders:** The crisis was worsened because provincial armies had become highly invested in the Roman tradition, leading various regional factions to declare their own generals as rival emperors.
---
[01:00:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3648s) Diocletian's Hard Reset and the Illyrian Emperors
The crisis was comprehensively resolved after 284 AD by Emperor Diocletian, who executed a total "hard reset" of the Roman system of government. Kaldellis notes that the separatist movements of the third century, like the Empire of the Gauls, were never attempts by discontented provincials to break away from Roman culture. Rather, they were simply provincial generals attempting to seize the throne; the only political model they could conceive of was a Roman one. Diocletian recognized that the empire's vast frontiers and endless political fires were too massive for a single ruler to manage. He brilliantly "turned the problem into its own solution" by officially dividing power among trusted military colleagues.
This new system, known as the Tetrarchy, established a rule of four emperors who collaboratively managed different military zones across the empire. These rulers were all Illyrians from a region in the former Yugoslavia about the size of Scotland. Because this economically underdeveloped area served as a major recruitment ground for the Roman military, tough, hard-drinking men successfully worked their way up the ranks to the purple. Kaldellis contrasts these third-century military men—depicted in statuary with thick necks, angry expressions, military stubble, and hands on their swords—with earlier, highly sophisticated, artsy cosmopolitan emperors like Hadrian.
* **The Tetrarchy:** A government model consisting of four cooperative rulers established to suppress rebellions simultaneously.
* **The Illyrian Dynasty:** A succession of rugged, career-military emperors hailing from the Balkans who restored imperial stability.
* **Bureaucracy and Big Government:** Diocletian created a much larger administrative apparatus, necessitating systematic censuses to fund a expanded military.
---
[01:05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3905s) The Myth of the Roman "Deep State" and Universal Taxation
Fridman asks whether Diocletian effectively created a historical equivalent of the "deep state" by constructing a massive, multi-layered bureaucracy of tax collectors and logisticians. Kaldellis pushes back on this modern characterization. While Diocletian did build a large administrative machine, historical evidence does not suggest a sinister internal apparatus working to undermine the emperor. In modern democracies, brief, temporary political terms incentivize a permanent bureaucracy to view itself as the long-term propagator of the state. In contrast, Roman emperors could rule for decades, meaning the bureaucracy was deeply integrated with, rather than opposed to, the leader at the top. Diocletian did, however, famously complain about the isolating nature of his massive government, once lamenting, "Nobody ever tells me anything."
The defining achievement of this expanded government was a revolutionary, universal system of taxation. Historically, Italy had been entirely exempt from taxes because, as the land of the original conquerors, its citizens lived off the tribute paid by conquered provinces. The Illyrian emperors looked at this wealthy, prosperous region and decided that a tax haven made no sense. Diocletian instituted a universal census tracking every taxable asset in the empire, introducing a standardized tax system that applied equally to all Roman citizens. Though it resembled a flat tax, it was highly progressive for its time because it forced the entrenched economic elites to pay the exact same rates as everyone else.
> "If you asked me to put my finger on one factor [for the flourishing or civil wars of the empire], it would be that. Taxation is the heart of it."
---
[01:09:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4199s) Social Mobility vs. Tax Enforcement
Fridman brings up historical accounts claiming that Diocletian legally frozen class mobility by making it illegal for farmers to leave their land and forcing the sons of soldiers to enlist. Kaldellis clarifies that these laws were strict tax enforcement mechanisms rather than a rigid, Indian-style caste system. For most professions, such as shipping or military service, an apprenticeship model meant sons naturally succeeded their fathers to preserve valuable corporate assets or secure insurance contracts.
While certain categories of agricultural workers were legally bound to their land for fiscal purposes, no physical barriers prevented them from moving. It was a matter of financial accountability so the state could guarantee its revenue stream and food supply, prompting the famous historical observation that "most of the time it's people who own the land, and in this arrangement, it's the land that owns the people." In practice, the Roman Empire remained a highly dynamic society with immense physical and social mobility. People routinely migrated from the West to the East, and few complained about mandatory military service because being a Roman soldier came with tremendous financial and social perks. Ultimately, Diocletian stabilized the empire by pairing territorial security with predictable economic and demographic growth.
* **Universal Census:** A comprehensive registration of all empire-wide assets allowed the Roman state to operate on an organized, predictable budget for the next three centuries.
* **Tax Enforcement Over Caste:** Regulations binding men to their fathers' professions were designed to lock in revenue streams, not to eliminate social flexibility.
* **Security Breeds Growth:** By decisively defeating foreign adversaries like the Sasanian Persians, the Tetrarchy reassured citizens that their long-term agricultural and economic investments would not be stolen or destroyed.
[01:15:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4508s) The Rise of Constantine the Great
Constantine was born into the imperial establishment as the son of one of Diocletian's original colleagues, making him an insider from the start. However, Diocletian's Tetrarchy system was explicitly designed to prevent hereditary succession; senior emperors were supposed to retire, junior ones would step up, and two new leaders would be recruited based on merit. Constantine was initially passed over by this system, but he possessed immense military competence and the staunch loyalty of his armies. This triggered a brutal series of civil wars among Diocletian's fragmented successors. At one chaotic point, there were six competing emperors at once, which Kaldellis humorously frames as a multi-stage tournament:
> "It's as long as you have the quarterfinals, semifinals, and then the final war, and Constantine emerges in 324 as the sole ruler of the entire Roman Empire."
Constantine proved to be a ruthless and masterclass general of civil war. He systematically eliminated his rivals—many of whom were his own fathers-in-law or brothers-in-law due to political intermarriages. By 324 AD, he defeated his final rival, Emperor Licinius, whose headquarters sat at the highly strategic town of Byzantium. Located exactly where Europe meets Asia on the Bosporus, controlling these straits was of paramount importance. Recognizing this, Constantine wiped Byzantium off the map and replaced it with a massive new city named after himself: Constantinople, otherwise known as "New Rome". Right from its inception, it was designed to be a "branch office" or a "copy and paste" of Rome in the East.
[01:17:39](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4659s) The Geography and Strategy of New Rome
During the third century, Roman emperors became entirely itinerant. They could no longer sit in Rome having civilized meetings with senators; they had to live on the muddy, brutal frontiers with their armies, enduring winter campaigns. Because of this, a popular historical saying emerged: "wherever the emperor is, that's Rome." Various frontier cities were briefly dubbed alternative Romes, but Constantinople became the last and most spectacularly successful of them all.
Geographically, Rome was safely nestled in the middle of Italy but entirely too far from the action. In contrast, Constantinople was perfectly positioned halfway between the empire's two primary military fronts: the Danube and the Euphrates. For emperors who understood that "the East is where it's at," this location was unparalleled. North to south, it acted as the vital maritime node between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. East to west, it sat precisely where Europe meets Asia. Previously, during civil wars, the empire would repeatedly fracture at this geographic break, with one emperor seizing Asia Minor and another taking the European side. Constantinople functioned as a "clamp" that unified the Balkans, Asia Minor, and Syria into an unbreakable unit.
- **The New Senate:** To solidify this union, Constantine and his successors built a brand-new senate in Constantinople, eventually peaking at 2,500 to 3,000 men.
- **Elite Cohesion:** These senators were recruited from the wealthiest, most well-connected elites of the Aegean, Asia Minor, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
- **The Adriatic Shift:** Because these elites were forced to literally invest in Constantinople to maintain their status, the empire never fractured at the Bosporus again. When the ultimate East-West split occurred in 395 AD, the breaking point shifted further west to the Adriatic Sea.
[01:22:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4944s) The Ruthless Number One Emperor
Kaldellis reveals that during an appearance on Robin Pierson's *The History of Byzantium* podcast, he ranked Constantine as the number one Byzantine emperor. This ranking is not a reflection of Constantine's character, as Kaldellis openly acknowledges he was "ambitious, murderous, [and] ruthless". His family structure was largely a web of political convenience, and when those alliances soured, he removed his relatives without hesitation. Most chillingly, he executed his own popular and highly competent son, Crispus, alongside his own wife, providing absolutely no media justification or spin to the public—an omission so severe that contemporary historians simply scrubbed Crispus from their records entirely.
When Lex jokes that Kaldellis probably wouldn't want to have a beer with most of these rulers, Kaldellis agrees but defends his ranking based on the sheer historic weight of Constantine's decisions. Groundbreaking choices like founding Constantinople and converting the empire to Christianity are world-altering events that put Constantine in a league of his own. While most "top emperors" earn their spots by cleanly managing the state and improving daily life for their subjects, Constantine earned his through monumental, consequential vision.
[01:26:53](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5213s) Rome and the Co-optation of Christianity
Prior to Constantine, Christianity did not have a defined role within the imperial system; it viewed its own history as entirely separate from Roman state power. When asked whether Christianity triumphed over Rome or if Rome captured Christianity, Kaldellis leans firmly toward the latter, arguing that the religion was co-opted by the imperial state. While Christianity has long perpetuated its own "narrative of triumph" regarding its victory over animal sacrifices and pagan gods like Zeus and Apollo, this is a very narrow view. In reality, the religion became deeply embedded into the Roman state machinery in ways that dictate its structure down to the modern era.
This dynamic sharply contrasts with the origins of Islam. Islam came into existence without a preexisting state apparatus, meaning the early Muslim armies had to construct a brand-new political system from scratch, establishing Islam as the primary societal identity. Christianity, conversely, was injected into a highly developed, centuries-old political ecosystem.
- **Christian Population Demographics:** At the time of Constantine's conversion, Christians made up an estimated 10% of the empire's population at most.
- **Social Class:** The early Church was not composed of ruling elites; it consisted mostly of the urban middle class, a few slaves, and scattered pockets of city-dwellers, while the vast majority of the Roman population remained rural and pagan.
[01:30:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5422s) The Mystery of Constantine's Conversion
Because Christians lacked significant political power or numbers, Constantine's decision to shift the entire empire toward Christianity was a radical, revolutionary choice. Historians have tried to argue that his conversion was a pragmatic, cynical ploy to leverage Christian bishops as social influencers. While bishops were safe political allies—since a bishop could never realistically claim the imperial throne—going "full Christian" caused far more political headaches than it solved. Stripped of a logical political motive, modern scholars generally accept the personal explanation: Constantine converted simply because he was a genuine, believing Christian.
Historians are traditionally uncomfortable attributing massive historical shifts to a ruler's personal whims, but the top-down nature of Roman society meant that the emperor's personal choices dictated reality. Romans generally mirrored their rulers; for instance, when Emperor Hadrian declared his deceased lover Antinous a god, temples and statues of the youth exploded across the empire. Similarly, when Constantine publically favored Christianity, the general populace quickly fell into line, discovering it as a prestigious rite backed by the full weight of the throne. Lex notes that this epochal conversion is traditionally dated to the year 312 AD.
[01:33:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5581s) Constantine's Vision and Political Branding
When discussing whether Emperor Constantine truly experienced a profound religious vision before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge, Anthony Kaldellis expresses deep skepticism regarding the face-value sincerity of the historical sources. He notes that these accounts were written years later by authors writing in the aftermath of a massive imperial victory. One famous account stems from a dinner conversation decades after the fact, prompting Kaldellis to remark, "okay, I'm not gonna believe that... this is how the emperor wants things to be remembered." Constantine had a pattern of experiencing convenient religious visions whenever he sought to shift policies or alter his imperial profile. For instance, before converging on Christianity, he claimed that Apollo appeared to him in a temple in Gaul in the form of light.
This shifting allegiance represents high-level imperial branding. While earlier emperors adopted a Jupiter or Hercules model of power, Constantine pivotally shifted to an Apollo model before finding his footing in the Christian faith. Despite this opportunistic political pragmatism, Kaldellis views it as highly plausible that Constantine genuinely came to believe the Christian God had aided him in battle, which was as good a reason as any for an emperor to back a deity. He was not a "hardcore Christian" from the outset, but rather a spiritually minded pragmatist who remained deliberately elusive or coy depending on his audience. When addressing Christians, he explicitly invoked Christ; when drafting general laws for the wider empire, he vaguely referred to "good religion" to avoid alienating his non-Christian subjects.
- **The Milvian Bridge Vision:** Highly debated by historians; reported decades late via post-victory imperial curation.
- **The Apollo Vision:** Occurred earlier in Gaul, demonstrating Constantine's habit of leveraging divine visions for political rebranding.
- **The Forum of Constantine:** Constructed in Constantinople featuring a colossal, eight-meter-tall gilded statue of Constantine repurposed from a naked Apollo with rays emanating from his head.
---
[01:37:29](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5849s) The Five-Century Christianization of Rome
The total conversion of the Roman Empire was a remarkably gradual, half-millennium process. Kaldellis clarifies that under Constantine's rule, Christians likely comprised 10% of the population at most. A majority Christian society did not emerge until the early-to-mid 5th century, and the empire could not be considered "solidly Christian"—meaning a society where non-Christians were reduced to a 10% or 15% minority—until the early 6th century. This timeline means it took roughly two full centuries after Constantine, and a total of five centuries after Jesus, for the Roman world to overwhelmingly adopt the faith.
Rather than relying purely on sudden theological epiphanies, the state successfully drove conversion through a pragmatic mix of structural incentives and disincentives. Bishops were systematically integrated into the imperial system and given immense state funds and land to distribute charity, manage lists of widows, and aid communities in distress. Simultaneously, emperors instituted legal restrictions that slowly suffocated traditional pagan practices. They outlawed animal sacrifices, banned rustic traditions like tying ribbons to sacred trees to make wishes, and eventually barred non-Christians from holding high public office or seamlessly executing wills.
- **Timeline of Majority:** Achieved by the early-to-mid 5th century.
- **Timeline of Solid Consolidation:** Reached in the early 6th century (500 years after Jesus).
- **State Disincentives:** Step-by-step bans on animal sacrifices, sacred tree rituals, and traditional legal rights regarding inheritance and public office.
---
[01:39:54](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5994s) Christianity as an Adaptable Social Technology
When asked what explains the overwhelming success of Christianity as a "technology" for spreading throughout the empire, Kaldellis credits its manifold diversity and structural adaptability. The religion developed unique forms that simultaneously appealed to vastly different constituencies. For intellectuals, it offered a rigorous theological and quasi-philosophical engagement that could compete with classical philosophical schools. For the broader public, it provided vibrant civic ceremonies, processions, and festivals that seamlessly replaced ancient pagan holidays. It also carried an intimate, initiatory allure via baptism and creeds, promising a deeply personal afterlife.
Crucially, Christianity successfully integrated itself into the language of imperial power and the military apparatus. Soldiers in the Roman army eventually began swearing their official oaths to the Holy Trinity. This multi-layered presence allowed the religion to position itself everywhere at once—"in the streets, in the court, in the armies, in the churches, in texts, in books"—making it uniquely resilient and versatile.
---
[01:41:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6104s) The Double-Edged Sword of Orthodoxy
Constantine did not anticipate that institutionalizing Christianity would trigger severe, long-lasting internal divisions. Because Christianity makes exclusive truth claims—asserting that its tenets are absolutely true and all others are inherently false or even authored by Satan—it introduced a highly polarizing dynamic to the empire. Kaldellis notes a fascinating historical paradox: "Christianity, in contrast to, say, the ancient religions, is both far more polarizing but also far more powerful as a unifying force at the same time." While ancient polytheistic religions rarely drove historical conflict or ideological wars, Christian theological disputes became incredibly fierce.
These theological "truths" were rarely static; they evolved dynamically through the controversies themselves, with the winning faction claiming in retrospect that their position was the one the church had always held. Kaldellis notes that many branded heretics were well-intentioned theologians who thought they were merely blurting out what everyone already believed, only to find themselves condemned by a rival faction in Alexandria and sent into exile. Lex Fridman observes that these seemingly subtle, academic debates over iconography or phrasing were viewed by ordinary citizens not as academic exercises, but as literal battles against the devil. Ultimately, this intense religious identity became a defining element of the culture, though it came at a high price. At the end of the empire, some Romans explicitly preferred the rule of the Muslim Turks over the Catholic West, explicitly stating that the Turks would at least respect their Orthodox identity without forcing them to compromise their faith.
- **Orthodoxy Definition:** Literally translates to "correct belief."
- **The Paradox:** Simultaneously the greatest unifying driver and the most volatile source of internal polarization.
- **The Ultimate Cost:** Driven by deep devotion to Orthodoxy, late Byzantine figures chose Islamic Ottoman rule over submission to Western Catholicism.
---
[01:47:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6429s) The Three Pillars of Byzantine Identity
Kaldellis pushes back against historians who try to subsume all of Eastern Roman history under the single umbrella of religion. While religion served as the vibrant cultural layer, the actual engine of the society was powered by the highly pragmatic operations of government, bureaucratic statecraft, and the tax system. When Fridman poses the "impossible question" of whether a citizen across a thousand-year span would identify primarily as a Roman or a Christian, Kaldellis asserts that the true answer is definitively both, though they were not identical concepts.
Logically, the Romans knew the terms did not overlap perfectly. They recognized that there were many Christians who were explicitly not Romans—such as the Bulgarians or the Rus. Conversely, they were reminded every week in church services of the many ancient Romans who were distinctly not Christian, as they celebrated historical martyrs who had been brutally executed by past Roman emperors. Kaldellis conceptualizes Byzantine society as a fascinating "laboratory" where three distinct elements coexisted and combined in various configurations depending on individual choice:
* **The Roman Identity:** The pragmatic state apparatus, legal traditions, governance, and political citizenship.
* **The Christian Identity:** The dedication to Orthodoxy, church liturgy, and monastic life.
* **The Greek Identity:** The linguistic, literary, and classical intellectual heritage of the Greek language.
### [01:50:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6651s) The Unique Synthesis of Roman History
Lex Fridman and Anthony Kaldellis reflect on the deep, integrated complexity of the Eastern Roman Empire, noting it as a unique society that simultaneously embodied Roman, Christian, and Greek identity. Kaldellis points out the futility of counterfactual historical analysis, arguing that you cannot conceptually extract individual elements—like the complex taxation system, religion, or the Greek language—to see if the empire would have been more or less successful without them. These components were so profoundly interwoven that changing any single one would mean the empire ceased to be what it fundamentally was.
This systemic stability is the core of Kaldellis's historical research and his next major book project, which aims to systematically analyze why the Eastern Roman Empire (and the broader Roman state) achieved such unparalleled longevity and stability in one of the world's most densely populated and contested regions.
---
### [01:52:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6742s) The Explosive Demographic Growth of Constantinople
Fridman steers the conversation toward the staggering growth of Constantinople, which swelled from a modest population of roughly 25,000 residents to over 500,000 within just two centuries. Kaldellis explains that such rapid expansion is biologically and demographically impossible through natural reproduction alone in an ancient city. Instead, it was driven entirely by massive, sustained waves of immigration from the Greek-speaking provinces, including Greece, Asia Minor, and major cities of the East.
Furthermore, keeping an ancient urban population stable was an uphill battle. Historians classify ancient cities as demographic "death traps" due to high disease density, where poor sanitation and crowded conditions meant losing 1% to 3% of the population annually to illness. To grow so aggressively despite these attrition rates, Constantinople required a continuous, heavy influx of new residents.
* **The Senatorial Nucleus:** Initially, approximately 2,500 Roman senators were required to relocate to Constantinople. In antiquity, a senatorial household was vast; while a household in Old Rome might average 100 people (including family, servants, slaves, cooks, barbers, and performers), Kaldellis conservatively estimates a Byzantine senatorial household at 30 people. This requirement alone immediately injected roughly 100,000 individuals into the new capital.
* **The Grain Dole Incentive:** To structurally incentivize immigration, Emperor Constantine established a state-funded grain dole, providing free bread for up to 200,000 citizens.
* **Resource Diversion:** The grain fueling this massive welfare program was systematically diverted away from Egypt to Constantinople. In Kaldellis's words, "New Rome is literally stealing food from the mouth of Old Rome." While Old Rome avoided starvation by redirecting grain supplies from Sicily and North Africa, the diversion sent an unmistakable geopolitical signal that the state's long-term investments and priorities had permanently shifted eastward.
---
### [01:56:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6993s) The Fall of the West and the Vicious Cycle of Collapse
The conversation transitions to the gradual decline and eventual collapse of the Western Roman Empire, punctuated by the Visigoth sack of Rome in 410 AD and the deposition of the final Western emperor in 476 AD. Fridman summarizes the multi-faceted, cascading pressures that destabilized the West: continuous civil wars, weak leadership, an economic currency crisis, a shrinking tax base, escalating military expenditures, heavy reliance on barbarian mercenaries, and the geopolitical East-West fracture. Kaldellis conceptualizes this collapse not as rocket science, but as a compounding, vicious economic and military cycle.
```
[Barbarian Invasions/Settlement] ➔ [Loss of Provincial Territories] ➔ [Shrinking Tax Revenue Base] ➔ [Inability to Pay/Mobilize Roman Armies] ➔ [Further Barbarian Encroachment]
```
When the Western Roman state failed to militarily suppress or evict invading forces—such as the Vandals seizing wealthy provinces in North Africa—it permanently lost access to the tax revenues of those regions. Deprived of cash flow, the state could no longer afford to recruit, train, or pay its standing armies, leaving it increasingly defenseless against successive waves of migration and military pressure from groups displaced by the Huns. This operational paralysis allowed settled barbarian groups to comfortably declare total independence.
---
### [01:59:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=7155s) Why the Eastern Roman Empire Survived
Kaldellis outlines why the Eastern Roman Empire managed to survive the identical external pressures that shattered the West. The root causes range from geographical luck to deep-seated cultural allegiance. A foundational failure occurred early in 376 AD when the Goths crossed the Danube, culminating in the catastrophic Battle of Adrianople in 378 AD, where Emperor Valens was killed and multiple Roman field armies were completely annihilated. The subsequent, inconclusive four-year war forced the Romans into an unprecedented and dysfunctional truce: accepting a quasi-independent Gothic army living within imperial borders.
However, geography shielded the East from the worst consequences of this compromise. Lacking a naval fleet, the Goths could not easily cross the Bosporus from the Western Balkans or Thrace into the hyper-prosperous, wealthy provinces of Asia Minor. Effectively bottlenecked in the less lucrative Balkan territories, the invaders eventually chose to march westward toward Italy and Naples, drawn by richer, unobstructed plundering opportunities.
* **Strategic Military Buffers:** The East's dual continental layout allowed it to pivot flexibly. If Persian or Arab armies invaded Asia Minor from the east, they were blocked by water from crossing into the European/Balkan provinces. The state could consistently fall back on one side, calling in reinforcements from the untouched half of the empire.
* **The Constantinople Bunker:** The capital was built as an impregnable, heavily fortified command center capable of withstanding prolonged sieges.
* **Technological Advantages:** The Eastern state eventually developed advanced military technologies, such as maritime flamethrowers running on Greek fire.
* **Civic and Cultural Allegiance:** Ultimately, Kaldellis attributes long-term survival to the choices of local provincial communities. Even when heavily raided or temporarily cut off, local populations viewed Constantinople as their natural political and cultural home; they chose not to permanently align with foreign invaders and immediately restored administrative and tax ties to the capital once the danger passed.
---
### [02:02:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=7356s) The Inversion of Imperial Power
Fridman and Kaldellis emphasize that the historical narrative of the Roman Empire "collapsing" and a separate "Byzantine Empire" rising is fundamentally flawed. In reality, the historic Western territories collapsed because the structural center of gravity of the single, continuous Roman state had migrated to the East. The institutional continuity was so profound that by the 430s AD, long after the formal administrative division of the empire, it was the legal scholars in Constantinople who codified Roman law in Latin and exported it back to the Western courts.
This evolution culminated in a total inversion of ancient geopolitical dynamics. In the early days of the Caesars, the province of Thrace (where Constantinople was founded) was dismissed by the elites in Rome as a backward, uncultured "armpit of the Roman Empire." Yet by the 6th century, under Emperor Justinian, the East reconquered parts of Italy and completely overhauled Roman law on a grand scale—meaning that Roman law as the modern world inherited it was preserved and formatted by Constantinople, not ancient Rome. By Justinian's era, the ancient capital had become a ruined, provincial backwater where wolves literally roamed the empty streets of the Roman Forum, while the true heart of Roman wealth and civilization beat firmly in the East.
---
### [02:05:17](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=7517s) The Mechanics of Eastern Bureaucracy and Taxation
To understand how the Eastern state survived for centuries, Kaldellis breaks down its administrative governance into two dominant pillars: the military and civilian branches (with the Christian Church functioning closely alongside them as a de facto third state institution). The military apparatus was run as a highly professionalized, career-based economic complex. The Eastern state maintained a massive standing army for a medieval society, fluctuating between a paper strength of 100,000 at its lowest points to 250,000 men at its imperial peaks. When factoring in soldiers' families, the military-industrial complex represented a massive percentage of the population.
The primary responsibility of the massive civilian administration was simply finding the money to fund this standing army, which constituted the single largest expenditure on the imperial state budget. To sustain this, the state developed an incredibly complex, sophisticated bureaucracy.
* **Taxation and Legal Infrastructure:** The civilian government operated specialized tax bureaus, precise asset census registries, and dedicated legal branches to resolve complex fiscal disputes between private citizens and the imperial fisc (*public treasury*). It also maintained the empire's broader judicial infrastructure, managing courts of appeal, local judges, and record-keeping facilities.
* **Diplomatic and Palace Bureaus:** The emperors funded extensive, separate administrative entities tasked with international diplomacy and managing the massive, complex internal staff of the imperial palace.
* **Religious and Civic Endowments:** Prominent state-aligned religious institutions required significant administrative oversight. For example, the Hagia Sophia cathedral employed hundreds of specialized staff, from clergy to specialized text readers. To pay these structural salaries, the state earmarked vast tracts of state-controlled land as dedicated endowments, further multiplying the size, scope, and complexity of the imperial bureaucracy.
Fridman jokes that this Byzantine system sounds mirrors modern America, where a massive percentage of the country is comprised of lawyers and IRS agents.
[02:09:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=7774s) The Inevitable Growth of Taxation and the Byzantine IRS
The conversation begins with a reflection on human nature and the structural tendency of governing institutions to grow indefinitely. Lex Fridman observes that an organization like the IRS seems incapable of staying small because people constantly petition for special-case tax reductions. To accommodate these requests, the state adds specialized clauses—humorously exemplified by Fridman as a tax break for "if you have purple hair"—until the code becomes opaque, giving rise to "corruption light," institutional momentum, and entrenched bureaucracy.
Anthony Kaldellis confirms that this dynamic was very much present in the Eastern Roman Empire. While they did not possess a centralized tax code like modern states, the system operated heavily through a network of custom exemptions. Monasteries, wealthy landowners, well-connected court figures, and even struggling provincial villages hit by a bad harvest or a barbarian raid would petition the emperor or high-ranking officials for tax relief. Emperors regularly granted these highly specific exemptions, but over time, corrupt officials began covertly issuing them on their own authority. This forced emperors to periodically "clear house" by canceling all active exemptions and restarting the entire process. By the 11th century, surviving documentation shows an incredibly complex web of localized tax exemptions granted to various villages, monasteries, and officials. Fridman notes that despite the administrative bloat, taxation served as the essential "engine of society" required to fund infrastructure and maintain the standing army against endless military incursions.
[02:12:03](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=7923s) Eunuchs in the Corridor of Power
Fridman steers the discussion toward the unique demographic makeup of the Byzantine bureaucracy, noting that a massive fraction of its officials were eunuchs (castrated men). Kaldellis explains that eunuchs functioned essentially as the "household staff of the emperor," comparing their domain to the modern West Wing of the White House. They managed the imperial person directly, overseeing the bedchamber, palace life, banquets, and the wardrobe. This constant physical proximity granted them immense gatekeeping power. Because anyone wanting an audience or a political favor had to go through them, eunuchs were heavily bribed and, consequently, widely detested by the public. However, Kaldellis points out that this hatred served an institutional purpose: the eunuchs acted as a political shield, "soaking up a lot of the frustration" that would otherwise be directed at the emperor.
Beyond managing palace logistics, eunuchs solved a critical structural problem for the monarchy: preventing the impersonal bureaucracy from completely displacing the emperor's power. To ensure absolute loyalty, emperors deliberately placed eunuchs in high positions because they were often foreign-born or former slaves disconnected from networks of powerful native families. Lacking the biological means to propagate a bloodline, they could not build competing dynasties. Emperors even placed wardrobe eunuchs in charge of entire armies to counterbalance entrenched networks of established generals. Kaldellis highlights Justinian’s famous general Narses as an example of an extraordinarily competent eunuch. Narses was a tiny, frail, and incredibly old man whom the Goths initially laughed at, but he proved to be a "total hardass" who successfully defeated them in Italy.
- **Methods of Castration:** While many eunuchs were children enslaved and castrated against their will, some families—particularly in Paphlagonia (northern Asia Minor), Georgia, and Persia—deliberately castrated their own sons as a strategic family plan to secure a lucrative, highly influential placement at the imperial court.
- **Historical Continuity:** The prominence of eunuchs was not a medieval innovation; it mirrored the exact same dynamic seen during the early Roman Empire under the first Caesars, where the aristocratic senatorial class similarly despised them.
[02:16:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8202s) The Myth of the Isolated Peasant
Fridman recalls an aside from an earlier podcast where Kaldellis claimed there were no isolated people in the Byzantine Empire who were disconnected from the state or unaware of taxation. Expressing fascination with this intense social cohesion, Fridman asks how such a dense network was maintained over such a vast territory. Kaldellis forcefully asserts that the completely isolated medieval peasant is a pure "myth" often encountered in flawed scholarship. The idea that rural communities lived independently, entirely unaffected by a weak medieval state, is flatly unsupported by historical evidence.
The only true exceptions were Christian ascetic hermits who actively fled into mountains so remote that even the census takers could not find them—an exception that proves the rule. In reality, every single piece of arable land in the empire had been strictly cataloged in a census for centuries. The taxation process was not a simple, once-a-year visit where an official took some coins and left; rather, tax collectors visited roughly three times a year, demanding not just currency but payments in kind, military recruits, and mandatory labor services. This relentless cycle created a "dense, institutional matrix" from which no community could escape. Furthermore, the ubiquitous presence of the state church meant every village adhered to the same calendar, listened to identical weekly sermons, and participated in communal prayers for the safety of the reigning emperor. Local economies were similarly integrated through the universal use of imperial coinage.
[02:20:09](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8409s) The "Monarchic Republic" and the Reality of Empire
Fridman asks Kaldellis to clarify the political terminology used to describe the East Roman state, picking up on the paradoxical term "monarchic republic." Kaldellis highlights that the conventional term "Byzantine Empire" is historically inaccurate on both fronts. In the Greek language of the period, there was no word that corresponded to the modern notion of an "empire." Instead, the state was officially referred to as a *basileia* (monarchy), a *politeia* (polity), or quite simply, *Romania*.
The Greek word *politeia* was a direct translation of the Latin *res publica*, which during Roman times did not mean a non-monarchical government in the modern sense (like the American Republic). Instead, a *res publica* signified the "common affairs" and public interest of a politically constituted community, regardless of its regime type. Cicero himself could easily imagine a *res publica* governed by a king, a senate, or a democracy. Under this framework, the Byzantine emperor was fundamentally understood to be an executive officer whose primary duty was to serve the *politeia*. Furthermore, in modern English, an "empire" denotes a state created when one distinct group conquers and rules over others. Romania, by contrast, consisted almost entirely of Roman citizens ruling themselves through their own established government.
- **Imperial Exceptions:** While the state occasionally established true imperial relationships by conquering outside groups—such as the Slavs, the Bulgarians, or North Syrian Muslims in the 11th century—these conquests never reached a tipping point where the entire state should be classified as an empire.
- **The Modern "Superpower" Definition:** Fridman points out that the word "empire" is often used today as a synonym for a geopolitical superpower (e.g., the "American Empire") regardless of internal governance. Kaldellis agrees but notes it becomes ridiculous when historians continue calling Byzantium an "empire" near its collapse, when its territory had shrunk to just a few minor islands in the Peloponnese.
- **Military Dictatorship:** When Fridman asks if the system functioned as a military dictatorship—given how frequently powerful generals seized the throne—Kaldellis acknowledges that while the position of Augustus was rooted in army backing, the Eastern Roman state developed structural mechanisms that prevented it from operating as a pure military dictatorship.
[02:27:37](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8857s) The Myth of the Military Dictatorship
Anthony Kaldellis argues that despite the emperor's control over the armies and the army's frequent role in determining succession through civil wars, the Eastern Roman Empire cannot be classified as a military dictatorship. The defining factor is that the Roman state almost never used its army as an instrument of internal social control or to keep down the population—a striking anomaly across 1,000 years of human history. This worked because of a fundamental societal consensus: the army existed to protect the Roman people, was largely recruited from among them, and lived directly within local villages.
Lex Fridman notes how remarkable this stability is, contrasting it with modern authoritarian regimes that routinely deploy their military forces to suppress domestic uprisings. Kaldellis emphasizes that using an army against one's own people is a highly precarious tactic. He points to recent history, such as the Arab Spring in Egypt, highlighting the three tense weeks where Hosni Mubarak had to calculate whether the military would actually fire on civilian protesters. Demanding that an army turn on its own population is a dangerous gamble that frequently triggers immediate regime change.
[02:30:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=9024s) Emperor Justinian and the Codification of Law
The singular major exception to this rule was Emperor Justinian I, who ruled a exceptionally long and consequential reign from 527 to 565. Both Justinian and his uncle, the preceding emperor Justin I, rose from poor, peasant agricultural communities in the western Balkans. Justin I ascended through the military ranks and eventually positioned his nephew as his successor. Strikingly, Justinian's life is a total mystery until he appears in the historical record around the age of 38, equipped primarily with a deep knowledge of Roman law and Christian theology.
Once in power, Justinian demonstrated a profound eye for talent, entirely disregarding social class and prestige to surround himself with highly capable, if sometimes disreputable, individuals. Among these was his powerful and influential wife, Theodora, a former sex worker. Because a senator marrying into such a profession was strictly illegal, Justinian had his uncle change the law so they could wed. Kaldellis notes that despite Justinian's harsh legal crackdowns on adultery and "getting freaky with it," his legal modifications explicitly declared that love knows no bounds, reflecting a genuine, lifelong devotion to Theodora.
Beyond his personal life, Justinian's most enduring legacy is the overhauling of Roman law. He appointed a committee led by the brilliant jurist Tribonian to condense centuries of legal tradition into the *Corpus Juris Civilis* (Body of Civil Law). This monumental work of codification remains the definitive source of Roman law studied today. Lex references a Perplexity AI search to highlight its core components: a tripartite structure of private law organized around persons, things, and actions, alongside robust protections for property and contracts. Kaldellis notes that while Justinian held extreme personal views—such as believing homosexuality caused earthquakes and subsequently punishing it with lethal brutality—the empire lacked an active social police or inquisition, meaning citizens were generally left alone unless a public scandal erupted.
- **Reign of Justinian I:** 527–565 AD.
- **Tribonian:** The master jurist who led Justinian's legal codification committee.
- **Corpus Juris Civilis:** The massive body of civil law that formed the template for modern European civil law systems and legal concepts of property and sovereignty.
[02:39:42](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=9582s) The Destructive Grandeur of Justinian's Conquests
Justinian believed he was divinely authorized by God to reconquer the lost Western provinces of the Roman Empire, viewing his battlefield successes as definitive proof of divine favor. While highly opportunistic and successful at exploiting the internal weaknesses of western barbarian kingdoms, these expansionary campaigns carried catastrophic long-term consequences. The grueling, decades-long wars ravaged territories like Italy to the point that they could no longer economically sustain themselves, resulting in a completely overstretched imperial treasury.
