Sandel Forces Harvard Clash Over Bentham's Greatest-Good Calculus

Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 01 "THE MORAL SIDE OF MURDER" — Harvard University

Harvard University

While emotional taboos and categorical duties trigger initial resistance, rational moral decisions must prioritize maximizing net human survival to prevent catastrophic collective loss.

AI-assisted summary of Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 01 "THE MORAL SIDE OF MURDER" — original source. Check the original for full context.

Source published:

Key ideas

  • When presented with the runaway trolley and emergency room triage dilemmas, the vast majority of people instinctively endorse sacrificing one life to preserve five, confirming that minimizing net loss of life serves as our baseline rational intuition. (0:33)
  • Intuitive moral consistency collapses when the mechanical delivery of harm changes, as seen when people refuse to push a bystander or harvest organs from a healthy patient despite the numerical outcome—five lives saved versus one lost—remaining identical. (4:14)
  • Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility formalizes this outcome-oriented standard by asserting that moral action and legislation must aim solely to maximize the overall balance of pleasure over pain across the community. (26:58)
  • The nineteenth-century survival case of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens demonstrates that evaluating real-world outcomes requires accounting for wider social ripple effects, such as the surviving crew members' dependents versus an orphaned youth with no survivors. (48:02)

Detailed notes

## Background Published on YouTube by Harvard University on September 4, 2009, this opening episode of Professor Michael Sandel's justice course explores the moral balance between sacrificing one life to save five others and remaining passive while multiple people perish. Drawing on classroom debates over escalating hypothetical dilemmas and the historical nineteenth-century cannibalism trial of shipwrecked sailors in the South Atlantic, the lecture examines whether moral rightness is determined by aggregate consequences and Jeremy Bentham's principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.

## TL;DR Professor Michael Sandel initiates an inquiry into moral reasoning by placing students before runaway trolleys and medical triage crises, illustrating that sound judgment naturally gravitates toward minimizing net casualties and securing the greatest balance of human life. The discussion deepens when physical contact and surgical interventions are introduced, revealing an irrational hesitation when the required intervention becomes uncomfortably direct despite identical life-saving payoffs. Moving from theory to historical reality, the lecture interrogates the survival trial of Dudley and Stephens, demonstrating how the sacrifice of a dying cabin boy preserved three experienced men and the broader well-being of their dependent families. Sandel systematically frames this conflict, contrasting the welfare-maximizing imperative of achieving optimal downstream outcomes against rigid, unyielding assertions of categorical rights.

## Atmosphere & style The lecture carries an energetic, intellectually demanding momentum inside a packed Sanders Theatre, where Sandel's swift Socratic questioning strips away comfortable platitudes to expose the underlying arithmetic of student intuitions. Bursts of self-conscious laughter regularly puncture the room as respondents realize the contradictions between their gut revulsions and their stated principles of preserving life. Watching the exchange feels like sitting inside a high-stakes arena of practical calculus, where visceral taboos are continually forced to answer to the urgent, unavoidable demands of human welfare and collective survival.

## Bulletin - [00:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=33s) When presented with the runaway trolley and emergency room triage dilemmas, the vast majority of people instinctively endorse sacrificing one life to preserve five, confirming that minimizing net loss of life serves as our baseline rational intuition. - [04:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=254s) Intuitive moral consistency collapses when the mechanical delivery of harm changes, as seen when people refuse to push a bystander or harvest organs from a healthy patient despite the numerical outcome—five lives saved versus one lost—remaining identical. - [26:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1618s) Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility formalizes this outcome-oriented standard by asserting that moral action and legislation must aim solely to maximize the overall balance of pleasure over pain across the community. - [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2882s) The nineteenth-century survival case of The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens demonstrates that evaluating real-world outcomes requires accounting for wider social ripple effects, such as the surviving crew members' dependents versus an orphaned youth with no survivors.

## Key takeaways - [00:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=33s) In runaway trolley scenarios, steering toward the solitary worker produces a clear surplus of net human survival compared to passive inaction that allows five workers to perish. - [02:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=128s) Appeals to historical crises like United Flight 93 show that sacrificing fewer lives to prevent a vastly larger catastrophe is widely honored as rational heroism. - [04:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=254s) Visceral squeamishness and physical proximity distort moral judgment, causing individuals to reject pushing a heavy man off a bridge even though it yields the identical outcome of four net lives saved. - [10:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=601s) Medical triage institutions routinely endorse outcome maximization, directing limited care to save five moderately injured victims rather than exhausting resources on a single critical patient. - [10:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=655s) The organ harvest dilemma tests the boundaries of consequential thinking, highlighting how social stability and visceral horror complicate straightforward survival arithmetic. - [13:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=786s) Consequential moral reasoning correctly places the evaluation of right and wrong within the resulting state of the world, contrasting with categorical approaches that focus on fixed rules. - [26:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1618s) Bentham's foundational insight recognizes pleasure and pain as humanity's sovereign masters, making aggregate well-being the only objective standard for justice. - [29:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1755s) In the catastrophic ordeal of the Mignonette, allowing all four castaways to perish would have produced total negative utility compared to sustaining three through the sacrifice of one. - [33:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2018s) Marcus's classroom defense of necessity correctly emphasizes that extreme existential emergencies require actions that preserve the greatest aggregate number of survivors. - [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2882s) A comprehensive assessment of suffering must incorporate secondary consequences, including the grief of surviving dependents and wider community impact, rather than isolating individuals in a vacuum. - [42:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2568s) Impartial mechanisms like lotteries gain support because treating every person as having equal standing aligns procedural fairness with the vital goal of collective preservation. - [48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2882s) Rigid prohibitions against taking life collapse under scrutiny when stakes scale to thirty, three hundred, or three thousand lives, proving that consequences cannot be ignored. - [21:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1309s) Skeptical evasion must be rejected because practical civic life perpetually demands concrete decisions that directly determine the distribution of human welfare.

## Detailed walkthrough ### [00:33](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=33s) The Runaway Trolley: Five Lives Against One

Professor Michael Sandel opens the lecture on justice by confronting the hall with an immediate, high-stakes moral calculation. He asks the audience to imagine operating a trolley car hurtling down a track at sixty miles an hour. Suddenly, the driver spots five track workers directly ahead. The brakes fail completely, leaving no ordinary means to halt the vehicle, and it is a certainty that continuing forward will annihilate all five men. In that moment of impending catastrophe, a single escape valve presents itself: an operational steering wheel and an available side track off to the right. On that spur stands a solitary worker. By turning the wheel, the driver can alter the course of events, preserving the five workers while extinguishing the life of the one. Sandel puts the core dilemma plainly to the assembly: what is the right action when five lives hang on one side of the ledger and one on the other?

A swift poll reveals where the moral weight instantly settles for the overwhelming majority. When Sandel asks how many would divert the trolley onto the side track, an ocean of hands rises across the auditorium. Conversely, when he calls for those who would stay their hand and let the trolley proceed straight ahead into the group of five, only a scattered few keep their hands raised. From a purely outcome-oriented view, the choice seems straightforward: five living beings produce far greater aggregate life, future experience, and collective human welfare than a single individual. Confronted with an unavoidable tragedy, the vast majority recognizes that minimizing the net loss of human life is the only defensible course.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Trolley Driver Decision Tree accDescr: Decision flow showing the consequences of diverting the runaway trolley versus staying on course. Start["Runaway Trolley at 60 mph<br/>(Brakes Fail)"] --> Choice{"Driver's Action"} Choice -->|"Turn wheel to side track"| Divert["Kill 1 worker"] Choice -->|"Maintain current course"| Straight["Kill 5 workers"] Divert --> NetBest["Net Result: 4 Lives Saved<br/>(Optimal aggregate outcome)"] Straight --> NetWorst["Net Result: 5 Deaths<br/>(Catastrophic net loss)"] ```

[02:08](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=128s) The Consequential Rationale and the Dissenting View

To unpack the justification behind this overwhelming vote, Sandel invites volunteers to defend the prevailing instinct. Standing up to articulate the obvious numerical arithmetic, the first respondent makes the rational balance sheet clear, stating simply: “Because it can't be right to kill five people when you can only kill one person instead.” Sandel echoes and validates the straightforward appeal of this reasoning. A second student immediately builds upon this welfare-maximizing foundation by drawing a parallel to the passengers on United Flight 93 during the September 11 attacks: “Well I was thinking it was the same reason it was on 9/11 we regard the people who flew the plane who flew the plane into the Pennsylvania field as heroes because they chose to kill the people on the plane and not kill more people in big buildings.” In both cases, extreme circumstances compel an agonizing trade-off where sacrificing fewer lives prevents an exponentially greater human catastrophe.

Sandel then pivots to examine the tiny minority willing to let five people perish. One dissenting student stands to offer a dramatic counter-argument, asserting that calculating lives in terms of net survival reflects a dangerous logic: “Well I think that same type of mentality that justifies genocide and totalitarianism in order to save one type of race you wipe out the other.” When Sandel presses him to clarify whether, in order to avoid that ideological hazard, he would genuinely permit the vehicle to plow directly into the five workers, the student concedes, “Presumably yes.” Sandel salutes the courage required to voice so stark and costly a conclusion, though the stark reality remains that passive inaction in this scenario guarantees five preventable deaths instead of one.

[04:14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=254s) The Onlooker on the Bridge: The Heavy Man Dilemma

Seeking to test whether students will remain faithful to the principle of maximizing net lives saved regardless of framing, Sandel introduces a second scenario. This time, the agent is not operating the vehicle, but standing as a bystander on a bridge overlooking the track. Below, the runaway trolley is once again bearing down upon five defenseless workers whose deaths are certain if nothing intervenes. Beside the onlooker leans a very heavy man over the railing. If given a shove, the man will tumble onto the tracks, his bulk halting the runaway trolley; he will lose his life, but the five workers below will be spared. When Sandel surveys the lecture hall on who would push the man to preserve the five, the room reverses its prior consensus: nearly every hand remains down, leaving only a negligible minority willing to bring about the optimal net outcome.

Sandel immediately confronts the classroom with the glaring inconsistency between the two votes. If preserving five lives at the expense of one is the morally sound principle, why abandon it simply because the physical mechanics have shifted? One student attempts to reconcile his conflicting answers by arguing that the second case introduces an entirely outside party: “The second one I guess involves an active choice of pushing a person down which I guess that that person himself would otherwise not have been involved in the situation at all and so to choose on his behalf I guess to involve him in something that he otherwise would have this escaped is I guess more than what you have in the first case where the three parties, the driver and the two sets of workers are already I guess in this situation.” Yet when Sandel points out that the lone worker on the side track never consented to risk his life either, the student can only muster a geographic distinction: the worker was already down on the tracks, whereas the man on the bridge was standing safely above them.

[07:19](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=439s) Agency, Trapdoors, and the Search for Distinction

Another student, Andrew, steps into the debate to suggest that physical causality and moral responsibility account for the hesitation. He contends that the runaway trolley is an unfolding disaster outside the agent's total control, meaning the deaths on the tracks are caused by the machine rather than the driver's malice. By contrast, physically pushing a stranger off an overpass feels like an unmediated personal act of homicide: “Whereas pushing the fat man over is an actual act of murder on your part you have control over that whereas you may not have control over the trolley car.” Another classmate counters this distinction, noting that choosing to redirect a vehicle is every bit as deliberate and conscious an intervention as pushing a person. Andrew concedes the tension, admitting, “It doesn't really sound right saying it now when I'm up here,” but insists there remains a visceral emotional difference between guiding a steering wheel and physically laying hands on a bystander to shove him to his death.