Kaldellis heavily criticizes Justinian's strategic priorities, asserting that a leader's true value lies in whether they strengthen institutions to leave their subjects better off. To fund and execute his western conquests, Justinian stripped defensive armies from the east. This structural vulnerability allowed the Persians to march right into imperial territory and destroy Antioch. For Kaldellis, "you don't get a pass for conquering North Africa by surrendering Syria."
Justinian's domestic legacy is equally polarized by extreme scales of grand building and immense violence. He is famous for constructing the architectural marvel of the Hagia Sophia, yet he only did so after he and his own troops set fire to the original structure during the Nika insurrection. When the citizens of Constantinople rose against his regime, Justinian ordered his armies to slaughter the protesters in the streets, leaving over 30,000 citizens dead.
- **The Nika Insurrection:** A massive domestic uprising featuring 10 days of violent street fighting that culminated in the slaughter of over 30,000 citizens by imperial troops.
- **Hagia Sophia:** The magnificent church rebuilt by Justinian as a monument to his reign following the destruction of the capital.
[02:43:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=9826s) The Plague of Justinian and the Dawn of a Tumultuous Century
In 541 AD, the empire was struck by the Plague of Justinian. While some modern historians put forward a maximalist position claiming the bubonic plague wiped out half the population and shattered the empire, Kaldellis is highly skeptical. Modern laboratory science and virology have successfully isolated the pathogen as *Yersinia pestis*, but Kaldellis emphasizes that understanding its true historical and logistical impact still requires traditional document-based history.
If 50% of the population had died, the society would have experienced the total logistical halt seen during the 14th-century Black Death, where the tax base dissolved, military recruitment collapsed, and all state functions ceased for years. In stark contrast, the records from the 6th century show that Justinian seamlessly continued to wage war on four or five different fronts simultaneously. Because the historical narrative shows no pause in military campaigns, court operations, or tax collection, Kaldellis argues the plague's actual disruptions were far more moderate, though they still set a volatile stage for the coming 7th century.
[02:46:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=9998s) The Burden of Justinian's Ambition
The territorial expansion under Emperor Justinian left the Eastern Roman Empire structurally overextended. His successors were forced to confront a compounding series of crises across a vast, fractured front with significantly fewer military forces available to protect the traditional core provinces. This structural vulnerability triggered a vicious cycle of opportunistic foreign raids, particularly in the Balkans, which eroded internal security.
Anthony Kaldellis emphasizes that while the catastrophic Justinian Plague severely undermined the empire, the ensuing geopolitical decline cannot simply be blamed on the mismanagement of Justinian's successors. Justinian handed them an incredibly fragile and overextended strategic landscape.
[02:47:27](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10047s) The Double-Edged Legacy of Heraclius
The rise of Emperor Heraclius presents a highly polarized historical narrative. While popular history and Western medieval tradition frequently romanticize Heraclius as a "proto-crusader" holy warrior who rescued Rome from extinction, recaptured Jerusalem, and recovered the True Cross, Kaldellis offers a more critical perspective, characterizing his overall legacy as a "complete wash."
```
[602–628] Roman-Persian War Destabilizes Both Empires
│
▼
[608–610] Heraclius Initiates a 3-Year Civil War
│
┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
Diverts Roman Armies Ravages Egypt's
From the Persian Front Vital Economy
```
The long Roman-Persian War began around 602 when the Persian Shah, Khosrow II, shifted from traditional border raiding to an overt policy of permanent territorial conquest. Facing the Roman military usurper Phocas, Heraclius initiated a devastating three-year civil war from his base in Carthage. This rebellion diverted crucial Roman military forces away from the Persian front, presenting a massive strategic gift to the advancing Sassanids. The internal conflict also ravaged Egypt, a wealthy province that had previously remained untouched by the war. Though Heraclius successfully seized Constantinople and executed Phocas in 610, he inherited an existential crisis that his own ambition had helped exacerbate.
[02:51:16](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10276s) Total War in the Persian Heartland
By the time Heraclius consolidated power, the Persian Empire had conquered Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, cutting off vital grain supplies and tax revenues, while launching deep raids into Asia Minor. For the Romans, this was a war of desperate survival. Sassanid motivations had also evolved; Khosrow II actively sought to revive the ancient grandeur of the Achaemenid Empire, seeking control of the Mediterranean coastline and the systematic capture of agricultural workforces and specialized craftsmen to till Mesopotamian estates.
It took Heraclius nearly fifteen years to effectively organize his forces. Rather than engaging the Persian and Avar armies directly during their massive combined siege of Constantinople in 626, Heraclius launched high-stakes, unconventional counter-campaigns directly into the Persian heartland. Striking through the Caucasus and deep into Mesopotamia, his forces systematically degraded Persian infrastructure. Ultimately, by leveraging a critical alliance with Central Asian Turks, Heraclius went on a destructive "field trip through Mesopotamia." This calculated devastation triggered a domestic political coup in Persia, culminating in the execution of Khosrow II and a hard-fought Roman victory in 628.
[02:55:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10515s) The Rise of the Arab Muslim Caliphates
The mutual exhaustion of the Roman and Sassanid states set the stage for the rapid expansion of the early Islamic Caliphates. While the initial objective of Arab Muslim warfare was the internal unification of Arabia under Islam, their armies quickly pivoted outward. Striking two deeply destabilized empires that were desperately low on manpower and resources, the highly effective Muslim forces achieved rapid conquests.
Crucially, the Caliphates advanced from the south—a geographic direction for which neither the Romans nor the Persians had prepared their defensive orientations. The strategic impact on the Roman Empire was immediate and severe: the loss of Egypt stripped away its richest province, permanently halting the grain supply to Constantinople and triggering a dramatic population decline in the imperial capital over the subsequent decades.
[02:57:07](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10627s) Greek Fire and Strategic Readjustment
The survival and stabilization of the fractured Roman state was a painful, centuries-long process that began with holding the line against relentless Arab advances in the seventh century. By the 660s and 670s, the Romans began securing victories on land and heavily investing in naval fleets.
The empire's ultimate defense was bolstered by the deployment of "Greek fire," a devastating, state-secret incendiary weapon. While the exact mechanics remain a subject of historical debate, it likely utilized a heated, pressurized container and a spigot to project a highly flammable, napalm-like compound through a nozzle. Because the substance continued to burn on top of the water, it was terrifyingly effective at incinerating enemy fleets.
- **Hand Grenade Variant:** The Romans also engineered a clay-container hand grenade version of Greek fire equipped with an external fuse, which was primarily deployed to torch enemy wooden siege engines.
- **Defensive Utility:** This secret weapon was successfully used centuries later to decimate raiding Viking fleets in the 940s and 1040s, and it served as a key deterrent that forced foreign actors to serve under the emperors rather than attack them.
[03:00:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10852s) The Siege of 717 and the Myth of Iconoclasm
The stabilization of the empire culminated in the containment of the second Arab siege of Constantinople in the early eighth century. The defense was masterfully orchestrated by Leo III, a highly competent military usurper who seized power just as the massive attack loomed. Leo III utilized a multi-faceted strategy: fortifying the city's walls, securing critical alliances with the Bulgars south of the Danube, deploying Greek fire via the Roman fleet, and effectively trapping the Arab forces in localized areas where they were progressively worn down and starved.
Following this military victory, Leo III's line—the Isaurian dynasty (though they did not actually originate from Isauria)—became associated with the intense internal religious controversies of Iconoclasm, which sought to ban or destroy sacred images within Christian churches.
Kaldellis highlights a major historical misconception regarding this era: while modern Orthodox churches are completely saturated with rich iconography as a direct reaction to the ultimate failure of iconoclasm, the contemporary social reality of the conflict was heavily localized. Secular historical research reveals that iconoclasm lacked widespread popular interest among ordinary citizens. Instead, the perception of a sweeping, society-wide crisis was completely overblown, written into historical memory by a tiny, highly vocal elite of emperors, bishops, abbots, and monks.
[03:05:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11134s) The Bias of Religious Sources and the Iconoclast Controversy
The passionate debates surrounding religious events in historical texts often reflect the intense personal biases of the authors rather than the consensus of the general population. While the authors of historical texts write at length about the fierce theological battles over icons, they consistently fail to mention any popular uprisings or widespread demands from the citizens of Constantinople regarding whether to keep or ban them. In the grand scheme of things, only a tiny elite truly cared about the controversy, yet because they were the ones writing the chronicles, their obsession skewed the historical record. When emperors pivoted their official religious stances, the vast majority of the population simply fell into line, viewing the issue as secondary. Ultimately, the pro-icon position triumphed, and their narrative began filling up both historical documentation and the physical walls of the churches.
* **Source Bias:** Historians must exercise extreme caution when reading about religious events, as intense passion frequently bleeds into historical reporting.
* **Political Compliance:** The broader population treated icon policies flexibly, adapting readily whenever an emperor mandated a change in policy.
---
[03:07:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11222s) *Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood* and the 10th-Century Expansion
Synthesizing a millennium of history is an immense challenge that risks overwhelming any historian. In his book *Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium, 955 AD to the First Crusade*, Anthony Kaldellis tested his ability to write a gripping historical narrative after years of publishing strictly analytical works. The success of this narrative experiment later prompted his editor to commission his comprehensive, thousand-page volume, *The New Roman Empire*. The specific period detailed in *Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood* explores a sudden, dramatic pivot toward conquest starting in the year 955. Following a prolonged era of defensive warfare, a newly appointed military leadership launched an aggressive expansionist campaign.
* **Geographic Expansion:** The Roman campaigns successfully conquered territories in Cilicia, northern Syria, Cyprus, the Caucasus, and eventually Bulgaria.
* **Macedonian Era:** Under prominent expansionist emperors like Basil II, the 10th-century empire emerged wealthy, resilient, and culturally confident.
---
[03:09:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11362s) The Triple Whammy of the 11th Century
The period of expansion and stability eventually buckled under the immense pressure of a "triple whammy" of new, external attackers. The empire was assaulted simultaneously from three distinct geographic fronts: the Seljuk Turks advancing from the east, the Pechenegs crossing south over the Danube from the north, and the Normans attacking southern Italy in the west. Traditional historical scholarship attributes this 11th-century crisis to internal moral decay, structural corruption, and civilian emperors neglecting the military. However, surviving a concurrent onslaught from three fundamentally different military forces is an unrealistic expectation for any ancient or medieval state.
* **The Norman Threat:** The Normans introduced a devastating, grinding style of Western warfare characterized by relentless aggression and terror tactics.
* **The Pechenegs:** A formidable northern enemy consisting primarily of highly mobile, nomadic horsemen.
* **The Seljuk Turks:** Emerging from Central Asia with vast reserves of manpower, the Seljuks triggered profound demographic and ecological shifts by converting Asia Minor's agricultural lands into pasturage.
---
[03:13:46](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11626s) Dynastic Instability and Budget Pressures
Compounding the external pressures were real internal political vulnerabilities, notably the conclusion of the Macedonian dynasty, which had provided stability for roughly two centuries. The termination of this lineage left a succession of insecure, childless old men occupying the throne. Lacking the inherent prestige of a deep-rooted dynasty, these emperors resorted to buying political survival. To secure loyalty, they handed out tax exemptions, cash grants, and prestigious titles to anyone willing to support them, which rapidly triggered a severe budget deficit. When the state simultaneously needed to raise massive new armies to repel the foreign invasions, the financial pressure reached a breaking point.
---
[03:14:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11676s) Exogenous Shocks vs. Endogenous Resilience
The history of the Eastern Roman Empire is not a random oscillation, but a series of distinct, brief crises caused entirely by exogenous shocks. These sudden external challenges inflicted massive territorial losses that forced painful societal adjustments. However, the Romans consistently managed to hold a line, consolidate their forces, regroup, and return to a steady trajectory of economic and military revival. Because "nobody came from the outside to help them rebuild," this resilience was entirely endogenous, driven by internal organizational strengths that primed the society for gradual, steady growth. History should be defined by these long centuries of stabilization rather than the brief, external crises that interrupted them.
> "The peak-to-peak histories, as you can think of them, they miss the machinery in the valleys."
---
[03:17:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=11860s) Challenging the Field of Byzantine History
Traditional, condensed historical overviews often fail to capture the true structural underpinnings of Byzantine society. When authors attempt to cram 1,200 years of history into a brief book, they are forced to jump exclusively from one extravagant highlight to the next—focusing heavily on the dramatic crises or the monumental reign of Justinian. This structural fragmentation leaves readers blind to the deep-seated mechanisms connecting those peaks. In *The New Roman Empire*, Kaldellis actively challenges the field with revisionist frameworks, shedding light on the darker, ignored valleys of history by exploring how institutions and ideologies bound daily lives to the state.
* **The Monarchical Republic:** A revisionist concept demonstrating a broad spectrum of political participation, where emperors constantly had to look over their shoulders and operate within a deep matrix of Roman Republican thought.
* **Roman Identity:** A correction of the field's terminology, emphasizing that these citizens explicitly possessed a distinct Roman identity that eventually evolved into a shared ethnic identity.
---
[03:20:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=12058s) The Point of No Return and the Final Collapse
The definitive, unrecoverable decline of the Eastern Roman Empire began in the early 14th century, specifically between the years 1300 and 1350, when its deep sources of resilience finally dried up. Around 1300, the empire lost Asia Minor to the Turks, permanently depriving the state of its ability to pull resources and manpower from two distinct geographic wings—the European side and the Asian side. Confined strictly to Europe, the state was subsequently crippled by a succession of internal civil wars, rapid Serbian expansion, and the devastating impact of the Black Death.
* **1300 State of the Empire:** Although reduced to a corridor stretching across the Balkans from Constantinople to the Adriatic, the empire remained financially viable, boasting revenues and gold-collecting capabilities comparable to or exceeding those of contemporary England.
* **The Fatal Blow:** The terminal mistake occurred during a civil war when a rebel leader made a desperate pact with the Serbs and surrendered half of the remaining Balkan territory. "After that, game over."
* **The Role of Tamerlane:** The final collapse in 1453 was delayed by half a century due to an accidental event: the Central Asian conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) trounced the Ottoman Turks and fractured their empire, granting the dying Roman state a 50-year reprieve.
* **The Primacy of Invasions:** The collapse was entirely the result of foreign invasions that eventually exhausted the empire's territory. Had the state been spared these relentless external onslaughts, its foundational systems of taxation, policy development, and political representation could have easily sustained the empire for another thousand years, as there were never internal movements looking to split away.
[03:25:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=12324s) The Internal Stability of the New Roman Empire
A striking anomaly of the Eastern Roman Empire across its 1,200-year history is the near-total absence of internal separatist movements among Roman provincials. While Bulgaria—which was conquered in 1018—staged a few independentist rebellions and finally succeeded in breaking away in 1185, no other province actively sought to leave the Roman system. Provincials frequently complained about heavy taxation, yet they never attempted to secede or overthrow the governing structure. The empire completely avoided the widespread peasant uprisings and agricultural rebellions that plagued almost every other historical empire. Furthermore, it never suffered from fragmentation driven by internal warlords trying to carve out independent territories, nor did it face intentional partitioning, a stark contrast to how the Franks divided Charlemagne's empire.
When analyzing the classic factors that cause states to fail, fracture, or become entirely ungovernable, the Eastern Roman Empire proved remarkably resilient. This extraordinary baseline of internal stability stands out as an incredible study of human societal formation. While other historical states like the British monarchy, Portugal, and Japan have achieved long-term stability, they did so because they were safely tucked away on the geographical edges of their respective worlds. The Roman Empire, conversely, sat squarely in the middle of the most dangerous neighborhood on Earth: the primary global corridor for aggressive empire-building and the birth of competitive new religions.
* **Bulgarian Secession:** Conquered in 1018, Bulgaria remained under Roman rule for just under two centuries before launching a successful independence rebellion in 1185.
* **Absence of Partition:** Unlike contemporary Western medieval states, Roman leaders and military rebels never attempted to permanently split the state into smaller, independent kingdoms.
---
[03:28:51](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=12531s) The Foundations of Consensus: Rhetoric and Identity
The self-healing nature of the Roman system did not mean its citizens lived in utopian harmony; rather, it achieved a "sufficient" level of stability to keep the peace. The constant complaints regarding taxes actually signal a functioning society where people knew they could protest without fear of violent reprisal. Anthony Kaldellis attributes this robust cohesion to a two-part formula. First, the ruling authorities made an extraordinary, continuous effort to persuade subjects that the government operated on their behalf, a rhetorical commitment that they generally backed up with real action. Second, the population shared a deeply unified, dual identity of being both Roman and Orthodox Christian. Surrounded by hostile entities who were neither, the citizens recognized that any realistic alternative to Roman rule would be far worse.
This dynamic illustrates how political rhetoric carries genuine, structural power when it is coupled with credible actions. Effective governance requires leaders to truly believe their own message, rather than cynically deploying it as a Machiavellian tool. Drawing a parallel to modern academic administration, Kaldellis notes that a dean delivering budget cuts will find vastly different levels of compliance and consensus depending on whether they dismissively slash programs or rhetorically align themselves with the department's core mission while promising future restoration. As Aristotle observed in *The Politics*, the absolute best way for a ruler to convince their subjects that they are a legitimate, benevolent king is to actually be one.
---
[03:33:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=12788s) Lessons for Modern Empires and the Rhetoric-Action Gap
The 2,200-year historical arc of the Roman Empire offers profound lessons for modern states, including the United States. While calling America an "empire" was once treated as academic taboos, the term has been used casually and unironically in geopolitical analysis since the 2003 Iraq War. A primary lesson from Rome is the value of long-term investment in durable institutions—like the Roman road network or the Christian Church—that clearly communicate their utility to the public, proving that building things to last ultimately benefits the ruling classes. Conversely, a major vulnerability in modern U.S. foreign policy is the massive, widening gap between its lofty rhetorical goals and its actual geopolitical actions.
In Byzantium, the military represented the state's largest single expense, but it generally fulfilled its stated purpose: protecting Roman subjects. While emperors occasionally launched predatory, plunder-gathering expeditions to glorify themselves, pre-modern infrastructure left no room for "shadow foreign policies." In contrast, modern conflicts highlight how the vast profits of the military-industrial complex combine with idealized political messaging to create an unsustainable disconnect. Kaldellis notes how international onlookers found it "breathtakingly implausible" when the invasion of Afghanistan was publicly framed by some as a feminist war to liberate women from burqas.
* **The Vietnam Analogy:** The catastrophic blow to military credibility during the Vietnam War forced the United States to abandon the conscript army in favor of a professional force, delaying its capacity to wage large-scale foreign interventions for decades.
* **Democracy's Temporal Cost:** Unlike the long-term outlook of the Roman system, modern democracies feature short-sighted leadership cycles where teams of experts and policy designers are completely ejected every four or five years.
---
[03:40:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13214s) Human Nature and the Tides of History
Applying historical lessons requires caution, but certain core aspects of human nature remain completely unchanged across centuries. Rejecting the mid-to-late 20th-century postmodern view that history is merely a sequence of disconnected, culturally isolated eras with no unifying human psychology, Kaldellis sides firmly with the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. Human beings across time exhibit the exact same fundamental parameters of psychology: they love, they hate, they harbor ambitions, and they display incompetence. In any random group of 20 to 30 people from any era, the exact same spectrum of human personality types will emerge.
Culture serves as a mechanism that adjusts the behavioral "dials" from one to ten, but the underlying dials remain identical. This shared baseline leaves room for exceptional, ultra-skilled individuals to occasionally come along at the perfect moment—whether wearing a historic hat, a strange mustache, or a black turtleneck—and single-handedly turn the tides of history. Ideologies and cultural systems are rarely so totalitarian that they completely clone or colonize every mind; historical actors retain the capacity to think outside the box and chart entirely unpredictable paths.
[03:43:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13415s) The Four Phases of Human History
Lex Fridman prompts a thought experiment, asking Anthony Kaldellis to fast-forward a million years into the future to consider whether current humanity is at the beginning, middle, or close to the end of its history. Kaldellis admits that predicting even a year out has become difficult for him, making him skeptical of long-term projections. Instead of using timeline markers like beginning or end, he prefers conceptualizing history through numbered phases defined by distinct operational parameters. He posits that humanity is currently navigating its third major phase.
The first phase, which spanned the vast majority of human existence, was defined by the hunter-gatherer lifestyle. This transitioned into the second phase via the agricultural revolution, allowing for the generation of surpluses and the subsequent rise of complex societies. Today, humanity is living through a combined industrial and technological third phase that is actively modifying what human beings can do and potentially what they can be. Kaldellis is confident a fourth phase lies ahead, though its nature remains uncertain. When pondering how a future phase will look back on the present day, Kaldellis notes that modern humans look back at the ancient Greeks or Romans and see a fundamental, recognizable shared humanity beneath the varying technological constraints and available materials.
- **Phase 1:** The hunter-gatherer period, accounting for the chronological majority of human history.
- **Phase 2:** The agricultural revolution, which introduced surplus production and complex societal structures.
- **Phase 3:** The industrial and technological era, which expands the baseline parameters of human capability.
- **Phase 4:** An impending future era that may alter human parameters even further.
[03:45:50](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13550s) Technology, Consciousness, and the Risk of Self-Destruction
Fridman expands on the transition to a potential fourth phase, highlighting that humanity now possesses tools like genetic engineering, brain-computer interfaces, and artificial intelligence to deeply modify the human experience. He theorizes that stage four might reveal that human uniqueness does not stem from intelligence, which can be artificially expanded, but from consciousness. This raw capacity to feel, love, fear, and suffer remains the consistent thread from hunter-gatherers through the industrial age. However, Fridman balances this philosophical outlook with the darker reality that, for the first time, humanity also possesses the tools required to completely destroy itself. Kaldellis compliments Fridman's eloquence, joking that it is an impressive summary after listening to him ramble about the medieval Roman Empire for hours.
[03:47:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13664s) Historical Perspectives on Hope and Human Flourishing
When asked what gives him hope for the future of civilization, Kaldellis leans on his perspective as a historian. He notes that history is full of eras that were far more miserable and difficult, where giving up hope would have been much easier. He views modern technological risks as difficult but solvable problems, arguing that if society can "rein in some elites," many structural issues can be addressed.
To illustrate how public sentiment fluctuates independently of objective danger, Kaldellis shares an anecdote about growing up during the Cold War. In the 1980s, there was a pervasive, existential fear of imminent nuclear annihilation, yet the popular culture of the decade was famously upbeat, cheerful, and naive. Conversely, when the Cold War ended in the 1990s and the immediate threat subsided, the cultural mood shifted toward depression and "whiny" music. This disconnect convinces him that cultural despair does not always align with objective reality.
> "Despair doesn't always match with, like, if you look at the situation objectively."
Fridman and Kaldellis agree that by most metrics of human flourishing, the late 20th and early 21st centuries represent a peak period of progress, with the absolute volume of sheer human misery decreasing globally year over year. While acknowledging that current progress creates new problems down the road, Kaldellis concludes that there is no logical reason to despair, summary stating, "We can do better. Let's do better."
[03:50:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13824s) Conclusion and Signs of a Great Empire
The conversation closes with expressions of mutual gratitude. Kaldellis notes that the podcast is likely the largest audience he has ever addressed, thanking Fridman for giving the field of Byzantine history an opportunity to be seen and heard by a broader audience. Fridman thanks Kaldellis for the whirlwind journey through Roman history and signs off by directing listeners to his sponsors and contact channels. He leaves the audience with a historical quote from Benjamin Franklin regarding the structural vulnerability of superpowers:
> "A great empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges."
## Notable quotes
> [35:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=2149s) who's the best man to do the job. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [51:35](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3095s) did it, and they meant it. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3905s) Nobody ever tells me anything. — Diocletian
> [01:05:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=3905s) If you asked me to put my finger on one factor [for the flourishing or civil wars of the empire], it would be that. Taxation is the heart of it. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:09:59](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4199s) most of the time it's people who own the land, and in this arrangement, it's the land that owns the people. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:14:52](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4492s) It's as long as you have the quarterfinals, semifinals, and then the final war, and Constantine emerges in 324 as the sole ruler of the entire Roman Empire. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:22:24](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=4944s) ambitious, murderous, [and] ruthless — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:33:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=5581s) okay, I'm not gonna believe that... this is how the emperor wants things to be remembered. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:41:44](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6104s) Christianity, in contrast to, say, the ancient religions, is both far more polarizing but also far more powerful as a unifying force at the same time. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [01:52:22](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=6742s) New Rome is literally stealing food from the mouth of Old Rome. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [02:23:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=8582s) you don't get a pass for conquering North Africa by surrendering Syria. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [02:46:36](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=9996s) The peak-to-peak histories, as you can think of them, they miss the machinery in the valleys. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [02:52:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=10378s) After that, game over. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [03:48:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13735s) Despair doesn't always match with, like, if you look at the situation objectively. — Anthony Kaldellis
> [03:51:20](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pv1TUJSEM2k&t=13880s) A great empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges. — Benjamin Franklin
## Mentioned
Lex Fridman, Anthony Kaldellis, Justinian, Narses, Goths, Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, Diocletian, Hannibal, Octavian, Constantine, Maxentius, Heraclius, Persia, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, Theseus, Hadrian, Samnites, Cicero, Alexios III, Perplexity, Caracalla, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Aurelian, Caligula, Nero, Sasanian Persians, Licinius, Byzantium, Constantinople, Danube, Euphrates, Robin Pierson, The History of Byzantium, Crispus, Antinous, Battle of the Milvian Bridge, Apollo, Valens, Battle of Adrianople, Hagia Sophia, Justinian I, Justin I, Theodora, Tribonian, Perplexity AI, Khosrow II, Phocas, Leo III, Basil II, Timur, Tamerlane, Charlemagne, The New Roman Empire, Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood, Corpus Juris Civilis, Aristotle, Thucydides, Benjamin Franklin
Historian Anthony Kaldellis argues that the Eastern Roman ("Byzantine") Empire survived for over a millennium as a resilient "monarchic republic," sustained not by military despotism, but by universal legal integration, deep civic accountability, and endogenous institutional recovery in the face of recurrent external shocks.
The Monarchic Republic and Imperial Accountability (35:49)
Rather than operating as a military autocracy, the Eastern Roman state functioned as a politeia—the Greek translation of res publica—where the emperor was viewed as an executive officer bound to serve the public interest. The Roman army was almost never deployed as an instrument of internal social control over citizens. Instead, imperial power existed in a "perpetual referendum" enforced by raw violence: roughly 46% of Constantinople's emperors were violently deposed, blinded, or assassinated. Rebellion was a systemic feature devoid of competing ideologies, acting as the ultimate stick that forced rulers to govern competently or face an early grave.
To survive, emperors assiduously projected an imperial persona of proactive, self-sacrificing stewardship. Rulers such as Justinian cultivated reputations as "sleepless" workaholics dedicated entirely to the common good. This accountability was institutionalized through a pervasive petition system, which operated under the civic expectation that the imperial administration would review and address grievances brought by any citizen.
Universal Citizenship and the Administrative Matrix (51:35)
A critical distinction separating the Roman Empire from later colonial empires was its complete legal integration. Under the Edict of Caracalla, citizenship expanded from roughly one-third to 100% of the free population, enabling provincials to rise into the highest senatorial and imperial offices within a single generation. This established a uniform Roman identity across diverse ethnic territories. The sophisticated legal code provided enduring social continuity; for example, in the 10th and 11th centuries, Jewish women frequently chose Roman civil courts over rabbinical courts because secular Roman law treated estate disputes strictly as property issues, granting women superior ownership and inheritance rights.
Kaldellis dismisses the idea of the isolated medieval peasant as a historical myth. Rural communities were locked into a dense administrative matrix: every tract of arable land was documented in imperial censuses, and tax collectors arrived roughly three times a year to collect coins, goods, recruits, and compulsory labor services. Reinforced by a uniform church calendar and weekly sermons, ordinary subjects remained tightly connected to central authority.
Strategic Geography and Co-optation of Religion (77:39)
The relocation of the capital to Constantinople positioned the Roman state at a vital geopolitical crossroads between the Danube and Euphrates frontiers, while joining the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. This dual-continental footprint created a geographic safety valve: when Asian provinces were overrun by Persians or Arabs, the state could fall back on European resources, and vice versa. Advanced technological secrets, notably the pressurized, ship-mounted incendiary weapon known as Greek fire, further insulated the empire from catastrophic maritime sieges.
Rather than Rome simply converting to Christianity, the imperial apparatus co-opted the religion over a five-century transition. The state integrated bishops into the administrative machinery, using public funds to finance church charity while progressively legislating away pagan civic rites. Although exclusive Christian truth claims introduced acute theological polarization, imperial orthodoxy ultimately functioned as a potent, unifying civic framework.
Endogenous Resilience and the Mechanics of Collapse (194:36)
Across its 1,200-year history, the Eastern Roman Empire was remarkably devoid of internal peasant rebellions, warlord territorial partitioning, or provincial separatist uprisings—with Bulgaria being the lone exception to break away in 1185. Kaldellis stresses that Roman history was not an oscillation of decay, but an exhibition of endogenous resilience: catastrophic downturns were triggered by exogenous shocks (such as invasions and the Justinianic plague), after which the state systematically consolidated, held a defensive line, and rebuilt its tax and military base without external aid.
This structural resilience ended between 1300 and 1350. The permanent loss of Asia Minor to the Turks eliminated the empire's ability to draw manpower and revenue from its eastern wing. Confined to a Balkan corridor, the state suffered fatal self-inflicted wounds during a factional civil war that surrendered half of its remaining European territory to Serbia, leaving a hollowed-out rump state that could no longer survive.
Kaldellis concludes that the longevity of the Eastern Roman state rested on internal institutional design and durable public trust rather than imperial borders. For modern superpowers, Rome's endurance highlights the imperative of building long-term civic infrastructure and demonstrates the systemic danger when official state rhetoric widens into an unsustainable gap with geopolitical reality.
[35:49] Anthony Kaldellis: who's the best man to do the job.
[51:35] Anthony Kaldellis: did it, and they meant it.
[65:05] Diocletian: Nobody ever tells me anything.
[65:05] Anthony Kaldellis: If you asked me to put my finger on one factor [for the flourishing or civil wars of the empire], it would be that. Taxation is the heart of it.
[69:59] Anthony Kaldellis: most of the time it's people who own the land, and in this arrangement, it's the land that owns the people.
[74:52] Anthony Kaldellis: It's as long as you have the quarterfinals, semifinals, and then the final war, and Constantine emerges in 324 as the sole ruler of the entire Roman Empire.
[82:24] Anthony Kaldellis: ambitious, murderous, [and] ruthless
[93:01] Anthony Kaldellis: okay, I'm not gonna believe that... this is how the emperor wants things to be remembered.
[101:44] Anthony Kaldellis: Christianity, in contrast to, say, the ancient religions, is both far more polarizing but also far more powerful as a unifying force at the same time.
[112:22] Anthony Kaldellis: New Rome is literally stealing food from the mouth of Old Rome.
[143:02] Anthony Kaldellis: you don't get a pass for conquering North Africa by surrendering Syria.
[166:36] Anthony Kaldellis: The peak-to-peak histories, as you can think of them, they miss the machinery in the valleys.
[172:58] Anthony Kaldellis: After that, game over.
[228:55] Anthony Kaldellis: Despair doesn't always match with, like, if you look at the situation objectively.
[231:20] Benjamin Franklin: A great empire, like a great cake, is most easily diminished at the edges.
Original transcript
[0:00] - We're talking about a society
that was right in the middle
[0:04] of one of the main corridors of
empire building and new religions
[0:08] in the world. This is the most dangerous
neighborhood that you can possibly live in.
[0:13] - 26 emperors were murdered
in a period of 50 years.
[0:18] - Yes. It's tremendous instability.
[0:21] - Almost all were of these emperors
were generals, and almost all were
[0:24] murdered by their men. So civil war was
the norm, hyperinflation, economic crash,
[0:31] plus there's a plague.
There's just a lot of chaos.
[0:34] - Here's why I don't think the
Eastern Roman Empire is a military
[0:38] dictatorship. Even though, again,
the emperors control the armies,
[0:43] and the armies themselves
will often have a say in,
[0:48] Who becomes emperor, like through the
civil wars that we mentioned. The reason
[0:52] why I don't think it's a
military dictatorship is because
[0:55] they almost never, very, very, very rarely
use the army as an instrument of social
[1:03] control. Sometimes these eunuchs
were extremely competent
[1:07] like Narses, Justinian's general, who
defeated the Goths in Italy in this
[1:11] massive battle. Like, this guy was a
total hardass. And he's this little
[1:15] old man. He was- he was very old, and he was
tiny, and he was a eunuch, and the Goths
[1:19] laughed at him, but he had the last laugh.
[1:24] - The following is a conversation
with Anthony Kaldellis, a
[1:28] historian of the Eastern Roman Empire,
also known as the Byzantine Empire.
[1:35] This is a Lex Fridman podcast. To support
it, please check out our sponsors in the
[1:39] description, where you can
also find links to contact me,
[1:43] ask questions, give
feedback, and so on. And
[1:47] now, dear friends, here's
Anthony Kaldellis.
[1:52] You've described that the
Byzantine Empire is the Roman
[1:56] Empire, that calling it the
Byzantine Empire is an invention of
[1:59] historians writing long after
the empire has collapsed,
[2:04] that the people of that time
considered themselves Romans, and that
[2:08] the so-called Byzantine Empire never
actually existed, that it was,
[2:12] in every legal and cultural
sense, the Roman Empire
[2:15] continuing unbroken. So let's get our terms
right in the grand historical context.
[2:24] What is the Byzantine Empire, and why
should we just call it the Roman Empire?
[2:28] - So Lex, the burden of proof is on those
who would assert that what we've been
[2:32] calling the Byzantine
Empire is something other-
[2:35] ... than the Roman Empire, because all of our sources
are very clear about this. And we've known about
[2:39] this. We've always known about it. It's
almost a form of cognitive dissonance, right?
[2:42] It's like when you know something is the
case, but you carry on as if it's not.
[2:47] So the Eastern Roman Empire,
this is the direct continuation
[2:51] of the ancient Roman Empire in the East,
right? Everybody knows the Western Empire
[2:54] fell in the fifth century.
[2:57] And for many conceptions of Western history,
that was sufficient. Like, that's when
[3:01] we just called it. The Roman
Empire fell in the fifth century.
[3:05] And we kinda, yeah, we kinda know that the
eastern half survived, but we don't wanna include
[3:09] that in our cultural genealogy. And
so we kinda pretend that it became
[3:12] something else. But in fact, it called
itself the Roman Empire. Its subjects were
[3:16] Roman citizens. They called themselves Romans
all the way down through to the end and
[3:20] beyond. So there are a number of
reasons why Western Europeans wanted to
[3:25] think that the Eastern Empire is something
different, and those reasons have
[3:30] created these models where
[3:32] They were, they called it Empire of the Greeks
for 1,000 years, then they switched to Byzantine
[3:36] Empire for very political
reasons. Now that's collapsing.
[3:40] So we're now moving into a phase where
we have the long Roman Empire. We,
[3:44] we recognize that the history of
the Roman state, the Roman polity,
[3:48] is something that lasts an
extraordinarily long time.
[3:51] Very unique almost in
history, from antiquity,
[3:55] like the archaic period,
down to the 15th century.
[3:59] - I think it would be really
nice to actually look
[4:01] just for a brief moment at
the grand scale of the,
[4:05] the full Roman state as it
lasted for over 2,200 years.
[4:11] - Yeah.
[4:11] - So its founding, 753 BC, to let's say
the fall of Constantinople in 1453 AD.
[4:21] So can we try to give a big picture
overview of everything that happened?
[4:25] - Okay, so first we have a period of the
kings. This is almost legendary, from
[4:29] like the eighth century
BC down to around 510 BC.
[4:34] So this is when Rome is ruled
by a series of local kings.
[4:37] The kings are expelled, and the
republic, or what we call the republic,
[4:41] is instituted, and this is a
regime that's governed by mostly
[4:45] an aristocracy, but with
cooperation from the
[4:49] people of Rome. In various ways,
the arrangements change over the
[4:53] centuries. So that lasts
for about five centuries.
[4:56] And then we have the end of the republic
in the era of Julius Caesar and
[5:00] Augustus Caesar, when the civil wars lead
to the creation of an imperial monarchy...
[5:05] ...right, under Augustus. So that's,
we date that roughly either,
[5:10] yeah, 27 BC, something like
that. And thereafter, it is an
[5:14] imperial monarchy for the
next millennium and a half.
[5:17] Very broadly, we can divide that
into two phases, one where the
[5:21] center of power is in Rome, and
one where it's in Constantinople.
[5:26] And, you know, we can debate the dates
of when that transition takes place.
[5:30] These big transitions usually take place over
long periods of time. They're not, like,
[5:34] very sudden. So that's the big picture.
Kings, republic, imperial monarchy.
[5:42] - The Roman Kingdom, the Roman
Republic, the Roman Empire.
[5:46] - Yes.
[5:46] - And then the West and East Roman Empire.
[5:49] - Yes.
[5:50] - Uh, and then maybe what are the
different terms that we could be
[5:53] using for the Byzantine
Empire, including Byzantium?
[5:59] Is it also fair to say
the Late Roman Empire?
[6:03] - So Late Roman Empire we use for
both east and west, starting
[6:07] around the reign of Diocletian maybe,
even a bit earlier, so during the third
[6:11] century AD. And that goes down to maybe
the early seventh century. So that
[6:16] period we call Late Roman Empire. And
[6:20] if you ask me to define its principal
characteristics, it would probably
[6:23] be the tax system and the
administration, the bureaucracy...
[6:27] ...of the later Roman Empire
is that that comes from mostly
[6:30] Diocletian and Constantine's reforms.
[6:32] - And Diocletian was in the 3rd century.
[6:35] - Yes, 284 to 305 AD. Yes. A
very important reformer.
[6:39] - And we'll talk about it, but let's just do
this whirlwind, and hopefully there'll be
[6:43] automagical images
somewhere overlaid, but-
[6:46] - Okay.
[6:46] - So in 753 BC, Rome, a small city state,
is founded, and in 509 BC, the kings are
[6:54] overthrown, and the Roman Republic is born.
390 BC, the Gauls sack Rome, and this, I
[7:02] believe, among other events throughout
its history, is a formative
[7:06] trauma that hardens Rome's
security obsession.
[7:10] It turns out, throughout
its history, people want to
[7:14] attack from different directions,
and so you have to defend. So
[7:19] there's two wars, as we're actually
saying off mic. There's two kinds
[7:22] of military operations. One is wars
of conquest and expansion, and one is
[7:31] more defensive. And we'll
talk about how the military
[7:34] changes throughout its history to allocate
more effort to one versus the other.
[7:40] In 264 to 146 BC, the Punic
[7:44] Wars and the survival against Hannibal
transform Rome into a Mediterranean
[7:48] superpower. Then like you
mentioned, Caesar in 49 to 31 BC,
[7:55] Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon
to assassination of Caesar to
[7:59] the Battle of Actium, and
then the Civil War dismantles
[8:03] the Republic and concentrates power in a
single ruler, Octavian, AKA Augustus, the
[8:10] first Roman emperor, let's say. Then
27 BC, Augustus founds the Principate,
[8:17] really low-key monarchy. And
so officially, that ends the
[8:21] Republic, and then that begins, 27 BC
to 180 AD, the Pax Romana, which is a
[8:28] period of relative peace and stability.
And a lot of the emperors we know of,
[8:32] the sexy, popular emperors
all come from that period.
[8:36] Marcus Aurelius, who I'm a big fan
of, from that period. Then that
[8:40] takes us to 284 AD, the guy we mentioned,
[8:43] Diocletian, who rebuilds the state.
Emperors drop the first citizen mask,
[8:49] this perception of the way, and we'll
talk about this, the persona that's
[8:52] presented by the state. 312 AD,
Constantine defeats Maxentius at the
[9:00] Milvian Bridge to become the sole ruler of
the western half of the empire, and then
[9:04] founds Constantinople in 330 AD. East
and West are split in 395 AD. Visigoths
[9:12] sack Rome in 410 AD. The West falls
at 476 AD as the last Western
[9:20] emperor is deposed. And then we sort of
focus more on the East Roman Empire with
[9:27] 527. In the 6th century,
Justinian's reign.
[9:31] In the 7th century, Heraclius defeats
Persia and then loses against
[9:35] the Arabs. There's the Arab
conquest continuing in the 7th
[9:39] century. In the 8th the Arab
siege of Constantinople fails.
[9:46] There's the Macedonian dynasty in that you
[9:50] have an excellent book about.
And then the Crusades,
[9:54] and then eventually leading to
Constantinople falling in 1453 AD.
[10:02] As a person who understands
the full journey of it with
[10:06] a focus on East Roman history,
is there obvious glaring
[10:10] holes or incorrect things
in what I just said?
[10:14] - No, nothing incorrect. I would say
if you wanted to produce a sort of
[10:20] very swift timeline of its history, it's
obviously important to focus on the
[10:28] moments when lots of territory was
[10:32] lost to foreign invaders, and
these are actually three main
[10:36] moments. There's the Arab conquests in the
[10:39] 630s. This is a decade. In a decade,
that war was lost. It is the Seljuk Turk
[10:47] conquest of Asia Minor,
modern Turkey, in the 1070s,
[10:53] and that was very swift and partly
reversed afterwards, but only partly.
[10:59] And then there's the Fourth
Crusade, 1204, when the armies from
[11:03] mostly France sack, conquer Constantinople,
and dismember the empire as
[11:07] much as they could. It didn't last
that long. The Romans managed to
[11:11] regroup and recover but those are the three
main crisis points. They are very swift,
[11:18] but they cause incredible damage.
[11:22] For all the rest of its
history, it is a state and
[11:25] society that is generally sort of
consolidating, you know, regrouping,
[11:33] and generally engaged in slow but steady
economic growth, territorial expansion on a
[11:41] small scale, but steady.
[11:43] Uh, so we can talk about this. It's...
I think it's an important thing
[11:47] to keep in mind about the big
picture, that the defeats were swift
[11:52] and kind of, you know, terrible. But most
of its history is one of slow growth.
[12:00] - There's some traumatic events
that have a big impact, but a
[12:04] lot of the developments
we'll talk about it might
[12:08] seem or feel like there's
a particular moment
[12:12] when those developments or changes in the
way the government or the military is
[12:15] structured arise, but really
it's a gradual process.
[12:18] - Exactly.
[12:19] - And so that's the tension we have
to be constantly dancing with.
[12:21] - Yeah, so as historians, this is a point
of method, and it's very important. There
[12:25] are moments when, like, individuals
with a great deal of power
[12:30] make choices that impact everybody
else and have, you know, long-term
[12:33] consequences downstream.
[12:36] Constantine's conversion to
Christianity, for example, right?
[12:39] Not something that anybody could
have or did predict. Okay.
[12:44] Otherwise, most of the
developments that we identify by
[12:48] specific dates, like you mentioned 395, the
division of the eastern and the western
[12:52] empires, those are conventional dates that
we use to actually capture what is in
[12:57] fact a much longer process. There
was no split between the two
[13:01] halves. It was one among many
[13:04] allocations of jurisdiction to, like, one
son and another son in the east and the
[13:08] west. The two halves were subsequently
reunited, then they kind of
[13:13] divided again among different
emperors. It's just a process,
[13:17] and so we sometimes use fixed dates
for what is in fact a process. Or for
[13:22] 76, the fall of the Western Empire,
that's just the last date. It's
[13:25] actually a very long
process that took decades.
[13:29] Right? So that's just something to keep in mind,
that sometimes we're talking about processes,
[13:32] sometimes we're talking about very discrete
events with long-term consequences. Yeah.
[13:37] - Maybe an impossible question
for a Roman state that lasted
[13:41] over 2,200 years, but is
there a kind of through
[13:45] line, a thread, a soul that runs
through the entire history of the Roman
[13:49] Empire? As you said, it's a slow
[13:52] transformation and evolution.
But if we dare call the whole
[13:56] thing Roman, Rome, the Roman state-
[14:00] - Yes
[14:00] - ... is there some aspect, some characteristics
that run through the whole thing?
[14:05] - I think so, yes. By the way, you know
the metaphor of the Ship of Theseus?
[14:10] Okay. So in case the audience doesn't know it,
this is when there's a ship, and it's, you know,
[14:14] at sea, and over time, like,
every component of that ship
[14:18] is replaced with some other component,
so that by the end of the story, it
[14:22] has none of the original
parts. But it's, like, in a
[14:26] certain sense still that ship because
of the story, right? The... Okay.
[14:30] So Roman history is different
from, let's say, Greek history
[14:34] or Christian history, right? Christian
history is the story of a religion. It can be
[14:38] in any country, among any ethnic group.
It's here, there, right? It's everywhere.
[14:43] But you still have
histories of Christianity.
[14:45] It's the same with, like
say, Greek culture-
[14:48] ... or your Greek literature, right?
It's not a function of a particular
[14:52] state. Ancient Greeks were
famously never united in a state.
[14:56] But it's people who culturally accept that
[15:00] tradition as their kind of elite
prestige culture and engage
[15:04] with Homer and Plato and so
forth. And they can be anywhere.
[15:08] Roman history is not like that. Roman history
is very specifically the history of a
[15:13] state or a political
community. And so this is the
[15:16] community of the Roman people,
the Roman citizens. And it
[15:21] is in gradual evolution, but at no
point is there a rupture in that
[15:24] history such that its members
would ever think that something
[15:28] dramatic had changed, and that
they're no longer part of that
[15:32] story. So in the same way as
the ship I just mentioned,
[15:36] in other words, it's the narrative that
you tell about it where the changes that
[15:40] take place to it make sense only when you
see them within the context of that story.
[15:45] It's the same with Roman history. Yes,
there are changes. Like, eventually
[15:49] everything changes. But it happens
so gradually that it doesn't
[15:53] seem that way to anyone living in it.
[15:56] And so the narrative of
the history of the Roman
[15:59] people is what holds all of this together.
[16:02] - How important is it that, so you
mentioned Greek culture. So a lot
[16:06] of my friends who are Greek are
extremely proud of being Greek.
[16:10] There's certain cultures that are proud.
[16:12] - Sure.
[16:13] - And it's not a momentary
ephemeral thing. It feels
[16:17] like a thing that has lasted
for many generations.
[16:20] - Oh, yeah.
[16:20] - And so that is an engine
that propagates through
[16:23] time that carries that
culture forward. And so does
[16:27] a similar thing apply for the Roman
Empire in a different way? Maybe
[16:31] because you say it's a political kind of
community, that means a set of ideals.
[16:36] And we'll talk about, because
those ideals become even more
[16:40] concretized and explicit, I
think, through the East Roman
[16:44] Empire, because one of the things
you talk about is that the
[16:48] citizens of the empire are kind
of all connected, that they are—
[16:53] ... engaged in this whole sort of
machinery. Anyway, that's a complicated way
[16:57] of asking, is there some
elements that Greek
[17:01] pride, dare I speak, is there some kind
of Roman pride that propagates the thing?
[17:06] - Oh, there totally is. You can find authors
and historical agents who definitely
[17:13] display this or talk about it.
But we don't want to make that
[17:17] the center of the story or the basis for
any analysis because... So what you're
[17:21] observing in your Greek friends is also
the result of modern nation building,
[17:25] is it's the result of modern systems of
education, and sort of national identities,
[17:29] and these are fostered and created
through all kinds of media and
[17:32] institutions. It's just a different
situation altogether. What you
[17:36] find in ancient republics or medieval
states is more something like a consensus
[17:45] to be ruled, to be, to rule and to be ruled
in this particular political community.
[17:50] Now, some members of it may definitely, and
in fact did have this kind of pride. I'll
[17:54] give you an example. So there's an ambassador
in the sixth century, and he's concluding
[17:58] a deal with the Persians. And you
know, the Persians are skeptical
[18:02] cause, you know, Romans can't always be
trusted. But this guy says to them, he says,
[18:06] and let me just tell you, you're
making a deal here with the Romans.
[18:10] The Romans. The name should say it all."
[18:13] Like, you, okay, and you get a sense that this
is, he's expressing a certain pride in, like,
[18:17] being a bearer of the Roman tradition and
speaking for the emperors and the Roman Empire.
[18:21] I mean, that's, for him, this was something
very, very momentous. You find these kinds of
[18:25] examples, so these people exist. But I
wouldn't want to make that the basis
[18:28] for like an analysis of how
the society works as a whole.
[18:34] For the most part, it was something
like a consensus where, you
[18:38] know, subjects or citizens, however
you want to call them, they agree to—
[18:44] let's say be taxed and be ruled by
political authorities because of what
[18:48] they get in return, and there's
this kind of understanding of a
[18:52] mutual set of responsibilities. And
[18:55] my concern, among other things,
is to try to explain how this
[18:59] society held together for so long. Pride,
yes, among some people, definitely. You
[19:06] find it in the sources. But
sources are, texts are written by
[19:09] literate, you know, usually
elites. So this is a small part
[19:13] of the population. We can't automatically
extend their attitudes to everybody else.
[19:18] So in dealing with everyone else, we have to work
with different kinds of materials, different kinds of
[19:22] assumptions. We can't just posit that
they're just proud of being Roman.
[19:26] They could have been. We don't know that,
though. We can see other sorts of things
[19:30] about them. Like, for example, did they
pay their taxes? Did they try to rebel and
[19:34] leave the empire? So those are the
kinds of things that I look for.
[19:37] - Pride is one component, but there could
be other explanations and factors
[19:43] that explain what motivates a soldier
to defend the capital, for example.
[19:49] Like, what motivates a
[19:53] particular person to pay the taxes.
And then this is something that we'll
[19:57] definitely talk about. But just
to linger at the big picture,
[20:01] if the Romans from the
different periods met,
[20:06] how different would they be
from each other? Like, if I
[20:10] brought to you... This is one of
those, you know, there's like-
[20:12] - Yes, yes,
[20:12] - ... blind taste tests
you can do with food.
[20:14] - Yes. Pepsi and Coke.
[20:16] - Pepsi and Coke.
[20:17] - Yes.
[20:17] - If I brought you a Roman
from the kingdom period,
[20:22] the republic period, the
early imperial period-
[20:27] - I mean, I get asked this in a much more radical
form, which is like if you take someone
[20:31] from, like, around 1453 who's a
Roman and a subject of this Roman,
[20:35] and compare, and, and, you know,
compare him or have him meet, you know,
[20:39] in your imagination with someone from
the ancient republic. Like, how-
[20:42] - Yeah,
[20:42] - ... could they find any kind of
agreement on what it means to
[20:46] be Roman and recognize each other as
belonging to that polity? This, this
[20:50] is a very difficult thing to...
Like, now, I can point to a
[20:54] number of things that they would
find eventually. And, you know,
[20:58] if you told them, "Yo, you're both Romans,
you're both from this long history, now you have
[21:02] to find, you know, what you have in common,"
I think they could find things. But
[21:06] before we talk about those,
if you wanna get into it,
[21:09] let's just say that the
question can even be posed
[21:13] about Romans who live at the
same time. I mean, if you take a
[21:17] senator from the age of
Cicero and someone from the
[21:21] slums of Rome, who's
maybe the son of a slave
[21:25] who was brought from the East by
some general a generation ago,
[21:30] and put them in a room and
say, "Now, you discuss. You're
[21:34] both Romans. What do you have in common?" They
might have trouble in coming up with something.
[21:38] Right? So let's not minimize the sheer
[21:41] diversity of experiences and
sort of life experiences
[21:45] of Romans who are living at the same time.
[21:49] The important thing is that a
change is always happening, and
[21:53] from my standpoint this change is sort of
[21:57] cumulative, so it results
in Greek-speaking Orthodox
[22:00] Christian Romans in
Constantinople who at first
[22:04] sight might have little to
do with Latin-speaking, you
[22:08] know, non-Christians or worshiping
the ancient gods, Romans from a
[22:12] republic in Rome. And those are very,
very different situations, and no
[22:16] doubt they would look and seem
foreign to each other, right? The
[22:20] question is, why do we assume that someone
like Hadrian, right, an emperor from the
[22:25] second century sort of a
very cosmopolitan figure
[22:29] who travels around the empire
with his Greek lover and,
[22:33] you know, writes poems and has a Greek beard
and, you know, loves Greek culture and
[22:40] has much to do with someone from
the Middle Republic who's, you
[22:44] know some warrior who's chasing
down cattle from the Samnites. I
[22:48] mean, and yet the way we understand history
is that, oh no, those belong together.
[22:53] Hadrian and this ancient Roman
from the fourth century BC.
[22:58] But not Hadrian and someone,
you know, an emperor a few
[23:02] centuries later who's just like him,
bilingual in Greek and Latin, who's
[23:06] ... kinda cosmopolitan, who,
you know, reads the same stuff,
[23:10] because we posit this rupture
between Roman and Byzantine.
[23:15] - One of the ways we can try to analyze
this is, for example, looking at
[23:18] a very specific role in society across
time. So we can look at soldiers,
[23:26] how they solve violence, for
example. That's one way.
[23:29] So you're making me realize
that we can just take 1,000
[23:33] different professions and
positions in society and really
[23:36] specifically look at what the
experience of the world was like.
[23:41] And so one of them is
the view on violence,
[23:47] Across time. And, and then the other
is the view on the role of the,
[23:54] the government- ... across time.
[23:57] - That's an excellent way of putting it. So take
soldiers, for example. They swear an oath.
[24:01] Right? Now, we don't have the
oath for every given period.
[24:05] We have some approximations of it, some hints
of what it contained, but we know that Roman
[24:09] soldiers swore an oath like,
throughout all of the centuries of the
[24:13] empire. Sometimes they might
add, like, a Christian formula
[24:17] to it. Sometime before that, not. But
they swore basically to protect the
[24:25] republic or depending on
what term they used or the
[24:28] empire or the emperor. And this
is something that they would have
[24:32] recognized very quickly. Like,
if, if they met each other over
[24:36] time and said, "Hey, what was your oath like?" And
they recited it this would have made much sense
[24:40] to them, right?
[24:41] Or take, for example, a woman who runs a
business, right? From any century of the
[24:47] empire. It, it would have been, especially
the later you go, the, the more so,
[24:53] that this woman is enabled
to do this by virtue
[24:56] of Roman law. Of certain,
you know, Roman law of
[25:00] property and inheritance
and, and marriage, but
[25:03] also regulations regarding
who can do what and what
[25:07] kinds of properties women can handle
and under what circumstances.
[25:11] This is something that Roman women had in
common that many other cultures did not.
[25:16] So I'll give you an example.
So for example, in the 10th,
[25:20] 11th century, there are Jewish women
who live in the Eastern Roman Empire-
[25:26] ... who realize that they have more
rights in Roman courts than in
[25:31] rabbinical ones, and they take
their disputes to the Roman courts.
[25:37] Now, the thing is that for the
Romans, these are property matters-
[25:40] ... not religious matters. But for the
rabbis, these are religious matters. But the
[25:44] Roman courts trump the Jewish courts-
[25:47] ... in the empire, right? And so you end up
with a situation where Jewish women have more
[25:50] rights-
[25:52] ... than Jewish women do elsewhere,
because where Roman law is not operative.
[25:56] And there you go. Right? Like, these
things matter, right? And that's a
[26:00] function of imperial law.
[26:02] - And this, this would be an interesting
actually interplay between the law
[26:07] and religious institutions- ... Throughout
the East- ... uh, Roman Empire.
[26:13] So you argue that even though the
personality of the various emperors varied,
[26:17] as we'll talk about, and as
they're often venerated,
[26:21] celebrated, criticized, talked about,
[26:24] the late Roman Empire was
projecting a persona to its
[26:27] citizens that was consistent
throughout its history.
[26:31] Can you describe what you mean by this
and describe the different detailed
[26:35] characteristics of this persona?
[26:37] - Yes. So this persona, it's what the
governments or the emperor, the court, and the
[26:44] spokesman, the bureaucracy
want their subjects to think,
[26:49] This whole thing is about. Like, how is
power being used, why, and for whom, right?
[26:56] And they do so in laws that
[27:00] they promulgate throughout the empire.
Sometimes they have these laws read in
[27:04] church, for example, or posted
publicly. They're definitely eager to
[27:08] have them communicated to
as many people as possible.
[27:11] But they're also a function of
imperial rhetoric so the way
[27:15] you praise an emperor, the way you
talk about an emperor. You find this
[27:18] language in petitions, so
this is a hugely important
[27:22] glue for this society,
is that anyone could
[27:26] basically petition the authorities for
let's just say just about anything.
[27:30] That's not technically true, but
there's a lot of petitioning going
[27:33] on. So, you know, if you think
something's wrong or you've been
[27:37] treated unjustly, you can
petition local officials, even
[27:41] imperial officials. You can petition
the emperor, you can... Right? And the
[27:45] expectation is that that petition will be
read, addressed, and answered. It might not
[27:49] be answered in the way that you
want, but it will be answered.
[27:52] And those responses contain this
language also, right? So these are
[27:56] the different media through which
the emperors are broadcasting this
[28:00] persona, and that persona is
what? Basically, that the
[28:04] authorities are responsive to
the needs of their subjects,
[28:08] that they are often accountable.
In other words, they understand
[28:12] that they are exercising public power,
[28:16] and that their mandate is to
exercise it solely for the
[28:19] benefit of their subjects.
They keep saying this. Um,
[28:23] so renouncing any kind of
private interest. In other
[28:26] words, "We're not doing this
for our benefit," say the
[28:30] authorities. "We're doing
this for your benefit."
[28:33] Also that they're proactive.
So the emperors are constantly
[28:36] saying that, "We're planning ahead.
[28:40] We're trying to foresee what problems
you might have, and we are solving
[28:44] them at, before you experience them."
[28:47] And that they are also working very
hard. So hardworking. In fact,
[28:51] the one of the cliches that they keep
using is sleepless. The emperors
[28:54] keep saying that, "I'm losing sleep over
this. I'm not sleeping at night because
[28:58] I'm just worrying so much about your
problems and how to solve them." Justinian,
[29:02] for example, was publicly known
as the sleepless emperor, and not
[29:06] because he was a demon whose head
floated around in the palace on its own,
[29:10] which some people
[29:12] - That's the thing?
[29:12] - It was a thing, yes.
[29:14] - Okay.
[29:14] - That's a whole thing.
[29:15] - But sleepless in terms of worked so hard-
[29:17] - Yes.
[29:17] - ... there's no time to sleep.
[29:19] - He was a workaholic. That is
conceded by even his enemies.
[29:24] All night he was up just hauling
officials in at any old hour to
[29:27] talk about whatever, you know, wars
and architecture and laws and the
[29:31] religion and theology and whatever. So the
emperors are projecting this image, right?
[29:36] So that's what I call the persona.
[29:38] Tireless effort to work on behalf
of subjects, to do so responsibly,
[29:45] to be responsive and
accountable. In other words,
[29:49] if some of my officials
breaks the law or oppresses
[29:53] you, I'm giving you
instruments, like legal
[29:56] instruments, by which to
hold them to account.
[29:59] So that's the persona.
It's very consistent,
[30:03] And I think it's part of the
mechanism of tying the society
[30:07] together. In other words, if subjects
think that their emperors are like this,
[30:11] right, they're more likely to agree to the
consensus of essentially paying taxes.
[30:17] - And you draw this distinction
between rhetoric and action,
[30:21] what the authorities say and what
they actually do. So when you say
[30:25] persona in the modern times, some of
that could be reframed as propaganda-
[30:30] - Yeah.
[30:30] - ... for example. And propaganda
implies that the rhetoric,
[30:36] that there's a big gap
between the rhetoric and the
[30:40] action. And one of the things you said you
took away from reading Machiavelli is that
[30:43] we should judge people not by what
they say, but by what they do.
[30:48] So how much of the Roman Empire's
government of what they espoused
[30:52] was merely rhetoric, and how
much was true in how they acted?
[30:56] - Yes. This is a key lesson I took
from reading Machiavelli, and
[31:00] I found this a very insightful way
of thinking about politics, and
[31:05] I would recommend that anybody kind of
practice this way of looking at the world,
[31:09] right? People and states and, you
know, powerful people can say
[31:12] anything they want to. At the end of the
day, what matters is what they actually do.
[31:18] And this doesn't mean
that what they say is
[31:21] irrelevant, even if it's discordant
with what they do. But nevertheless,
[31:27] In the case of the East Roman state,
[31:31] so my research suggests that the
emperors and the authorities
[31:35] were generally sincere in what
they said. In other words,
[31:39] I have found that they generally did what
they said they were going to do overall.
[31:46] Not perfectly, obviously. And of course,
these are human beings we're talking
[31:50] about. The, right, the human societies,
there was a lot of, you know,
[31:54] corruption, and you name it. Abuse-
[31:56] ... of course. Of course there is.
But overall, I think that there was
[32:00] a sufficient level of
understanding that the emperors
[32:04] are in fact doing this, and they were
actually incentivized to do this. We can talk
[32:08] about how. Because they were also in a
pretty vulnerable situation too, so they
[32:14] needed their subjects to be
relatively content on this front.
[32:18] - Isn't this surprising to
you? So, you know, from the
[32:22] outsider point of view, Roman emperors,
even in the East Roman Empire,
[32:29] technically have a lot of power.
[32:33] You can even say in some
cases absolute power, and yet
[32:37] they seem to be awfully worried ... to
make everybody in the empire happy.
[32:44] What explains that? Like
what, what explains the small
[32:48] gap between rhetoric and action
in the East Roman Empire?
[32:52] - A number of things, but ultimately it is
that there is no right to the throne.
[32:57] And this is a function of the Roman
matrix of politics here. In other words,
[33:03] So here's a bit of a paradox.
[33:06] What we call the Roman Republic
was the most imperialistic
[33:10] phase of Roman history. Like this is when
the Romans did most of their conquering.
[33:15] What we call the empire is much
less imperialistic in this way.
[33:19] That's much more defensive in
its approach, right? And yet our
[33:22] terms are a little mismatched in that way.
The empire is more a function of the,
[33:30] That it has an emperor rather than
it is engaged in imperialism.
[33:36] And that emperor emerged
out of the republic.
[33:40] But emerged out of the republic in
a very strange way. In other words,
[33:44] not as a dynasty that created the
[33:48] state. So for example, if you think of
the Ottoman Empire, many other empires,
[33:52] they... The whole thing existed because
this dynasty engaged in conquest and-
[33:57] ... was successful in creating the state, and
so the dynasty was like at the heart of the
[34:01] state. But that's not at
all the case in the Roman
[34:05] Empire. The emperor is a
figure who emerged within a
[34:09] republic, and in order to
create peace after the
[34:13] civil wars, those emperors had
to, for a long time, kind of
[34:16] pretend that they were not what they
really were. Um, basically, you know,
[34:23] continuing to flatter the idea of a
republic that is, you know, that has a
[34:27] first citizen maybe. "Oh, no,
no, I'm not a king. I'm just, I
[34:31] have this office and that
office and that office."
[34:33] "Whatever the Senate has given me." Now,
we understand that's a facade, but the
[34:37] fact that they had to create this
facade at all is very important.
[34:40] - Can we actually just linger on that?
[34:41] I mean, how much of this... 'Cause you
said they had to create this facade.
[34:45] - Yeah.
[34:46] - Did Augustus, who started the whole
thing, the first emperor of Rome,
[34:53] did he have to act that way? 'Cause he
kept acting like he's not an absolute-
[34:59] - Yes
[34:59] - ... monarch, and he could have gone
hardcore, destroy the Senate, just full
[35:07] hardcore rule, dictatorship.
[35:09] - Well, then how does he govern then?
[35:11] - Uh, so he wants to be
an effective governor.
[35:13] - Oh, yeah.
[35:13] - And he also wants to not be overthrown.
[35:16] - Exactly. Because, you know, just
because you ended one civil war
[35:20] doesn't mean that there's
not going to be another.
[35:22] You have to create a consensus such that
people don't want to have another civil war.
[35:26] If he did what you said, which
he in theory could have done,
[35:30] but that would've just led
to more wars, right? So the
[35:34] problem is that the emperors, even those
who come to power through violence, they
[35:37] can't prevent other people from trying
to come to power through violence
[35:41] because like I said, no one
has a right to the throne.
[35:45] - We should also say one more thing where,
[35:49] dare I carefully say this, but it
seems like riots and civil wars
[35:56] is a feature, not a bug of the system.
[35:59] - Yes.
[35:59] - This is a different thing that
we have to the modern day,
[36:03] is because the threat of a civil
war, a violent civil war where you
[36:07] overthrow the government
and there's just a lot of-
[36:11] ... death and struggle for
power is always a threat.
[36:15] That's another incentive that, I
guess the stick, not the carrot, but
[36:19] the stick for the emperor to behave.
[36:22] - Yes. It's the main one. In
other words, just take the,
[36:26] the thousand years that I study.
There's something like 120 civil wars.
[36:31] Now, these are usually very
swift. They're over quickly,
[36:35] and they're never about ideology. So
they're not like modern civil wars.
[36:40] Right? It's about slavery or the rights
of kings or whatever. No, no, no. They're
[36:44] solely about who has the power.
[36:47] All sides have the same ideology.
They talk about, you know, the
[36:50] responsibility of government in the same
way, right? They're just competing over
[36:54] who's the best man to do the job.
[36:57] Right? And so once you have that
situation... And it might not be a
[37:00] civil war, it could be a palace
coup, it could be a kind
[37:04] of fighting in the capital-
[37:06] ... something like that. Once everyone's
taken their side and you have a winner,
[37:10] that's the emperor, And you often overthrow
the previous regime. I'll give you some
[37:16] statistics. Something like
46% of the emperors of
[37:20] Constantinople are overthrown through
violence. 46%. And that's almost half.
[37:25] Right? So that's a huge, that's a huge
number, which means that every emperor
[37:29] is vulnerable and insecure,
and they know it,
[37:32] right? So what they have to do is make
sure that that doesn't happen to them,
[37:36] and the way to do that is not by arresting
[37:40] and executing everybody you think might
be a threat or just generally behaving
[37:44] like a, you know, a Caligula or a
Nero. That will just get you killed.
[37:48] Like, they know this. So
the best way to avoid that
[37:52] fate is to actually do
the things that will make
[37:56] people happy so that they don't
support a rebel if a rebel
[38:00] decides to appear. And
sometimes rebels would appear.
[38:03] There's a kind of convention in
Constantinople, like if you... Sometimes you
[38:07] you think, "Hmm, that emperor's pretty unpopular
and I think I can overthrow him." What you would
[38:11] do is you would march down
the center boulevard-
[38:15] ... And, you know, you'd have
your people just call the
[38:19] populace of Constantinople out to
rally, to you know, maybe go to
[38:23] Hagia Sophia, the, the church, and just
create a big crowd and call for the
[38:27] deposition of the emperor and, you know,
maybe that would hap- And sometimes it did,
[38:31] and sometimes it didn't, and the
rebel or wannabe rebel would sort of
[38:35] proceed down the Mese, the
boulevard, and people would just
[38:39] gradually just disappear,
and then he'd be left alone-
[38:43] ... and go up to Hagia Sophia as
seeking asylum. Right? So that's a bid.
[38:49] That's someone making a bid for the
throne, and it just goes disastrously bad.
[38:53] Other times, the people come out 'cause they hate the emperor,
and they drag the emperor out and cut his nose off or
[38:57] whatever. So emperors are
[39:01] constantly trying to prevent that from
happening, and the best way to do
[39:05] that is through goodwill.
[39:07] - I'm trying to load in that kind
of world 'cause it's a different
[39:11] world than we live in today.
[39:13] - Yes.
[39:14] - There's a constant inner workings of
policy development inside government.
[39:20] - Yes.
[39:21] - But the check on power is, like,
literal, like, we will murder you.
[39:27] - Yes, it depends on the period. Sometimes
murder you, sometimes blind you,
[39:31] sometimes cut your nose off,
but there were periods-
[39:33] - Thank you for the nuance
[39:35] - ... No, there were periods that were more civilized.
We'll just basically, you'll get retired to a
[39:38] monastery.
[39:39] - Right.
[39:40] - Okay. You're right. So
here's what elections do.
[39:43] Elections give a government a mandate
for, I don't know, four or five years,
[39:48] and during that period, you may be
unpopular, but you're legitimate,
[39:53] right, because of the institutions.
[39:55] Whereas in Constantinople, we don't
have those kinds of institutions.
[40:00] We have instead an ongoing referendum.
[40:04] We just call it a perpetual
referendum, right?
[40:07] And in fact, the emperors are, they're
conducting opinion polls in a sense
[40:11] because they appear in public. When
they appear in public, everyone is
[40:15] expected to cheer and chant
acclamations, right, like,
[40:19] Slogans. Right? So you have
100,000 people in the Hippodrome
[40:23] all chanting, you know, "Worthy" or "Many
years for you, Augustus" or something
[40:27] like this. And if that happens, it's great. But
if you appear in the Hippodrome and people are,
[40:31] like, sullen or if the chanting is
a bit tepid or if they're booing,
[40:37] then you know something's wrong, right?
[40:39] So you gotta find out what's wrong.
It could be something like the grain
[40:42] supply is, you know, not working or
[40:46] whatever. And so emperors are
desperate to fix those problems.
[40:49] - And the Hippodrome is this
big gathering place in
[40:53] Constantinople, which I guess
a lot of people gathered
[40:57] at and did this kind of cheering or
not cheering based on policy and-
[41:01] ... and whether the emperor is
popular or not. This was democracy.
[41:07] Uh, I apologize to use that term, but-
[41:09] ... in our conception of what that
means, because what do we mean by
[41:13] democracy in the modern day is
that the people somehow have a
[41:16] connection to who leads and how they lead,
[41:20] and this is, the Hippodrome was that
connection between the people and the leaders.
[41:26] - Yes. Now, we can talk about modern democracy
if you, if you want. That's a, that's a,
[41:30] I have, I have my own views about-
[41:32] ... modern democracy, and, and,
you know, how it works and how
[41:36] it doesn't and, anyway, whether it is democracy,
in fact, 'cause there are other models of
[41:40] democracy, like-
[41:41] ... ancient Athenian democracy, which is
a whole other thing. But you're right.
[41:45] So it's not just in the Hippodrome.
It's wherever people assemble in large
[41:49] numbers. So this could be
military mustering grounds,
[41:53] right? So the army. The army is also
the Roman people in a way, and the-
[41:57] in some cases, the most decisive
part of it, right? So if an
[42:01] army gathers together and they decide
they want a different emperor,
[42:04] that's serious, and that can happen
out in the provinces too. That doesn't
[42:08] necessarily have to happen in
Constantinople. There's also Hagia
[42:12] Sophia, so the people gather in
the church, or they gather in
[42:16] public spaces like the
Forum of Constantine.
[42:19] So this can happen anywhere where a
large number of people can gather,
[42:24] and it's, I don't know if you
wanna call it a democracy as such
[42:28] but it is definitely a form
of popular, mm, let's say
[42:32] consultation and a testing of consensus.
[42:36] I'll give you another example. So in the
1190s, the emperor, and it's Alexius III,
[42:42] he's being threatened by the German emperor. German emperor's
basically, "You, you, you pay me a bunch of money or
[42:46] I'll invade." Just straight up extortion.
[42:49] - Yeah.
[42:50] - Um, and Alexius decides, "Okay, I'm
gonna gather this money. I'm gonna
[42:54] impose these taxes."