To isolate whether this resistance is merely squeamishness about physical contact, Sandel introduces a mechanical variation: suppose the heavy man is standing over a trapdoor that could be dropped open simply by turning a steering wheel on the bridge. Andrew hesitates, maintaining his reluctance: “For some reason that still just seems more more wrong.” He suggests he could only endorse it if the trolley itself were hurtling toward a switch that mechanically tripped the trapdoor, or if someone accidentally leaned into the wheel. Ultimately, Andrew retreats to the onlooker distinction: a trolley driver is already caught inside the disaster, whereas a bystander on an overpass possesses the choice to remain uninvolved rather than initiate harm, even if staying uninvolved guarantees five deaths.

[10:01](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=601s) The Emergency Room: Triaging for Maximum Survival

Moving away from locomotives, Sandel shifts the inquiry into a medical setting where the cold optimization of human survival is standard practice. He asks the students to envision working as an emergency room physician when six victims of a horrific trolley accident arrive simultaneously. Five of the patients suffer from moderate injuries, while one individual is severely mangled. If the physician devotes the entire day to intensive surgery on the severely injured patient, that single victim will survive, but the other five will perish from lack of timely care. Conversely, if the doctor tends to the five moderate cases, all five can be restored to full health, but the solitary critical patient will die.

When Sandel calls for a show of hands, the classroom returns overwhelmingly to the outcome-maximizing mindset. Almost the entire room votes to treat the five and let the single patient expire, while only a trivial handful choose to save the one. When evaluating identical systemic stakes—five lives preserved versus one life lost—intuition aligns smoothly with the optimal collective outcome. Because medical triage inherently aims to secure the greatest total number of survivors from limited resources, treating the five is viewed not as murder, but as the only sensible allocation of life-saving effort.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Medical Resource Allocation accDescr: Doctor triage decision comparing outcome-maximizing care against single-patient care. ER["6 Crash Victims Arrive at ER"] --> Triage{"Physician's Allocation of Care"} Triage -->|"Treat 5 Moderate Patients"| SaveFive["5 Restored to Health<br/>1 Severely Injured Dies"] Triage -->|"Treat 1 Critical Patient"| SaveOne["1 Restored to Health<br/>5 Moderate Patients Die"] SaveFive --> NetUtility["Maximizes Net Survival<br/>(Classroom Overwhelmingly Endorses)"] SaveOne --> Deficit["Massive Deficit in Net Survival<br/>(Rejected by Almost All)"] ```

[10:55](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=655s) The Transplant Surgeon and the Balcony Compromise

Sandel tests the limits of that medical math with a second clinical scenario: the transplant surgeon. In this case, a surgeon oversees five patients, each on the brink of death from organ failure, desperately needing a heart, a lung, a kidney, a liver, and a pancreas. With no donors available, all five will die before the day is out. In the adjacent room, an entirely healthy individual has come in for a routine checkup and is currently taking a peaceful nap. The surgeon could slip in quietly, extract the necessary five organs—causing the healthy man's death—and distribute them to save the five dying patients. Sandel asks how many students would perform the operation.

The auditorium erupts into uncomfortable laughter, and virtually no hands are raised, save for one student high in the balcony who catches Sandel's attention. Sandel cautions him not to lean too far over the railing, then asks him to defend his willingness to harvest the organs. Instead of embracing the trade-off, the student attempts an evasive compromise: “I'd actually like to explore slightly alternate possibility of just taking the one of the five he needs an organ who dies first and using their four healthy organs to save the other four.” The auditorium laughs at the clever sidestep, but Sandel immediately cuts through the evasion, noting: “That's a great idea except for the fact that you just wrecked the philosophical point.” The core challenge requires directly confronting whether five lives can be valued above one when the sacrifice involves actively liquidating a healthy bystander.

- Five patients requiring organs: one needs a heart, one a lung, one a kidney, one a liver, and one a pancreas. - The classroom overwhelmingly rejects harvesting the healthy patient, despite the identical net outcome of five living persons versus one dead.

[13:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=786s) Consequentialist Moral Reasoning vs. Intrinsic Wrongs

Pausing the case studies, Sandel steps back to draw out the two competing philosophies that have driven the students' contradictory instincts. He observes that the discussion has laid bare two distinct ways of determining what is right. The first perspective, which dictated the initial trolley vote and the ER triage case, is consequentialist moral reasoning. This framework holds that the moral worth of any action resides exclusively in the end state of affairs it produces, operating on the conviction that preserving five lives is vastly preferable to preserving only one, regardless of the path taken: “Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act. In the state of the world that will result from the thing you do.”

Yet the moment the cases shifted to pushing the heavy man or butchering the sleeping checkup patient, the students recoiled from the very arithmetic they had previously endorsed. In those instances, their instincts pointed to categorical moral reasoning, which insists that certain acts possess an intrinsically unacceptable nature, regardless of the positive downstream consequences they might achieve. Killing an innocent onlooker or violating bodily integrity felt categorically impermissible, even if doing so would generate an overall surplus of saved lives. Sandel leaves the audience at this philosophical crossroads: whether morality is fundamentally about maximizing positive net outcomes in the world, or whether there exist absolute lines of duty that no calculation of consequences can ever justify crossing.

[14:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=880s) Categorical Moral Reasoning and the Course Syllabus

Reflecting on the students' visceral hesitation to push a bystander off a footbridge or sacrifice an innocent patient to harvest their organs, Professor Michael Sandel identifies a distinct school of ethical thought that emerged from those dilemmas. Even when sacrificing one life could spare five, many students judged the act to be fundamentally and categorically wrong. As Sandel explains, “Categorical moral reasoning locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements, in certain categorical duties and rights, regardless of the consequences.” While the leading tradition of consequentialist reasoning is utilitarianism—founded by eighteenth-century English political philosopher Jeremy Bentham—the preeminent philosopher of categorical moral reasoning is the eighteenth-century German thinker Immanuel Kant.

To evaluate these competing modes of thought, the course combines foundational texts with urgent, real-world debates. Sandel outlines a syllabus featuring seminal works by Aristotle, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill. Rather than treating these thinkers as museum pieces, the class uses them to interrogate pressing contemporary political and legal controversies, including equality and inequality, affirmative action, free speech versus hate speech, same-sex marriage, and military conscription. Sandel stresses that engaging with these practical dilemmas is not a gimmick to enliven distant books, but rather the essential method for revealing what is at stake for philosophy in daily civic life.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Two Modes of Moral Reasoning accDescr: Diagram contrasting consequentialist and categorical moral reasoning along with their leading philosophers. subgraph Consequentialist["Consequentialist Moral Reasoning"] C1["Locates morality in results & states of the world"] --> C2["Jeremy Bentham: Utilitarianism"] end subgraph Categorical["Categorical Moral Reasoning"] K1["Locates morality in absolute duties & rights"] --> K2["Immanuel Kant: Deontology"] end ```

[17:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1035s) The Personal Risks of Philosophy: Making the Familiar Strange

While the study of philosophy may sound appealing, Sandel pauses to deliver an explicit warning about its inherent dangers. Reading these philosophical masterworks as an exercise in self-knowledge carries real personal and political risks that have confronted every student of political philosophy throughout history. These perils arise because philosophy does not instruct by handing down new, unfamiliar facts; instead, it teaches and unsettles by confronting us with what we already know. It takes beliefs and assumptions that seem completely ordinary and unquestioned in everyday life and deliberately renders them strange.

This estrangement was precisely the mechanism at work in the opening hypothetical dilemmas regarding runaway trolleys and triage doctors, which blended playfulness with deep moral sobriety. Sandel emphasizes that once the familiar has been made strange, our initial innocence is irrevocably shattered. As Sandel puts it, “Self-knowledge is like lost innocence, however unsettling you find it, it can never be unthought or unknown.” The philosophical journey is captivating yet daunting precisely because students cannot foresee where the inquiry will lead, even while knowing with certainty that the story is about themselves.

[19:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1180s) The Political Risks: Callicles's Warning to Socrates

Beyond personal disorientation, Sandel cautions the lecture hall about the political risks of philosophy. A conventional, comforting syllabus might promise that studying political philosophy turns students into better, more responsible citizens who can sharpen public policy and participate more effectively in civic affairs. Sandel rejects this promise as misleading. In practice, political philosophy can just as easily make a person a worse citizen—or at least a worse citizen before it makes them a better one—because critical philosophical reflection inherently distances people from established conventions, settled beliefs, and societal orthodoxies.

To illustrate this estrangement, Sandel turns to Plato’s dialogue *Gorgias*, where Socrates is confronted by his practical-minded friend Callicles. Callicles urges Socrates to abandon abstract musings, warning that while philosophy is a delightful toy when sampled in youth, excessive devotion leads to absolute ruin. Reconstructing Callicles's plea, Sandel quotes: “Take my advice, Callicles says, abandon argument, learn the accomplishments of active life, take for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbles, but those who have a good livelihood and reputation and many other blessings.” Sandel translates Callicles's ancient admonition into a modern refrain to laughter from the lecture hall: “Quit philosophizing, get real, go to business school.”

[21:49](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1309s) The Skeptical Evasion and the Restlessness of Reason

Confronted with the unsettling personal and political demands of philosophy, thinkers often seek refuge in a characteristic defense mechanism: skepticism. This evasion reasons that because the class failed to resolve the opening dilemmas definitively, and because titans like Aristotle, Locke, Kant, and Mill have left these questions unresolved after hundreds of years, it is presumptuous to think students in Sanders Theatre can settle them across a single semester. Skepticism concludes that morality is ultimately an intractable matter of individual subjective opinion where rational argument is futile.

Sandel firmly rejects this surrender. Although these questions may be impossible to resolve conclusively, they are completely unavoidable because our everyday civic lives compel us to enact answers to them continually. Citing Immanuel Kant's critique of skeptical apathy, Sandel explains: “Skepticism is a resting place for human reason, where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings, but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement.” Merely throwing up one's hands in resignation can never extinguish our deep impulse to make sense of our choices. Sandel concludes the first lecture with a statement of purpose: “I would simply conclude by saying that the aim of this course is to awaken the restlessness of reason and to see where it might lead.”

- **The nature of skepticism:** A temporary resting place to examine dogmatic assumptions, not a permanent dwelling for reason. - **Why moral questions cannot be dismissed:** While theoretically unresolved across centuries, human beings inevitably live out practical answers to them every day. - **The ultimate goal:** To move past easy skeptical evasion and embrace the ongoing restlessness of philosophical inquiry.

[24:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1455s) Recapping the Moral Dilemmas: Consequentialist vs. Categorical Principles

After a brief introductory interlude highlighting a student named Marcus—who defends desperate survival measures by arguing, “If you've been going nineteen days without any food, someone has to take the sacrifice, someone has to make the sacrifice and people can survive”—Sandel steps forward to review the lessons of the previous class. He reminds the students of the opening dilemmas involving runaway trolley cars and surgeons tempted to harvest organs from healthy patients to save five others.