[42:55] And he gathers the people in the Hippodrome, and
he says, "You know, we're gonna have the German
[42:59] tax." He called it the German
tax. And there's such an uproar
[43:04] in the Hippodrome against this
that he was like, "Uh, that
[43:08] wasn't my idea. I don't know where that came from.
No, never mind. We're not gonna have the German
[43:12] tax." Fortunately, the German emperor
died and, and nothing ever happened,
[43:17] but it gives you a sense of how emperors, like,
literally can backtrack when they see that the
[43:20] people are against something in a matter
of policy, right- ... like tax policy.
[43:24] So yeah, there was this give and take.
[43:28] So institutionally, the emperor
might look absolute, as
[43:32] you called him earlier. In practice, no.
No. The ones that did that didn't end well.
[43:40] - And we should say, going to Perplexity
here, the Hippodrome of Constantinople
[43:44] was the main stadium and social
center of the Byzantine capital,
[43:49] used primarily for chariot
racing and imperial ceremony,
[43:53] and today survives in Istanbul's
Sultanahmet district.
[43:57] And the reason I looked this up, I
wanted to see how many people. Shaped as
[44:01] a long U-shaped race course
with a central barrier
[44:05] and tiered seating, it may
have held from roughly thirty
[44:09] thousand up to a hundred
thousand spectators,
[44:13] though exact capacity is debated because
archaeological remains are limited.
[44:18] That's a lot of people.
[44:19] - Thirty thousand is definitely
a pretty un- underestimate.
[44:22] The Hippodrome is still there. I mean, you
can see it from, it's like satellite photos.
[44:26] The shape of it is still there.
[44:28] And actually some parts of the built,
the, the Sphendone, the, the sling
[44:32] around the southern side is still there.
You can walk around it. And it's right
[44:36] next to the palace. In other words,
emperors didn't have to go far. Now,
[44:41] sometimes there are events for replacing
an emperor. So say the emperor dies in
[44:45] his sleep, and there's no heir.
This happens in 491, for example.
[44:51] And so the people gather in the
Hippodrome in order to have a
[44:54] discussion with the court about whom to
appoint. Now, in those kinds of contexts, it's
[44:58] entirely possible that there are
people also in the, the arena,
[45:03] like not just in the stands. I
think some military units might
[45:07] have just been arrayed there rather than
in the stands. So you can get more people
[45:11] than what we project might fit in the
stands, because they're not having the races
[45:15] on that day.
[45:16] - We should say, so like, I think the thing that
was emphasized in the first paragraph is the,
[45:20] the athletic events and the
entertainment events, right? Like the
[45:24] imperial ceremony. But there is
a sort of a political gathering
[45:28] was also popular. The Hippodrome
was not just for sport. It
[45:32] was where emperors appeared before
the people, where acclamations,
[45:36] public punishments, and political
demonstrations took place, and where the
[45:40] rival circus factions,
blues, greens, reds, whites,
[45:44] became powerful social and
sometimes paramilitary forces.
[45:48] And this goes on and on and
on. So this was a place-
[45:51] - Oh, it's a very important place. Yeah,
[45:52] - ... for people to speak to the leader.
[45:55] - Yeah. Vent sometimes. Even insult them.
[45:58] - Yeah. This is fascinating. I mean, it's
human civilization. It's converged
[46:02] towards a mechanism that
has clearly worked, because
[46:06] for the empire in the East, stood
[46:10] for a thousand years. So it's,
it's fascinating. We as humans,
[46:16] throughout our history, we try
to figure out, okay, how do we,
[46:22] figure out how to govern
[46:25] large collections of humans in a way
that they're represented, in the
[46:29] way that they don't
riot, they don't rebel.
[46:33] Um, in the way that we
flourish together as a
[46:37] people, all this, all this kind of stuff.
[46:39] So this is a real... The
East Roman Empire is a real
[46:42] study of something that seemed
to have worked. There are
[46:46] lessons there even for the modern
times, I think. And modern times,
[46:50] again, is very early human civilization.
[46:54] - From a certain standpoint,
yes, we are still early in-
[46:57] - Trying to figure it out
[46:58] - ... trying to figure it out.
[46:59] Yes. Now, mind you, I'm not
advocating for this type of social
[47:03] organization and government. What
I'm trying to do as a historian
[47:07] is understand how and why it survived
[47:11] and also to find the ways
that it worked, because it
[47:15] did work. We know that much. We have
to start from that. It survived. It
[47:18] was resilient. There was a lot of,
[47:21] you know, give and take in the exercise
of power, and I want to understand the
[47:25] mechanisms of that.
[47:27] - So if we can, before we go
to Emperor Constantine the
[47:31] First and the founding of
Constantinople, can we look at some
[47:36] maybe seminal events that
led up to some of the
[47:40] topics we'll be talking about? So
one of them maybe tell me if this is
[47:44] not as interesting as I think it is, but
the Edict of Caracalla, in 212 AD. So this
[47:52] is where,
[47:54] You described that starting with Augustus
in the early imperial period, government
[47:58] saw itself as a protector
of the Roman citizens,
[48:02] which is a minority of the people
living in the, in the Roman
[48:06] Empire. It doesn't consider
the, the provincials.
[48:11] And then you described that
the Edict of Caracalla, that
[48:14] extended full Roman
citizenships to basically all,
[48:20] free inhabitants of the Roman Empire. So
[48:24] what is it? Why was it
done? Why is it important?
[48:28] And how did it change the Roman Empire?
[48:30] - Right. I agree with you that this is,
in fact, a very important... It's
[48:34] a, it's a real turning point in a sense,
but it also is part of a process.
[48:40] So for various reasons, the Roman polity
tended to bestow its metropolitan
[48:49] citizenship, that is, Roman
citizenship, on its allies,
[48:54] and eventually in time, on many
people that it had conquered.
[48:59] And it had various mechanisms for doing
so. It could bestow block grants.
[49:03] Sometimes it allowed its generals
to bestow citizenship on people
[49:07] they thought would, you
know, would be necessary
[49:11] players for controlling local
societies. Sometimes they even
[49:14] allowed foreign cities to,
like non-Roman cities, to
[49:18] decide who would get Roman citizenship by
[49:22] basically electing them to certain kinds of
offices. Like they, they outsourced a lot of this.
[49:26] And so you have over time
the steady growth of a
[49:30] Roman community of citizens
who are not all in Rome, and
[49:34] who are not all of Roman origin, whatever that
means, but they, they were not descended from
[49:38] people who were from Rome.
[49:40] And this proceeds, you know, it
expands, it expands, it expands.
[49:44] By Caracalla's time, so
early third century AD,
[49:48] we can estimate that maybe at, at most, a
[49:52] third of the free citizens
of the empire are
[49:56] Roman citizens. Everyone else has
local citizenship, like you're
[50:00] Alexandrian or Athenian or, or whatever.
And with... You're subject to those laws.
[50:05] This emperor, Caracalla, now that's his
nickname. His reigning name is Marcus
[50:09] Aurelius Antoninus.
[50:12] So just like Marcus Aurelius, it's
sa- same name two generations later.
[50:15] - Some badass names for emperors, by the
way. I don't know if it's the chicken or
[50:19] the egg, but just... some epic names.
[50:22] - They've been remembered that way, and
so we read that back into the name—
[50:25] - Yes, that's true.
[50:25] - ... and absolutely, yes.
[50:26] - But anyway, Caracalla. Yeah.
[50:28] - Yeah, so he issues this
edict in 212 called the
[50:31] Constitutio Antoniniana, named
after him. Some people at the
[50:35] time called it the Divine Decree,
[50:37] which basically extended citizenship to
everybody. Now, we don't know exactly why
[50:41] he did so. We can guess
[50:44] the reasons that he said he did
so, and this was for religious
[50:48] reasons. In other words, he wanted
people to go to the temples and pray and
[50:54] give thanks to the gods for him,
for his survival out of a coup.
[51:01] Which is whatever. And it's
[51:05] possible that there was some kind of
religious motivation here, and he wanted
[51:09] everybody to do so as Roman citizens to
honor the Roman gods and something like
[51:13] that. Other historians at the time
said he did it for tax reasons.
[51:17] We don't know exactly.
There might even have been
[51:21] a kind of ideology of a
unified community across
[51:25] the empire playing in his, if
not in his mind, in that of
[51:29] the jurists, that is the legal advisors
that he had. So that's possible. But
[51:35] less interesting than his
motivations, more interesting are the
[51:43] consequences of this— ... and what it
tells us about the Roman community. So
[51:47] imagine a situation where, like, no modern
empire has ever done this really, right?
[51:55] When what's significant about the Roman
case is that not only did they extend
[51:59] citizenship to everybody, but they meant
it. This is something that had teeth. In
[52:02] other words, it meant that the rights
and opportunities that were available to
[52:06] Roman citizens, say, in
the Roman Senate at Rome—
[52:10] ... are now available to everybody. And
within a generation, you have a situation
[52:17] where, like, all of the
emperors are provincials,
[52:21] right? All the most powerful people
in the empire are from the provinces.
[52:25] - This is, like, mind-breaking,
mind-blowing. This is incredible.
[52:29] The fact that the Roman Empire was
able to do this, and it stuck.
[52:33] - They did it, and they meant it.
[52:34] - And they meant it. They
implemented it. It was real.
[52:37] That's, that tells you, that's an
important thing that tells you a
[52:41] lot of information about the
populace of the Roman Empire.
[52:45] That the, the fact that it stuck,
that the government meant it,
[52:49] that the system encouraged,
incentivized the government to mean it.
[52:54] It's incredible.
[52:54] - Yeah, and there's a law of citizenship,
and it, basically it says something like,
[52:58] "Anyone born within the Roman
Empire is a Roman citizen."
[53:02] And the Roman jurists and
policymakers who were behind,
[53:06] This had some very interesting ideas
about, you know, creating this kind of
[53:09] community. Look, like, imagine
if, I mean, it's almost
[53:13] impossible to, to imagine,
but the, the British at the
[53:17] time of the peak of the empire
bestowed British citizenship on
[53:21] everyone, including in India, and, like,
[53:25] suddenly made positions of
power in London available to
[53:29] people from India, like, including the
throne. Like, it's just unthinkable.
[53:34] And that has to do, you know, with race and
colonialism and all kinds of things, right?
[53:38] But not in the Roman Empire.
So we have a situation where
[53:42] the emperors are all from the provinces.
The most powerful officials are
[53:46] all from the provinces.
And so a century later,
[53:50] when Constantinople is created,
this is, it's created,
[53:54] right, like, in, in the Bosporus,
so, like, where modern Istanbul is,
[53:58] in the Eastern Roman Empire. It's
created within the preexisting Roman
[54:02] context, right? It doesn't bring Romanness
to the East. It's already there.
[54:07] And so it's not such a leap to
create a center of Roman power
[54:11] in the East because of that.
[54:13] - And you've helped put together a book on the history
of intellectual thought in the East Roman Empire.
[54:17] But this is the interesting thing
here, and I can ask that many
[54:21] times, but let me ask it here
also, is the great man, the
[54:25] great woman view of history.
[54:28] Were there, like, Thomas Jefferson or
those types of characters in the meetings
[54:34] as they're executing on
the edict or developing
[54:38] the edict? Is that important, or is it
more about the system and the culture and
[54:42] just, uh—
[54:44] ... is it, how important was it? 'Cause this
seems like a revolutionary idea, and when
[54:48] we think about the American Revolution
and the, the founding documents, it seems
[54:52] like a few individuals—
[54:55] ... were really critical about the
wording of things, and then words matter
[54:59] because those words create the reality,
and then it propagates through time.
[55:03] - Yeah. For the edict, I suspect that yes,
there were a few people who were behind
[55:07] it, and quite possibly jurists,
that is Roman legal scholars.
[55:11] And, and 212 is in an
age of very important
[55:15] Roman legal scholars Ulpian,
for example, and others.
[55:20] But we just don't have those... We, we
have- ... minutes of the meetings for the-
[55:24] ... American Revolution.
[55:25] Not only do we not know who was in the
room, we don't actually even have the whole
[55:29] edict. We have a papyrus fragment,
this is a piece of ancient paper—
[55:33] ... that's mostly torn and mutilated,
and we have, like, a bit of a
[55:37] paragraph from it.
[55:39] Um, in Greek, not even the Latin
original. And it's kind of torn,
[55:43] but it actually preserves the
key clause. Right? And that's,
[55:48] that's all we have of the original.
We have contemporary sources that
[55:52] mention it, we have legal
documents, but nothing like a,
[55:56] Like we can talk about the
people involved in it. Or even
[56:00] how it was immediately implemented.
Like, suddenly we know everyone in the
[56:04] provinces, like, there's this explosion
in the number of people called
[56:08] Aurelius, because that was
his Roman family name.
[56:13] Um, and so when you acquired citizenship
from that edict, you became an Aurelius.
[56:18] Right? And there are lots of Aurelii suddenly
all over the place. Like, we can see it
[56:21] immediately. Uh, but we can't
actually see the implementation.
[56:26] - But your instinct says that
individuals were very important
[56:31] in the development of that
idea and execution of it.
[56:33] - Probably, yeah. Yeah. Even though
it's part of a long-term process
[56:37] of expanding Roman citizenship, this was
a, an explosion, not just an expansion.
[56:43] - And then you said that one of the
important aspects about this edict is
[56:47] that giving equal rights to provincials
[56:51] was one of the things
that helped deal with the
[56:53] crisis of the third century,
and was the thing that,
[56:57] I think you said, quote,
"sapped discontent from the
[57:01] relevant populations," which then
minimized the probability of uprisings.
[57:07] - Well, now that's a very long-term process.
[57:09] Now, the third century is chaos,
there's a crisis, it's a mess, right?
[57:13] So what follows the edict is
quite a few decades of unrest.
[57:20] - Okay, let's put it in mildly.
[57:21] Let's talk about the crisis
of the third century, where
[57:25] 26 emperors were murdered
in a period of 50 years.
[57:30] - Yes. It's tremendous instability.
[57:33] - So there's civil wars
nonstop. Almost all were,
[57:37] of these emperors were generals, and
almost all were murdered by their men.
[57:42] So civil war was the norm, hyperinflation,
economic crash, plus there's a plague-
[57:48] ... from 249 to 262 AD, which is a
pandemic, possibly smallpox or Ebola. It
[57:56] killed up to 5,000 people a day
in Rome alone, devastating the
[58:00] tax base and army recruitment
pool. And the empire
[58:07] fractured into three
pieces, but then Emperor,
[58:10] Aurelian miraculously reconquered
them in a period of five years.
[58:16] So just a lot of chaos. It deserves the
name, the Crisis of the Third Century.
[58:20] - Yeah, it's a perfect storm. Yeah, I mean,
you have a crisis of imperial legitimacy.
[58:24] Basically, the army's proclaiming
emperors left and right. In an odd sense,
[58:30] ironically, this is in part
because there are now a lot more
[58:33] stakeholders in the Roman tradition, right?
There's all of these provincial armies,
[58:37] and they're appointing their
generals as rival emperors.
[58:41] But you also have a serious
uptick in foreign invasions.
[58:47] In the north, you have the creation
of the Sasanian Persian or
[58:51] Iranian Empire in the east, and
this was very, very bellicose.
[58:55] So lots of foreign defeats.
Armies are defeated by
[58:59] you know, like, quote, "barbarian
enemies." You have eventually
[59:03] inflation, and you have plague. And so
under the pressure, right, of all of those
[59:09] forces, it almost fell apart.
Now, it didn't actually.
[59:14] Inevitably, there are also historians
who downplay the crisis. Of course,
[59:18] right, like, and legitimately so, right?
We must push back against every of these
[59:22] characterizations.
[59:23] - 26 emperors died, bro. What do you-
[59:25] - That's just the emperors. That's
just the emperors. We should be
[59:29] - I'm sorry. In 50 years.
[59:31] - Yeah.
[59:31] - Every other year, emperor dead.
[59:33] - Yeah, that's-
[59:34] - Civil war
[59:34] - ... that's political instability
at the top, right? But what-
[59:38] - Right, that's not-
[59:39] - ... what are the l- the
lives of most people?
[59:40] - Sure.
[59:40] - So if you go to Egypt, for example,
which is kind of out of the... Right?
[59:45] What's going on there? How are people living there?
And we can see how people are living in Egypt
[59:49] because we have all these
papyrus documents from Egypt.
[59:52] - That's true.
[59:53] - And for the most part, they don't
seem to be experiencing a crisis.
[59:56] - I mean, this is something you talk
about. Constantine, as we'll get to him,
[59:59] is one of the most murderous
leaders in all of human
[60:03] history, if you consider
his own family. But
[60:07] if you're living in the provinces,
you know, there's... He's not-
[60:13] - Oh, yeah, yeah.
[60:14] - ... he's not that murderous.
[60:15] - No, no, no, he's perfectly
fine. Yeah, yeah.
[60:16] - So it's very important to actually remember
about what the actual experience of
[60:20] the average citizen of the empire is like.
Fair. Okay, so but how... Maybe there's
[60:27] more we could say about the crisis.
And then of course, the, the
[60:31] crisis is in part
resolved by Diocletian as
[60:35] he does a hard reset on the
structure on the Roman system of
[60:38] government. So maybe you could speak a
little bit more to the crisis that's
[60:42] important for us to understand, and how
Diocletian solves the crisis in 284 AD.
[60:48] - Right. So again, these are processes
rather than specific events.
[60:52] - Sure.
[60:53] - So for example, you mentioned that the
empire kind of breaks into pieces.
[60:57] - Yes.
[60:57] - And we have what's called
sometime the Empire of the Gauls.
[61:02] Gaul are modern France and sort
of Britain, for a while are, for
[61:06] a decade and a half or so, are kind
of like this little separatist-
[61:09] empire. So what's interesting
about that is that this was
[61:13] not an attempt to break away
from the empire. In other words,
[61:17] it's not some discontent provincials
who are just tired of Roman
[61:21] rule and wanna break away
and do their own thing. No.
[61:26] This is actually just
a, it's an attempt by,
[61:30] provincial generals to take the
throne, and do so to rule the entire
[61:34] empire. It doesn't work. They get only
as far as the provinces that they take.
[61:38] And the only way that they know to set
up a state is to make it a Roman state.
[61:43] Right? Like, that's the total of their
political imaginary is like, "Well,
[61:47] we're just gonna do a Roman thing here."
[61:50] And maybe we'll get, you
know, we'll reunite the
[61:53] empire ourselves, or as happened,
Aurelian, that is someone from the other
[61:57] side, will reunite the empire. But it's
always a Roman model. Like, there's,
[62:01] it's almost like there's no alternatives
by this point. So that's interesting.
[62:07] What Diocletian does essentially is,
[62:11] The, the way I characterize
it sometimes is that he
[62:15] turns the problem into its own solution.
[62:18] In other words, the problem is too
many emperors or wanna-be emperors.
[62:21] Because there's just more going on. Like, one
emperor can't deal with all these problems
[62:25] along the frontiers, with
all the political problems.
[62:29] So what he does is he deputizes some
of his colleagues, people he was on
[62:33] very good terms with from the army. These are
all Illyrians. They're from... By the way,
[62:37] for a few centuries, the emperors are
all from this region of the former
[62:41] Yugoslavia that's the size of Scotland.
Like, that's where they all come from.
[62:44] - Well, what explains that?
[62:46] - Uh, the army.
[62:47] - Ah.
[62:47] - These are military men. Sometimes
hard-drinking military men.
[62:51] Very good at their job like Aurelian, you
mentioned, right? So there's a series of
[62:55] Illyrian emperors who
[62:58] restore stability. And the reason
why there's so many Illyrian
[63:02] emperors is because they worked their way
up through the ranks of the army. And,
[63:06] you know, the regions of Yugoslavia
in, at that time are sufficiently,
[63:11] you know, economically underdeveloped
that there's a strong incentive for,
[63:16] for young men to go join the army
because, you know, it's a living.
[63:21] Um, and so Illyrians become,
like, kind of the backbone of the
[63:25] Roman army, and they're described as
these, you know, tough Roman conservative
[63:29] types. I mean, these are, you
know, these are, these are tough
[63:33] military guys. I say that to
draw a contrast between, say,
[63:37] Hadrian, whom I mentioned earlier-
[63:39] ... you know, who was a much more
sophisticated, artsy, poetic,
[63:43] cosmopolitan emperor.
[63:44] - Sure.
[63:44] - Also a hard-ass. You did not
wanna mess with Hadrian. But,
[63:49] These guys from the third century are military
men through and through. Like, their whole
[63:52] careers are in the army. And they
have, like, the military stubble.
[63:57] They've got these thick necks.
[63:59] They look angry. They've got their hands
on their swords. Like, they're not
[64:03] projecting an image of sort of-
[64:04] - Yeah.
[64:04] - ... calm and sophisticated,
you know, bum-bum, you know.
[64:08] - So, military men.
[64:09] - Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[64:10] - ... military men from Aurelian.
[64:11] - Yep. So Diocletian gets a gang of them
together. They, eventually there are
[64:15] four. We call this the Tetrarchy. Um, and
he basically allocates them to various,
[64:22] um... This wasn't any kind of
hard division of the empire.
[64:26] Basically, it was a
collaborative project. They each
[64:30] went wherever they were needed.
[64:31] - Uh, was it, is it fair to say that
there was four administrative zones?
[64:36] He allocated each one to a zone?
[64:38] - Broadly. I'd say more military zones.
[64:40] - Okay.
[64:41] - Um, so the administration tends to
operate, it kind of humming along in the
[64:45] background wherever these emperors
happen to be, right? This is a,
[64:49] We're talking about a period of big
government now. So Diocletian creates a
[64:53] larger government, possibly a larger army,
and in order to pay for that, you need more
[64:57] systematic and effective taxation-
[64:58] - Mm-hmm.
[64:58] - ... which means you need more census, you need
more bureaucracy, you need more collect...
[65:02] You know? So it is an era
of bigger government.
[65:05] - So just to linger on that point-
[65:07] - Yeah.
[65:07] - ... is it fair to say that Diocletian
created the deep state? Quote, "deep state."
[65:11] So the tax collectors, the, the logistics,
[65:15] the thing that you've kinda hinted at, which
is the separation of the civil and the
[65:19] military layer of society.
[65:21] - So the concept of a deep state,
I've had discussions about that
[65:26] with experts who work on the
idea of the deep state, and I'm
[65:29] not sure that I would characterize
the Roman Empire that
[65:33] way, in part because while you do have big
government, you do have bureaucracy, you
[65:37] have, you have bureaucrats who are
buried in various echelons, and you
[65:41] know, nobody knows exactly what
they're doing and things like that,
[65:44] you know, I have not come
across the idea of some sort of
[65:48] sinister elements, you know, who are working
within the administrative apparatus to
[65:54] undermine the emperor.
[65:58] Like, from a distance occasionally, you
might get glimpses of this kind of thing.
[66:02] Diocletian, for example, once complained that, "Nobody
ever tells me anything." In other words, like,
[66:06] he's so removed-
[66:07] ... in part from the realities of
what's going on on the ground that he,
[66:11] felt sometimes he'd lost touch. But
I don't find this kind of idea of of
[66:17] undermining imperial power
from within the bureaucracy.
[66:21] - Yeah, I think the, one of the ways
to explain that is because, so, you
[66:25] know, in the modern day,
[66:27] democracy in quotes, there's a kind of
temporary nature to the leader at the top.
[66:32] So it's incentivized
the deep state to form.
[66:35] That, so the deep state thinks
of themselves as a thing that
[66:38] propagates long-term periods
of time, and then the
[66:41] leader is a very ephemeral
short, short-term thing.
[66:45] - Yeah.
[66:45] - With a, with an emperor, technically-
[66:47] ... you can go for a long time, so
it's best to be integrated deeply.
[66:51] With, the bureaucracy should be integrated
with the leader. It makes sense.
[66:55] - Yeah. But also,
[66:56] - Fair enough
[66:57] - ... also in, in, in modern social thought
or, or fear is that the deep state might
[67:03] be undermining, say...
[67:04] - Undermining, yeah
[67:05] - ... the democracy itself rather than,
right, rather than... It can cut both ways.
[67:09] - But there is a bureaucracy.
There is a big government.
[67:13] - Absolutely. Yeah.
[67:14] - There's a big machinery.
[67:15] - Yeah, compared to before.
[67:17] - Before.
[67:17] - Yes.
[67:18] So Diocletian creates these larger bureaucratic
structures, and these are the ones that define
[67:22] the society that I study. So
as a specialist, I focus on
[67:26] the period after him mostly.
[67:29] But he implemented those to
solve a lot of these problems.
[67:33] He was mostly successful. So in
terms of generating revenue from
[67:37] a much more troubled and kind of
precarious situation in sustaining large
[67:43] armies and putting down these
rebellions and usurpations. And he was
[67:50] generally successful at doing that.
[67:53] So he created the model that they kept for
the next, Well, three centuries or more.
[68:00] - But a lot of the elements of that
model lasted even beyond that, right?
[68:04] - Yeah, like universal taxation. I'll
give you an example. Up until then,
[68:09] Italy was exempt from taxes. Italy was the land
of the conquerors. The conquerors don't pay
[68:13] taxes to themselves. The conquerors
live off the taxes that others pay,
[68:17] right? So Italy was this
big tax haven, right?
[68:22] Diocletian, Galerius, you know,
his guys, these guys are from
[68:25] Illyria. They're from the Balkans.
[68:27] Like why is Italy tax-free exactly, you
know? That doesn't make any sense. It's a
[68:31] very, very wealthy, prosperous part
of the world, and so, no, they
[68:35] tax Italy. So now, like, not only do all
Romans have the same citizenship and
[68:39] the same law, they all
have the same tax system,
[68:43] and the Diocletianic tax code, as it
were, it's not a code, it sounds like
[68:47] a flat tax, which for
us sounds regressive.
[68:51] But by those stand- by the standards
of that time, it's actually kind of
[68:55] progressive in a way.
[68:56] - Right.
[68:57] - It means that, like, even-
[68:58] - Right.
[68:58] - ... elites paid, like,
the same, right? Yeah.
[69:01] - So how much of all of this, everything
we'll talk about in the, in
[69:06] the coming centuries
is all about taxation?
[69:08] - I think it's huge. Taxation
is the heart of it.
[69:12] - So I mean, the functioning, the
success, the flourishing of a society,
[69:17] the way the government works, the way the
people are represented, all of it has to do,
[69:21] all the civil wars and everything, it
feels like taxation is at the core.
[69:25] - Yes. Yeah. If you asked me to put my
finger on one factor, it would be that.
[69:30] - So the taxation system,
that feels like the early
[69:34] framework for the East Roman Empire.
[69:37] - It did create a more sort of
homogeneous framework, for sure.
[69:40] By the end of the third century,
it's pretty much in place. What
[69:44] Diocletian does is a universal census,
[69:48] and this is continued by
his successors. So every
[69:52] taxable asset in the empire is censused.
And so you can now start to have a budget.
[69:59] - Now, there is some element, and
then you push back against that,
[70:03] some element of Diocletian where he legally
limited social and class mobility in
[70:10] part for the taxation
system, and made it, in many
[70:14] cases, illegal to move and
illegal to quit your job. For
[70:17] example, as I read to guarantee the food
[70:21] supply and land tax, farmers
were legally forbidden from
[70:25] moving away from the land they worked,
so the state always knew who to
[70:29] tax. And then for soldiers,
sons of veterans were
[70:32] legally obligated to serve in the
army to maintain troop numbers.
[70:38] You argue that these were tax enforcement
[70:42] mechanisms, not a rigid caste
system, and so in practice, the
[70:46] empire remained a society
of high mobility.
[70:50] - This is a complicated matter.
[70:51] So let's talk, for example,
about soldiers. It's probably
[70:55] the case that most soldiers' sons were
expected to succeed them. Like most
[71:02] professions where you have an
apprenticeship, the son will usually
[71:06] succeed, right? There
are a number of other
[71:10] professions that were kind of guild-like
in nature like for example, shipping.
[71:15] Uh, where there were considerable
assets involved in order to
[71:21] secure contracts for insurance
purposes for the ships and so forth,
[71:25] and it made sense for those assets to be, you
know, passed from father to son. In other
[71:29] words, and with them
comes the obligation to
[71:32] continue in that line of work. Some of
these things are inherently, sort of
[71:40] hereditary, and I don't think most
people would have objected to it.
[71:44] The farmers is probably the only case
[71:48] where it might have actually
involved some coercion. There was
[71:52] a category of farmers, and we don't
know how many of them, who were,
[71:56] for fiscal purposes, bound to the land.
[72:00] This doesn't mean they couldn't leave the land, like
physically. No one's preventing them from leaving.
[72:03] But they were fiscally responsible
for providing the taxes or rents or
[72:07] whatever because the state
wanted to have a secure
[72:11] revenue stream from, say, those lands.
And if... Anyway, it's, it's one of these
[72:15] complicated situations. This
did create some limitations on,
[72:19] on those people. And it's a
topic of current research,
[72:23] these bound farmers, as it were,
[72:25] who are tied to the land. It's more of
a... You know, someone put it that,
[72:29] you know, most of the time it's
people who own the land, and in
[72:33] this arrangement, it's the
land that owns the people.
[72:36] - But you're saying the bigger picture
thing is that there was mobility.
[72:39] - Oh, there's considerable mobility.
[72:40] - So, so class mobility- ...
and physical mobility-
[72:42] ... meaning people moved a... And we'll
see this as from the West into the
[72:46] East and Constantinople and
all this kind of stuff.
[72:48] - Oh, yeah. There's tons of mobility.
[72:50] No, no, this is not a society
where people are bound really,
[72:54] to... We, like, we don't find
anybody who's, who's like, "Ah, I
[72:59] I really don't want to be a soldier. But my
father was a soldier, and I'm obligated to be
[73:03] one." Like- ... like, we just don't
hear those kinds of complaints-
[73:06] of people who don't want to be a so- Why wouldn't
you want to be a soldier in the Roman Empire?
[73:09] I mean, it's got tremendous perks.
[73:11] - Right. Right. So can we just linger
on the why is it that Diocletian
[73:17] was able to stabilize the
empire? It's like, you
[73:21] know, the crisis of the third century
really threatened to tear apart everything.
[73:25] So why did some of these things
that we talked about stabilize?
[73:30] - Well, Aurelian had already
united the empire territorially.
[73:33] So this is right before Diocletian.
[73:36] And what Diocletian did was
put in place a system that
[73:39] reduced the number of rebellions.
Simply by having four big guys with
[73:43] four armies, they managed to put out
all of those fires, or most of them.
[73:48] And once you have stability, and
he also beat the Persians, I
[73:52] mean, Galerius did so
starting to beat back foreign
[73:56] invasions, that creates a framework
for economic stability. People need
[74:02] To, you know, if they're going to
invest in, like, land reclamation
[74:06] or expand production, they
need to know that, you know,
[74:10] foreigners aren't gonna come rampaging through,
marauding through the, you know, stealing their
[74:14] cattle and, you know, enslaving
them and taking them off to work on
[74:17] agricultural farms in Mesopotamia.
Like, they need to know this.
[74:20] And if you provide that context of
stability, the economic growth, the
[74:24] demographic growth will return. And Diocletian
created that kind of, that context.
[74:30] - So that takes us to Constantine but
first a quick bathroom break, if I can.
[74:35] - Sure.
[74:36] - Quick ten-second thank you to our sponsors.
Check them out in the description. It really
[74:40] is the best way to support
this podcast. Go to
[74:42] lexfridman.com/sponsors.
And now, dear friends,
[74:47] back to our conversation about
the Eastern Roman Empire.
[74:52] All right, we're back, and
let's talk about Constantine
[74:56] and Constantinople. Let's go
to the rise of the East Roman
[75:00] Empire. Who was Constantine?
Tell me about his rise
[75:04] to power and the founding of
Constantinople in 330 AD.
[75:08] - Sure. So Constantine was the son
of one of Diocletian's colleagues,
[75:12] so he comes from within the system.
[75:15] And the system was actually designed
to be non-hereditary. In other words,
[75:20] the senior emperors would retire, the
junior ones would move up to the senior
[75:24] position, and then they
would recruit two new ones.
[75:27] And they tried to skip
the dynastic element. So,
[75:31] so it would be kind of, let's
just say, kinda meritocratic, not
[75:35] whose son, you know, you were. Constantine
was a son. He was passed over,
[75:39] but the armies liked him. He
was actually quite competent.
[75:43] And so there's a series of
civil wars among all of these
[75:47] successors of Diocletian, and
Constantine emerges as the winner.
[75:51] There are periods when there are quite a few of
them. There are, like, six at a time, but they gra-
[75:55] they gradually dwindle down to one. So
[75:59] yeah, it's as long as you have the
quarterfinals, semifinals, and then the final
[76:03] war, and Constantine
emerges in 324 as the sole
[76:07] ruler of the entire Roman Empire.
So that's who he is. He's
[76:11] definitely an insider,
very, very competent
[76:14] general at civil war. And he
gradually moves eastward.
[76:20] So as he's conquering his
rivals, who are often
[76:23] his father-in-laws or his brother-in-laws,
because these people are all
[76:27] intermarried, and they have alliances, and
they fall out. It's one of those kinds of
[76:30] situations. He moves eastward,
and by the time he defeats his
[76:34] last rival, this uh, an emperor called
Licinius, in 324 he's in the East. And
[76:42] Licinius had his headquarters
or one of his headquarters at
[76:45] this town called Byzantium. Byzantium is a
[76:49] city right where
Constantinople was founded.
[76:53] And it is at exactly the point where
Europe meets Asia, so on the Bosporus.
[76:59] And it's a very strategic location. It always had
been, right? So whoever controls the straits of
[77:03] the Bosporus, yeah, we don't need
to explain how important that is.
[77:07] And Constantine decides to create
a city named after himself,
[77:11] Constantinople, on that spot,
Byzantium. So Byzantium
[77:14] essentially ceases to exist as a city
and is replaced by Constantinople,
[77:20] AKA New Rome. So it's pretty clear
that right from the beginning,
[77:24] Constantine intended this
to be a kind of branch
[77:28] office of Rome in the East, a
kind of copy and paste of Rome
[77:33] in the East, and it's a plan that his
successors continued, right? Now,
[77:39] there are a number of
other cities in this,
[77:43] Let's say in the generation
or two before this,
[77:47] that were also treated as sort
of quasi-Romes. Basically,
[77:51] there was this historian in the third century
who said, "Well, wherever the emperor
[77:54] is, that's Rome," right? 'Cause
emperors are now itinerant.
[77:58] They're no longer staying at Rome.
They're mostly on the frontier, and
[78:02] Constantine is one of these frontier emperors.
They will sometimes visit Rome, maybe once or
[78:06] twice, maybe once a decade,
you know, something like this.
[78:10] So Rome becomes something
that can be sort of copied
[78:14] and pasted in other parts of the
empire, and a bunch of other cities get
[78:17] called, you know, a New
Rome, an Other Rome, an
[78:21] Alternative Rome, My
Rome. And Constantinople
[78:25] is the last and most successful of those.
[78:28] - So maybe can you speak geographically the
importance of Constantinople? It's an interesting
[78:32] place 'cause it-
[78:35] ... when you're talking about a land so
large as the West and the East, with
[78:39] enemies, with threats from all
kinds of different directions, the
[78:43] location where the emperor
sits is important.
[78:46] - Very. So look at Rome,
[78:49] right? So it's right in the middle of Italy,
right in the middle of the Mediterranean.
[78:53] Very safe location in a way, but
it's very far from the frontiers.
[78:57] And this is a period when emperors
need to be with the armies, right?
[79:01] They're not senatorial emperors who are
sitting in Rome having meetings with
[79:05] senators. They are military emperors
who are marching along the frontiers,
[79:11] mostly with generals rather
than civilian administration.
[79:15] So they're doing their job.
Like, this is the hard
[79:19] work. They're slogging through the
mud of winter campaigns, right?
[79:24] Uh, they're not just sitting in a palace
enjoying themselves when they could.
[79:28] But Rome just becomes inconvenient
because of that. And if you
[79:32] look at Constantinople, it is
[79:36] kind of halfway between the Danube
frontier and the Euphrates frontier.
[79:42] So if you want to prioritize the
East or treat it as an equal part of
[79:46] the Roman Empire, as these
emperors all did. In fact,
[79:50] almost all emperors who had a choice
about whether they would stay in the East
[79:54] or stay in the West chose the
East. There's only one who
[79:58] chooses the West, and that's Valentinian
later in the fourth century. All the others
[80:02] understand that the East is where it's at.
[80:04] And Constantinople is right between the Danube
and the Euphrates. These are two major frontiers.
[80:09] And so it allows emperors
to move between the two.
[80:13] And also look at its location
north, south, east, west, right? So
[80:16] north, south, it is the node between
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean,
[80:22] right? And east, west, it's
precisely where Europe meets Asia,
[80:26] right? And because there's a break
there, so there's a Bosporus, the
[80:30] Sea of Marmara, the Hellespont,
the Roman Empire during the civil
[80:34] wars, it would tend to break there.
[80:38] And you would have one emperor on one side in Asia,
and you would have another emperor on the other
[80:41] side. And this just kept happening. And
[80:45] Constantinople ultimately functions as a
kind of clamp that unifies this whole area,
[80:53] so basically the Balkans and Asia
Minor and Syria as a kind of unit,
[81:00] right? And, you know,
what is a new Rome? A new
[81:04] Rome is, among other things, a new senate,
right? And Constantine and his successors
[81:11] recruit this new senate for the new
[81:15] Rome. So we're talking about maybe
two and a half thousand, 3,000
[81:19] men, you know, at, at, at
its peak, and these are all
[81:22] recruited from all of these areas.
You know, some come from Rome,
[81:26] but others come from the Aegean
region, from Asia Minor,
[81:30] Eastern Mediterranean. So these
are the wealthiest people,
[81:34] usually most well-connected elites
from the whole Eastern Mediterranean,
[81:38] and they come together and form a new
purpose, common purpose in Constantinople.
[81:43] And the empire never breaks there again.
[81:46] Right? So it, it holds together
this part of the world. The
[81:49] breaking point now, interestingly,
moves to the Adriatic,
[81:53] right? So when, in 395, we talked
about East and West kind of splitting.
[81:57] It breaks at the Adriatic 'cause
Constantinople is now holding that whole
[82:01] Eastern world together. 'Cause all
of these elites, they now, they're
[82:05] invested in it. They're literally investing in
it. They have to invest in it in order to be
[82:09] senators in Constantinople.
[82:11] So that's kind of one of the functions that
it, that it performs, a strategic function.
[82:15] There's a political function. There's also
a cultural one, but you know, we can talk
[82:19] about that, too. But that's what you see
there on that map, the northwest, east,
[82:23] south.
[82:24] - So just to linger on it,
so you do a podcast,
[82:28] Byzantium and Friends, but you're also a
guest on podcasts, and I should mention
[82:34] you being a guest multiple
times on the excellent The
[82:38] History of Byzantium podcast
hosted by Robin Pierson. I
[82:42] highly recommend people listen to it, to all
of your appearances. You have a lot of really
[82:45] fascinating ones. But the reason I bring
all that up is one of the episodes,
[82:50] you do the fun thing of selecting the
top 10 emperors of Byzantium, and
[82:58] spoiler alert, everybody should go
listen to the full list 'cause you
[83:02] justify all the different options. But
Constantine ends up in the number one spot.
[83:09] And so can you just add a
little bit more depth why he
[83:13] would be in your number one spot-
[83:15] - Yes
[83:15] - ... now that we're talking about him?
[83:17] - Yes. It's not because I sort of like
him as a person, right? I mean-
[83:21] ... as you said, he was pretty murderous.
[83:23] Right? All those wars, so clearly
ambitious, murderous, ruthless, basically.
[83:30] - Can you actually speak to the murderous
aspect? He seemed to have murdered a
[83:34] lot of people in his family.
[83:36] - Yes, that's because what we
call his family were also
[83:40] alliances of convenience that
he made on the way to the top.
[83:44] And when those alliances
or, you know, those, you
[83:48] know, those wives or those fathers-in-law
were no longer convenient or,
[83:52] or turned against him,
he had no hesitation in
[83:56] removing them. But he's also, you know, he
[84:00] gets a little extra bonus because he also
murdered his own son, Crispus, who was-
[84:05] ... apparently a very competent and popular
kind of general, and we don't know why.
[84:11] He executes Crispus soon
after defeating Licinius,
[84:15] and then follows it up with
the murder of his wife-
[84:18] ... not Crispus' mother, and we don't
know why. The funny thing is that when
[84:22] emperors do this sort of thing, if
there's any kind of remotely, like, a
[84:26] good reason, they'll blast it through
all of the media, right? Like, "Crispus
[84:30] was rebelling against me," or
whatever. There's nothing.
[84:34] He doesn't even try to justify it,
which means it must have been something
[84:38] unjustifiable- Like, I don't
know. I can't process it.
[84:41] - And also, I read that the
historians of the time would
[84:45] just ignore that that happened.
[84:47] - Yes. Well, sort of. So
[84:51] when Crispus is alive, it's all,
like, praising Crispus as, "Oh,
[84:55] Constantine, you great emperor, and your
wonderful son who will..." whatever.
[84:58] And then Crispus is executed, and
he just disappears from the, like-
[85:01] ... they never talk about him.
[85:02] - Yeah. Actually, as another side
to a side, I think you mentioned,
[85:09] Whether it's on your podcast or
elsewhere, that if, if you had
[85:13] to have a beer with any of the
emperors, that you probably wouldn't.
[85:17] So it's not like some of the
most impactful, some of the
[85:21] most influential and great
emperors that we talk about,
[85:25] they might not be very pleasant people.
[85:28] - So let's set aside whether you'd like to have
a beer with these people. The reason I put
[85:32] Constantine at the top of the list is
because the decisions that he made were so
[85:36] consequential, just important, and
[85:40] for the most part, not bad decisions.
So I couldn't not put him at the
[85:49] top of the list. The,
you know, the creating
[85:52] Constantinople and converting to Christianity
and setting the empire on a path
[85:56] to conversion, these are major,
like, world history level decisions.
[86:02] Right? Now, not many emperors do
that. In fact, Constantine is in,
[86:05] like, his own league when it comes
to those kinds of decisions.
[86:09] My other criteria for top emperors were
basically those who did the job well,
[86:16] right? Not making, you know, these
kinds of earth, you know, shattering
[86:20] decisions or, you know, world
history changing decisions, but just
[86:24] who performed the role competently with
[86:28] results that impacted the lives
of their subjects for the better.
[86:33] So those are the other
criteria that I used.
[86:35] It's difficult to juggle these different
criteria, right, in order to create a
[86:39] systematic list. And by the way, we, historians
generally don't do these kinds of things.
[86:43] But you said it's fun. It is fun.
[86:45] - It was fun. It was fun.
[86:45] - And it allows you to talk about certain
things that you might not otherwise do.
[86:50] So yeah, that's why
Constantine was at the top.
[86:53] - So you mentioned Christianity. That
was one other big component of his
[86:57] rule. What was the role of Christianity
in, in Constantine's life,
[87:02] in the lives of the citizens
of the new Roman Empire?
[87:08] - At this stage, Christianity doesn't have
a role. It actually took the emperors...
[87:13] When the emperors took it on board,
that is, they made it a part
[87:17] of the imperial system, then
it began to acquire a role
[87:21] within the system. Previously, it
had imagined itself as having its
[87:25] own history, like not
necessarily part of the
[87:28] empire or affiliated
with imperial power. But
[87:32] after Constantine, it does acquire a role.
[87:34] - And so actually, one way to ask that question,
which is fascinating, 'cause you said that there's
[87:38] like, there's Rome, and then
there's like cultures like,
[87:43] or traditions like Christianity, or
being Greek, that kind of thing.
[87:51] So, one of the ways to ask this
question is does Christianity
[87:55] triumph over Rome, or did
Rome capture Christianity?
[87:58] - Right. Yes. That's a—
[88:00] - Which is the mechanism?
[88:04] - I would lean more toward the second.
In other words, that the religion was
[88:07] co-opted by the imperial system.
Now, there are many areas in which
[88:11] that's not the case and where the opposite
happens, so I'm not going to be absolute about it,
[88:15] but I think it's very important
to recognize that because
[88:19] Christianity generates
this narrative of triumph-
[88:22] ...right, which modern
historians perpetuate,
[88:26] and it's framed in very particular ways. In
other words, that Christianity triumphs over the
[88:30] ancient religions. Right? So
displacing Zeus and Apollo and all of
[88:35] that, and animal sacrifice is gone,
and like, that's because Christianity
[88:39] triumphs, and that's a very narrow way of
looking at it. In other words, you pick your
[88:43] enemy, and then you can
defeat that enemy, right?
[88:46] But if you look in the other direction, there's,
like, the Roman imperial state, and you
[88:50] cannot say that Christianity
either triumphed over it or
[88:53] even tamed it or anything. It
actually became part of it.
[88:56] in many ways that, you know,
determined its history for
[89:00] centuries and, in fact, down to today.
[89:03] So this is very different, for
example, from the history of Islam.
[89:07] So Islam comes into existence without a
[89:11] preexisting state to receive
it and take it on board. It
[89:15] creates its own state,
right? So the Muslim armies,
[89:19] they conquer this empire, and then
they have to sort of govern it.
[89:23] They think according to whatever Islamic
principles. The Quran doesn't say anything about
[89:27] running an empire.
[89:29] So that creates a completely different
society, right, where, like,
[89:32] Islam is a, is really a
primary kind of identity and,
[89:36] like, drives a lot of developments.
But Christianity comes into
[89:40] existence within a very
well-developed society and, and
[89:44] political system. Now, here's the thing.
[89:46] We don't know exactly how many Christians
existed in the time of Constantine.
[89:50] Well, we speculate maybe 10% of
the empire. That might be very
[89:54] high, right? But even if it's 10%, it's
[89:57] not a lot, and these are not, like,
elites for the most part. Maybe
[90:01] middle, you know, what we
loosely call middle class,
[90:06] a few elites, a few slaves,
like this kind of thing.
[90:10] Mostly urban, and keeping in mind,
most of the population is rural.
[90:14] Right? So pockets of
concentrated, you know,
[90:18] Christian groups in cities. That's
what we're talking about. Not terribly
[90:21] politically powerful.
[90:22] - So Constantine's conversion to Christianity
and moving the empire towards Christianity is
[90:26] not something where it's a
gigantic majority of the people-
[90:30] ... or it's a political convenience because
it's the elites. It's something else.
[90:34] I mean, it's, I mean, a pretty
revolutionary decision, I would say.
[90:38] - Exactly. Now, there used to be theories
that Constantine did this for, like,
[90:42] pragmatic, cynical reasons, that he, like,
wasn't a true Christian or anything, but there
[90:46] was some kind of political gain
to be had here. But I have never
[90:50] read a convincing account of what
exactly that political gain is.
[90:54] We now know that there are
fewer Christians. They were not
[90:58] that influential. You can make an
argument that bishops are a kind of
[91:02] convenient social influencers, you
might say. Like, you can use those.
[91:06] They're not a threat to your position.
[91:08] Right? So a bishop is not
gonna try to take the throne.
[91:11] So they're not dangerous political
operatives in that way. But they
[91:15] do have some influence over sectors
of society, and so that might be
[91:18] a... Okay, I see that,
but I don't quite see the
[91:22] argument for, like, going full Christian,
[91:25] Just to get the support of some bishops,
who actually pretty quickly turn out to be,
[91:29] some of them, more trouble
than they're worth.
[91:31] Anyway, so I have not
yet seen a convincing
[91:35] like, political argument for Constantine's
decision, which means that you then
[91:39] fall back on a personal
explanation that he did this
[91:43] because he was a believing
Christian, right? And he came out,
[91:47] You know, in support of the religion
that he held, and that's kind of
[91:51] where most scholars are today.
Though, I gotta tell you,
[91:55] historians are very uncomfortable
about personal choice, like explaining
[91:59] history in terms of these
kinds of personal choices.
[92:02] Because Constantine's conversion
is like, it's massive. It
[92:06] opens the door. It incentivizes
so many people to also convert.
[92:11] 'Cause Romans will generally do
what their, you know, rulers
[92:15] will tell them. If we've
mentioned Hadrian a few times
[92:19] Hadrian's, he had this lover,
Antinous, Greek boy from Bithynia,
[92:23] who died in an accident in Egypt,
whatever, and Hadrian said
[92:27] Basically that Antinous should be
regarded as a god throughout the empire.
[92:31] And he was. We have, like, more statues
and busts of Antinous from all of
[92:35] these temples all over the empire than
I think of anyone else except Hadrian.
[92:39] So yeah, if, if the emperor says, like, "This
is a person who's a god now, you know, put
[92:43] statues of him everywhere," they will.
[92:45] And when Constantine comes out in favor of
Christianity, you know, suddenly people
[92:49] discover that, oh, this is an interesting
rite. It's got the support of the emperor.
[92:53] - So one of the things here, going to the Perplexity,
Constantine's conversion to Christianity is
[92:57] usually dated to 312 AD,
[93:01] Linked to a visionary experience
before the Battle of the Milvian
[93:04] Bridge. Do you believe that vision, that he
had this religious experience before the
[93:12] Battle of the Milvian Bridge? Here
it says, "But historians debate
[93:15] both its nature and its sincerity."
[93:18] - Well-
[93:18] - Do you believe the sincerity
of that experience?
[93:20] - Before we even get to the sincerity-
[93:22] ... is the problem of the sources. This
is reported by authors writing later
[93:25] in the aftermath of a victory
when the emperor... Like,
[93:29] one of them had a dinner conversation with
the emperor a few decades later, and he
[93:33] said, "Well, let me tell you about the Milvian Bridge."
And it's like, okay, I'm not gonna believe that.
[93:36] I'm not gonna take that
at face value, rather.
[93:38] It's a much more complicated...
You know, this is how the emperor
[93:42] wants things to be remembered.
[93:43] That's different. Also, Constantine tended
to have a lot of religious visions.
[93:47] He had had religious visions of
Apollo before Christ, and we have
[93:51] sources that talk about that, too, that he went
to this temple in Gaul, and Apollo appeared to
[93:55] him in the form of light. Okay, Constantine
has a religious vision every time
[93:59] he kind of wants to shift
policies. And his, like,
[94:03] profile. Like, when he wanted to
break away from his other emperors
[94:07] who used to go for the, like, they went
for this kind of Jupiter/Hercules model.
[94:11] And he shifted to an Apollo model. This
is a branding. This is emperors doing
[94:14] branding.
[94:15] - So we should say that, as you've
described, Constantine is a
[94:19] pragmatist. He's very pragmatic.
[94:22] - Yeah.
[94:22] - But you're saying it's fair
to believe, based on the
[94:26] evidence, that he actually converged
towards being a Christian believer.
[94:32] - Yeah. It's very possible, in
fact plausible, that he thought
[94:36] the Christian God had
helped him in battle. And,
[94:40] you know, for someone like him, that's as
good a reason as any to support that god.
[94:44] - But he was not, like, a hardcore
Christian all the way through.
[94:48] He was a kind of a spiritual,
religious kind of person. He
[94:52] thought about religions more generally and
just converged towards Christianity as
[95:00] a good religion. He also had ideas
about what a good religion is-
[95:04] ... and what a bad religion is, that kind
of stuff. So he's thinking in this space.
[95:08] - He's tending not to be too explicit.
[95:11] Depending on the audience. So
Constantine remains a pragmatist
[95:15] in the sense that he doesn't want to
alienate too many of his subjects, right?
[95:20] - Mm-hmm. Fair. Mm-hmm.
[95:20] - And so he's sometimes a bit
coy or elusive about what he's
[95:25] getting at. When he's talking to
Christians, he will talk about Christ. He
[95:29] will mention Christ. When he's talking to
everybody else in, like, a general law,
[95:34] he'll just refer to good
religion. And it's like, maybe
[95:38] you know what I mean, right? But he's not
gonna, like, you know, come to Jesus.
[95:43] - Yeah.
[95:43] - Right?
[95:43] - Yeah.
[95:44] - So even at the time when he's,
like, supporting the church, like,
[95:50] basically institutionalizing the
church as part of the imperial
[95:54] system, but he's also putting up
statues of himself that look like
[95:58] Apollo in Constantinople,
right? So the focal point of
[96:01] Constantine's Constantinople
is the Forum of Constantine.
[96:04] And in the middle is this very tall
column, and it has a colossal statue of
[96:08] Constantine on top, gilded, enormous
[96:12] thing. I don't know, like, eight
meters tall or whatever. But it's a
[96:16] repurposed Apollo. It's even, it,
like, visibly so. It's naked. It
[96:20] has the rays coming out of the-
[96:22] ... head, right? Right. And everybody
knew it was an Apollo. So that's
[96:25] Constantine in the guise of
his old patron god, Apollo.
[96:30] Still, but he's still Christian
Constantine, so he's sending all of these
[96:33] different messages.
[96:34] - I mean, he likes being the god-like
figure. I mean, that whole
[96:38] statue just is like, "I am the god."
[96:41] - Yeah. It's assimilating yourself
to... Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[96:43] - And I mean, a lot of the Romans, is it fair
to say, kinda saw the emperor a little
[96:47] bit in that light?
[96:48] - No, yeah. Oh, yeah. They
called him divine and-
[96:50] ... yeah. There's not a hard theology there,
right? Like, if you pressed them on the actual
[96:54] theology, they wouldn't-
[96:56] ... they wouldn't say the emperor
is a god. No. This is mushy.
[97:00] This gets very, very mushy.
[97:01] - But I mean, a lot of the Christians
have a kinda humility before God.
[97:07] I think when you have an emperor that's
god-like, it gets a little weird-
[97:11] - Yes. Yes
[97:13] - ... in the way you talk about God.
[97:15] - It depends on the context. Like, there are
contexts in which you are an emperor and
[97:19] you're proclaiming your majesty, and then
there are more personal contexts where you
[97:23] might be more humble because, I
don't know, you're being baptized or
[97:27] something. Like, those
are different contexts.
[97:29] - So can you speak to the whole process of
the conversion to Christianity, of the-
[97:33] ... propagation of Christianity throughout
the empire and, and Constantine's role in
[97:37] that?
[97:38] - Constantine, or his successors
as well, because this was a
[97:42] gradual process, and it takes
a very long time. So let's,
[97:46] Let's put it into perspective.
[97:49] We probably can't talk about
a majority Christian society
[97:53] until maybe the 5th century, or early 5th-
[97:57] ... mid-5th. We don't
have data, obviously.
[98:01] And we can't talk about,
like, a solidly Christian
[98:05] society until early 6th century.
And by solidly, I mean maybe
[98:09] where the non-Christians are 10,
15%, right? So that's a long time.
[98:15] That's, like, five centuries after
Jesus. That's half a millennium.
[98:19] So we're talking about a half a millennial
process here. It's, it's very long.
[98:25] - But it's only a couple of centuries
after Constantine. So it takes-
[98:29] ... about two centuries to really
make the Roman Empire Christian
[98:34] - Yes. So very slow conversion,
maybe, maybe up to 10%
[98:38] tops under Constantine.
Then obviously larger and
[98:42] larger groups join the church,
even if only nominally, right?
[98:46] Until you get to the sixth century when
you're clearly talking about a, you
[98:50] know, mostly or overwhelmingly
Christian society.
[98:54] A lot of this is just
done through incentives
[98:57] and disincentives, right?
So bishops are given
[99:01] funds with which to
distribute, like, charity and
[99:05] help to communities in
distress. They have lists of
[99:09] widows and whatever they support. Land is
[99:13] given to the church by the
emperors or in wills so that they
[99:16] can engage in this kind of social policy.
And then there are disincentives. So
[99:20] emperors pass laws that increasingly restrict
the exercise of traditional religion.
[99:25] Like, you can't perform animal
sacrifices, then you can't start doing
[99:28] these like tying ribbons to make
wishes or, like, all of these
[99:32] things, like going out to sacred
trees and doing this or that,
[99:36] because they say, "Oh, this is kind of
nefarious business," or, like, magic or
[99:40] whatever it is. And then they just
gradually start outlawing it more
[99:43] and more, putting restrictions on, like,
if you're not a Christian, you can't hold
[99:47] these high offices or you can't...
Your... There's problems with your wills.
[99:52] So they gradually do it like that.
[99:54] And this is how you... Yeah, this
is... And it works. It works.
[99:58] - What explains the success of
Christianity after Constantine?
[100:02] Why was it, as a technology, so successful
at spreading throughout the empire?
[100:08] - Christianity developed in a number of
[100:12] ways. So it acquired a certain
number of forms that were capable
[100:16] of appealing to different constituencies.
[100:20] In other words, there was
an intellectual side to it,
[100:26] The sort of theology, the almost
[100:29] quasi-philosophical or engagement
with philosophical schools that could
[100:33] draw in, let's say,
intellectuals. There is a,
[100:38] a public ceremony and ritual
aspect where you can organize
[100:42] communities and cities
to have processions or,
[100:45] like, have ho- all these festivals
that take the place of the ancient
[100:49] ones. You have a kind of
[100:54] not, it's not secretive, but it's
kind of this initiatory aspect
[100:59] where there's this baptism and
you learn a sort of creed,
[101:03] and you're initiated into the
religion with the prospect of a
[101:06] personal afterlife, right? And
that appeals to other kinds
[101:10] of people. There's also ways in which it
[101:15] it integrated itself into the
court and the language of power.
[101:19] Also in the army, right? Soldiers
now swear an oath to the
[101:22] Trinity, right? So it takes all
of these different forms that
[101:26] enable it to position itself, you know,
[101:30] here and there and, you know, in the
streets, in the court, in the armies,
[101:34] in the churches, in
texts, in books. And so
[101:38] it has this kind of manifold diversity,
right, that makes it very adaptable.
[101:44] - So one of the things you mentioned that
[101:47] Constantine did not anticipate,
did not realize that Christianity
[101:51] creates divisions between various groups.
[101:53] - So in part, this happens when you have,
[101:57] Religions that make exclusive claims,
right? Like, my beliefs are true-
[102:02] ... and yours are by definition false.
Not, not just wrong, but false and
[102:07] even kinda evil. Like maybe- ...
Satan put them in your mind to-
[102:10] ... lead you astray, right? And this
is inherently divisive. Like, it is.
[102:15] So there's this paradox where
[102:19] Christianity, in contrast to, say,
the ancient religions, is both
[102:23] far more polarizing but also far
more powerful as a unifying force
[102:30] at the same time, right? So
ancient religions tended not to
[102:34] produce this kind of conflict
or identities, right,
[102:38] or, or wars or these kinds of
things. And they could under certain
[102:41] circumstances, but for the
most part, they were not
[102:45] drivers of history in this kind of way.
But when you have exclusive claims, then
[102:49] suddenly these very communities
of, that are sort of
[102:52] consolidated and have this
very strong identity,
[102:57] But you also alienate other groups- ...
that you then are in conflict with.
[103:03] So this is why I for one
can't come down on whether,
[103:07] you know, Christianity is more of a
unifying force or a divisive force in the
[103:11] history of the Eastern Empire,
because it's, it's both.
[103:14] - And also trying to figure out
whether the unifying or the divisive
[103:19] aspects are a feature or a bug.
[103:21] Maybe some of the divisive
elements is a way for society
[103:25] internally to try to, much like the
civil wars, to try to figure itself out.
[103:31] - Yes.
[103:31] - So sometimes tension and conflict is a
good mechanism for figuring out what
[103:35] do the people want.
[103:36] - Or what's the truth, right?
[103:38] - Or what's the truth.
[103:39] - Yeah. So the story that it
likes to tell itself is that
[103:43] there's this, like, this
one original truth, and the
[103:46] hardcore of true believers is defending
that truth at every moment against
[103:50] all of these evil heretics
who are coming in-
[103:52] ... and trying to corrupt it. In reality,
what happens is that this truth is
[103:56] something that's evolving in the
course of the controversies.
[104:01] And, like, often they don't
know that they believed
[104:05] that until in retrospect, once
they've had the fight and the winner
[104:09] has this position, oh, now that turns
out to have been the position we
[104:13] always held, right? And this happens again
and again and again. You know, a lot
[104:17] of the time, these Christian theologians
[104:20] who get into so much trouble and get branded
as heretics and sometimes get sent into
[104:23] exile, they didn't mean any harm.
[104:27] They often just were stating what
they thought everybody believed.
[104:31] And then when they blurt it out, someone is
like, off in Alexandria, is like, "What?
[104:34] That's heresy." And then now you're, now you're in
trouble. Now you're getting into this fight, and you
[104:38] might win, you might lose. But, like,
a lot of them were kind of sort of
[104:42] well-intentioned in that way, or they had
no intention of starting a fight. But
[104:46] there's always someone who
wants to start a fight.
[104:49] - Yeah, I mean, sometimes the
fights are extremely intense
[104:53] over things that I could see
on the surface or, like,
[104:57] iconography. It's like, it
seems like a very subtle-
[105:00] ...debate, like almost academic. And then
[105:04] a large number of people don't
see it as academic. They,
[105:09] they do see it like the devil
put ideas in your head that are-
[105:12] ...completely wrong, and it's, it's fascinating
how that kind of division can emerge.
[105:17] Uh, I mean, I—
[105:18] The impossible question, and I
apologize for asking it, but maybe just
[105:22] worthwhile to try to think about
it is, on the grand scale of
[105:27] centuries of the East
Roman Empire, is religion
[105:32] a constructive or a destructive force
[105:36] for the empire? Did it help it
flourish, or did it hold it back?
[105:41] - This society identified
itself increasingly
[105:44] with what it saw as orthodoxy. Orthodoxy
just means correct belief. I mean—
[105:49] ...like every religion ultimately
thinks it's orthodox, right? That's—
[105:53] But that's the conventional name, right?
Orthodoxy today might be called Greek Orthodoxy.
[105:57] Um, and I mean, it's such an
essential part of the culture.
[106:03] It really is. I can't think of
the two of them inde... I mean,
[106:07] I try to because, as a historian,
I have to test the models,
[106:11] you know, and try to see these
things as independent of each other.
[106:15] But ultimately, it's very difficult to
[106:18] disentangle them, and I would
say that to the degree that
[106:22] this is a successful society historically,
[106:26] that its religion definitely contributed
to that and played a role in it.
[106:29] Not without cost, right?
There are, it mattered to
[106:33] them. They valued it, but things
that matter to you have a cost.
[106:38] And they paid that price. They were
willing to pay that price for it.
[106:43] For example, at the very end, they had to
choose between Catholicism, Western rule,
[106:49] where they essentially have to
compromise on their faith, or
[106:54] rule by Muslims, the Turks, where they
would not have to compromise their faith.
[106:59] And some of them were explicit that
they were preferring option B,
[107:03] because the Turks will at least respect
our identity. Like, that's a cost.
[107:09] - Yeah. But there's other
layers, like taxation and-
[107:13] ...the, the functions of government—
[107:15] ... that are connected to religion
to the degree it interacts with the
[107:19] tax system. But it feels
like that's the engine
[107:23] of the society and religion is
more like the cultural layer.
[107:27] - Yeah. So this is why I said that I try
[107:31] in thinking of the models
that we use to understand the
[107:35] society, not to assume that religion is
[107:38] everywhere and for everything.
Now, I have colleagues who do
[107:42] that, and I would disagree with them about
this, but you're exactly right. There are
[107:46] elements of this society that I
like to see as their own thing.
[107:50] Like the Roman identity, for example.
It's not the same as Orthodoxy.
[107:56] But also the operations
of the state. Those are
[107:59] very pragmatic things, and you see them
[108:03] intersect with religion
in, largely in areas of
[108:06] terminology or the vocabulary that
they use or, you know, like at the
[108:10] top, but not at their actual functioning.
[108:14] So in my field, I'm a
historian who's tried
[108:18] to promote other aspects
of the culture as having
[108:22] a kind of integrity of their own and not
to subsume them all within Orthodoxy.
[108:28] - So, I mean, again, an
impossible way of asking the
[108:31] same question. If you asked a
Roman, a million Romans across
[108:38] a thousand years, "Are you
a Roman or a Christian?"
[108:44] What would be the answer for that?
[108:45] - Oh, both. Oh, absolutely.
[108:47] - No, you don't get to say both.
You're not allowed to do that.
[108:49] - Why not? It's the-
[108:50] - Well, you're-
[108:50] - It's the true answer.
[108:52] - Okay. So you're saying
they're really tied together.
[108:55] - Well, they overlap. But if you were to...
[108:59] And this might be a somewhat more
subtle conversation than most of
[109:03] them would want to have, but if you were
to say, "Is Roman and Christian the
[109:07] same thing to you?" If they thought
about it for a little while,
[109:11] they'd quickly be able to say no. Because
there were, I mean, just logically, there
[109:18] were Christians who were not Romans.
[109:20] The Bulgarians or the Rus
or, you know, whoever.
[109:24] There were lots of Christians who were not
Roman, and they did not regard them as
[109:28] Roman just because they were Christian.
Conversely, they knew perfectly well
[109:32] that there had been Romans who were not
Christians, and they knew this how? Because in the
[109:36] churches like almost every
week, they celebrated
[109:39] martyrs who had been killed by
the Roman emperors in the past.
[109:43] And so it was, like, the
performance of violence by
[109:47] Roman emperors against Christians was
something they remember. They knew perfectly
[109:51] well. So those two things
did not overlap perfectly.
[109:55] And there were some contexts in which
you would be more Roman, and there were
[109:59] some contexts in which you
would be more Christian.
[110:02] And you find characters who, and I love
to do this. I find characters who,
[110:07] As some sources say we didn't pay
too much attention to Christian
[110:11] things. Like, they were just politicians.
They were just doing their work. And then
[110:15] you find characters who, like,
devote themselves. They go all
[110:19] in on Orthodoxy and, like, monasticism
and they just don't care about
[110:23] the Roman stuff at all.
[110:25] And that is, in fact, part of the reason
why I like this society, is because
[110:28] it has these kinds of options for people to choose.
And there's another one. There's the Greek stuff,
[110:33] too, because their language is Greek, their
literature is Greek, and so there are people in
[110:37] the society who go all in
on the Greek stuff. Right?
[110:40] And I see this society as
this kind of laboratory of
[110:44] these three elements coexisting
in these fascinating
[110:47] combinations. Usually it's
combinations, right? But
[110:51] sometimes you'll find people who are like,
kinda try to be purists in one way or
[110:55] another. And it's the only
society in history in
[110:59] which you can do this, 'cause it's the only
society that's Roman and Christian and Greek.
[111:04] But in different ways, right?
[111:06] - Yeah, unfortunately, I think it's tempting,
but it's probably impossible to say
[111:10] if we remove the taxation system,
would the, would Roman Empire
[111:13] be more or less successful? If we
removed religion, would it be more or
[111:17] less successful?
[111:18] - Right.
[111:18] - If we removed, uh,
[111:24] Greek and kept it Latin all the way through,
would it be more or less successful?
[111:28] It's probably impossible to do this
kind of analysis 'cause they're all so
[111:32] deeply integrated.
[111:33] - And fundamentally, it also wouldn't be what
it was. It would be something different.
[111:39] - But there is a big temptation, and this
is at the core of your work, and to
[111:43] understand why did the East Roman
Empire last as long as it did.
[111:48] And why did the broader Roman
Empire last as long as it did?
[111:51] - Yeah.
[111:51] - 'Cause it's, it is one of, if not
the most successful empires in terms
[111:57] of duration and stability in a
very dense part of the world.
[112:02] - That's actually like my next project.
I'm starting to write a book
[112:06] trying to explain just kind of
from an analytical standpoint why.
[112:11] - How did it last so long?
[112:13] - Yeah.
[112:13] - A lot of your work kinda hints at it.
[112:15] - Yeah.
[112:15] - It's here and there.
[112:16] But you're trying to do more, more
systematic. So, and we'll keep hinting at it.
[112:21] - Yes.
[112:22] - But to put a bow tie on
Constantinople, it went from a
[112:25] very low population of maybe 25,000 people
[112:30] to 500,000 people in just two centuries.
So can you explain how that happened?
[112:37] - Well, it didn't happen through
just demographic growth
[112:41] and reproduction in the city
itself. That rate of growth is
[112:45] impossible for an ancient city. So
when I say 20,000, 25,000, that's
[112:50] possibly what the ancient
city of Byzantium had-
[112:53] ... when Constantine decided to found
Constantinople, and it grew to a city of a half a
[112:57] million in two centuries. That can
only have been done in one way,
[113:02] and that is immigration from the provinces.
So people must have been moving there,
[113:08] In large numbers,
[113:12] Which is a movement that we can't
see very clearly in the sources, but
[113:16] we have to infer it and
then try to explain it. So,
[113:21] Also there's another factor,
which is that ancient cities
[113:25] we now know or suspect are
[113:28] what some historians call death
traps. In other words, the density
[113:32] of disease is such that ancient cities
probably are losing something like
[113:38] 1, 2, possibly 3% of their
population per year.
[113:43] So just in order to stay with a stable
population, they have to import people.
[113:49] Right? Now, they're not like 17th
century London. They're not that bad.
[113:53] - Do diseases and plagues
seem to be prevalent?
[113:56] - Oh, yeah. Now, you know, Roman
cities have some corrections
[114:00] for these sorts of things, like the way
they distribute the water through the city.
[114:04] Anyway, they, they weren't as
bad as they could've been,
[114:08] but there's that. So not only to
keep the population steady, but to
[114:12] expand it so dramatically means
that a lot of people are coming in
[114:16] from the provinces, mostly the
Greek-speaking provinces. So
[114:20] you know, Greece, Asia Minor, and
some of the major cities in the
[114:24] East that are Greek speaking.
And I start to wonder
[114:28] like, well, how did this happen? Like,
who are these people, for one thing?
[114:33] And then I did some simple calculations.
So I mentioned earlier that we
[114:37] have something like two and
a half thousand senators-
[114:40] ... Who are required initially
to reside in Constantinople.
[114:44] Well, senators don't
live in bachelor pads.
[114:47] Senators have manners. They have
household staff, right? In Rome
[114:51] at the time, there's a calculation
that a senatorial household
[114:55] was something like 100 people,
right? Just servants, slaves,
[115:01] dancing girls, cooks,
barbers, whatever, right?
[115:05] So let's assume sort of conservatively
that in Constantinople it's
[115:09] only 30 people, which it might be
low, right? So if you do the math,
[115:13] you're starting to get something like,
I mean, closer to 100,000 people,
[115:18] right? And that's just
by bringing in senators.
[115:22] Right? They come with people.
So I think this was the nucleus
[115:29] of the population. Now then
Constantine also makes
[115:32] provision for possibly up to like 200,000
people to receive the grain dole, the
[115:39] bread. So that would've incentivized even
[115:43] more people to travel
there because there are-
[115:46] - So you get free bread.
[115:47] - Yes. And you can't live on that
alone, but it is, it's something.
[115:51] - Incentive. Is it true that he diverted
resources from Rome to Constantinople?
[115:55] - Absolutely. Oh, yeah. That
grain, that's coming from Egypt.
[115:59] So New Rome is literally stealing
food from the mouth of Old Rome.
[116:05] Now, Old Rome doesn't starve because
they, they divert other, like from North
[116:09] Africa and Sicily, you
can feed Rome, right?
[116:11] - But it sends a strong signal to
the people living in Old Rome
[116:15] that, long term, we should probably move.
[116:18] - Some people do move. So we know of
some senators who move from Rome.