Sandel draws attention to two core observations that emerged from those debates: 1. **The method of moral reasoning:** Arguments began with intuitive judgments about specific, concrete cases. Students then articulated the underlying principles behind those gut judgments, tested them against new scenarios, and revised their principles in an ongoing effort to bring their specific intuitions and their endorsed principles into alignment. 2. **The substance of moral reasoning:** Students repeatedly swung between two competing frameworks. In some cases, morality was judged entirely by results—the state of the world brought about by an action (consequentialism). In other cases, students felt that the intrinsic character of the act mattered regardless of the outcome, insisting that taking an innocent life is simply categorically wrong even if it saves multiple lives.

[26:58](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1618s) Jeremy Bentham and the Principle of Maximizing Utility

Turning to consequentialist moral theory, Sandel introduces its most prominent and systematic expression: utilitarianism, formulated in the late eighteenth century by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Bentham proposed a simple principle with profound intuitive appeal: “Bentham's idea is the following: the right thing to do, the just thing to do, is to maximize utility.” By utility, Bentham meant the overall balance of pleasure over pain, and happiness over suffering.

Bentham arrived at this standard through an empirical observation about human psychology. Human beings are fundamentally governed by two sovereign masters: pain and pleasure. We naturally seek pleasure and avoid suffering. Because these two forces define the human condition, Bentham argued that all moral reasoning—whether an individual deciding how to conduct their life or a legislature deciding what laws to enact—must aim collectively to maximize the net balance of happiness and minimize pain across the entire community.

[29:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1755s) The Tragedy of the *Mignonette* and the Real-World Calculus

To test the foundational doctrine of maximizing aggregate well-being—seeking the greatest net balance of happiness over suffering for the greatest number—the discussion turns away from hypothetical switch-pulling and toward the tangible realities of historical circumstance. In nineteenth-century British jurisprudence, few cases present the raw arithmetic of human survival as vividly as *The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens*. The incident involved four crew members adrift in the South Atlantic, stranded thirteen hundred miles from the Cape of Good Hope after their yacht, the *Mignonette*, was overwhelmed by a wave and sank.

Three of the crew were seasoned seafarers of upright reputation: Captain Thomas Dudley, First Mate Edwin Stephens, and sailor Edmund Brooks. The fourth was Richard Parker, a seventeen-year-old orphan serving as the ship’s cabin boy. Embarking on his very first long voyage, Parker had set out against the counsel of his acquaintances, animated by youthful ambition and the hope that sea life would forge his manhood. With no family or dependents relying upon his provision, Parker stood in stark contrast to the older crew members, whose survival mattered directly to the broader networks of dependents awaiting them at home.

The material reserves available to sustain the four castaways in their open lifeboat were vanishingly meager: two tins of preserved turnips and no fresh water. For three days, the men consumed nothing at all. On the fourth day, they opened the first can of turnips; on the fifth, they captured a small sea turtle. Sustained by the turtle and the remaining tin of vegetables, they survived for several days, only to spend the subsequent eight days in total deprivation, with no food and no fresh water to stave off physical collapse.

- The vessel *Mignonette* foundered in the South Atlantic, 1,300 miles from the Cape. - The four survivors comprised three experienced men (Dudley, Stephens, Brooks) and an orphaned seventeen-year-old cabin boy (Parker). - Sustenance was limited to two cans of turnips and one turtle across roughly two weeks, followed by eight days of complete starvation. - As the contemporary press reported of the calamity: “A sadder story of disaster at sea was never told than that of the survivors of the yacht Mignonette.”

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: Survival Calculus of the Mignonette accDescr: Flowchart mapping the escalating desperation and eventual decision to sacrifice the cabin boy for the survival of the crew.

subgraph Deprivation["Resource Exhaustion"] A["Shipwreck: 4 Survivors"] --> B["Provisions Expended: Turnips & Turtle"] B --> C["8 Days Without Food or Water"] end

subgraph Crisis["Critical Asymmetry"] C --> D["Parker Drinks Seawater: Near Death"] D --> E{"Dudley Proposes Lottery"} E -->|Brooks Rejects| F["Stalemate: Imminent Universal Death"] end

subgraph Outcome["Maximizing Net Survival"] F --> G["Sacrifice Parker: 1 Dies"] G --> H["3 Sustain Themselves on Body & Blood"] H --> I["Rescue on Day 24: 3 Lives Saved"] end ```

[31:47](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1907s) Desperation, Selection, and the Act of Survival

By the nineteenth day of their ordeal, the asymmetry of suffering among the men became acute. Parker, having disregarded the experienced sailors' warnings, drank seawater in his desperation. The resulting illness left him languishing in a semi-stupor at the bottom of the lifeboat, visibly dying and draining no collective resources, yet possessing the bodily capacity to preserve the others. Confronted with the certainty of four deaths if no action were taken, Dudley proposed instituting a lottery so that one person might be chosen to die to sustain the rest. Brooks refused to participate in the draw, whether out of a refusal to gamble with his own survival or an attachment to absolute prohibitions, leaving the proposal unrealized.

With the twentieth day bringing no sign of sail or rescue, the sheer utility of survival forced Dudley's hand. He signaled to Stephens and instructed Brooks to avert his gaze. Offering a brief prayer, Dudley informed the dying youth that his time had arrived, then severed Parker’s jugular vein with a penknife. Faced with the reality of nourishment versus impending death, Brooks set aside his earlier objections and joined Dudley and Stephens in consuming the body and blood of the boy.

For four full days, the flesh of the single dying teenager sustained the vital functions of three adult men until a German vessel finally spotted them on the twenty-fourth day. The practical economy of Dudley's diary reflects the grim matter-of-factness with which the survivors viewed their deliverance. As Dudley recorded in his journal: “On the twenty fourth day as we were having our breakfast a ship appeared at last.” Taken aboard and returned to the English port of Falmouth, the men were met not with an understanding of extreme necessity, but with criminal proceedings.

- Day 19: Dudley proposes a lottery; Brooks dissents, preventing any random drawing. - Day 20: Dudley and Stephens execute Parker using a penknife to the jugular vein. - Duration of sustenance: The three men fed on the remains for four days. - Rescue: Picked up by a German ship on Day 24 and transported to Falmouth, England, where Brooks became a state's witness while Dudley and Stephens stood trial for murder.

[33:38](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2018s) The Classroom Jury and the Defense of Necessity

Brought before the court, Dudley and Stephens did not dispute the sequence of events; their defense rested on the plea of unavoidable necessity. Their argument was simple arithmetic: it was vastly preferable for one individual to perish so that three could survive, rather than allowing all four to perish together. The Crown prosecution rejected this calculus outright, declaring that homicide remains homicide regardless of circumstances. Presenting the scenario to the lecture hall as a jury deciding moral culpability rather than narrow legal statute, the question was posed: who would deem their conduct morally permissible under the demands of survival?

A clear majority of the auditorium voted to convict, finding the act morally indefensible, while a small minority voted to exonerate. A student in the minority argued that extreme deprivation alters the moral landscape, suggesting that when the degree of necessity becomes absolute, it should relieve an actor of moral culpability even if the formal law remains rigid.

Taking up the consequentialist defense, another student named Marcus argued that extreme existential crises demand whatever actions are required to preserve life. Marcus observed that after surviving nineteen days without food, an individual must be sacrificed so the aggregate group does not vanish. He went further, suggesting that the ultimate balance of utility depends on the future productivity of the survivors, who might return home to establish charitable organizations and enrich society at large. When challenged on whether this justification would collapse if the men had returned home only to become contract killers, Marcus held his ground, noting that one would first need to evaluate the identity and value of those they eliminated before weighing the net balance of harm.

- The defense rested on the principle that preserving three lives at the cost of one produces a superior net outcome compared to losing all four lives. - A substantial majority of the student jury voted that the killing was morally impermissible, while a distinct minority endorsed the necessity defense. - Marcus captured the fundamental imperative of self-preservation in extreme emergencies, declaring: “In a situation that desperate you have to do what you have to do to survive.” - On the prospect of the survivors turning into assassins, Marcus insisted on examining the net consequences, answering: “You would want to know who they assassinated.”

[37:05](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2225s) Absolute Rights Versus Consequential Aggregates

The debate shifted from the minority's consequential reasoning to the majority's prosecution of the act. A student named Britt initially considered whether severe mental impairment induced by prolonged starvation might diminish the crew's agency, functioning as an excuse by establishing that they were not in a rational state of mind. Yet she recognized that relying on insanity or delirium implicitly concedes that the act itself is inherently wrong and incapable of being defended on its merits.

When asked to address Marcus’s defense that extreme situations justify doing whatever is necessary to save the greater number, Britt rejected the entire framework of measuring outcomes. She maintained that regardless of how desperate the circumstances become, human beings have no right to manipulate the survival of others or allocate life and death according to an arbitrary weighing of interests. From this non-consequential standpoint, the sanctity of an individual life creates a barrier that sheer arithmetic cannot override, regardless of how many lives might be sustained by the breach.

- Britt argued that invoking an altered state of mind undermines any claim that the killing was a measured, morally justified choice. - The fundamental critique of the defense asserts that individuals lack the authority to decide who lives and who dies, regardless of the ratio of survivors. - As Britt formulated the absolute prohibition: “There is no situation that would allow human beings to take the idea of fate or the other people's lives into their own hands that we don't have that kind of power.”

[38:45](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2325s) The Calculus of Consent and the Problem of Uncertainty

The debate took a new turn when Kathleen introduced the variable of consent, inquiring whether Parker’s voluntary agreement to sacrifice himself would alter the moral ledger and exonerate Dudley and Stephens. A scenario was sketched in which Dudley, penknife in hand, offered Parker the opportunity to become a martyr for his crewmates given his already terminal trajectory. Kathleen concluded that even with verbal assent from a dying youth in a semi-stupor, the killing remained morally unacceptable.

Other students argued that consent changes the moral balance only if the proposal originates entirely with the victim. Given the three-to-one power dynamic aboard the lifeboat, any agreement solicited by the captain would inevitably be coercive. If, however, the victim freely offered his life as an unprompted act of altruistic agency, the sacrifice could be recognized as socially beneficial and admirable.

Finally, a student challenged the practical logic of the killing by highlighting the problem of empirical uncertainty. At the moment Parker was killed, the survivors possessed no guarantee that rescue would ever arrive. To extinguish a life on the mere speculative hope of being found risks wasting the sacrifice entirely; if no ship appeared, the logic of consuming the weakest would inevitably repeat itself, reducing the crew member by member until none remained. The moral logic of the act thus depended entirely on the gamble that rescue would materialize before the caloric benefit of the sacrifice was exhausted.

- Consent under extreme duress in an isolated setting is functionally coercive due to the inherent three-to-one imbalance of power. - Autonomous self-sacrifice can transform a homicide into an act of utility-maximizing martyrdom, provided it originates entirely from the individual's own agency. - The critique of utilitarian killing under uncertainty points out that taking a life offers no guarantee of ultimate deliverance. - As a student noted regarding the gamble of rescue: “There's no definite reason that he should be killed because you don't know when they're going to get rescued so if you kill him you're killing him in vain.”