[116:22] It sends a signal about the priorities of
the state, like they're investing much
[116:26] more in the East. And that the East
would be regarded as an equal parallel
[116:31] Roman, you know, world. Yeah.
[116:33] - As we talk about diverting
resources, slowly
[116:39] the West declines and collapses in 476
AD. So the Visigoths sack Rome in 410 AD,
[116:51] and in 476 AD, the last
Western emperor is deposed,
[116:55] marking the end of the
Western Roman Empire.
[116:59] High-level question: What is
the reason for that decline
[117:03] and the collapse of the
Western Roman Empire? So,
[117:07] nonstop civil wars, as we've
talked about, weak emperors.
[117:11] There's an economic money
crisis, so shrinking tax base,
[117:17] rising army costs. There was a loss of key
[117:21] provinces, especially in North Africa.
Reliance on contracted barbarian troops
[117:27] as they immigrated more and more into—
[117:30] ...the Western Roman Empire.
Cascading invasions,
[117:34] migrations amplified by Hun pressure,
and then the East-West split. The richer
[117:42] East survives, the West can't
stabilize under— ...that split.
[117:48] - Yeah. The crux of the matter is that
barbarian armies, so armies from
[117:52] outside the empire, put
increasing pressure on it during
[117:56] the fifth century. And
for whatever reason,
[117:59] when the Roman state failed
to sort of suppress one of
[118:03] them and, say, settled them here
or allowed them to have here
[118:07] or couldn't stop them and they took over
a province, like the Vandals did in
[118:11] North Africa— ...this created this kind
of vicious cycle because then the Roman
[118:17] state lost access to the resources
from those provinces, that
[118:21] is the taxes, and without those
resources, they couldn't,
[118:24] you know, maintain, mobilize,
pay for their armies.
[118:28] Then they had fewer armies to handle
the next wave of barbarians that
[118:32] came in. The previous barbarians who
settled kind of declared their kind
[118:36] of independence. They also could not be
put down, and so this created a vicious,
[118:40] cycle that just continued in that way.
[118:43] It's not rocket science, actually.
I mean, you can see it playing out.
[118:47] Yeah. Now, who these groups are,
where they came from, why did they
[118:51] cross, that, those are
different questions, right?
[118:54] But from the Roman standpoint, that's
how it was experienced. These are
[118:58] armies that can defeat a Roman field army-
right, in battle. And sometimes they do.
[119:07] And they then settle and take over
territories, and then you lose the revenues,
[119:11] and so you can't recruit your own armies.
And so, anyway, that's the kind of
[119:15] cycle. The East tried to help.
[119:18] Occasionally, they would send forces, but they
were also subject to some of the same pressures.
[119:23] Because remember, the Goths
cross the Danube for the first
[119:27] time in a major way in 376.
Then you have the Battle of
[119:30] Adrianople a couple years later, where,
like, one and a half field armies is just
[119:34] annihilated, and the Emperor Valens dies,
and the Goths are just, like, kind of loose
[119:38] in the Balkans. And there was then
a long war with them, four years.
[119:44] It results in a kind of
truce where neither side
[119:48] wins, and the Romans, for the
first time, accept the presence of
[119:52] this quasi-independent Gothic army
in the territory of the empire.
[119:57] This is unprecedented, as I
said, and it creates a lot of
[120:01] tensions and dysfunctions.
Okay, so why does
[120:05] the East survive and the
West does not, right?
[120:08] There's... And so the-- Lots of reasons
that we can give here, but one of them
[120:12] is the geography that we were talking
about earlier. In other words,
[120:16] the, without a fleet, which they
don't have, the Goths can't cross
[120:20] over from Thrace or the western Balkans
to Asia Minor and go plunder some of the
[120:27] more prosperous provinces. So
they're stuck in the Balkans.
[120:31] They're gradually pushed kind of in toward the
western Balkans, which is, like, the worst
[120:35] part you, you know, at the
time, like, you wanna be in.
[120:38] And eventually, they just decide, "Well,
you know, it's kinda nicer in Naples."
[120:44] And so they go to Italy, right?
[120:46] Just because there's just a lot
more resources there for them.
[120:50] And that's one way that the
East just kind of manages to...
[120:54] It doesn't do this deliberately, but it,
[120:56] the geography kind of pushes
these invaders to the West.
[121:00] - So that's one. So geography is, some of
it's sort of the luck of geography and-
[121:06] ... both of the invaders and
the geography of the empire.
[121:09] - Yeah.
[121:10] - But, you know, the East had
a lot of invaders since-
[121:15] ... and was able to still barely at times-
[121:19] ... survive the invaders, so... And
some of that could be luck. Some of it
[121:24] could be about the nature of
the invaders and the, the
[121:27] effectiveness of their military,
all that kind of stuff.
[121:30] - By the way, it worked in the other direction, too.
So if you have, like, Persians or Arabs coming
[121:34] into Asia Minor from the East,
[121:37] they usually can't cross over
into your Balkan provinces.
[121:40] - Mm-hmm. Right.
[121:40] - So you can fall back on one
side or the other side.
[121:44] They... If you fortified Constantinople
so that it's an impregnable bunker,
[121:48] which it was, right? So you're
holding your command center in
[121:52] Constantinople. You can alternate
between your European or your Asian
[121:56] provinces, depending on where the trouble is.
You can call in reinforcements from either
[122:00] side. So the East does have that kind
of advantage. This is not the reason
[122:04] why it survives for as long as it does,
though it is a reason. You know, also,
[122:08] they acquire flamethrowers at some
point, which- ... those help, too.
[122:12] Um, right? Ultimately, I think it's
the decision made by local communities
[122:16] to stick with the Roman state,
like, ultimately. Like, they're
[122:19] not going to actively side with invaders.
[122:25] And when the trouble passes, they
restore ties with Constantinople
[122:28] immediately. Like, this is
their natural political home.
[122:32] And, and that's the question that I'm really
trying to answer, like, why does that happen?
[122:36] - You know, we should say, just like we've
articulated multiple times, that it, the
[122:40] Roman Empire survives-
[122:43] So it's not like the Roman Empire collapsed
and another Byzantine Empire was born.
[122:49] Really, there is a shift that
happens, and part of that
[122:53] shift is because of Constantine,
[122:55] right? It's not just about where
the capital is, but I'm sure that
[122:59] there's just a general move towards that
direction from the West to the East.
[123:05] - Yeah, yeah.
[123:05] - And, and that in many ways, you know, weak
emperors and the West, the weak leaders,
[123:12] The structure of government, all
these kinds of elements put together-
[123:16] ... maybe demographic shifts
and declines that have to do
[123:20] with the fact that the center
of the empire has moved.
[123:24] - That's right.
[123:25] - And so ultimately- ... it's not that
the West Roman Empire collapsed, it is
[123:30] that the center of the
Roman Empire shifted.
[123:34] And because of that, the
historic West collapsed.
[123:38] - It's quite striking. So for example, already
by, like in the 430s, Constantinople is
[123:46] basically codifying Roman
law for the West. So Roman
[123:50] law in Latin is codified in
Constantinople, and then sent
[123:54] to the West as, "Oh,
here's your law code."
[123:57] And this is in the 430s, so after the
alleged division between the two, which
[124:00] like I said, is kind of loose.
It's not hard and fast. In the
[124:04] 6th century, it is the East that reconquers
part of the West under Justinian.
[124:10] - Mm-hmm.
[124:10] - And not only that, he also recodifies
Roman law on a much bigger
[124:14] scale, and then that law becomes Western
[124:18] law. So in a certain sense,
Roman law as we know
[124:22] it comes from Constantinople. It
doesn't come from ancient Rome. I mean,
[124:26] ultimately it comes from ancient Rome, but
we don't have those versions of it. We have
[124:30] the East Roman versions of it. It is East
[124:34] Rome that reconquers Rome. This
is a funny inversion, you know,
[124:37] because Constantinople is situated in
a province, Thrace, which always was
[124:41] sort of considered backwards,
[124:43] right? In the time of, like, the early
Caesars, if you were in Rome and you
[124:47] thought, you know, Thrace, it was like, "Ugh."
It's like, you know, some sort of, yeah,
[124:51] armpit of the Roman Empire or something,
you know? But by Justinian's time,
[124:55] it's complete inversion. Like, the capital
of the Roman world, the heart of it
[124:59] is there, and Rome is this kind of
backwater provincial city in Italy,
[125:05] you know, that you've just liberated from the Goths,
and it's kind of in ruins. There are wolves roaming the
[125:09] streets of the Forum. So this
is a complete, you know,
[125:13] overhaul of the centers of power.
It's turned inside out almost.
[125:18] - And I think it's fair to say
that the reason the East...
[125:22] Part of the reason the East lasted as
long as it did is the topic that we've
[125:26] mentioned, which is the structure of
government. So can we just zoom out once again
[125:30] and explain the key ways the government
functioned in the East Roman Empire,
[125:35] and how it evolved over the
lifetime of the empire?
[125:38] - Very broadly speaking, there's
civilian and military,
[125:42] right? And you might actually add the
church. It's entirely plausible to treat the
[125:46] church as a kind of government
institution at this time.
[125:51] But let's just stick with
military and civilian.
[125:55] the military is pretty straightforward,
would be recognizable to any student
[125:59] of military history. This is how
you recruit, organize, equip,
[126:04] pay, and lead soldiers. And the
East Roman state tends to have a
[126:12] larger military, at least paper strength.
[126:15] Active is a different matter. Like, how many soldiers
you take on a campaign is a different matter,
[126:19] but how many soldiers you maintain, like,
in the provinces generally, right, is a...
[126:24] It tends to be on the large side for a
medieval society, right? So it compares
[126:32] favorably to, say, the Caliphate
later on, which is a much
[126:36] more massive territorial entity. So the
military is that. It can have anywhere
[126:44] between 100,000 at a minimum, at a low
point, up to maybe about 250,000 at a high
[126:52] point, depending on the period. It's
a lot of people. It's a lot of men.
[126:57] Factor in their families, right?
These are also, like, part of the
[127:00] whole, you know, military
economic complex, if you will.
[127:05] - And they're career military,
so, like, this is their job.
[127:08] - Yep, yes.
[127:09] - And is the military for most of
the history of the East Roman
[127:13] Empire defensive military?
[127:16] - Mostly, but not always.
[127:18] - Yeah. And we'll talk about Justinian.
[127:20] - Sure.
[127:21] Um, and so then you have the civilian administration.
Civilian administration does a number of
[127:25] things. Principally, it is to find
the funds to pay for this army,
[127:30] which is the single largest
expense on the state budget,
[127:34] right? And so in order to
find those funds, it has
[127:37] to have census of the assets, and it has
[127:41] to be able to tax them, and there are
lots of different ways of doing that. So
[127:46] the civilian administration
has a number of tax bureaus,
[127:51] records keeping this sort of
thing, also a legal branch for
[127:55] resolving disputes with the imperial
fisc. Okay. But the civilian
[127:59] administration does a number of other
things, too. For example, the whole legal
[128:02] regulation of the, of the empire, the
courts, judges, courts of appeal,
[128:09] Or also issuing laws,
keeping records, all,
[128:13] all of this. And those
are the main bureaus that
[128:17] have to do with the
subjects of the empire.
[128:21] The emperors obviously maintain bureaus
that are for things like diplomacy,
[128:26] right, or running the palace staff,
[128:29] Because the palace is a huge
institution, right, with...
[128:33] And then there are a number of
endowments that, you know, major
[128:37] churches, Hagia Sophia, for example,
has hundreds of staff, clergy to, you
[128:41] know, readers to whatever, and so
they need to be paid, and so you need
[128:44] endowments. The imperial household,
it has expenses, so it needs
[128:48] endowments, right? So there's
a lot of land that's earmarked
[128:52] For these kinds of expenses, that
requires administration. So,
[128:56] this multiplies, right? I mean,
go on and on and on and on.
[128:58] - And I'm sure the tax code is
not a simple flat tax. It's...
[129:03] ... probably incredibly complicated. So
it's just like in the United States,
[129:08] it feels like the majority of the United
States is basically lawyers and the IRS.
[129:14] That's maybe 98%, I think, is lawyers.
[129:18] - Lawyers.
[129:18] - I'm not sure it's scientifically-
[129:20] - I thought they shrunk the IRS down now to a
size that it can't, like, actually do anything.
[129:24] - They shrunk it down...
[129:25] - I thought it was just...
[129:26] - ... to just 90% now.
[129:27] - 90, just 90.
[129:29] - No. I think there is
something—this is another,
[129:34] Conversation about human nature
and about the, the nature of
[129:38] governments, but there's something about,
[129:40] like I think it's impossible to have an
IRS-type organization that doesn't grow.
[129:47] I think maybe with good intentions
because you can't— You have to, like...
[129:53] ... everybody always comes to you,
"Well, I don't... Here's my special
[129:57] case. I want my tax to be lower."
[130:01] And they kind of add another
line. "All right, if you have...
[130:04] ... purple hair, you..."
[130:06] ... the tax decrease. And so you keep adding,
and then of course, the more you add,
[130:12] the more opaque the thing becomes,
therefore corruption seeps in
[130:16] or co- you know, maybe not like
official corruption, but...
[130:20] ... corruption light, and
then that tax code grows, and
[130:23] then all of a sudden you have
these big institutions that then-
[130:26] ... encourage corruption, and then
there's a bureaucracy, and there's a
[130:30] momentum, and this is just how humans are.
[130:32] - Yes. So this happens in East Roman society
too. I'll give you some examples. So,
[130:38] there's not a tax code as such,
but what you-- The way it
[130:43] operates is through basically exemptions.
[130:46] So you petition for an
exemption. You might be
[130:50] a monastery, you might be a wealthy la- You
might be someone well-connected to the court.
[130:54] You might be a struggling provincial
village, and you petition the emperor or
[130:58] some official, and you say, "Hey, we know we
had a bad season," or, "The barbarians came
[131:02] through and they took all of our... We can't
pay the taxes. Could we have an exemption?"
[131:06] And emperors often are granting
these exemptions for very
[131:10] specific things, like maybe for this
year or for that tax or whatever.
[131:15] The problem is that the emperors are discovering
every once in a while that their officials are,
[131:18] are granting these exemptions sort of on their
own. So every once in a while, the emperors have
[131:22] to, like, clear house
when they have to, like,
[131:26] cancel all of these exemptions and
start the whole process again. But,
[131:30] later on, when-- once we start to have
documentation, like maybe in the 11th century,
[131:34] we see that every little, well, not every,
[131:38] but we have all these monasteries, these little
villages, these high officials, and they all have these
[131:42] documents that give them exemption from this
or that or the other thing, and it gets
[131:46] so complicated and that's how it works.
[131:49] - Uh, but it is the engine of society that
makes the whole thing work 'cause you
[131:53] have to fund--
[131:55] I mean, there's infrastructure projects,
but you have to also fund the army, and the
[131:59] army's necessary to defend against
all the military incursions.
[132:03] A good fraction of the bureaucracy
seemed to have been eunuchs,
[132:07] which are castrated men. Can you
explain why this was a prominent thing?
[132:11] - The eunuchs are part of the
household staff of the emperor.
[132:16] So that would be like, what would it be? The West
Wing of the White House or something like this.
[132:21] So they are the people who
handle the imperial person,
[132:25] the bedchamber, the
organization of palace life,
[132:29] things like banquets, you know,
these kinds of things, the wardrobe.
[132:34] And why are they important? So
for starters, if you're, like,
[132:38] physically with the emperor
all day, right? Like,
[132:42] you're handling the meetings, you're... Right?
People can come to you and say, "Hey, I need
[132:46] you to put in a good word for
whatever," right? So they can
[132:50] get things done. So you bribe them,
they get things done. So they're
[132:54] very useful in this way. They're
also kind of hated for that reason.
[132:57] Right? But they're also kind of there
to be hated. In other words, they
[133:02] soak up a lot of the frustration
that people sometimes feel when
[133:06] they're not getting, you know,
what they want from the court.
[133:10] Okay. That's one thing. Here's the
other thing that's more interesting.
[133:15] How do you as an emperor make sure
that your bureaucracy doesn't displace
[133:19] you? Like, if the bureaucracy is handling
all the matters of running the empire,
[133:23] what do we need you for? Right? Like, the
bureaucracy can develop rules of its own-
[133:29] ... for solving all the
problems for dealing with
[133:33] petitions and exemptions and
whatever. Like, they can do it. So
[133:37] where's your power exactly? So what
the emperors did not want is to
[133:41] be displaced or overshadowed
by these kinds of more
[133:44] impersonal institutions. And so
they would often set up, like,
[133:48] So this could be a bit confusing.
[133:52] So eunuchs were perfect for
this reason because often
[133:56] their origin was from outside the
empire, or they were former slaves. They
[134:00] weren't connected to, like,
networks of powerful families.
[134:04] So you knew that they would generally
be loyal to you because they
[134:07] depended entirely on you, the emperor,
for their position and their power.
[134:12] And what you would sometimes do is you'd
say, "Okay, I'm putting you in charge of,
[134:16] like, this army." Literally, like
putting you in charge of an army,
[134:20] just so that you can
counterbalance the kind of
[134:24] networks of established generals,
and you'll have, like, a eunuch
[134:28] from my wardrobe. You know, I'm
putting him in charge. And so this
[134:32] kind of shook things up a little bit
so that people who were part of a
[134:35] system or a network could never fully
count that that could get them all
[134:39] the power that they wanted. They now have to answer
to this eunuch from the wardrobe who's, like,
[134:43] outside of their system. And sometimes
these eunuchs were extremely
[134:47] competent like Narses,
Justinian's general, who
[134:51] defeated the Goths in Italy in this
massive battle. Like, this guy was a total
[134:54] hardass. And he was this little old man.
He was very old, and he was tiny, and he
[134:58] was a eunuch, and the Goths laughed at
him, but he had the last laugh, right?
[135:04] - Is there some component to them
being eunuchs, so they can't
[135:08] propagate the bloodline?
[135:09] - Yeah. They can't have their own family, so
they can't be, like, looking out for their own
[135:13] offspring. They're kind of isolated
individuals who depend entirely on your favor.
[135:21] - Is it known whether the castration
is almost always by force?
[135:26] - There are eunuchs in society generally.
They're often bishops. They're appointed
[135:30] Patriarch of Constantinople
sometimes. They're-
[135:32] ... they're in all kinds of
positions. Many of them are
[135:36] children who are enslaved and
castrated against their will.
[135:41] Sometimes, however, they are castrated very
much according to the will of their families.
[135:46] Um, in some parts of, like in
[135:50] Caucasia, there were some regions that
were famous for producing eunuchs,
[135:54] also in, in Persia and so forth.
[135:56] But also, we are pretty sure that
this happened within the empire,
[136:00] because there were some families that, like,
really wanted to place a eunuch at the court.
[136:04] Um, so from Paphlagonia, there
were a number of... This is in
[136:07] northern Asia Minor. And so they would...
It was almost like a family strategy.
[136:15] - I mean, it's fascinating. It's
fascinating that they had so,
[136:19] So much representation
in the inner circles-
[136:24] ... of the emperor, and
therefore had real influence.
[136:28] - Oh, yeah. But this was the case always,
even in Rome, like in the Julio-Claudians
[136:32] under-
[136:33] ... you know, the first Caesars. There
are all these powerful eunuchs, and the,
[136:37] the senatorial class always hates them. I
mean, it's just the s- it's the same dynamic.
[136:42] - Uh, one of the interesting things you've
said as an aside in one of the many
[136:45] podcasts that I listened with you is you
said that there were no isolated people,
[136:52] You know, people that are
disconnected from the empire,
[136:57] Maybe who, for example, don't know
about the taxes or just don't feel
[137:01] integrated into the system. I mean,
that's really interesting to me, that
[137:06] there's so much connectivity, there's so
much cohesion- ... as an entire peoples.
[137:12] - These people do not exist, these
isolated peasants. This is a
[137:16] myth that I, one day I'm going
to write a chapter about this
[137:20] because it's this idea that you occasionally
encounter, well, actually quite
[137:24] often in the scholarship, that there
are these sort of rural communities out
[137:28] there somewhere that don't
know what's going on in
[137:32] Constantinople. They might not know, even
know who the emperor is. They're cut
[137:36] off. Maybe a tax official
will show up every once in a
[137:40] while, maybe not, and they just
live their lives on their own,
[137:43] unaffected by the, say, state,
because the medieval state,
[137:48] we suspect, is you know, always
[137:51] powerless and can't, you know,
affect people's lives. There's
[137:55] no proof for these communities
at all. At most, you
[137:59] might try to find some,
like, actual hermits, like,
[138:03] actual Christian ascetic hermits who
try to go out and find this situation,
[138:09] and sometimes they're described in the
text as, like, oh, so, so-and-so went so
[138:13] far out into the mountains that,
like, not even the tax census people
[138:17] showed up there, which tells you how
they think about what it means to be
[138:21] isolated, right? So this is not
a... This is a state in which every
[138:25] arable, you know, piece of arable
land has been censused for
[138:28] centuries. It's not like you
can hide a village, right?
[138:32] And the, the taxation process
is not like, what, they visit
[138:36] once a year, give us some coin, and we'll
leave. It's actually more like three
[138:40] times a year. And the
taxes is not just coin and
[138:45] maybe a payment in kind or something, but
it's, it's a whole bunch of things like
[138:48] services and recruits and all...
You're right. And once you
[138:52] start adding all of these things
up, it creates a very dense,
[138:57] Institutional matrix in which
all communities are enmeshed.
[139:02] They can't get out of it. Also, they,
they have a church, don't they?
[139:07] And if they have a church, they have the calendar.
And of course they have the calendar because...
[139:11] So, like, how do they
organize time and space and
[139:15] boundaries and all of these things? No, this is all
state institutions. How do they pay for anything?
[139:19] They have coins. Coins are
everywhere. So I think
[139:23] that these institutions
structured the way that everyone,
[139:27] even in village communities, even in
the most isolated ones, supposedly,
[139:31] how they thought about things
like time and space and value and
[139:35] relations and power and
kinship and so forth.
[139:39] - So what you're saying is taxation is the
thing that brings the empire together.
[139:44] - It is, principally, yes.
[139:46] - I mean, it's- ... it's true, right?
This is, like, this is how you know.
[139:50] - Yeah. But on top of that is
layered things like the economy,
[139:53] coins, right? But also there's the church.
[139:56] - Yeah, and the church is
important, just like you said.
[139:59] Yeah. And there's churches
throughout the empire.
[140:01] - Yes, and they have sermons,
and they pray for the
[140:04] emperor after this service. No,
there are no isolated communities.
[140:09] - So one of the things I briefly
mentioned just would be nice to
[140:13] elaborate on is this term
of monarchic republic.
[140:18] So we've been throwing around words like
kingdom and republic and empire and,
[140:25] Monarchy. So what is the actual... What's
a good applicable term to what this
[140:33] thing is- ... the East Roman Empire?
[140:35] - That's an excellent question,
and I'm glad you flagged that
[140:40] because we call it conventionally Byzantine
Empire, and it's neither of those things
[140:43] really. We talked about Byzantine.
[140:46] Now, empire's a bit of a problem because
first of all, There's no term in Greek,
[140:53] In the Greek that they use at this period
that corresponds to our notion of empire.
[140:59] It's not part of the official terms. It's
not even... They didn't even have a term
[141:03] for it. You could have... There's some
terms that might mean something like state
[141:07] Arche maybe or kratos. But for the most
part, it's either basileia, which we might
[141:13] translate as monarchy or
politeia, which is polity.
[141:18] And politeia in Greek, polity, is a
Greek translation of Latin res publica.
[141:24] Res publica doesn't mean republic
the way we mean it for the Romans,
[141:28] like a non-monarchical regime, right? That's how
we mean, like, the American Republic or, you
[141:32] know. That's a usage that came
in later, like during the
[141:35] Enlightenment. In Latin,
a res publica is the
[141:39] common affairs, the common
interest of a people who are
[141:43] constituted as a political
community, regardless of the type of
[141:47] regime that they have. Like even
Cicero could imagine the Roman res
[141:51] publica governed by a king
or by a senate or by a
[141:54] democracy. And they continue to
use that term. We don't use it
[141:58] according to Roman norms. We use it according
to modern norms, the term republic.
[142:03] So they continue to call it a res
publica or a polity under the emperors
[142:07] as well, right? And it was
understood that the role of the
[142:11] emperor, whether he's Caesar or
basileus or whatever, whatever
[142:15] language, was to serve the
polity. They keep saying this.
[142:19] So the terms that occur in
the sources most commonly are
[142:24] basileia of the Romans, polity
of the Romans, or Romania,
[142:28] which is the proper name
of this state. Not empire.
[142:33] Now, empire. Empire in
modern English commonly,
[142:39] an empire is a state that's created
when one group conquers a bunch of
[142:43] others and rules them. It could be an ethnic
group. It could be an ethnoreligious group.
[142:47] It could be a political group, whatever.
But there's an act of conquest, and
[142:51] results in a state where one
group is ruling over others.
[142:55] That's not how Romania is actually constituted.
We've talked about this. It's, for
[142:59] the most part, all Roman
citizens ruling like Roman
[143:03] subjects ruling themselves,
through their own government.
[143:07] So it's not an empire strictly
speaking. Now, occasionally,
[143:11] they will conquer other people, right? We talked
about the warfare. Sometimes it's not just
[143:15] defensive. Sometimes
it's offensive, right?
[143:17] In that case, you do
establish a- an imperial
[143:21] relationship. Like we, the Romans, are
ruling over this other group. Could
[143:25] be Slavs, it could be Bulgarians for
a while, it could be whatever. Or,
[143:29] even some Muslims in northern Syria
for a while in the 11th century,
[143:35] who-- and you are not Romans.
[143:37] And that's an imperial relationship. The question
is, how many of these imperial relationships do
[143:41] you need to decide that, well,
we've reached a tipping point, and
[143:45] now we're just gonna call the whole
thing an empire? Personally, I don't
[143:49] think we ever reach that point.
I mean, all states, even today,
[143:53] have like minorities.
[143:56] Some of them are part of that state because
they were conquered once upon a time.
[144:00] But we don't call those states empires
necessarily. Even though... Like,
[144:06] look at the United Kingdom.
Well, Wales was conquered.
[144:11] And, you know, the Welsh have their
own identity, their own language.
[144:15] I don't know that you would call
that now an imperial relationship.
[144:21] Maybe. I don't know.
[144:22] - I think there's also a synonymous use
of the word empire that refers to
[144:26] the power that the state has-
[144:29] ... in the global context
geopolitically. So sometimes
[144:33] empire is used synonymously with superpower,
meaning it's one of the primary-
[144:39] ... nations in the world, and it
doesn't necessarily have to do with the
[144:43] imperial nature of its history.
[144:47] - That's true.
[144:47] - Hence the sort of American
empire, US empire.
[144:50] - Yes. Though you would never characterize
the American political regime as an
[144:54] imperial one insofar as it does not have
an emperor, for example. But anyway,
[145:02] yes. The problem is that in my
field, we use the term empire
[145:06] conventionally, even when
what you just described is
[145:10] clearly not happening, like even
toward the end. It's not a major world
[145:14] power. It, like, has a few islands in
the Peloponnese, and, but we call it
[145:18] empire and the emperor, and it's like, it's
completely ridiculous. There's not even a
[145:21] term in their language
for that sort of thing.
[145:25] anyway, we can call things whatever we want,
just so we understand what the reality
[145:29] is- ... and what we are
using those terms to mean.
[145:33] I think that's the important thing. Yeah.
[145:35] - So then let's look at words which are
both fascinating, monarchic republic.
[145:41] - Right.
[145:42] - Why is that a good term
for the East Roman Empire?
[145:46] - Uh, because they understood it very
much to be a polity in the Roman sense
[145:50] of a res publica that was governed
by a regime that was monarchical.
[145:55] - So those two elements, there's
an emperor dude at the top,
[146:00] and it functioned
politically like a republic.
[146:04] - Also, the emperor was expected
to be working for the republic.
[146:08] Like, they keep saying this. So,
like, this was their conception.
[146:13] You don't find it, for example, in
other kinds of dynastic empires,
[146:19] The ones that don't emerge from
within the context of an ancient
[146:22] republic. So this is another reason
why I find this civilization so
[146:26] fascinating, right? I mean, we mentioned the,
the Greek and the Roman and the Christian
[146:30] elements that are kind of jostling
together. This is fascinating to me in part
[146:34] because it's this weird
combination of monarchical
[146:37] power, like in terms of executive
institutions— ... and a republican kind of
[146:44] baseline ideology on which it
operates. Yeah, and they, they
[146:48] sometimes come to a head.
[146:50] - Is there at all a degree to which
it's a military dictatorship?
[146:54] Because especially when it's the
general in the emperor's seat,
[146:58] yes, there's a republic, yes, there's
political discussion, but the army has
[147:02] a lot of power. So to what degree is
it a military dictatorship, as is
[147:08] sometimes talked about when you
talk about the Roman Empire?
[147:12] - Yeah, so Augustus' position,
for example, and that of his
[147:16] successors is, is talked about as a
military dictatorship. In other words, when
[147:20] push comes to shove— ... and the
basis of political power is the army,
[147:25] then I suppose it's legitimate
for historians to talk
[147:29] about a military dictatorship.
But here's why I don't think
[147:33] the Eastern Roman Empire is a military
dictatorship. Even though, again,
[147:37] the emperors control the armies, and the
armies themselves will often have a say
[147:44] in who becomes emperor, like through
the civil wars that we mentioned.
[147:49] Okay. The reason why I don't think it's
a military dictatorship is because
[147:54] they almost never, very, very, very rarely
use the army as an instrument of social
[148:01] control.
[148:03] - Is that, isn't that strange to you?
Because you see that being done
[148:07] through so much of human history. And
the fact they don't resort to that,
[148:13] I mean, they, for 1,000 years,
that's just not a thing.
[148:18] - As a way of keeping down the
population, you just don't see it.
[148:23] And part of the reason for that is I don't
think the population needs to be kept down.
[148:26] Like, this gets back to the consensus that we were
talking about. The understanding is that the army
[148:30] is there to protect the Roman people.
[148:34] And is often recruited among them. And for
most of the period that I study, is like
[148:41] lives among them. So when the emperors have
to call up the army, they're literally
[148:45] calling up soldiers from local villages.
[148:47] - It's just incredible that this
worked. I guess the civil war thing
[148:52] is, as a mechanism, is effective.
'Cause you just, throughout human
[148:55] history, I mean, you look at even
recent history, it's just a very
[148:59] common thing for a authoritarian figure
to use the army to suppress people.
[149:05] - Yeah, but isn't that dangerous, though?
Look at how many modern regimes
[149:09] tried to use their own armies against their
people who are in a moment of rising up.
[149:14] - It doesn't last.
[149:15] - Well, it's a risk. Like the Arab Spring.
[149:19] Especially in Egypt. And you could,
you could tell for those three weeks
[149:25] that Mubarak was trying to
decide whether he could
[149:29] actually count on the army to
suppress the protesters or not,
[149:33] because you never know what
they're going to do if you ask
[149:37] them to fire on a civilian population.
It can backfire on you badly.
[149:45] So I think that is a very
dangerous force to use, and
[149:49] even in the context of modern regimes,
can result in a regime change.
[149:53] - Absolutely, and there's huge wisdom
behind that, but, you know, leaders are
[149:57] not always wise, often not wise.
[149:59] And often maybe they start out wise,
but power corrupts them over time,
[150:03] and so the fact that this does not happen
just over and over and over and over-
[150:08] ... in the East Roman Empire is, is,
there's just a signal there that's
[150:12] fascinating. And I mean, this goes to
the book that you want to be working on-
[150:16] ... About why the thing lasts. So.
[150:19] - There's one emperor who does
do that, and that's Justinian.
[150:22] - Mm-hmm. Yeah, he gets wild.
[150:24] - Right. Yeah.
[150:25] - So let's talk about Justinian. We have
to. We have to talk about Justinian.
[150:28] - Yes.
[150:29] - one of the most impactful
Roman emperors in history,
[150:33] started as a peasant, and rose
in power to become emperor.
[150:38] He fought wars of conquest and was
very consequential and impactful.
[150:42] - Yes.
[150:42] - So who was he?
[150:44] - All right. So Justinian was
the emperor from 527 to
[150:48] 565, so quite a long reign. He was the
nephew of the previous emperor, Justin I,
[150:55] who was an older man, ruled for just
under a decade before Justinian.
[150:59] And both of them came from small, poor
[151:03] agricultural communities
in the western Balkans.
[151:06] - We should say that Justin I ended
up in your worst 10 emperors list.
[151:11] - Yeah, for one decision. He's not
the worst of the worst, but he,
[151:15] he made a very, very bad call when it
came to church policy, tore the church
[151:19] apart. He shouldn't have done that,
[151:21] in my view. But by the way, Justinian's
an immensely complicated figure.
[151:25] I found it impossible to decide, first of all,
whether to put him on the best emperors or the worst
[151:29] emperors.
[151:30] - Yeah, you, I mean, you're
being spicy. Yeah.
[151:31] - Yeah, yeah. You have to be
provocative about these things.
[151:35] And I thought omitting those two would
be that, and it, and it was. So,
[151:39] and here we are talking about it.
[151:39] - Yeah, yeah, exactly. The controversy.
[151:42] - And through all the systems of
social mobility that we've been
[151:46] talking about, Justin ended up emperor.
[151:49] because of his military background, he just rose through
the ranks. He was in the right place at the right
[151:53] time, became emperor, and then he
gradually positioned his nephew,
[151:57] Justinian, whose background we do not know.
Literally, we do not know anything that
[152:01] Justinian did before the age of something like
38 when he appears on the historical record.
[152:06] Same background. We know where he came
from, but we don't know what he was
[152:09] doing, although, like, was he an active
soldier for decades? We don't know.
[152:15] Probably not. He comes equipped with,
[152:19] like, a knowledge of something
like Roman law and some Christian
[152:22] theology. That seems to
be, like, what he knew.
[152:26] And then Justin positions
him to become his
[152:30] successor eventually, kind
of reluctantly, but he does.
[152:33] Justinian also marries
Theodora, who's a woman who's a
[152:37] former sex worker, which
is a controversial choice.
[152:41] By this point, he's a senator and is
holding all of these top generalships,
[152:46] and then he becomes emperor.
[152:47] - She was also very influential, yes?
[152:50] - Very powerful, yes.
[152:51] - Very powerful.
[152:51] - Under his, yeah, during his reign. So
the interesting thing about Justinian's
[152:57] choice of, let's say, associates,
and that includes his wife,
[153:01] is that he seems to have just gone for
people he, like, he thought were talented-
[153:06] ... or that would be good for
him as a ruler, rather than
[153:10] their social class or prestige.
And so he accumulates
[153:14] around him quite a motley group of
odd, sometimes like these kinds of,
[153:22] disreputable people. But they did what he
wanted them to, and they were, they, with
[153:28] lasting consequences for world
history. So he has an eye for talent,
[153:32] and, and he doesn't hesitate to pick
people that others might look down
[153:36] on if he thought they
could get the job done.
[153:39] And these are some of the attributes that
enable him to be as successful as he
[153:43] was. So that's his background.
[153:47] He's a Latin speaker primarily,
but he knows Greek, too.
[153:51] - So here he is and he, but he had, so
like I mentioned, the wars of conquests.
[153:55] He also overhauled the Roman law.
[153:58] - He appoints a committee-
[153:59] ... As one does- ... To just take the
whole of Roman law and condense it
[154:05] into what today we call the Corpus
Juris Civilis, which is the,
[154:09] the body of Roman civil law. And this
was a massive work of codification,
[154:15] And it is our main source for Roman
[154:19] law. Like overwhelmingly,
what we call Roman law
[154:23] is what Justinian's committee, and
specifically this character called Tribonian,
[154:28] who was a very accomplished
jurist said it was.