[42:04](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2524s) The Intrinsic Taboo of Cannibalism Versus the Demand for Justification

When considering the desperate circumstances aboard the lifeboat, the instinct to recoil from cannibalism often presents itself as an immediate, absolute barrier, regardless of whether the victim had already died of natural causes. One student insists that consuming human flesh is inherently wrong under any circumstance, declaring: “First of all, cannibalism, I believe is morally incorrect so you shouldn’t be eating a human anyway.” For this student, even waiting for someone to succumb naturally does not alter the fundamental wrongness of the act, though she concedes that this judgment rests entirely on individual sentiment: “Yes, to me personally I feel like of it all depends on one's personal morals, like we can't just, like this is just my opinion of course other people are going to disagree.”

Evaluating actions purely through personal sentiment, however, fails to weigh the genuine stakes involved when human survival hangs in the balance. Professor Michael Sandel challenges the class to move beyond unexamined intuitions and discover whether reasoned arguments can withstand scrutiny. If moral choices are to be evaluated rationally, one must determine whether arbitrary taboos should take precedence over tangible outcomes—specifically, preserving the lives of starving individuals who would otherwise perish.

[42:48](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2568s) The Lottery, Due Process, and Impartial Sacrifices

To explore the conditions under which the outcome might be justified, Sandel reintroduces Captain Thomas Dudley’s original proposal: an impartial lottery in which every crew member takes an equal risk of being sacrificed for the collective survival of the group. When Sandel asks how many students would view the killing as morally permissible if the cabin boy, Richard Parker, had drawn the short straw under an agreed lottery, a noticeably larger portion of the lecture hall raises their hands. A fair mechanism that weighs every life equally appears to alter the moral calculus for many listeners.

```mermaid flowchart TD accTitle: The Moral Evaluation of the Lifeboat Dilemma accDescr: Flowchart contrasting the utilitarian defense of net welfare with the three core objections raised by students.

subgraph Defense ["Consequential Defense: Net Welfare"] D1["Dire Necessity"] --> D2["Impartial Aggregation"] D2 --> D3["3 Survivors + Dependents at Home vs. 1 Orphan"] D3 --> D4["Maximizing Overall Survival & Happiness"] end

subgraph Objections ["Three Competing Objections"] O1["Categorical Duty:<br/>'Murder is Murder'"] O2["Fair Procedure:<br/>Lottery & Equal Risk"] O3["Autonomy & Consent:<br/>Voluntary Agreement"] end

Defense -.->|"Challenged by"| Objections ```

A student named Matt steps forward to argue that the fundamental injustice of the actual killing lay in the crew unilaterally placing their own lives above Parker's. As Matt explains: “I think the essential element, in my mind that makes it a crime is the idea that they decided at some point that their lives were more important than his, and that I mean that's kind of the basis for really any crime right?” Matt argues that had everyone consented to a lottery where each person accepted the risk of dying to preserve the majority, it would represent a collective agreement where individuals sacrifice for the common good. Although Matt admits the act remains “a little grotesque,” he maintains that having a shared procedure makes the sacrifice morally permissible, reframing the dilemma not around the revulsion of cannibalism, but around the presence of due process and equal standing.

[44:34](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2674s) Procedural Agreements and the Irrevocability of Consent

Expanding upon the necessity of procedural fairness, another student emphasizes that Richard Parker was entirely excluded from the deliberation. The cruelty of the act stemmed from Parker having no forewarning or opportunity to grasp what was about to happen to him. When Sandel poses a critical counter-scenario—asking what happens if everyone, including the cabin boy, willingly agrees to draw lots, but the boy recants the moment he loses—the student insists that a binding commitment must be honored for the collective good: “You've already decided, it's like a verbal contract, you can't go back on that.”

From this viewpoint, the participant has entered a shared social contract knowing that one life must be surrendered so that the greater number might survive. Once someone enters that agreement with the expectation of sharing in the benefits should another lose, they cannot unilaterally defect when the outcome disfavors them. Yet, the student returns to the original circumstance, maintaining that the complete denial of Parker's awareness was the decisive wrong: “I just think that that's the whole moral issue is that there was no consulting of the cabin boy and that that's what makes it the most horrible is that he had no idea what was even going on, that if he had known what was going on it would be a bit more understandable.”

[46:13](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2773s) The Categorical Refusal to Balance Lives

Sandel tallies the room: roughly twenty percent support the act purely on grounds of necessity from the start, while a much larger share becomes willing to justify the killing once consent or an impartial lottery is introduced. He then invites the perspective of those who remain unpersuaded—those who insist that even with a lottery, and even if Parker had whispered consent in his dying breath, taking his life would remain strictly wrong.

A student defends this categorical stance, arguing that even a lottery remains coercive when a person's back is against the wall. She points to Captain Dudley’s diary as evidence of an intolerable callousness toward human life, noting that describing the act as merely “getting our breakfast” reveals a disturbing absence of remorse. Sandel observes that her instinct is to punish Dudley severely because he lacks any sense of wrongdoing, driving her to maintain an unyielding prohibition against killing, regardless of how many people might be preserved as a result.

[48:02](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=2882s) Net Utility and the Fallacy of Absolute Prohibitions

The tension between absolute rules and aggregate well-being sharpens when another student declares that no circumstance can justify taking a life. He asserts without qualification: “I think undoubtedly the way our society is shaped, murder is murder and every way our society looks down at it in the same light and I don't think it's any different in any case.” He compares Dudley and Stephens killing Parker to feed their families to impoverished people committing street crimes to survive, arguing that society must treat all intentional killing with identical condemnation.

Sandel counters this rigid assertion by directing the lecture hall back to the welfare of everyone touched by the tragedy. A comprehensive moral evaluation cannot stop at a simple count of three people against one; it must include the ripple effects across society: - Richard Parker was an orphan without dependents, whose death left behind no grieving family. - The three surviving crew members had wives, children, and dependents in England who relied upon their return. - Public sentiment in London, reflected in contemporary newspapers, openly sympathized with the men, recognizing that genuine affection and concern for their families had driven them to this extreme measure.

When Sandel asks whether the prohibition against killing would hold if sacrificing one person could preserve thirty, three hundred, or three thousand lives, the student unbendingly insists that the moral status does not change. When pressed on whether it is an error to evaluate actions by summing up collective happiness, the student is forced to confront the direct contradiction between his absolute rule and the welfare of hundreds or thousands of individuals: “I don't think he is wrong, but I think murder is murder in any case.” Sandel points out that both positions cannot be true simultaneously: if the absolute rule stands, then the principle of maximizing overall happiness must be rejected. Pushed to the brink, the student concedes: “Well then Bentham has to be wrong if you're right he's wrong. okay then he's wrong.”

[50:12](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=3012s) Three Foundational Questions for Evaluating Human Welfare

Stepping back from the passionate exchange, Sandel systematizes the arguments advanced by the class. On the side of defending the crew, the justification rests squarely on dire necessity, the reality that numbers matter, and the calculation of wider consequences: three men and their families survived at the cost of an orphan whose loss caused comparatively little collective sorrow. When the balance of happiness is weighed against suffering, an undeniable case emerges that taking the cabin boy’s life produced the greatest net balance of well-being.

Against this consequential assessment, Sandel identifies three distinct philosophical challenges that demand rigorous examination:

| Objection Type | Central Argument | Core Philosophical Question | |:--- |:--- |:--- | | **Categorical Objection** | Murder is strictly wrong regardless of net consequences or increases in social happiness. | Do individuals possess fundamental rights that transcend aggregate welfare, and if so, where do those rights originate if not from utility? | | **Procedural Fairness** | A fair lottery counts all persons as equals, making the sacrifice permissible. | Why does voluntary agreement to an impartial procedure justify whatever outcome that procedure generates? | | **Consent & Autonomy** | Voluntary submission transforms an impermissible killing into a justified sacrifice. | What is the precise moral work accomplished by consent that alters the fundamental moral status of an act? |

Sandel concludes by noting that resolving whether individual rights can truly exist independently of collective well-being requires engaging directly with the foundational texts of utilitarian philosophy. He announces that the next lectures will take up the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, laying the groundwork for a systematic exploration of whether justice is ultimately about maximizing the collective good.

## Notable quotes > [17:15](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=1035s) Self-knowledge is like lost innocence, however unsettling you find it, it can never be unthought or unknown. — Professor Michael Sandel

> [14:40](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=880s) Categorical moral reasoning locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements, in certain categorical duties and rights, regardless of the consequences. — Professor Michael Sandel

> [13:06](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY&t=786s) Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act. — Professor Michael Sandel

## Mentioned Michael Sandel, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Aristotle, John Locke, Plato, Socrates, Callicles, Gorgias, Thomas Dudley, Edwin Stephens, Edmund Brooks, Richard Parker, Mignonette, United Flight 93, Harvard University, Sanders Theatre

## Video description To register for the 2015 course, visit https://www.edx.org/course/justice-harvardx-er22-1x-0.

PART ONE: THE MORAL SIDE OF MURDER If you had to choose between (1) killing one person to save the lives of five others and (2) doing nothing even though you knew that five people would die right before your eyes if you did nothing—what would you do? What would be the right thing to do? Thats the hypothetical scenario Professor Michael Sandel uses to launch his course on moral reasoning. After the majority of students votes for killing the one person in order to save the lives of five others, Sandel presents three similar moral conundrums—each one artfully designed to make the decision more difficult. As students stand up to defend their conflicting choices, it becomes clear that the assumptions behind our moral reasoning are often contradictory, and the question of what is right and what is wrong is not always black and white.

PART TWO: THE CASE FOR CANNIBALISM

Sandel introduces the principles of utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, with a famous nineteenth century legal case involving a shipwrecked crew of four. After nineteen days lost at sea, the captain decides to kill the weakest amongst them, the young cabin boy, so that the rest can feed on his blood and body to survive. The case sets up a classroom debate about the moral validity of utilitarianism—and its doctrine that the right thing to do is whatever produces "the greatest good for the greatest number."

[Source](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBdfcR-8hEY)

Reading summary

In this lecture on justice, Professor Michael Sandel examines whether moral rectitude is fundamentally determined by the consequences of an act—maximizing aggregate human life and welfare—or governed by categorical prohibitions that forbid violating individual rights regardless of the net outcome. Maximizing Net Survival Across Acute Crises (0:33) When confronted with sudden catastrophe, rational moral judgment gravitates toward preserving the maximum number of human lives. In Sandel's opening dilemma, a runaway trolley hurtling toward five track workers can be diverted onto a spur where only a solitary worker stands. Faced with this stark ledger, the overwhelming majority of students vote to turn the wheel, recognizing that sacrificing one life prevents five deaths and minimizes net human loss. A student draws a parallel to United Flight 93 on September 11, where passengers crashed a hijacked aircraft into a Pennsylvania field, sacrificing themselves to prevent an exponentially greater catastrophe in densely populated buildings. This same outcome-maximizing logic governs clinical resource allocation. When Sandel posits an emergency room physician who must choose between spending an entire day saving one severely mangled patient or treating five moderately injured victims, the classroom returns decisively to maximizing net survival. Allocating limited care to ensure five patients recover while allowing one to expire is seen not as murder, but as the only defensible distribution of scarce life-saving resources. Intuitive Squeamishness Versus Identical Outcomes (4:14) Outcome-based reasoning encounters friction when emotional aversion and physical mechanics obscure the underlying numerical stakes. In the footbridge scenario, Sandel asks if an onlooker should shove a heavy man onto the tracks to halt the runaway trolley and preserve the five workers. Despite producing an identical outcome—five lives saved for one lost—the lecture hall reverses its consensus, with almost everyone refusing to push. A student named Andrew attempts to distinguish the cases by arguing that shoving an onlooker is an unmediated act of personal homicide, whereas steering a vehicle feels governed by an unfolding machine accident. Yet when Sandel introduces a trapdoor operated by a steering wheel, the hesitation remains, exposing an emotional reluctance to inflict direct harm even when doing so secures an optimal aggregate result. A parallel inconsistency arises in clinical medicine. When Sandel presents a surgeon who could harvest organs from a healthy patient taking a nap during a routine checkup to save five patients facing organ failure, the room overwhelmingly rejects the trade-off. Although students instinctively recoil from liquidating a healthy bystander, Sandel underscores the core philosophical challenge: both the bridge and transplant cases yield the exact same arithmetic surplus of five living persons over one, questioning whether visceral taboos can logically override net human welfare. The Real-World Calculus of Extreme Survival (29:15) The imperative to maximize net survival shifts from theoretical scenarios to historical reality in the nineteenth-century maritime trial of *The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens*. Stranded thirteen hundred miles from land in the South Atlantic after the yacht *Mignonette* sank, four castaways faced starvation after consuming only two tins of turnips and a small turtle over sixteen days. As seventeen-year-old cabin boy Richard Parker lay dying from drinking seawater, Captain Thomas Dudley severed Parker's jugular vein with a penknife, allowing three men to feed on his body for four days until rescue arrived on the twenty-fourth day. Evaluating the case consequentialist grounds, a student named Marcus defends the killing as an unavoidable survival measure, arguing that extreme deprivation necessitates sacrificing one individual so the aggregate group does not vanish. Furthermore, Dudley and Stephens had wives and children awaiting them in England, whereas Parker was an orphan without dependents. From a comprehensive accounting of social well-being, sacrificing a dying youth with no dependents generated a superior net outcome by preserving three providers and sparing their wider families devastating grief. Procedural Fairness and Aggregate Social Welfare (42:48) When assessing the lifeboat crisis, student opposition softens significantly once fair procedures enter the ledger. Captain Dudley had originally proposed drawing lots, which sailor Brooks rejected. When Sandel asks if an agreed lottery would make the killing morally permissible, a substantially larger portion of the hall raises their hands. A student named Matt contends that an impartial lottery recognizes equal standing, providing a legitimate mechanism for individuals to accept mutual risk for the collective survival of the group. While some argue that extreme duress invalidates consent, others assert that entering a shared compact creates a binding obligation to accept the sacrifice for the common good. The debate ultimately isolates Jeremy Bentham's principle—that justice consists in maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain across a community—against rigid categorical prohibitions. When a student insists that murder remains universally wrong regardless of whether one life spares thirty, three hundred, or three thousand, Sandel points out that absolute rules directly conflict with the welfare of thousands of people. An unbending refusal to balance lives ignores the extensive ripple effects on society, forcing a choice between arbitrary dogma and the maximization of collective human well-being. Sandel concludes that while individuals frequently vacillate between maximizing net outcomes and upholding categorical duties, skepticism provides no dwelling place for reason. Because civic life continually compels society to enact practical answers to these trade-offs, subsequent lectures will evaluate the foundations of utilitarian philosophy through Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill to examine whether justice is ultimately defined by maximizing the collective good.

Source quotes

[17:15] Professor Michael Sandel: Self-knowledge is like lost innocence, however unsettling you find it, it can never be unthought or unknown. [14:40] Professor Michael Sandel: Categorical moral reasoning locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements, in certain categorical duties and rights, regardless of the consequences. [13:06] Professor Michael Sandel: Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act.

Original transcript

[0:04] Funding for this program is provided by: [0:08] Additional funding provided by [0:33] This is a course about Justice and we begin with a story [0:37] suppose you're the driver of a trolley car, [0:40] and your trolley car is hurdling down the track at sixty miles an hour [0:44] and at the end of the track you notice five workers working on the track [0:49] you tried to stop but you can't [0:51] your brakes don't work [0:53] you feel desperate because you know [0:56] that if you crash into these five workers [0:59] they will all die [1:01] let's assume you know that for sure [1:05] and so you feel helpless [1:07] until you notice that there is [1:09] off to the right [1:11] a side track [1:13] at the end of that track [1:15] there's one worker [1:17] working on track [1:19] you're steering wheel works [1:21] so you can [1:23] turn the trolley car if you want to [1:26] onto this side track [1:28] killing the one [1:30] but sparing the five. [1:33] Here's our first question [1:36] what's the right thing to do? [1:38] What would you do? [1:40] Let's take a poll, [1:42] how many [1:45] would turn the trolley car onto the side track? [1:52] How many wouldn't? [1:53] How many would go straight ahead [1:58] keep your hands up, those of you who'd go straight ahead. [2:04] A handful of people would, the vast majority would turn [2:08] let's hear first [2:09] now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think [2:14] it's the right thing to do. Let's begin with those in the majority, who would turn [2:19] to go onto side track? [2:22] Why would you do it, [2:23] what would be your reason? [2:25] Who's willing to volunteer a reason? [2:30] Go ahead, stand up. [2:32] Because it can't be right to kill five people when you can only kill one person instead. [2:39] it wouldn't be right to kill five [2:42] if you could kill one person instead [2:47] that's a good reason [2:48] that's a good reason [2:52] who else? [2:53] does everybody agree with that [2:56] reason? go ahead. [3:01] Well I was thinking it was the same reason it was on [3:03] 9/11 we regard the people who flew the plane [3:05] who flew the plane into the [3:08] Pennsylvania field as heroes [3:09] because they chose to kill the people on the plane [3:11] and not kill more people [3:14] in big buildings. [3:16] So the principle there was the same on 9/11 [3:19] it's tragic circumstance, [3:21] but better to kill one so that five can live [3:25] is that the reason most of you have, those of you who would turn, yes? [3:30] Let's hear now [3:32] from [3:33] those in the minority [3:35] those who wouldn't turn. [3:40] Well I think that same type of mentality that justifies genocide and totalitarianism [3:45] in order to save one type of race you wipe out the other. [3:50] so what would you do in this case? You would [3:53] to avoid [3:55] the horrors of genocide [3:57] you would crash into the five and kill them? [4:03] Presumably yes. [4:07] okay who else? [4:09] That's a brave answer, thank you. [4:14] Let's consider another [4:16] trolley car case [4:20] and see [4:21] whether [4:24] those of you in the majority [4:27] want to adhere to the principle, [4:30] better that one should die so that five should live. [4:33] This time you're not the driver of the trolley car, you're an onlooker [4:38] standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track [4:42] and down the track comes a trolley car [4:45] at the end of the track are five workers [4:49] the brakes don't work [4:51] the trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them [4:55] and now [4:57] you're not the driver [4:58] you really feel helpless [5:01] until you notice [5:03] standing next to you [5:06] leaning over [5:08] the bridge [5:09] is it very fat man. [5:17] And you could [5:20] give him a shove [5:22] he would fall over the bridge [5:24] onto the track [5:27] right in the way of [5:29] the trolley car [5:32] he would die [5:33] but he would spare the five. [5:38] Now, how many would push [5:41] the fat man over the bridge? Raise your hand. [5:48] How many wouldn't? [5:51] Most people wouldn't. [5:54] Here's the obvious question, [5:55] what became [5:56] of the principle [6:00] better to save five lives even if it means sacrificing one, what became of the principal [6:05] that almost everyone endorsed [6:07] in the first case [6:09] I need to hear from someone who was in the majority in both [6:12] cases is [6:13] how do you explain the difference between the two? [6:17] The second one I guess involves an active choice of [6:21] pushing a person [6:22] and down which [6:24] I guess that [6:25] that person himself would otherwise not have been involved in the situation at all [6:29] and so [6:31] to choose on his behalf I guess [6:33] to [6:36] involve him in something that he otherwise would have this escaped is [6:39] I guess more than [6:41] what you have in the first case where [6:43] the three parties, the driver and [6:45] the two sets of workers are [6:47] already I guess in this situation. [6:50] but the guy working, the one on the track off to the side [6:55] he didn't choose to sacrifice his life any more than the fat guy did, did he? [7:02] That's true, but he was on the tracks. [7:05] this guy was on the bridge. [7:10] Go ahead, you can come back if you want. [7:13] Alright, it's a hard question [7:15] but you did well you did very well it's a hard question. [7:19] who else [7:21] can [7:22] find a way of reconciling [7:26] the reaction of the majority in these two cases? Yes? [7:30] Well I guess [7:31] in the first case where [7:32] you have the one worker and the five [7:35] it's a choice between those two, and you have to [7:37] make a certain choice and people are going to die because of the trolley car [7:41] not necessarily because of your direct actions. The trolley car is a runway, [7:45] thing and you need to make in a split second choice [7:48] whereas pushing the fat man over is an actual act of murder on your part [7:52] you have control over that [7:54] whereas you may not have control over the trolley car. [7:57] So I think that it's a slightly different situation. [8:00] Alright who has a reply? Is that, who has a reply to that? no that was good, who has a way [8:04] who wants to reply? [8:06] Is that a way out of this? [8:09] I don't think that's a very good reason because you choose [8:12] either way you have to choose who dies because you either choose to turn and kill a person [8:16] which is an act of conscious [8:18] thought to turn, [8:19] or you choose to push the fat man [8:21] over which is also an active [8:23] conscious action so either way you're making a choice. [8:27] Do you want to reply? [8:29] Well I'm not really sure that that's the case, it just still seems kind of different, the act of actually [8:34] pushing someone over onto the tracks and killing them, [8:38] you are actually killing him yourself, you're pushing him with your own hands you're pushing and [8:42] that's different [8:43] than steering something that is going to cause death [8:47] into