[154:31] - Mm-hmm. And that, did that persist
through time? Did that last?
[154:34] - Yes, still to this day. When you
study Roman law, you're studying
[154:39] Tribonian's committee.
[154:40] - And so in terms of our modern society,
how much of impact did that have,
[154:46] this codification, this stable law
that ran the East Roman Empire?
[154:51] - Well, I mean, Roman legal concepts pervade
[154:54] everything from philosophy to political
thought to actual Roman, uh, legal
[154:58] practice. I mean, depends on what country you're
in. So in many of the countries of Europe,
[155:03] it is the,
[155:06] you know, current law. And it is to some
degree. I mean, I'm, I'm exaggerating.
[155:09] But legal scholars have to
study Roman law. Even, even,
[155:13] law students have to do that.
[155:15] Not in, so much in countries like the United
States or Britain, which have the so-called
[155:19] common law system. But ideas in
Roman law about, for example,
[155:25] property, right, ownership,
things like this,
[155:29] these were hugely important in formulating
ideas, for example, about sovereignty
[155:33] in political thought. Yeah, it's
one of the most important and
[155:37] influential acts of committee
work ever done in Constantinople.
[155:41] - So, going to Perplexity here and
looking at some aspects of the
[155:45] Justinian's laws, they include a
systematic structure of private
[155:49] law, persons, things,
actions, strong protection of
[155:52] property and contracts,
detailed family and inheritance
[155:56] rules, and a hierarchical
status-based view of
[156:00] persons. These elements became
the template for later civil
[156:04] law systems. And some overall
structures, tripartite schema, law
[156:11] organized around personae, legal
subjects, things, and procedural
[156:18] actions. Essentially
who, what, and how of—
[156:22] ...private law. And it goes on. I mean, a
lot of the things I'm reading here really
[156:25] sounds like what we think
of as law. Marriage.
[156:31] - Look, most of it's about property.
[156:35] - Marriage is a legal status.
Lawful matrimony required
[156:38] conformity to rules about
age, citizenship, and
[156:42] cognatum or prohibited degrees,
incest rules, adoption
[156:46] relations, et cetera.
All that kind of stuff.
[156:49] - Oh, yes. Who you can marry, who not.
[156:52] - What was their view of homosexuality?
[156:54] - Well, I mean, Justinian
thought it caused earthquakes.
[156:58] - Oh, did it?
[156:58] - Yes.
[156:59] - Did it?
[157:00] - Yes.
[157:00] - Wow. That's fascinating.
[157:01] - Um, no, for him no, for, for...
So for Christian emperors
[157:06] or Christian authorities, this is
a, a reprehensible immoral act.
[157:11] Um, depending, it, it could be punished.
[157:16] Um, Justinian did try to punish
it pretty brutally. I mean,
[157:20] ultimately lethally. Um,
however, this gets really tricky
[157:27] here because what counts as a homosexual
act is not clear to everybody, right?
[157:35] And in addition to which, there... This
is a society that generally will not go
[157:45] after, let's say,
[157:50] Scandals or deviance or however you
wanna call it, like systematically.
[157:54] This is not like some--
There's no inquisition.
[157:56] There's no social police. If there's
some sort of scandal and this comes out,
[158:04] then it's a problem. But they're
not actively going to track down,
[158:07] hunt down, monitor, survey, interrogate
[158:11] people about their sex lives. I
mean, it is in a way, despite
[158:15] having views that we, we may
not agree with about sexuality,
[158:22] uh, it was, it was, it was generally
humane in the way of just kind of leaving
[158:27] people alone.
[158:28] - I mean, that said, there's some...
I'm just on Perplexity, looked
[158:32] up Justinian Roman law view of sexuality.
They're pretty harsh on, like adultery
[158:40] and just getting freaky with it.
[158:43] - No, Justinian was more zealous
in this matter, definitely.
[158:48] - Even though he married a sex worker.
[158:53] - Well, sex work wasn't illegal.
[158:56] - Right, but it's a bit spicy.
[158:58] - Yes. And in fact, it was
illegal for a senator to marry
[159:02] someone from such a
disreputable profession.
[159:05] And he got his uncle to pass a law
changing that rule- ... so that he could.
[159:11] - Well. Love knows no bounds.
[159:14] - Actually, Justinian kind of
says that in one of his laws.
[159:17] - Oh, wow.
[159:18] - No, he clearly loved her.
There, there's no question.
[159:20] - This actual love. I mean, this, you have
to like this guy. Starts as a peasant.
[159:24] Surround himself by all kinds
of weirdos just because they
[159:28] were good at what they did, and it
doesn't really matter, class or not.
[159:31] - Yes, but there's a lot to be said
against him, too. Um, I like so much.
[159:37] - Let's get into it. So he did
launch wars of conquest.
[159:42] What was his view of war and
conquest, and what maybe what
[159:46] are the things we should mention
in terms of expansionary wars?
[159:50] - He thought he was authorized by God to
reconquer the lost provinces of the Western
[159:54] Roman Empire, and when he did so,
that was proof that God favored him.
[159:59] And he was generally opportunistic
about it and for the most part, kind
[160:03] of successful in that he
intervened in the most
[160:07] critical moments of the histories of these
barbarian, you know, kingdoms in the
[160:11] West, and exploited their
weaknesses and took them
[160:15] over. Now, in the process, many of
these provinces were ravaged by
[160:18] war Italy for decades. He overstretched
his resources, leaving his
[160:25] successors with a much more
dangerous situation to defend.
[160:32] and he disbanded certain armies that
were meant to protect Constantinople,
[160:36] sent them to Italy, for example.
This weakened the home front.
[160:41] So he left a very difficult legacy
for his successors in that way.
[160:45] Plus, some of the provinces
that he conquered were so like
[160:48] Italy, I don't think it could even
pay for itself after a certain point.
[160:53] so I'm not sure that some of those
decisions were the best ones. North
[160:56] Africa, yeah, probably that paid off.
Italy and southern Spain, not so sure.
[161:02] - So that's one of the big criticisms
is even though there was conquest,
[161:07] it was overextended, and- ... those
lands were not economically stable.
[161:13] - Yeah, and
[161:14] - Broke. AKA.
[161:15] - Conquest is not just good, you
know, in itself. I mean, this is...
[161:20] I know that some rulers in history are called
the Great simply because they conquered
[161:24] something. But that's, no, that's not
enough. I mean, I know that rulers do this,
[161:29] but if we're to compare them to
each other we should at least
[161:33] expect that they have a plan or that
it works out well in the end, let's
[161:37] say, and I don't think
that many of these did.
[161:40] - I should say that as far as historians go,
[161:44] I think you don't give too many
points on the conquest front.
[161:49] - Personally, I? No, I don't.
[161:51] - Yeah, so your value comes from
is a leader implementing lasting
[161:58] change, like a stable-
[162:00] - Was he good for his subjects?
[162:02] Were they living better
because of him than otherwise?
[162:05] - And also, like, longer, like, the
long- term nature of it, not just-
[162:10] ... not just, like, a temporary thing.
[162:13] - Right. Are you strengthening
institutions that benefit your subjects?
[162:18] That. And some he did, some
not. So look, in order to send
[162:22] those armies west to make the
conquests, he stripped the
[162:26] east of armies, so the Persians could
just march in and, like, destroyed
[162:30] Antioch. Like, that's a
major strategic failure,
[162:34] and I don't think you get a pass for
conquering North Africa by surrendering Syria.
[162:39] - He did rebuild Constantinople and
reconstructed the Hagia Sophia.
[162:44] - Yes, after he and his soldiers
set fire to it. Yes. I-
[162:48] in the Nika insurrection. So this is when the
people of the capital rise up against him,
[162:53] and there's, like about 10 days of street
fighting, and he brings in some armies,
[162:57] and eventually he orders
his armies to slaughter the
[163:00] protesters, leaving more than
30,000 dead. Like, this is an
[163:04] enormous number. And a
lot of Constantinople
[163:08] burned in the process, and yeah,
he rebuilt it. So his building is
[163:12] considered one of his great points. He
built Hagia Sophia, for example, which
[163:16] is a magnificent church, like, hands
[163:19] down. It's just a fascinating
monument to study,
[163:23] too. And yeah, that was, that
was him, too. I'm trying
[163:27] to give you a sense here that the good and
the bad are mixed in such equal measure
[163:31] that, like Buridan's ass, I can't decide
which- ... which bale of hay to put him on.
[163:35] - But there's a grand scale
to the good and the bad.
[163:37] - Yes, yes.
[163:38] - For many people, that's
what makes for a, uh-
[163:42] ... top 10 emperor list.
Uh, what about the plague?
[163:46] - Well, he wasn't responsible
for that at least.
[163:49] - All right.
[163:49] - Okay.
[163:50] - The plague of Justinian- ... AKA
541 AD. So some historians claim
[163:56] that it killed half the
population and ruined the empire.
[164:00] You are skeptical on this view.
[164:02] - Yes. So this is a bubonic plague.
[164:06] Um, which lasts more or
less for two centuries. It
[164:10] comes and it goes, and it's kind
of endemic to large parts of the
[164:14] world. 541 is when it
starts to break out in
[164:18] the empire, in Constantinople and
other cities, and it spreads.
[164:22] There's been a lot of debate about
this recently because now we've
[164:26] actually isolated the pathogen. It's
Yersinia pestis. Like, we know this.
[164:31] Just as of, like, a generation
ago, this was just guesswork.
[164:34] But now there's all of this new, like,
laboratory science work that's come in to
[164:37] fill in some of the gaps in history.
[164:40] - That's so cool.
[164:40] - It is. It is. There are lots
of discussions about that. And
[164:44] so the study of diseases and virology have
just become much more important lately.
[164:51] It still doesn't tell you, however,
like mortality rates and historical
[164:55] impact. Like, for that, you still
need standard old-fashioned
[164:59] non-laboratory historical work.
[165:01] And there's a debate about the impact of this
plague. It's ongoing, I should say that.
[165:06] And some scholars argue for a
kind of maximalist position
[165:10] of 50%. I think that would have
brought this society to a halt.
[165:16] Just logistically speaking. And so I
believe in a much more moderate impact.
[165:22] - And the real impact is
what? The tax base shrinks?
[165:25] - Oh. Oh, yeah. The tax base
would shrink instantly.
[165:29] You wouldn't be able to recruit armies.
You know, there would be massive social
[165:33] dislocation. Like what
happens in the, in the Black
[165:37] Death in Europe in the 14th century.
Like, we have very good records
[165:41] for what happened to those societies, and basically
everything that they were doing stopped for a few
[165:45] years until they sort of tried to
put things back together again. This
[165:49] does not happen in the 6th century.
[165:52] In fact, Justinian is at that
time waging war on something like
[165:56] four or five different fronts.
[165:58] If you read the narratives of those
wars, there's no pause. There's
[166:02] no, there's no impact
from the plague on the
[166:06] conduct of those wars.
They just continue on.
[166:09] Taxation continues. The courts continue.
Like, you just don't see it in
[166:13] the narrative, and so I think
that there's a much less
[166:17] impact than, certainly than 50%, yeah.
[166:19] - So this sets the stage for
a tumultuous 7th century.
[166:25] - Yeah, you could call it that. Yes.
[166:27] - So what is the legacy of Justinian,
in terms of how he left the empire
[166:35] leading into the 7th century?
[166:38] - Well, he left it overextended,
so his successors
[166:42] had to deal with many more
problems along many more fronts,
[166:46] With fewer military forces
concentrated in what we might call the
[166:51] homeland of the Eastern Roman Empire.
[166:53] And so that made the, the center
vulnerable too, and so you start
[166:57] to get raids into the Balkans and, you
know, it enters a kind of vicious cycle
[167:05] again.
[167:07] now, not all of this was Justinian's fault.
I mean, the plague definitely had some
[167:10] impact. But I wouldn't
blame everything on his
[167:16] successors, as is sometimes done,
like they mishandled the situation.
[167:21] He... Yeah, he left them a very
difficult situation to deal with.
[167:27] - So speaking of which, let's
talk about Heraclius.
[167:30] He didn't make, he didn't make your
list either, which is a shocker
[167:35] for a lot of people. Perhaps you can
describe the nuance of that, but
[167:38] he took over the Roman
Empire on the verge of
[167:41] extinction. Persians at the gates,
treasury empty. So maybe first tell the
[167:49] full saga of the Roman-Persian War that
threatened the empire's existence.
[167:53] - Sure. Well, he wasn't entirely, you know,
[167:57] free of blame for the
situation that he inherited.
[168:01] He was in part responsible for it.
So he doesn't get a pass on that.
[168:05] So Heraclius is basically
a rebel and a usurper. So
[168:11] for various reasons Rome and Persia
are at war starting around 602.
[168:18] and the, the Persian shah
at this time, Khosrow II,
[168:23] has basically decided on
a policy of conquest,
[168:27] not just raiding. Like, I'm gonna
go in and take your people,
[168:31] some cattle, and some statues, and
take them to, you know, Mesopotamia.
[168:35] He starts what... I mean, I think there's
some evolution in his thinking and his
[168:39] planning about this, but
pretty soon during the
[168:42] 600 and the aughts, he
realizes that there's
[168:46] potential for actual permanent territorial
gain here, and his armies start moving
[168:50] in. And the Roman Emperor is this guy
called Phocas, who is himself a usurper,
[168:54] a military background, and
he now faces a rebellion
[168:58] by Heraclius, who, whose base is in North
Africa at this time, like around Carthage.
[169:04] And they have a civil war
for three years, 608 to 610.
[169:10] That civil war that Heraclius initiates
[169:14] causes a diversion of Roman
armies to the civil war away
[169:18] from the Persian front. So it's
a massive gift to the Persians.
[169:22] Plus, a lot of the fighting takes
place in Egypt, and Egypt was a
[169:26] province that had up until that point not
really been harmed by war. Now it is,
[169:32] right? So Heraclius's forces, he's
not in Egypt, but his backers,
[169:37] are fighting a civil war in
Egypt, so that province is
[169:41] now, you know, ravaged in part. The
[169:45] Persians make tremendous gains in the
east. Heraclius heads straight for
[169:49] Constantinople during all of this, and
to make a long story short, he manages
[169:53] to take Constantinople, execute
Phocas, and become emperor,
[169:57] right? But now he's facing a problem
that's much worse than it was
[170:01] when, before he started the rebellion.
The reason why Heraclius is sort of
[170:06] lionized in some... Well, actually,
there's a very long tradition of doing
[170:10] this, which goes back to the Middle Ages. In the
Western Middle Ages, Heraclius was sometimes
[170:14] considered, like, the first crusader.
[170:16] - Oh, interesting.
[170:17] - Yeah, yeah. So there's all this medieval
literature about Heraclius as being a
[170:21] a proto-crusader type and all that,
[170:24] For reconquering, like,
Jerusalem from the Persians and
[170:28] restoring the True Cross and all
that. So he had this kind of
[170:32] aura, and I think his modern
[170:35] admirers are basically just continuing...
I mean, they might not know it,
[170:39] but they're kind of continuing this very,
very long tradition of treating Heraclius as
[170:43] this heroic holy warrior.
Anyway, from my standpoint,
[170:49] it's a complete wash.
In other words, yes, he
[170:53] does beat the Persians and he gets, like,
[170:57] in my view, full credit for that,
though he did it with, I think, the
[171:01] help of some Turkish allies from
Central Asia. These were, I think,
[171:05] the major component of his
success at the very end. But no,
[171:09] no. So he held the Persians off
and ultimately defeated them, yes.
[171:14] And then he loses everything to the Arabs.
[171:16] - So the Arab conquests are 630s and 640s,
but the Persian War is 602 to 628.
[171:23] - Yes.
[171:24] - So what can be said about this what
seems to be a pretty costly war, I guess
[171:31] Persians
[171:32] - So the war was costly
initially only for the Romans.
[171:38] the eastern provinces were conquered
by Persia. That means Syria,
[171:42] Palestine, Egypt. So that's a loss.
[171:45] You lose all that revenue, and then
they start raiding into Asia Minor.
[171:48] - Yes.
[171:49] - By the way, this is exactly what the Arabs
would do, you know, just a couple decades
[171:53] later. They would conquer Syria, Palestine, Egypt,
and they would start raiding into Asia Minor.
[171:57] So almost like this phase of
East Roman history begins
[172:01] already during the Persian invasion. It's
just a kind of a prelude. It was, in
[172:05] fact, the Arabs that would do
that for the next few centuries.
[172:08] So Heraclius, it takes him a
very long time to get organized,
[172:14] In fact, something like
15 years, and it's not
[172:17] entirely clear, like, what
he's doing all this time. Um,
[172:22] but he ultimately manages to defeat
the Persians by waging these really
[172:29] spectacular, weird
campaigns in the East. He
[172:33] decides to strike into
the Persian heartland,
[172:37] as it were. Well, first in the
Caucasus region, and then he goes into
[172:41] Mesopotamia. So not to try
to defeat their armies that
[172:44] are rampaging around Asia Minor
or even besieging his capital
[172:48] in 626. The Persians and the
Avars, this people from... This
[172:52] nomadic warrior group that
settled in roughly modern
[172:56] Hungary, they're besieging Constantinople.
Heraclius doesn't even go.
[173:01] And he's just kind of preparing his
armies in the East, and he strikes the
[173:04] Persians right where it
hurts, and this now begins to
[173:08] degrade the Persian heartland
and their infrastructure
[173:12] because remember, both of these empires are going
to be in shambles by the time the Arabs come
[173:16] along, and this is what enables the Arabs
to conquer them so quickly. I mean, they've
[173:20] destroyed each other
[173:22] in these wars. And eventually Heraclius
calls in his Turkish allies, and they
[173:25] go on a field trip
through Mesopotamia, and
[173:29] this causes a coup in, in
Persia, and Khosrow is killed.
[173:34] - Is there something to be said,
a little bit of texture to the
[173:37] motivations of the different empires and
the different groups involved? So the
[173:41] East Roman Empire, the Persian
Empire, and the Islamic
[173:45] Caliphates, were they after
conquering? Were they
[173:48] after expansion? Were they
after more like raiding
[173:52] for financial benefits?
What was the motivation?
[173:56] - So in the past, the Persian Shahs
basically were interested in raiding, and
[174:00] they also had an interest in manpower.
So all of those Mesopotamian
[174:04] agricultural estates won't till
themselves. So they were kind of
[174:07] insatiable for agricultural workforces and
specialized craftsmen and people like that.
[174:11] so they would go into
the empire and get them.
[174:15] But in this phase, it seems that Khosrow
[174:19] II is taking really to heart
the idea that the Persian
[174:22] Empire should really extend
to the Mediterranean
[174:25] as it did in, like, Achaemenid times,
right, in, in ancient history, the empire
[174:29] that Alexander conquered. So it
seems that the, the Sassanians,
[174:33] this is this dynasty, this Iranian
dynasty that's ruling the Persian
[174:37] Empire, of course, they were aware of
the Achaemenids, but sometimes they
[174:41] would have these claims to reviving the
former greatness of the Iranian Empire.
[174:46] So, you know, bathing in the
Mediterranean Sea is something
[174:50] that many Near Eastern monarchs, you know,
[174:54] they did this as a sign of success. Anyway,
for the Romans, it was sheer survival,
[175:00] Just desperate survival 'cause
they knew that this was a war
[175:05] that could end the Roman state.
[175:06] - I mean, they're already on
the verge of being ended.
[175:10] And here, their defensive
wars of survival.
[175:15] - Yeah. So it's pretty clear that initially
the goal of Arab Muslim warfare is to
[175:24] unify Arabia. That is,
that all Arabs should be
[175:28] Muslim and should be unified into this
religious kind of state, whatever, that
[175:35] the prophet and his successors had created.
Now, then they start striking out,
[175:41] Into Rome and into Iran. It's not
entirely clear, like, why. Now,
[175:49] there are obvious reasons. Like, I
mean, we don't-- It's not, like, a
[175:52] huge historical mystery
why a, you know, recently
[175:56] formed successful army will decide
to take on two very weak opponents-
[176:01] ... who are on their doorstep. Like-
... this is not, you know, complicated.
[176:04] - Yeah, they're pretty effective
at military- ... conquest.
[176:08] - Yeah. But they're striking both
empires from a direction that those
[176:12] empires had never prepared to
defend from. Arabia was just
[176:16] not, "Oh, you might get some occasional
raiders, but you're never gonna get an
[176:20] army that's coming out that can
potentially conquer you." So
[176:24] the defensive orientations are all wrong.
[176:27] And these two empires have
gone through this massive war,
[176:31] that has destabilized them. They're,
they're low on manpower, low on
[176:34] resources. The outcome is almost kind
of inevitable. I don't think there's a
[176:38] great mystery.
[176:40] - And the effect of that is they
stripped away the richest provinces
[176:45] of the Roman Empire.
[176:47] - Yes, Egypt in particular.
[176:50] That's, that means now you can't feed Constantinople.
Like we talked about the grain from Egypt,
[176:54] right, that came to Constantinople.
You don't have that now.
[176:57] And so that means that the population
of Constantinople will decline
[177:01] dramatically over the next few decades.
[177:03] - So how, how does the
empire rebuild itself,
[177:07] you know, restabilize? Because it's
not, it doesn't collapse there, right?
[177:11] - Yes.
[177:12] - It stays, it survives.
There's interesting low
[177:16] points for the empire
where it still survives.
[177:18] - This is one of them.
[177:20] - And that is as interesting
as the survival at the top,
[177:23] and the flourishing survival
at the bottom is also super
[177:27] interesting. So how do-- What
happens? How does it kinda stabilize?
[177:32] - Very slowly. This is a painful process, and
it takes them centuries, you could say.
[177:39] First you gotta stop the bleeding,
just try to hold the line.
[177:43] It takes them decades to just
to hold a line. Like, they get
[177:46] pummeled by the Arabs for decades in the
seventh century until finally by, 6-
[177:54] 660s, 670, they finally
begin to beat them.
[177:59] Beat them on land and hold
the line, on the sea.
[178:06] And so we now have an
investment in fleets.
[178:10] Eventually, you get the Greek
fire, which is the flamethrowers.
[178:14] And when the Arabs try to
take Constantinople, these
[178:18] attempts are defeated,
like, twice, and that
[178:22] ensures the survival of this, of
the Roman state in some form.
[178:27] - How were the flamethrowers used?
[178:29] - Ah, yes. This is an interesting question.
We're still kind of debating that.
[178:33] - Oh, it's not fully understood.
[178:34] - Well, it's a state secret.
[178:37] They didn't want this getting out, so
they kept it pretty well. The fact
[178:41] that we're debating it will tell you that
they were pretty good at keeping secrets.
[178:44] So possibly through a pressure valve.
Right? So you have this flammable compound
[178:55] whose preparation and components
is also a state secret.
[178:59] So there's specialized-- There's a corps
of engineers that prepares this and
[179:03] deploys it.
[179:04] Um, and it's possibly through a heated
pressurized container with a spigot,
[179:12] let's say, that unleashes this thing
through a nozzle, and it's lit and
[179:20] basically spews flaming napalm
[179:24] on other ships, and it will continue
to burn even when it's on the water.
[179:29] Right? On the top. So, like, you can't,
like, swim away or anything. So it's
[179:33] this very, very destructive
weapon. Terrifying. They used it
[179:37] against Vikings too. This is much
later. So once the Vikings show up-
[179:41] ... Like, when they would raid attacked
[179:45] Constantinople in the 940s,
then again in the 1040s-
[179:50] ... Yeah, the Romans used Greek fire
fleets to just incinerate the...
[179:55] And that'll teach Vikings.
[179:59] Yes. If you're in that situation,
you'd rather serve under
[180:03] the emperors than attack them.
[180:06] - And so this is a kind of nuclear
weapon level state secret.
[180:10] - They even had it in hand grenade form.
[180:14] - This is a real thing?
[180:15] - Oh, yes.
[180:16] - Hand grenade form.
[180:17] - Yes. So it's a, it's
like a clay container,
[180:20] with the compound, and it
has, like, some sort of
[180:24] fuse that you light on the
outside and you throw it. Now,
[180:28] you throw it... You can throw it against
people, but it's not gonna be that effective.
[180:31] Maybe you burn a person, whatever. You just
wasted a hand grenade for, you know, one
[180:35] person. It's most effective against
things like, uh, siege engines.
[180:40] Uh, so you, you throw that on a
wooden frame and, you know, yeah.
[180:45] - This is incredible. So this is one of
the things that's finally stabilized,
[180:49] Stopped the bleeding from
a military perspective.
[180:52] - Yeah, eventually. Now, now remember, they've
pulled the armies back into Asia Minor,
[180:56] so they're, they're beginning
to defend and fortify Asia
[181:00] Minor. Now you have to find ways to pay and
support and feed all of these soldiers, and
[181:04] this is a whole administrative-
it's a wrenching
[181:07] administrative readjustment. But they go
through it. It takes them a long time.
[181:11] Eventually, they emerge with a different
kind of strategic logistical system.
[181:15] - Just a smaller, harder- ...
core- ... of the empire.
[181:20] - That's right. Very militarized.
[181:22] - Very militarized. And then in the eighth
century, the, the second Arab siege
[181:27] of Constantinople, that somehow fails.
[181:31] - In the early eighth century,
yes, that was the second siege.
[181:34] - Yeah, the early eighth century.
So why, why did it fail? Can you
[181:38] tell the story of that siege? That was
really the empire hanging by, by a thread.
[181:43] - Yes, but it happened to have a very
competent man in charge. This is,
[181:47] uh, Leo III, and he's an emperor
who has- he's a usurper. He's just
[181:51] seized power. They knew that
this massive Arab attack was
[181:55] coming, and so it's quite
possible that the Roman
[181:59] elites, you know, preferred to put someone
[182:02] capable in, in power at that moment.
The city was very well prepared.
[182:07] I encourage people in the audience to, to go and
read the, the sources that we have for that.
[182:10] You, you can find many accounts of it
online. It, it was just very, very
[182:14] well done. He also had Bulgar allies.
[182:18] So these are the, the Bulgars who had just,
you know, crossed the Danube just, like, just
[182:22] a few years earlier actually and
settled south of the Danube, you
[182:26] know, where eventually, you know, Bulgaria
emerged. So he had Bulgar allies,
[182:31] and he used the, the Greek fire very,
very strategically. He used his
[182:35] own fleet. He contained the Arabs to
certain places where they kind of
[182:38] starved and wore them down.
Yeah, it's just very well done.
[182:42] - From a military perspective.
[182:44] - From a military perspective.
[182:45] - Well, was there, was it the, the
walls, the navy, the weather, the
[182:52] diplomacy, just good luck that
helped Constantinople hold?
[182:58] - I don't see much role for good luck there. I
mean, I think he had it all pretty planned out.
[183:01] It was all of the elements that you mentioned.
And yeah, he, he just deployed them very,
[183:05] very astutely and went on to rule
[183:09] after that for another 20-some
years, and his son continued. Um,
[183:13] they, they formed a dynasty. It was-- We call it
the Isaurian dynasty, though they were not from
[183:17] Isauria.
[183:19] - And then from that, the fascinating
thing that we mentioned about religion,
[183:23] there was a whole stretch
of time marked by intense
[183:27] internal religious
conflicts over iconoclasm.
[183:32] Maybe you can clarify this, but so
iconoclasm, of course, is whether
[183:35] sacred images, icons, should
be venerated or destroyed.
[183:40] This had major political
and theological stakes. The
[183:44] seemingly smallest things can
have the biggest of conflicts.
[183:48] - Yeah. You've been in an Orthodox church.
[183:51] Have you seen all the icons and
the just painting everywhere?
[183:54] Every space that you can imagine
is covered in either icons or
[183:58] images or iconography of saints.
All right. That's a result of this.
[184:03] No, that's not what Christian churches used
to be like, at least not in Constantinople.
[184:08] But his dynasty basically tried to limit,
[184:14] Or remove images from
churches, and ultimately that
[184:18] policy failed. And the other side that
[184:22] wanted images or liked images, or let me
put it differently, thought that images
[184:26] were not only appropriate but
helpful in the context of Christian
[184:29] worship prevailed. And so
gradually the churches began
[184:33] to fill up with icons, lots of icons.
They're almost like, you know, like a
[184:41] catchword for Orthodox,
you know, devotion. Um,
[184:45] I have icons at home. You have a little corner
in the house and you have little iconography.
[184:49] Um, anyway, I mean, as a secular Orthodox
person, but I... even I can't get away
[184:53] from them.
[184:55] - But that has serious
consequences. I mean, that was-
[184:57] ... serious. It was an extremely
serious internal religious conflict.
[185:01] - Well, okay, so one asterisk on that.
In my research, I did not find a
[185:09] popular interest in this matter. Like-
[185:12] - Oh, interesting
[185:12] - ... yeah, I don't-
[185:14] - So this is an overblown-
[185:15] - Yes. Yes, socially completely overblown.
[185:18] - Oh, this is one of those things
where religious folks will write the
[185:22] story of history.
[185:23] - That's it. Got it.
[185:24] - Ah.
[185:25] - You got it.
[185:26] I could not find... There were, like, a
few emperors, and there's some bishops
[185:30] and abbots and monks. Like,
I don't know, maybe 100, 200
[185:34] people are, like, seriously invested
in this, and they're going at it.
[185:38] But these are the people
who write the texts.
[185:41] But they never mention, for example,
that, oh, you know, the people of
[185:45] Constantinople, they rose up, and
they demanded icons or not icons or
[185:48] anything like that.
[185:50] Nah, never. So in my view, this is
one of those controversies that's
[185:56] only a few people really, really cared-
[186:00] ... about it, and unfortunately,
they're the ones who wrote the sources.
[186:04] - So you always have to,
[186:07] Be very careful to consider the
sources when you're reading about
[186:11] anything involving religious events.
[186:14] - Or any kind of events.
[186:15] - But certain things are more intensely,
People are more intensely passionate about-
[186:21] ... and therefore they're
going, that bias is going to-
[186:24] - Yeah, yeah
[186:24] - ... bleed into the way
you report the history.
[186:28] - Yeah. And not only that, when
emperors changed their policy,
[186:33] almost everyone fell into
line. They switched positions.
[186:37] It's like, "No, yeah, whatever. Put the
images, take the images," like, whatever.
[186:41] I mean, like this isn't, they did not
see this as central. Some people did,
[186:45] and they got very worked up about it.
[186:48] Anyway, but in the end,
the pro-icon position won,
[186:52] and their view just began
to fill up the space.
[186:56] Like, like it literally was filling
up the churches, and it still does.
[187:02] - The thing is, we somehow took on the
impossible task of talking about a thousand-
[187:10] - It'll defeat you, man. It'll
defeat you every time.
[187:12] - I mean, there's a reason why you
really wanna do a thousand-hour
[187:16] podcast on this, right?
[187:18] As, as, as you do, as there's so many
incredible conversations about every
[187:22] single emperor, every single nuanced
detail of the emperors. It really is a, is
[187:26] a thriving civilization. It's
a thriving empire which in it
[187:31] contains so many lessons for even
the modern times. But anyway,
[187:35] you have written one of the books
is Streams of Gold, Rivers of
[187:39] Blood: The Rise and Fall of Byzantium,
955 AD to the First Crusade. So this
[187:46] period has... We talked
about survival and some low
[187:50] points. This is a period where, once
again, there's some flourishing.
[187:55] So by the 10th century in the
Macedonian era, the empire is back.
[188:01] It's wealthy, it's culturally confident,
and under emperors like Basil II,
[188:08] Who I think is in your top 10 list.
[188:11] it is expanding again, and
this is a period that you
[188:15] describe in part in your book, Streams
of Gold, Rivers of Blood. So how did
[188:19] Byzantium go from surviving
to expanding again?
[188:23] - So I wrote that book in part in
order to test myself and see if I
[188:29] could write narrative.
[188:31] So I hadn't written a history narrative
book up until that point. Everything
[188:35] I wrote was sort of analytical, right?
[188:38] And it was successful enough that a
few years later, my editor asked me to
[188:42] write the big history,
the new Roman Empire-
[188:44] - Yeah
[188:45] - ... the thousand page-
[188:46] - Of the whole thing
[188:46] - ... of the whole thing. And
so I set for myself the
[188:50] task of explaining in this book,
Streams of Gold, Rivers of Blood,
[188:55] a very particular period
that was marked by a
[188:59] sudden turn to conquest again after a long
period of more or less defensive war. 955,
[189:06] there's a new military
leadership is appointed, and
[189:10] the Romans go conquering
again, especially in Cilicia,
[189:14] northern Syria, and Cyprus, and the
Caucasus, and then eventually also Bulgaria.
[189:22] And then right afterwards,
they have this generation plus
[189:26] period of stability and prosperity, and
[189:30] then they're hit by a triple
whammy. These are three new
[189:33] attackers. So it's primarily the
Seljuk Turks coming in from the
[189:37] east, some Pechenegs coming down
from the north over the Danube,
[189:42] And the Normans in southern Italy.
[189:47] And under the pressure of
this three-part attack, the,
[189:52] you know, this expansionist what had
become more imperial state buckles.
[189:58] And enters another one of these
crises, just like the one we
[190:02] described for the seventh century. You
know, survives it by the skin of its teeth.
[190:09] And goes on again to rebuild and become
prosperous, wealthy, and powerful
[190:13] again, as it does throughout its history.
[190:15] It's these cycles. So I just wanted
to describe that iteration of that-
[190:21] ... that process, and that's
what I do in that book.
[190:25] - So I think the traditional view, In
this perfect storm of the 11th century
[190:33] is that it was more to do with the
internal sort of moral decay and,
[190:39] Civilian emperors neglecting
the army, this internal stuff.
[190:43] And you make the case that
it's the external stuff, the
[190:47] three-prong attack, like you
said, Normans in the west,
[190:50] the Turkic steppe people in the north, and
in Central Asia, the Turks in the east.
[190:58] Can you describe that, the three
forces in the case that that was the
[191:02] main reason why it hit a low?
[191:05] - Well, this is also a methodological problem,
right? In other words, when you're looking
[191:09] at a society that suddenly faces a bunch
of problems, and you could, you know,
[191:13] reasonably make the case for a kind of
decline or a crisis, is your instinct,
[191:19] it's your first instinct to suppose that
there must be something wrong in the
[191:23] internal mechanisms of that society
that, you know, led it to fail,
[191:28] which is what my field
has done traditionally.
[191:31] Uh, in part because of the decline
and fall model, right, of this
[191:35] society, we're kind of primed to think
that there was something wrong with it.
[191:40] It's a long story. Or is it
reasonable to say that a society
[191:47] that does not seem to have any, like,
particularly serious structural flaws
[191:54] is hit by external, you
know, challenges that it
[191:58] couldn't realistically have foreseen
or prepared for such that, you
[192:02] know, it, it couldn't cope with
them and, as I said, buckled.
[192:06] And I think that's what
happened. I think that's the,
[192:10] main narrative. Not that there
weren't problems. There were. But
[192:16] no state can, I mean, medieval or
ancient, can realistically survive
[192:22] the simultaneous attack of
three very different kinds of
[192:25] enemies, the Normans or,
like, these knights...
[192:29] Like a new type of Western warfare
that is just all about, you know,
[192:33] grinding the enemy to
bits. But who are also
[192:37] terrorists. Like, they're
straight up terrorists.
[192:40] - Normans are fascinating
because, I mean, there's...
[192:41] ... there's a Viking component too-
[192:43] - Yeah, yeah, yeah.
[192:43] - ... with the Normans.
[192:44] - Yeah, yeah.
[192:44] - That's a whole... So they have, they
have three different kinds of enemies.
[192:50] - Yes. The Pechenegs, who's, you know, a, a
[192:53] totally different type of, you know,
probably mostly nomadic horsemen.