another...you know [8:48] it doesn't really sound right saying it now when I'm up here. [8:52] No that's good, what's your name? [8:54] Andrew. [8:55] Andrew and let me ask you this question Andrew, [8:59] suppose [9:02] standing on the bridge [9:03] next to the fat man [9:04] I didn't have to push him, suppose he was standing [9:07] over a trap door that I could open by turning a steering wheel like that [9:17] would you turn it? [9:18] For some reason that still just seems more [9:20] more wrong. [9:24] I mean maybe if you just accidentally like leaned into this steering wheel or something like that [9:30] or but, [9:31] or say that the car is [9:33] hurdling towards a switch that will drop the trap [9:37] then I could agree with that. [9:39] Fair enough, it still seems [9:42] wrong in a way that it doesn't seem wrong in the first case to turn, you say [9:45] An in another way, I mean in the first situation you're involved directly with the situation [9:50] in the second one you're an onlooker as well. [9:52] So you have the choice of becoming involved or not by pushing the fat man. [9:56] Let's forget for the moment about this case, [9:59] that's good, [10:01] but let's imagine a different case. This time your doctor in an emergency room [10:06] and six patients come to you [10:11] they've been in a terrible trolley car wreck [10:18] five of them sustained moderate injuries one is severely injured you could spend all day [10:23] caring for the one severely injured victim, [10:27] but in that time the five would die, or you could look after the five, restore them to health, but [10:32] during that time the one severely injured [10:35] person would die. [10:36] How many would save [10:37] the five [10:39] now as the doctor? [10:40] How many would save the one? [10:44] Very few people, [10:46] just a handful of people. [10:49] Same reason I assume, [10:51] one life versus five. [10:55] Now consider [10:57] another doctor case [10:59] this time you're a transplant surgeon [11:02] and you have five patients each in desperate need [11:06] of an organ transplant in order to survive [11:09] on needs a heart one a lung, [11:12] one a kidney, [11:13] one a liver [11:15] and the fifth [11:16] a pancreas. [11:20] And you have no organ donors [11:22] you are about to [11:24] see you them die [11:27] and then [11:28] it occurs to you [11:30] that in the next room [11:32] there's a healthy guy who came in for a checkup. [11:39] and he is [11:43] you like that [11:47] and he's taking a nap [11:53] you could go in very quietly [11:56] yank out the five organs, that person would die [12:00] but you can save the five. [12:03] How many would do it? Anyone? [12:10] How many? Put your hands up if you would do it. [12:18] Anyone in the balcony? [12:21] You would? Be careful don't lean over too much [12:26] How many wouldn't? [12:29] All right. [12:30] What do you say, speak up in the balcony, you who would [12:33] yank out the organs, why? [12:35] I'd actually like to explore slightly alternate [12:38] possibility of just taking the one [12:40] of the five he needs an organ who dies first [12:44] and using their four healthy organs to save the other four [12:50] That's a pretty good idea. [12:54] That's a great idea [12:57] except for the fact [13:00] that you just wrecked the philosophical point. [13:06] Let's step back [13:07] from these stories and these arguments [13:10] to notice a couple of things [13:12] about the way the arguments have began to unfold. [13:17] Certain [13:18] moral principles [13:20] have already begun to emerge [13:23] from the discussions we've had [13:25] and let's consider [13:27] what those moral principles [13:29] look like [13:31] the first moral principle that emerged from the discussion said [13:35] that the right thing to do the moral thing to do [13:39] depends on the consequences that will result [13:43] from your action [13:45] at the end of the day [13:47] better that five should live [13:49] even if one must die. [13:52] That's an example [13:53] of consequentialist [13:56] moral reasoning. [13:59] consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act. In the state of the [14:04] world that will result [14:06] from the thing you do [14:09] but then we went a little further, we considered those other cases [14:12] and people weren't so sure [14:15] about [14:17] consequentialist moral reasoning [14:20] when people hesitated [14:22] to push the fat man [14:24] over the bridge [14:25] or to yank out the organs of the innocent [14:28] patient [14:29] people gestured towards [14:32] reasons [14:34] having to do [14:35] with the intrinsic [14:37] quality of the act [14:39] itself. [14:40] Consequences be what they may. [14:42] People were reluctant [14:45] people thought it was just wrong [14:47] categorically wrong [14:49] to kill [14:50] a person [14:51] an innocent person [14:53] even for the sake [14:54] of saving [14:55] five lives, at least these people thought that [14:58] in the second [15:00] version of each story we reconsidered [15:05] so this points [15:06] a second [15:09] categorical [15:10] way [15:12] of thinking about [15:14] moral reasoning [15:16] categorical moral reasoning locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements in [15:22] certain categorical duties and rights [15:24] regardless of the consequences. [15:27] We're going to explore [15:29] in the days and weeks to come the contrast between [15:33] consequentialist and categorical moral principles. [15:36] The most influential [15:38] example of [15:40] consequential moral reasoning is utilitarianism, a doctrine invented by [15:45] Jeremy Bentham, the eighteenth century English political philosopher. [15:51] The most important [15:54] philosopher of categorical moral reasoning [15:56] is the [15:58] eighteenth century German philosopher Emmanuel Kant. [16:02] So we will look [16:03] at those two different modes of moral reasoning [16:07] assess them [16:08] and also consider others. [16:10] If you look at the syllabus, you'll notice that we read a number of great and famous books. [16:16] Books by Aristotle [16:18] John Locke [16:19] Emanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, [16:22] and others. [16:24] You'll notice too from the syllabus that we don't only read these books, [16:28] we also all [16:30] take up [16:32] contemporary political and legal controversies that raise philosophical questions. [16:37] We will debate equality and inequality, [16:40] affirmative action, [16:41] free speech versus hate speech, [16:43] same sex marriage, military conscription, [16:47] a range of practical questions, why [16:50] not just to enliven these abstract and distant books [16:55] but to make clear to bring out what's at stake in our everyday lives including our political [17:01] lives, [17:03] for philosophy. [17:05] So we will read these books [17:07] and we will debate these [17:09] issues and we'll see how each informs and illuminates the other. [17:15] This may sound appealing enough [17:17] but here [17:19] I have to issue a warning, [17:22] and the warning is this [17:25] to read these books [17:28] in this way, [17:31] as an exercise in self-knowledge, [17:34] to read them in this way carry certain risks [17:38] risks that are both personal and political, [17:42] risks that every student of political philosophy have known. [17:47] These risks spring from that fact [17:50] that philosophy [17:52] teaches us [17:54] and unsettles us [17:56] by confronting us with what we already know. [18:01] There's an irony [18:03] the difficulty of this course consists in the fact that it teaches what you already know. [18:09] It works by taking [18:12] what we know from familiar unquestioned settings, [18:16] and making it strange. [18:20] That's how those examples worked [18:22] worked [18:23] the hypotheticals with which we began with their mix of playfulness and sobriety. [18:29] it's also how these philosophical books work. Philosophy [18:33] estranges us [18:35] from the familiar [18:37] not by supplying new information [18:40] but by inviting [18:41] and provoking [18:43] a new way of seeing [18:47] but, and here's the risk, [18:49] once [18:50] the familiar turns strange, [18:54] it's never quite the same again. [18:58] Self-knowledge [19:00] is like lost innocence, [19:03] however unsettling [19:04] you find it, [19:06] it can never [19:07] be unthought [19:09] or unknown [19:13] what makes this enterprise difficult [19:17] but also riveting, [19:19] is that [19:20] moral and political philosophy is a story [19:25] and you don't know where this story will lead but what you do know [19:29] is that the story [19:31] is about you. [19:34] Those are the personal risks, [19:37] now what of the political risks. [19:40] one way of introducing of course like this [19:43] would be to promise you [19:44] that by reading these books [19:46] and debating these issues [19:48] you will become a better more responsible citizen. [19:51] You will examine the presuppositions of public policy, you will hone your political [19:56] judgment [19:57] you'll become a more effective participant in public affairs [20:02] but this would be a partial and misleading promise [20:06] political philosophy for the most part hasn't worked that way. [20:11] You have to allow for the possibility [20:14] that political philosophy may make you a worse citizen [20:19] rather than a better one [20:21] or at least a worse citizen [20:23] before it makes you [20:25] a better one [20:27] and that's because philosophy [20:30] is a distancing [20:32] even debilitating [20:34] activity [20:36] And you see this [20:37] going back to Socrates [20:39] there's a dialogue, the Gorgias [20:42] in which one of Socrates’ friends [20:44] Calicles [20:45] tries to talk him out [20:47] of philosophizing. [20:49] calicles tells Socrates philosophy is a pretty toy [20:54] if one indulges in it with moderation at the right time of life [20:57] but if one pursues it further than one should it is absolute ruin. [21:03] Take my advice calicles says, [21:06] abandon argument [21:08] learn the accomplishments of active life, take [21:11] for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbles, [21:16] but those who have a good livelihood and reputation [21:20] and many other blessings. [21:22] So Calicles is really saying to Socrates [21:26] quit philosophizing, [21:28] get real [21:30] go to business school [21:35] and calicles did have a point [21:38] he had a point [21:39] because philosophy distances us [21:42] from conventions from established assumptions [21:45] and from settled beliefs. [21:46] those are the risks, [21:48] personal and political [21:49] and in the face of these risks there is a characteristic evasion, [21:54] the name of the evasion is skepticism. It's the idea [21:57] well it goes something like this [21:58] we didn't resolve, once and for all, [22:03] either the cases or the principles we were arguing when we began [22:09] and if Aristotle [22:11] and Locke and Kant and Mill haven't solved these questions after all of these years [22:17] who are we to think [22:19] that we here in Sanders Theatre over the course a semester [22:23] can resolve them [22:26] and so maybe it's just a matter of [22:29] each person having his or her own principles and there's nothing more to be said about [22:33] it [22:34] no way of reasoning [22:36] that's the [22:37] evasion. The evasion of skepticism [22:39] to which I would offer the following [22:41] reply: [22:42] it's true [22:43] these questions have been debated for a very long time [22:47] but the very fact [22:49] that they have reoccurred and persisted [22:52] may suggest [22:54] that though they're impossible in one sense [22:57] their unavoidable in another [22:59] and the reason they're unavoidable [23:02] the reason they're inescapable is that we live some answer [23:06] to these questions every day. [23:10] So skepticism, just throwing up their hands and giving up on moral reflection, [23:16] is no solution [23:18] Emanuel Kant [23:19] described very well the problem with skepticism when he wrote [23:23] skepticism is a resting place for human reason [23:26] where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings [23:29] but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement. [23:33] Simply to acquiesce in skepticism, Kant wrote, [23:35] can never suffice to overcome the restless of reason. [23:42] I've tried to suggest through theses stories and these arguments [23:47] some sense of the risks and temptations [23:49] of the perils and the possibilities I would simply conclude by saying [23:55] that the aim of this course [23:58] is to awaken [23:59] the restlessness of reason [24:02] and to see where it might lead [24:04] thank you very much. [24:15] Like, in a situation that desperate, [24:16] you have to do what you have to do to survive. You have to do what you have to do you? You've gotta do [24:21] What you [24:22] gotta do. pretty much, [24:23] If you've been going nineteen days without any food [24:25] someone has to take the sacrifice, someone has to make the sacrifice and people can survive. Alright that's good, what's your name? Marcus. [24:33] Marcus, what do you say to Marcus? [24:40] Last time [24:44] we started out last time [24:46] with some stores [24:48] with some moral dilemmas [24:51] about trolley cars [24:53] and about doctors [24:54] and healthy patients [24:56] vulnerable [24:57] to being victims of organ transplantation [25:00] we noticed two things [25:04] about the arguments we had [25:06] one had to do with the way we were arguing [25:10] it began with our judgments in particular cases [25:13] we tried to articulate the reasons or the principles [25:18] lying behind our judgments [25:22] and then confronted with a new case [25:25] we found ourselves re-examining those principles [25:30] revising each in the light of the other [25:34] and we noticed the built-in pressure to try to bring into alignment [25:38] our judgments about particular cases [25:41] and the principles we would endorse [25:43] on reflection [25:46] we also noticed something about the substance of the arguments [25:50] that emerged from the discussion. [25:55] We noticed that sometimes we were tempted to locate the morality of an act in the consequences [26:00] in the results, in the state of the world that it brought about. [26:06] We called is consequentialist [26:09] moral reason. [26:11] But we also noticed that [26:13] in some cases [26:16] we weren't swayed only [26:18] by the results [26:22] sometimes, [26:23] many of us felt, [26:25] that not just consequences but also the intrinsic quality or character of the act [26:31] matters morally. [26:35] Some people argued that there are certain things that are just categorically wrong [26:40] even if they bring about [26:42] a good result [26:44] even [26:45] if they save five people [26:47] at the cost of one life. [26:49] So we contrasted consequentialist [26:52] moral principles [26:54] with categorical ones. [26:58] Today [26:59] and in the next few days [27:00] we will begin to examine one of the most influential [27:06] versions of consequentialist [27:08] moral theory [27:10] and that's the philosophy of utilitarianism. [27:16] Jeremy Bentham, [27:17] the eighteenth century [27:19] English political philosopher [27:21] gave first [27:22] the first clear systematic expression [27:26] to the utilitarian [27:28] moral theory. [27:32] And Bentham's idea, [27:36] his essential idea [27:38] is a very simple one [27:42] with a lot of [27:44] morally [27:46] intuitive appeal. [27:48] Bentham's idea is [27:50] the following [27:51] the right thing to do [27:54] the just thing to do [27:57] it's to [27:58] maximize [28:01] utility. [28:02] What did he mean by utility? [28:06] He meant by utility the balance [28:11] of pleasure over pain, [28:14] happiness over suffering. [28:16] Here's how we arrived [28:18] at the principle [28:19] of maximizing utility. [28:22] He started out by observing [28:24] that all of us [28:26] all human beings [28:27] are governed by two sovereign masters, [28:31] pain and pleasure. [28:34] We human beings [28:37] like pleasure and dislike pain [28:42] and so we should base morality [28:45] whether we are thinking of what to do in our own lives [28:49] or whether [28:50] as legislators or citizens [28:52] we are thinking about what the law should be, [28:57] the right thing to do individually or collectively [29:02] is to maximize, act in a way that maximizes [29:05] the overall level [29:07] of happiness. [29:11] Bentham's utilitarianism is sometimes summed up with the slogan [29:15] the greatest good for the greatest number. [29:18] With this [29:20] basic principle of utility on hand, [29:22] let's begin to test it and to examine it [29:26] by turning to another case [29:28] another story but this time [29:30] not a hypothetical story, [29:32] a real-life story [29:34] the case of [29:35] the Queen versus Dudley and Stephens. [29:38] This was a nineteenth-century British law case [29:41] that's famous [29:44] and much debated in law schools. [29:47] Here's what happened in the case [29:50] I'll summarize the story [29:51] and then I want to hear [29:54] how you would rule [29:57] imagining that you are the jury. [30:04] A newspaper account of the time [30:06] described the background: [30:09] A sadder story of disaster at sea [30:11] was never told [30:12] than that of the survivors of the yacht [30:15] Mignonette. [30:16] The ship foundered in the south Atlantic [30:19] thirteen hundred miles from the cape [30:21] there were four in the crew, [30:24] Dudley was the captain [30:26] Stephens was the first mate [30:28] Brooks was a sailor, [30:30] all men of [30:31] excellent character, [30:32] or so the newspaper account [30:34] tells us. [30:35] The fourth crew member was the cabin boy, [30:38] Richard Parker [30:40] seventeen years old. [30:42] He was an orphan [30:44] he had no family [30:46] and he was on his first long voyage at sea. [30:51] He went, the news account tells us, [30:53] rather against the advice of his friends. [30:56] He went in the hopefulness of youthful ambition [31:00] thinking the journey would make a man of him. [31:03] Sadly it was not to be, [31:05] the facts of the case were not in dispute, [31:07] a wave hit the ship [31:08] and the Mignonette went down. [31:12] The four crew members escaped to a lifeboat [31:14] the only [31:16] food they had [31:18] were two [31:19] cans of preserved [31:20] turnips [31:21] no fresh water [31:23] for the first three days they ate nothing [31:26] on the fourth day that opened one of the cans of turnips [31:30] and ate it. [31:31] The next day they caught a turtle [31:34] together with the other can of turnips [31:36] the turtle [31:38] enabled them to subsist [31:40] for the next few days and then for eight days [31:43] they had nothing [31:44] no food no water. [31:47] Imagine yourself in a situation like that [31:50] what would you do? [31:52] Here's what they did [31:55] by now the cabin boy Parker is lying at the bottom of the lifeboat in a corner [32:00] because he had drunk sea water [32:03] against the advice of the others [32:05] and he had become ill [32:07] and he appeared to be dying [32:10] so on the nineteenth day Dudley, the captain, suggested [32:14] that they should all [32:17] have a lottery. That they should [32:18] all draw lots to see [32:19] who would die [32:20] to save the rest. [32:24] Brooks [32:25] refused [32:26] he didn't like the lottery idea [32:29] we don't know whether this [32:30] was because he didn't want to take that chance or because he believed in categorical moral [32:36] principles [32:36] but in any case [32:38] no lots were drawn. [32:42] The next day [32:43] there was still no ship in sight [32:45] so a Dudley told Brooks to avert his gaze [32:48] and he motioned to Stephens [32:50] that the boy Parker had better be killed. [32:53] Dudley offered a prayer [32:55] he told a the boy his time had come [32:58] and he killed him with a pen knife [33:00] stabbing him in the jugular vein. [33:03] Brooks emerged from his conscientious objection to share in the gruesome bounty. [33:09] For four days [33:11] the three of them fed on the body and blood of the cabin boy. [33:15] True story. [33:17] And then they were rescued. [33:19] Dudley describes their rescue [33:22] in his diary [33:24] with staggering euphemism, quote: [33:27] "on the twenty fourth day [33:29] as we were having our breakfast [33:34] a ship appeared at last." [33:38] The three survivors were picked up by a German ship. They were taken back to Falmouth in England [33:44] where they were arrested and tried [33:47] Brooks [33:47] turned state's witness [33:49] Dudley and Stephens went to trial. They didn't dispute the facts [33:54] they claimed [33:55] they had acted out of necessity [33:58] that was their defense [33:59] they argued in effect [34:01] better that one should die [34:03] so that three could survive [34:06] the prosecutor [34:08] wasn't swayed by that argument [34:10] he said murder is murder [34:12] and so the case went to trial. Now imagine you are the jury [34:16] and just to simplify the discussion [34:19] put aside the question of law, [34:21] and let's assume that [34:23] you as the jury [34:25] are charged with deciding [34:28] whether what they did was morally [34:31] permissible or not. [34:34] How many [34:36] would vote [34:39] not guilty, that what they did was morally permissible? [34:49] And how many would vote guilty [34:51] what they did was morally wrong? [34:54] A pretty sizable majority. [34:58] Now let's see what people's reasons are, and let me begin with those who are in the minority. [35:03] Let's hear first from the defense [35:07] of Dudley and Stephens. [35:10] Why would you morally exonerate them? [35:14] What are your reasons? [35:17] I think it's I think it is morally reprehensible [35:20] but I think that there's a distinction between what's morally reprehensible [35:24] what makes someone legally accountable [35:26] in other words the night as the judge said what's always moral isn't necessarily [35:30] against the law and while I don't think that necessity [35:34] justifies [35:36] theft or murder any illegal act, [35:38] at some point your degree of necessity does in fact [35:43] exonerate you form any guilt. ok. [35:45] other defenders, other voices for the defense? [35:50] Moral justifications for [35:53] what they did? [35:56] yes, thank you [35:58] I just feel like [35:59] in a situation that desperate you have to do what you have to do to survive. [36:03] You have to do what you have to do [36:04] ya, you gotta do what you gotta do, pretty much. [36:06] If you've been [36:07] going nineteen days without any food [36:09] you know someone just has to take the sacrifice has to make sacrifices and people can survive [36:14] and furthermore from that [36:16] let's say they survived and then they become productive members of society who go home and then start like [36:21] a million charity organizations and this and that and this and that, I mean they benefit everybody in the end so [36:26] I mean I don't know what they did afterwards, I mean they might have [36:28] gone on and killed more people [36:30] but whatever. [36:32] what? what if they were going home and turned out to be assassins? [36:35] What if they were going home and turned out to be assassins? [36:38] You would want to know who they assassinated. [36:42] That's true too, that's fair [36:45] I would wanna know who they assassinated. [36:49] alright that's good, what's your name? Marcus. [36:50] We've heard a defense [36:52] a couple voices for the defense [36:54] now we need to hear [36:55] from the prosecution [36:57] most people think [36:59] what they did was wrong, why? [37:05] One of the first things that I was thinking was, oh well if they haven't been eating for a really long time, [37:09] maybe [37:11] then [37:12] they're mentally affected [37:15] that could be used for the defense, [37:16] a possible argument that oh, [37:20] that they weren't in a proper state of mind, they were making [37:24] decisions that they otherwise wouldn't be making, and if that's an appealing argument [37:28] that you have to be in an altered mindset to do something like that it suggests that [37:33] people who find that argument convincing [37:36] do you think that they're acting immorally. But I want to know what you think you're defending [37:40] you k 0:37:41.249,0:37:45.549 you voted to convict right? yeah I don't think that they acted in morally [37:45] appropriate way. And why not? What do you say, Here's Marcus [37:49] he just defended them, [37:51] he said, [37:52] you heard what he said, [37:53] yes I did [37:55] yes [37:56] that you've got to do what you've got to do in a case like that. [38:00] What do you say to Marcus? [38:04] They didn't, [38:06] that there is no situation that would allow human beings to take [38:13] the idea of fate or the other people's lives into their own hands that we don't have [38:17] that kind of power. [38:19] Good, okay [38:21] thanks you, and what's your name? [38:24] Britt? okay. [38:24] who else? [38:26] What do you say? Stand up [38:28] I'm wondering if Dudley and Stephens had asked for Richard Parker's consent in, you know, dying, [38:35] if that would [38:37] would that exonerate them [38:41] from an act of murder, and if so is that still morally justifiable? [38:45] That's interesting, alright consent, now hang on, what's your name? Kathleen. [38:51] Kathleen says suppose so what would that scenario look like? [38:56] so in the story [38:56] Dudley is there, pen knife in hand, [39:00] but instead of the prayer [39:02] or before the prayer, [39:04] he says, Parker, [39:07] would you mind [39:11] we're desperately hungry, [39:14] as Marcus empathizes with [39:17] we're desperately hungry [39:19] you're not going to last long anyhow, [39:22] you can be a martyr, [39:23] would you be a martyr [39:25] how about it Parker? [39:29] Then, then [39:33] then what do you think, would be morally justified then? Suppose [39:37] Parker [39:38] in his semi-stupor [39:40] says okay [39:42] I don't think it'll be morally justifiable but I'm wondering. Even then, even then it wouldn't be? No [39:47] You don't think that even with consent [39:50] it would be morally justified. [39:52] Are there people who think [39:54] who want to take up Kathleen's [39:56] consent idea [39:57] and who think that that would make it morally justified? Raise your hand if it would [40:01] if you think it would. [40:05] That's very interesting [40:07] Why would consent [40:09] make a moral difference? Why would it? [40:15] Well I just think that if he was making his own original idea [40:18] and it was