[192:58] And then the Seljuk Turks who are
[193:03] also mostly nomadic horsemen, but
who are coming in from Central Asia
[193:07] with vast reserves of manpower
behind them. In fact,
[193:10] either intending to or, as it happens,
effecting a demographic change in not just
[193:18] demographic, but ecological too,
because they basically, when they
[193:22] move into Asia Minor, they're
transforming or terraforming,
[193:26] Agricultural land into pasturage.
[193:29] And, and they're just backed
by reserves of manpower
[193:32] that no other enemy of
the empire has had yet.
[193:38] Uh, so yeah, how do you, how do you cope with
these situations? I mean, they're, it's very,
[193:42] very difficult, and it's a wonder that they
survived it at all. Now, they also have
[193:46] internal problems, and I'm not gonna sort
of try to sweep these under the rug,
[193:50] right? In particular, we're
seeing the end of the Macedonian
[193:54] dynasty. This is a dynasty that had
lasted for about two centuries, and
[194:01] this has a kind of politically
destabilizing effect. New
[194:05] emperors, and there are a lot of, like,
childless old men in this period,
[194:09] are relatively insecure. They don't have
this sort of a dynastic glitz behind
[194:13] them, and so they're tending to,
to buy a lot of political support,
[194:17] like hand out these exemptions,
give cash, you know, titles to
[194:21] anyone who will support them, and this, of
course, causes a budget problem. Like, they
[194:25] don't have enough money after a while. And then they have
to start raising all of these armies to deal with all of
[194:29] these problems, and that just increases
the pressure on the budget, and
[194:32] so there is an internal
problem as well, yeah.
[194:36] - So you mentioned this loop of
thriving and then having to survive,
[194:42] surviving, that happens a few times- ...
throughout the history of the Roman Empire.
[194:48] It seems that societies in
general oscillate in that way.
[194:52] Is there something particular you
could say about the oscillations,
[194:56] the loops that the Roman
Empire goes through?
[194:59] - Yes. Now, I don't think this is an oscillation.
At least that's not how I think of it in my own
[195:03] mind. Um, so as I explained,
the crises that this, this
[195:10] polity, this state, this
society that it undergoes
[195:13] are dis- there are a discrete
number of them. I can tell
[195:17] you what they are, and we've
talked about most of them so far.
[195:21] They don't last very long, and they
are all sudden challenges that appear
[195:28] from the outside. In other
words, they're exogenous shocks,
[195:32] that they can't really have prepared for.
[195:36] These shocks cause
massive territorial loss,
[195:41] which requires adjustment,
right? But they don't last
[195:44] that long. In other words, the
Romans almost always, at some point,
[195:48] figure out how to hold a line, how to
consolidate their position, regroup-
[195:54] and put their economy and their society
back on a trajectory of revival, regrowth,
[196:01] and eventual reconquest. Always. Every
single time, except the last time, right?
[196:09] And for me, this poses the
following kind of dilemma,
[196:15] which I can answer. And the
dilemma is, should we define the
[196:19] society by these brief
crises of exogenous shocks,
[196:23] or should we define it by the
centuries-long, sometimes,
[196:27] periods of regrowth, consolidation, and
stabilization, which are endogenous.
[196:36] Nobody came from the outside
to help them rebuild.
[196:39] Uh, and my answer is
unequivocally the latter. So
[196:43] I see this as a society whose internal
organization primes it to stabilize
[196:51] and embark on steady growth.
Slow and gradual, but steady.
[196:58] And that's what I would like my
field to explain more, and I'm
[197:02] gonna try to do so in the book
I mentioned that I'm writing
[197:05] on, like, the longevity or the
resilience of this society.
[197:10] And not try to center the crises,
[197:13] which I see as being from the
outside. Like, these aren't...
[197:17] Of course, they're part of its story,
but they're not coming from it.
[197:20] What's coming from it is the
stability, and I think that's the more
[197:24] interesting part of this society.
[197:26] - Yeah, so the, you know, these
peak-to-peak histories,
[197:31] as you can think of them, they miss the
machinery in the valleys. Institutions,
[197:35] incentives, daily life, all of these
things. The politics, the religion.
[197:40] You have a bunch of revisionist
history ideas in your work. You're
[197:44] challenging the field.
[197:45] - Yes. You could say that.
[197:47] - In the best possible way. So
just to linger on it, what
[197:51] are, what are some of the things that
historians miss? So this is a big one, right,
[197:55] that you're speaking to, which
is, like, focusing too much
[197:59] on specific moments versus on the
broad structural underpinnings
[198:06] of, of an empire, of a society.
[198:08] - Right. So what you alluded
to there is a critique
[198:11] of what we might call short histories
of Byzantium, which is a kind
[198:15] of genre of a book. Right? This isn't
necessarily, like, what my other
[198:21] revisionist ideas are about. The
more important ones are things
[198:25] like the monarchical republic that we
talked about. In other words, that there's
[198:28] actually a broader spectrum
of political participation.
[198:32] Um, that emperors are having to look over
their shoulders all the time. That there is a
[198:36] deeper matrix of Roman Republican
thought there. Like, that's one
[198:40] revisionist idea. Another
one is about Roman identity,
[198:44] just like who are these people?
[198:45] And no, they are Romans, and in fact,
it's kind of an ethnic identity after a
[198:49] certain point. Like, those kinds of ideas.
[198:53] The criticism of the peak
to peak kinds of books.
[198:57] So if you're trying to condense
1,200 years into 120 pages
[199:01] or even, you know, even 200 pages,
[199:04] there's no way to do so realistically
and give a sense of the whole
[199:08] terrain. In other words, what these
books do is they go, they jump from,
[199:13] from highlight to highlight, and these
highlights are sometimes things like,
[199:17] you know, everything Justinian did because
it's so extravagant, to the crises.
[199:22] The crises are, of course, dramatic
moments that you can't skip.
[199:27] And you can't get a sense
from these books as to
[199:31] how all of this is interconnected
in the valleys, right?
[199:35] In the crags, down there. Like,
what are the mechanisms that are
[199:38] connecting these peaks together?
And that's how I tried to write
[199:42] the big history, The New Roman
Empire, is to tell the story by
[199:46] casting light in those darker
places. That is, to show how
[199:50] especially institutions
and ideologies sort of
[199:54] tie, you know, people's
lives together. That
[199:58] is, tie people to institutions and to
the broader history that surrounds
[200:01] them. So that the reader
can get a sense when
[200:05] I'm, when I'm recounting specific
events or either of, you know,
[200:10] greatness or of a success or a
failure, that they can understand
[200:16] roughly why these things are happening,
right? Look, there's no perfect
[200:20] answer. A short book will just not
tell you these things. A long book,
[200:24] well, is a long book.
[200:26] - Well, in some sense, I mean, this, in this, even
in this very conversation, I think we did a pretty
[200:30] good job of looking at the valleys, at
the structure, at the institutions.
[200:34] And that gives you a sense
of the whole underpinnings.
[200:36] And so it's, it's beautiful. It's a
beautiful way to see history, especially for
[200:40] societies that have lasted as long as-
... as the, as the East Roman Empire has.
[200:44] - But it did take us a few hours.
[200:46] - Yes.
[200:46] - Yes. You're right. But it requires
that you actually spend some
[200:52] time to look in there, yeah.
[200:53] - What's, what's a few hours among friends?
[200:55] - No, no, no, that's... I agree.
[200:58] - Uh, so zooming out and asking once again,
[201:03] the old we're getting a little
close to last call at a bar,
[201:07] I'm gonna ask you the big question.
We asked it before about the
[201:10] collapse of the West Roman Empire.
[201:15] When did the decline of the East Roman
Empire begin for you? Throughout this loops,
[201:26] when, if you were to predict, Would you be
able to say where this is gonna be over?
[201:33] And what led to that decline and the
[201:37] collapse? So of course, the
collapse is finally in 1453 AD.
[201:44] - Right. That's actually a very good
question. In other words, um,
[201:50] not looking at all of the previous
crises that caused loss of territory,
[201:54] like, you know, you lose Egypt, you lose
Syria, you lose Palestine, you lose
[201:58] Eastern Asia Minor, you lo- right?
But at what point could you
[202:01] say there's no coming back from this?
[202:04] Right? I would say early 14th century.
Somewhere between 1300 and 1350,
[202:11] the sources of resilience begin to
dry up, and you have a number of
[202:18] setbacks. They lose Asia Minor
to the Turks by 1300, roughly,
[202:24] which means that you can
now no longer draw upon the
[202:28] two wings, as it were,
the European side and
[202:32] the Asian side, which they could
always do. They're confined to Europe.
[202:36] And then you have a series of
civil wars, you have the Serbian
[202:40] expansion and you have the Black Death,
and they never recover from that.
[202:48] In 1300, you think of this, you
look at it and you think, "That's a
[202:52] tiny little Balkan state."
[202:54] Okay, it goes from Constantinople
to the Adriatic in this
[202:58] just sort of ribbon, right, this,
this corridor that just stretches
[203:03] across the Balkans. And yet, it's
not that much smaller than England
[203:09] and has about as much, if not more,
revenue, because they're still able
[203:13] to raise cash, because taxes.
[203:15] Right? So the emperor's still able
to pull in a lot of gold. Um,
[203:20] and his territory is not, you
know, completely insignificant.
[203:24] It's not what it, you know, the Roman Empire
used to be. But I don't think that it's
[203:28] completely lost. Then they
have some civil wars. Then one
[203:32] emperor- um, a rebel makes a deal
with the Serbs, surrenders half that
[203:35] territory. Okay, after that, game over.
[203:39] What's surprising is it takes the Turks
that long. 1453, that's another century.
[203:44] Right? It didn't need to be.
It looks like they might have
[203:48] had it wrapped up like 50 years
after- uh, you know, like by 1400.
[203:54] But then accidental events happened.
This is Timur, Tamerlane comes-
[203:58] ... from Central Asia, trounces the
Turks, breaks up their empire. So they go
[204:02] into a cycle of, you know, rebuilding,
and so that's why it takes
[204:06] another 50 years. Anyway, but
I'd say by the 1340s, game over.
[204:12] - And so why did it collapse? What are the
things in the ground, when you zoom out,
[204:20] the thing that ate away at the, I like
this term, sources of resilience?
[204:26] - Oh, foreign invasions. There's
no question. It's just-
[204:28] - It's just invasions
[204:29] - ...it's foreign invasions,
those which they could
[204:33] not cope with. They
coped with lots of them.
[204:37] But, you know, it, all it
takes is to lose to one,
[204:41] and you lose some part of your territory.
And if you keep losing enough,
[204:45] you won't have anything to fall
back on, and that's what happens.
[204:49] - So really, you know, if there's no
significant external invasions,
[204:56] the East Roman Empire, the
fundamentals, the taxation system,
[205:03] the way the, the policies were developed,
the way the politics was done, the way
[205:07] the representation was done, all of
that, this empire could have lasted
[205:12] for another thousand years.
[205:14] - Absolutely. I'm absolutely
convinced of this because
[205:20] you never see movements to split away.
[205:24] That is, there's no separatist
movements, at least not on the part of
[205:28] any Roman provincials. There's one
separatist movement, which is Bulgaria.
[205:32] We mentioned Bulgaria was
conquered, right, in 1018. There's
[205:36] a couple of independentist
movements rebellions. Um,
[205:40] eventually one succeeds in 1185,
so just under two centuries.
[205:44] So Bulgaria is the only
part of this empire that
[205:47] actively seeks to break away and does so.
[205:50] But for the rest of the 1,200 years,
you don't find provincials wanting
[205:54] to leave this system. However much
they complain about the taxes,
[205:58] they don't want to leave, and they make
no move to do so. You also never have
[206:02] a moment when the center loses its
ability to tax its territories,
[206:10] right? You don't have, like,
widespread peasant uprisings or
[206:14] provinc- or, right, agricultural
rebellions or these kinds of things,
[206:18] Which happens in every other one of
these empires. They also never decide
[206:22] to partition it. The Franks partition
theirs, right, like after Charlemagne.
[206:26] No. There are no, like, Roman
[206:30] warlords that try to carve out
a piece of the territory for
[206:33] themselves and rule it independent.
Nope, that doesn't happen either. So
[206:37] if you're looking at the kinds of
factors that cause states to fail,
[206:41] fragment, you know, become
ungovernable, these never happen.
[206:47] - This is so incredible.
This is truly incredible.
[206:51] In the history of human civilization,
just an incredible study of
[206:55] what human societies can
form. So, so what, what,
[206:59] what, what are the whys? Why?
Why? Why was it so stable?
[207:04] - Well, now look, there are other
stable... Like, for example,
[207:08] The, the British monarchy. That's
been around for quite a while.
[207:11] - Yeah, that's true.
[207:12] - Right? States like Portugal, Japan,
they have one thing in common.
[207:18] They're all tucked away at the edges.
[207:20] Like, they're off, they're little islands
or whatever. They're not like, right?
[207:24] We're talking about a society
that was right in the-
[207:27] - In the, yeah
[207:28] - ... middle of one of the main corridors
of empire building and new religions
[207:32] in the world. This is the most
dangerous neighborhood, right,
[207:36] that you can possibly live in.
[207:38] So no wonder it didn't
survive. Like it would've been
[207:42] extraordinary if it had.
But absent those forces,
[207:47] I don't see any forces of internal
[207:51] decomposition that would have
imperiled it, you know, significantly.
[207:56] - So what, I mean we've talked about a
lot of it, but what, just to, like,
[208:00] return to it, why was there no internal
[208:05] sources of decomposition. Like
why, why did it work so well?
[208:09] Why did the people feel represented?
Yes, they— By the way, you talked about
[208:14] how they complain about the taxes, which is
one of the signs of a healthy society, that
[208:17] we... It's like complaining about the weather.
The fact that you complain about the taxes
[208:21] actually means that you're happy with the taxes,
kind of counterintuitively, or it's not too
[208:25] bad. You're just complaining
as part of the system.
[208:28] Anyway, but why? Why, why did it work
so well? Why did everybody get along—
[208:33] - Oh, no, they—
[208:33] - ... feel represented? No, not get
along. Not in a, in a silly way.
[208:38] I mean, sufficiently to where they
wouldn't... Warlords wouldn't
[208:42] rise and break apart the system and—
[208:44] ... or if there was those kinds of
forces, they would come back together.
[208:48] Like, why is this such a
great self-healing system?
[208:51] - So you're exactly right. So sufficient is the
key word. We don't want to idealize this,
[208:55] right? These aren't, like, they're not just
dancing in the streets, holding hands and then
[208:59] direct... It's so— Even when
it comes to the tax system,
[209:02] they are complaining all the time. Of
course, they're doing so because they know
[209:06] that complaining gets you things.
[209:08] There's no disincentive to complaining. You might
not get what you want, or you might get it,
[209:12] but you know, no harm will come to
you. So they're complaining all the
[209:16] time. They have all of these civil
wars. They're like, "Okay." Um,
[209:21] so I think I would give
you a two-part answer, so
[209:25] really quickly, as to why
this held together so well.
[209:30] First is that an extraordinary effort was
[209:33] made by the authorities to persuade
their subjects that they were
[209:37] ruling on their behalf, and
I think, for the most part,
[209:41] actually tended to do so.
And the second is that it
[209:45] had a very tightly unified identity
[209:49] as Roman and as Orthodox. In
other words, for the most,
[209:53] most time, they knew that they were surrounded
by enemies who were not those things.
[209:58] And they did not want to live
under the power of non-Romans and
[210:02] non-Christian people. And so those two
factors combined, I think, gave everybody
[210:08] reason to hold it together.
The alternatives were worse.
[210:13] - Yeah. I mean, that's a really brilliant
summary, and I think we should mention
[210:17] that both the rhetoric and the
action are important. I think you've
[210:20] articulated that rhetoric is really powerful,
like stating over and over and over-
[210:27] ... that you represent the people, that
you're acting on behalf of the people and
[210:30] doing the action. But it's not enough to actually
do the action. You would think that's all
[210:34] Machiavelli says that's the only
thing that matters. But no.
[210:37] It's the rhetoric actually has a lot of
power- ... because it is a uniting idea-
[210:42] ... an ideal that propagates through
time, and it pacifies you. It
[210:46] makes you, it puts you at
peace. Rhetoric is important.
[210:50] - I'll give you an example. As an
academic administrator, right?
[210:54] I mean, I was chair of a
department for years and years.
[210:58] There's a difference between a dean who
says, "Sorry, bad budget situation. We're
[211:07] just going to have to cut your programs,"
on the one hand, and a dean who says,
[211:13] "I am fully on board with what
you're trying to accomplish with
[211:17] these programs. I am a defender
of the humanities. Unfortunately,
[211:23] we have this budget situation, and we're going
to have to cut some of the programs. But
[211:27] I assure you, the moment I'm
in this with you together-
[211:32] ... the moment we find the
funds, we will restore them."
[211:35] Those two just rhetorical strategies, they're
aiming at the same practical outcome,
[211:42] will produce very different levels of
compliance- ... right, and consensus.
[211:47] - And I should say that
there's subtlety there.
[211:49] The best rhetoric in that context,
and maybe in the East Roman Empire,
[211:55] is you also have to believe it.
[211:57] - Yes. It has to be credible. You can't
just say it and then not do it.
[212:00] - But one of the things I've learned about
humans, just having, doing this little podcast,
[212:05] is that people could-- Like,
the best way to say a thing,
[212:09] a powerful thing, is to really believe it.
[212:12] And so, like, this is clearly
one of the things that made
[212:16] the Roman Empire work, is doing the
action is the best way to make the
[212:23] rhetoric powerful and effective.
[212:26] - Yeah. This is sort of what
Aristotle says about tyrants.
[212:30] In The Politics, Aristotle's giving essentially
advice to tyrants on how to protect
[212:34] themselves because tyrants are usually
hated and are killed in coups,
[212:38] right? And he says, "Well, how-- You
know, essentially, how do you manage
[212:42] to secure yourself when you're a
tyrant?" Well, you know, you can start
[212:48] by maybe, you know, obeying the laws
or making sure that your subjects obey
[212:52] the laws and, you know, maybe work for
the interests of yourself. Essentially,
[212:56] he's telling them to kind
of become benevolent kings.
[213:00] And the best way to persuade your subjects
that you're legitimate, benevolent
[213:04] kings is to be that.
[213:08] - So what, from all of this, from this
2,200-year history of the Roman Empire,
[213:14] what lessons can we draw for modern
times? Now we're sitting in America, this
[213:21] young empire. I know we're not
calling it an empire, but, you know.
[213:26] - Lots of people are calling it an empire. I
thought it was sort of taboo. Yeah, in the 20th
[213:29] century, it was like, "Is America
an empire now?" But like, I
[213:33] think since the Iraq War, like since 2003,
I've seen at least very casual uses of
[213:41] America and empire in the same, you
know, sentence without any kind of
[213:45] hand-wringing.
[213:46] - Is it ever called that
in a academic setting?
[213:49] - Yes.
[213:49] - I mean, it's technically,
I guess you could say-
[213:50] - Oh, yeah
[213:51] - ... given, given the expanse
of the military bases and,
[213:56] and the military might and
and the way that represents
[214:00] itself in the geopolitical context.
[214:02] - There are books published all
the time that unironically
[214:06] Discuss America as an empire
in various ways. Yeah, no.
[214:09] - By the way, both positive and negative.
[214:11] So when you're saying a positive thing about America,
calling it an empire, and when you're saying it
[214:15] to criticize America, you call it
an empire. Yeah, you're right.
[214:18] - Yeah. I mean, most academic books aren't trying to
do, like, either. They're just trying to analyze a
[214:22] situation.
[214:24] - What lessons about, about representing
the people, about flourishing,
[214:32] about stability can we draw?
[214:34] - I will say that, just drawing on what
we were talking about a moment ago,
[214:40] that investing in institutions that
work for the majority of your subjects,
[214:46] even if indirectly, like they have to pay a
cost for them, but you have to explain to them
[214:50] why they're paying that cost, is to the
benefit of the ruling classes as well.
[214:57] Because you're-- ideally,
you're thinking about
[215:01] long-term success and not just your own
[215:04] short-term, you know, gain. And
I think that's what this society
[215:08] tends to do well. You know, the Romans generally,
you know how they built roads for the,
[215:12] the centuries and the millennia. They
built institutions too. You know,
[215:16] one of the institutions they built
was, like, the Christian Church.
[215:20] Like, they build things to last.
[215:22] Um, and I think that's a, that's a good
lesson beyond even the roads. I think
[215:26] institutions that explain, you
know, to people why they exist,
[215:32] is... Yeah, I think we could
we could use some of that.
[215:37] - And also the first point you made
about the East Roman Empire. I think
[215:41] you've said that US foreign
policy sometimes has a, quite a
[215:45] large gap between the rhetoric and the in
modern times, the rhetoric and the action.
[215:50] - Oh, yeah. Yeah.
[215:51] - And so that's to the Machiavelli's
point that we want to
[215:54] maybe narrow that gap for a successful
empire, for a successful nation.
[215:59] The rhetoric has to match the action.
[216:03] - Yes.
[216:03] - And it doesn't quite for some of the
foreign policy engagements in the world.
[216:10] - So in the context of the society
I study, let's say the army
[216:14] is the single largest expense,
is doing pretty much what
[216:18] the emperors say that it's doing,
which is protecting its subjects.
[216:21] That's actually what it's doing most
of the time. Not all the time. So, for
[216:25] example, emperors will sometimes
take the armies out on a
[216:29] raid or an expedition, you know,
crack some skulls, gather some
[216:33] plunder, come back, and this is done to glorify
the emperor. Like, yeah. Yeah, yeah, this,
[216:37] this does happen. But for the most part,
they're doing that, not much else.
[216:43] And actually, in pre-modern
context, it's very difficult to
[216:46] operate like, you know, shadow
foreign policies and things like
[216:50] this. Like, it's just not part of the-
[216:53] ... It's not in the cards. But
America in particular has such
[217:00] a history of proclaiming
the loftiest goals.
[217:05] It just, sometimes just, you
know, breathtakingly implausible.
[217:11] - Plus the incredible engineering behind
the military industrial complex, so
[217:15] America's very good at creating-
... to the flamethrowers.
[217:19] - Yes.
[217:20] - The technologies— ... of war, and
so the lofty goals combined with
[217:25] just a lot of profit
that could be made on-
[217:27] ... the technologies of war creates a very
difficult situation to navigate, where
[217:32] the gap naturally widens.
[217:34] - Yeah. I don't think most of the
world even believes, you know, what
[217:38] American leaders say their goals are,
especially when it comes to, like, war.
[217:43] Like spreading democracy? No, really?
[217:46] I remember when they were
trying to convince me,
[217:51] us, that the invasion of
Afghanistan was a feminist war.
[217:57] - Oh, that was a thing, huh?
[217:58] - Oh, yes. They were to liberate the women
from the burqas or whatever, and, like,
[218:02] the news was just flooded with, like, how
terrible women have it in Afghanistan.
[218:06] It's like, you're really trying to
persuade me that that's why you're
[218:09] sending armed forces— like... Anyway.
[218:13] - I think there's a lot, a lot of wake-up calls about
the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, where people
[218:17] realized that there is that gap
between the rhetoric and the action.
[218:21] And I mean, that's how, because of
a lot of people waking up to that,
[218:27] they create pressure on the government
to close that gap, and that's—
[218:32] ... how we kind of navigate this—
[218:34] ... complicated world, but it's a
costly one. I mean, these, these were
[218:37] extremely costly wars— ... on
every front, on every measure.
[218:42] - Yep, but the same lesson was
learned in, like, the Vietnam War,
[218:46] and that was such a disaster that
[218:49] essentially they had to switch to--
abandon the conscript army, switch to a
[218:53] professional army. And,
like, it took them so long
[218:57] to be able to, like, wage, you
know, these empire wars again
[219:02] because of the sheer damage that the
Vietnam War did to the credibility
[219:06] of the military leadership
in the country, right? This
[219:09] never happens in, like, this
doesn't happen in Constantinople.
[219:14] I can lose a w-- You can be criticized for
losing a war. That's, that's one thing,
[219:18] right? But that you're using the army
to do some, like... You know. No.
[219:23] - Some of this does have to do
with the, the functioning of
[219:28] of how democracy works, the,
the temporary nature of the
[219:32] leaderships, and that they're very-
[219:34] ... short-sighted because of the nature
of the elected position or the executive.
[219:40] I mean, that's what we're trying to figure out as
a human civilization, how to do this for, in this
[219:44] particular case, the democracy thing.
[219:47] - There's no right answer, and by the way, I don't
wanna be ruled by kings or monarchs or emperors
[219:51] either. So it's like I wouldn't
necessarily support that. I'm not
[219:55] advocating here for anything. I'm just
trying to explain. But you're exactly
[219:59] right. You know, we, we want democracy.
We want leaders whom we can eject
[220:05] every four or five years-
[220:07] ... which includes sometimes their, their,
you know, teams of experts and policy
[220:10] designers and whatever, and
that comes at a cost too.
[220:14] - So you, you said that. You know, the
Roman Empire, maybe ancient Greece,
[220:18] maybe the societies before that, and
now societies after that, the society
[220:24] we live in are very different. And
so applying the lessons of history,
[220:29] you have to be careful doing so. But
are there things that are the same
[220:35] with us humans?
[220:37] So of everything you've studied across
hundreds of years and centuries,
[220:42] are there aspects of human
nature that kind of persist?
[220:46] - So look, intellectually,
I have gone through,
[220:50] periods when, like when
I was a grad student,
[220:54] it was, you know, this was kind
of when postmodernism, what
[220:58] we might call loosely, was kind
of alive and well and not-
[221:02] ... had not yet been kicked in the pants.
[221:05] Um, it was very common
to find colleagues who
[221:09] did not believe that there was such a thing
as, let's say, human nature. In other
[221:13] words, that, let's say, the
parameters of human psychology
[221:16] are, you know, yes, there's considerable
variation, but they're within a certain set
[221:20] of, you know, norms. Like it's not--
[221:25] We're, we're not gonna behave
like different species.
[221:29] And, and that they did
not believe that there
[221:32] was such a thing. In other words, that
all of human history is essentially
[221:36] a series of incommensurate
slices of difference,
[221:41] right? That you just couldn't go from
one to the next. And I think it's a
[221:45] very problematic view for all kinds of reasons,
like how, how small do you slice these
[221:49] slices? I mean, it... And no,
I'm with Thucydides on this one-
[221:53] ... Who says that, you know, more or less
human beings are gonna, more or less,
[221:57] they're, they're going to be act-- Right?
They love, and they hate, and they have
[222:01] ambitions, and they're incompetent,
and, you know, you find the whole
[222:05] range of, you know, the
whole gamut of diversity-
[222:08] ... Pretty much in every, in any group of,
of about 20 or 30 people, you're gonna
[222:12] find the same kinds of types.
Now, culture then comes in and,
[222:16] you know, tweaks things in all kinds of weird
ways, and that's, as a historian, what I like
[222:20] to study. I like just how the culture
will modify, will set the dials, right?
[222:27] But that the dials go from
one to 10 most people-
[222:30] ... it's like, yeah,
yeah, yeah, I think so.
[222:31] - But every once in a
while, there'll be a few,
[222:35] A few folks who come along, whether
it's Steve Jobs with a turtleneck
[222:39] or some guy with a weird mustache or
[222:43] with a funny hat, and those
can turn the tides of history.
[222:47] - I think so. Occasionally, yes.
[222:49] - But they're just ultra skilled at the
right time- ... at the right moment.
[222:54] - Oh, I believe that too. Oh, yeah. In
other words, I don't-- I also don't
[222:58] think that, that cultural
systems or ideologies are so
[223:02] effectively totalitarian that they sort
of colonize the mind of every person.
[223:06] And so everyone in a culture
is just like a clone. No, you
[223:10] encounter this sometimes in,
in historical scholarship.
[223:13] And, no, I think people can sometimes just think
for themselves, or they can think outside the
[223:17] box, and they can do all kinds of
things. And, and I always wanna keep my
[223:21] mind open to that possibility when I'm
encountering historical agents. Yeah.
[223:26] - So just because you've
seen this grand history,
[223:29] I apologize for the ridiculous question,
but if we look at the entirety of Earth,
[223:35] and we fast-forward a
million years from now-
[223:39] - Oof
[223:40] - ... and the, and the history
of life on Earth is written,
[223:44] do you think we're at the very
beginning of human history?
[223:50] Or is, are we in the middle,
or are we close to the end?
[223:54] - A million years from now. Um, I mean, I
can't project or predict anything like a
[224:01] year from now.
[224:02] And I've become actually increasingly
skeptical that I can do so at least.
[224:07] However, so I don't know about
beginning, middle, and end. Um, I--
[224:14] It's easier to think in terms
of like, like numbered phases.
[224:18] Like significantly different
phases of human history.
[224:20] And I would say we're probably in the third.
I think there've only been three phases.
[224:25] The first one being sort of
hunter-gatherer period, which--
[224:28] ...that lasted for the majority
of human history so far.
[224:31] Right? Then there's the agricultural
revolution, basically. And
[224:35] this is when you start to produce surpluses
that create more complex societies.
[224:40] And we're now living through a technological--
first industrial, now, you know--
[224:47] - Yeah. You can throw it
all in the same bucket.
[224:48] - ...all kinds of tech--
[224:48] - Industrial, technological.
[224:49] - Yeah. Industrial, technological. Which
is modifying the parameters of what it
[224:53] is that human beings
can do and possibly be.
[224:56] And who knows where this will go.
But I see these as very distinct,
[225:01] In many ways. It's all human beings--
[225:04] - Yeah, it's all humans--
[225:05] - ...but very different contexts.
[225:06] - But they're almost modifying themselves.
So the question is, is there a fourth?
[225:12] Is there going to be a--
[225:13] - Yeah, I'm pretty sure there will be.
[225:14] - And what does that look like? And is
it-- When they look back at the third,
[225:20] would they still see us as the same
[225:23] as them, or would it be
something completely different?
[225:28] - Oh, no. I mean, we look back at the,
you know, Romans or the Greeks or,
[225:32] like, any period in history, and we're like,
"Yeah, no, I see what you're doing there.
[225:36] You're doing it with the, you know, the
technological capabilities that you had
[225:40] at that time. You're doing it with the materials
that you had. But I see what you're doing.
[225:44] Yeah. You've got, you've got families, and
you've got armies, and you've got, you know, you
[225:48] bury your dead, and you, you know."
[225:50] - Mm-hmm. But now we're
increasingly actually having the
[225:54] tools and technology to modify,
[225:57] to, like, deeply modify what it means
to be human. Genetic engineering,
[226:01] brain-computer interfaces. As we
understand the brain more, we can
[226:05] modify things, expand completely. Plus
artificial intelligence can expand the
[226:12] knowledge base and the intelligence
of the human mind. Unless
[226:17] we figure out the human mind is
actually incredibly special to the
[226:21] degree where it's-- At least with the
tools we have this century, we cannot
[226:26] accomplish, we cannot achieve the level--
[226:30] ...of intelligence that-- general
intelligence that humans have.
[226:34] Or one of the things we might
figure out in stage four of
[226:37] this long history is that
the thing that makes humans
[226:41] special is not intelligence. It's
not any of the things we kind of
[226:45] value each other by. It's
actually consciousness,
[226:49] and consciousness is the thing that
is very difficult to engineer.
[226:53] And so that's the common thing
from the hunter-gatherers,
[226:57] to before the Industrial Revolution
and after, is we're still the same.
[227:02] We still feel like something to be alive,
[227:06] and that's maybe an important component
of what makes us fall in love with each
[227:09] other or fear each other or suffer and all
[227:13] the full range of the human
condition, the human experience.
[227:16] Maybe even technology cannot,
cannot replicate that, cannot
[227:20] modify that. Maybe
that's what we learn. Or
[227:25] very possibly we destroy this whole thing.
[227:29] 'Cause now for the first time in
human history, we have the tools-
[227:32] - Yeah, yeah, we have
[227:32] - ... unfortunately, to destroy everything.
[227:35] - This is all very eloquent.
[227:37] I mean, after so many hours of my
rambling about the medieval Roman
[227:41] Empire, you're, you're--
Yeah. I'm impressed.
[227:44] - Okay. What gives you hope
about this whole thing,
[227:48] about the future of human civilization?
[227:51] - Look, there are a lot of
challenges, right, that we, that
[227:55] we face and we talk about them a lot. As
a historian, I see other periods that
[228:02] were far, far more difficult
[228:06] when people could have far more easily
have given up hope, and sometimes did. Um,
[228:13] but I don't think we're in one
of those... Like, there, there's
[228:17] some major issues like the uncertain
future of technologies, what they might
[228:20] do, exactly what you were talking about.
[228:23] I think they're solvable problems to
a certain degree. Like, if we can
[228:27] rein in some elites, a lot of these problems
can be fixed, and that's not like a
[228:33] super difficult... I mean, it's difficult,
but it's not, like, impossible.
[228:37] Look, so I grew up
during the Cold War. Uh,
[228:41] let's just take the '80s, for example.
And in the '80s, like, there was a
[228:45] pervasive sense that nuclear war
could happen at any time and just
[228:49] annihilate everything, and we lived under
that. If you look at the popular culture of
[228:53] the '80s, it's, like, all, like,
upbeat and cheerful and naive and-
[228:57] ... like, there was just no correlation.
And then you move into the '90s, and the
[229:01] Cold War is over, and everyone's
all depressed. The music gets
[229:05] all, like, whiny, and it's
like, "What happened?"
[229:08] There's just no correlation. Anyway,
I just think that the, the, it's
[229:12] a pervasive sense of
hopelessness or, you know-
[229:16] ... Despair doesn't always match with,
[229:20] like, if you look at the situation
objectively. I mean, yeah, it's, it, it
[229:24] can be pretty bad. I-- But there's so
much that's happening that is good-
[229:30] ... All the time, so.
[229:32] - I think this period of human history
will be-- 'cause we've talked
[229:36] about the ups and downs of
the Roman Empire. I think
[229:39] unquestionably, this period
in history, the 20th,
[229:44] the, the late 20th century
and the 21st century will be
[229:48] seen as the flourishing of humans.
So if we actually just wake up-
[229:53] ... it's like what everything around us,
by most measures of human flourishing-
[229:59] ... we're doing pretty good.
[230:01] - The amount of, like, sheer misery is
probably objectively decreasing every year.
[230:07] Now, you know, we're also creating
problems, yes, that will cause
[230:11] misery down the road.
Yeah, yes. But overall, I
[230:15] don't see a reason to
despair and not have hope.
[230:19] - Yeah. We're doing okay.
[230:21] - We can do better. Let's
do better. But yeah.
[230:24] - That's the... Let's do better. Well,
Anthony, this was an incredible
[230:30] conversation. Thank you for all the
[230:33] Amazing work you do and
for the whirlwind journey
[230:37] through such a fascinating
part of human history.
[230:41] this was fun. Thank you for talking today.
[230:43] - It was a pleasure to be here,
and thank you for, not just for
[230:47] inviting me, I mean, this is probably the,
the largest audience, you know, I've,
[230:51] I've ever spoken to but also just
for giving my, my field and this,
[230:55] this civilization that I study the opportunity
to be seen and heard from more people.
[230:59] I think that's very important. You've,
you've done a real service here, so
[231:03] I wanna thank you for that.
[231:05] - Thank you.
[231:07] Thanks for listening to this conversation
with Anthony Kaldellis. To support this
[231:11] podcast, please check out our sponsors in
the description, where you can also find
[231:14] links to contact me, ask questions,
give feedback, and so on.
[231:19] And now, let me leave you with some words
from Benjamin Franklin. "A great empire,
[231:26] like a great cake, is most
easily diminished at the edges."
[231:32] Thank you for listening, and
hope to see you next time.