his idea to start with [40:20] then that would be the only situation in which I would [40:23] see it being appropriate in anyway 0:40:25.940,0:40:28.359 because that way you couldn't make the argument that [40:28] he was pressured you know it’s three [40:30] to one or whatever the ratio was, [40:32] and I think that [40:34] if he was making a decision to give his life then he took on the agency [40:38] to sacrifice himself which some people might see as admirable and other people [40:42] might disagree with that decision. [40:45] So if he came up with the idea [40:49] that's the only kind of consent we could have confidence in [40:52] morally, then it would be okay [40:55] otherwise [40:57] it would be kind of coerced consent [40:59] under the circumstances [41:01] you think. [41:05] Is there anyone who thinks [41:07] that the even the consent of Parker [41:10] would not justify [41:13] their killing him? [41:15] Who thinks that? [41:18] Yes, tell us why, stand up [41:19] I think that Parker [41:21] would be killed [41:22] with the hope that the other crew members would be rescued so [41:26] there's no definite reason that he should be killed [41:29] because you don't know [41:31] when they're going to get rescued so if you kill him you're killing him in vain [41:35] do you keep killing a crew member until you're rescued and then you're left with no one? [41:38] because someone's going to die eventually? [41:40] Well the moral logic of the situation seems to be that. [41:44] That they would [41:45] keep on picking off the weakest maybe, one by one, [41:50] until they were [41:51] rescued and in this case luckily when three at least were still alive. [41:57] Now if [41:58] if Parker did give his consent [42:01] would it be all right do you think or not? [42:04] No, it still wouldn't be right. [42:06] Tell us why wouldn't be all right. [42:08] First of all, cannibalism, I believe [42:10] is morally incorrect [42:13] so you shouldn’t be eating a human anyway. [42:14] So [42:17] cannibalism is morally objectionable outside [42:19] so then even in the scenario [42:22] of waiting until someone died [42:24] still it would be objectionable. [42:27] Yes, to me personally [42:27] I feel like of [42:29] it all depends on [42:31] one's personal morals, like we can't just, like this is just my opinion [42:35] of course other people are going to disagree. [42:39] Well let's see, let's hear what their disagreements are [42:41] and then we'll see [42:42] if they have reasons [42:44] that can persuade you or not. [42:46] Let's try that [42:48] Let's [42:50] now is there someone [42:53] who can explain, those of you who are tempted by consent [42:57] can you explain [42:59] why consent makes [43:02] such a moral difference, [43:03] what about the lottery idea [43:05] does that count as consent. Remember at the beginning [43:08] Dudley proposed a lottery [43:11] suppose that they had agreed [43:13] to a lottery [43:16] then [43:17] how many would then say [43:20] it was all right. Say there was a lottery, [43:23] cabin boy lost, [43:25] and the rest of the story unfolded. How many people would say it's morally permissible? [43:33] So the numbers are rising if we add a lottery, let's hear from one of you [43:37] for whom the lottery would make a moral difference [43:41] why would it? [43:43] I think the essential [43:44] element, [43:45] in my mind that makes it a crime is [43:47] the idea that they decided at some point that their lives were more important than his, and that [43:53] I mean that's kind of the basis for really any crime [43:56] right? It's like [43:57] my needs, my desire is a more important than yours and mine take precedent [44:01] and if they had done a lottery were everyone consented [44:04] that someone should die [44:06] and it's sort of like they're all sacrificing themselves, [44:09] to save the rest, [44:11] Then it would be all right? [44:12] A little grotesque but, [44:15] But morally permissible? Yes. [44:18] what's your name? Matt. [44:22] so, Matt for you [44:25] what bothers you is not [44:27] the cannibalism, but the lack of due process. [44:31] I guess you could say that [44:34] And can someone who agrees with Matt [44:38] say a little bit more [44:40] about why [44:41] a lottery [44:43] would make it, in your view, [44:47] morally permissible. [44:50] The way I understood it originally was that that was the whole issue is that the cabin boy was never [44:55] consulted [44:56] about whether or not it something was going to happen to him even though with the original [45:00] lottery [45:01] whether or not he would be a part of that it was just decided [45:04] that he was the one that was going to die. Yes that's what happened in the actual case [45:08] but if there were a lottery and they all agreed to the procedure [45:11] you think that would be okay? [45:13] Right, because everyone knows that there's gonna be a death [45:16] whereas [45:17] you know the cabin boy didn't know that [45:18] this discussion was even happening [45:21] there was no [45:21] you know forewarning [45:23] for him to know that hey, I may be the one that's dying. Okay, now suppose the everyone agrees [45:28] to the lottery they have the lottery the cabin boy loses any changes his mind. [45:35] You've already decided, it's like a verbal contract, you can't go back on that. You've decided the decision was made [45:40] you know if you know you're dying for the reason for at others to live, [45:45] you would, you know [45:46] if the someone else had died [45:47] you know that you would consume them, so [45:51] But then he could say I know, but I lost. [45:57] I just think that that's the whole moral issue is that there was no consulting of the cabin boy and that that's [46:01] what makes it the most horrible [46:04] is that he had no idea what was even going on, that if he had known what was going on [46:08] it would [46:10] be a bit more understandable. [46:13] Alright, good, now I want to hear [46:14] so there's some who think [46:17] it's morally permissible [46:18] but only about twenty percent, [46:24] led by Marcus, [46:26] then there are some who say [46:28] the real problem here [46:30] is the lack of consent [46:32] whether the lack of consent to a lottery to a fair procedure [46:37] or [46:38] Kathleen's idea, [46:39] lack of consent [46:40] at the moment [46:42] of death [46:45] and if we add consent [46:48] then [46:49] more people are willing to consider [46:51] the sacrifice morally justified. [46:54] I want to hear now finally [46:56] from those of you who think [46:58] even with consent [47:00] even with a lottery [47:01] even with [47:02] a final [47:04] murmur of consent from Parker [47:06] at the [47:08] very last moment [47:09] it would still [47:10] be wrong [47:12] and why would it be wrong [47:14] that's what I want to hear. [47:17] well the whole time [47:18] I've been leaning towards the categorical moral reasoning [47:22] and I think that [47:25] there's a possibility I'd be okay with the idea of the lottery and then loser [47:29] taking into their own hands to [47:31] kill themselves [47:33] so there wouldn't be an act of murder but I still think that [47:37] even that way it's coerced and also I don't think that there's any remorse like in [47:42] Dudley's diary [47:43] we're getting our breakfast [47:44] it seems as though he's just sort of like, oh, [47:47] you know that whole idea of not valuing someone else's life [47:51] so that makes me [47:53] feel like I have to take the categorical stance. You want to throw the book at him. [47:57] when he lacks remorse or a sense of having done anything wrong. Right. [48:02] Alright, good so are there any other [48:06] defenders who [48:08] who say it's just categorically wrong, with or without consent, yes stand up. Why? [48:13] I think undoubtedly the way our society is shaped, murder is murder [48:17] murder is murder and every way our society looks down at it in the same light [48:21] and I don't think it's any different in any case. Good now let me ask you a question, [48:24] there were three lives at stake [48:27] versus one, [48:30] the one, that the cabin boy, he had no family [48:33] he had no dependents, [48:34] these other three had families back home in England they had dependents [48:38] they had wives and children [48:41] think back to Bentham, [48:43] Bentham says we have to consider [48:44] the welfare, the utility, the happiness [48:48] of everybody. We have to add it all up [48:51] so it's not just numbers three against one [48:54] it's also all of those people at home [48:58] in fact the London newspaper at the time [49:00] and popular opinion sympathized with them [49:04] Dudley in Stephens [49:05] and the paper said if they weren't [49:07] motivated [49:08] by affection [49:09] and concern for their loved ones at home and dependents, surely they wouldn't have [49:13] done this. Yeah, and how is that any different from people [49:15] on the corner [49:17] trying to having the same desire to feed their family, I don't think it's any different. I think in any case [49:21] if I'm murdering you to advance my status, that's murder and I think that we should look at all [49:25] of that in the same light. Instead of criminalizing certain [49:28] activities [49:30] and making certain things seem more violent and savage [49:33] when in that same case it's all the same act and mentality [49:36] that goes into the murder, a necessity to feed their families. [49:40] Suppose there weren't three, supposed there were thirty, [49:43] three hundred, [49:44] one life to save three hundred [49:47] or in more time, [49:48] three thousand [49:49] or suppose the stakes were even bigger. [49:51] Suppose the stakes were even bigger [49:52] I think it's still the same deal. [49:54] Do you think Bentham was wrong to say the right thing to do [49:58] is to add [49:58] up the collected happiness, you think he's wrong about that? [50:02] I don't think he is wrong, but I think murder is murder in any case. Well then Bentham has to be wrong [50:06] if you're right he's wrong. okay then he's wrong. [50:09] Alright thank you, well done. [50:12] Alright, let's step back [50:14] from this discussion [50:16] and notice [50:19] how many objections have we heard to what they did. [50:23] we heard some defenses of what they did [50:26] the defense has had to do with [50:28] necessity [50:28] the dire circumstance and, [50:32] implicitly at least, [50:33] the idea that numbers matter [50:36] and not only numbers matter [50:37] but the wider effects matter [50:40] their families back home, their dependents [50:43] Parker was an orphan, [50:44] no one would miss him. [50:47] so if you [50:49] add up [50:50] if you tried to calculate [50:52] the balance [50:54] of happiness and suffering [50:56] you might have a case for [50:58] saying what they did was the right thing [51:02] then we heard at least three different types of objections, [51:09] we heard an objection that's said [51:11] what they did was categorically wrong, [51:14] right here at the end [51:15] categorically wrong. [51:17] Murder is murder it's always wrong [51:19] even if [51:20] it increases the overall happiness [51:23] of society [51:25] the categorical objection. [51:28] But we still need to investigate [51:30] why murder [51:32] is categorically wrong. [51:35] Is it because [51:38] even cabin boys have certain fundamental rights? [51:42] And if that's the reason [51:44] where do those rights come from if not from some idea [51:47] of the larger welfare or utility or happiness? Question number one. [51:53] Others said [51:56] a lottery would make a difference [51:58] a fair procedure, [52:00] Matt said. [52:05] And some people were swayed by that. [52:08] That's not a categorical objection exactly [52:12] it's saying [52:13] everybody has to be counted as an equal [52:16] even though, at the end of the day [52:18] one can be sacrificed [52:20] for the general welfare. [52:23] That leaves us with another question to investigate, [52:26] Why does agreement to certain procedure, [52:29] even a fair procedure, [52:31] justify whatever result flows [52:34] from the operation of that procedure? [52:38] Question number two. [52:39] and question number three [52:42] the basic idea of consent. [52:45] Kathleen got us on to this. [52:48] If the cabin boy had agreed himself [52:52] and not under duress [52:54] as was added [52:57] then it would be all right to take his life to save the rest. [53:01] Even more people signed on to that idea [53:04] but that raises [53:06] a third philosophical question [53:08] what is the moral work [53:11] that consent [53:12] does? [53:14] Why does an act of consent [53:16] make such a moral difference [53:19] that an act that would be wrong, taking a life, without consent [53:23] is morally [53:25] permissible [53:26] with consent? [53:29] To investigate those three questions [53:31] we're going to have to read some philosophers [53:34] and starting next time [53:35] we're going to read [53:36] Bentham, [53:37] and John Stuart Mill, utilitarian philosophers. [53:43] Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice [53:43] join the conversation, [53:49] take a pop quiz, watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. Visit www.justiceharvard.org. It's the right thing to do. [54:36] Funding for the program is provided by [54:40] Additional funding provided by